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1808.

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Table of the Number of *Christenings* and *Burials*, within the Bills of Mortality, from June 1808, to November 1808, inclusive.

Epoch	Christened.		Buried.															Total Buried.	
	Male.	Female	Under 2 Years.	2 to 5.	5 to 10.	10 to 20.	20 to 30.	30 to 40.	40 to 50.	50 to 60.	60 to 70.	70 to 80.	80 to 90.	90 to 100.	100 &c.	Males	Females		
June	898	868	378	181	69	51	90	136	158	98	88	88	32	7		731	685		
July	886	854	421	202	54	50	93	132	179	135	104	84	34	6		747	747		
August	859	780	506	168	39	45	86	118	126	104	87	69	26	4		727	651		
September	968	928	729	229	85	70	105	164	180	141	114	78	37	6		977	962		
October	768	691	397	14	50	49	85	138	140	89	91	83	24	6		672	635		
November	807	730	430	173	67	44	199	129	126	121	111	89	22	5		696	718		
	5186	4851	2831	1099	361	309	658	817	917	688	595	491	175	34		4549	4398		
Total Christenings . 10037			Total Burials . 8947																

Table of the Prices of *Meat, Sugar, Salt, and Coal*, in London, from June to November, 1808, inclusive.

	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	per Stone of 14 lb to sink the Official.
Beef ..	5 6	5 0	5 0	5 0	4 8	5 4	
Mutton	5 4	5 4	5 4	5 4	5 0	5 6	
Pork ..	5 4	5 8	6 0	6 4	5 8	6 0	
Sugar ..	39 7½	41 0	36 10	36 11	38 5	54 5½	Cwt.
Salt ..	1 0	0 1	0 0	0 1	0 0	0 0	Bushel
Coal ..	51 6	51 6	52 0	51 9	55 0	55 0	Chald.

Table of the Prices of the *Quartern Loaf* in London, from June to November, 1808, inclusive.

June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.
s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
60 11	41 0½	11 0½	51 0½	31 2	71 3½
13 6 0	17 1 0½	81 0½	121 1½	101 2	141 3½
204 0½	18 0½	151 0½	191 1½	171 2½	211 3½
271 0	25 1½	221 0½	261 2½	241 3½	281 3½

Table of the Prices of the English *Three per Cent Consols*, from June to November, 1808, inclusive.

Day	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
1	68½	68½	68½	65½	65½	67½
2	68½	70½	67½	65½	65½	67½
3	70	—	67½	66½	67½	67½
4	—	70½	67½	66½	67½	67½
5	—	70½	67½	66½	67½	67½
6	—	70½	67½	66½	67½	67½
7	—	69½	67½	66½	67½	67½
8	70½	69½	67½	66½	67½	67½
9	70½	69½	67½	66½	67½	67½
10	70½	68½	67½	66½	67½	67½
11	70½	68½	66½	66½	66½	67½
12	—	68½	65½	66½	66½	67½
13	70½	68½	66½	66½	65½	—
14	70½	68½	66½	66½	66½	—
15	70½	68½	66½	66½	67	67
16	70½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
17	70½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
18	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
19	—	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
20	70½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
21	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
22	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
23	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
24	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
25	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
26	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
27	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
28	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
29	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
30	69½	68½	66½	66½	66½	66½
31	—	—	65½	—	—	—

Table of the Prices of the French *Five per Cent Consols*, from June to November, 1808, inclusive.

Day	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
1	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	—	85.25	84.60	—	80.5	—
3	—	—	—	—	—	—
4	87.10	—	—	—	80.75	—
5	—	—	—	—	—	—
6	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	—	86.20	—	—	—	—
8	—	—	—	78.60	80.65	—
9	87.5	—	—	—	80.50	—
10	—	85.10	—	—	—	—
11	—	—	—	—	—	—
12	—	—	—	—	—	—
13	—	—	—	—	—	—
14	87.0	85.10	—	—	—	—
15	—	—	—	—	—	—
16	—	—	—	—	80.25	—
17	86.70	—	81.40	—	—	—
18	—	—	—	—	—	—
19	—	—	—	—	—	—
20	—	85.0	81.25	—	80.50	—
21	86.50	—	—	—	—	—
22	—	—	—	—	—	—
23	—	—	—	—	—	—
24	—	—	80.75	—	—	—
25	—	—	—	—	—	—
26	—	84.75	—	—	—	—
27	86.0	—	—	—	—	—
28	—	—	—	80.50	—	—
29	—	—	—	—	—	—
30	—	—	—	—	—	—
31	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table of the Number of *Bombardments* in England, from June to November, 1808, inclusive.

June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
194	85	79	94	87	92

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

[Vol. XIV. No. 1.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 2, 1838.]

[PRICE 10D.]

"I would have no expeditions against the Americans. I would securely stop their holes, and leave them to quarrel and fight amongst themselves, which they would soon infallibly do."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XIII. p. 61.

1]

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATE.—On the 21th instant, Mr. WHITBREAD made, in the House of Commons, a speech, which formed a sort of recapitulation of the subjects of debate during the session, which is now upon the point of closing. Amongst other topics, he revived that of the dispute with the American States. "With respect to America," said he, "I wish to know, as far as it can be disclosed with discretion, what is the real situation in which the British and the American governments stand with regard to each other. If, Sir, I may trust that channel of information which is alike open to every man, the public papers, I see that Congress has been prorogued for the session, but that the embargo still continues. Thus it appears, that one of the effects anticipated from the Orders in Council has failed. England holds out; America holds out; nor does there appear any probability of a relaxation on the part of the latter."—Mr. CANNING's answer was as follows. "Nearly all that has passed, between this country and America, the house and the public have been put in possession of by the publication of the American government. I presume that the hon. gent. does not intend to blame his majesty's ministers for not having made similar communications to parliament; for if he had thought such communications necessary, he would doubtless have moved for them. Without censuring their production by the American government, his majesty's ministers have felt that the transaction, being pending, any appeal from government to parliament would look as if it were concluded. I shall only state, that in the whole conduct of the British government, with respect to the affair of the *Chesapeake*, we have endeavoured to keep in view the principle upon which we set out; namely, to make ample reparation for that which was decidedly a wrong act; but to make that reparation upon a firm determination not to surrender

[2

der a right which the great majority of the country has ever considered as essential to its dearest interests. Sir, I may boldly appeal to the country to determine whether from the correspondence on the table of the house any such disposition on the part of his majesty's ministers has appeared through the whole transaction. That the rupture of the negotiation on this subject was not attended with any hostile feeling on either side, is an incontrovertible truth. The reparation was not accepted by America, because America would not fulfil the condition on which alone it was tendered, namely, the revocation of that proclamation by which British ships were not allowed to enter the harbours of America, while those of the enemy visited them at pleasure. But, sir, the manner in which the British reparation was tendered to America by a special mission, was, to all the feelings of nice honour, an effective reparation, although not accepted; and so in fact we have every reason to believe that it was considered by the American government. With respect, sir, to the embargo, and to the probable effects of the Orders in Council in producing its abandonment, the hon. gent. has misstated my right hon. friend's propositions. The hon. gent. declares my right hon. friend to have predicted, that the Orders in Council would do away the embargo, whereas my hon. friend only argued in opposition to the hon. gentlemen on the other side, that the Orders in Council did not produce the embargo; that they were not substantively known in America when the embargo took place; and that they were not included in the complaint made by the American government to Congress, on which complaint the embargo was founded. Nor, sir, do I think that the Orders in Council themselves could have produced any irritation in America. If I were not disposed on this occasion to avoid making any observations that might be suspected of a party feeling, I would say, that I do think

"irritation in America may have been produced by the echo of the discussions in this house. Sir, since the return of Mr. Rose, no communication has been made by the American government, in the form of complaint, or remonstrance, or irritation, or of any description whatever. I mention this particularly, because it is notorious that there have been several arrivals from America, supposed to be of great importance, and that several special messengers have reached this country from thence, after having touched at France. But, sir, if the hon. gent. in the execution of his public duty had thought fit to move for any communications that had been made by the American government since the departure of Mr. Rose—my answer must have been, not that his majesty's government were disinclined to make them, but that absolutely there none to make. If it be asked "why?" I am unable satisfactorily to reply. I can only conjecture that America has entered into negotiations with France which are expected to lead to some result, and that the communications of America to this country are to be contingent on that result.—This, sir, is conjecture alone, but it is founded on the extraordinary circumstance of so many arrivals without any communication. It cannot be expected of me, that I should state prospectively, what are the views of his majesty's government on this subject. The principle by which they have hitherto been guided, they will continue invariably to contemplate. They attach as much value to the restoration, and to the continuance of cordiality, and perfect good understanding with America, as any man can do; they are ready to purchase that advantage by every justifiable conciliation; they have proved that readiness by the act of the present session, in which the trade of America has been placed on the most favourable footing; but, Sir, they are not ready to purchase that advantage, great as they acknowledge it, at the price of the surrender of those rights, on which the naval power and preponderance of Great Britain is imminutely fixed."—The first thing to be noticed here is, the mild and friendly manner, in which the honourable gentleman address one another. The trial is over, the case is decided for this time; the wrangling for place is, for a while suspended, and, here and there, like two old friends, at the the ties shake

happily, while the poor people stand astounded at the sight. The *outs* have, too, found, that violence is quite unavailing; they have in vain endeavoured to convince the nation, that their being restored to place is necessary to its safety; the nation finds the Duke of Portland to be full as able a prime minister as Lord Grenville was; they see exactly the same transactions a-foot; they see no difference in any respect whatever; whether they turn their eyes towards elections, towards the courts of justice, towards the army affairs, towards the treasury, towards the taxing system, towards the Red-Book, towards the divers committees of inquiry and the divers boards of commissioners; whichever way they look, not the least difference do they see; all goes on full as well, and quite as much to the advantage and credit of the Kingdom, under the Duke of Portland as under my Lord Grenville, nay, as under "the great man, now no more," or either of the great men, now no more. The nation, therefore, has been inensible to all the earnest and pathetic appeals, made to it by the *outs*, who, luckily for us, have, and recently too, had an opportunity of shewing what they do when *in*. Discovering this has made the *outs* more mild. It has taken the edge off their attacks; and, as a last shift, they appear to have formed a plan for dividing their opponents. They lose no opportunity of paying their court to Mr. Canning, whom they evidently suspect to be hated by no small number of those, whom he sometimes calls his honourable friends; and, Mr. Canning, on his part, appears to be rather more than usually civil to the opposition. There can be no doubt, I think, that the making of the Duke of Portland premier must have been chiefly his work. His associates cannot do without him. He is most luckily situated; and, as things stand, may, and, I dare say, will, carve for himself—I should not be at all surprized, if a new session of parliament should discover to us that party, intriguing has not been neglected during the recess. Let those, therefore, who are in possession of the *place* fling, down to the very door-keepers, make hay while the sun shines. One little twist may jerk them all out, and lay them sprawling, like worms ejected by an emetic. Let them make haste to be rich; for, if the Whigs should once more get into the *carcase*, not all the drugs in the world will again oust them. There is no potion yet discovered by man, that will be found strong enough to stir them. They will live and die with the body. Let no popery look to it; for, if

the Whigs once more worn themselves into power, they will beat the grand apostate old father Brute, in crying out danger to the Church. Mr. Canning holds the key, by the aid of which they hope to re-enter the paradise of place. His colleagues obviously are afraid of him, and yet they dare not openly avow their fears. It is a strange thing, that the opposition, consisting of men of great family and fortune, or, at least, many of them, should condescend to wheedle Mr. Canning; but, courtiers, like common soldiers, measure every man's worth by the standard of power.—Begging the reader's pardon for having led him through this digression, I return to my subject.—Mr. Whitbread says, that “we have heard out, and the Americans have held out.” Which is as much as to say, that it is yet a matter of doubt, *which country will hold out longest*. But, the American newspapers, of which I have some now before me, clearly convince me that, if they attempt to hold out for the whole year, their Federal government will be overturned. Discontents have prevailed from the day the embargo was imposed; and now, as the reader will see, they have proceeded so far, in one place, as to call for a proclamation from the President. Upon the Mississippi, that is to say, in the Western States, the authority of the Federal Government has been completely set at defiance. In the New England States, the newspapers very coolly propose a separation of those States from the Southern States; and, unless Jefferson and his party be ousted at the next election, this separation, which has been talked of for years, will most assuredly take place. I will now insert the proclamation above-mentioned, adding what may be necessary to give to my readers in general a correct notion of the present state of the country. “Whereas

“information has been received that sundry persons are combined or combining and confederating together on Lake Champlain and the country thereto adjacent for the purposes of forming insurrections against the authority of the laws of the United States, for opposing the same and obstructing their execution; and that such combinations are too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by the laws of the United States.—Now, therefore, to the end, that the authority of the laws may be maintained, and that those concerned directly or indirectly in any insurrection or combination against the same, may be duly warned, I have issued this my pro-

clamation, hereby commanding such insurgents, and all concerned in such combinations, instantly and without delay to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes. And I do hereby further require and command all officers having authority, civil or military, who shall be found within the vicinage of such insurrections or combinations, to be aiding and assisting, by all the means in their power, by force of arms, or otherwise, to quell and subdue such insurrections or combinations, to seize upon all those therein concerned, who shall not instantly and without delay disperse and retire to their respective abodes, and to deliver them over to the civil authority of the place, to be proceeded against according to law.”—This *must* be the case. The government has no authority in those distant parts, except merely in name. Mr. Thos. Jefferson now begins to find, that his partiality for France will be tolerated only as long as it does not manifestly injure the people. The people know, that the embargo arose out of the president's hatred of England. This they know full well, and, all its numerous embarrassments they will impute to him. They will forget their own prejudices and violence; they will forget, that their malignant clamour emboldened him to do what he has done; they will make him the scape goat; they will send him from his offices with an universal hiss.—It appears, from these newspapers, that the elections are running against the French party. Here a little explanation is necessary. The President is elected every four years, the election taking place in the autumn and he entering upon his office in the ensuing month of March. But, the elections for the Senate and the House of Representatives take place oftener; it appears that some of these elections were going on in April, and that, as far as they had gone, they clearly indicated a change in favour of a resistance of French politics and French influence. This change, if it be such as is anticipated, will, at once, put an end to all the disputes with England, and may lead to consequences the most pleasing and most important. The events in Spain, the abdication on the part of the Bourbons, and the assumption on the part of Napoleon, will, unless the Americans are quite mad, have great weight in producing this desired effect; for extensive as their country is, they will not be safe an hour, *without our assistance*, if Napoleon take possession of Spanish America. In the mean while, it is evident, from letters sent by the Secretary of the Treasury, to

the several ports, that the Embargo-law has been evaded, that numerous vessels have sailed out laden with lumber and provisions, and that, in short, the law is obeyed by those only, who are unable to stand the risk of disobedience. This was to be expected. There are no threats that will prevent it. The government has not the power of making itself obeyed against the interests of so large a portion of the community. Where are now the grounds of that alarm for the supplying of our West India islands, which Mr. A. B. (or Alexander Baring) of the *Morning Chronicle* so pathetically laid before us? I should not be surprised if our West India colonies were now better supplied than ever; because the American ships are now prevented from going to our enemies' colonies.—The people in Vermont carry on a trade, across Lake Champlain, with Canada. They have set the Embargo-law at defiance; they still carry on the trade, and carry it on they will in spite of ten thousand proclamations from Thomas Jefferson. In the Western States, it is said, that the government gun-boats have been burnt, and the militia beaten. All this, the reader will recollect, I said would be the case. I said it till I was afraid my readers would be wearied with the repetition; but Mr. Alexander Baring and his set dwell so strongly upon the dangers of a prohibition of trade on the part of America, that I was obliged to repeat it. It is worthy of observation, too, that the very States, which have now risen in opposition to the French party, are those which, until now, were most decidedly in favour of that party.—How often have I said, that the Federal Government could not exist a year under the effect of a prohibition of trade with England and her territories? The trade is, in fact, now carried on. It was stated in Congress, just before it adjourned, that a hundred thousand barrels of flour had been smuggled from the single port of Baltimore. What has been done, then, from Philadelphia, New York, and Boston? In fact, the law is nearly a dead letter; and I said it would be so. It must be so, or the government must fall. I told the Americans, a thousand times, that, if ever they should be fools enough to try their strength against England, their weakness would be exposed to the whole world. They would not believe me. They would insist, that they were a great nation; that England was dependant upon them; that they could starve England; and now we see the result of the attempt. There has, it seems, been warm work in the Congress. Blackguarding and black eyes. This is

the natural consequence of a state of embarrassment. They do not know who to blame but themselves. Like Lucifer and his crew, they fall to abusing one another. This blackguarding is, however, by no means the worst sign. It shews, that the combatants are sincere, at least. I would much rather hear them call one another rogues and traitors and sycophants, than hear them palavering with "honourable gentlemen," and "learned friend," and the like, which would sicken one to death. I would much rather see an angry debate conclude with a fight, or even with a gouging bout, than see the angles all laid aside with the discussion, and the combatants shaking hands and laughing at the folly of their clients. A smooth smiling rogue is the worst of rogues, and when this "gentlemanly" sort of rogues get possession of power, they seldom let go their hold while there is any thing to be got. I, for my part, hate sham fights, in the senate as well as in the field. It is villainous to talk as if you were in earnest, and be in jest all the while; to express the greatest anxiety about what is a matter of indifference to you; to act the mere pleader, nay, the player, in discussions involving the well-being of millions of men.—The way that the American States will get out of their embarrassment, with respect to us, will, I should think, be this: Mr. Thomas Jefferson and his party will be ousted, and then, the new president will disclaim all their hostile acts. Should this be the case, we shall go on harmoniously for the future; and I think, that the Americans (especially if Napoleon succeed in Spain) will not be long before they join us against France. That this may be the case, I heartily wish; but, I am sure, it never will be, if we make the first movements towards it.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—A very great part of this sheet is devoted to the documents relating to this great event. They are regularly arranged, and will hereafter be found very useful. They exhibit the parties in their true colours, and most black some of them appear.—In some papers of a more recent date, but not official, it is stated, that the Queen of Spain has openly declared her eldest son to be the fruit of an unlawful amour; in plain words, that he is a *bastard* and she a *whore*! And yet, I'll warrant you, that girls in Spain used to do penance for having bastards. Well, Ferdinand has the consolation of knowing, that he is not the only bastard fruit of a royal mother. It might be somewhat indelicate to investigate such matters; but history informs us of a

great many bastards, female as well as male, who have put forward their pretensions to a crown; and, the worst of it is, we find that nations, that millions of men, have ragged themselves on different sides, have vexed, harassed, lacerated, and killed one another, in disputes and wars about the honour of such bastardized gentry. This species of madness is, however, at an end, I hope. I do not think that any people could now be found to cut one another's throats for the sake of maintaining the pretended rights of a bastard girl or boy. In this respect, the world is certainly grown wiser than it was. What a shocking thing it would be to see a whole nation involved in confusion; to see it desolated; to see the people (wise and virtuous people too) stained with each other's blood, and all this in consequence of the freaks of a woman, who, perhaps, might owe it merely to her dignity of place, that she was not found amongst her coarse-skinned and big-mouthed sisters, in the rear ranks of the stewards. And, reader, I have been speaking here merely upon the *supposition* that the account of the late Queen of Spain's declaration be true; for, as to myself, I cannot suffer the belief of the fact to enter my mind. *Princes*, indeed, not only have bastards, sometimes, but *least* of them, and not unfrequently when it is pretty well known, that they are perfectly innocent of the guilt they so generously assume. To see a Prince with a troop of bastards, whether his own or not, at his heels, would be no very seemly sight, especially while bastardizing is held to be criminal in the people. But, for a *Queen*, reigning "by the grace of God," or for a gracious *Princess*, to have a bastard, is not to be believed, though averred by half a score of witnesses, the single oath of either of whom would hang a hundred forgers or coiners. — If the account be true, which has been given of the conduct of the Queen of Spain, her royal husband seems to have acted a very amiable part. He must be, upon this supposition, what Pegg calls "a well-bred cuckold." The good man said not a word, which, though *not without an example*, perhaps, is certainly worthy of imitation amongst all "gentlemanly" husbands, whose fate bears a resemblance to his. — Turning now to the *Patriots* of Spain; there really does appear to be some prospect of their final success. There seems to be a general spirit of resistance against France. The language of the several addresses is that of men resolved. All this noble spirit lay smothered under the yoke of despotism. That removed, up it bounds with the quickness

of lightning. Lightning, forked lightning, may improve to all those, be they who they may or where they may, who would dash again to smother it. And yet I do fear, I greatly fear, that there are persons, and those not few or feeble, who would rather see Buonaparte slaughter the Spaniards, man, woman, and child, than see those Spaniards succeed in establishing a government upon the principles of freedom, upon the principles of the real constitution of England. I trust, however, that no such villains as these will obtain influence with our ministers, and prevail upon them to be suspicious and tardy in their operations for the assistance of the Patriots. This is the only fair opportunity that has offered for checking the progress of Napoleon. It is the only cause to which all the people of England have heartily wished success. In all probability it is the last opportunity that will offer for enabling us to give a turn to the long-flowing tide of success. And, if we neglect this opportunity; if we waste the precious hours, that are now given us for action, in doubts, hesitations, and delays, we, or, at least, those amongst us who shall be found to have been the cause of such conduct, ought to perish, or, which would be better, to linger out a life of misery, loaded with the curses of all good men. I know, that there is, amongst some persons, a disposition to hate Buonaparte, not on account of the hatredfulness of his tyranny, but from a feeling of *envy*; and where that disposition exists, there can be no desire to assist, for any good purpose, the Patriots of Spain. "I do not like that word *patriot*," said a man (I am informed) the other day; and, I am much afraid, he is not quite singular in his taste. That taste will not, I hope, prevail. I am confident it will not become general; but, I am not quite confident that it may not do mischief.

Bottle, June 30, 1803.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary History OF ENGLAND,

Which, in the compass of Sixteen Volumes, royal octavo, double columns, will contain a full and accurate Report of all the recorded Proceedings, and of all the Speeches in both Houses of Parliament, from the earliest times to the year 1803, when the publication of "Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates" commenced. . . . The Fourth Volume of the above work is ready for delivery. It embraces that period

of our Parliamentary History. Which is, perhaps, the most interesting of any; namely, from the Restoration of Charles the Second in the year 1660, to the Revolution, in 1688. For this period, the Proceedings and Debates, in both Houses, have been, for the most part, collected from the following works: 1. The Journals of the House of Commons; 2. The Journals of the House of Commons; 3. That portion of the Parliamentary, or Constitutional History of England, which contains the proceedings of the Convention Parliament, from its meeting on the 25th of April, 1689, to its dissolution, on the 21th of December following, at which epoch the editors of this able performance conclude their labours; 4. The Life of the Earl of Clarendon, written by himself, containing some interesting Debates, in both Houses, during the period between the Restoration of the King and the banishment of the said Earl, in the year 1677, which Debates never yet found their way into any Collection; 5. The Proceedings of the House of Commons touching the Impeachment of the Earl of Clarendon, with the many Debates in that House upon the subject; 6. The Works of the celebrated Andrew Marvell, who, from 1659 to 1678, regularly transmitted to his constituents of Hull, a faithful account of each day's proceedings; 7. The Debates of the House of Commons, from 1657 to 1694, collected by the Honourable Anticell Grey, who was thirty years a member for the town of Derby; 8. The Debates in the House of Commons on the Bill of Exclusion, in the year 1680, first published in 1681, in a small duodecimo volume, and afterwards republished in 1716, and again in 1807, with the addition of the Debates in the Short Parliament held at Oxford, in the month of March, 1649-1, the proceedings of which related chiefly to the same subject, that is to say, the Exclusion of the Duke of York from the succession to the crown; 9. Timberland's History and Proceedings of the House of Lords; and 10. Chandler's History and Proceedings of the House of Commons.—It will, doubtless, have been observed by most persons who have much attended to this matter, that, for the period from the Restoration to the year 1743, the two last mentioned works, that is to say, those of Timberland and Chandler, have hitherto been regarded as a regular and complete collection, and the only regular and complete collection, of the Proceedings in Parliament; and that, as such, they have been introduced into, and enjoyed a distinguished place in, almost every public and great private library in the kingdom. Therefore, in preparing

the present volume for the press, it might naturally have been expected, that considerable assistance would have been afforded by those works. It is, however, a remarkable fact, which may be verified by a reference to the proceedings of any single session, that very little assistance indeed has been received from them. To say the truth, a discovery of the extreme imperfectness of these works produced one of the motives which led to the present undertaking. On comparing their contents with those of the authentic works before enumerated, they were found to be so extremely defective and incorrect, that they could, in hardly any case, be relied upon with safety. In them, King's Speeches are, in numerous instances, either wholly omitted, or very much curtailed. Scarcely any of the Speeches of the different Lord Chancellors, delivered at the opening of the several Sessions, though those speeches generally contain an outline of the state of the national affairs, are preserved. The Journals appear to have been rarely consulted. Scarcely a Motion or Resolution, is given as it stands in those authentic records. Explanatory notes there are none; and, in only one or two instances have the compilers deemed it necessary to favour the reader with information as to the source, whence they have drawn their materials; which would seem, indeed, to have been moulded into the form of volumes for the mere purpose of filling up a chasm in a book-case.—Besides resorting to the above recited works, recourse has been had to the best historians, and contemporary writers. From Burnet, Echard, Kennet, Oldmixon, Rapin, North, Ralph, Marvell, Reresby, Temple, Walpole, and the Work of the late Mr. Fox, recently published, many Notes, historical and biographical, have been introduced; and, for the sake of connexion, a short account of the principal Occurrences, during each recess of Parliament, has, where necessary, been inserted.—By way of Appendix to this volume, is subjoined a Collection of scarce and valuable Tracts, purely parliamentary, taken from the State Tracts, privately printed in the reign of Charles II. and James II, from the Harleian Miscellany; and from the noble Collections of Lord Somers. Through these, a more lively image of the times is conveyed, than could be received from any general description, from however eloquent a pen it might proceed. From their scarceness, it is impossible that they should, in their separate state, be generally known; and, as the utility of them, when accompanying the Parliamentary History of the times in which they were written, must

be manifest to every one, the compiler does certainly consider them as not the least valuable part of his work.

* * The success of this work, up to the time of publishing Vol. III. was before stated. Its success since that time has been still greater. No work of equal magnitude, had ever so great success, in so short a space of time. The fifth volume, barring accidents from illness, will be published in October, and the sixth in December; after which it is hoped, that a volume every three months will be regularly finished, until the work be concluded, or rather, brought down to the "Parliamentary Debates," which will form a sequel to it, and which will, of course, be continued, in the same manner that they now are.

* * The Tenth Volume of the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, including the period from the Opening of the Session, on the 21st of January, to the 9th of April, 1808, will be ready for delivery on the 10th instant. The Eleventh Volume, which will embrace the remainder of the Session, is in considerable forwardness. *It is particularly requested that all Communications for this work may be forwarded to the Publishers on or before the 15th of the present month.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Papers relative to the Spanish Revolution beginning with the Report made to MURAT (French Commander in Chief in Spain) by DE MONTMIGOU, one of his Officers, respecting the Dethronement of the King, and the Elevation of the Prince of Asturias*

Report, dated Aranjuez, 25th March, 1808.

Monsieur,—Agreeably to the commands of your imperial highness, I received with the letter of your highness to the queen of Etruria at Aranjuez. It was 8 o'clock in the morning; the queen was still in bed, she rose immediately, and bade me enter. I delivered your letter to her. She begged me to wait a little, and said she would go and read it with the king and queen, half an hour afterwards I saw the queen of Etruria enter with the king and queen of Spain—His majesty said, that he thanked your imperial highness for the share you had taken in his affliction, which was the greater as his own son was the author of it. The king said, that the revolution had been effected by fury and corruption, and that the principal actors were his son and M. Cevallo, minister of justice; that he had been compelled to abdicate the throne, in order to save the lives of himself and his queen, that he knows that but

for this, they would have been murdered in the course of the night; that the conduct of the prince of Asturias, who was shocking, seeing that himself (the king) having perceived his desire to reign, and being himself near 60 years of age, had agreed to surrender the crown to him, on his marriage taking place with a French princess, which the king ardently desired.—The king added to this, that the prince of Asturias was desirous that he and the queen should repair to Badajoz, on the frontiers of Portugal, that he had found means to inform him that the climate of that country did not suit him; that he begged him to permit his choosing another place; that he sought to obtain permission of the Emperor to purchase an estate in France, where he might end his days. The queen told me she had begged of her son to postpone their journey to Badajoz; that she had not procured this, and that the journey was to take place on the ensuing Monday.—At the moment I was departing from their majesties, the king said to me, "I have written to the emperor, in whose hand I repose my fate."—I wished to send my letter by courier, but I know no surer means of sending it than by yours. The king left me then, in order to repair to his cabinet. He soon returned with the following letters (Nos. 1 and 2) in his hand, which he gave me, and added these words—"My situation is most deplorable; they have seized the prince de la Paz, and will put him to death, he has committed no other crime than that he has at all times been attached to me."—He, added, there were no efforts which he would not have attempted to save the life of his unhappy friend, but that he had found the whole world deaf to his entreaties, and bent on vengeance; that the death of the prince de la Paz would draw after it his own, and that he should not survive him.

No. I. Letter from the King to Napoleon, 25th March, 1808.

"Sir, my Brother.—Your majesty will assuredly hear with pain of the events which have taken place at Aranjuez, and their consequences. You will not, without sympathy, see a king who has been compelled to resign his throne, throw himself into the arms of a great monarch his ally, placing every thing in his protection, with a view to his happiness and that of his own family, and his trusty and beloved subjects. Under the pressure of the present, and the dashing of weapons, and the cries of a rebellious world, I found that I had no choice between life and death, and that I must

death would be followed by that of the throne: I was compelled to abdicate the throne; but to-day peace is restored, and full of confidence in the generosity and genius of the great man who has at all times declared himself my friend, I have taken my resolution to resign myself into his hands, and await what he shall see fit to do on my fate, that of the queen, and of the Prince de la Paz—I address myself to your majesty, and protest against the events which took place at Aranjuez, and against my dethronement. I rely with confidence, and altogether upon the cordiality and friendship of your majesty, praying that God may have you in his holy keeping."

No. II. *Protest of the King.*

I protest and declare, that my decree of the 19th of March, in which I renounce my crown in favour of my son, is a deed to which I was compelled, in order to prevent greater calamities, and spare the blood of my beloved subjects. It is therefore to be considered as of no authority—(Signed)

"I, THE KING."

Sword of Francis I. delivered up to Napoleon by the young King Ferdinand Madrid, 5th April, 1808.

His imperial highness the grand duke of Berg, having intimated to his excellency Don Pedro Cevallos, first secretary of state, that his imperial majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy, would be pleased in the possession of the sword that Francis I. king of France, surrendered in the famous battle of Pavia, in the reign of the emperor Charles V. in Spain, which was kept with due estimation in the royal armoury, since the year 1525, desiring that it might be thus represented to our lord the king. His maj. being informed of this, and desirous of availing himself of every opportunity to testify to his intimate ally the emperor of the French, his high regard for his august person, and the admiration, his unnumbered deeds inspire him with, immediately ordered the afore-mentioned sword to be remitted to his imperial and royal majesty, and thought that the most worthy and respectable channel would be his serene highness the grand duke of Berg, who was brought up by his side, and in the same school, and rendered illustrious by his services and military talents, and more especially being a body to be charged with so precious a deposit, and to transmit it into the hands of his imperial majesty. In consequence of this, and of the royal order which was given to his excellency the marquis de Aranda, groom-major to his majesty, the sword of the sword to the

bedings of his imperial highness was arranged with great pomp and ceremony. *Mandate, issued by order of the new King upon his leaving Madrid to go to meet Napoleon. 8th April, 1808.*

The king our sovereign has received certain intelligence, that his faithful friend and mighty ally the emperor of the French in Italy is already arrived at Bayonne, with the joyful salutary purpose of passing through his kingdom, to the great satisfaction of the king, and to the notorious profit and advantage of his beloved subjects. Since it is becoming the close friendship which happily prevails between both crowns, and the great character of his imperial and royal majesty, that his majesty should go and meet him, and give the most sincere, sure, and firm proofs of his sentiments and resolution, in order to preserve and renew the good harmony, confident friendship, and salutary alliance which has hitherto happily subsisted and ought to subsist between the two monarchs, his majesty has resolved, with the utmost expedition, to undertake the journey in order to fulfil his purpose. Since his absence can last but a few days, his majesty expects, from the love and fidelity of his dear subjects, and especially those who belong to the court, and who have hitherto conducted themselves in a laudable manner, that they will continue to remain tranquil, and while his majesty confidently relies upon the known vigilance and integrity of his ministers and counsils to whom he has for that purpose given especial directions, while his majesty especially places his confidence in the high council of the government, under the presidency of his serene highness the infant Don Antonio, and which has retained its power and authority; while his majesty hopes, what is indeed practicable, that the good harmony which subsists between the troops of the king, and those of his imperial and royal majesty will be respected, and those troops punctually supplied with every thing that may be necessary for their maintenance till the time when the object in view shall be obtained, to the great prosperity and felicity of both nations, his majesty declares his assurance, that he entertains not the least fear that the happy tranquillity, the good harmony, and the advantageous alliance which now subsists, will be destroyed or interrupted; but, on the contrary, he sees with great satisfaction that these advantages are every day fixed upon a surer basis. Thus I impart to your excellency, that it may be immediately communicated to the extraordinary council, laid to heart, and publicly announced, and that

all necessary measures may be taken for its punctual execution—May God preserve your excellency many years—SEBASTIAN PINOBLA, President of the Council
Doctre to all the Counsellors of State—Same Date.

Being informed that the emperor of the French and king of Italy is on the point of arriving in this our city and court of Madrid, I have deemed it expedient to go and meet his imperial majesty, in order to give a convincing proof of my reverence for his serene person, and of the strong desire which animates me to bind still closer the ties of friendship and alliance which happily subsist between this monarchy and the French empire, to the mutual advantage of both nations. Accordingly I shall depart from hence on the 10th, and repeat to Burgos, and as my absence will continue but a short time, I have, considering the present circumstances, decreed and authorised and I do hereby by this authoritative my beloved uncle the infant Don Antonio, in whom I have placed my confidence, as well on account of the ties of blood which bind him to my person, as on account of the distinguished qualities with which he is endowed, that he have full power to transact and dispatch all pressing and necessary business which may occur, with the advice of my secretary of state and of the *depeches*, which shall be communicated to my council, in order that it be carried duly into execution.

Letter from Napoleon to the new King of Spain, dated Bayonne, 16th April, 1808.

My brother.—I have received the letter of your royal highness. In the papers which you have received from the king, your highness's father, you must have found a proof of the interest which I have always felt for you. You will permit me under the present circumstances, to speak to you with truth and frankness. I wished by my journey to Madrid, to draw over my illustrious friend to some necessary amelioration of his states, and also to give a certain satisfaction to the public feelings. The rumor of the Prince of Peace appeared to me to be necessary for the prosperity of his majesty and that of his subjects. The affairs of the north had retarded my journey. The events at Aranjuez took place. I pass no decision on what had previously fallen out, nor upon the conduct of the Prince of Peace; but I know well that it is dangerous for kings to accustom their people to shed blood or to seek to redress themselves. I pray God that your royal highness may never feel this by your own experience. It is not the interest of Spain to injure a prince who has married a

princess of the blood royal, and who for a long time directed the affairs of the kingdom. He no longer has any friends; your royal highness will possess them no longer than while you shall be fortunate. The people willingly revenge themselves for that homage which they pay us. How can the process drawn up against the Prince of Peace, without involving in it the queen, and the king your father? This process would give nourishment to hatred and fictitious passions, the issue of which would be fatal to you and to us. Your royal highness has no other interest in that which you derive from your mother. If this process guide her, your royal highness destroys your own right. He who has lent an ear to weak and disloyal counsels has no right to pass sentence on the Prince of Peace. His misdeeds, if he can be reproached with them, go to destroy the rights of the crown.—I have frequently expressed a desire, that the Prince of Peace should be removed from affairs, the friendship of king Charles has often induced me to remain silent, and to turn away my eyes from the weakness of his conduct. Unhappy mortals that we were! Weakness and error, these are our mottoes! But all may be amended, namely, that the Prince of Peace should be banished from Spain and I should invite him to a place of retirement in France. As to the abdication of king Charles IV, that has taken place at a moment when my troops were traversing Spain, and in the eyes of Europe, and of posterity, I should seem to have sent so many troops solely for the purpose of pushing from his throne my ally and friend. As a neighbour sovereign, it is fit I should know this abdication, before I acknowledge it. I say it to your royal highness, to the Spaniards, and to the whole world, if the abdication of king Charles has proceeded from his own will, if he was not driven to it by the insurrection and uproar at Aranjuez, I make no scruple to accede to it, and to acknowledge your royal highness as king of Spain. The circumspection which I have observed for the month past, must be a security to you for the support which you shall find in me, should ever party differences disturb you; in your turn, upon the throne.—When king Charles made me acquainted with the events of last October, I was much affected by them, and I think that by my efforts the affair of the Escorial received a happy issue. Your royal highness was much to blame; I have no need of any other proof of this, than the letter which you wrote to me, and which I shall always desire to consider as not having come to me. Your royal high-

ness must distrust all popular commotions and insurrections. A few of our soldiers may be murdered, but the subjugation of Spain shall be the consequence of it. I see with pain that some persons at Madrid have communicated certain letters of the captain-general of Catalonia, and have done every thing to excite his subjects against the people. You may not be perfectly comprehending, my dear son, You perceive that I have touched slightly upon many points, which it would not be proper to enlarge upon.—You may be assured that I will conduct myself in every thing, that I do in the same way as to your royal father. You may rely upon my desire to arrange every thing, and of finding an opportunity of giving you proof of my perfect regard and interest.

*Letter from the old King of Spain to his Son
Dated Bayonne 21 May, 1808.*

My Son,—The faithful counsels of the men who surround you have brought Spain into a most distressing situation. The country cannot now be saved but by the emperor.—Since the peace of Basle I have been always convinced, that it was the first duty of my people to preserve a good understanding with France, and I have considered this sacrifice too great to act in this object. I saw when France was the prey of temporary governments, I determined to repress my own inclinations, and be ruled only by a regard to sound policy and the welfare of my subjects. But when the French emperor had restored order in France, then my apprehension was in a great degree removed, so that I had then new reasons for remaining faithful to my system of alliance.—When England declared war against France, I had the good fortune to remain neutral, and thereby afford to my people the advantages of peace. England, however, soon after captured four of my frigates and made war upon me before war was declared. This was I compelled to repel force by force, and the evils of war were extended to my subjects.—Spain being surrounded by enemies, and being indebted for her great prosperity to her transmarine possessions, suffered more than any other country by the war. The interruption of trade, and all the evils connected with this state of affairs were experienced by my subjects, so that we were uncandid enough to this wall the blame upon me and my ministers. I had, however, at least, the consolation that the country was safe, and had no reason to be alarmed for the preservation of my provinces. At the same time, I was the only king of Europe who lived in this security, amidst the convulsions of these

latter times; and I should still have enjoyed tranquillity, had it not been for the advice which has turned you aside from the path of duty. You have been too easily led away by the hatred which your first wife cherished against France, and you have participated in her obstinate dislike to my ministers your mother, and myself—I resorted to the rights of a father and a king, and arrested you, when I found among your papers proofs of your guilt. But at the end of my career, about to become the prey of grief, I felt for the tears of your mother, and forgave you.—Meanwhile my subjects were agitated by the false representations of a faction, at the head of which you placed yourself. From that moment the peace of my life was gone, and to the evils which had befallen my people, I had still to add, that distress which the division of my family had occasioned. Even my ministers were slandered to the emperor of the French, who, thinking he perceived that Spain wished to depart from her alliance, and seeing the disposition to disorder even in my family, occupied under various pretexts, my states with his troops, but so long as they remained on the right side of the Libron, and appeared destined to maintain a communication with Portugal, I still hoped that he would return to those feelings of respect and friendship which he had always treated to receive. When I learned that his troops advanced towards my capital, I felt it necessary to assemble my army around me, in order to exhibit myself to my illustrious ally in that state which became the king of Spain. Thus I expected his doubts would be removed, and my own interests adjusted. I recalled my troops from Portugal, and ordered them to Madrid to evacuate that capital, and directed them to assemble on several points of the monarchy. This was not done for the purpose of abandoning my subjects, but, on the contrary, in order to maintain more worthily the glory of the crown. My long experience convinced me that the emperor of the French, consistently with his own interests, and the extended political system of the continent, could entertain no wish prejudicial to my house. But in the meantime what was your conduct? You threw my whole palace into confusion. You instigated my guards to turn against me. Your father was your prisoner. My prime minister, whom I had reared and adopted into my family, was dragged bleeding from dungeons to dungeons. You have disgraced my grey hairs; you have bereft them of a crown wove with lustre by my ancestors, and which I have preserved without a stain, you have

ascended my throne, and have put yourself into the hands of the people of Madrid, who are incited by the numbers of your party, and of the foreign troops that have entered the city.—The conspiracy at the Escorial was accomplished, and the acts of my government were consigned to public contempt. Old, and loaded with infirmities, I could not withstand this new misfortune, and fled to the feet of emperor, no longer as a king at the head of his troops, and surrounded with the lustre of the throne, but as an unfortunate and abandoned prince. I have found a place of refuge and protection in the midst of his army. I am indebted to him for my life, for the life of my queen, and for that of my people. I have followed you to Bayonne. You have brought affairs to such a state, that henceforth every thing must depend upon the armament and protection of this great prince. To have recourse to insurrections of the people, to plant the standard of rebellion, would be the ruin of Spain, and would reduce yourself, my kingdom, my subjects, and my family, to the greatest wretchedness. I have opened my whole heart to the emperor. He is acquainted with all the insults I have received, and the usurpation imposed upon me. He has declared to me that he will never acknowledge you as king, and that the enemy of his father can excite no confidence in the breast of a stranger. He has besides shown me letters which contain proofs of your evasion from France.—Under these circumstances it is evidently my right, and still more evidently my duty, to spare the blood of my subjects, and not at the end of my days to adopt a course which would expose Spain to fire and sword, and reduce the country to the most wretched condition. Assuredly you ought, faithful to your duty, and to the feelings of nature, to have rejected the traitorous counsel given you. Had you constantly appeared by my side, ready for my defence, and had you waited till the usual course of nature had raised you to the throne, then the political interests of Spain might have been brought to coincide with the interest of all. For these six months circumstances have been very critical, but such as they were, I should not have feared to meet them supported by the good conduct of my subjects, and even my own feeble efforts, but, above all, with the moral power which I should have possessed in proposing to my ally an arrangement calculated to reconcile the interests of my subjects and my family. In depriving me of my crown, you have broken your own in pieces; you have stripped it of all that was illustrious, of

all that rendered it sacred in the eyes of men.—But your conduct towards me, and your intercepted letters have erected a brazen wall between you and the people of Spain. I am a king in the right of my ancestors. My abdication was a consequence of compulsion. I have therefore, nothing to receive from you. I can consent to no meeting—I will consent to nothing but I may occasion a civil war or insurrection. I very thing ought to be done for the people, but nothing by them, and to forget this principle is to make ourselves guilty of all the consequences which its neglect occasions. I have, through my whole life, sacrificed myself for my people, and, at the years at which I am arrived, I shall never do any act repugnant to their religion, their tranquillity, and their prosperity. But all my virtues will be forgotten whenever I am forgotten that the religion of Spain, the inviolability of my provinces, and their privileges and independence are secured, I shall then lie down in my grave, leaving you all the sorrow which in my latter years you have occasioned me.—CHARLES.

Declaration of the old King to the Spaniards. Dated at Bayonne, 4th May 1808.

Spaniards. My beloved subjects, perditions men seek to shake you. They would put arms into your hands against the French troops, they seek alike to arm you against the French, and the French against you. The sacking of all Spain, the cruelties of every kind, would be the result. The spirit of fiction, the sedition, even which I have already felt, is still in motion in the midst of these important and critical circumstances, I am occupied in concert with my ally, the emperor of the French, all that concerns your welfare. Beware of listening to the enemies of it. All those who speak to you against France, thus for your blood, they are either the enemies of your nation, or agents of England, who are busy availing themselves of circumstances, and whose intrigues would involve the loss of your colonies, the separation of your provinces, or a series of years of trouble and calamity for your country.—Spaniards! trust to my experience, and obey that authority which I hold from God and my fathers, follow my example, and think that in the position in which you stand, there is no prosperity and safety for Spaniards, but in the friendship of the great emperor, our ally.—Given at Bayonne, from the imperial palace, styled palace of the government, May 4, 1808.—I THE KING.

Declaration of Abdication of the old King. Dated, at Bayonne, 4th May, 1808.

In the present extraordinary circumstances, we have resolved to give new proof of our affection towards our beloved subjects, whose happiness during the whole course of our reign, has been the constant object of our solicitude. We have to refer abdicated all our claims upon the Spanish kingdoms in favour of our friend and ally, the emperor of the French, by a treaty which has been signed and ratified, and which stipulates for the integrity and independence of the Spanish kingdom, and the preservation of our holy religion, not only predominant, but as the sole and exclusive religion of Spain.—We have therefore thought proper to send you this letter, that you should conform yourselves thereto, publish its contents, and make every exertion in support of the emperor Napoleon. Display the most firmness and friendship towards the French, and, above all, direct all your exertions to preserve the country from insurrection and tumults.—In the new condition upon which we are entering, we shall fix our eyes towards you, and happy shall we be to know that you enjoy peace and contentment.—Given at the imperial palace, the 4th of May, 1808.—I RAFAEL KING.

Declaration of Abdication of the new King, (now called a Prince of Spain) and of his Brothers. Dated, at Bayona, 12th May, 1808

Don Ferdinand, prince of Asturias, and the infants Don Carlos and Don Antonio, deeply sensible of the attachment and fidelity displayed towards them by all the Spaniards, with the utmost grief behold them on the point of being plunged into ruin, and threatened with all the dreadful calamities consequent thereupon, and being aware that these might, in a great measure, proceed from the state of ignorance in which they now are, believe to the principles of the conduct but too pursued by their highnesses, and the persons chiefly concerned in the rebellion of the country, to have caused themselves under the necessity of making an effort to open their eyes by the salutary counsel which they give in order to prevent any obstruction to the execution of those plans, and thus to give them the dearest proof of the affection which they cherish for them.—Their highnesses, at the same time, sustain from information, that the circumstances under which they place, upon the abdication of the king, and the reins of government, the occupation of several provinces of the kingdom, and of all the frontier fortresses, by a numerous body of French troops, the actual presence of more than 60,000 of that nation in the capital, and

the environs; in short, the knowledge of many other circumstances known only to themselves, convinced them that, surrounded by difficulties, they had only chosen, among various expedients, that which was likely to produce the least evil, and that, as such, they resolved upon a journey to Bayonne.—On the arrival of their royal highnesses at Bayonne, the prince and princess, was unexpectedly apprized that his father had protested against this act of abdication, declaring that it was not voluntary. The prince, who accepted the crown only under the impression that the abdication was voluntary, was no sooner informed of the existence of such a protest, than his sense of his filial duty instantly determined him to give back the throne. But a short time after, the king, his father, abdicated it in his own name, and that of his whole race, in favour of the emperor of the French, in order that the emperor, considering the good of the nation, should determine the person and race which should hereafter occupy it.—Their royal highnesses, in this state of things, considering the situation in which themselves stand, and the difficult circumstances in which Spain is placed—considering that, under these circumstances, any attempt on the part of the inhabitants of Spain for the maintenance of their rights, would be not only useless but ruinous, and could tend only to increase the loss of at least a great part of her provinces, and that of her transmarine colonies.—Being further convinced, that the most effectual means of preventing the evils, is that their royal highnesses, for themselves, and all connected with them, should consent to the renunciation of their rights to the throne,—a renunciation already executed by the king, then further, taking also into consideration, that his majesty the emperor of the French engages, in this case, to maintain complete the independence and integrity of the Spanish monarchy, and its transmarine colonies, without retaining the smallest of its dominions for himself, for separating any part from the whole, that his imperial majesty engages to maintain the unity of the catholic religion, the security of property, and the continuance of the existing laws and usages which have for so long a period of time, and in so indisputable a manner preserved the power and honour of the Spanish nation, their highnesses conceive that they afford the most undoubted proof of their generosity, and their affection towards it, and their eagerness to return the ardent attachment which it bears towards them, by submitting to the utmost extent of their

power, their individual and personal interests, for the benefit of that nation, and by this present instrument to assent, as they already have assented in a particular treaty, to the renunciation of all their rights to the throne. They accordingly release the Spaniards from all their duties in this respect, and exhort them to consult the general interests of their country, by conducting themselves in a peaceable manner, and by looking for their happiness to the wise arrangements of the emperor Napoleon. The Spaniards may assure themselves that by their zeal to conform their conduct to those arrangements, they will give their prince and the two infants the strongest proof of their loyalty; in like manner as their royal highnesses give them the greatest example of their paternal affection, by renouncing all their rights, and sacrificing their own interests for the happiness of the Spaniards, the sole object of their wishes.—I THE PRINCE.—CARLOS.—ANTONIO.

Address of the Supreme Junta of the Government to Napoleon. Dated Madrid, 13th May, 1808.

Those who at critical and difficult periods are placed nearest the government, and who have at all times shown themselves to be good and faithful subjects, can and ought to avow their sentiments when the welfare of their country requires it.—Convinced that the condition of Spain and all its concerns demand the closest connection with that political system of the empire which your majesty governs with so much glory, we consider that the greatest proof of kindness to the Spanish nation, which our sovereigns ever gave, is their having fixed their last determination on an immoveable basis, and confirmed by a long series of political events.—Oh that there were no Pyrennees! This was the constant wish of good Spaniards; because there could be no Pyrennees, whenever the wants of each should be the same, when confidence should be returned again, and each of the two nations have received, in the same degree, the respect due to their independence and worth.—The interval which yet separates us from this happy moment cannot now be long. Your imperial majesty, who foresees every thing, and executes them still more swiftly, has chosen for the provincial government of Spain, a prince educated for the art of government in the great school of your majesty. He has succeeded in stilling the boldest storms by the moderation and wisdom of his measures. What have we not, therefore, to hope from his deeds, now that all Spaniards unite to devote to him that admiration to

which he has so many claims, and assist him in those labours which he applies in our service?—The Spanish monarchy shall resume the rank which belongs to it among the powers of Europe, as soon as it is united by a new family compact to its natural ally, whose power is so great. Whoever the prince may be, whom your majesty destined for us, chosen from your illustrious family, he will bring that security we so much need; but Spain can urge a plea which none of the other countries connected with your majesty can dispute.—The Spanish throne rises to a greater height. The consequences arising from its relations to France are of an importance commensurate with the extent of its possessions. It seems therefore that the throne itself calls for your majesty's eldest brother to govern it. On the other side, it is a happy presage that this arrangement, which nature has confirmed, so well corresponds with the sentiments of reverence and admiration with which the actions of this Prince, and the wisdom of his government, had inspired us.—The council of Castile, whose wisdom commanded their giving all the support to these principles which stood in their power, unites with the wish of the supreme junta. May God grant prosperity to your imperial and royal majesty!

Address of the City of Madrid to Murat, dated 15th May, 1808.

Monsieur;—The city of Madrid has been informed, that its illustrious sovereigns have resigned the crown of Spain into the hands of the great emperor, and that the supreme junta of the government, as well as the council of Castile, have notified to his imperial and royal majesty their wishes for the well-being of this monarchy; since they think it is certain, that his imperial and royal majesty intends to place the said crown upon the head of his illustrious brother, Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples.—This city, monsieur, distinguished for its love of, and obedience to its sovereign, and desirous of the happiness of the people whom it contains, cannot omit joining its homage to that of the supreme junta of the government, and of the council, and to request your highness will have the goodness to notify the same to his imperial and royal majesty, if your highness thinks proper.—The city avails itself of this opportunity to assure your highness of its respect and submission.

Napoleon's Proclamation making his Brother Joseph King of Spain. Dated, at Bayonne, 6th June, 1808.

Napoleon, by the grace of God, emperor of the French, king of Italy, protector of the confederacy of the Rhine, to all men,

to whom these presents shall come, sends greeting :—The junta of the state, the council of Castile, the city of Madrid, &c. &c. having notified to us by their addresses, that the well-being of Spain requires a speedy stop to be put to the provisional government, we have resolved to proclaim, and we do by these presents proclaim, our well-beloved brother Joseph Napoleon, the present King of Naples and Sicily, to be king of Spain and India.—We guarantee to the king of Spain the independence and integrity of his states in Europe as well as in Africa, Asia, and America; charging the lieutenant-general of the kingdom, the ministers, and the council of Castile to cause this proclamation to be expedited, and publicly announced, according to the usual custom, that none may plead ignorance hereof.—Given at our imperial palace at Bayonne, the 6th of June, 1808.

Arrival of King Joseph at Bayonne, 7th June, 1808.

His majesty king Joseph Napoleon arrived on the 7th inst. at eight o'clock, at Pam. As soon as the emperor was informed of it, he repaired from the castle of Marac, to meet his serene brother. His majesty met the king two miles from Bayonne, and brought him in his carriage to Marac, where he passed the evening. Her majesty the empress, attended by her ladies-in-waiting, met the king on the steps of the palace. Immediately afterwards, the deputation of the grandees of Spain, with the Duke del Infantado at their head, had the honour of being presented to king Joseph Napoleon, by his excellency, M. Azanza, minister of finance for the kingdom of Spain. The president of the deputation made the following speech to the king :—“Sire—we feel the most lively joy in presenting ourselves before your majesty. The presence of your majesty is necessary to the re-establishment of our country. The grandees of Spain have at all times distinguished themselves by their fidelity towards their sovereign. Your majesty shall meet with the same integrity and the same fidelity towards your person. May your majesty be pleased to accept our homage with the same benignity of which you have given so many testimonials to your subjects of the kingdom of Naples.”—To this his majesty answered :—“That he should devote himself altogether to the government of Spain : that all his endeavours should be employed to bring order into the finances, and re-organize the naval and military force ; that Spain might rely upon the preservation of her rights ; that he would rule only by virtue of the laws ; and finally

that the grandees of Spain might be assured of his especial protection.”—Messieurs Urquijo and Cevallos were then admitted to an audience with his majesty, who conferred with them a considerable time concerning the affairs of the kingdom.—The deputation of the council of Castile was afterwards introduced, and made the following speech :—“Sire—The council of Castile, the first of the supreme courts of justice of the Spanish nation, having at their head Don Manuel de Lardizabel, Don Joseph Colon, the eldest of the deputation, has the honour to offer its homage to your majesty, and to testify its especial joy at the happy and wished for accession to the throne of Spain of the serene brother of the great Napoleon, whose fame has eclipsed the glory of antiquity. Your majesty has merited his choice, and your serene person unites the sublime qualities which support and strengthen thrones.—Your majesty constitutes a part of the family destined by Providence to govern. The fame of your deeds has stretched itself over the Pyrenees, and spread over all Spain.—Noble Spaniards! indulge in hope. The Catholic worship shall not suffer the least wrong. It shall retain all its purity, and be the sole religion in the country. The laws, the lawful customs, the courts of justice, the clergy, the national colleges shall be maintained and ameliorated for the benefit of the church and state. The various orders of the kingdom, the necessary supports of every true monarchy, shall continue in the employment of their prerogatives. The poor shall be relieved. The integrity of Spain and the property of every one shall be inviolably respected.—These are the services which we expect from the known beneficence of your majesty. Such are the wishes which the council of Castile, under the present circumstances, forms. Heaven grant that these wishes may be fulfilled, and that your majesty may be the happiest monarch in the whole world!”—His majesty discoursed a considerable time with the deputation, concerning the various establishments of the kingdom. He remarked a great resemblance between the laws of Spain, and those of the kingdom of Naples.—The deputations of the council of the inquisition, of the Indies, and finances, were presented to the king of Spain.—His Majesty said to the deputies of the inquisition, that “he considered the worship of God as the basis of all morality, and of general prosperity; that other countries allowed of different forms of religion, but that he considered it as the felicity of Spain that she had but one, and that the true one.”—His majesty answered

the council of the Indies, that "he should not consider America as a colony, but as an integral part of Spain, and that its welfare would be as dear to him as that of his European states."—His majesty answered the council of finances, that "he well knew he had much to effect in this branch; that the pay of the soldiers and sailors were several months in arrears, but that he hoped, with the help of his faithful Spaniards, that he should be able to provide a remedy for the evil."—The deputation of the military force of Spain with the Duke del Parque at its head, then addressed the king, who answered that he had confidence in the fidelity and attachment of the Spanish soldiery.—"I consider it (he added) an honour to be the first soldier of the army, and were it necessary, as in ancient times in your conflicts with the Moors, you should see me at your head, in every danger, advance to repel the unjust attacks of the eternal enemies of the continent. You may assure all who have served the state under my predecessors, that they shall enjoy their pay, pensions, titles, and emoluments; and that I pledge my honour to reward ancient services, as if they had been performed under my own government."—After this audience his majesty, at ten in the evening, repaired to his apartments, and supped with their majesties the emperor and empress.

Address of the Deputation of Spaniards at Bayonne, to the Spanish Nation.—Dated Bayonne, 6th June, 1808.

Dear Spaniards, beloved countrymen.—Your inhabitants, your cities, your power, and your property, are as dear to us as ourselves; and we wish to keep all of you in our eye, that we may be able to establish your security.—We, as well as yourselves, are bound in allegiance to the old dynasty—to her to whom an end has been put by that God-like Providence which rules all thrones and sceptres. We have seen the greatest states fall under the guidance of this ruler, and our land alone has hitherto escaped the same fate.—An unavoidable necessity has now overtaken our country, and brought us under the protection of the invincible emperor of France.—We know that you will regard our present situation with the utmost consideration, and we have accordingly, in this conviction, been uniformly conciliating the friendship to which we are tied by so many obligations. With warm admiration must we see the benevolence and humanity of his imperial and royal majesty outstep our wishes—qualities which are even more to be admired than his great power! He has desired

nothing else, than that we should be indebted to him for our welfare. Whenever he gives us a sovereign to reign over us in the person of his magnanimous brother Joseph, he will consummate our prosperity.—As he has been pleased to change our old system of laws, it becomes us to obey; and to live in tranquility.—As he has also promised to re-organize our financial system, we may hope that then our naval and military power will become terrible to our enemies; national credit will be maintained; the chains which fetter our commerce will be broken; our agricultural resources will receive similar improvement. Lastly, knowing your attachment to your religion, and the uprightness of your character, no change will be made in your worship. He assures you, that you, as your forefathers have done, shall enjoy the holy catholic religion, as the same is permitted in all the kingdoms under his dominion.—And what is the return which the great emperor of the French requires from you, and from the whole nation, for such important blessings?—that you remain peaceable; that you watch over the interests of your households and your families; that you do not blindly give up yourselves to that madness which is inseparable from rebellion and insurrection, that you receive the improvement of your lot with becoming confidence, whereby you will experience the government of a worthy monarch, who will watch over you like a father, and whose happiness is inseparable from yours, and of which his subjects will reap the benefit.—Spaniards, think upon yourselves, your families, and your children! What can you expect from rebellion and anarchy? Think on the benefits you enjoy, and are likely to enjoy—a continuance of the blessings enjoyed by your forefathers, with the redress of every thing of which they had cause to complain!—Honest agriculturists, who know the sweets of domestic comforts:—industrious mechanics, who fill the cities, you know what is dear to your hearts—merchants and manufacturers who owe your existence to your industry and diligence—citizens of all classes who owe so much to the protection of the laws—let all keep in view in what misery you will be involved if you suffer yourselves to be misled by those who wish to profit by your animosities!—One false step will deprive you of all! What can you hope to receive in return for so great a hazard? Can anything induce you to resist the powers which reign over you, or to abjure the wholesome safeguard of the laws?—Anarchy is the greatest curse

that God can bring upon a people while it prevails, it breaks down, by us, annihilates, and loosens every thing—the best people, in such circumstances, are generally the greatest sufferers. This state of things is as ungovernable as the waves of the sea.—Let us recollect the ties that bind us together as one people; that we have always fought under the same standard! Ah! how dreadful is civil war; For this century past Spain has enjoyed tranquility—Why change the scene, and turn away from our fraternal advice?—No man doubts Spanish bravery. You can do wonders. But, without system, and without leaders, your efforts would be in vain. The most numerous bands of undisciplined men dwindle before a regular army, like chaff before the wind.—We have been placed in a most critical situation, but we now present you with a new and well-organized government, which secures the liberty, the rights, and the property, of every individual. This was to be expected of the invincible Napoleon, who has been occupied in matters that relate to our happiness, and who has shewn himself anxious to deserve well of our country by becoming her restorer. Let us throw no obstacles in the way of the great benefits which will result from our new union. Thus you will fulfil the most ardent wishes of his imperial highness the lieutenant general of the kingdom (Murat), of the Junta, and of the council of Castile—the highest powers in the nation. Thus also will you deserve the countenance and protection of Him in whose mighty and benevolent hand is our lot.—May heaven, which has hitherto guarded our country, incline you to repose your confidence in these our councils.

Proclamation by the Superior Junta of the Government. Dated 7th June, 1808.

Spaniards,—The superior Junta of the government, consisting of the first magistrates of the nation, this day assembled, address you, in order to remove the errors which the evil-disposed and the ignorant endeavour to make you believe and cherish—Wretched errors which might produce incalculable evils, if the supreme authority did not hasten to destroy them in the birth.—The Junta confident that those who at all times, and on all occasions, have listened with respect to the voice of their magistrates, will not less incline their ear, and display submission, when the question is for them, either to secure their prosperity for ever, by uniting themselves with the first authorities of the state, or to labour for the destruction of their native land,

by lending themselves to those commotions, into which the eternal enemies of the glory and prosperity of Spain seek to throw them.—At a moment when in Spain, a country so highly favoured by nature, but impoverished, exhausted, and disgraced in the eyes of all Europe, by the defects and misrule of its government, the period of its complete annihilation was approaching; when the very efforts which had been made for the renewal of its debilitated powers, had only served to aggravate its disasters, and to plunge it in new misfortunes; when, in short, no longer any hope remained, Providence had presented us with the means, not only of averting the destruction of our country, but even of raising it to a degree of prosperity and splendour, which it never reached even in the most illustrious periods of its history. By one of those political revolutions which amaze those only who are inattentive to the progress of events, the house of Bourbon saw itself driven from those thrones which it possessed in Europe, except that of Spain, the only one which it still retained. After having reduced the nation to the last stage of weakness and decay, deprived of that support which they had hitherto derived from the other branches of their family, those relations could not be maintained which had before united them with France; it became impossible for the Bourbons to maintain themselves on a throne, from which all the intervening changes of the political system obliged them to descend: the mightiest prince in Europe has received the abdication of the Bourbons, not to incorporate your territory with his own kingdom, which is already so extensive, but to establish the Spanish monarchy on a new basis, thus employing his irresistible power, for the purpose of operating those wholesome reforms which we have long wished for. It is with this view that he has summoned the deputies of the cities of the provinces, and of the state councils, into his illustrious presence, in order to consult them with regard to those fundamental laws which must form the security of sovereign authority, and of the fidelity of the subjects. He will place the crown of Spain in the head of a noble-minded prince, who will know how to attach to himself all hearts, by the worth of his character; he will exert means which no other man has in his power, and soon place Spain in that rank from which she has fallen by the weakness alone of those princes who have hitherto governed her.

(To be continued.)

"The Cortes will be assembled, abuses reformed, and such laws enacted as the circumstances of the time, and experience may dictate for the public good and happiness; things which we cannot now how to do, which we have done before, without any necessity that the viceroys should come to instruct us."

—ADDRESSES OF THE SPANISH PATRIOTS.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—What must

Mr. Roscoe say upon reading the divers papers, published by the patriots of Spain? Does he wish those patriots success? I am afraid not. He wishes, no doubt, that he could wish them success; but, he cannot, without, at the same time, confessing his error as to the disposition of the governor of France. Why not confess this error; why not give us, from his elegant pen, a song to match "O'er the vine-cover'd hills and gay regions of France," and not leave the task of hailing the dawn of freedom in Spain to the vulgar, sot-headed, hacknied muse of "Thomas Fitzgerald, Esq." who now pretends, that he has long foreseen that Napoleon would be overthrown in Spain, and that, at last, he would go to hell.—The language of the Spanish Patriots rises with the approach of danger. It is noble and animating in the highest degree. It expresses sentiments which can be entertained in no minds but such as are free. The people of Spain, so long oppressed, so long trampled under foot, are, all at once, become high-minded. It requires ages to bend the mind to slavery, but a moment (circumstances being favourable) restores it to its native freedom and vigour.—If there be any one of the several addresses that I prefer to the rest, it is that which is entitled "PRECAUTIONS, &c." and which will be inserted, in its proper place in the Register. From this paper I have selected my motto. The patriots do not, we see, mean to confine their views to the mere driving the French out of Spain. The Cortes, that is to say, the real representatives of the people, will be assembled; abuses will be reformed; and such laws will be passed, as the circumstances of the time and experience may dictate for the public good. This is what is wanted; this, indeed, is an enterprise in which it is worth while to "spend the last shilling and to shed the last drop of blood." But, if nothing were intended more than a mere defeat of the French armies, and a re-establishment of the old

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system, there is no man of any reflection who would cure a straw which way the thing terminated.—It is clear, however, that a salutary resolution is intended; for, in this same excellent paper, the patriots of Spain talk of "the late infamous government," and, in another place, of the "infamous news-papers which the baseness of the late government caused to be circulated." Why, to obtain the liberty of entering and publishing these words, though but for a few days, is well worth hazarding one's life for, when accompanied with only a very slight hope of being able to continue in the enjoyment of such liberty.—If the Patriots of Spain succeed, therefore, there is little fear of their again becoming slaves for some time at any rate; and it is upon this ground, and only upon this ground, that I, for my part, wish them success.—The slogan just made to the parliament, in the king's name, is not, as relating to Spain, exactly what I could have wished it. I wish the word *loyal* and the word *monarchy* had not been in it. If the Patriots of Spain choose to drive any of their late royal family back again, we have nothing to do with it; but, it appears to me, that we should say nothing that could possibly be construed into a reservation of a right, on our part, to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain. The late king and the late princes of Spain have abdicated their rights of sovereignty. In the first place, the king accused his son of conspiring against his life; next, the king admits, without any attempt at resistance, a large French army into the heart of Spain, and deceives his people by telling them, that he is upon the best possible terms with Napoleon, whose army is passing across Spain upon an expedition against the common enemy, whereupon he avails himself of his kingly authority to prevent the people themselves from making any resistance, and even to compel them to furnish the French with clothing, provisions, and every thing they demand. Having thus introduced the French, he throws himself into the arms of Napoleon, and becomes

his pensioner, after having, by a treaty, formally resigned to him all his rights of sovereignty. The son, who had, in the meanwhile, obtained a previous act of abdication from his father, and who had assumed the royal authority, follows the example of his father in deceiving the people as to the views of France? he, too, calls Napoleon his friend and most intimate ally; upon the very first demand of Murat, he gives up the sword of Francis I; upon the first summons, off he goes and puts himself into the hands of Napoleon, assuring the people upon his journey, that the views of France are friendly; and, upon his arrival, he also abdicates his right of sovereignty, which example is followed by all the junior members of the family.—From these facts, well known to all the world, it is undeniable, either that the Spanish monarchy was become so rotten as to be unable to protect itself, or, that the king and the prince did of design betray their country into the hands of France. No matter to us which of the two was the case: for, take which we will, the objection to our doing or saying any thing that can be construed into a condition in behalf of the royal family is equally strong. Our king has received no communication from the late king of Spain, or from the prince, who assumed, for a short time, the kingly authority. He orders the commissioners to tell the parliament, that "communications have been made to him by several of the provinces of Spain," and not from the king of Spain. That king has, by treaty, abdicated the throne; he has bargained away his kingly office and authority; the monarchy is, in reality as well as in form, extinguished in the House of Bourbon. Would it not, then, have been best to say nothing at all about that monarchy, and not to utter words, which may be construed to mean, that we will assist the Patriots of Spain so long only as they are fighting for the restoration of that monarchy; a monarchy, by which, if it was not totally rotten, the people of Spain have been cruelly betrayed?—Besides, which of the two kings (upon the supposition and recognition of an existing king) are we to support? The patriots appear to prefer Ferdinand; but, upon what principle are we to support him against the claim of his father? We get ourselves into inextricable difficulties by any declaration about monarchy; and, the probability is, that, if we continue in this track, Napoleon, if he finds his views in favour of his brother thwarted, will very soon beat us by creating distrust of us in the

midst of the patriots, by representing us as fighting for the restoration of that government, which they themselves call "infamous."—If Spain is to be wrested from the grasp of the Buonapartés, the thing must be done by the people, headed by men, who have not partaken in the vices and corruptions of the old government; and, is it not incredible, that such men should voluntarily recall that government? They talk of their "king"; it is a name that may be yet necessary to their purposes; but, as they proceed, they will find the means of dispensing with its effect; and, though it is probable, that the wisest men amongst them may think the kingly office necessary to the good government of so extensive an empire, yet it is not at all probable, that they will be able, supposing them to be willing, to induce the people, when once they have tasted the sweets of freedom, again to bend their necks to a yoke, which has hitherto bent them to the earth.—These are my reasons for wishing, that nothing had been said, in the Speech, about loyalty or monarchy, which, in my opinion, may do harm, and cannot possibly do any good. It is reasonable to suppose, that, in the course of the great and glorious struggle which the Patriots of Spain appear now to have begun, some man, and that man of no very lofty origin, may so distinguish himself as to be thought the most fit to be placed at the head of the government of Spain. In such a contingency are we prepared to say, that we will drop the cause of the Patriots? If not, what are we to do with our declarations about loyalty and monarchy? How, or when, are we to get rid of these words? Would it not have been better, then, to express our intentions to preserve, as far as we were able, the integrity of the Spanish dominions; or, rather, would it not have been better to dispense with all French phraseology, and to say, that we would, to the utmost of our power, preserve the Spanish dominions whole and entire?—With this exception, the Speech is very satisfactory. It says as much as could have been reasonably expected at this time; but, while I wish not to detract from the merit of the ministers, in this respect, truth demands, that I should remark, that they have appeared rather reluctant in making a communication of their sentiments and intentions: they have been the iron and not the flint: they have not inspired the public, but the public them. An express message, upon the subject, would have been far preferable; it would have more strongly marked a disposition to be hearty in the cause of the

Spanish Patriots; a specific sum asked for on that particular account would have had great weight in other parts of Europe as well as in Spain.—I have witnessed, upon this occasion, with some regret, an uncommon disposition to execrate Buonaparté for his *perfidy* towards Spain. Really, there appears to have been very little perfidy on his part. His views were not at all disguised, nor, indeed, was it possible to disguise them from the government of Spain. From the people, with the aid of the government, it was possible to disguise them; but, from the government itself, it was totally impossible. And, then, as to the consequences, who is not pleased with them? Who is not now glad that Buonaparté did make an attempt to put the crown of Spain upon the head of his brother? This is so obviously a fortunate circumstance, in the eyes of all those, who wished to see the Spanish nation free, that one cannot help fearing, that such uncommon manifestations of anger against him, upon this occasion, indicate vexation at the prospect of seeing that freedom achieved. The anger seems, in fact, to arise from the mortification that is felt at his having given the people of Spain an opportunity of shewing, that a nation, when its energies are roused, is capable of defending itself without a royal family and a civil list. The grand question is now to be decided, whether regular armies, however numerous and well-trained, are capable of subduing a great nation, whose population are bent upon resistance, animated by the motive of acquiring or preserving their liberties. These same French armies have subdued kingdom after kingdom, where there was a sovereign prince reigning; they have now to subdue a nation, who has neither king nor government; and, if they fail, having a large army already introduced into the heart of the country, no man will hereafter say, that large regular armies are necessary to the defence of a country, the people of which have freedom to defend.—I hope that no stupid and selfish brute will be suffered to approach the ear of our ministers with insinuations as to the effect of such an example. I hope that no such villainous insinuations will be listened to, at any rate. I hope that there will be no delay in sending off succours to the self-armed and self-commanded Patriots of Spain. I hope that there will be no coldness perceivable, on our part.—In Piedmont there was an arming of the peasantry; the same in several parts of Germany; the same in Austria; the same in Prussia; the same in Russia; every where did we hear of Volunteers and Levies-en-

masse. But, somehow or other, there has been no where any effectual resistance. The people have been found to be nothing against the armies of France. Their kings and our news-papers have represented the people as ready to perish to the last man; but, when the pinch has come, they have preferred remaining unhelped, and their countries have been subdued. Poet Fitzgerald, who has pasted up his doggerel against every dead wall, deserted house, and stinking corner, of the town, calls upon the *Germans* and *Italians* to rouse themselves and to join the Spanish Patriots; but, poet Fitzgerald does not seem to perceive, that the Spaniards have a *motive*, which the Germans and Italians have not. The latter, indeed, might and may have a motive; but, the former have none. The Spaniards are fighting for *themselves*. They are engaged in a struggle, not only against the French, but against what they call their "late infamous government." They are not hazarding their lives merely to obtain a choice of masters; but, at the same time, to insure the restoration and preservation of their freedom.—There is a talk of associations and subscriptions in England for the purpose of aiding the Patriots of Spain. Nothing could be more honourable to the country. We have had "voluntary contributions" before, and why not now, in a cause, which, if any man dislikes it, he will be hardly bold enough to express that dislike. The government took the lead in exciting the people to associate and subscribe before; but, I hear of none of this now; nor do I hear a word of the Lloyd's people. Let us wait, however, and see what proof they give of their feelings upon this occasion. Let us see, how many copper pennies they will draw out in the cause of a people, for ages oppressed, bent upon re-acquiring their freedom. The Spanish Patriots have drawn the sword, not only for the preservation of their country from a foreign yoke; but for the restoration of the *Cortes*, that is to say, a *representation of the people*; and also for a *reform of abuses*, including, of course, not only an examination into the conduct of speculators, but the condign *punishment* of those infamous wretches, who have so long revelled in luxury upon the fruit of the people's labour. This is the cause of the Spanish Patriots, and we shall now see who will, in England, take the lead in subscribing to support this glorious cause; and, we shall have an opportunity of comparing the sums and names which will appear upon the list, with the sums and names which have appeared upon other subscription lists. In this cause one

might have hoped to see, not only pecuniary, but personal aid, voluntarily given. To have heard a thousand or two of English gentlemen asking the king permission to join the bands of Patriots in Spain, fighting in the cause of freedom, would have sounded well; but, Bond Street and the Bacchælian routes, the gaming table, the stews, and, which is still worse, the concerts, have, for them, more charms than the din and toil and danger of battle. They can sing "How sleeps the brave?" but they are quite willing to leave the thing to the enjoyment of others. They can, like poet Fitzgerald, recite odes to liberty; but, if liberty is to be fought for, the soldiers must not be sought amongst them. No: we shall see them as cold as death, upon this occasion. They hate Buonaparté because they fear him; because they fear that he will deprive them of their pleasures; because his acts and views are in incessant war against all that is effeminate and base; but, they will not stir an inch to oppose him. Some few, however, one would hope, might be found of a different description. We shall see, whether, amongst the whole of the nobility and gentry of this kingdom, there be found a hundred to volunteer their personal services in support of the cause of freedom in Spain. What are the universities doing? Do they not afford a dozen or two, whose impatience to partake in so glorious a warfare is not to be restrained? One would think that stone walls would, at such a time, be unable to contain the high-blooded youths, who inhabit those seminaries. We shall see.—The Morning Chronicle, of the 5th instant, has the following passage: "We have seen, with SATISFACTION, that the official paper of government has been instructed to contradict the rumour, that the DUKE of YORK is himself to take the command of the Expedition. Ministers have in this instance prided themselves on becoming respect to the feelings of the public."—From this, it would appear, that the ministerial paper, alluded to, had announced the intention of the ministers to commit the troops, destined for Spain, to the command of the Duke of York, which had, it seems, greatly alarmed the Editor of the Morning Chronicle. His meaning is, I suppose, that the Duke ought not to be spared from home, while there is even a possibility of this country being invaded by a formidable enemy; for that, though we ought to do our utmost to assist the Patriots of Spain, the duty of providing for our security is certainly not to be neglected. It was for similar reasons, we must suppose, that the Times news-paper,

the other day, expressed a hope, that the people would, if they found the thing in agitation, send up an unanimous petition against sending the Duke of York to Spain. The same motives will, doubtless, operate in preventing any of the royal dukes, who have all, I believe, except the Duke of Clarence, commands of districts in England, from being sent to partake in the glory of restoring long-lost freedom to Spain. The Spanish Patriots, however, do not, to say the truth, appear to want much instruction in the science of appointing commanders; for the rule they have laid down is excellent. "It is," say they, "indispensable, that each province should have its general, of known talents, and of such experience as our situation permits; that his heroism should inspire the utmost confidence; and that every general should have under his command officers of merit, particularly of artillery and engineers."

—You see, they are resolved not to entrust their safety to the hands of either a fool or a coward, and are aware that merit alone ought to be considered in the appointment of even inferior officers. If they do but stick to this, they will triumph, without any assistance from any part of the world. If there be a serious war, in Spain, we shall now see how far the people of a country are capable of selecting their commanders.

—In every way, in which it can be considered, the struggle, now going on in Spain, is interesting to the world, and particularly to England. Should the Spaniards succeed in driving out the French, the reverses of Napoleon will not stop there. They will assuredly pursue him into Portugal, where also "a reform of abuses" will take place. Similar effects may be produced in Italy. The noble spirit may extend itself to Holland, to Germany, and the North; and, it is possible, that the new despotism may be ejected from France itself. All this; if it should be achieved, will have been achieved by a people, having no guide but that of their own good sense and a desire to be free. Napoleon has, of late, become the patron of crowned-heads. He never opens his lips but "by the Grace of God;" he always winds up with talking of the authority given him by "Providence;" and, in his letter to the late Prince of Asturias, he plainly says, that the people are always to be considered as hating kings, and are to be, of course, looked upon as enemies, and treated as such. The war, in Spain, therefore, is a war of the people against despotism. There is a revolution going on in favour of liberty; and, I must repeat, that it is curious

enough, that we should now be fighting on the side of the people, and that, too, with the only fair prospect of success that we have had since the commencement of a war of fifteen years duration! — What a wonderful thing it will be; what a subject for the able historian; if Buonaparté should fall in consequence of his despotic acts, after having himself been the terror, the scourge, and the destroyer of despotism. In order to be able to eradicate deep-rooted despotism, it seems to have been necessary for him to possess and exercise despotic powers greater than those which he had to overcome; and, now that his work is done, if he should be deprived of those powers by a spirit of liberty generally diffused over this fair and oppressed quarter of the globe, how interesting the scene will become! — It is desirable, that the war in Spain should not be of very short duration. Napoleon, in such a state, was eager to regenerate the out an arduous struggle. There are rous vermin to destroy in Spain, and to insure their complete destruction, the storm must not only be violent, but must last for some time. It is in stormy times, that great and salutary changes are most easily effected. When men have arms in their hands, and are hourly exposing their lives, they think nothing at all of making those changes in civil matters, which hinge they would, at other times, tremble but to think of. All great and good changes, in matters relating to government, have been made in stormy times. Necessity is the mother of invention, and it is in such cases, that a nation feels what is necessary to it — It will require time and experience, too, for the people of Spain to discover, who are the wisest, the most vigilant, the most brave, and most public-spirited men in their country. Slavery, like darkness, keeps men from the knowledge of each other. At present the people of Spain can know but very little of their leaders. They meet like acquaintances of yesterday. Like the inhabitants of — brought together by a fire. All must be confusion and uncertainty. It will require time for things to jostle into order. Some, who present themselves for trust and confidence will be found unworthy. Time for trial is wanted. A year's war and hardship and danger will winnow the people; will divide the grain from the chaff; the hollow from the solid; the rotten from the sound. It requires time, too, to wear away prejudices; to destroy the effect of names; to make the people, from experience, learn how they have been duped and abused by the most contemptible of their species; to

give to truth that fair play, which the people have been made to labour to deprive it of. The Provisional Government recommends, it will be seen, frequent short and pithy publications, calculated to counteract the falsehoods promulgated through the newspapers of the "late infamous government." This is a good beginning, but it will require time to do away the effect of the reiterated lies of those newspapers. It is possible, too, that many of those leaders, who are opposed to the French, may not wish for such a change as would restore freedom to the people; but, if the struggle continue any length of time, and become arduous, they will find, that they must either go the whole way with the people, or submit to the French. — There must be time to break up connections. To tear to pieces the accursed trammels, which it has taken ages to make. The locusts, who have so long been devouring the fruits of the people's labour, would soon find the means of alighting upon them again, unless destroyed by the long duration of the storm. With a head of prey they will retire to their hiding places and wait for the sun-shine; but, if the storm last for a year or two, out they must come, expose themselves to observation, and labour or starve. The hurricane and the torrent, though they do great visible mischief, do greater invisible good; and a struggle, such as that which we are, I hope, about to witness, in Spain, though it occasions great sufferings for the time, naturally and necessarily puts a stop to all those vices, which degrade, and, by degrees, enslave a nation. I will venture to say, that already bribery and corruption have received a check in Spain; sycophancy can have no meat to feed on; the whole body of flatterers and panders and procuresses (a numerous host!) must be nearly disbanded. Murat and his people having other matters to attend to; the troops of players, dancers, musicians, and buffoons must be in a miserable way; the endless hordes of annuists and petty oppressors and robbers can scarcely stand a chance of getting bread any longer without working. But, it will require time; it will require a good long and rough contest to clear the land of all those and other noxious animals. There will be no real good to Spain, until the speculators are justly punished and their wives and children are made to labour for their bread. Without accomplishing this, the change would not be worth wishing for, much less shedding of blood for. What could Joseph Napoleon and his set do more than rob the people with impunity? For my part, if I were a

Spaniard, I should be for punishing the *old* speculators *at any rate*; for while they remain unpunished it is a mockery to talk of any measures for the public good.—There is still another reason for wishing the struggle to be of pretty long duration; it will give time for the principles of the Patriots to spread over other countries; it will give time for discussion in those other countries; men will hear that such or such a change has taken place in Spain, that the reason of it was such or such, and that the effect will be this and that; and, as the Spaniards proceed in their work of renovation and “*reform of abuses*,” there will be other nations ready to make a comparison, and to feel shame at being behind hand with them, especially if there should exist an intimate intercourse between them and Spain. There are some persons, who seem to be delighted with the resistance of the Spaniards, regarding it merely as the means of restoring every thing to its situation of twenty years ago. But, they may be assured, that, if such were the object of the Spaniards, it would fail. Things can never be brought back to that situation; and, the event will prove, I trust, that the resistance of the Spaniards will have precisely a contrary effect. Buonaparté was bringing the state of twenty years ago back again as fast as possible. He meant, and still means, to make a mere change of dynasties all over Europe, and then to have sitten down quietly amidst a world of slaves; but, the Spaniards, from whom he expected no resistance at all, threaten totally to frustrate his views, and to give to the other nations an example well worthy of their imitation.—I have often had occasion to observe, that, if Napoleon were to make such an attack upon England as should give rise to an opinion that he would finally become its master, the first to join his standard would be those sycophants and panders, who now accuse others of a want of loyalty. This has been exactly the case in Spain. The whole of this infamous tribe, with the late *prime minister at their head*, are now in the court of Buonaparté, having first been bribed to betray their country, upon the vitals of which they have so long preyed, into his hands. Infamous miscreants! I dare say, that they have, for years, claimed a monopoly of loyalty; I dare say, that the virtuous and brave men, who now complain of “the late base and infamous government,” were, by them, considered as being enemies to their country; I dare say, that the men, whom we are now assisting, and who declare for “*a reform of*

abuses,” were, by them and their hiring news-papers, represented as harbouring designs to overthrow the government, to destroy all order, property, and law; I dare say they were considered as demagogues, libellers, and traitors, whom it was the bounden duty of every man in authority to stigmatize, harass, oppress, persecute, and, if possible, take off by some means or other. Oh! that king and his family are, at this moment, an excellently useful example. In their fate may be seen what it is for kings and princes to take sycophants and panders to their bosom, while they cast a scowling eye upon, and drive from their presence, all those who come with remonstrances in behalf of the people. Here is a *prime minister* and his whole shoal of underling courtiers gone over to the enemy in a body; and, what is still better, being formed into a Junta to deliberate upon what is to be done, their very first act is a declaration, that the late government was become so bad, that nothing could mend it, and that even a change of the dynasty was become indispensable. Villains! As if it were any but themselves, who had rendered the government so bad; and as if they, when in power, would not have put to the rack and torn piecemeal, any one who should have but half insinuated what they have now openly declared and proclaimed.—In dismissing this subject, for the present, I cannot refrain from pointing out, as worthy of unqualified approbation, the very great, the apparently unparalleled exertions, which our ministers are making for giving the Spanish patriots assistance. To be sure they must sleep neither night nor day, if they mean to keep pace with the wishes of the nation at large; for never, I believe, was there any thing so popular, any thing that inspired half so much enthusiasm amongst the people, as the cause of the Patriots of Spain; whence the ministers and their master may learn what is the real taste of Englishmen. Our government, as will be seen from Lord Castlereagh’s *letter* to the Mayor of London, acknowledges the existence and authority of a “*Provisional government*,” in Spain. It is not a *regency*, or a *lieutenancy*, or a *commission*; it is a *government*, erected by the nation, for the managing of its affairs; and, therefore, while our ministers are laudably making such great exertions to assist the cause of the Patriots, I hope they will steer clear of the embarrassment that would inevitably arise from any thing meddling, on their part, about the *king* of Spain. If Buonaparté finds, that he cannot beat the Patriots and impose

his brother upon them, he will, very likely, set up the king of Spain, or the prince of Asturias, again; and, then he will be fighting for the king of Spain as well as we, if we are foolish enough to adopt this line of proceeding. No: send the Patriots arms, ammunition, provisions, money, ships, and men; but, send them no commands as to what they are to do in forming a government for themselves. If the statements, in the newspapers, be true, the preparations we are making for sending off aid to the Patriots are of a magnitude worthy of the cause and of ourselves. I repeat the expression of my thanks to the ministers for this, and I am sure they will receive the thanks of the whole country, with the exception of those only, whom, I hope, they will have the sense and the spirit to despise, of whatever rank they may be.—It is a subject of curious speculation what will be the conduct of the American States with respect to Spain. They would, upon hearing that the king and prince had abdicated the throne, in behalf of the Buonapartes, be greatly alarmed; nor will they be very well pleased, when they find, that a revolution is taking place, especially under *our* auspices. The old rotten government of Spain made the Spanish nation an excellent milch cow to them as well as to France. They will not like to hear, that Spain is likely to have a vigorous government, that government being naturally in close alliance with England, as it will be if a totally *new* government be formed. Jonathan will be puzzled to know what to do. If he has sense enough to get the better of his vanity, to give up the idea of being a "great nation," and content himself with his barter and sale, he may yet do very well. But, if he persists in his big talk, and his spiteful though impotent measures, I think things are working, as well abroad as at home, in a way that promises to produce a speedy breaking-up of his boasted confederation. If the Spanish Patriots should succeed, as there is now some reason to hope, there will be nothing for which they will have to thank Jonathan. France having stolen part of the territory of Spain, Jonathan stood a ready purchaser. This territory, if the Patriots succeed, he will have to resign, upon principles of common sense as well as of common law. If Jonathan should see France likely to sink, he will rise upon her, and you will hear his Cerberean press barking at her from the first column to the last. Next to Jonathan's hatred of England is his partiality for the strongest; therefore, if Buonaparte should chance to slip, let him, of all things, beware of Jonathan;

for, under such circumstances, Jonathan is a very Hector of Troy. Florida, under a wise and spirited government, will be a formidable neighbour to Jonathan, and that neighbour, if we have the wisdom to encourage, by all the means in our power, the forming of an *entirely new government* in Spain, will and must be our friend. Let Jonathan ponder well upon these matters, for they are closely connected with his future fate.

Bolley, 7th July, 1808.

• OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPEECH

Delivered to the Parliament by the Lords Commissioners, at the Prorogation of the Parliament, on the 4th of July, 1808.

"MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN, We have it in command from his majesty to express to you the great satisfaction which he derives from being enabled, by putting an end to the present session of parliament, to terminate the laborious attendance which the public business has required of you.—The measure which you have adopted for the improvement of the military force of the country, promises to lay the foundation of a system of internal defence eminently useful, and peculiarly adapted to the exigencies of these times.—The sanction which you have given to those measures of defensive retaliation, to which the violent Attacks of the Enemy upon the commerce and resources of this kingdom, compelled his majesty to resort, has been highly satisfactory to his majesty.—His majesty doubts not that in the result the enemy will be convinced of the impolicy of persevering in a system which retorts upon himself, in so much greater proportion, those evils which he endeavours to inflict upon this country.—GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, We are commanded by his majesty to return his most hearty acknowledgements for the cheerfulness and liberality with which the necessary supplies for the current year have been provided.—His majesty directs us to assure you, that he participates in the satisfaction with which you must have contemplated the flourishing situation of the revenue and credit of the country, notwithstanding the continued pressure of the war; and he congratulates you upon having been enabled to provide for the exigencies of the public service, with so small an addition to the public burthens.—His majesty commands us to thank you for having enabled him to make good his engagements with his allies; and to express to you the particular gratification which he has derived from the manner

in which you have provided for the establishment of his sister, her royal highness the Duchess of Brunswick. — MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN, His majesty has great satisfaction in informing you, that, notwithstanding the formidable confederacy united against his ally the king of Sweden, that sovereign perseveres, with unabated vigour and constancy, to maintain the honour and independence of his crown: no doubt has been wanting on the part of his majesty to support him in the arduous contest which he is engaged in. — The recent transactions in Spain and Italy have exhibited new and striking proofs of the unbounded and unprincipled ambition which actuates the common enemy of every established government and independent nation in the world. — His majesty views with the liveliest interest the loyal and determined spirit manifested by the Spanish nation, in resisting the violence and perfidy with which their dearest rights have been assailed. — Thus nobly struggling against the tyranny and usurpation of France, the Spanish nation can no longer be considered as the enemy of Great Britain; but is recognized by his majesty as a natural friend and ally. — We are commanded to inform you that communications have been made to his majesty from several of the provinces of Spain, soliciting the aid of his majesty. The answer of his majesty to these communications has been received in Spain, with every demonstration of those sentiments of confidence and affection which are congenial to the feelings and true interests of both nations: and his majesty commands us to assure you, that he will continue to every exertion in power for the support of the Spanish cause; guided in the choice and in the direction of his exertions by the wishes of those in whose behalf they are employed. — In contributing to the success of this just and glorious cause, his majesty has no other object than that of preserving unimpaired the integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy. But he trusts that the same efforts which are directed to that great object, may, under the blessing of divine providence, lead in their effects, and by their example, to the restoration of the liberties and the peace of Europe. •

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Order of Council in England, dated 4th July, 1808.*

His majesty having taken into his consideration the glorious exertions of the Spanish nation for the deliverance of their country from the tyranny and usurpation of France, and the assurances which his majesty has received from several of the pro-

vinces of Spain, of their friendly disposition towards this kingdom; his majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, — First, that all hostilities against Spain, on the part of his majesty, shall immediately cease. — Secondly, That the blockade of all the ports of Spain, except such as may be still in the possession or under controul of France, shall be forthwith raised. — Thirdly, That all ships and vessels belonging to Spain shall have free admission into the ports of his majesty's dominions, as before the present hostilities. — Fourthly, That all ships and vessels going to Spain, which shall be met at sea by his majesty's ships and cruisers, shall be treated in the same manner as the ships of states in amity with his majesty, and shall be suffered to carry on any trade now considered by his majesty to be lawfully carried on by neutral ships. — Fifthly, That all vessels and goods belonging to persons residing in the Spanish colonies, which shall be detained by any of his majesty's cruisers after the date hereof, shall be brought into port, and shall be carefully preserved in safe custody, to await his majesty's further pleasure, until it shall be known whether the said colonies, or any of them, in which the owners of such ships and goods reside, shall have made common cause with Spain against the power of France. — And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his majesty's treasury, his majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, the judge of the high court of admiralty, and the judges of the courts of vice admiralty, are to take such measures herein as to them may respectively appertain.

Lord Castlereagh's Letter to the Mayor of London, dated 1st July, 1808.

My Lord.—I have the honour to acquaint your lordship, that dispatches have been received from major-general Spencer, dated off Cadiz the 6th inst. by which it appears that a negotiation had been entered into between his majesty's naval and military commanders off that port, with deputies appointed on the part of the Provisional government of the province of Andalusia, assembled at Seville, the result of which had been forwarded for the approbation of the said government. — Every arrangement had been taken for the reduction of the French ships, and admiral Purvis had been invited by the Spanish commanders to anchor his fleet at the mouth of the harbour, with a view to co-operate in compelling the common enemy to surrender. — It appears that the southern provinces of Spain had decla-

against France, and dispatches of the 4th instant received from lieutenant general Sir H. Myrle, at Gibraltar, mention that the Spanish army before that fortress, reinforced by the greater part of the garrison of Ceuta, had marched against the French.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Proclamation by the Superior Junta of the Government. Dated 7th June, 1808.*

(Continued from page 32.)

When the morning of our prosperity dawns, is it possible to conceive that men incapable of the high destiny prepared for them, who lay claim to the honourable title of true Spaniards, and upright friends of their country, should seek to deceive you, and give us up to all the horrors of civil war, at the very moment when the hero, who is the author of our present blessings, and must be the wonder of posterity, was fully employed in the development of those plans which he had formed for the prosperity of Spain. Certainly the Junta of the government wish to remove this error on the part of the Spaniards, so praiseworthy for their patriotism; and in the meantime they at present see with pain, that some persons, led away by an inconsiderate zeal and by the anxieties of a mistaken loyalty; that others misled with respect to the true situation of their country, and above all by the secret agents of a hostile nation, actuated by envy of the prosperity of the continent, have been able to lead into a spirit of error a part of the good inhabitants of some of the provinces, and to sow the seeds of disunion and insurrection. Brave Spaniards! should you permit yourselves to be deceived by their deceitful pretences? Understand you not that those who in such critical circumstances become the apostles of insurrection, and counsel you to disobey your superiors, are the true enemies of your country? What do those "exciters of uproar and dissension aim at? Is it the restoration of your old monarchs? These are out of Spain:—what can they expect from your impotent efforts?—Is it to defend the laws on which you make your future prosperity to depend? Who then thinks of annulling them?—On the contrary, is it not in contemplation to restore to the nation its ancient freedom and original constitution, a blessing which it has only been permitted us within these few days to think of? Mistaken inhabitants of the provinces, what would you be at? Will you bring down upon your heads all the horrors of war, see your fields laid waste, your cities burnt, your habitations destroyed? Think you that a tumultuous levy of brave inhabitants,

without military skill, without chiefs, without money, without magazines, without provisions, will be able to withstand experienced armies, and soldiers grown old in the habits of victory? The Junta still flatters itself that you will reflect on the fatal consequences which your first steps must infallibly produce, if unfortunately a foolish obstinacy prevent you from quickly returning to the path of submission and patriotism, which a moment of error has permitted you to desert. And to convince you, that this only object is the better to instruct you, that the prince who adores them, that the emperor of the French, who holds our destinies in his hand, has no other view than to promote your prosperity, the Junta will make known to you the intentions of the new sovereign who comes to rule you. Hear and judge:—The Cortes, these ancient securities of our freedom, will be re-established, more powerful and better constituted than they had ever been; they shall be assembled at least every three years, and as often as the wants of the nation shall make their assembling necessary. The yearly expenditure of the royal establishment shall be limited; the sum taken out of the royal treasury for that purpose shall never be increased; it shall only be the half of what has hitherto been appropriated to the same purpose. The Roman catholic religion shall be exclusively that of Spain; no other worship shall be permitted. Finally, the Junta of government have strong reasons to hope that the personal contributions levied during the present war will be considerably diminished in consequence of the improvements which the new government intends to make in the mode of its collection; and while the warlike and political situation of Europe will require the greatest exertions for increasing our marine, the diminution of our land forces may be hoped for. Add to this, that useful reforms will be gradually made in all the departments, public credit shall be restored, the debt shall be fixed and paid off in a few years.—The administration of justice shall be made certain by invariable rules. The sovereign authority shall not be permitted to influence its course. Agriculture will be encouraged, commerce animated, and population increased. The army and navy will resume their ancient lustre; all the means calculated to secure general prosperity will be put in motion. Judge then, whether it is your interest to draw your swords, in order that your own happiness and that of your posterity may be prevented, and whether those who light up the fire of discord among you are true Spaniards, and friends of their country. You now know,

Spaniards, the destiny which awaits you if you preserve among yourselves tranquillity and order—if you heartily unite, with your government. Every thing tends to your benefit, and approximates the moment when your happiness shall commence. But if you forget this wholesome advice of the Junta, you may dread the just wrath of a monarch who will punish a blind and obstinate criminality with as much severity as he would nobly forgive the error of a moment. Are you ignorant that numerous French armies are already in Spain? Do you not know that still more numerous armies are now crossing the frontiers? The provinces which do not immediately return to their duty, will be occupied by the French troops, and treated with all the severity of martial law. The lieutenant-general has already given orders for several divisions to advance and punish the rebellious, but the Junta of the government wishing to save several provinces, in which disturbances have commenced, from the danger which threatens them, have, on the application and in name of these provinces, acknowledged their error, and promised to return to order, his imperial highness has graciously accepted their request. He has suspended the punishment of the guilty, but that punishment will be terrible if the traitorous suggestions of the evil disposed should have more power over the minds of the Spaniards, than the paternal voice of their magistrates, their clergy and all their authorities, civil, and military.

Address of the Leaders of the Patriots, in several of the Provinces and Principalities of Spain. Dated in the Month of May, 1808.

ARRAGON.

Providence has preserved in Arragon an immense quantity of muskets, ammunition, and artillery, which have not treacherously been sold, or delivered to the enemies of our repose. Your patriotism, your loyalty, and your attachment to the good customs which you have inherited from our ancestors, induced you to shake off the disgraceful yoke; which was prepared for us by sedition, and by the false promises of the French government, which regulating France's conduct by the most abominable Machiavelism, merely endeavoured to deceive us and all Spain in order to cover with shame and disgrace the most generous nation upon earth. You have placed implicit confidence in me, and this honour which you have bestowed on me undeservedly, obliges me to tear the veil of the most detestable iniquity and injustice. My life, which can only be of any value to me as far as it can promote your happiness and

the prosperity of my beloved country, is the smallest sacrifice I can make in return for the many proofs of confidence and love which you have honoured me. Do not doubt it, Arragonians; my mind is not able to harbour crimes, nor to associate with those who cherish and protect them. Some of the depositaries of the confidence of the Spanish nation, they who hold the supreme power in their hands, are the first to work your ruin by every means which malice can suggest, and to form traitorous connections with the enemies of our country. Thirst of gold, and the mistaken idea which they have perhaps conceived, to defile our destinies by their iniquitous proceedings, make them view with indifference the destruction of their country. Although I have strong grounds to believe it, yet I shall forbear to mention names, lest I should render grief still more poignant. At this time, being acquainted with your determination, that of your neighbours, the inhabitants of Valencia, and all the provinces of Spain, where the same sentiments are entertained, some of their leaders have perhaps changed their determination, embraced the cause of justice, and endeavoured to shake off the yoke, which they tried to impose on us, by means the most iniquitous and base. Should I be mistaken in this opinion, time will discover the truth. Fear not, Arragonians; let us defend the most just of causes, and we shall be invincible. The enemy's troops now in Spain are not able to withstand our efforts. Woe betide them, should they ever dare to repeat in any other Spanish town, what they did in Madrid on the 2d May, sacrificing without pity, and calling those seditious and assassins, of whom they had but very lately received honours and favours, which they did not deserve. Bayonne has witnessed and will remember the acts of violence, which after a long series of treacheries and frauds, have been committed; acts of violence, which clearly appear by the striking contradictions found in the papers published, where Charles IV. is charged with having conspired with a minister, who is afterwards appointed a member of the council of government; where the king, his son, who was never married but once, is questioned about his first wife. In consequence thereof, it is my duty to declare, and I accordingly do hereby declare what follows:—1. That the French Emperor, all the individuals of his family, and every French general and officer, shall be personally responsible for the safety of the king, and of his brother and uncle. 2. That, in case any violence should be attempted against

lives so valuable, in order that Spain may not be without a king, the nation will make use of their elective right in favour of the Archduke Charles, as nephew of Charles III. in case that the Prince of Sicily, or the Infant Don Pedro, and the other heirs should not be able to concur. 3. That should the French army commit any robberies, devastation, and murders, either in Madrid or any other town, invaded by the French troops, they shall be considered as guilty of high treason, and no quarter shall be given to any of them. 4. That all the transactions which have hitherto taken place, shall be considered as illegal, void, and extorted by violence, which is known to be practised in both places. 5. That what may hereafter be done in Bayonne, shall also be considered as null and void; and all who shall take an active part in the like transactions, shall be deemed traitors to their country. 6. That all deserters of the French army who shall present themselves, shall be admitted in Arragon, and treated with that generosity which forms a prominent feature of the Spanish national character; they shall be disarmed and conducted to this capital, where they may enlist in our troops. 7. All other provinces and kingdoms of Spain, not yet invaded by the enemy, are invited to meet by deputies at Terma, or any other suitable place, to nominate a lieutenant-general, whose orders shall be obeyed by the particular chiefs of the different kingdoms. 8. The foregoing manifesto shall be printed and published in the whole kingdom of Arragon; and it shall also be circulated in the capitals and principal places of all the provinces and kingdoms of Spain. Given in the head-quarters at Saragossa, the 31st May, 1808.—PALAFOX, Governor and Captain-General of the Kingdom of Arragon.

ASTURIA.

Loyal Asturians! beloved countrymen! your first wishes are already fulfilled. The principality, discharging those duties which are most sacred to men, has already formally declared war against France. You may perhaps dread this vigorous resolution. But what other measure could or ought we to adopt? Shall there be found one single man among us, who prefers the vile and ignominious death of slaves to the glory of dying on the field of honour, with arms in his hand, defending our unfortunate monarch, our homes, our children, and our wives? If the very moment, when those bands of banditti were receiving the kindest offices and favours from the inhabitants of our capital, they murdered in cold blood upwards of two thousand people, for no

other reason, than their having defended their insulted brethren, what could we expect from them, had we submitted to their dominion? Their perfidious conduct towards our king and his whole family, whom they deceived and decoyed into France under the promise of an eternal armistice, in order to chain them all, has no precedent in history. Their conduct towards the whole nation, is more iniquitous than we had the right to expect from a horde of Hottentots. —They have profaned our temples; they have insulted our religion; they have assailed our wives; in fine, they have broken all their promises, and there exists no right which they have not violated. To arms, Asturians, to arms! let us not forget, that Asturias at the time of another invasion, which undoubtedly was less unjust, restored the monarchy. Let us aspire to the same glory on the present occasion. Let us recollect that no foreign nation could ever lord it over us, whatever exertion it may have made for that purpose. Let us offer up our prayers to the God of Hosts. Let us implore the intercession of our Lady of Battles, whose image is worshipped in the most antient temple of Covadonga; and perfectly sure that she cannot forsake us in so just a cause, let us rush upon our detestable enemy, and annihilate and drive out of our peninsula, a people so base and treacherous. This demand is addressed to you in the name of your representatives, by the procurator general of the principality.—ALVARO FLOREZ ESTAUDA.

OVIEDO.

The council general of the principality must not lose a moment to publish the following letter which has just been received from their king, Ferdinand the VII. and the authenticity of which is ascertained by one of the members of the council, who possesses the most unquestionable knowledge thereof. On the first cover is the superscription—"To the royal assemblage of Oviedo." The second is superscribed—"To the chief of arms of Asturias."—"Noble Asturians.—I am surrounded on all sides, and a victim of perfidy. You saved Spain under worse circumstances than the present. Being now prisoner, I demand not from you the crown, but I require, that, concerting a well digested plan with the neighbouring provinces, you do assert your liberty, and not submit to a foreign yoke, nor subject yourselves to the treacherous enemy, who despoils of his rights your unfortunate—PRINCE FERDINAND.—Bayonne, May 8th, 1808."—To expressions so energetic and impressive the council ought not to add any observation; but with the most poig-

nant grief they mingle their tears with those of all their beloved and faithful countrymen, to whom the letter is communicated.—
JUAN DE ARGÜENNER TORAL, Act. Secretary.

GALICIA.

Brave Spaniards,—The application of his kingdom by our Sovereign Ferdinand VII. officially communicated to us, is the most striking proof of the violence he suffers. He thereby manifests to us his want of liberty and power, and the grief he feels on being compelled, by despotism and tyranny, to separate himself from his subjects; he implicitly demands our assistance. It is intended to substitute in his place a haughty and perfidious conqueror, who meditates the effusion of your blood, to satiate his sanguinary appetite and his boundless ambition, as he has hitherto profusely shed the blood of the noble, brave and loyal French nation. He means to drag, by main force, the most illustrious Spanish youths, whither the good faith of our monarch has already sent a great part of them, without any other object than to aggrandize a man, for whom the world does not appear to be sufficiently extensive, and who gluts on human blood. The reward of that generous act, has been a perfidious conduct, unprecedented in the annals of civilized nations. The stratagems, the frauds, the treacheries, are notorious, which Napoleon has employed to introduce, in the quality of an intimate ally and a faithful friend, his troops to our very capital, and makes himself master of the four seas on our frontiers; to harass the feelings of our monarch; to cause disturbances among the people; to rob us of king, prince and infant, and to controul with an iron hand the deliberation of our government, which, without liberty, gives orders which it abhors, ruled as they are by a foreign regent and intruder. This scandalous conduct, and that which he has committed with regard to Etruria, and our neighbours the Portuguese, point out to us the degree of fidelity and faith which we may expect from the high sounding promises with which he means to cloak his malignant designs, treating us as a people at once insensible and dastardly!—Shall a cultivated, brave, and generous nation, bend its neck under the yoke of perfidy? Shall it allow itself to be insulted by injuries—the most perfidious, immoral, and disgraceful, committed in the face of the whole world; and submit to the most humiliating slavery prepared for it? No, noble Galicians, such are not the dictates of your noble minds. Glowing with the most virtuous ardour and noblest enthusiasm, you have already expressed your sentiments,

worthy of the praise and imitation of all Spaniards. You rather wish to die, than to see your independence trampled under foot, your religion destroyed, your king in captivity, and your country threatened with a yoke equally burdensome and unjust. Quicken the generous sentiments of your noble minds. Fly to arms, not like that monster, to indulge an inordinate ambition; not like him, to violate the rights of humanity and the law of nations; not to render us odious to mankind; not to offend a generous and friendly nation, ruled by a monster already become insufferable upon earth—Fly to arms, to assist your countrymen; to rescue your king from captivity; to restore to our government liberty, energy, and vigour; to preserve your lives and those of your children; to maintain the uncontrolled right of enjoying and disposing of your property; to assert the independence of your native soil; and, above all, to defend your sacred religion. Employ the arms which she tenders; arm your minds with the fear of God; implore the aid of the immaculate conception, and of the glorious Apostle St. Jacob, our patron; and confident of success in so glorious a cause, rush forth to grasp the victory which is prepared for you by their intercession, and the justice of your cause.—And ye, corporations and private individuals, who, from your situation and circumstances, cannot take up arms, assist your brethren with your property and fortunes. You are concerned more than any other subject in this demand; sacrifice spontaneously part of your property, that you may not be deprived of the whole by violence. Do not delay that sacrifice a moment, if you wish that by the prompt execution of a well combined plan, the fury of an enemy be checked, who is accustomed at all times to act with the rapidity of lightning. Divest yourselves of all private views, and hesitate not; for, otherwise you yourselves, your wives, children, and families, will become the victims of the most inveterate revenge.—DON MANUEL ACHA, Sec.

PRECAUTIONS,

Which it will be proper to observe throughout the different Provinces of Spain, in the necessity to which they have been driven by the French, of resisting the unjust and violent possession which their Armies are endeavouring to take of the Kingdom.

We cannot doubt a moment of the exertions which the united provinces of Spain would make to obstruct and defeat the malicious designs of the French, and

that they will sacrifice even their lives on this occasion, the most important, and even unparalleled in the history of the nation, both in the thing itself, and in the horrible means of ingratitude and perfidy by which the French have undertaken, pursued, and are still endeavouring to effect our slavery:—

1. Let the first object be to avoid all general actions, and to convince ourselves of the very great hazards, without any advantage, or even the hope of it, to which they would expose us. The reasons of this resolution are many, and such as any one will discover who has the use of his understanding.—

2. A war of partisans is the system which suits us; the embarrassing and wasting the enemy's armies by want of provisions, destroying bridges, throwing up entrenchments in proper situations, and other similar means. The situation of Spain, its many mountains, and the passes which they present, its rivers and torrents, and even the collocation of its provinces, invite us to carry on this species of warfare successfully.—3. *It is indispensable that each province should have its general, of known talents, and of such experience as our situation permits, that his heroic loyalty should inspire the utmost confidence, and that every general should have under his command officers of merit, particularly of artillery and engineers.*—

4. As a combined union of plans is the soul of every well concerted enterprise, and that which alone can promise and facilitate a successful issue, it appears indispensable that there should be three generalissimos, who should act in concert with each other—one who should command in the four kingdoms of Andalusia, in Murcia, and Lower Estramadura—another in Galicia, Upper Estramadura, Old and New Castile, and Leon—another in Valencia, Arragon, and Catalonia; a person of the greatest credit being appointed to Navarre, the Biscayan Provinces, Montanus, Asturias, Rioja, and the North of Old Castile, for the purposes which will be mentioned hereafter.

—5. Each of these generals and generalissimos will form an army of veterans, troops and peasantry united, and put himself in a situation to undertake enterprises, and to succour the most exposed points, keeping up always frequent communication with the other generalissimos, in order that all may act by common accord, and assist one another.—6. Madrid and La Mancha require an especial general, to concert and execute the enterprises which their particular local situation demands—his only object must be to embarrass the enemy's armies, to take away, or cut off their provisions, to attack

them in flank and rear, and not to leave them a moment of repose. The courage of these inhabitants, is well known, and they will eagerly embrace such enterprises if they are led, as they should be. In the succession war the enemy entered twice into the interior of the kingdom, and even as far as its capital, and this was the cause of defeat, their entire ruin, and their utter failure of success.—7. The generalissimos of the North and East will block up the entrances to the provinces under their command, and come to the assistance of any one that may be attacked by the enemy, to prevent as much as possible all pillage, and preserve its inhabitants from the desolation of war; the many mountains and defiles which are on the confines of these provinces being favourable to such projects.—8. The destination of the general of Navarre, Biscay and the rest of this department is the most important of all, in which he will be assisted by the generals of the North and East: with the troops and other succours which he stands in need of. His whole business must be to shut the entrance of Spain against fresh French troops; and to harass and destroy those that return from Spain to France by this point. The very rugged local situation of these provinces will be of singular advantage in such a design, and these enterprises, if well concerted and carried into execution, will no doubt be successful; and the same may be understood of the different points by which the French troops which are in Portugal may come into Spain, or by which French troops may enter through Roussillon into Catalonia, for there is not much to be apprehended for Arragon. And, even from Portugal, it is not thought that they will come, on account of the proclamations which have been circulated in that kingdom, and the hatred which they before bore to the French being increased without measure by the innumerable evils which they have been made to suffer, and the cruel oppression in which they are held by them.—9. At the same time it would be very proper that the generalissimo should publish and circulate frequent proclamations amongst the people, and rouse their courage and loyalty, shewing them that they have every thing to fear from the horrible perfidy with which the French have dealt with all Spain, and even with their king Ferdinand VII. and that if they rule over us all is lost, kings, monarchy, property, liberty, independence, and religion; and that therefore it is necessary to sacrifice our lives and property in defence of the king, and of the country, and though our lot (which we

hope will never come to pass) should destine us to become slaves, let us become so fighting and dying like gallant men, not giving up ourselves basely to the yoke like sheep, as the late infamous government would have done, and fixing upon Spain and her slavery eternal ignominy and disgrace.

France has never domineered over us, nor set her foot in our territory. We have many times mastered her, not by deceit, but by force of arms; we have made her kings prisoners, and we have made the nation tremble—we are the same Spaniards; and France, and Europe, and the world shall see, that we are not less gallant, nor less brave than the most glorious of our ancestors.

—10. All persons of education in the provinces should be stimulated to frame, print, and publish frequent short discourses, in order to preserve the public opinion, and the ardour of the nation, confuting at the same time the infamous diaries of Madrid, which the baseness of the late government has permitted, and still permits to be published in Madrid itself, and has caused to be circulated abroad, detecting their falsehoods and continual contradictions; let them cover with shame the miserable authors of these diaries, and sometimes extend their remarks to those Charlatans, the French Gazetteers, and even to their *Moniteur*: and let them display and publish to Spain, to all Europe, their horrible falsehoods and venal praises, for they afford abundant matter for such a work. Let all such perverted minds tremble at Spain, and let France know that Spaniards have thoroughly penetrated their designs, and therefore it is that they justly detest and abominate them, and that they will sooner lay down their lives than submit to their iniquitous and barbarous yoke.

—11. Care shall be taken to explain to the nation, and to convince them, that when freed, as we trust to be, from this civil war, to which the French have forced us, and when placed in a state of tranquillity, our lord and king Ferdinand VII. being restored to the throne, under him and by him the Cortes will be assembled, abuses reformed, and such laws shall be enacted as the circumstances of the time and experience may dictate for the public good and happiness. Things which we Spaniards know how to do, which we have done as well as other nations, without any necessity that the vile French should come to instruct us, and, according to their custom, under the mask of friendship, and wishes for our happiness, should contrive, for this alone they are contriving, to plunder us, to violate our women, to assassinate us, to deprive us of our liberty, our laws, and our king, to scoff at and

destroy our holy religion, as they have hitherto done, and will always continue to do so long as the spirit of perfidy and ambition which oppresses and tyrannises over them shall endure.—“JUAN BAUTISTA PARDO, Secretary.” By Order of the Supreme Junta.

LEON.

When we behold the great and noble resistance which is at this moment opposed by the provinces of Galicia and Asturias, to the projects of the basest and most execrable of tyrants, it is impossible to believe but that they must be seconded by all, who, like themselves, have a sovereign to avenge, sacred rights, and a country to defend. Still, should any be restrained by fear; should any fail to concur in the sentiment which calls them to arms against an unprincipled oppressor, it will sufficiently determine them if we recal to their memory what Spain owes to the virtues, to the courage, to the heroism of Pelage, to the valour and to the patriotism of Rodrigue Diare de Bivar.—These two great men, one from the province of Asturias, the other from that of Castile, were called forth at different epochs, but both equally difficult, each to preserve our country from a foreign yoke. To their characters, and to the sentiments of enthusiasm which they excited in every breast, does Spain owe the glory and the happiness which she has so long enjoyed.—Should the government of Asturias discover that any part of the inhabitants take up arms coldly or indifferently in the defence of the country, let it address to them those sentiments which the immortal Pelage addressed to the citizens, to his brave companions in arms, when a formidable and cruel enemy wished to subjugate them to his power:—“It is no longer time to deliberate,” said this virtuous and courageous Spaniard, under circumstances nearly resembling the present; “the nature of our cause, the situation of our affairs, and those of the enemy, require promptitude and activity, and that we should not waste our time in useless deliberation. We arm to re-establish our laws, our religion, our glories, the liberty of our children, of our friends, of our country! to place in safety the honour and chastity of our wives; to rid ourselves of the yoke of a conqueror base as he is cruel, who has covered himself with our spoils, and under whose dread dominion our lives could not boast the security of a moment.—If ever opportunity occurred to tempt a most glorious enterprise, this is the moment—this moment in which we are assembled, united, bound together by a chain of interest, which equally concerns all! Inhabitants of the mountains, and ye of the vallies! Hear our determination

to arm, and join yourselves to us. Those even, whom the love of tranquillity hath hitherto deceived, and still retained among the Moors, I now behold ready to break their fetters, and join those who hasten to accomplish the great purpose of their struggle. The Moors in short are occupied with great projects; but for us, necessity should put an end to indecision, we have taken the first step, there is no longer time to retract; already they march against us; while we hesitate to place ourselves in a disposition to drive the enemy from our mountains, we shall be surrounded, we shall have no escape, and we are too great in number to subsist upon the stinted produce of bare and sterile rocks.—Come on then!—God, whose cause we support against the enemies of his name, will fight for us while we fight for him, and the hand which has punished us because we have forgotten him, will fortify our arms in a war undertaken for the honour of his glory! Let us put our confidence in the invincible strength of the Almighty! I will lead you to battle; I will ever be the first, and will require of you nothing but that of which I will set you an example."—This harangue, so suitable to the occasion, produced then the same effect as it will produce to-day. At the voice of Pelage, all the Asturians took up arms, each of them performed prodigies of valour; Cantabria and Galicia severally sent deputies, praying to be admitted into the confederation of Asturias; they were received, their means united, and the Moors were conquered.—Three hundred and thirty-nine years afterwards, Spain had another defender; this was Rodrigue Diere de Bivar, a fierce and noble Castilian of the city of Burgos. This virtuous citizen and gallant warrior, burning with desire to secure the liberty of his country, did not hesitate to remonstrate with animation, in a council where the king of Castile himself presided. He said he was ashamed to deliberate upon the pretensions of the emperor Henry II; that the independence of Spain was established above all titles! that base Spaniards alone could admit of its being compromised! that it should be upheld even at the expence of life, and that he would declare himself the enemy of that man who should advise the king to tarnish its lustre!—If the Prince of Peace, instead of betraying his sovereign and his country, had had the foresight, the loyalty, or the energy of the two great men we have just cited, the pretensions of Buonaparte, like those of Henry, would have been received with indignation. As the Moors were, under Philip, so the French would have been expelled, and Spain would have

been saved. What has not hitherto been done, may yet be achieved; but for that purpose there must be unanimity among principals, and a reunion, wisely combined, of all our forces and of all our means.—Without this concordance to retain our country's welfare, without the most resolute courage to drive from her bosom a cruel and perfidious enemy, like an enslaved people, we shall lose our fleet, our arsenals; our army will be disbanded or sent into Germany, our militia disarmed, our clergy despoiled and destroyed, our churches pillaged, our altars profaned, the lands of our grantees confiscated, our commerce ruined, our possessions beyond sea no longer belonging to our capital; the kingdom drained by enormous contributions; Spain, in short, happy and free under her kings, will be reduced to the most frightful slavery.—To avoid calamities so dreadful, one only resource remains to us. It is to rally round the standard which the provinces of Galicia and of Asturias have raised, in defence of religion, of justice and of honour. Children of our country! we will be worthy of ourselves; let us perpetuate the glory with which our ancestors are covered: great, like them, let us think no sacrifices too much, when we have our liberties to preserve, the massacre of our parents, or our friends, to revenge, our wives and children to defend. If, to the shame of the Spanish nation, there have been found men, such enemies to themselves and to their country, as to hasten to the feet of the tyrant, and prostitute before him their existence and their rights, let us nevertheless hope, that the chiefs of the Spanish league will not like Pelage, have to guard against designs such as those of the archbishop of Seville, who was base enough to betray his faith, his God, his king, and his country. Let us endeavour to believe, that the great and laudable example which the bishop of Oviedo and of Compostella have afforded, shall be followed, not only by all those in the kingdom, but likewise by every member of our respectable clergy, secular and regular, who, alike interested as the ministers of religion, and as good citizens, to punish crime, to accelerate the triumph of virtue, and to preserve Spain from the disgrace and oppression of a foreign yoke!—Signed by the members of the council at Leon, May 17th, 1808.

ADDRESS TO THE FRENCH.

FRENCHMEN.—You possess no longer either laws or liberty, nor any good whatever; with streams of blood shed by yourselves and your children, you have been compelled to enslave Europe. A family, not French, reigns over you and several European na-

tions, without the least benefit to France, or any other people. Spain, your constant ally has contributed you know, by a variety of means, to your triumphs; and yet she has been despoiled of her laws, her monarch, and her greatness, her very religion is threatened; and all this has hitherto been achieved, not by gallantry and valour, but by treachery and fraud, in which you are forced to co-operate; your valiant arms are defiled; you are made to assist in deeds of infamy, inconsistent with your generous character and with the name of the great nation, which you have acquired.—Frenchmen, the Spanish nation, your ally and generous friend, invites you to withdraw from banners, which are destined to enslave all nations, and to enlist under ours, which are raised for the best of causes, to defend our laws and our king, whereof we have been robbed, not by force of arms, but by fraud, treachery, and ingratitude of the deepest dye. We all will die, and you should die with us to wipe off the stain which will otherwise indelibly disgrace your nation. The Spaniards tender you the just reward for such an action; with open arms will they receive you, and fight by your side; and when the war shall be terminated with that success, which they have every reason to expect, land shall be given you, which you may cultivate unmolested, and pass your remaining days amidst a nation, which loves and respects you, and where impartial justice shall incorruptibly protect all your fair enjoyments.—Italians, Germans, of all the provinces of that great nation, Polanders, Swiss, and ye all who compose the armies called French, will you fight for him, who oppressed and despoiled you of what you held most sacred? For him who has dragged you from your families and homes, robbed you of your property, your wives, your children, your native country, which he has enslaved? and will you fight against a nation, generous like the Spanish, from whom you experienced the kindest reception, which loves you with the tenderest attachment, and which at the zenith of its glory and dominion respected your rights, because it looks upon all as brethren. Will you fight against a nation, which it is intended to subdue and enslave, not by dint of arms, as brave men would do, but under the cloak of alliance and friendship, by fraudulent treachery, detestable and horrid beyond any precedent in history, even among barbarous nations. We hope you will not. Come to

us, and you shall meet with valour, generosity, and true honour. We tender the same rewards to you as to the French; and we trust, you and your posterity will enjoy them in happiness and peace.—DON JUAN BAUTISTA ESTELLER, First Secretary.—DON JUAN BAUTISTA DE PEDRO, Second Secretary.—*Seville, May 29, 1808.*

VALLADOLID.^o

NOBLE CASTILIANS!—The common foe of mankind was the traitor who tore from our bosom our amiable Ferdinand VII. and the whole of the royal family. He carries his audacity the length of holding out to us offers of happiness and peace, while he is laying waste our country, pulling down our churches, and slaughtering our brethren. His pride, cherished by a set of villains who are constantly anxious to offer incense on his shrine, and tolerated by numberless victims, who pine in his chains, have caused him to conceive the fantastical idea of proclaiming himself lord and ruler of the whole world. There is no atrocity which he does not commit to attain that end. The respectable name of the great emperor of Russia; the political dissimulation of the German emperor; the timorous condescension of the holy father of the church; the opinion of true Frenchmen, exposed more than others to the severity of their iron sceptre; in short, the most sacred laws of humanity have been trampled under foot with the utmost contempt, to pronounce the detestable sentence of the extirpation of the house of Bourbon. Shall all these outrages, all these iniquities, remain unpunished, while Spaniards, and Castilian Spaniards, yet exist? No, it cannot be. Your minds glowing with generous ardour for your religion and your country, have resolved to renew the heroic scenes, in which Castilian valour shone with immortal lustre, saved the country, and consolidated our religion. The stratagems which hitherto secured victories to the tyrant, vanished the moment when Europe saw with her own eyes the artful snares and devices by which he seduced the unwary, until he had bent their neck under his yoke. Let us shed the last drop to resist that dominion. Let us all become gallant soldiers, full of discipline and subordination. Let us breathe but obedience and respect for the great man by whom we are governed, one of the best generals of Spain, his excellency Don Gregorio de la Cuerta. To arms, Castilians, to arms; let us die for our country, our religion, and our king.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"The examples in history, wherein subjugation and tyranny have been introduced from abroad, under the mask of friendship and defence, are infinite: and, the domestic examples of freedom destroyed by surrendering the sword to the sovereign, in hopes of being thereby defended, are precisely as many in number as the instances of that insane policy." MAJOR CARTWRIGHT. *Ægis*, Vol. I. page 36.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—Major Cartwright, from whose work upon national defence my motto is taken, has for a long time most earnestly endeavoured to produce, in the public mind, a conviction, that there can be no sure and safe defence but that which arises from a general arming of the people. His work is very elaborate, and, therefore, I shall not attempt to dip into the detail; but these are the positions it maintains: that the whole of the people, capable of bearing arms, ought to have arms put into their hands, and ought, at all times, to be fit to use those arms; that there might be a standing army for foreign service, but that the defence of the country should rest solely upon the people; that a country defended by a standing army, in fact, a country enslaved with means furnished by itself.—Amongst those who are not desirous of keeping the people in a state of virtual slavery, the scheme of Major Cartwright has been objected to only because they doubted of its practicability; only because they feared, that, as opposed to standing armies, to regular and well-disciplined troops, under experienced commanders, an armed population would be as chaff before the wind; and such, I confess, was my opinion, though I always approved of putting arms into the hands of the people; because, after all is said and done, the country is *the people's*, and, if they cannot be trusted with its defence, for *whose sake*, I would ask, is that defence to be undertaken? —But, the events in Spain do really seem to promise a complete practical proof of the soundness of the doctrine of this venerable patriot, who, I should think, must be thereby not a little gratified.—Our eyes are now directed, in the most forcible manner, towards a people, who had been so long oppressed, that they had apparently lost the very notion of freedom; a people amongst whom there existed scarcely the forms of rights and immunities; a people who possessed not any ground-work for a general arming; a people completely disarmed, and cut off from all association with one another for

any national purpose; a people sunk even in their own eyes, and appearing to retain, under their late government, not the desire to be free, and, of course, not the smallest desire to defend their country against an invader. In this state of abject subjection, they quietly see their government introduce a foreign army into their country and even into its metropolis; the commander of that army is, by the act of their own king, constituted the Lieutenant of the kingdom, and they are commanded to obey him upon pain of death; all the passes and out-posts of their country are, beforehand, placed in the hands of the invader; all those, at whose names they have long been accustomed to tremble, go over to that invader, espouse his cause and endorse his proclamations; the people have no sovereign, no constituted authority, no acknowledged chief, no leader, no known point round which to rally, while they are hourly plied with threats of punishment, of towns sacked and inhabitants exterminated, and that, too, by those who have given to the world numerous proofs, that, in this respect, they never fail of being as good as their word. Were there ever disadvantages so great? And, if this people (which God grant!) should succeed in defending their country against those very armies who have walked over the fortresses of Germany, Italy, and Flanders, and who have hoisted their flag at Vienna, Berlin, and almost at Petersburg; if this should be the case, who will say, that martello-towers, intrenchments, lines of circuvallation, depôts, barracks, and standing armies are necessary for the internal defence of a country? —It has, of late, been said, in answer to those who have expressed their dislike of the new system of an immense standing army and numerous military depôts and stations, that "the circumstances of Europe are totally changed." In other words, that, because the French have great standing armies to attack us with, it is necessary for us to have standing armies for our defence; but, this argument will, if the Spanish Patriots succeed, be no longer

of any force; if they beat the very armies who have beaten all the standing armies and all the most experienced generals in Europe, the question will be scuttled at once, and there will not, I should think, be a single man in England bold enough to insist, that we stand in need of so fearful a military force in this kingdom, especially if the arming plan of Major Cartwright were adopted, and all the frippery of volunteering were thrown aside.—The stand, which the Spanish Patriots have *already* made, does, indeed, warrant the conclusion here aimed at; for, we are in a situation quite different from theirs. We have no invading army in the heart of the country; we have no treacherous ministers gone over to the enemy; we have no want of arms and ammunition; we have no want of a settled system of government; every man is in his place; and, above all, there are here no passes open for the inroads of an invader. Should the Spanish Patriots fail, therefore, after having made a respectable stand, their want of final success will be no proof of our inability to defend ourselves, under such a system as should, at once, put arms in the people's hands and inspire their minds with motives to use them. In this light, considered as affording lessons to ourselves, the deeds of the Patriots in Spain are deeply interesting to every man in this kingdom. And, if it should become the general opinion, that our defence needs not barracks, depots, fortresses, and standing armies, and that opinion should prevail, what a blessing it will be! That army now costs about twenty millions of pounds sterling a year, raised in taxes upon the people. It employs, in all ways, about three hundred thousand able men. Not more than from 40 to 50 thousand would be necessary for services abroad. What a great relief it would be, if the rest of this vast number of men were to return to labour, and if, at the same time, fifteen millions of pounds sterling a year were saved! Why, the very *boards and commissions*, appointed to examine into the accounts of our present army, cost the whole amount of no trifling tax. The ramifications of army connection and influence are endless. We do not all wear red coats, but who is there that can say, that he is quite independent of the standing army? If any one will say, that it is good that it should be so; that military rule is the best sort of rule; and that all which has been written and said to the contrary is nonsense; such a man is candid, and may be disputed with, but, with the hypocrites, who keep crying out "constitution," and yet do not wish that means of defence may be found other than those of

barracks, depots, and a standing army, there is no reasoning at all.—It argues well that the Spanish Patriots have taken possession of the French fleet themselves. They thereby discover confidence as to their final success; and, though their commander at Cadiz avowedly acts for Ferdinand, that may produce but little mischief. Indeed, if the Spaniards restore Ferdinand, their work will not be less a *revolution*; for, they thereby cast off their old king, and, a new-modeling of their government will necessarily be included. Indeed, it is possible, that they might, in one sense, have a better bargain for Ferdinand than of an entire new sovereign; for he would be more dependant upon his people, than a chief of another description might be; for, a new chief might threaten them with a restoration of the old despotism, and thus, with the aid of the name of pretender, terrify them into submission to a sway even more tyrannical in fact, though not in form, than that from which they had delivered themselves. They will and ought to, do as they please as to this matter; but, I am glad to see, that whatever formal acts are done, are done in the name of the people. It is the "deputy of the people," who goes to treat with the French admiral; and, in the people's name the several juntas, or councils, all act. A war for Ferdinand, avowedly for him and in his name, would assuredly fail.—Some of the leaders seem very anxious to prevent the people from supposing, that they are engaged in a *revolution*; and, it is not only possible, but probable, that they may not have a design to make a revolution; but, they must, or they must submit to Napoleon; for, the energy, the talents, the free discussions, the publications, without which his power is not to be resisted, will and must produce a complete change of the government. The men, who shall have beaten the armies of France, who shall have driven out the hordes of resolute robbers, armed with muskets, will never again submit to the insolent sway of a swarm of tame cheaters, who pilaged under the sanction of what they called the law, who, having the jail and the gibbet under their command, with endless bands of alguazils and corregidores to assist them, not only plundered the people, but made them assist in the act of plundering one another. No: there is but this one choice. Either the people of Spain must be slaves to Napoleon, or they must be free; and, indeed, this is the only choice; that they ought to have; if they are not fighting for freedom, what are they fighting for? If they are content with being slaves, what matters it who is their master? Joseph

Napoleon may be scoundrel enough; but, what could he possibly do worse, than sell thirty or forty thousand of the people to go to fight in the north of Europe, as the late detestable government did? How could he disgrace the Spaniards more than they were before disgraced? The junta of Seville, which seems to have taken the lead of all the rest, say that "it became necessary to break the shackles, which prevented the Spanish people from displaying their generous ardour;" but, if the junta believes, that these shackles are to be made whole again, they grossly deceive themselves. The battle is for the freedom of Spain; for the effecting of a revolution; and, we shall see, that, let who will be sovereign, the government will bear little resemblance to what it was before. Were the Buonapartes to be defeated at once, the old bribery and corruption system might be pitched up, with some little talk about "a reform of abuses" and a hundred or two of fair promises, made but to be broken; but as the struggle will be long and bloody, if the Patriots succeed, those who have bled in the cause, will take care not to become again the slaves of those who before betrayed them, and of whose baseness they will, at every new danger and difficulty, contract a new degree of hatred.—It is curious enough, that, after all the continent of Europe has submitted to the arms of France, stout resistance on the part of the people, should, at last, be met with in the Spaniards. Doctor Duigenan and his friends must be surprized to find that the "*most catholic*" appear to be the *only* people, who have a sincere hatred of the French and their emperor. They will hardly place their motto, "no-popery," upon the English banners to be unfurled in Spain. Napoleon has endeavoured to persuade the Spaniards, that he has the Pope's sanction for what he has done, and is doing, with regard to Spain; but, as will be seen by the documents, the Spanish Patriots reject this with scorn, and remind the people, that he has just come from robbing the poor Pope. Why should we suppose, then, that the Catholics of England or Ireland would be disposed to side with Napoleon? Why are they less worthy of trust, in our fleets and armies, than Protestants are?—If the Catholic religion, the religion of our forefathers, be so damnable a thing, why do we assist Catholics in a foreign country? This is a weighty point for a *tender conscience*, and well worthy of an early investigation; for, though Buonaparté is our enemy at present, it seems that he is doing his best to root out popery, and is, in

this respect, co-operating with the ministry of England. Napoleon has had to fight against Protestants enough, upon the continent of Europe, and has beaten them all, making their princes scamper before him like sheep. He has found the most Catholic princes still more gentle, if possible; but, the people, he has found resolute to defend their country. This proves, that the mere circumstance of being a Catholic does not make men prone to either slavery or cowardice. The greatest coward, the most notorious coward, the most beaten and despised thing, in the shape of a man, that I ever heard or read of, was a Protestant. There may be a coward as perfect amongst the Catholics: but, for the honour of human nature, I should hope that there never was but one of the sort in the whole world. It is not a man's religion that makes him a coward. It is a certain natural weakness, which no man can help, and for which he is not to be blamed, unless he voluntarily assume the garb of a hero, and put forward pretensions to powers and honours and rewards, in that character. When he does this, he deserves not only public censure but punishment; because he, by his cowardice, exposes the lives and reputation of the soldiers or sailors under his command, tarnishes the renown and hazards the safety of his country, and this is what no man ought to be suffered to do with impunity.—It would be rash to say precisely what our ministers ought to do in the way of assistance given to Spain; but, I must confess, that I should like to have heard, before now, of the expedition having *actually sailed*. What does it do hanging about so long? If it does not land in Spain, there are other places enough. I think it will be lucky if the struggle in Spain be of long duration; but, it depends, perhaps, upon our promptitude at the present moment, whether there shall be any serious struggle at all. The disposition of the Spanish revolutionists has been known long enough for us to have received an account of the reception of our promises of aid; and yet our armaments are still lying in port! It is rumoured, that there have been difficulties about choosing a commander; but, surely, this cannot be the case, seeing how great an abundance of generals we have. I hope the commander, whenever he is appointed, will be one that has, at some time or other, in some one instance, *faced the enemy*, faced the French, I mean, in the *field*; for, as to facing them over a bottle, that any coward can do. Let our troops have, at their head, a man who has one single time in his life looked the French in the

face, in the field of battle, and I shall be confident as to the result. There, should, however, be no delay in sending what troops we can muster up to make a diversion in favour of the Spaniards. Napoleon has now a pretty wide range to look to, and will not be able to provide for every contingency and to carry on a war in Spain at the same time. So large a country as Spain, including Portugal, in a state of pretty general resistance, will demand, at least, two hundred thousand men. Then there is all the space between the Atlantic and the Adriatic to keep in subjection, together with Holland and Germany. He never can do it all. If there be a general insurrection in Spain, followed by a war of six months, he must be defeated there, or must lose his sway in some other quarter. Of what vast importance is it, then, that we are prompt in contributing our share towards the producing of that insurrection, towards blowing up a flame, which when once safely kindled cannot fail to burn with fury. Our armament, under some brave and experienced officer, should now have been landed, or, at least, hovering upon some coast, where it might have drawn off part of the force of Napoleon. But, really, the language of the Patriots is so bold, it contains such home truths, it gives such hard slaps, that I have been half afraid of their discretion being suspected.

The cry of *death, or freedom*, resounds from one end of the kingdom to the other; the dishonourable career of CORRUPTION has been run; the arts and machinations to *divide and terrify* been attempted in vain." Such is their language in one of their proclamations, and there are others, which are still more "violent" upon the subject of *corruption and abuses*. So that, in fact, if one were to give any description of the cause, in which the Patriots are engaged, one would be disposed to say that they are waging a war against bribery and corruption and speculation much more than against Buonaparté, and, you know, reader, it is Buonaparté whom we wish to put down.—The talk about *subscriptions* has been mere talk. No subscription is going on; no subscription is encouraged by any one in authority; we hear of no voluntary contributions proposed. Very cool upon it, at both ends of the town! It is to be hoped, that the Spaniards will be able to do without such subscriptions. Meetings upon the subject might produce statements and comparisons and conclusions; but, surely, there could be no danger in Englishmen meeting to congratulate one another upon the prospect of seeing Spain

recover her freedom! Yet, the ministerial newspapers do actually discourage all such meetings. They seem to be extremely anxious to keep people from having an opportunity to make speeches upon the subject; and, I should not be very much surprised to hear any meeting which may take place, termed disorderly, if not seditious. Only let the thing go well on in Spain, however, and, in time, we shall not, I hope, have to regret the want of such meetings.

THE POOR.—I was, some little time past, put in possession of a statement, relative to the expenditure, on account of the poor, in the parish of ENFIELD, in Middlesex, which statement I deem worthy of general notice, and which, therefore, I shall insert here.—"ENFIELD, April, 1808.—The following Comparison of "Parochial Expenditure, between the time "when we were in the Road to Kain, and "the present Year, is drawn for the information of the inhabitants of this parish; "by PETER HARDY.—By introducing a regular and known Table at the work-house (by which the people are better fed than before); by substituting economy for waste; by obliging those to work who were able; and by refusing the able and healthy, but idle, drunken and dissolute, admittance into the work-house, (which ought only to be a refuge for infancy, the sick and the aged) society in general has been benefited, and the inhabitants of this town relieved of a very enormous burthen.—At that time as much Meat was destroyed at the work-house in one week, as is consumed now in three months. That article cost us then at the rate of £600 per annum. It now costs us £60.—At that time we consumed of bread 90 half-pecks per week. We now consume on an average 16.—Bread and flour alone cost us in a year then, double what the whole house costs now.—We paid then, for cheese only, double what we pay now for every article of shop goods.—We then consumed 100 cart-loads of wood and 18 chaldron of coals in a year. We now consume only 12 chaldron of coals, without any wood.—At that time we raised £3,900 poor's rates per annum. We now raise £1,900.—We then had above £2,000 by sale of timber from the Chase, in addition to our rates. We now have £400.—We were at that time very deeply in debt. We now do not owe any debts."—This reform was, it appears, effected by the activity, good-sense, and public-spirit of this Mr.

Hardy, to whom the parish have given, I believe, some mark of their respect and gratitude.—Of all the numerous symptoms of national decline in England, none is, perhaps, so strong, so completely indisputable, as the rapid increase of our paupers. There are, out of nine millions of people, one million and a quarter of paupers; that is to say, of persons, who *cannot* have any motive whatever for wishing to preserve the government and the laws. Nearly a *seventh* part of the whole population of England and Wales is of this description. As to the great cause of this increase of pauperism, it evidently is the corresponding increase of taxation, through the means of which so many are maintained in idleness upon the fruit of the labour of others. I have, I think, upon a former occasion, clearly shown, that taxes, if carried to a certain extent, *must* cause some of the people to be so poor as to be unable to maintain themselves; but, at present, my object is to offer a few observations as to what might now be done, with a view of checking this lamentable evil, if only one or two of the principal persons, in each parish, would heartily set about the work.—Until of late years, there was, amongst the poor, a horror of becoming chargeable to the parish. To become chargeable was a reproach; and never to have been chargeable was a subject of proud exultation. This feeling, which was almost universal, was the parent of industry, of care, of economy, of frugality, and of *early* habits of labour amongst children. But, this feeling is now extinguished; the barrier, shame, has been broken down, and in have rushed for parish aid all those, whether young or old, who are not of a turn of mind which must always be rarely met with.—The parishes, instead of endeavouring to check the evil by a vigilant attention to the different earnings and means and manners of the poor, have, in general, adopted the easy course of giving *wages* in the shape of relief. For instance, the week's wages is, in some places, ten shillings, and, in order to put the labourer with a family upon a par with the labourer without a family, the former receives, in the shape of relief, a certain allowance for each child above two. So that, as a *matter of course*, every labourer, who has more than two children, becomes, with all his family, paupers; they sink quietly and contentedly into that state, from which their grandfathers, and even their fathers, shrunk with horror. Nay, when a labourer, in such a state of things, marries, he counts the pauper chest among his ways and means; and even

his hours of courtship are partly spent in anticipating the receipts from that ~~never~~ failing source. That men should possess ~~spirit~~, that there should be any independence of mind, that there should be frankness, amongst persons so situated, is impossible. Accordingly, whoever has had experience in such matters, must have observed, with deep regret, that, instead of priding himself upon his little possessions, instead of decking out his children to the best advantage, instead of laying up in store the trifling surplus produce of the harvest month, the labourer now, in but too many instances, takes care to spend all as fast as he gets it, makes himself as poor as he can, and uses all the art that he is master of to cause it to be believed, that he is still more miserable than he really is. What an example for the children! And what must the rising generation be? It used to be the boast of the labourer, that he could mow or reap or hough so much in a day; that he could earn so much money by his labour; but, now, if he does earn great wages, his first and greatest care is to disguise the fact; and, it frequently happens, that he will change from master to master, and from one sort of work to another, for the express purpose of preventing the parish from being able to ascertain the amount of his earnings. When part of his children become able to assist in maintaining the family, he takes care that the amount of their earnings shall never be known; and, as he still gains by counting them amongst the number to be maintained, he keeps them at home, in preference to sending them to annual service, where they would, under the command of others, contract those habits of industry, regularity, and obedience, which, in very few cases, in any rank of life, children contract at home. So that this system operates in producing a twofold mischief, 1st, in encouraging the labourer to rear his children paupers, and 2ndly, in preventing them from ever shaking-off their pauper-like habits. When children, thus reared, do become servants, they are generally the very worst of servants. Bred up in dissimulation, no word that they utter can be believed; they are totally unworthy of confidence; and, as is universally the case with slaves, they are sure to be insolent when they can be so with impunity.—It is very right, that some power should stand ready to decide between the pauper and the parish; but, even this institution, so benevolent in its intention, has its evils. To resist, by a formal process, the claims of a pauper has always the appearance, or, at least, is liable to the imputation, of

hardness of heart; and, especially when the exence of yielding does not fall upon themselves, this is an imputation which few men are willing to incur; yet, it is easy to conceive, what shocking abuses must arise from a general yielding to claims of this sort. Parish aid has this peculiar defect in it, that it *never excites gratitude*, and, of course, produces none of those amiable effects, which naturally flow from gratitude. Upon the parish the pauper makes a demand; he comes, like a dun, with a threat of the law ready to apply in case of refusal; and, whether he obtain his ends or not, his feelings are nearly the same.

—There is another terrible consequence of this system of general pauperism, and that is, that it withholds from the cripple, from the orphan, from the helpless widow, from the aged, and from all those who are really objects of compassion, and who ought to be comfortably supported and tenderly guarded; from all these it withholds a part, at least, of what they ought to receive. It confounds these with those who have brought themselves into misery by their laziness, or their vices. I know an instance, in a parish which has now a work-house, of two men, one about forty, who lost his two eyes in two drunken brawls, and who scarcely ever did a day's work in his life; the other, upwards of fourscore, who fought at the battle of Minden, and who worked, I think, 'till his eighty-fourth year. What could be more unjust than to couple these men together under the general name of paupers, and to treat them alike? Yet, until they had a work-house, the parish, though very desirous to do it, were unable to discriminate; were unable to give any visible and solid proof, that they looked upon one man as being more entitled to their compassion than the other.—I have introduced the statement respecting the work-house at Enfield, for the purpose of showing what abuses work houses are exposed to, when left in common hands; but, I am satisfied, that, if the *gentlemen* of the parishes, whether in town or country, were to take the superintendence, or controul, upon themselves, such establishments would become of the greatest utility. To the farmers, who are the *payers*, the task of refusal is always an ungracious one; being parties, and parties refusing to pay, the magistrates hear them, and ought to hear them, with some suspicion, unless under particular circumstances. Besides, the farmers have not time to attend to any concerns but their own; and, unless they are of the superior order of farmers, they can-

not be expected to be proper judges of all the various matters, upon which they have to decide. Gentlemen are seldom payers of poor-rates to an amount that can produce a temptation to do what is cruel or harsh; they are better qualified for making representations to the magistrates; they stand as umpires between the farmers and the poor, with a little harmless bias towards the latter; and, it would happen but in few cases, that there would be any appeal from their decision. An instance of the effects of an interference of this sort may be witnessed in the parish of Droxford, in this county, where one gentleman has, by his sole exertions, reduced the poor rates to one half of their former amount, and is, I am told, able to say, that now there is no such thing as misery in his parish, where it was formerly visible in numerous families. For my part, I know of no greater blessing to a parish than such a man; and, I wish he had more imitators, amongst those who run from the misery of their neighbourhoods to the gaieties of the metropolis. The parish rates, all together, of England and Wales amount to nearly, if not quite, *six millions* annually. Look at *Enfield* and *Droxford*; and ask yourself, why, under the zealous efforts of only one or two men in each parish, a general effect of the same sort, and in the same degree, might not take place? The poor-rates, in general, amount to one half as much as the *rent of the land*. Is this an object beneath the consideration of the proprietors of the land? Or, is it of less importance to them, than the babble about what they call politics, which so many of them help to keep up in London? But, the most weighty consideration of all, is, that, by neglecting to perform this, their natural duty, they suffer those who are real objects of compassion and of tenderness to be confounded with the lazy, sturdy pauper, and they leave the rising generation to come up to man's estate, with minds divested of even the idea of independence. If a gentleman talks to me of love of country, of public-spirit, I would ask him how he can so effectually and usefully evince it, as in this way? His efforts in almost all other ways may be useless; but, in this way, they are not only certain to be attended with utility, but immediate utility.—The numerous general regulations that have been made by parliament, without producing any good effect, the paupers having, notwithstanding all of them, continued to

increase in number, prove, that, while the present system of taxation lasts, it is in vain to seek for any general remedy for this great and disgraceful evil. The remedy, or the mitigation, at least, must come from individual exertion, or the whole evil must not only remain, but must receive daily addition. It appears to me, that country gentlemen should lay it down as a rule never to have a pauper in their employ, and that, according to the quantity of their work, they should select men of the largest families and pay them for their labour a sufficiency for their maintenance. This would be giving an example to the farmers, and would, at the same time, be fixing a mark of disgrace upon pauperism. I cannot endure the idea of the labourer's receiving regularly, while he and his family are ill in good health, a part of his subsistence in the character of a pauper. Nothing does good but that which is *earned*. There are particular cases when acts of charity (properly so called) are useful, but, I like not the system of *present* and *rewards*. The labourer, like other men, will do little for himself if he be coaxed to do it, and, like other men, he will not, if he can avoid it, have any one to watch over him, or pry into his concerns. I am for giving him his earnings, and, that he may set a high value upon them, say not a word which shall lead him to believe, that I do not regard them as his own. If I had a labourer, who was to become a notorious drunkard, I would dismiss him, because it would be my duty strongly to shew my disapprobation of so beastly a vice; but, after a good deal of observation, I am thoroughly convinced, that, as a "wretched 'pot never boils,'" so a wretched penny never breeds. The lending of cows to cottagers and all that system of superintendence, including child-bed linen and the like, though arising, in most instances, from amiable motives, has, I am persuaded, never done any good, and, I make no doubt, that, if the fact could be ascertained, fifty pounds expended in good cheer of the old fashion, would not only excite more gratitude but would work more solid advantage to the receivers, than ten thousand pounds expended in "comforts" and spelling books. The "comforting" system necessarily implies *interference* on one side, and *dependance* on the other, and, if these exist, it matters not whether you call the "comforted" family paupers; for, they will feel themselves dependent, and will have no other than the mind and character which belong to the pauper state, the most

prominent feature of which is dissimulation, or, what is vulgarly called "making a poor mouth." I do not think that ladies visiting poor families is at all useful. When any part of a family, particularly the mother, is ill, then, indeed, such visits are proper, but, I have no opinion of the visitings, which, in some places, are in vogue. They savour too much of ostentation, and, whether they be really so, or not, ninety nine times out of a hundred they are so considered by the visited party. In short I am for giving the labourer a sufficiency, in the shape of wages, to maintain his family, and leaving him to live and manage his affairs entirely in his own way.—The great obstacle to the restoration of the labourers to their former independence of mind, is, that their wages, generally speaking, are partly paid in the shape of parish relief. A man, with a wife and three children, cannot possibly keep body and soul together upon ten, or even twelve, shillings a week, and, how, then, is he to labour upon the food which that wages will supply? Well, say the employers, we will, then, give him a little more wages in the shape of relief, because, if we make an addition to what he receives in the shape of wages, we must raise the wages of single-men also. And, why not? Would you have no soul of them all earn a penny more than what is barely sufficient to sustain life? Would you have them to be, in effect, slaves from the cradle to the grave? Of what avail is it for a man to be industrious, if his industry will neither enable him to live something up in store, nor enjoy a day of leisure or recreation? What motive has he to keep from the parish list, if he be certain, that a cut in the hand in whetting his scythe, will make him a prumper?—To those whom I may have wearied with these desultory remarks, I would beg leave to repeat, that the paupers of England and Wales are nearly a million and a quarter in number, and that, by the exertions of individuals of weight in their several parishes, this shameful evil may in some measure, at least, be removed.

Botley, 14th July, 1809

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—GALICIA.

(Continued from page 64.)

GALICIA.—You have bewailed the fate of your amiable Ferdinand. The horror of the perfidy by which he was seduced, still burns in your bosoms. You fear danger to our holy religion, you look upon our exterior worship as annihilated, upon our altars profaned, and the temples of the eternal and sole Omnipotent converted into places of do

isolation by order of the tyrant, who arrogates to himself the title of arbiter of destinies, because he has succeeded in oppressing the noble French nation, without recollecting, that he himself is mortal, and that he only holds the power delegated to him for our chastisement. You turned your eyes towards the municipal authorities, and you even insulted them; because they did not animate the flame of your indignation against the enemy. The time is come. Your kingdom has assembled in Cortes, and re-assumed the sovereign authority, which under such circumstances devolves upon it by right, and of which its first exercise is in complying with your wishes so loudly declared; you have already a leader, and the most vigorous dispositions are taking. Fly therefore to arms! and let us march to defend the cause of God, the honour of our country, our lives and our fortunes! Will you be insensible to the voice of the nation, and will you only be found valiant in the streets of your cities? Now, that twenty thousand brave soldiers have taken up your cause for theirs, will you refuse to unite with their generous battalions? Will you hesitate to embody yourselves with these masters of the military art? Do you imagine, forsooth, that your courage without discipline can be useful? Such ideas avail—receive in your arms these heroes who are going to marshal your strength, and only from the common name of Spaniards, even without being Galicians, feel a deep interest in your cause. The kingdom sends them to you. You should obey their sovereign and legitimate authority. Let discord fly from us; we are brothers, and are going to sacrifice ourselves for the same sacred cause.—Galicians! enrol yourself from 16 to 40 years of age. It is better to die in defence of your religion and freedoms, and in your own country, than to be led bound to slaughter in order to satisfy an inordinate ambition. The French conscription compels you. If you do not serve your kingdom, you will go and die in the north. We lose nothing. For even should we be unsuccessful, we shall have freed ourselves by a glorious death from the galling chains of a foreign yoke. But there is no reason to fear this peril. Death has alarms only for poltroons—and God, for whose cause we are going to fight, will watch over us, because, in the end, every mortal has a determined measure, and we ought to trust in his mercy, that when his wrath (which we so much deserve) is appeased, he will protect us. The standard of your holy patron Saint James is now unfurled; let us follow it.—Galicians! The Asturians and Alouenses have 80,000 men enlisted, and already

20,000 under arms. Let us go and relieve our brethren, these intrepid men. We shall thus save our country from becoming the theatre of war. This kingdom, which has assembled through your instance, expect it from you. This kingdom will reward those who distinguish themselves, with every thing in its power, and at the conclusion of the war it will immediately give you, your discharge, and enable you to enjoy the fruits of victory under the shade of the laurels you will have won, and consign to your children at your ease, the example of your glorious deeds.—DOMINGO VALADO DE PARGA, *sec.* Corunna, June 5th, 1808.

BISCAY.

Brave BISCAYANS AND COMRADES—Your wish is already fulfilled; the mine, which lay deep in your bosom, and our's, is sprung. The time has arrived when we are all called upon to make a noble sacrifice for our holy religion, our good laws and customs; and what object is more worthy of such a sacrifice than their preservation. Since last night, the whole of this town is in arms, to avenge the provocation and insults we have received from the French. Nothing was capable to check the ardour of our people, especially since they knew that you entertained the same sentiments with them. Yes, their ardour, their fervent courage, must be regulated by order, intelligence, and prudence, that it may produce the result at which we all aspire. Above all things, it is absolutely necessary that we should act in concert, and meet for that purpose, by proper deputation. A council has already been formed in this place furnished with all the necessary powers, and composed of us, the undersigned. If in imitation of the meetings, which took place in this country in 95, the deputies of the different districts meet without the least delay, the means of our common defence will soon be organized. We will mutually instruct and assist each other, according to the means and local circumstances of each district. Let for this purpose exact returns immediately be made of all, who can take up arms, from the age of seventeen to forty-five, and somewhat more, where bodily strength and vigour permit; let also instantly a return be made of all arms, fit for service, which are found in the different districts. Let us immediately be trained to arms by military men, retired from service, who are scattered over our provinces, and let us at least devote two hours a day to military exercise. The general principles, which move us to think and act as we do, you will with pleasure find elucidated in another paper, which for that purpose shall be circulated among you. *Santander, May*

27, 1808. R. Thomas, Bishop of Santander. D. Angel Gutierrez de Celis. D. Jose de Miranda. D. Francisco de la Torre. Coun. de Campo-Giro. D. Juan de Trueba. D. Geronimo de Argos. D. Jose Maria de la Torre. D. Jose de Quijano. D. Jac. Antonio de Losada. D. Vicente de Camino. D. J. M. Fernandez Velarde. D. Joaquin Perez de Cosin. D. Francisco de la Pedraja. D. J. Nepomuceno Munoz. By command of the illustrious council, D. Luis Del Campo, Sec. *Letter from the 1st Lord of the Admiralty to the Mayor of London, 11th July, 1808.*

My lord,—I have great pleasure in acquainting your lordship, that by dispatches received at the Admiralty this morning from vice admiral lord Collingwood, dated off Cadiz, the 14th of June, it appears that the French squadron in Cadiz struck their colours to the Spaniards at seven o'clock on the morning of that day, when the Spanish colours were immediately hoisted on board them. The Spanish admiral is about to embark for England on board the *Revenge*, commanded by Sir John Gore, as one of the commissioners from the council of Seville to his majesty's government.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MADRID.

PEOPLE OF MADRID,—Seville has learned with consternation and surprise your dreadful catastrophe of the second of May; the weakness of a government, which did nothing in our favour; which ordered arms to be directed against you, and your heroic sacrifices. Blessed be ye, and your memory shall shine immortal in the annals of our nation.—She has seen with horror, that the authors of all your misfortunes, and of our's, has published a proclamation, in which he distorted every fact, and pretended, that you gave the first provocation, while it was he who provoked you. The government was weak enough to sanction and order that proclamation to be circulated, and saw, with perfect composure, numbers of you put to death, for a pretended violation of laws which did not exist. The French were told in that proclamation, that French blood profusely shed, was crying out for vengeance! And the Spanish blood does not it cry out for vengeance?—that Spanish blood, shed by an army which hesitated not to attack a disarmed and defenceless people, living under their laws and their king, and against whom cruelties were committed which shake the human frame with horror. We, all Spain, exclaim—the Spanish blood shed in Madrid cries aloud for revenge!—Comfort yourselves; we are your brethren: we will fight like you, until we perish in defending our king and country. Assist us with your good wishes, and your continual

prayers offered up to the Most High, whom we adore, and who cannot forsake us because he never forsakes a just cause. Should any favourable opportunity offer, exert yourselves as valiant Spaniards, to shake off the ignominious yoke imposed on you with the slaughter of so many of your innocent fellow citizens, and with a perfidy horrid beyond example.—Don Juan Bautista Esteller, first secretary.—Don Juan Pardo, second secretary.—*Seville, the 20th May 1808.*

BANDO.

The supreme junta of government, desirous beyond measure that the public should partake of the joy which they feel, informs it,—1. That the city of Valencia, and the kingdom fired with the generous impulse of their loyalty, have proclaimed and sworn allegiance to their king Don Ferdinand VII. without any trouble or disorder whatever ensuing.—2. That in consequence thereof they named a government, to superintend the kingdom as long as the urgency of their circumstances should continue.—3. That they published a declaration to that purpose including other matters, which shall be communicated in due time.—4. That they recognise a sovereignty, and will neither receive nor obey any orders but those of Ferdinand VII. and in the interim the government be names, or that which represents him.—5. That the paper stamped in the name of the lieutenant general of the kingdom shall not be used.—6. That his excellency the count de Cervellon is named general of the troops.—7. That the aforesaid government should enforce a general enlistment of inhabitants, from the age of 16 to 40.—8. That they have stopped a number of chests of money, which were destined for Madrid.—And for the information and for an example which we hope will be followed by all Spain, the present paper is ordered to be published.—Royal palace of the Alcazar, May 31, 1808.—Don Juan Bautista Pardo, Sec. 2.—Don Manuel de Aguilar, Sec. 3.

CORDOVA—TO ITS INHABITANTS.

Soldiers!—The kingdoms of Andalusia see themselves attacked by the assassins of the north; your country is on the point of being oppressed by the yoke of a tyrant; you yourselves will be dragged from your firesides and from your homes. The wanton Murat is fabricating 40,000 manacles to conduct you, like the most contemptible animals, to the north. What atrocity! Who is such a coward, such an infidel, that his breast does not burn with courage, at the cries of his country lamenting over its destruction?—Soldiers! Do you, too, groan over it; but let your groans be the groans of rage and fury at the wretch who plunges her

in slavery and oppression. Would you rather die defending the robberies and impieties of a perfidious traitor, than shedding your blood in defence of your church, your nation, and yourselves?—Soldiers! ye that have been the first in raising the standard of the nation, carry into your camps, virtue, religion, and the manners of your forefathers. With such qualities they overcame innumerable armies. If among the chiefs who lead you to the theatre of glory and honour, you should perceive any treachery, abandon them, and choose others more worthy of your cause.—Soldiers! Twelve millions of inhabitants are observing you and envying your glory; nay, even France herself pants for your triumphs and success.

INSTRUCTION.

From the Supreme Junta of the Government, to all Cities and Towns, to be executed with the utmost promptitude.

1. In cities and towns consisting of 2000 or more house-holders, a junta shall be established, which shall superintend all arrangements, and shall be obeyed by all the inhabitants; and in places of smaller size, the ayuntamientos shall hold the place and perform the functions of the juntas.—2. It is ordered, that with the concurrence of the ayuntamiento, clergy, prelates, priests, nobles and other persons so assembled, a junta of six be formed to receive orders from the supreme junta, and correspond therewith, and in every particular act under their authority; and the inhabitants and the corregida are required to obey them in their office, and every thing thereunto appertaining.—3. It shall be the duty of this junta to enlist the inhabitants from the age of 16 to 45, first, such as volunteer their services, and then all the secular inhabitants of the aforesaid age; to form them in companies, to assign them respectable persons for captains, lieutenants, and ensigns, with full power to name sergeants and corporals, which they will proceed to do with all possible dispatch.—4. They will instruct the towns of their districts, and even those of the neighbouring districts, to submit to the same regulations, enlistments, and appointments, and to advise the junta thereof without delay.—5. For the present, each company shall remain in its district, but the junta is empowered, if it think fit, to call together the enlisted companies in the other towns.—6. The junta will name a confidential person to administer, under its direction, the funds which must meet the expences of the present occasion.—7. These funds shall be raised

by orders of the junta to all corporations and rich individuals, and over and above a subscription shall be opened; that all the inhabitants may contribute in proportion to their zeal for their king and country, and the urgent necessity of the cause.—8. To these funds shall be added patriotic loans of money, to be afterward repaid in full; and it is expected from the public spirit of the inhabitants, that there will be no occasion for forced loans, or any other proceeding, which, though it might be violent, would still be justifiable by the necessity of the case.—9. This proclamation (bandos) shall be printed and published by this supreme junta, and shall be placarded and circulated in all places.—10. All the magistrates and public functionaries are for the present confirmed in their respective offices.—*Seville, 29th May, 1808.*—1) JUAN BAUTISTA ESTELLER, Sec. 1^o. D. J. B. PARDO, Sec. 2^o.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL.

PORTUGUESE.—Your lot is, perhaps, the hardest ever endured by any people on the earth. Your princes were compelled to fly from you, and the events in Spain have furnished an irrefragable proof of the absolute necessity of that measure.—You were ordered not to defend yourselves, and you did not defend yourselves. Junot offered to make you happy, and your happiness has consisted in being treated with greater cruelty than the most ferocious conquerors inflict on the people whom they have subdued by force of arms, and after the most obstinate resistance. You have been despoiled of your princes, your laws, your usages, your customs, your property, your liberty, even your lives, and your holy religion, which your enemies never have respected, however they may, according to their custom, have promised to protect it, and however they may affect and pretend to have any sense of it themselves. Your nobility has been annihilated, its property confiscated in punishment of its fidelity and loyalty. You have been basely dragged to foreign countries, and compelled to prostrate yourselves at the feet of the man who is the author of all your calamities, and who, by the most horrible perfidy, has usurped your government, and rules you with the sceptre of iron. Even now your troops have left your borders, and are travelling in chains to die in the defence of him who has oppressed you, by which means his deep malignity may accomplish his purpose, by destroying those who should constitute your strength, and by rendering their lives subservient to his

triumphs, and to the savage glory to which he aspires.—Spain beheld your slavery, and the horrible evils, which followed it, with mingled sensations of grief and despair. You are her brother, and she panted to fly to your assistance. But certain chiefs, and a government either weak or corrupt, kept her in chains, and were preparing the means by which the ruin of our king, our laws, our independence, our liberty, our lives, and even the holy religion in which we are united, might accompany yours, by which a barbarous people might consummate their own triumph, and accomplish the slavery of every nation in Europe—our loyalty, our honour, our justice, could not submit to such flagrant atrocity! We have broken our chains—let us then to action. We have armies, we have chiefs, and the universal cry of Spain is, “We will die in defence of our country, but we will take care that these infamous enemies shall die with us.”—Come then, ye generous Portuguese! unite with Spain to die in defence of your country. Her banners expect you; they will receive you as brethren infamously oppressed.—The cause of Spain and of Portugal is the same: distrust not our troops—their wishes are the same as your own, and you may reckon upon their courage and their strength as a part of your security.—You have among yourselves the object of your vengeance—obey not the authors of your misfortune—attack them—they are but a handful of miserable panic-struck men, humiliated and conquered already by the perfidy and cruelties which they have committed, and which have covered them with disgrace in the eyes of Europe and the world! Rise then in a body, but avoid staining your honourable hands with crimes, for your design is to resist them and to destroy them—our united efforts will do for this perfidious nation; and Portugal, Spain, nay all Europe, shall breathe or die free like men.—Portuguese,—Your country is not in danger—it is already gone—unite, unite, and fly to restore and to save it.—*Seville, May 30, 1808.*—By direction of the supreme Junta of government, —DON JUAN BAUTISTA ESTELLER, Sec. 1^o. —DON JUAN BAUTISTA PARDO, Sec. 2^o.

DECLARATION OF WAR

Against the Emperor of France, Napoleon the First.

France, under the government of the emperor Napoleon the first, has violated towards Spain the most sacred contracts—

forced and manifestly void, abdication and

renunciation; has behaved with the same violence towards the Spanish nobles whom he keeps in his power—has declared that he will elect a king of Spain, the most horrible attempt that is recorded in history—has sent his troops into Spain, seized her fortresses and her capital, and scattered his troops throughout the country—has committed against Spain all sorts of assassinations, robberies, and unheard of cruelties; and this he has done with the most enormous ingratitude to the services which the Spanish nation has rendered France, to the friendship it has shown her, thus treating it with the most dreadful perfidy, fraud and treachery, such as was never committed against any nation, or monarch, by the most barbarous or ambitious king or people. He has in fine declared, that he will trample down our monarchy, our fundamental laws, and bring about the ruin of our holy catholic religion.—The only remedy therefore for such grievous ills, which are so manifest to all Europe, is in war, which we declare against him.—In the name therefore of our king Ferdinand the seventh, and of all the Spanish nation, we declare war by land and sea against the emperor Napoleon the first, and against France; we are determined to throw off her domination and tyranny; and command all Spaniards to act hostilely against her, to do her all possible damage according to the laws of war, to place an embargo upon all French ships in our ports, and all property, and effects, in whatever part of Spain they may be, whether belonging to the government or to the individuals of that nation. In the same manner we command, that no embarrassment, nor molestation be done to the English nation, nor its government, nor its ships, property, or effects, nor any individual of that nation.—We declare that there shall be open and free communication with England, that we have contracted, and will keep an armistice with her, and that we hope to conclude a durable and lasting peace.—Moreover we protest, we will not lay down our arms till the emperor Napoleon the first, has restored to Spain our king Ferdinand the seventh, and the rest of the royal family; has respected the sacred rights of the nation, which he has violated, and her liberty, integrity, and independence.—With the same understanding and accordance with the Spanish nation, we command that the present solemn declaration be printed, posted and circulated, among all the people and provinces of Spain and America, that it may be known in Europe, Africa and Asia.—Given in the royal palace of Alcazar at Seville, this 6th of June, 1808.—By order

of the Supreme Junta of Government.—
MANUEL MARIA AGUILAR, Sec. JUAN
BAUTISTA PARDO, Sec.

CONNECTION WITH ENGLAND.

*Don ALVARO FLOREZ ESTRADA, Procurator
General of the Principality of Asturias,
made the following Proposition to the
Supreme Council.*

The general council of the principality of Asturias do not delay a moment in making known to the public the daily proofs they receive of the friendship of the English government and nation, who in order the better to enable it to supply all our wants, have promptly sent to this capital a military committee, composed of three officers of distinction, who, this morning, presented themselves before the supreme council, not only to assure us, that all the supplies and succour which we pointed out to them, might be daily expected in our ports, but also to offer in the name of their government; to this principality, and to the rest of the Spanish nation, all other assistance we might stand in need of; to send us troops, money, arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores, and to make a common cause with us, in order that we might be able to repel and destroy the common enemy. That generous nation deserves the utmost gratitude on our part; but as it offers its protection to all the provinces which defend the good cause, it will know on the other hand, how to employ all its power against those provinces, which, guided by a pernicious selfishness of apparent timidity, are forgetful of their duty, in the present critical circumstances in which the country is placed, do not endeavour in imitation of the real patriots, to defend the glorious cause, and shake off a disgraceful yoke. The supreme council think it right to declare to the public, that they felt the liveliest emotions of gratitude and respect, when they heard the commissioners give them the assurance, that it was their anxious wish to shed the last drop of their blood fighting with our brethren, in defence of the common cause.—ALVARO FLOREZ ESTRADA.—Oviedo, the 30th June, 1808.

And it having been resolved, that the preceding proposition be printed and circulated through all the districts of the principality, we communicated it also to you for your information. God keep you many years in his holy guard.—IGNACIO FLOREZ VALDER. JUAN ARGUELLES TERAL, Representative and Secretary.—Oviedo, the 30th June, 1808.

FRENCH FLEET AT CADIZ.

*A Dispatch, together with inclosures, from
Major-General Spencer, Cadiz, June 12.*

My Lord,—The French squadron, consisting of five sail of the line, and a frigate, having placed themselves in a defensive position, in the channel leading to the Carracas, and out of the reach of the works of Cadiz, and having refused to listen to any terms, I have great satisfaction in reporting that the Spanish gun and mortar boats, and the batteries erected for this purpose, on the Isle of Leon, and near Fort Louis, commenced hostilities against the French ships, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, and the firing continued without interruption on both sides till night. It was renewed on the part of the Spaniards on the morning of the 10th, and partially continued till two, when a flag of truce was hoisted by the French, but the terms proposed being inadmissible, the Spaniards intend to recommence hostilities with an additional battery, to the eastward of Fort Louis, consisting of thirty 24-pounders.—Admiral Purvis and myself wished to have co-operated in this attack, but the Spaniards, feeling themselves confident in their own force, have declined our offers of assistance.—The Supreme Council of Seville have nominated commissioners, and applied last night for passports, and a frigate to convey them to England, and they are also equally anxious to send feluccas with dispatches to South America.—Information having been received that a small French corps was assembling at Tavira, with a view of entering Spain by the River Guadiana, we have been requested to proceed against this corps, and either to attack them on the coast, or endeavour to prevent the further prosecution of their plans against Spain. I accordingly propose to sail immediately for this object, Lord Collingwood approving of it.—Admiral Purvis had already detached three ships of war off the mouth of the Guadiana, and has offered every other necessary assistance, which Lord Collingwood has since confirmed.

Letter from General Morla, Captain-General of Andalusia and Governor of Cadiz, addressed to their Excellencies Adm. Purvis and Major-General Spencer.

Admiral Rossilly, as your Excellencies will observe by the annexed copy, has proposed to disarm, but upon conditions which I thought were inadmissible. Whatever may be his terms of surrender, I shall in no manner deviate from my promise; it is therefore necessary that I should have your consent, as I have already said in my first conference with Brigadier-General Smith and Captain Sir John Gore, to whom I have pledged myself with simplicity and good faith.—It will afford me considerable satisfaction to consult with your Excellencies on

all occurrences, incidents, and circumstances, conducive to our common advantage, and contrary to the interests of the common enemy.—Nothing gives me more real pleasure than the absolute confidence of your Excellencies in my candour and sincerity, with which I remain your Excellencies' most affectionate and devoted servant,—(Signed) THOMAS MORLA.—Cadix, June 11, 1808.

Letter from Admiral Rossilly, addressed to Gen. Morla, dated on board the Admiral's ship, Hero Bay, off Cadix, June 11, 1808.

Captain-General,—Obliged to defend myself on account of the inquietude inspired into the people of this province by my imposing attitude, I yesterday, in order to tranquillize them, proposed to your Excellency to quit the Bay. In case the English cannot accede to this proposal, I suggest the idea of disembarking my means of attack, and keeping my ships' companies on board; no colours shall be displayed on my squadron. Hostages shall be given for our security, our sick, and all the French people in the province, with their national and individual property. Hostages will be equally given on my part. The refreshments, water, and provisions necessary for my squadron, shall be provided on my paying for them, as has hitherto been done. In short, I shall demand no conditions but those which are necessary for my honour and that of the people serving under my orders, and as are compatible with the public tranquillity. Deprived by my proposal of the means of defence against the exterior enemy, I demand security against them.

Answer from General Morla to Admiral Rossilly.

Excellent Sir, Admiral Rossilly,—In answer to certain proposals and official demands transmitted by your Excellency, which, although dictated by your honour, are unquestionably incompatible with mine, as must be evident to your Excellency, I have to acquaint you, that I cannot accept any terms but an unconditional surrender, my honour and character not allowing me to depart in any way from my promises. I therefore inform you, that my orders from the Supreme Council being positive with respect to the surrender of the squadron commanded by your Excellency, I cannot enter into any conditions without previously consulting them. It is likewise my duty to consult with the English commanders, as without their consent, I cannot compromise myself.—For these reasons, I shall suspend my attack, until I have dispatched those two presses; availing myself however of the intermediate time to prepare other means

for the attack.—Nothing opposes the individual esteem entertained for your Excellency, by your faithful servant,—(Signed)—THOMAS MORLA.—Cadix, June 11.

(To be continued.)

DENMARK AND SWEDEN.—*Observations on the Answer published at Stockholm to the Danish Declaration of War:—from the Copenhagen Gazette.*

The king of Sweden must have little respect for his people, if he can suppose them to be so unacquainted with the events of our time, that he may be permitted to confound effects with their causes, by representing the alliance of Denmark with France as a cause of the present war, when it is to be considered, as all Europe knows, as a consequence of the treacherous attack of England. The king of Sweden thinks he can so blind the eyes of the Swedish nation, that he can make them believe that the war in which Sweden is engaged, is a defensive war, whereas, it is an offensive one, which it has cost the king of Sweden much trouble to procure, as he has done all in his power to kindle its flames.—The difference, the very great difference, between the policy of our government and that of the king of Sweden has been, that the former has with the greatest care endeavoured to secure to its people the blessings of peace; while the latter appears only to have had for his object to sacrifice the blood of his subjects, bring on the calamities of war, and to lay waste their peaceable habitations. All see with surprise the king of Sweden, whose constant restlessness, and whose false policy has extended the theatre of war so far to the north, yet represents himself as the sovereign who had offered peace and tranquillity to the Baltic and its coasts. But he has rendered his love for peace too manifest for such an offer to be confided in.—After having made every exertion, for a series of years, to become involved in a war, and having at length obtained his object and shewn that he knew how to enter into a war inconsiderately, and how to maintain it with folly and obstinacy after he had been compelled entirely to abandon the first theatre of his war, it was believed that true policy and regard for the welfare of his subjects would have induced him to live in peace and good understanding with his neighbours, and to find a refuge in the patience of a magnanimous people, against a storm which he himself had raised. His sense of danger on the one hand, and of his feebleness on the other, might probably inspire him with the wish to see the Baltic maintained free from a foreign fleet.—While in

Germany he wished to set bounds to the victories of the Emperor Napoleon, and used every endeavour to persuade different courts that this was his object, nor would he pledge himself for the tranquillity and security of the Baltic from English ships. Can we place more confidence in one of these professions than the other? Can it be required of Denmark to trust the pacific promises of England? Will they be held more sacred than those given last year, at the very moment when an attack was intended? A sovereign can have little respect for the truth, who can say to his nation, "whose danger and sufferings are the only consequences of an alliance with England, "I have concluded an alliance with England to obtain the means of defence for Sweden." Was Sweden then in danger? Who threatened Sweden with an attack? Against whom was this protection and aid necessary? Every Swede of sense knows, as well as all Europe, that all his losses, and all the dangers that threaten him, are the consequence of this alliance with England which no self-defence rendered necessary. Had this alliance not existed, Sweden would still have possessed Pomerania, would still have possessed Finland, and the country would not have been a prey to famine, and all the misery which war brings with it. Were all the offers actually made to the King of Sweden, which he has signified were made, England is much indebted to him for not accepting them; but the Swedish nation is not. And if it were prudence not to accept some of these offers, it is to be regretted that they could not induce him to depart from an alliance that must certainly have the most destructive consequences to his country.—Had the King of Sweden seen the true interest of himself and his country, the North would have preserved peace, Sweden would have still possessed Pomerania and Finland, Denmark her fleet and tranquillity, and England her honour. All these losses are the consequences of the policy of the King of Sweden. How often has Sweden been warned by the Powers of Europe? Had we received such warning, our fleets would have been in safety, and ready, if necessary, to guard, in conjunction with our northern brethren, the safety of our seas from the tyrants of the ocean.

Tax Portz.—*Answer of his Eminence Cardinal Gabrielli, first Secretary of State, to the note of his Excellency M. Champagny, addressed to M. le Fevre, Chargé d'Affaires from the Emperor of France, dated April 19, 1808.*

After your excellency had made known

to the holy father, that it was the decided wish of his majesty the emperor and king, that he should enter into an offensive and defensive league with the other powers of Italy, as had been declared by M. Champagny to the Cardinal Caprara, by note of the 3d current, the dispatch of the said cardinal has been received, which brought the original note of the above minister.—The holy father, after having attentively read and considered the said document, has ordered Cardinal Gabrielli, first secretary of state, to make known to your excellency his holiness's sentiments on its contents; beginning with that which forms the cardinal point among all the others. His holiness has seen with pain, that even the final proposition therein contained of the offensive and defensive league, should be accompanied with the threat of depriving him of his temporal dominions in case of his non-compliance. If worldly considerations had at all influenced the conduct of the holy father, he would, from the first, have yielded to the wish of his majesty, and not have exposed himself to suffer so many calamities; but the holy father is regulated alone by the consideration due to his duty and his conscience, both have prevented him from agreeing to the federation, and they equally hinder him from consenting to the offensive and defensive league, which differs but in name; its nature, however, does not except any prince, to whom the pope, according to the circumstances of the times, might not become an enemy.—His holiness feels, moreover, that this article, far from improving, detracts from his situation. In the articles presented to Cardinal de Bayan, the federation was proposed as alone against heretics and the English. But this is couched in general terms, pointing out no people as an enemy, yet excluding no government, no nation, from the contingency of becoming one. If, then, his holiness declined from conscientious motives to be a party to that federation, so is he equally withheld from this league. The holy father would not merely bind himself to a defence, but to an aggression. Then would be seen the minister of the God of peace placing himself in a state of perpetual warfare; then would be seen their common father in arms against his children, and the head of the church exposing himself, by his own act, to a deprivation of his spiritual connection with the catholics of those powers against which the league would make it imperative on him to act hostilely. How then can his holiness make off his power and natural character, and sacrifice, as must be the consequence, the interest of religion?—His holiness, un-

like other princes, is invested with a two-fold character, namely, of sovereign pontiff, and of temporal sovereign, and has given repeated evidence that he cannot, by virtue of this second qualification, enter upon engagements which would lead to results militating against his first and most important office, and injuring the religion of which he is the head, the propagator, and the avenger. His holiness, therefore, cannot enter into any offensive and defensive league, which would, by a permanent and progressive system, drag him into hostility against all those powers upon which his majesty may think proper to make war; since the Italian States, now dependent upon his majesty, can never avoid taking part in such wars. His holiness would consequently be obliged to become a party in them by virtue of this league. Such an engagement must begin to be acted upon by the pope from this moment, and against any Catholic prince; thus waging war against him without a motive. Farther, it must be waged against all those powers, whether Catholic or not, who may, upon whatever grounds, be the enemies of any Italian prince. Thus is the head of the church, accustomed as he is to rule his estates in peace, driven in a moment to a state of warfare, offensive against hostile powers, and defensive of the others. This engagement is too repugnant to the sacred duties of his holiness, and too injurious to the interests of religion, to be entered into by the head of that religion. His holiness feels that it would be a dereliction of truth to enter into the league; he would announce, by such a resolution, his refusal of any accommodation, any peace with the emperor, and would even declare hostilities against him. How could it ever be supposed, that his holiness should be capable of declaring war against any power? He has long been enduring the most hostile treatment, and is therefore prepared to endure the threatened loss of his temporal dominions.—Heaven is witness of the purity of his holiness' intentions, and the world will judge if it was possible to have conceived so extraordinary a scheme. Ardently desiring to compromise, and to be in peace with his majesty, he manifested in his note of the 28th of January last, his compliance, as far as it was possible to comply; his majesty, however, does not practise all those condescensions, which he might practise towards the holy see; he persists inflexibly in demanding what his holiness neither can nor will accede to, namely, in binding him to a war, and to a perpetual and aggressive war, under the pretence of securing the tranquillity of Italy. What can Italy have to fear, if his holiness should not enter into

the proposed league?—Surrounded as the papal dominions are by those of his majesty, no rational fear could be entertained but of the ports; yet his holiness having offered to shut them, during the present war, against the enemies of France, and to guard the coast, he thus proposed to contribute, as far as was in his power, without betraying his sacred duties, to the security and tranquillity of Italy. If, in spite of all this, his majesty shall take possession, as he has threatened, of the papal dominions, respected by all, even the most powerful monarchy, during a space of ten centuries and upwards, and shall overturn the government, his holiness will be unable to prevent this spoliation, and can only, in bitter affliction of heart, lament the evil which his majesty will commit in the sight of God; trusting in whose protection, his holiness will remain in perfect tranquillity, enjoying the consciousness of not having brought on this disaster by imprudence, or by obstinacy, but to preserve the independence of that sovereignty which he ought to transmit, uninjured, to his successors, as he received it; and to maintain, in its integrity, that conduct which may secure the universal concurrence of all princes, so necessary to the welfare of religion. For this fidelity to his sacred duties, his holiness will receive consolation from the words of his divine master—"Blessed are they who are persecuted for righteousness' sake."—With respect to the article relating to the dismissal of the cardinals, his holiness, in the complaints alledged, had no need of examining the principle of their allegiance. Presuming on that freedom which the rights of nations allow to every man, to live under that sky which is most congenial to him; presuming on that new allegiance acquired by the domicile of many years, his holiness remarks, that primitive allegiance cannot avail against the sacred obligations undertaken by the cardinals in the church of God, the oaths they take on receiving the purple, and their eminent office of counsellors to the sovereign pontiff in his spiritual concerns; and that, therefore they cannot be torn from his bosom.—With regard to the cessation of the functions of the legate, and to his departure, his holiness could hardly have expected that they would have been attributed to the motives assigned in M. Champagny's note. His holiness will repeat them once more. After having tried every method to recal his majesty to his previous sentiments towards the papal see, and to concert the desired reparation of so many religious innovations; after having endured, for such a length of time, with unsubdued patience, and with unalterable meekness, so many out-

rages and insults; after having seen how fruitless were all the remonstrances urged against the hostile proceedings of the French; after having peaceably borne the humiliation of imprisonment; and seeing these insults, these contempts, these violations, increase with every hour, his holiness found it necessary, though with the deepest regret, to determine on the recal of his legate in order to overthrow, at least, in the face of the world, the false and scandalous opinion that whatever might occur, even the most flagrant wrongs, would receive his tacit consent.—

—In this very recal, the precise period of which could not have been anticipated by his holiness, he professed, along with those constant affectionate regards which he entertained for his majesty, that could he but consent to the demand of the evacuation of Rome, and be satisfied with those concessions which are compatible with the duties of his holiness, the legate might continue, in conformity with his instructions, to exercise his functions.—But his majesty proved inflexible, and instead of receding a single step, preferred the discontinuance of the legation, and the departure of the pontifical representative.—It is not, therefore, his holiness, who by this hypothetical recal of his legate, has declared war against the emperor; it is the emperor who chooses to declare war against his holiness; and not content with declaring it against his temporal sovereignty, he threatens to raise in his spiritual, a wall of division between the Catholics of France and the sovereign pontiff, in the assurance, according to M. Champagny's note, that the cardinal legate having given up his functions, the Gallican church resumed its doctrine in all its integrity.—His holiness has too good an opinion of the illustrious clergy of France to doubt that the Gallican church, however jealous of its prerogatives, is yet so attached to the chair of St. Peter, that it will maintain itself unshaken in its true principles, without asserting rights, which it does not and cannot possess; not become schismatic, by separating itself from the catholic unity.—It is not then—the repetition is important—it is not his holiness who seeks the rupture. A pacific prince, notwithstanding he was obliged to witness the spoliation, indefiance of all right, of his states of Benevento and Ponte Corvo; notwithstanding his enormous expense of maintaining French troops; notwithstanding the usurpation of his capital, the usurpation of almost all his sovereign rights; notwithstanding the violent dismissal of so

many spiritual persons, composing his holy senate, and notwithstanding all the other acts, by which his dignity has been degraded, all that his holiness did was to command his people when the French army entered Rome, to shew it respect; all that his holiness did was to receive it in the most hospitable manner, and implore of his majesty, in the mean time, relief from so many aggravated evils; and all that his holiness now does in this extremity is, to mourn between the vestibule and the altar, invoking the pity of heaven upon his people, and that by a return to better counsels, the most potent emperor Napoleon will not suffer the inheritance of the Roman see, given by providence to the head of the catholic church in full enjoyment, to be lost and rooted out.—Thus has his holiness made war! Thus has he conducted himself to the present hour towards his majesty, however distressing and unfortunate has been the result. Still his holiness will cherish the hope that his majesty, rejecting the counsels of the enemies of the holy see, who have had recourse to every art to change his disposition, will revert to their former friendly correspondence, and be satisfied with the concessions made in the note of the 28th of January. If, by the hidden purposes of the Most High, this should not take place, and his majesty regardless of his own glory, and deaf to the calls of justice, should put his threats in execution, and take possession of the states of the church by right of conquest, overturning the government in consequence, his holiness will be unable to remedy such fatal occurrences, but he solemnly declares, that the first will not be a conquest, as his holiness is in peace with all the world, but will be an usurpation more violent than history can furnish; and the second will not be the result of conquest, but of that usurpation. He declares, at the same time, that it will not be the work of political genius and illumination, but an awful visitation of that God from whom all sovereignty is derived, and especially that given to the head of the church.—Bowing, in that event, with profound adoration to the decrees of heaven, his holiness will find consolation in reflecting that the creator and redeemer willed these things, and that all concurs to accomplish his purposes when his appointed time arrives.—This is the answer which the undersigned is commanded by his holiness to give to the note of M. Champagny, and to communicate to your excellency.—CARDINAL GABRIELLI.

The commotion, more or less violent, which has taken place in the whole peninsula of Spain, has been of eminent service to awaken us from the state of lethargy in which we indulged; to make us acquainted with our rights, our glory, and our duty towards our holy religion and our king. We wanted some electric stroke to rouse us from our paralytic state of inactivity. We stood in need of a hurricane, to clear the atmosphere of the insalubrious vapours with which it was loaded."—ADDRESS OF GENERAL MORLA to the People of Cadiz, June 15, 1808.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS

SPANISH REVOLUTION—From what has been published under official authority, there appears good reason to hope, that the French army under General DUPONT has been worsted, if not made prisoners of war, by an unconditional surrender. This event, if it should have taken place, together with the unconditional surrender of Roilly's fleet, at Cadiz, will have a wonderful effect upon the minds of men both in France and Spain, and, indeed, in every other part of Europe. But, auspicious as these events must be considered, I derive less satisfaction from them, than from the sentiments expressed by the revolutionists, and the evident moral effect, which the contest is producing, and has already produced in Spain. Amongst the regulations, contained in the edict, issued by the revolutionary government, for calling forth the exertions of the people, one is, that all the people, women as well as men, of whatever rank they may be, who are not employed in military service, shall assist in getting in the harvest, with the exception of such women as are aged, or infirm, or of weak constitutions, and these are called on to employ themselves in preparing *lint* and *bandages* for the use of the hospitals. What a change! What a train of new and noble ideas must be created! What a sweeping and fatal scythe to luxury and all its endless train of vices! Smash, all to atoms, go the fashions and follies of the cities. The swarms of players, buffoons, musicians, makers of false hair, false eyes, false teeth, false shoulders, and false breasts; the pimps, parasites, bawds; the toad-eaters, whether in red, blue or black. The whole of this numberless swarm are dispersed; are driven, by the first rustle of the storm, from the fruits upon which they were gorging; and, are compelled either to fight, or to help to get in the harvest. If this be not a revolution, I want to know what the word revolution means. When the air is foul and unwholesome, those qualities arise from its being full of noxious creatures; and, as General Morla

well observes, when this is the case, a hurricane is necessary.—As to any hope of the French being resisted without a total change of the government, and even a very considerable shifting of property, it is downright folly to entertain it. Already is there a *paper-money*, and a scheme for selling part, at least, of the property of the church. If this be the case before the contest is well begun, what must take place before it be ended?—The Courier newspaper of the 15th instant, has an article upon the subject of Spain, which demands particular notice. The Morning Chronicle, of the same day, contained the following paragraph: "We cannot contemplate this project of an attack on Austria without dread, when we think of the debasing prejudices, and debilitating system of the court of Vienna. All their sufferings have not served to open their eyes to the impolicy of their principles of government. May we cherish a hope that in this, the extremity of their fortune, they will make a virtue of necessity, and begin by giving to the people a country for which to fight."

—This is, surely, very sound doctrine. Nothing can be more reasonable; and, experience, to kings woeful experience, has proved, that nothing can be more true. Yet, does the Courier take great offence at it; and, as if it, or its masters, were a party deeply interested, flies in a passion, and falls into the foulest of misrepresentation and abuse.—"This, it will be remembered," says the Courier, "was the disgusting and detestable language of a faction at the beginning of the present war. According to them Britons had nothing to fight for.—Nothing! fighting to avoid subjugation by Buonaparte was fighting for nothing!! It was by such abominable language and doctrines circulated in Germany by writers styling themselves philosophers, who endeavoured to philosophize mankind into an indifference to country, constitution, and climate, to make them look upon themselves not as citizens belonging to a particular state,

" but citizens of the world; it was by such
 " doctrines that Germany was reduced to
 " that state of apathy in which Buonaparté
 " found her, and which rendered her so
 " easy a conquest. The Germans were in
 " love with the works of their philosophers,
 " they were a reading nation, they called
 " themselves enlightened—the governments
 " under which they lived were old, many
 " of them had great defects; defects which
 " these philosophers magnified and enlarged
 " upon, to convince the people that no
 " change could place them in a worse
 " situation than that in which they
 " were. The people believed, and no
 " where did we find any vigorous efforts on
 " their parts to resist the French. The
 " people believed, and what has been the
 " consequence!—they thought they had
 " nothing to fight for, and they have found
 " that their former situation, under even
 " the worst of their governments, was per-
 " fect happiness and freedom compared with
 " the tyranny and exactions under which
 " they now groan.—Oh, bitterly do they
 " now repent their criminal apathy, and
 " confess that the first duty of every coun-
 " try is to resist with all its might and
 " means being placed under a foreign yoke
 " —It is well worthy of remark, that the
 " true and proper feeling with respect to
 " country and resistance to the French, has
 " been manifested by nations supposed to
 " be amongst the least enlightened in Eu-
 " rope—the Calabrian peasantry and the
 " Spanish people. They lived under con-
 " stitutions perfectly despotic; yet when
 " they were invaded by the French they did
 " not listen to the Burdettites and cold
 " calculating politicians, who told them
 " they had nothing to fight for—they flew
 " to arms and resistance; for they felt that
 " no curse can be so great as being a con-
 " quered nation, and conquered, too, by
 " the French. Yet upon the principles of
 " the Burdett party, and of the late minis-
 " ters, who say now, that the Austrian
 " government, before they resist Bonaparte,
 " " should begin by giving the people a
 " " country to fight for," the Spaniards
 " and the Calabrians should have said,
 " " give us a country first, before we fight
 " " against those who are attempting to
 " " conquer it." Among the Spaniards
 " we saw none of these men attempting to
 " damp the ardour and heart of the nation,
 " by such dispiriting doctrines—No—no—
 " they all saw that resistance against France
 " was their first duty, and that whatever
 " might be the defects of their government,
 " those defects were but as dust in the

" balance, when weighed against the pre-
 " ponderating and imperious necessity of
 " preventing their country from falling
 " under the yoke of France.—Doctrines
 " and language such as those to which we
 " have alluded, we had hoped never to
 " have heard again; they cannot be too
 " deeply deprecated, they cannot be too
 " strongly reprobated; they are most exe-
 " crable; they are the doctrines that are
 " admirably calculated to do service to the
 " enemy; make but a people believe that
 " they have no country to fight for, and
 " they are half conquered to Bonaparte's
 " hands already."—This article sets out
 " with a falshood, which has been a hundred
 " times refuted, but which has still preserved
 " its malice in the breast of the foul propa-
 " gator, though he himself has experienced a
 " change of place.—With respect to the
 " Germans being now in a worse situation,
 " than they were in under their former govern-
 " ment, that is a point upon which men
 " differ; but, supposing it to be granted to
 " this outrageous assertor, he forgets, that
 " men will very willingly suffer much them-
 " selves, in order to bring suffering upon their
 " oppressors; and, he also forgets, that the
 " sufferings of the Germans, though we were
 " to allow them to be more acute, are not so
 " firmly settled, and so likely to be perma-
 " nent, as they were before. The hurricane
 " as General Morla says, was necessary; and,
 " though there be a sort of pause, the hurri-
 " cane is *not yet over* in Germany. If the
 " Germans should, by and by, rouse them-
 " selves, shake off the yoke of France, and,
 " which will follow as a matter of course,
 " establish freedom in their country, will the
 " Courier deny, that the French invasion was
 " a good thing for Germany?—We are next
 " desired to bear in mind, that it has been only
 " amongst those who were the *least enlight-*
 " *ened*, and who lived under governments the
 " *most despotic*, that the French have met
 " with any thing like manly resistance; which
 " is a pretty broad hint, that it is best for peo-
 " ple to be kept in this state. The Calabrians
 " and Spaniards, we are told, "did not listen
 " to the cold calculations of the Burdettites;
 " they flew instantly to arms and resistance;
 " for they felt, that no curse could be so
 " great as being a conquered nation; yet,
 " upon the principles of the Burdett party,
 " they should have said: "give us a coun-
 " " try to fight for, before we fight against
 " " those who are attempting to conquer
 " " it." No, Sir, there would have been
 " no sense in their saying this; for, though,
 " seemingly, you would wish the world to for-
 " get the very important and valuable fact,

they had a country to fight for, before they drew a single sword from the scabbard. Before they drew the sword, their country was left to themselves; they had neither king nor prince; and, in the case of Spain, so far from having a sharer in their country, they took up arms to defend it for themselves, against the declared will, and in defiance of the commands of the sovereign, whose authority, until then, they had implicitly obeyed. The Burdettites would not have been so foolish as to say: "give the *Spaniards* a country to defend." They had got a country. They had it entirely in their own hands. If its government was bad, it was their own fault. They had a country, and, therefore, they took up arms to fight. No, Sir. It was not because the Calabrians and the Spaniards were under the most despotic governments; this was not the cause of their taking up arms in resistance to the general invader; it was from a cause of precisely an opposite nature; it was because, they felt that they might, by fighting, now obtain their freedom. Their shackles had been, all of a sudden, broken, or, rather, they had been let loose, through the imbecility of their masters. They once more felt the use of their limbs; they tasted the sweets of freedom, and they were ready to die rather than again become slaves. No, Sir, I pray you look not in the Spanish revolution for a compliment to despotic government. While that government existed, not a noble deed or a noble sentiment did any man ever hear of in Spain, formerly so renowned for her valour. The French troops came unresisted to Madrid; the French fleet downeered in Cadiz; the people, in all parts of Spain where the French appeared, gave up their dinners to feed and their coats to cloth, those very troops, whom, since that government has ceased to exist, they have been preparing to fight to extermination. No, Sir, we must not suffer you to persuade your readers, that the most effectual way of rendering a country invulnerable against the French, is to make its government despotic. This is a very pernicious doctrine, however well it may suit your purposes to promulgate it, and however palatable, to some persons, it might be. We contend, that the Spaniards are now free men, fighting for the preservation of their freedom; we hear them declaring, that the *Cortes*, or *real representatives of the people*, shall be restored; that there shall be a *reform of the abuses*, existing under the late government, which they term "*base and infamous*;" we, therefore, heartily wish them success. But, you obstinately

persist in considering them as moved to action by the principles of despotism, and as having in view no other object than the preservation of that despotism. Napoleon, for once, outwitted himself. He should have suffered the king to remain in the country, and brought in his brother softly, without any interregnum. He should have suffered no cessation of the despotism. The new master should have come in, before the old one quitted the house. There should have been not a moment's suspension of the use of the rod. When a German bird-catcher sells you one of the poor little creatures whom he has enslaved, he takes a special care to put him out of his hand safely into yours; but, king Charles, as if he had meant to defraud his "intimate friend," Napoleon, let the bird fly, and left his intimate friend to catch him and tame him again. The bird, delighted with the enjoyment of his native freedom, has hitherto withstood all the temptations of the decoy at Bayonne, though the old bird-catcher has lent it his assistance; and, Napoleon, in a rage, has sent out his marksmen to destroy what he fears he cannot possess. No, Sir, you will never persuade the world, that the energy, the wisdom, the bravery, now displayed in Spain, are the fruit of despotic government. I can easily conceive reasons for your wishing to cause this to be believed; but, in this, at least, you make up your mind to a complete want of success.—"Make a people but believe, "that they have no country to fight for, "and they are already half conquered to Buonaparté's hands." Make a people believe, Sir? Why, do you think it possible to make a man believe that he is cold when he feels the sweat pouring down his forehead? If the belief was produced, in Germany, for instance, by artificial means, had not the government the use of ample means wherewith to counteract the philosophers? It was done by printing, was it? And cannot governments employ the press, Sir; cannot they keep hiring writers and hiring printers in their pay; cannot they expend a considerable part of the taxes for the purpose of producing a belief in the public mind? Had the philosophers of Germany greater powers of this sort than the several governments had? No, Sir, "philosophy," as Sir Francis Burdett observed, in the House of Commons, some years ago, "has no such triumphs to boast of; revolutions have been the work of oppressive governments, of tyrannical or misguided princes, and corrupt ministers." Philosophy, real philosophy, aided by the press,

may do much in directing the mind, in hastening the growth of discontent; but, the seeds of discontent must be first sown, and take root; and this will never happen to a dangerous extent, under a good government.—When you first espoused the cause of the Spanish patriots, you did not seem to be aware of the conclusions which would be drawn from the success of a people, deserted and betrayed by their royal family, taking up arms against the conqueror of all the rest of Europe. You seem to have been carried away by your joy at the prospect of seeing somebody, no matter who, or with what motive, resist Buonaparté, and thereby draw him off, for a while, at least, from his undertakings against this country. But, now that you perceive, the *moral* to which the Spanish revolution so plainly points; now that this has been shown you, you appear to be alarmed and greatly embarrassed. You cannot wish Buonaparté success; and yet you appear to see little less danger in the success of the patriots, unless you can cause it to be believed, that they have not been, and are not, animated by the love of freedom. Hence your anger at our observations relative to a people who have no country to defend; hence your malicious revival of a very malicious and refuted falshood against Sir Francis Burdett. But, why, Sir, be so anxious upon this score? Why drag in an old falshood, and retail it as truth, for the purpose of indirectly asserting, that "*Britons have a country to fight for*?" Who has asserted the contrary? Who dares openly and plainly to assert the contrary? Why, then, do you think it is necessary to weary us with a defence of what has not been, and will not be, attacked? The Morning Chronicle could not so much as express its regret, that the government of Austria (a government with whom we are at war) did not begin its preparations for defence by giving the people a country to fight for, but you must burst out into a violent passion; and discover resentment as keen as if you had a hand in conducting government of the same sort as that of Austria. "Let the galled jade go wince; our withers are unwrung," should, upon this occasion, have been the only observation from an English ministerial waiter. But you seem to take the thing to heart. You seem, from some cause or other, to be deeply interested in the reputation of the Austrian government, and are thrown almost into madness, at hearing it asserted, that, if the people are already as perfect slaves as they can be, they have no motive

for fighting against an invader.—What you wish your readers to believe is this, that the Spaniards are fighting for their country as it stood before the departure of the royal family. That this is not true is undeniably proved by the plain narrative of events. Till their royal family were completely gone, they made no resistance against the French; they saw the king and queen and prime-minister go to Bayonne; they saw their new king and his brethren summoned to the same place; not a man of them rose in the defence of either; but, when they were all safely gone, when the despotism was dissolved, then, and not until then, the people took up arms. It is, by some, pretended, that the young king was inveigled away. Inveigled away! Leaving a French army in the heart of the kingdom too! What! could a king be inveigled away, and nobody have any suspicion of the matter? Do you think, now, that, if our king and all his family were to be invited by Buonaparté to take a trip to Calais, a French army being arrived in the neighbourhood of Westminster; do you think that we should have very sanguine hopes of seeing any of the family come back again? No; that the people of Spain looked upon Ferdinand as being bound upon a mere visit of friendship is too gross an absurdity to be sucked in by any but mere idiots.—As to the use which is made of the name of Ferdinand, there may be many reasons for that, which one cannot detail without being better acquainted with the characters and probable views of the leaders in the revolution. They, or, at least, some of them, may really wish for his return to the throne; and, if the Cortes be first restored and abuses reformed, there might be no solid objection to that restoration, which, besides, might prevent the country from being torn to pieces by the contests of ambitious leaders, some one of whom must, sooner or later, become the chief ruler; but, my opinion is, that, if Napoleon should, as there is some reason to hope, be successfully resisted, the name of Ferdinand will, gradually, be dropped, and that some one will be chosen in his stead. At the outset of a revolution all is bustle and chaos. Men do not know one another. But, difficulties and perils try the hearts; they harrow up all the layers of society; they bring the gems to light, and sink the baser soil.—The foolishness of all hopes (to say nothing of the wickedness of it) is, that Napoleon will be beaten, and that then the Spaniards will quietly return to a submission to their former despotism. There are peo-

ple enough, I am afraid, to entertain such a hope; but, if they reflected for one moment, they must be convinced, that it can never be accomplished; for, to resist Buonaparté will require such language, such sentiments, such discussions, such active measures as to rank and property as well as to warlike preparations, as will so completely annihilate the old despotism, that it cannot be restored. My fear is, and this is my greatest and almost only fear, that Napoleon, finding his views frustrated, will give way in time, and will send back Ferdinand before the revolution has proceeded to a wholesome length. If this should be the case, nothing of permanent utility will have been accomplished. Napoleon will have time to ripen his plans, to profit from past errors, and to make his next stroke sure; while the world will have the woeful example of a people again becoming slaves, after having buckled on their armour in the cause of freedom. For the taking of this crafty line of policy, the use which some of the patriots make of the name of Ferdinand affords Napoleon a plausible pretence. "All I wished," he may say to the Spaniards, "was to see your government reformed. If you prefer Ferdinand to Joseph, it matters little to me." This bait would take at once, and we should have the mortification to see Spain very nearly as much under the influence of France as she now is, instead of seeing her free, independent, and the fast ally of England, which latter she naturally would be under a government and rulers entirely new. I hope there are no persons, who have, *underhand*, given advice to the Council at Seville to use the name of Ferdinand. Every one must, I think, perceive, how mischievous, in various ways, that use may probably prove; but, so afraid are some persons of the example of a people defending their country, and settling their own concerns, that there is no telling to what lengths they may go.—A correspondent, whose letter will be found in another part of this number, says, that we can assist the Spaniards *only* in the name of their king, and, of their king Ferdinand too, whom their old king has charged with *usurpation*. This is too absurd to merit an answer; but, the fact is, that, with some persons, there exists a dread, a very horror, of espousing the cause of any *people*, however identified that cause may be with our own. We have had almost all the kings and princes of Europe in alliance with us against France. Whom are they allied with *now*? And, are we still to adhere to the old system, and to resolve to make war only for kings,

though those kings protest against the war, in the carrying on of which we are giving our assistance? This is the rock in our way, and if we get upon it, we shall assuredly split, and deserve to split, because we do it with our eyes open. Napoleon, once in secure possession of Spain, would easily keep us in a state of continual alarm. All hopes of resistance would be extinguished upon the continent of Europe, which united under one head, would and must harass us in a way that we could not support for any number of years. So that the choice lies between that of seeing the Spanish people acquire real freedom, and that of living ourselves in protracted war and incessant alarm, with the fair chance of being finally subdued. I am greatly afraid, that there are some persons who would, without hesitation, prefer the latter; but I still hope, that their influence will not prevail. We are called upon to assist the cause of real freedom, and threatened with subjugation to a foreign power as the penalty of our refusing to obey that call. Nothing can be more fair, nothing more reasonable or just.—The correspondent, to whom I have referred here, denies, that, agreeably to the law of nations, Napoleon is the sovereign of Spain; because, says he, the cession of the crown and sovereignty was made without the consent of the people. So, then, as far as serves his purpose, the people are to be something. An old despotism is not to be destroyed without their consent formally expressed; but, they are nothing at all, when the question of who shall we make war for is to be decided. The whole of the royal family have abdicated the throne of Spain; they have transferred it to Napoleon; they have gone out of the country; and the last act of their former authority has been to command the people to obey Napoleon. I say that this is a vile fraud; I say, too, that a crown cannot be rightfully transferred without the consent of the people; but, as far as the royal family had any right or power, they have transferred it; as far as they could bind the people, they have bound them to Napoleon. So that, either he is the rightful sovereign of Spain, or there is no sovereign at all. I contend that the latter is the case, and, therefore, I am for making war for the people; but, my correspondent is still for making war for the king, as he calls him, and that, too, in direct disobedience of his commands. This is *loyalty* such as, I am persuaded, no man ever heard or read of before. This correspondent finds fault, too, of my title, or head, and, instead of "*Spanish Revolution*," he wishes me to

use the words, "*Spanish Patriotism.*" As if there was something horrible, and contagious, in the sound of revolution. Why what is it, what can it be, but a revolution? We talk of, and boast of our revolution in England; and why should we be scared at the idea of a revolution in Spain? The king and all the royal family, following his kingly example, have abdicated the throne of Spain; and, another royal family have been appointed in their stead; so that in Spain, the revolution is upon a much larger and more splendid scale than ours was in England. What has my correspondent to quarrel with then? He is not by himself, however, in this respect. There are more, who cannot bear to look this great event in the face. They are delighted that Buonaparte is likely to be beaten, or, at least, thwarted; but, they cannot bear the thought of the work being done by a people left to manage their own affairs. God forbid that any body but the people should be suffered to have a hand in it! Let the princes and the grandees and the ministers remain at Bayonne and drink and dance and sing and make long silly speeches and cuckold one another in peace and tranquillity. They are not wanted in Spain, where their lands and goods will very soon be applied to an excellent purpose. They have led long enough upon the labour of others; and now the turn of those others is come.—The wise men in the city of London with a MR. QUIN (I wonder who or what he is?) at their head, have assembled, in Common Council, to vote an address to the king upon the subject of his declaration relative to Spain; and, it was, at last, resolved, "that a dutiful and loyal address be presented to his majesty, expressive of their thanks for the great, decisive, and magnanimous measures adopted by his majesty, towards assisting the glorious cause in which the Spanish nation is engaged, to defeat the perfidy and usurpation of the common enemy of Europe."—The motion for this address was seconded by the celebrated pastry-cook, who keeps the large shop at Cornhill, whose name is *Birch*, and who, amongst other things, observed, that "the day on which that court was assembled to deliberate upon the motion under consideration, was the anniversary of the French Confederation (the 14th of July)." That day had been at one time celebrated by a party in this country, but it remained for that court to consecrate that day by an unanimous vote in favour of the patriotic efforts of the Spanish people, who had risen in arms for the most sacred duties, to pre-

serve its holy altars from pollution."—The pastry cook was rather unfortunate in his selection of facts as well as in the subject of his panegyric; for, having reminded his readers of the coincidence of dates, it remained for him, after his word "but," to show, that the work going on in Spain did not resemble the work that was going on in France, in 1791, at which time, Mr. Birch might have remembered, the altars in France remained unpolled, and that no alteration in the affairs of the church had taken place, except that of somewhat curtailing the influence of the Pope, at which, one would suppose Mr. Birch must have been amongst the first to rejoice. But, this is not all, he prizes the doing in Spain so highly, for why? because the people have risen in arms "for the most sacred duties, to preserve its holy altars from pollution." Now, as MR. WAITMAN reminded him, he was amongst the most vociferous in the city in favour of the ministers and against the Catholics of Ireland, whose altars must certainly be full as holy as those of the people of Spain. No, no, thou man of paste, it is not the altars of the Spaniards that thou carest for. You care no more for their altars than you do for their hovels; all you want of them is, that they may keep on fighting in such a way as to keep Buonaparté and his armies from coming hither.—Upon the subject of the motion, MR. WAITMAN, who is a very sensible and very worthy man, said: "that, agreeing heartily as he did in the end of the motion, he disapproved altogether of the mode in which it was to be attained. He regretted that parliament had separated without any declaration of its feelings with respect to the cause of Spain. But it was decidedly his opinion, that the course which ought to be pursued in that assembly was, not by address to his majesty, but by a declaration of their sympathy in the Spanish cause, and their determination to support any measures necessary to afford them effectual assistance. A worthy friend near him (Mr. Goodbehere) had an amendment to offer, which he was confident would attain the end of the mover of the address, in a way more desirable than by his motion. He was an enemy to addresses, because under the semblance of a mark of attachment to the sovereign, they amounted indirectly to an approbation of the conduct of ministers. The worthy alderman had alluded to the celebration of the anniversary of the destruction of the Bastille. He could not see any distinction between the cause of the

"people of France at that period, and the struggle of the people of Spain, for their independence and liberty in the present instance; and if the people had been then suffered to pursue their object without external interference, a great part of the calamities which had since befallen Europe, would have been prevented, as well as the vast effusion of blood and treasure which had since taken place." There was no answering this. On the 14th of July, 1791, I think it was, the cause of the French was so much like what the cause of the Spaniards now is, that it would be very difficult to make a distinction. The Spaniards are fighting against foreign invaders, and for a reform of abuses. So were the French, at the out-set of their revolution; and, it is truly worthy of remark, that we who fought against the French, should now be fighting for the Spanish people.—There was one Dixon, who objected to an amendment, upon the plan of Mr. Waithman, because it was *not constitutional* for the assembly to convey its sentiments to the public, in any other way than in an address to the throne, and hinted at certain motives, by which Mr. Waithman and his friends were actuated. To this Mr. Waithman replied, "that as motives had been personally imputed to him, he would have been glad that the motives had been mentioned. It had always been his wish, as it would through life, that his motives should be not only apparent, but publicly known. As the imputed motives had not been mentioned, he should state some motives by which he had not been influenced. He had not written to Lord Grenville for a living for one of his sons, nor had he obtained from the present administration places for two other sons." Whence it appears, that the loyalty of the said Dixon is much about of the same sort as that which passes current at Whitehall. These are valuable anecdotes. They serve to explain the conduct of men. What a shocking thing it is to reflect, that there is scarcely a living soul, however contemptible, that appears upon the public stage, with loyalty in his mouth, who has not an eye upon the taxes!—Mr. QUIN, too, whose voice and manner resemble those of an itinerant hero of the buskin, has, I dare be sworn, an eye towards the taxes, or, at least, towards knighthood; which latter he may probably obtain by way of augmenting the amount of his claim to the former; for he will hardly, like the late worthy and deeply regretted Mr. Phillips, get himself knighted, for the mere honour of the thing.—Verily, if the

poor Spaniards have nothing better to support them, than the friendship, or rather, empty applause of these candidates for place and for city nobility, their cause is in a desperate way. Not a word of *sympathy* is expressed; not a penny is proposed to be raised; nor is the king advised to do any thing in behalf of that cause. Mr. QUIN talked about *freedom*, but it was easy to perceive what sort of freedom he meant. Not a word did he say about the restoration of the *Cortes*, or the reform of abuses. Not a word of censure upon the cowardice and treachery of the late rulers of Spain: all was mere mouthy invective against Buonaparté; and this, I am sorry to say it, is all that one can get from any of those, who are known for adherents of the ministry. But, there is another city, from the people of which, were they to assemble, I should expect better things. They, too, might address the king, and, through that channel, they might express their views of what is going on in Spain. To them the independent part of the nation would listen, and, like bread cast upon the waters, the effects of their address might appear again after many days. It is of great consequence, that now, at the outset of this great change in the affairs of Europe, the people of England should be rightly informed of its causes, and of the principles by which the movers are actuated. If the Spaniards should be successful, that success cannot fail to be felt here; but, for it to produce its full effect, the people must begin betimes to think rightly as to the causes which led to it.

Bolley, 21st July, 1808.

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT'S LETTER TO MR. WHITBREAD ON THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.

Enfield, July 15, 1808.

DEAR SIR;—It is said to have been the advice of Lord Mansfield to a person appointed to a judicial situation abroad, to decide causes to the best of his judgment, but never to give reasons in support of his decisions. When you deprecated the discussion brought forward by Mr. Sheridan, respecting the resistance rising in Spain to the domination of Napoleon, your forming an erroneous opinion on the prudence or imprudence of that discussion, was of little consequence; and few would have kept in their minds any recollection of an error, supposing you to have committed one, had you not written a book to explain your conduct and sentiments. There being in this proceeding a formal appeal to the public, if no part of your book be replied to, you may imagine it unanswerable; and so be con-

firmed in error, if into any you have fallen. It is by friendly disputation on shades of difference, that well-intentioned men come to ~~the~~ of one mind. To speak mine plainly, I think you have been wrong both in your conduct and your reasoning.* A part of Spain (a country open to us on three sides) had drawn its sword upon Napoleon, had flung the scabbard in his face, and had sent its deputies to England. What knowledge beyond this, was wanting to an eloquent member of parliament, for fanning the flame of Spanish patriotism, and at the same time touching generally on the principles which ought to govern ministers in their co-operations with these new allies? Was not this an occasion to have been seized on with avidity, for delivering those sentiments which the English constitution so eminently teaches, for the recovery of liberty, and for the defence of a country against invaders? And nothing, surely, was more easy, than to have expressed an admiration of Spanish virtue, and an approbation of affording every practicable assistance, without calling on ministers for unnecessary explanations. But, on account of the unfitness of calling for disclosures, you deprecated, (unadvisedly as I think) all mention of the subject in parliament; and in the explanation since given of your conduct and motives, (in your letter to Lord Holland) you appear to me not to have mended your case. Your original coldness no argument can teach me to approve. If it were a force upon your own feelings for liberty, I cannot understand it. Not even in the view of the most frigid caution, does it seem to have any warrant. In the same breath that you convey to us how little confidence you have in ministers, as "incapable of conducting to "a happy issue the efforts of a great people, "just entering upon a struggle against "tyranny and oppression," you give it as your opinion, that those ministers, merely because of their superior intelligence from Spain, were "those only who"—"could "judge of the steps fit to be taken." Nay, you hold this to be "a case in which the "servants of the crown ought to be left "perfectly free"—"to form and execute their own designs;" for it seems, "they are of the king's appointment: to them the interests of the kingdom are confided."—And was not the late minister of Spain, the Prince of the Peace, of the king's appointment? were not to him "the "interests of the kingdom" of Spain confided? Was not a royal appointment in Spain, as sacred as a royal appointment in England? Who could doubt the wisdom of

Charles the IV, more than that of George the III.?—By the majority of the grandees and courtiers, the Prince of the Peace was accordingly left "perfectly free"—"to "form and execute his own designs;" until those designs were perfected at Bayonne, in the royal family and the whole court being in the clutches of the treacherous Napoleon; the capital and strong holds of the country being occupied by French armies; and Spain being reduced to the alternative, of either receiving the Corsican yoke, or shedding rivers of blood to preserve her independence. Blessed fruit of the sacredness of a royal appointment and of implicit confidence in a minister!

That a minister was "of the king's appointment," used to be the very reason, why implicit confidence was *not* to be given him, and why the jealous and vigilant eye of parliament was to be kept on all his motions. But we have of late learned new maxims of government. The "king" appoints. The constitutional watchmen of the state are therefore to sit with seals on their lips. Or, if any thing is to be uttered, it is "confidence, confidence, confidence." This new doctrine, I allow, is perfectly in harmony with a House of Commons having numerous placemen; with sinecure offices; as well as with universal jobs and abuses, and the superadded expense of commissioners in every department, who bring not to justice a single peculator. The creed I know is become extremely fashionable among modern statesmen, whether in or out of power; as those who are out, hope in time to get in. That it is a creed extremely offensive to the people, matters not. As ministers are "of the king's appointment," the opinion of the people is little cared for. It is therefore perfectly natural, that the people should as little care who are ministers. And so things must continue, until a party shall rise who shall be advocates for the whole constitution, and nothing but the constitution. Let us hope that day is not far distant.

You are still, Sir, it seems, an advocate for offering peace to the French Emperor; but you have not yet shewn us the basis on which a peace can be concluded with safety. Unless you can do this, I confess, Sir, that I can allow to your opinion but little weight. Have you well contemplated the recent conduct of this French Emperor towards Spain, while she was in his alliance, and fighting by his side? After you shall have so done, then tell us what you should think of the judgment of a Spanish statesman, who, before the national Cortes were restored, and

the Spanish population completely armed and trained to defensive war, should "now" advise the governing powers of his country, to "commence a negotiation with the enemy, on a footing of equality, for the termination of hostilities on terms of equality and honour?" Are you aware, Sir, how much a man implicates himself with the instruments of despotism, who, in calling for peace, demands not at the same time those accompaniments, by which alone his country can have freedom? If your peace is not to be guaranteed by independence in the House of Commons, and by arms in the hands of the people on the true principles of our constitution, how is it to keep Napoleon out of England when he shall choose to enter it? Or how, if he should enter it, will the condition of England be superior to that of Spain, under the corrupt and infamous government, which so lately, as the last act of its baseness and avarice, sold her to the Corsican? These questions, Sir, I put to you as a Whig—as a man professing a regard for liberty—as one who occasionally talks of the constitution—as once a member of "the society of the Friends of the People associated for the purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform."—While "the emancipation of Spain, the enthronement of Ferdinand VII, and the amelioration of the government of that country, through the means of the legitimate organ of their Cortes, or any other of their own choosing," as well as "the freedom of the Spanish royal family," are it seems to be among the very objects of your proposed negotiation for peace, how, in God's name, has it happened, that not a single thought has been bestowed on those things which on our account ought to be the accompaniments of Peace? To question you: but, had you strenuously insisted on these English objects, "is there a statesman who could doubt of their propriety, of their justice, of their honour?" Could a Windham, a Grenville, or a Grey have condemned you? Could a Castlereagh or a Hawkesbury have reproved you? "If rejected, is there a free spirit in the universe that would not join in applauding your honesty and wisdom?"

I have now, Sir, for the hundredth time, explained "my views, and I am desirous they should be known. I may be deemed romantic for entertaining them. But I trust that those who may treat me as chimerical or absurd—those especially who class themselves among the friends of liberty and the constitution—will, for the

benefit of their country, explain the grounds on which they claim to be considered as better practical politicians.

Self-deceit is not always merely personal; we are equally subject to this foible when we put ourselves in the place of our nation. When, therefore, we would know what, in the making of a peace is necessary to national safety, we ought not only to foresee the extremity to which misgovernment of any kind is leading us, but to contemplate also the dangers to which, after peace shall be made, we shall still be exposed, unless that peace have the accompaniments necessary to national health and vigour in full perfection. As, after what has passed, it is evident that Spain, in peace, can have no safety, unless her renovated Cortes shall insure to her a reformed government; and unless her people shall become an armed nation, organized for crushing an invader, whatever his force, and how sudden soever his coming; so, in our own case, (who are only separated from France by a channel, as easily passed as the Pyrenean mountains) I beseech you, Sir, if you would not pass for an unreflecting, a temporizing, or a mere party statesman, duly to estimate the value of a proposition for peace, without those accompaniments, of a reformed parliament and armed safety, by which alone a peace can yield the fruits of peace.

So wide indeed am I from what appears to be your opinion, that, in my judgement, the ministers who should negotiate a peace with Napoleon, and at the same time neglect a renovation of our Commons House of Parliament and of our Posse Comitatus—the shield and the spear of the constitution—would richly deserve to lose his head. I beg I may be clearly understood. I protest against all substitutions whatever, in place of that system of arming which you must know to be prescribed by the constitution of our country, agreeably to the voice of nature, and the principles of human liberty. I equally object to the dexterity of a Dundas, to the dictation of a Pitt, to the artifice of a Yorke, to the fancy of a Windham, and to the project of a Castlereagh, who, each in his turn, as if the constitution were not good enough, or else too good for him, has accordingly, in respect of arming, substituted for that constitution some conceit of his own. By the parliament, as if the mere creature of every succeeding minister, these ephemeral maggots of the day have been successively and regularly preferred to the constitutional system. How many more of these inventions—all of them without exception hostile to our liberties—we are yet for our

punishment doomed to number, no human magic can divine.

Keep your eye, Sir, upon Spain; that faithful mirror in which we may see in its true light, the value of that return to our constitution which has been so much despised and so long neglected. To what *does* Spain, to what *can* she resort, in the hour of her extremity, but to a renovated Cortes and an armed population? If she *fall* in the attempt, it can only be, *because she reformed, and armed too late*. And, if she should fall, we know whose harness, for the final conflict, must be next buckled on.

I remain, dear Sir, your well-wisher,

J. CARTWRIGHT.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.

SIR,—In your last number [Vol. XIII. p. 1004], you have laid it down as a maxim, that “a sovereignty ceded is a sovereignty rightfully possessed;” and you challenge the “sticklers for the law of nations,” to shew how it is that Buonaparté is not, at this moment, the rightful sovereign of Spain. To me it appears, that if Buonaparté, at this moment, holds the sovereignty of Spain by any tenure, it is by a tenure which all laws both individual and national, not only do not sanction, but positively reprobate. In private property no man can cede his right of inheritance, or possession. This right belongs not to him exclusively, but to his family. He is a mere life-renter. From his ancestors his inheritance was acquired, and to his own posterity it must be faithfully transmitted.—But this is a law, Sir, precise as it is, which applies not only to the transmission of the private property of individuals, but also to the transmission of crowns and sceptres, in as far as sovereigns are but individuals, and mere men, subject to the laws of nature, and to the dictates of common sense. There is however, besides, something still stronger which always will, and ought to have a very powerful effect upon the assignation of sovereignties; and independent of which no sovereignty can be held, but by the violent hand of usurpation, or conquest. I mean, the will and voice of the people. What is a sovereign but the delegate of his subjects, to whom, according to the nature of the government, is entrusted the management of the public affairs, and the furtherance of the laws of the nation? It is from his subjects that every ruler derives his authority; and, without their approbation and concurrence, his power and title can no longer exist. Upon this irrefragable principle, no monarch can, from his private whim, without the sanction of

his subjects, or, rather, his constituents, pretend to, cede his sovereignty to another person, out of his family. He may, perhaps, resign it in favour of his son, or lineal and legal successor, as Charles V. did in favour of his son Ferdinand, because he has, in a manner, the virtual consent of his subjects for so doing, from their allegiance to an hereditary sovereignty; but to dispoise it to a stranger is an inconsistency, an impossibility; and, excuse me Sir, for saying, that it appears an absurdity to maintain that a tenure flowing from such a source, constitutes a good, and unimpeachable right to a great kingdom.—Napoleon, therefore, Sir, is worse than usurper of the Spanish sovereignty, and ought to be expelled by every mode of annoyance: but, you say, [p. 999] “our ministry may look upon the restoration of the monarchy, and the continuance of the government, of the ranks, and of the orders in Spain, as the price of our aiding this expulsion;” and that “were you a Spaniard, rather than receive their aid upon such conditions, you would, after using all the means in your own power to keep us out, admit Napoleon and his government!!!” Here either hurry or enthusiasm has deprived you of the power of discriminating bad from worse, and worse from worst. But admitting that the government of Spain has been as bad as you represent it, still I say that the restoration of it, or of the family at the head of it, is the only object for this country assisting the Spanish patriots. Changes of government are always dangerous, and a change great and violent, such as that of Spain, at present, would be, which tries to derange or to anticipate the uniform sequence of events, invariably proves fatal. What! because an accidental abdication of their sovereign has taken place, either from his own weakness or the intrigues of another, are the Spaniards to attempt a change of government at present, when France is ready to exterminate them from the pale of Europe? Such an attempt would be folly, which leads to perdition. No: this is not the season for such national reformation. However fair the fabric, the whole mass will crumble to pieces in a moment, unless its foundation be good; and the foundation cannot be laid till the flood has subsided, when the sand of corruption may be safely cleared away, and the solid rock, upon which improvement may be erected, searched for, and laid bare. It ought to be the boast and the stimulus of every Spanish Patriot,—if our government is bad, let the present occurrence rouse us reasonably to

work for its improvement when the proper season arrives; but, bad as it may be, rather than meanly accept of the insidious offers of our enemies, we will fight for it to the last drop of our blood, merely because it is our own.—But, Sir, besides this consideration, the only object for our affording assistance to the Spanish Patriots ought to be the establishment of the old royal family on the throne of Spain, because this is the only definite object which they can at present fight for. It is impossible that the Spaniards can have formed any distinct idea of an improved government, supposing this were the proper season for carrying it into execution: and, this being the case, all our aid would serve only to weaken ourselves; and Buonaparté would say as a certain rebellious Scotch nobleman said of old, when the Court of Scotland was rent by contending factions, that “he is happy to see the parties hacking and hawing each other, as he will be able to take possession of the government when they themselves have destroyed each other.”—Moreover, it is contrary to sound policy for us to give aid to shake off the yoke of both sorts of “tyranny.” We have nothing to do whether the Spaniards are pillaged, robbed, gagged, imprisoned, &c. I, for instance, have much occasion to dictate to, and assist you in managing the private matters of your own family; for example, to advise you not to dig your own garden. What is oppression to one, is pleasure to another. One nation may assist another against the common enemy; but the practice of interfering in the regulation of internal government, terminates always in the detriment, or ruin, either of the assisting, or of the assisted.—The contrary is incompatible with the selfishness of man. The ancient Britons, by calling in the Saxons and Normans to assist them in organizing their legislature, became the slaves of their assistants: and we, who most imprudently interferred in the French revolution, have raised up an empire, which now threatens our very existence. “To endeavour to induce the people of Spain to shed their blood for the sake of the Bourbon family, would be an act [you say, p. 1002] of unparalleled insolence.” And can you call the Prince of Asturias a coward after his publishing the following proclamation?—“Noble Asturias! I am surrounded on every side, and a victim of the most cruel perfidy. You once saved Spain in worse circumstances. At present a prisoner, I do not ask of you the crown; but entreat of you to form a regular plan with the neighbouring pro-

vinces for the repulse of a foreign yoke, and the redemption of your liberties; by the destruction of the treacherous foe who deprives of his right your unfortunate Prince Ferdinand. Bayonne, May 8.” But why did he not “stay to help,” you add. The tenour of the above proclamation shews that he had been carried away by force. Is there any thing more probable? Independent of the proclamation, and of every thing else, we are bound in charity and in reason to believe so, till informed positively of the contrary. Even yet we know nothing about all the diabolical schemes and proceedings by which the deposition of the King of Spain has been effected. It is so unnatural, and so unlike all transactions of that sort, that he must be very credulous indeed who believes that it has taken place without irresistible compulsion.—Is the Prince of Asturias, then, to be held a “stinking coward?” And because you conclude on such grounds, that he is so, are his subjects not to fight for him? Are the representatives of the House of Bourbon, the most ancient, and most illustrious family in Europe, to be made “kennel-sweepers?” Even to think so in the present posture of things, excuse me, Sir, for saying, argues what I must forbear to name.—Families are all alike: this generation is good, and the next is bad. But when a government is to be entrusted to a monarch, there can be no question whether his family be ancient or upstart; for the former is respected by the wise and revered by the vulgar, and the latter is almost constantly disrespected and hated by all.—This brings to my recollection Mr. Hume’s Discourses on the Protestant Succession, and the Idea of a perfect Commonwealth, recommending which to your attentive perusal, I remain, Sir, your reader and well-wisher,—J. B. SCOTO-BRITANNUS.—*Edinburgh, 30th June, 1808.*—P. S. I dislike the title you have given to this subject of “Spanish Revolution;” and, therefore, beg leave to suggest “Spanish Patriotism.”

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

CUBA.—*Salvador José de Murey Salazar, Marquis of Someruelos, President, Governor, and Captain-General, &c.—To the most loyal, brave and gallant Inhabitants of the Island of Cuba.—Dated Havannah, Jan. 27, 1808.*

The experience and knowledge I have acquired in nine years that I have held my present command, have inspired me with the most pleasing confidence in your loyalty to the King, inherited from your ancestors,

in your love of your country, and in your intrepid gallantry.—This confidence, and my just consideration for citizens so worthy, have hitherto prevented me from adopting any other means of defence than that of forming plans well combined, thus avoiding all expense, molestations, and burdens that did not appear to me absolutely necessary, being very unwilling to increase the distresses you suffer in consequence of the present war.—But as the fury and desperation of the common enemy daily give additional proof of a desire to desolate all nations, without sparing even his allies, the time is come when prudence dictates to put ourselves in a more respectable state of defence, that your zeal and enthusiasm in making preparations to repel his attacks, and disconcert his enterprizes, may remind him of the discomfiture which, in July, 1807, your bravery made him suffer in the ungarrisoned city of Baraça, and warn him that it is vain for him to imagine that he can gather laurels in the fields of Cuba, whose inhabitants yield neither in valour nor in energy to the heroic defenders of Buenos Ayres.—I therefore exhort you, with all the effusion of my heart, to bear in mind that you are menaced in the security of your homes, the safety of your wives, your children, and aged parents, the sanctity of your religion, and the felicity of living under a mild and benign government, ever attentive to your welfare, and to let these considerations weigh with you in determining how far it may be necessary to extend your vigilance, and add to your sacrifices, to avert such calamities, ever mindful that the British flag is, cupidity and pale envy of the prosperity of all those who were not born in that incendiary island, and that your laborious application to agriculture, on a soil fertile in rich productions, is an unpardonable offence in the moral code of the British government.—Remember that this enemy, totally disregarding the laws of humanity and the system of warfare adopted by civilised nations, in which the victors conquer by valour and generosity, commenced the present war by perpetrating, in the midst of peace, an act of perfidy and piracy unprecedented, except in the annals of England. I allude to the capture of our four frigates in distress, with several other vessels, and the murder of the brave Spaniards who attempted to defend them; as the highway robber surprises the unsuspecting traveller, to despoil him of his property, and bereave him of life; and imitating this example, the satellites of England have committed on your coasts the horrid barbarities of pillage and burning, carrying off even

the slaves of your plantations, as was witnessed in Bahiabonda and in other parts, and lately happened in Arcos de Canasi.—Engrave these deeds on your hearts, and on those of your children, that they may serve to stimulate your animosity and just vengeance; but yet without ever belying the character of Spanish humanity and generosity, or forgetting that, as the good faith of the Spaniards has long been proverbial, so has the perfidy of the English been known and detested from remote ages, and, accordingly, four hundred years ago, Gutierrez Diez de Games, in the Chronicle of Count D. Pedro Nino, wrote thus: “as the English are different from, and contrary to, all other nations of Christians, they bear no love to any nation.”—To arms, to arms, at the call of your King, your country, and your well being, that you may not fall under the dominion of a government so odious and so inhuman. Your safety and security are in your own hands, and depend solely on your will; for your resources, animated with the spirit of union, and directed by wisdom, are not to be overcome by the power of your enemy.—Repair then to your standards, with the enthusiasm and confidence with which you ought to be inspired, by motives so powerful, and let there be no necessity for coercive authority.—Imitate the bravery and intrepidity of the inhabitants of the shores of the River of Plate, who, suspending their agricultural labours to exercise themselves in the use of arms, have saved their country, secured themselves from the desolation which threatened them, and have covered themselves with immortal glory, to the eternal honour of the Spanish nation.—Recollect, in a word, that your progenitors were, at one time, the terror of the English, and be assured that the false valour of mercenary banditti, in the garb of disciplined troops, is not to be compared with, and much less can it triumph over, the noble sentiments with which I have the pleasure to see you animated; for this very reason that the armed criminal is cowed at the unarmed voice of justice.—THE MARQUIS OF SOMERUELOS.—*Havannah, Jan. 27, 1808.*

POPEDOM.—*Proclamation of Napoleon relative to the Possessions of the Pope.—Dated Ancona, 11 May, 1808.*

Napoleon, by the Grace of God and by the Constitution, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Rhenish Confederacy, considering that the present sovereign of Rome has constantly refused to declare war against the English, and to co-

operate with the kingdoms of Italy and Naples for the protection of the Italian peninsula; that the interest of the two kingdoms, and the relative situation of Italy and Naples; require that their communication should be interrupted by no hostile power; that the gift of the lands which compose the Ecclesiastical States was made by our illustrious predecessor Charlemagne, for the benefit of christendom, but not for the succour of the enemies of our holy religion; therefore have we, upon consideration of the demand for passports, made by the Romish ambassador at our court, on the 8th of March, decreed, and do decree, as follows: [Here follow the different articles of the decree, uniting the provinces of the Papal territory to the kingdom of Italy, and presenting various local regulations as to their government.]—In pursuance of a second decree, all cardinals, prelates, and other officers of the Romish court, born in the kingdom of Italy, must retire to the place of their birth before the 5th of June, on pain of forfeiting their goods.

FRANCE'S NAVAL PROJECTS. 24th May, 1808.

On the 24th May, the Prince Arch-Chancellor, presiding in the sitting of the senate, appointed the state-councillor, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely minister of state, to lay before them the grounds of a *senatus consultum*, for uniting Tuscany with the French empire; and M. Semonville spoke in the name of the commission of the senate, which unanimously voted for this incorporation. The following is a summary of the assigned grounds:—The whole coast of the Mediterranean Sea must form a part of the French territory of the great empire. The regions, the coast adjoining to the Adriatic, are united with the kingdom of Italy; all those which lie along the Mediterranean, which are adjacent to our territory, must be united with the empire of France. From Leghorn to Toulon, to Genoa, to the department of Corsica, is not farther than from Leghorn to Milan. The commerce of the Mediterranean, whatever may be the opposition of the tyrant of the seas, shall be necessarily under the influence of France.—The very same first principles in consequence of which Genoa was incorporated with France rather than with the kingdom of Italy, also require that Leghorn be made a part of that empire. The kingdom of Naples, which lies both on the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, constitutes a distinct kingdom, subject, however, to the same federative system, and to the same state policy.—The port of Leghorn

has given constant reason of complaint to France. That port, appertaining to a territory governed by a weak prince, had fallen under the influence of England, and was become one of the principal inlets for her commerce. In different instances, without wishing to violate the neutrality of the sovereign of Tuscany, it became necessary for divisions of French troops to enter Leghorn, to confiscate the English merchandise there. These violations of territory, however necessary, are always disagreeable; and since Leghorn cannot be under the influence of France and England at the same time, it must become a part of France. Besides, Leghorn and the Tuscan territory produces sailors for the extension of our marine; through its whole extent ship building is carried on, and in the same proportion must the means be increased of providing seamen for manning them. If as of late a squadron was created at Toulon, as if by a miracle, and if contrary to the ideas of all those who are acquainted with the sea service, we found means to equip a numerous squadron, which Admiral Gantheaume commanded with so much ability, and for which he obtained so much renown, by the skilful manœuvres by which he frustrated the plans of the enemy—which having supplied with men, provisions, and warlike stores, Corfu, the key of the Adriatic, menaced by an expedition, already on its way, thus rendered fruitless, and which, on its returning voyage, capturing many considerable prizes, braved all storms, and exercised the crews during a difficult voyage of three months—if all these advantages have been gained, they must be partly ascribed to the incorporation of Genoa, which numbers many of her sons among the good seamen of that squadron.—The sons of the Arno are invited to the glory, his majesty having decreed that Spezzia shall be a military port: the docks, the works of the arsenal, and the forts, both on the sea and land side, are already marked out, and before the end of the present year, six ships of two or three decks shall be put upon the stocks.—It would not be proper to establish such considerable works at the extremities of the empire, if a foreign power were placed at the very gates of that arsenal. Spezzia shall become a second Toulon in the Mediterranean; on the whole coast there abound iron, timber, provisions, and useful hands; the provisions, the iron, and the men surrendered up, must become French. France and the continent, which are desirous of restoring the balance of power on the ocean, have the self same interest, in the prosperity of the new maritime depart-

ment of Spezzia. The incorporation of Tuscany is a necessary consequence of that grand plan.—This union is also the interest

Tuscany, which, under the sway of its little princes, was governed without system, without vigour, and was perpetually infested by the Barbary powers. Men can no longer be governed in a capricious and fantastic manner. There must be a certain rule, the government of the law, protected by a prince sufficiently great and elevated above the passions of men, and inflexible, as the law is necessary for this purpose. The time indeed is passed, in which it was believed that people were made for kings, not kings for people.—Lands, pastures, and forests may become property, but no person can possess a kingdom as if it were a farm. These disastrous consequences can no longer take place in great states. It is in vain then that objections are made to the great extension of the empire; the communication by land, now that neither Alps nor Apennines oppose it, is as easy from Leghorn to Paris, as from Paris to Nice. It has been the policy of European states to subdue the most distant countries, in order to obtain new commercial and maritime resources; why then should we neglect those resources and acquisitions which are so valuable to us? The territory of the Medici, the country of the sciences, and the arts, must form an immediate part of the French empire.—The dukedom of Urbino, Camerino, and the Mark of Ancona, lying on the coast of the Adriatic fall under the influence of Venice and must necessarily be united with the kingdom of Italy. This is also accomplished, and the considerable works in the port of Ancona will afford the opportunity of fitting out their ten sail of the line, to secure the freedom of the Adriatic sea, of which Ancona shall be the harbour, and Venice the naval arsenal. Before the end of this year five sail of the line shall be lying in the roads of Ancona, in that dangerous sea, which to the English presents only hostile shores, and where they will be obliged to maintain six ships of the line, if they attempt to counterbalance our power. No, the war shall not be eternal, in spite of the blind fury which cherishes that inhuman and senseless principle in the cabinet of London. Every where French squadrons are forming, and our naval power in the Scheldt is already considerable. In a few days there will be in the roads of Flushing and Antwerp a fleet of thirty sail of the line, that on the coast of Britain will be still stronger.—Besides that, we have the allied Russian squadron at Lisbon, where there are already a division of

several new ships of the line, in the best state, which the rapid advance of the army under gen. Junot placed in our hands.—The events in Spain have converted a declining and badly conducted monarchy into a constitutional and energetic government, the dock-yards at Cadiz, Ferrol, and Carthagena have felt this already. Toulon, Spezzia, Venice, all the resources forthcoming from Holland, Spain, and Italy, are in operation, we must have ships, and these last named countries have no deficiency either of iron, or of timber and hemp, for building or rigging them.—A decree has then issued from the emperor for the incorporation of Tuscany, on the principle of the necessity for completing the system of the great empire, and for rendering the naval administration of France harmonious throughout all the members of the great confederacy. Without the incorporation of Tuscany, there can be no immediate communication with Naples, and our relations could not be maintained with her, but through the medium of states subsisting under other governments, from which it might be feared that the guidance and influence might be lost which must be exercised towards such states, to place the coasts and sailors in a state of opposition to the common enemy.—The following is the decree of the senate, passed in consequence of this exposition:—Art. 1. The dukedoms of Parma and Placentia are united to the French empire, under the name of the department of the Taro; they shall form an inseparable indivisible portion of the French territory, from the period of the notification of the present senatus consultum.—2. The states of Tuscany are united to the French empire under the name of the department of the Arno, the department of the Mediterranean, and the department of the Ombrona. They shall form an indivisible portion of the French empire, from the period of the notification of the present decree.—3. The laws which govern the French empire shall, in the departments of the Arno, the Mediterranean, and the Ombrona, be made public before 1st January, 1809, the period from which the constitutional government for the departments shall take its commencement.—4. The department of the Taro, and that of the Arno, shall each have six deputies in the legislative body, the department of the Mediterranean three, and the department of the Ombrona three; which will raise the number of the members of that body to 342.—5. The deputies of the department of the Taro shall be chosen and named without delay and shall enter the legislative body before the sitting of 1808.—6. The

shall enter the legislative body before the session of 1809, &c.

AUSTRIA.—*Proclamation for arming the People.*—9th June, 1808.

We, Francis I. by the grace of God, Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, Bohemia, Galicia, and Lodomeria, &c. &c. Archduke of Austria, &c. &c.—We have discovered to our beloved subjects, in our letters patent, of the 12th ult. our design attending the organization of the reserves, namely, the defence of the monarchy, which is to be founded on such means as to afford the possibility of facilitating the finances of state by a reduction of the regular army.—In this design we have found it good to organize a national levy-en-masse, tending to defend the country.—We do, for this end, choose a period when we are in friendly relation with all the powers of the continent—for only then, if such measures are ripely adopted, and cemented by time, can success be expected from them, in case they should become needful.—To execute these measures, we have appointed plenipotentiaries, whose knowledge, zeal, and attachment to our person and the state, have been repeatedly tried, viz.—For Austria, Carniola, Carinthia, Stiria, Triest, and Saltsburgh, our aulic commissioner, count Von Sauray.—For Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, our serene cousin, his royal highness the archduke Ferdinand, with our upper burgrave, Von Wallis and governor count Lazansky.—For lower Austria, and Austria on the Enis, our serene cousin, his royal highness the archduke Maximilian, with the president count Von Bissengen and baron Von Hackelberg.—For Galicia, our general of cavalry, count Von Bellegarde, and the vice-president of government, count Von Wurmser. They have received definitive instruction as to the manner and time of execution, and will take the other requisite measures accordingly.—We expect our beloved subjects, who have always shewn in a most laudable manner their unshaken devotion and fidelity towards us, will acknowledge in that regulation the full measure of our paternal designs, and assist to carry them into effect with all their might, as a measure inseparable from their welfare. The activity and prudence displayed in this business shall obtain our special approbation, and recommend them who shall laudably distinguish themselves in this particular.—Given in our capital and place of residence, Vienna, June 9th, in the year 1808, and of our reign, the eighth year.—

FRANCIA.—**ALOYS**, count Von Ugarte, first chancellor.—**JOSEPH**, baron Von der Mark.—**JOSEPH CHARLES**, count of Dietrichstein.—**JOSEPH**, baron Von Kielmansegg.

AUSTRIA.—*At Vienna the following Proclamation has been affixed in the public places by the order and in the name of his Majesty.*

His majesty has not heard without the greatest displeasure, that the evil-disposed have endeavoured, with all their might, to spread disquieting reports concerning the insecurity of the external peace and apprehension of a new war. These reports are merely the result of an insatiable spirit of gambling. His majesty is in the most amicable relations with all the powers of Europe; but he will not suffer the public peace to be interrupted, without punishment, by the avarice of a few persons. and has, in consequence, ordered that search should be made for the authors and disseminators of such false reports; having sufficient confidence in the body of merchants, to trust that they will inform a special commission, which has been established for that special purpose. all they are acquainted with concerning the circulators of the current reports and the artifices they employ.—Commissioners were appointed by the government, who were to watch daily in the exchange, against the stock-jobbers, and the spreaders of false reports.

PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION.—*Edict and Proclamation, issued at Oporto, 20th June, 1808.*

In the name of the Prince Regent of Portugal, the junta of the supreme government of the city of Oporto makes known unto all the subjects of the said prince, that the French government is entirely exterminated from this country, and the royal authority of our legitimate sovereign is restored, which will be exercised fully and independently by the above-mentioned junta, until the government established in this kingdom, by his royal highness shall be restored; in consequence of which the said junta orders that his royal highness shall be proclaimed, and his royal arms be displayed and respected as they always have been, and shall be; and that all constituted authorities shall act conformably, publishing all their orders in the name of his royal highness.—The Bishop, President, and Generalissimo, given at Oporto, 10th June, 1808.

EDICT.

The provisional council of the government of Oporto, invites the veteran soldiers, to whatever regiment of the line they may

belong, to unite with the army of this province, that is, to enter into the ranks with the two regiments of the garrison of this city, which are in the course of organization: and to each man, by way of remuneration, are promised a month's pay, and a daily allowance of four vintains, with clothing, &c. This same pay will be allotted to all the soldiers now on service, as well as those who will join the same regiments, as far as circumstances will permit this extraordinary pay. Likewise the militia will have the same advantages.—The Bishop, President and Governor.

PROCLAMATION.

Portuguese!—By Heaven, and by Jesus Christ!—You have a governor who loves you, who is anxious for your happiness, and who will exert himself to obtain it. What avail your turbulence, your excesses, your want of that order and subordination to which he would conduct you, anxious to preserve your lives? What opportunities have you not lost, of which you ought to have availed yourselves against the enemy, since you have neglected your own resources? What signals do you not exhibit to the enemy, that he may entrap and surprise you!—Portuguese! Listen to one who loves you. The French intend to strike a blow, fatal to you, and you are lost if you are guilty of insubordination, or disregard the councils of your governor. Your firing, your beat of drum, your bells, give to your enemies the knowledge of where you are, where your force, and where your weakness. From your enemy conceal your power, that you may strike the blow with the more success; and that you may encounter him when he least expects your approach. By these means you may conquer him. Subject yourselves to your superiors in all and through all, if you are desirous of victory; otherwise, be assured you will meet only disgrace. From necessity, after this manner, the mighty bull yields to vigilance, dexterity, and the little cloak. By whatever is sacred in heaven, or in earth, by the sacred name of Jesus Christ, the governor implores you, that you maintain subjection to your chiefs, conforming to the regulations of your respective companies. If you are ordered to a post, there you ought to remain until the moment of combat and glory shall arrive. To you who are in the van we first commit our cause, and by valour diminish the number of our enemies. You who are next in order, when your turn comes, fulfil your duty by dealing destruction around you: and you who form the rear-guard, destroy the rest. Your energy must be guided by intelligence; you must be con-

ducted by wisdom, in order to be conquerors.—Long live the Prince Regent; long live Portugal; long live the Portuguese! —The Bishop, Governor and President.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from p. 90).—*Proclamation of the Supreme Junta at Seville, 29th May, 1808.*

Seville could not resist the impulse of her heroic loyalty, of which she has set the example in all ages. The king, to whom we all swore allegiance with emotions of joy, unprecedented in history, has been decoyed from us. The fundamental laws of our monarchy are trampled under foot; our property, our customs, our wives—all which the nation holds most dear, is threatened with imminent danger. Our holy religion, our only hope, is doomed to perdition, or will be reduced to more external appearances without support and without protection. And all this is done by a foreign power, not by dint of arms, but by deceit and treachery, by taking advantage of our good nature, and by converting the very persons who call themselves the heads of our government, into instruments of those atrocious acts; persons, who, either from the baseness of their sentiments, from shameful fear, or perhaps from other motives, which time or justice will unfold, hesitate not to sacrifice their country. It therefore became necessary to break the shackles, which prevented the Spanish people from displaying that generous ardour which in all ages has covered them with glory; that noble courage, with which they have always defended the honour of the nation, their laws, their monarchs, and their religion.—The people of Seville joined accordingly the 27th May; and, through the medium of all their magistrates, of all their constituted authorities, perfectly united, and of the most respectable individuals of every rank and description. This supreme council of government was formed, invested with all necessary powers, and charged to defend the country, the religion, the laws and the king. We accept the heroic trust; we swear to discharge it, and reckon on the strength and energy of the whole nation. We have again proclaimed Don Ferdinand VII. our king; again we swore allegiance to him, swore to die in his defence—and this was the signal of happiness and union, and will prove so to all Spain.—A council of government had scarce been formed, when it violated the most sacred laws of the realm. A president appointed without any authority whatever, and who, had he had any lawful title, hastened to forfeit it. In addition to his being a foreigner, which was a

legal objection to his promotion, he acted with the utmost duplicity, and co-operated for the destruction of the very monarchy, from whom he received his appointment, and of the laws, which alone could sanction his authority. Under these circumstances we could not restrain our loyalty, and much less could we violate the sacred engagements, which we had before contracted, as Spaniards, as subjects, as christians, as freemen, independent from all foreign authority and power.—Nor could the authority of the first tribunal of the nation, the council of Castile, check or controul our exertions. The weakness of that council became obvious from the wavering and contradictory proceedings it adopted. The most momentous and most critical situation in which the nation ever hath been placed, and in which the council should have displayed that heroic firmness with which numberless motives and its own honour compelled it to act. The order tamely to submit to, and circulate, and obey the act of abdication in favour of a foreign prince, was the consummation of its weakness, perhaps of its infamy, for that act was evidently void and illegal from want of authority in him who made it, because the monarchy was not his own, nor was Spain composed of animals subject to the absolute controul of their rulers; his accession to the throne was founded on his royal descent, according to his own confession, and on the fundamental laws of the realm, which invariably regulate the hereditary succession, and with regard to which the council is not invested with any other power, than the sacred duty to enforce their observance. It is void on account of the state of violence and oppression in which it was made, and which is far more evident than the abdication itself; it is void, because the published Act of Abdication of King Ferdinand VII. and of his uncle and brother, was made in the same state of violence and compulsion, as it expressly declared, in the very Act of Abdication; it is void, because many royal personages, possessed of the right to claim the crown, have not relinquished that claim, but preserve it entire. Add to this the horrid treachery which has been employed to sacrifice and degrade the Spanish nation. It is to our alliance, and our sacrifices, that the French are indebted for what they call their triumphs: France withdrew our gallant troops from their native land, and sent them to the most distant countries; she made them fight for her in-

terests, without having any occasion of them, for the obvious purpose of weakening us, and despoiling us of our strength. Her armies afterwards entered Spain, under continual professions of an anxious desire to promote our prosperity, and under the pretext of co-operating in expeditions against an enemy, of whom no farther mention is made. The people, by a generous effort, prevented the departure of their king, a measure which the French should have hailed with shouts of joy; but far from so doing, they kept a profound silence with regard to that departure, and what is still more, converted it into a motive to oppress us. France affected to perceive divisions in the nation which did not exist; the Spanish nation having never been more united in the love and defence of its king. The latter was decoyed into the French territory by deceitful insinuations and professions; with a degree of generosity, of which perhaps there does not exist a precedent, the king with implicit reliance on those vain professions, threw himself into the arms of the French, who with the basest treachery, unprecedented in the annals of civilized nations, made him their prisoner, treated him in a manner the most disrespectful, and forced him to the deeds of horror, which all Europe has witnessed with astonishment, and every Spaniard with indignation and the most poignant grief. In a manner equally deceitful they invited the royal parents to their country, and compelled them to unjust and illegal acts; acts which must hand down their memory to the latest posterity branded with disgrace; they also dragged away the rest of the royal personages, to whom their tender age would have proved an inviolable shield, even among the most barbarous nations.—The French ruler summoned the Spanish nation before him; he chose such deputies as best suited his purpose; in a despotic manner of election of other deputies, appointed to deliberate in a foreign country on the most sacred interests of the nation, while he publicly declared a private and respectful letter, written to him by Ferdinand the seventh, at the time when he was prince of Asturias, a criminal performance, injurious to the rights of sovereignty, although the same foreigner, who now affects to consider it as an offence, perhaps induced him to write it. It is indeed a heinous offence, it is rebellion, when an independent nation submits to the controul of a foreign prince, and discusses in his

presence, and under his decision, its most sacred rights and public welfare; and neither Seville, nor any Spaniard, will lower himself to a degree of disloyalty and meanness, which could induce him to a rebellion so atrocious, that even slaves would scorn to disgrace themselves by deeds of infamy like this.—He has resorted to many other indecorous means to deceive us. He has distributed seditious libels to corrupt the public opinion, in which under the strongest professions of respect for the laws, and for religion, he insults both, leaves no means untried, however infamous they may be, to bend our necks under an iron yoke, and make us his slaves. He carries his audacity and deceit the length of assuring the public, in one of his libellous publications, that the supreme pontiff and vicar of Jesus Christ, approves and sanctions his proceedings, while it is notorious, that in sight of all Europe he has despoiled him of his dominions, and forced him to dismiss his cardinals, in order to prevent him from directing and governing the whole church, in the manner sanctioned by our godly Saviour Jesus Christ.—Spaniards, every consideration calls on us to unite and frustrate views so atrocious. No revolution exists in Spain; or did we declare against any power; our sole object is, to defend what we hold most sacred, against him, who, under the cloak of alliance and friendship, intended to wrest it from us, and who, we have reason to fear, will despoil us, without fighting, of our laws, our monarchs, and our religion. Let us, therefore, sacrifice every thing to a cause so just, and if we are to lose our all, let us lose it fighting, and as generous men.—Join me, therefore, all; the people are ready to take up arms; let us commit to the wisest among us in all the provinces of Spain, the important trust to preserve the public opinion, and refute those insolent libels replete with the most atrocious falsehoods. Let every one combat in his way; and let even the church of Spain incessantly implore the assistance of the God of Hosts, whose protection is secured to us by the evident justice of our cause.—And what do you fear? There is not in Spain the number of the enemy's troops which they proclaim, in order to intimidate us. Those who occupy part of our country are composed of different nations, dragged into service, and who anxiously desire to break their chains. The positions they have taken are exactly those in which they can be conquered and defeated in the easiest manner. They are besides weak and dismayed, because the consciousness of guilt makes a coward of the bravest man.—All Europe

will applaud our efforts, and hasten to our assistance. Italy, Germany, and the whole north, which suffer under the despotism of the French nation, will eagerly avail themselves of the favourable opportunity held out to them by Spain, to shake off their yoke and recover their liberty, their laws, their monarchs, and all they have been robbed of by that nation. France herself will hasten to erase the stain of infamy which must cover the tools and instruments of deeds most treacherous and heinous. She will not shed her blood in so vile a cause. She has already suffered too much under the idle pretext of a peace and happiness, which never came, and can never be attained but under the empire of reason, peace, religion, and laws, and in a state where the rights of other nations are respected and observed.—Spaniards, your native country, your property, your laws, your liberty, your kings, your religion, nay, your hopes in a better world, which that religion can alone devise to you and your descendants, are at stake, exposed to great and imminent danger.—By command of the supreme council of government, —DON JUAN BAUTISTA ESTELLER, *First Secretary*.—DON JUAN PARDO, *Second Secretary*.

Proclamation of Gen. MORLA, Cadix, May 30, 1808.

People of Spain, loyal countrymen, whither does your blind enthusiasm, arising from your fervent love for our august and beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII. (for whom we are to die) hurry you along? Are ye not aware that the excesses you commit, hurl us to a precipice, and cause the ruin of the state. Would you be so much misled by prejudice as not to know, that disorganization is the principal cause of the downfall and destruction of the most powerful nation? And convinced of that truth, why do you not hasten to submit to the orders of a government, which has no more earnest wish than to die for our sovereign, who is torn from us by the usurpation of a tyrant? The advantages arising from such a line of conduct will be truly great, because, being organized as militia or veteran troops, the same number of men who pant for the welfare of the nation, will form a body of troops able to march in any direction, which circumstances shall require, and how great will be your satisfaction when you shall see the tranquillity and peace of this town restored.—Hitherto you have acted with inconsiderate precipitance, and done nothing, and under the cloak of your patriotism rogues and ruffians rob and destroy; a thing which cannot but deserve the detestation of

all ~~plan~~ of sense, and in this manner the merit which your might acquire, by gratifying yourselves to march against the enemy of our native country, is undone.—Valiant Spaniards, be therefore calm, and prepare for honourable combat. Let us all endeavour to perfect the vast plan which has been formed to attack the frontiers of our usurper.—The voice of reason has dictated to me these observations, and, as commander in chief, I tell you, that I give you my word, that the French shall not shift the flag, or at least not hoist theirs; any other measure would bring numerous misfortunes over ourselves. Attempt nothing, because you would disconcert my plan; I have already taken my measures, and within twenty-four hours you shall witness the favourable consequences, which we all desire.

Address of General MORLA, at Cadix, May 30, 1808.

BELoved SPANIARDS.—The Deputy of the people, whom I empowered personally to treat with General Rosilly on the present circumstances, having discharged his trust, I now proceed to acquaint you with the result.—This gentleman has given me a very minute account of the conferences which he had with the said general; the most important point of which is, that, supposing no formal rupture to have as yet taken place, the same treatment ought to be continued towards persons belonging to the French nation, as they have hitherto experienced, until Napoleon shall have given his decision on the prayer addressed to him, to restore to us our august sovereign, Ferdinand VII; the nation universally demands him; ready to shed the last drop of blood in defence of this cause, and declaring that in order to obtain the restoration of our said sovereign, leave should be given to his ships, which are lying in this bay to depart.—We have nothing to fear from this squadron; on the contrary, by the change of position made by our fleet, it is surrounded in such a manner, that it must be ours, if the reasonable proposal which has been made, should be rejected.—Under these circumstances, my dear countrymen, I only charge you to observe strict subordination to the chief, whom you shall elect: because I shall this instant resign my place, if you do not judge me fit to command you; but if you renew the election, and leave me in the post which I occupy, I alone have to command; no person is to prescribe conditions to me, and no person shall demand of me hazardous actions, which would merely tend to the dismemberment of the nation, and, in some measures to frustrate the vast plan, which I

have already announced to you.—But should you still entertain the least apprehensions on account of the small number of French ships, which so much engage your attention, recollect, that we have already with one voice proclaimed our firm determination not to obey any other sovereign than Ferdinand VII. and that no advantage or opposition can ever induce us to violate that obligation. And should on the other hand indignation against the crews of the said ships urge you on to vindictive proceedings, bear in mind that you would thereby unavoidably occasion the loss of 25,000 of your countrymen, who are in the north, and above all expose the life of our sovereign Ferdinand VII. who is in a worse situation than the said few ships, and whose life is so valuable to us, that we are determined to fight for him.—Do not, therefore, harbour any mistaken notion, and rest satisfied, that if you act as Spaniards, I shall never separate my destiny from that of Spain—"To die or conquer," is my motto: let no other resound in your breast.

Account of the first Battle between the Spanish Patriots and the French, published by the Supreme Board of Government at Seville.—June 8, 1808.

For the satisfaction of the public, that all may know the real extent of the kind of misfortune which has befallen our troops, and that it entirely arises from this circumstance, that the troops, composed of inhabitants, did not fight so bravely as they ought to have done, since, had they acquitted themselves properly, the French army would have been completely destroyed, and that the people may thereby be excited to wipe off this trifling blot from their scutcheon by their ardor and steadiness in the field. This supreme board of government, orders the publication of the two following letters, one of which is from an officer commanding the van, confidently expecting and enjoining every one for the safety of the country, to display, in such actions as may be fought for the future the discipline, vigour, and steadiness, which have ever been characteristic of true Spaniards, and which are so necessary under the existing critical circumstance when they become an imperious duty.

MOST SERENE SIR,—The Rev. Anthony Cebrenos, a clergyman, who had at Cordova the management of the telegraph which had just been destroyed, presents himself before the board at three in the morning, and relates that at two in the afternoon the French began to batter and force the New-gate of the said town,

and that the action commenced about four in the morning.—All the officers agreeing, that if the armed inhabitants had kept their ground though ever so short a time, no trace would have been left of the French; the troops of the line have distinguished themselves, and more especially their provincial grenadiers and their commandant D. Juan Maria de Morales. The staff, with a considerable part of the army under Echvarri, remained at three in Mango N-gro with a great quantity of ammunition and ordnance, one piece of cannon excepted, which is said to be left behind in consequence of the carriage having been broken; which account, signed by the said clergyman, is thus laid before your highness for the corresponding purposes. May God, &c (Signed) —ANTHONY CEBREROS, and D. JOSEPH MARIA ROMERA.

MOST SERENE SIR,—In conformity to the instructions which I received the moment I was leaving Cordova, which major Alveaz brought me from your highness, and collecting all the troops which I found dispersed in my way, I came back to this town at half past 11 at night, to wait for your further orders. The action which had been doubtful for two hours, was decided in favour of the enemy, by the precipitate flight of the armed inhabitants, whom I found it impossible to keep in their ranks. The pass of the bridge of Alcolea was gloriously defended, both by our artillery and the brave Lasala, who had under his orders 100 volunteers of Campo Mayor and Provincial Grenadiers.—I can assure your highness, the pass cost the enemy upwards of 200 killed or wounded, and that they lost nearly as many in the encounter with our cavalry. For our part, I will send positive intelligence to your highness as soon as I receive the returns from the respective commandants of corps. In the mean while, from those in my hands, and from what I have seen, I am convinced that the number of both will not amount to thirty.—(Signed) PETER AUSTIN DE ECHIVERRA. To his Most Serene Highness Francis de Saverdra, and the Supreme Board of Seville.

Letters from Gen. Spencer, Lord Collingwood, Capt. Creyke, and Capt. Digby, relative to the affairs in Spain and Portugal, written to the Secretary of State, and to the Lords of the Admiralty, from the coast of Spain and Portugal.

FROM GEN. SPENCER, 17 JUNE, 1808.

My lord.—I avail myself of the opportunity afforded by the passing of the Nautilus, from Lord Collingwood to sir Charles Cotton, to congratulate your lordship on the

surrender of the French squadron, of five line of battle ships, and one frigate, in the harbour of Cadiz, to the Spanish arms, on the 14th instant; on which day the Spanish colours were flying in all the French ships. The particulars of this important and interesting event will, no doubt, be fully communicated to your lordship by lord Collingwood.—It is also very satisfactory for me to inform your lordship, that the movement I have made to this quarter, at the request of general Morla, has been attended with the happiest effects. The French troops are retreating in every direction towards Lisbon, except some very insignificant parties left to occupy the different small forts and posts on this side of Portugal. The Portuguese people are rising in all parts, encouraged greatly by our presence here; and the Spanish frontier on the Guadiana is thus effectually secured from any attack of the French.

FROM GEN. SPENCER, 21 JUNE, 1808.

My lord,—The French fleet having surrendered on the 14th, and the Spanish commissioners having since embarked for England, I beg leave shortly to recapitulate the different events which have led to these desirable objects and to state to your lordship the present situation of Spain and Portugal, as far as I have obtained correct information.—The general feelings of the Spaniards had been for some time excited to the utmost degree of indignation at the conduct of the French. The information of the forced renunciation of the crown of Spain by Charles the Fourth, Ferdinand, and all the royal family in favour of Bonaparte, appeared to be the signal of universal opposition to the views of France.—The council of Seville, one of the principal provincial jurisdictions in Spain have laid hold of some statutes in their constitution, which authorises their rejecting the orders of the supreme council of Madrid, when that capital shall be in the power of foreign troops. They have therefore assumed an independent authority in the name of Ferdinand VII, whom they have proclaimed king; and after some previous steps, they have formally declared war against France, and have appealed to the Spanish nation to support them; and their supremacy has been acknowledged by the councils of several other provinces. In Andalusia they collected from fifteen to twenty thousand regular troops, and have put arms in the hands of upwards of sixty thousand peasants. General Castaneos is appointed commander in chief; and I understand they propose, out of the first levies, to augment the establishment of the old regiments to

double their present numbers. Provincial assemblies are also forming in most of the large towns, and different depots fixed upon for raising volunteers. — They have a proportion of near 4000 cavalry, and a large quantity of artillery, as Seville is a foundry, and one of the largest depots in Spain. — All accounts agree, that in every part of Spain the insurrections have commenced almost at the same period; many small detachments of the enemy, and many officers have been cut off. Gen. Dupont was on his march to Seville, and had already passed the Morena Mountains, when the insurrection took place. He has pushed on to Cordova, and, by the intercepted dispatches, we learn, he is strengthening himself there, and proposes to wait for reinforcements. In the mean time, the Morena passes in his rear have been occupied by 5000 Spaniards; the road is broken up; and I trust all communication has been cut off. — General D'Alril had received orders to join him at Seville with 4000 men who were to assemble at Alcorentia, but our arrival off Ayamonte, and the arming of all Spain, and the alarms in Portugal, having prevented this movement, I trust that general Junot will not now be able to detach any troops from Portugal, though we understand a French corps have been collected at Elvas, but I do not think it can exceed 4000 men, though the reports of its strength are very various. — At Faro the Portuguese have already risen, having taken or destroyed a detachment of about 200 men, have seized the arms and ammunition of the province, which the French had collected in a depot, and also about 40,000 dollars in gold, which the French general had amassed.

LORD COLLINGWOOD, 14TH JUNE, 1809.

Sir, — In my letter of the 12th instant, by the Alpha, I informed you that application had been made for a ship to carry to England commissioners appointed by the supreme council of Seville, to treat with his majesty's ministers on such matters as are important to the interest of both countries. The admiral who commands in the port of Cadiz being one of the deputed, they did not choose he should depart until the surrender of the French ships, which took place this morning. — The Spaniards having constructed an additional battery of thirty heavy guns, and numerous gun and bomb vessels having taken their stations, the French ships struck their colours at seven o'clock this morning, and soon after the Spaniards were hoisted on board them. The French ships, I understand are not at all injured, as the Spaniards wanted them

for their own use; nor has there been much loss of men on either side. The governor some days since (and before I came here) requested of Major General Spencer to proceed to Ayamonte, to oppose a detachment of the French army, which was said to be marching from Portugal by the coast; and yesterday the transports proceeded, under the protection of the Zealous, to that quarter, where the Windsor Castle had conducted a detachment the day before. — June 15. — The governor of Cadiz has notified to me, that the commissioners will be ready to embark in two days. As the Revenge has been stationed near the town, where sir John Gore has had much intercourse with the governor and chiefs in command during the late operations, and witnessed the temper and disposition of the people, I have ordered that ship to receive them, that he may give to his majesty's ministers the information they may desire of what has come within his observation as to the present state of this part of Spain. — Application has been made to me this evening by the supreme council of Seville and the governor of Cadiz, to give a passport to a Spanish frigate and ten dispatch vessels, to carry to the several governments and presidencies in the West Indies, information of the events which have happened in Spain, and their instructions to the governors: and also that a sloop of war may take out officers, to that country, whose presence there is important; this they urge in preference to their going in a Spanish vessel, as it will convey a proof of their connexion with Great Britain.

CAPT. CREYKE, 20TH JUNE, 1808.

Sir; — Since the account I had the honour of delivering to you on the 10th June, Oporto has undergone two revolutions, and has been successively in the hands of the French and the subjects of the Prince Regent. After the Spaniards had delivered the forts into the custody of the Portuguese, and the national colours were every where hoisted, the French were again able to establish their authority, in consequence of the weak and undetermined measures of the governor, Louis d'Oliveira, who is now confined as a traitor, and maintained it till the 10th, the day of Corpus Christi, a great national festival, when it had been usual for the Portuguese regiments to attend with colours flying. The governor, d'Oliveira, in consequence of orders from Junot, attempted to establish the French flag instead of the Portuguese at the procession. This violent attack on the national custom drew forth the murmurs of the populace to so great a degree, that an attempt to compromise on the part of the go-

governor had no effect; and on the 18th, in the evening, the day before my arrival here, they were excited to such a degree of fury, that, countenanced by the priests, the people rose en masse, broke open the depots, and supplied themselves with 25,000 stand of arms, and, together with the regulars, formed a most determined and enthusiastic army. From this moment all French authority ceased; and every man, either French, or suspected of being inclined to French interest, was arrested.—The bishop of Oporto was elected as the new governor, and an army of 20,000 men sent to meet the French, who had advanced, to the amount of 900, within six leagues of Oporto. The enthusiasm has communicated from one to the other, and the Portuguese provinces of Tralos, Montes, Minho, and the northern part of Beira, in imitation of the Spaniards have risen in arms, determined to extirpate the French from their kingdom. From the most moderate accounts, besides what are at Oporto, I may estimate them at upwards of 100,000 men. All the regular regiments disbanded by the French are forming again with the greatest alacrity, and will soon join them. I have this day had an interview with his excellency the governor, conducted to him amid the shouts and huzzas of the populace. To-morrow I send a party of men to mount the guns of a large Brazil ship, the command of which is given to an Englishman, and destined as a floating battery to defend the bridge, in case the French should have the temerity to approach, though such an event is not to be apprehended. If any requisition is made for powder, I shall comply with it, but they have at present abundance of arms, ammunition, and provisions. The detestation of the Portuguese to the French is so great, that capt. Jones and myself, after having begged the life of the French intendant of police had the greatest difficulty in conveying him a prisoner to the boat, and the unbounded love and respect to the English alone prevented the enraged populace from tearing him to pieces.

CAPT. DIGBY, 25th JUNE, 1808.

My lord;—The last opportunity I had of writing to your lordship, I acquainted you of my intention of going to St. Andero immediately, and afford every assistance in my power to the loyal inhabitants, and bring off any British subjects that might wish to come away in the present uncertain state of the country; and I had intelligence that the French frigate in Passage, accompanied by several gunboats, was expected to make a descent on that part of the coast. Owing to the strong easterly winds and long calms, I

did not get there till the 21st. The signal post displayed a flag of truce, which was answered by both ships. The captain of the port, Don Vincenzo Caminho, came on board; he told us the French army were soon expected to make an attack on the pass in the mountains that guarded the approach to the town; he invited us to anchor in Sardenero Bay, which we did at 5 p. m.; until he had made his report to the bishop, who was the present governor, he wished us not to land. No boat returning by one o'clock the next day, I concluded some sudden attack or unexpected event must have taken place. In the afternoon a brig came out of the harbour, full of people of all descriptions, who had left the town on the report that the French were advancing. I immediately got under way, and sent capt. Daly of the Comet up the harbour, to gain some confirmed intelligence, and, should the report prove true, to reconnoitre the fort, and find out where the principal magazine was, and if it was possible to destroy it. Between 8 and 9 p. m. capt. Daly returned with certain information that the French troops had gained the pass, and had halted only a few miles from the town, and were expected to enter that night or next day.—Capt. Daly also made every possible observation, and had himself spiked the guns in two forts near the town, and he requested to go and destroy the magazine, and the guns in the forts that guard the entrance of the harbour. I should certainly have sent the boats that night, but the great chance of their being taken by surprise, should the enemy advance, and the night being very dark and squally, with every appearance of bad weather, made me defer it till the next morning. At daylight we stood into the bay, and manned and armed two boats from each ship, under the orders of capt. Daly; he was accompanied by lieut. H. M. Herbert, of the Cossack, and lieutenant Read, of the Royal Marines, and several of the younger officers, who all volunteered their services; they left this ship soon after 6 o'clock, and landed about 8, spiked all the guns in Fort Salvador d'Ano, and Fort Sedra, and wedged shot in the chambers of them, which renders them quite useless; the magazine was at some little distance, and had 500 whole barrels of powder in it, besides quantities of other stores; all which were completely destroyed, great part by throwing it over the cliffs into the sea, leaving sufficient to blow up the magazine; the train was laid for a considerable distance, and it was let off about 10 o'clock, which instantly levelled the whole building to the ground; finding some more powder in Fort

Sedra, a train was laid to it, which took effect, and blew part of the house and store-house in it up; the two other forts on the west side of the bay they could not attempt, as the surf was so high it was impossible to land, and to walk round was too far from the boats, as they had not a moment to spare: having heard before they set fire to the first train, that the French had entered the town, and they expected a strong guard at the forts, the boats left the shore by 11 o'clock, and had just got round the point of De Ano, when a considerable body of French dragoons appeared on the hill, and took post near the smoking ruins of the magazine. I am sorry to say, capt. Daly, and lieut. Read, of the marines, are much scorched, particularly lieut. Read, in setting fire to the last train; but am happy to find his eyes are safe, and is doing well. Capt. Daly speaks in high commendation of the zeal and exertion of every officer and man employed with him.

Address to the Galicians

Spaniards!—You have no other alternative! You must either clank your chains in infamous slavery, or fight bravely for your liberty. The monster of France has determined to tyrannize over our independence, by expedients more detestable than any yet disclosed in the history of mankind. His infamy is discovered, his treachery is exposed, and our suspicions are confirmed by the plunder of the sacred person of our sovereign. Ah! complicated misery! the butcher will bathe his hands in the blood of our king, if Ferdinand be not rescued by our valour! Shall we permit this public robber to execute his base purposes upon our prince? Shall we allow his banditti, unresisted, to rob our houses, outrage our families, and bear off the holy vessels of our religion, crimes which have been already perpetrated in Portugal?—Spaniards! this is the cause of the Omnipotent God. It must be supported, or your names must be transmitted with infamy to all future generations. Under the hallowed standard of religion, our ancestors gave freedom to the soil, opposed by the multitudinous hosts of Mahomet; and shall we fear to meet a confused crowd of detested atheists, led by the avowed protector of the infidel Jew? If we abandon the field of battle and of glory, our venerable fathers, those heroes, who shed their blood for the extirpation of Ishmael, will lift up their heads from the sepulchre, will upbraid us for our cowardice, and will disown us for their offspring.—The tyrants of France, of Italy, and of other nations of the continent, those common enemies of humanity,

thrown up by the waves of Corsica, are the same that deluded our young Ferdinand, seduced him by idle promises, and proclaimed him the sovereign of our monarchy. Commencing with this deception, when they had blown up the flames of discord among the members of the royal family, they took advantage of their situation and imprisoned them. By the same intrigues and falsehood, they designed to have enslaved the whole of the Spanish nation; and for this purpose, they endeavoured to attract within their toils, your strength, your valour and your fidelity. It is true, that a few base born wretches, unworthy of their country, have a short time since submitted to their authority, in the way which other faithless and cowardly Frenchmen yield to their proud superiors. These, countymen, are not the illustrious and generous Gauls, who assist this tyrant in the abominable schemes of his perfidy. His minions are extracted from the most degraded of his conquered countries, and the established principle of their leader is the extermination of those, who, by the sacrifice of their blood, accelerate the projects of his wild ambition.—Are you ignorant, that by the same impulse he has been guided towards our brothers and companions, wishing to blend them with his vile, unhallowed, and manacled slaves, which have betrayed Spain?—Noble Galicians, learned priests, pious Christians, natives of this happy soil! you will be the first to throw off the yoke imposed by this vile rabble. You are the honoured depositories of the sacred remains of the apostle St. James, the patron of Spain. You are decorated with the awful trophies of the most Holy Sacrament, which adorn our standards: you will discharge your duty: you will not tear the hostile bands which lay waste our country to the utmost boundary of a Pyrenean frontier. Fly, then, to arms; let the other provinces unite under the blessed auspices of your fidelity, and of your canonized patron. Raise high your invincible standards, and, confident of success, hasten to the field of battle and of victory, for by such means, alone, you can secure your liberty, and protect yourselves from dishonourable chains.

*Regulations for calling forth the People,
issued by the Supreme Council at Seville.
6th June, 1808.*

Don Ferdinand VII. King of Spain and the Indies, and in his name the supreme council of government of both.—The defence of the country and the king, and the happiness and prosperity of the people, has been and will ever be the sole aim of this supreme council; which to attain that end,

has spared no exertions, and shrunk from no fatigue or danger. In order to facilitate its attainment, the council ordains and enacts as follows:—1. That the enlistment it has ordered, shall be general, including all persons able to bear arms, of the age of 16 to 45: but they shall be divided into three classes. The first is to consist of volunteers: the second of unmarried persons, married men, and widowers without children; the third of married men and widowers with children; persons who have received the lower orders and necessary servants of the church.—2. The volunteers are to put themselves immediately in motion, and march in any direction, which the councils of government or boards of magistrates shall command; and as soon as they shall have reached the place of destination pointed out to them, they shall either join the veteran troops, or form distinct bodies under the orders of their respective military chiefs, who shall be appointed for that purpose; and the said volunteers, whether they join the veteran troops or be formed in distinct bodies, shall do duty in every point of view as troops of the line.—3. In the second place shall be called out for service those of the second enlistment, that is, unmarried men, and married men, and widowers who have no children, who, on their arrival at the place of destination, shall either join the veteran troops or be embodied in distinct corps; and thus being done, they shall in every respect serve and act as troops of the line.—4. At the third calling out, which shall not be resorted to but in case of extreme necessity, such as calls upon us to sacrifice ourselves in defence of our country, shall come the turn of those of the third enlistment, that is, married men and widowers who have children: persons who have received the lower orders, and such servants of the church, as are not indispensably required for divine service; after having reached their point of destination, they shall join other corps or form distinct bodies, and act as troops of the line, in the same manner as is enacted with regard to persons enlisted of the first and second class.—5. The volunteers of the first class cannot plead or claim any exception. Should persons of the second and third class alledge any, they shall be heard, and after a summary discussion, their case shall be determined upon by the respective councils of government, or boards of magistrates, and in this metropolis by the supreme council of government, without any judicial proceedings, costs, or fees: and the decision then given shall be abided by and carried into effect without any

further opposition whatsoever. Yet the right shall be reserved to all persons, who may think themselves aggrieved, to lodge their complaints before the supreme council, which, with strict and impartial justice, will give such a decision as the case shall require: but the supreme council at the same time think it right to observe, that the complaints brought before them must concern matters of importance, and not be futile or fictitious: because the situation of the country, which is in danger, demands it.—6. As it is but fair, that the ardour to defend the country should not be damped or cramped in any manner whatsoever, all persons who have received the lower orders, and all individuals, of any class or description, and they whose age exceeds 45 shall be received, if they choose to enlist as volunteers, and permitted to turn out with the first class, or join the others.—7. The supreme council of government cannot discard from its recollection the urgent necessity of gathering and inning the harvest, so plentiful as that with which God has vouchsafed to bless us this year. The council, therefore, orders all persons enlisted of the second and third class, personally to apply themselves, without claiming any exemption on account of rank, wealth, or any other motive whatsoever, to gather and inn the harvest, so indispensably necessary for the public support and happiness. This injunction, however, applies to those only who have exceeded the 45th year of their age, and he who complies shall be declared to have deserved well of his country; and the supreme council of government expects, from the generous character of all Spaniards, that not one of them will take advantage of the present critical situation of the country to raise the price of labour to an excessive amount, but that, on the contrary, they will all act with that heroic moderation which the country and public felicity demand.—8. Women apply themselves in many parishes to reap the corn, and to perform other agricultural labour; and in all the provinces of Spain a great number of them may do the same. The supreme council advises and directs them to do so in the circumstances in which we are placed, and declare this employment in all those who shall devote themselves to it, the highest service which they are able to render their country. All persons belonging to the regular and secular clergy may do the same, and will thereby evince the love of their king, their loyalty and zeal to promote the public prosperity and welfare; and the example which they shall then set to the people, and to persons of every rank and description

will force them to imitate it.—Such women, as on account of their age, debility of constitution, and other reasons, are absolutely prevented from devoting themselves to that employment, will apply themselves to make lint, bandages, and other necessities, for the use of the hospitals, and after they are made, they will deliver them to their respective councils of government, or boards of magistrates, who will transmit them without the least delay to the intendants or commissaries general of our armies in this capital. The latter will cause lists to be formed of the persons, who shall have applied themselves to this service, and to all other employments ordered, and transmit them to this supreme council of government, who will order them to be printed and published, that they may be universally known, and that every one may receive the praise and reward due to his love of our native land.—We are about to fight in defence of our country and religion, and our conduct and exertions ought to shew that we really are Spaniards and Christians. The supreme council of government do, therefore, charge the armies, the people and persons of every rank and description, to study the utmost purity of manners, modesty, and virtue, and incessantly to offer up prayers to the God of mercy, to appease his just wrath. The council, above all, charges and beseeches them, for love of Jesus Christ, to avoid all jealousies, differences, and disputes, and, sacrificing all personal interests, closely to unite, and devote themselves entirely to the defence of our king. Doing this, the supreme council of government hope and are certain, that God will look down on us with an eye of mercy, and we shall succeed to save our religion, our country, and our king, whose ruin would be consummated by our enemies if they conquered us, which, however, this supreme council of government neither fears nor has reason to fear.—DON JUAN BAPTISTA PARDO, and DON MANUEL MARIA DEAGUILAR, Sec.

• *Public Notice.*

The five bodies of citizens for the defence of their property, and who can maintain themselves, shall be attached for their instruction, to the five provincial regiments which are now in Cadiz. To each one shall be named a commander from the first families, who may have served with honour, and the remainder of the officers shall be distinguished by their exertions, public acceptance, and other circumstances. A uniform shall be chosen by the military committee. At ~~last~~ they shall do duty with the

regiments to which they may be attached for their instruction; and afterwards separately, without any other connection with them than as here expressed.—The most interesting is the prompt enlistment with the respective commissaries.* •

Edict of the Supreme Council of Government, communicated to the Council of the city of Seville, 7th June, 1808.

DON FERDINAND VII. KING OF SPAIN AND THE INDIES, AND IN HIS NAME THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT OF BOTH—In order to carry into full effect the declaration of war against the emperor Napoleon I. decrees as follows.—I. Within four days from the publication hereof, every Frenchman, or person who has served under the French banners, and is desirous to enjoy the advantages of the Spanish service, shall present himself in this capital at the Chamberlain's office, and make his declaration; and, after having taken the oath of allegiance, he shall remain free from all molestation, and enjoy all the privileges which pertain to him. And the same shall be done in all other places and cities, and attended to either by the boards of government or common council, where the former shall not yet have been formed.—II. Every Frenchman or other person, who has served under the banners of that nation, and shall not present himself within four days, as aforesaid, shall be considered as a person disirous of remaining perfectly French; and all his property, of whatever nature or description it may be, shall be confiscated.—III. All merchants, and all other persons who have in their possession, on any ground or title whatever, any goods, claims, or effects belonging to Frenchmen, or to persons who have served under the French banners, shall keep them in their possession, and not dispose of them on pain of being accountable for the same; and they shall within four days make a declaration upon oath of the said goods, claims, and effects, and deliver it to our board of Exchequer; and all persons who offend against this order, shall be prosecuted according to law.—Given in the royal palace of Alcazas, in Seville, the 7th June, 1808.—By command of the supreme council,—JUAN BAPTISTA PARDO, Sec. MANUEL MARIA AGUILAR, Sec.

And in obedience to the said supreme injunction, the council of this place orders the same to be published and posted in the usual places, and give notice that the committee appointed for that purpose shall acquaint the Frenchmen who reside here, with the day when they are to make their

appearance, and comply with the said supreme injunction.—Cadiz, June 13, 1808:—Don JUAN DE DIOS DE LANDABURU, 1st Sec. Don JUAN DE LA VENA P. SANTANDER, 2d Sec.

Financial Affairs.—4th June, 1808.

From the moment that this supreme board was established, its first care was the preservation of our religion and our country, and it flatters itself it has secured both; because the same noble enthusiasm is observed in all the provinces of the kingdom, in the midst of the serious negotiation, it never fails watching over the complete felicity. It waits favourable moments to secure completely the credit of paper-money, the interest of which will be most religiously paid, and its liquidation will be verified with rapidity, to preserve solely the sums that may be deemed useful, not to burthen the subject. The board has committed the plan to some of its members of the greatest rectitude and experience in these matters, and full of regard for their fellow citizens, and the determinations to be taken are the most simple and uniform. The supreme board has thought proper to order the suspension of the sales of the church property, until they are enabled, after due reflection, to examine and adopt the most convenient measures for the happy issue of their wholesome intentions; and that it may come to the knowledge of all, it orders this to be published.—DON JUAN BAUTISTA PARDO, Sec.

Edict of the Supreme Council, 8th June, 1808.

In order to avoid the doubts, which, from want of sufficient information, may arise with regard to the true meaning of the manifesto published on the 6th of this month, touching the enlistment, it is hereby made known:—1. That the said manifesto does not at all concern those who have already enlisted in the different corps.—2. That the first calling out of Volunteers includes all unmarried young men, and widowers without children, whom the manifesto places in the second class.—3. That all individuals of the metropolis, and other places, who have not enlisted, must do so without the least delay, excuse, or pretext.—JUAN BAUTISTA PARDO, Sec. MANUEL MARIA AGUILAR, Sec.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF SEVILLE.

Spaniards!—The most artful usurper of the throne of France, imagined that our loyalty and ardour had sunk into apathy; but experience is about to shew him how great an error he commits in taking for a cowardly inactivity the promising offspring

of the noble sentiments which are our characteristics.—The moment in which the most vile of tyrants throws away the mask, is that for which we most anxiously waited, to prove to him that we are as intrepid, in the eternal enmity his perfidy has aroused, as we were patient in suffering the most condescending and fatal alliance.—From the tomb of our holy king Ferdinand the first standard was unfurled, which leads us to break the chains by which the Ferdinand we now shout for is disgracefully bound, and under which he groans.—Oh prodigy! at this heavenly call, let those passions disappear; which in such a crisis, fatality places as a barrier to courage and bravery. Let the patriotism which glows in our bosoms foment them, and unite us in the best of causes. God, who is always for the just, is our best guarantee, that the unheard of conflict will be decided in our favour.

Letter of the French Admiral at Cadiz, to the Spanish General 11th June, 1808.

CAPTAIN GENERAL.—I find myself compelled, in consequence of the means exercised against me, to give up the fleet under my command, without further resistance; seeing that it is the interest of both nations not to destroy the ships.—Although your excellency has not announced to me, that the crews of the ships under my command, as well as their property, should be respected, I should reckon too much on Spanish honour, and the known generosity of your own character to entertain any fears on those subjects.—I request that your excellency will only send a few troops at first, that the crew may evacuate, ship after ship, in order to avoid the confusion which has on such occasions taken place.—According to the law of war, I shall request that you will permit, or procure permission for me to send an officer to his majesty the emperor of the French, in order that I may be enabled to give him an account of the events which have taken place.—I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, your excellency's most humble Servant.—ROSSILLY.

BANDO June 12, 1808.

The Junta of the government of this place, seeing the indispensable necessity of attending to its defence under the present critical situation of circumstances, in which the people ought to assist as one of their first and most essential duties, determined in the sitting of yesterday to form a body of 3000 men under the name of Militia for the Defence of Cadiz: this body shall be subdivided into five divisions, applicable to a like number of regiments, which there are of

provincials. Each individual or member shall present himself every afternoon with his respective corps, to acquire the necessary instruction, destining for that purpose two or three hours; understanding, besides, that they are to clothe and maintain themselves at their own expence: and further, that on Monday next, the 14th instant, the enlistment is to be concluded which has been communicated to the commissaries of the different districts, to whom they are to present themselves, and who will take a proper note of their names, address, occupation, &c. hoping that every one will hasten to imitate the distinguished example set by the chiefs and individuals of all the public and private offices, offering themselves on so important a service.—And that this may be known to all, it is published by order of the Junta.—
D. JUAN DE DIOS DE LADABARN, 1st Sec.
D. JUAN DE LA PENA Y SANTANDER, 2d Sec.

Proclamation of the General Assembly of Asturias.—Oviedo, 14th June, 1808.

Beloved Countrymen—The first duty of a citizen is obedience to the laws and lawful authorities. Man, placed in social relations, is obliged to relinquish a small part of his independence in order to secure the rest, and the enjoyment of all the advantages of civilized nations. This subjection, dictated by reason, establishes confidence, tranquillity, and order. Without these valuable blessings the public force is precarious and feeble, and frequently used to oppress the very people whom it shall protect. These principles are evident, and equally apply to the constitution and situation of all political bodies.—This being the case, how powerful ought to be their influence in the critical situation in which we are placed. We have to combat a formidable enemy; how shall we be able to conquer him without union? How can union exist without order, and order without subordination, and a profound veneration and respect for the supreme power? With that power you have invested the general council of the principality. Its members, representing the body of the people, have a right to give you laws, which you must obey. Whatever has a tendency to violate those principles and institutions, destroys the constitution, and consequently the welfare of the country and the people. Bear, therefore, in mind, beloved citizens, that popular commotion, confusion, and disorder, whatever may be the pretext on which they are fomented, are contrary to the laws, and neither can nor ought to be tolerated by the supreme power. Confide, therefore, in the depositories of sovereignty, whom you

acknowledged and elected. Regulate all your movements and operations, both civil and military, by that leading principle, and true basis of the welfare of the people. Avoid then, from this day, whatever has the appearance of disorder and popular commotion. The peaceful husbandman on his farm, the priest before the altar, the magistrate in the sanctuary of the law, the soldier in trenches or in camp, all perform their functions under the protection of justice, with perfect tranquillity and freedom. Let the legislators issue their command and regulations for the good of the country, sure of your obedience and respect, and let those who shall dare to violate or destroy it, be considered convicted enemies of the country, and be punished as such. This is decreed and intimated to you by the general council.—
IGNACIO FLORES.

Address of the Government to the People of Cadiz, 14th June, 1808.

The French squadron has surrendered at discretion, relying on the humanity and generosity of the inhabitants of Cadiz, as has already been made known. The measures which have been pursued, have prevented our squadron from sustaining the least damage, nor have the forces employed to reduce the French squadron sustained any considerable loss, and the effusion of blood has been less than in the combat of two small armed vessels; the loss in killed does not exceed four men. The French ships, their arms, and warlike stores, remain at our disposal, and the prisoners taken will be exchanged for our troops. Nothing of that kind could have been attained by red-hot balls, or similar means. Had no measures of prevention been taken, which require time, our loss would have been much greater. I therefore trust I have acquitted myself in a manner worthy of the inhabitants of this town, who have given me so many repeated proofs of their confidence and respect, that I shall at all times entertain the highest sense of the approbation with which they have honoured my conduct.—But now I demand, exact, and ordain, that all disturbances shall cease; that every thing shall return to order; that all persons, according to their different ranks and stations, shall submit to the constituted authorities, who all depend from the supreme council of government, at all times solicitous to promote the public welfare, and to procure the best alliances and means to secure a successful issue of our undertaking: let the laws reign and all arbitrary proceedings be avoided. The most enlightened and civilized people upon earth disgraces itself by

demanding the death of any individual. The field of battle, where force is repelled by force, authorises alone the effusion of blood, which is otherwise illegal. The sovereign himself is not master of the life of an offender, unless he has forfeited the same by the laws of his country.—These laws prohibit in all countries, even among the most barbarous nations, beguile and disturbances of every description; we are bound to obey and respect them. This is the only means to secure a successful issue of the contest in which we are engaged, and not to offend either against the God of Hosts, or the sovereign, whose sacred rights we have sworn to defend.—In order to avoid an unnecessary multiplication of publications, I now address the French, who reside in this city. The supreme council has used towards you the utmost lenity and respect; after having taken the oath of fidelity to the Spanish nation, you are permitted to remain in this country, and your property is respected.—Grateful for this valuable blessing, you should not be vipers, which destroy the bosom that gave them shelter. On the contrary you are bound to shew the utmost loyalty and respect for a government which treats you in so generous a manner; by such conduct you will not only avoid the odium of the good inhabitants of this town, but also obtain their love. Should you act otherwise dread their justice, they will punish with the utmost rigour, and without the least mercy even meetings which you may hold among you yourselves, and disloyal expressions which you may make use of in opposition to our cause. Should any one of you be so far devoid of reason as not to respect it on account of its equity and justice, he will fall a victim of his wickedness or pride.—MORLA.

Address of Gen Morla to the People of Cadix, 15th June, 1808.

The commotion more or less violent, which has taken place in the whole peninsula of Spain, has been of eminent service to rouse us from the state of lethargy in which we indulged, and to make us acquainted with our rights, our glory, and the inviolable duty which we owe to our holy religion and our monarch. We wanted some electric stroke to rouse us from our paralytic state of inactivity; we stood in need of a hurricane, to clear the atmosphere of the insalubrious vapours with which it was loaded. Fortunately the only antidote which could save us has proved efficacious. It is, however, necessary to know, that if the use of heroic remedies be continued, after the good effect which was expected from them has been obtained, they destroy, annihilate,

and kill; that excessive efforts bring on indirect debility, which is worse than direct weakness, because the very principle of strength is emaciated. Hence it is, that although the popular ferment which has pervaded all the provinces has been of considerable use, yet if not checked, it will produce a state of putrefaction, or, in other words, prove extremely destructive. It is necessary to return to order, and to have confidence in the magistrates, who from their knowledge, studies, and experience, are able to deliberate, combine, and determine as circumstances shall direct. Without the most intimate knowledge, the wisest are liable to err, and how can a mob possibly steer clear of errors, which is mostly guided by the cries of women and boys?—But not restricting myself to this city, I really believe, that all these observations are perfectly useless, because the inhabitants of this city are more enlightened than any other, on account of their trade and intercourse with other nations. There are but few idiots in this city, who are merely guided, as it were, by instinct, and much smaller is the number of those, who, from their vicious habits, can only exist in confusion and disorder. These few have been joined by others of the neighbouring districts, who neither enlist for the honourable and glorious service in which we are engaged, nor apply themselves to reap the plentiful crops with which providence has been pleased to bless us. There are the men who have not looked for any other employment than that of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of this place, and of preventing the rest of the inhabitants; nay, the magistrates, from performing their duty. They are well known; unless they amend their conduct, and all foreigners withdraw to their different habitations, they will certainly be punished. Well-disposed persons will be obliged to take up arms; they who are not able to bear arms will be employed for other purposes; and boys neglected by their parents, and women who raise the hue and cry, shall be punished. The troops, the whole town, the sword of justice, and, above all, God himself, who avenges the wrongs of those who misuse his mercies, authorise and support me. I make this known, that no person may plead ignorance, however disposed, I shall always follow the dictates of humanity and mercy. It will never be my wish to punish, but I shall at all times be happy to correct.

Proclamation of the Partisans of the French, St. Andero, 25th June, 1808.

Inhabitants of St. Andero—An insurrection organized in this city has exposed

your lives and property to the utmost danger. The insurgents routed, conquered, and dispersed, leave you at the mercy of the French army. The bishop of this city has taken advantage of all the influence which he possessed from his dignity and exalted situation, to incite the mob to sedition, and the latter compelled peaceful persons, whose only wish was tranquillity, to march at their head, these persons have quitted their homes, and dare not return, lest they should be persecuted as rebels. The general of division, commanding in St. Andeio, considering that the violence of an ignorant and brawling mob has been the only cause of the step they have taken, invites them to return to their homes, to appear with their arms, and promise fidelity and obedience to his majesty, king Joseph Napoleon, their sovereign in which case they shall enjoy perfect security and remain unmolested. Within the term of four days, reckoned from the date hereof, the seals shall be put on the goods and effects of such persons as shall remain absent, and their property shall be confiscated for the benefit of the state.—**MR. LLE**—General of division, commanding the French troops—**BONIFACIO RODRIGUEZ DE LA GUERRA**, **PEDRO FERNANDEZ NICTO**, SEC.

Sketch of Buonaparte's New Constitution for Spain

TITLE I.

Art. 1 The Catholic-Apostolic, and Romish religion is the predominant and sole religion of Spain and its dominions, none other shall be tolerated.

TITLE II.

2. Prince Joseph Napoleon, king of Naples and Sicily, is king of Spain and the Indies.—3 The crown of Spain and the Indies shall be hereditary in the male issue lawfully begotten of the body of the said prince, according to seniority of birth, to the perpetual exclusion of females.—In default of such issue male, lawfully begotten of the prince Joseph Napoleon, the crown of Spain shall descend to us and our heirs male, and legal successors, either of our body, or by adoption.—In default of such our male descendants and lawful successors, to descend to the issue male and lawful successors of Prince Louis Napoleon, king of Holland.—And in default of such male descendants and lawful successors of prince Louis Napoleon, to the issue male, and lawful successors of prince Jerome Napoleon, king of Westphalia.—And in default of these, to the first born son, before the death of the last king, of the eldest daughter of those who have male issue, and to his male descendants, and lawful successors; and in case the last

king should not have nominated that one of his daughters who has male issue, then to him whom he shall appoint by his will, either among his relations, or among those whom he shall deem most worthy to rule over Spain. This nomination shall be delivered to the Cortes for their acceptance.—4. The crown of Spain shall never be fixed upon the same head with any other crown.—5. In all the edicts and laws, the title of the king of Spain shall be —D N—by the grace of God, and the constitution of the state, king of Spain and the Indies.—6. The king on his accession to the throne, or on his attaining his majority, shall take an oath to the Spanish people on the gospel, in the presence of the cortes, the senate, the council of state, the council of Castile, the archbishops and bishops. 7 The form of the king's oath is —“I swear, on the holy evangelists, to reverence and cause to be revered our holy religion, to maintain the inviolability of the Spanish territory; to reverence and cause to be revered, the liberty of the person, and to govern alone for the welfare, happiness, and glory of the Spanish nation.”

TITLE III.—OF THE GOVERNMENT.

8 The minority of the king shall last till he has attained his 13th year. During his minority there shall be a regent of the kingdom.—9. The regent must be at least 25 years old.—10. The regent shall be nominated by the preceding king, among the infants who have attained the age mentioned in the preceding article.—11. In default of nomination by the preceding king, the regency belongs to the prince the farthest removed from the throne, according to the law of succession, and who has attained the age of 25 years.—12. In case the prince farthest removed from the crown shall be in a state of minority, the regency belongs to the next prince, who shall continue to exercise his functions till the king shall have attained his majority.—13. The regent is not personally answerable for the acts of his administration.—14. All the acts of the regency pass in the name of the minor king.—15. The yearly revenue of the regent shall be one-fourth of the income of the crown.—16. In case the preceding king shall have nominated no regent, and all the princes shall be minors, then the government shall be carried on by the ministers who form the council of government.—17. All state affairs shall be determined by a majority of votes in the council of government.—18. The regency has no right to the personal custody of the king, during his minority.—19. The care of the king during

his minority is vested in his mother, and in default of her, in the prince appointed thereto by the demised sovereign.—20. The board of guardianship, composed of the ministers, shall principally be charged with superintending the education of the young king; and the same shall be consulted in every matter of importance, relative to his person or establishment.

TITLE IV.—PROPERTY OF THE CROWN.

21. The palaces of Madrid, the Escorial, St. Ildefonso, Aranjuez, D'El Pardo, and all the others now forming part of the property of the crown, together with the parks, woods, domains, and estates of what kind soever, constitute the property of the crown. The revenues accruing from the said property shall be paid into the treasury of the crown; and should they fall below the yearly sum of a million of hard piastres, an addition of hereditary property shall be made, so as to make good the revenue to the amount stated.

—22. The public treasury shall annually pay over to that of the crown, a sum of two millions in hard piastres.—23. The king's sons, on attaining the age of twelve years shall receive the following annual revenues in the name of subsistence money, viz.:—the heir apparent, 200,000 piastres; each infante, 100,000 piastres; and each infanta, 50,000 piastres.—24. The dowry of the queen is fixed at 400,000 piastres, and shall be paid out of the treasury of the crown.

TITLE V.—OF THE OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD.

25. The chief and grand officers of the royal household are six in number,—a grand almoner, grand chamberlain, grand cup-bearer, grand master of the horse, grand huntsman, and grand master of the ceremonies.—26. The noblemen of the chamber, the steward's chaplains, and equeries, are officers of the royal household.

TITLE VI.

27. There shall be nine ministerial departments, viz. of police, religion, foreign affairs, internal affairs, domains, war, marine, the Indies, and general police.—28. A secretary of state, in the character of minister, shall sign all acts of government.—29. The king may commit several ministerial functions to one minister.—30. There is no other precedence among the ministers than what results from their priority of nomination in point of time.—31. The ministers, each in his own department, are responsible for the execution of the laws, and of his majesty's orders.

TITLE VII.—OF THE SENATE.

32. The senate is composed, 1. of the infants of Spain, being 18 years of age.

2. Of twenty-four individuals, specially appointed by the king from among the ministers, captain-generals, ambassadors, councillors of state, and members of the council of Castile.—33. The existing councillors of state are members of the senate. No new nomination shall take place until they are reduced below twenty-four, as regulated by the preceding article.—34. The president of the senate is appointed by the king. He is chosen out of the senate, and his functions last for one year.—35. The senate meets by the command of the king, or on the application of the junta, or one of its officers for internal affairs.—36. In the case of an armed insurrection, or of apprehensions respecting the safety of the state, the senate may, on the proposition of the king, suspend the operation of the constitutional act in a particular district, and time to be limited.

[The remaining articles of this title, and those of the 8th title relative to the council of state, contain little that is of general interest. The king presides in the council, which is to consist of not less than 30, nor more than 60 members, divided into six sections, viz. those of justice, religion, internal affairs, police, finance, war, the marine, and the Indies.]

TITLE IX.

57. The cortes or juntas of the nation are composed of 150 members, divided into three estates or orders, namely those of the clergy, nobility, and people.—58. The order of the clergy shall consist of 25 archbishops or bishops.—59. The order of the nobility shall consist of 25 nobles, who shall have the title of Grantees of the cortes.—60. The order of the people shall consist of 40 deputies from the provinces, 30 from the principal cities, 15 from the merchants, and 15 deputies from the universities, to consist of the most celebrated for their attainments in the arts and sciences.—61. The archbishops or bishops constituting the order of the clergy, shall be raised to the rank of members of the cortes, by a writ sealed with the great seal of the state. They cannot be divested of their functions, but by virtue of the sentence of a competent court, pronounced in due form.—62. The nobles must possess an annual income of at least 200,000 hard piastres, and have performed great services in the civil or military departments, to qualify them for being elevated to the rank of grantees of the cortes. They shall be raised to the rank by a writ stamped with the great seal of the state. They cannot be divested of their functions but by the sentence of a competent

court, pronounced in due form.—63. The deputies from the provinces shall be nominated by the same, in the proportion of at least 1 to 300,000 inhabitants; for this purpose the provinces shall be divided into so many elective districts as shall be necessary to furnish the population giving a right to the election of a deputy.—[The articles from 64 to 70 inclusive, contain the forms to be observed in electing the deputies of the people, the commercial bodies, and the universities.]—

71. The cortes shall assemble upon the summons of the king. They cannot be adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved; but by his orders. They shall meet once, at least, in three years.—72. The president of the cortes shall be appointed by the king, but shall be chosen out of three candidates to be nominated by the cortes by ballot, and an absolute majority of votes.—73 and 74. On the opening of such session, the cortes shall nominate three candidates for the presidency, two vice presidents, two secretaries, and three committees, each to consist of five members, viz. a committee of justice, of internal affairs, and of finance.—75. The sittings of the cortes shall not be public. Their votes shall be taken by ballot.

76. Neither the opinions nor votes shall be printed or published. Any act of publication, in print or in writing, by the assembly of the cortes, or the individual members thereof, shall be regarded as an act of insurrection.—77. The alterations to be made in the civil or criminal code, or in the system of finance, shall be laid before the cortes for their decision thereupon, by the orators of the council of state.—80. Should the cortes conceive themselves to have just grounds of complaint as to the conduct of any of the ministers, a petition, containing their alleged grievances and suggestions shall be carried by a deputation to the foot of the throne.—The king shall appoint a commission, consisting of six councillors of state, and six councillors of Castile, to examine into the said petition.—81. The decrees of the king, issued in pursuance of the decision of the cortes, shall be introduced with the formula "upon consulting the cortes."

TITLE X.—OF THE SPANISH COLONIES IN AMERICA AND ASIA.

82. The Spanish colonies in America and Asia shall enjoy the same privileges as the mother country.—83. Each kingdom and province shall always have deputies at the seat of government, charged to watch over their particular interests, and to serve as their representatives in the cortes.—84. These deputies are 20 in number, viz. two from New Spain, two from Peru, two from

the new kingdom of Granada, two from Buenos Ayres, two from the Philippine islands, one from the island of Cuba, one from Porto Rico, one from the province of Venezuela, one from Chareas, one from Quito, one from Chili, one from Guatimala, one from Guadalupe, one from the interior western provinces of New Spain, and one from the eastern provinces.—86. The said deputies shall exercise their functions during the period of eight years; and if upon the lapse of the same their successors shall not have yet arrived, they shall retain their functions until their actual arrival.

TITLE XI.—OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

87. Spain shall be governed by one and the same code of civil laws. 88. The administration of justice, is independent.—89. Justice shall be dispensed in the name of the king, by judges and courts of justice to be appointed by his majesty. All courts claiming particular privileges, and all the exclusive jurisdictions of any orders or seignories whatever, are abolished.—[The remaining articles under this head contain nothing of general interest.]

TITLE XIII.—GENERAL REGULATIONS.

107. There shall be a permanent alliance by sea and land, offensive and defensive, between France and Spain. The contingent to be furnished by each of the respective powers, in case of a continental or maritime war, shall be regulated by a separate treaty.—108. Foreigners who have performed, or may hereafter perform, great services to the state; who may prove useful from their talents, inventions, or zeal and activity; who may form great establishments, or purchase funded estates paying a tax of fifty hard piastres,—are admissible to the rights of naturalization in Spain. The king confers this indulgence through his minister for internal affairs upon consulting his council of state.—109. The residence of every inhabitant of the Spanish territory is an inviolable sanctuary. It can only be entered in the day time, and for a purpose commanded by law, or in execution of an order issued by the public magistracy.—110. No person domiciliated in the Spanish territory can be arrested, except in the actual commission of a crime, or by virtue of a lawful warrant in writing.—111. In order to the execution of a warrant of arrest, it is necessary 1. that the reason of the arrest shall be formally set forth therein, and that it shall state the law enjoining the same. 2. That it shall be granted by an authority formally empowered by law to grant it. 3. That its contents shall be communicated, and

a copy thereof given to the person to whom it applies—112 No jail or prison keeper can receive or hold any one in custody, without entering in his register a copy of the warrant or commitment, indictment, or sentence, or, in a word, every order whatsoever in virtue of which he holds the person in custody—113 Every jailer or prison keeper shall be compelled, and no order whatever shall be considered as an impediment, to bring his prisoners as often as he shall be required to do so, before the magistrate charged with the affairs of the police—114 The relatives and friends of the prisoner shall not be prevented from entering the prison, upon their producing an order from the magistrate. A specific order from the judge to the jailor, can alone justify the detaining of a prisoner in close custody—115 Persons not authorised by law to issue warrants of commitment who shall give orders for arresting, or cause to be arrested, any person whatsoever, as well as those who, in cases of legal arrest, shall detain the prisoner in any place not known as a legal jail, and all jailors contravening the three preceding articles, are guilty of the crime of arbitrary imprisonment—126 The present constitutional statute shall successively, and according to the importance of the respective articles, be carried into execution by royal decrees or edicts, so that the whole shall be in operation before the 1st of January, 1813—127 The freedom of the press shall be regulated two years after the constitutional statute shall have been in operation. The cortes shall pass a law respecting the freedom of the press (To be continued)

SWEDEN—*Report from Field-Marshal Count Klingspor, to His Royal Majesty, bearing date, Head-Quarters, Hemmango, the 14th of June*

In my last report, of the 9th inst I humbly stated to your majesty and the Finnish army, that I found it necessary to send reinforcements to Hemmango, in order that I might be better able to make such arrangements as circumstances should require. I thought it expedient to remove the headquarters to this place. In consequence of information having been received that the enemy was forming a considerable magazine, which was nearly completed, I ordered major Ticandt, at the head of 200 men, to dislodge the enemy from his position near Perha, and render himself master of the above magazine, the result of which operation

was that, after a short action, the enemy's troops were surrounded, and two officers, five non-commissioned officers, and 88 rank and file were made prisoners, and one officer and two men killed. The magazine, consisting of a very considerable quantity of oats, grain, meal and bread, was taken, but want of horses has hitherto prevented me from removing it for the use of the army—**MAJESTIC KLINGSPOR**, Field Marshal and Commander of the Finnish Army. *General Vegesack's Report to his Royal Majesty, dated Island of Karlo, June 21, 1809*

General Vegesack reports, that he made himself master of the different islands in the inlet of Abo, stationed strong armaments on Kuste and Karketta, the nearest of them, and distributed his force in small bodies on every isle and rock, so as to seem formidable, and make the enemy believe that the main attack was meant upon Abo, but fearing that this alone should not have the desired effect of drawing the Russians from the North, he determined to make a landing, which he accomplished on the 19th, at the point of Lemo, under the protection of the well directed fire of the gun boats, which came close ashore, and soon forced the Russians to make room for the Swedes. General Vegesack now proceeded to the pass at outer Lemo, on the high road to Abo, having three guns and one thousand five hundred men. Here an action began which lasted fourteen hours and a half, the Russians endeavouring to dislodge him. But seeing great bodies of Russians, mostly cavalry, hourly pouring in, and hearing from a Swedish non-commissioned officer, who in the night had made his escape from Abo, that the Russians, already 10 000 strong, were advancing from all quarters, and that they took his corps to be only the avant guard, he judged that he had attained his purpose, and retreated under the same protection of the gun boats. His loss in killed and wounded he states to be 14 men, including officers. His adjutant Baron Ramsay, was killed. Barons de Geer and Adelsward, of the volunteers, wounded. He praises the soldier-like conduct of the latter corps, whom he now had the honour the first time to lead to battle. In the night of his landing, 107 young men, of whom 66 were soldiers of the garrison of Sveaborg, flew to his standard, and embarked with him.—(*Stockholm Gazette*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 30, 1808.

[PRICE 10D.]

"By the law of England, there is no impunity to any person, publishing any thing that is injurious to the feelings and happiness of an individual. . . . No man has a right to render the person or abilities of another ridiculous. . . . It has been observed, that it is the right of the British subject to exhibit the folly or imbecility of the members of the government; but, gentlemen, we must confine ourselves within limits. If, in so doing, individual feelings are violated, there the line of interdiction begins, and the offence becomes the subject of *penal visitation*."—Report of Lord Ellenborough's charge to the jury, upon the Trial of Mr. Cobbett for a libel, in May 1804. See Political Register, p. 854, and the following ones.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

LIBEL LAW.—After the trial, mentioned in my motto, took place, there were, as the public will remember, several papers, published in the Morning Chronicle, shewing the dangerous tendency of the doctrine laid down by the lord chief justice. A great orator and statesman observed to me, at the time, that neither I nor any other writer could now, with impunity, mention the name of any man, unaccompanied with praise; "for," said he, "to name him without praise may injure his individual feelings; to injure his individual feelings is to pass the line of interdiction, and to expose yourself to *penal visitation*; therefore, you are reduced to this simple alternative: name no one, point out no one, hint at no one; or, bestow upon him positive and serious praise." That this was the case is evident; for, how is it possible to ridicule the folly or imbecility of any man, without violating his feelings? and, if this be a necessary consequence with individuals in general, must it not be so with those persons, who are members of the government, and who have the eyes of the whole nation fixed upon them, while they have, at the same time, rivals for power, who are anxiously watching for every opportunity of exposing and exaggerating their follies and imbecility, in order to oust them, and to get their power and their emoluments? Upon the effects which doctrine like this, must have upon the interests of a nation, I will speak by-and-by, after having introduced a recent Trial, which will be found, I believe, to have originated in this very doctrine.—It was observed, at the time, that the *Reviewers* were in a very perilous way; for, that, if "no man had a right to render the person, or abilities, of another ridiculous," it was clear that the reviewers of books ought to have a bit of their ears taken off once a month, at least, and that, in general, they would be exposed to a double or a triple cropping. What a glorious doctrine for dull and senseless authors! And, what abomi-

nable, what atrocious unchangeable libellers, were the Popes and the Gays and the Swifts! What a misfortune for the poetasters and sycophants of their day, that they did not live in ours! This is the light, in which a person, named SIR JOHN CARR, appears to have viewed the doctrine. He is, it seems, the author of a work called, "*The Stranger in Ireland*," which, as is stated in the report of the trial, was published some time ago, by SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, one of the present Sheriffs of London. He has another work in manuscript, entitled "*A Tour through Scotland*," which work also had been carried to the same shop; but, Sir Richard declined purchasing the Tour, because he thought its sale would have been prevented by the effect of a work, published by Messrs. HOOD AND SHARPE, booksellers in the Poultry, in which work the abilities of Sir John Carr were ridiculed and exposed to contempt. Well, then, said this knight of the quill, finding myself injured, not only in my feelings, but in my interests too, by this critical work, in which my folly and imbecility are exposed, I will even apply to the law; these men are libellers in faith, and I will have ample damages from them. On the 25th of this month the trial came on, and the following is the fullest report that I can find of it in the news-papers.—"Mr. GARROW stated this was an action for damages. The plaintiff (sir John Carr) was a gentleman who had been originally intended for a barrister, but on account of ill health was advised by his physicians to travel. He did, and thought proper to make his travels useful, by taking notes of whatever he saw remarkable, and afterwards publishing them for the amusement of the public; and he also derived a considerable emolument from the sale of those publications. The defendants are booksellers, who had published a book called "*Mr. POCOCKE'S BOOK, or Notes for a righte merrie and conceited Tour through Ireland by a Knight Errant*,"

“ for the purpose of ridiculing the works of
 “ the plaintiff. They were not satisfied
 “ with attacking one of the books that he
 “ had written, but the whole, viz. *Stranger in France*, *Northern Summer*, *Tour*
 “ *round the Biltie*, *Stranger in Ireland*
 “ and *Tour through Holland*. Another
 “ work, written by sir John Cur, viz. *A*
 “ *Tour through Scotland*, never had been
 “ published, in consequence, as he would
 “ prove, of the book published by the de-
 “ fendants. In the front of that book,
 “ which they entitled “*My Pocket Book*,” is
 “ a frontispiece representing the departure
 “ of the plaintiff from Ireland, and in page
 “ 29, preface, an explanation of that front-
 “ispiece, which commences with “*You*
 “ *shall see what you shall see, the knight*
 “ *errant's regret at leaving Ireland*” a grotesque
 “ figure, with a handkerchief to his
 “ eyes, a number of ridiculous figures fol-
 “ lowing him, setting up the Irish howl, a
 “ huge porter, carrying his *Moss-trovels*,
 “ which are so heavy, that the weight of
 “ them obliges him to bend under them, in
 “ one hand he carries the *Wardrobe of the*
 “ *knight errant*, encompassed in a small
 “ pocket handkerchief, &c. The publication
 “ itself commences by observing, that the
 “ writings of the plaintiff consisted of nothing
 “ worth paying for, except the fine binding,
 “ the fine paper, and the goodness of the
 “ print; and there was nothing to recom-
 “ mend them except the wideness of the mar-
 “ gins. The defendants had not been satisfied
 “ with publishing one edition of this book,
 “ but they had published three, and had
 “ advertised and circulated it most indis-
 “ tinguishably. This morning there was one
 “ purchased at the defendant's shop, enti-
 “ tled “*a third edition*.” If this was not
 “ the case, it was for the defendant to
 “ prove it, for he understood it was often
 “ advertised to be the tenth edition of a book
 “ when there were not fifteen copies of the
 “ first disposed of. He would prove that
 “ the publication complained of had injured
 “ the plaintiff as an author, that he would
 “ have got £600 for the *Tour in Scotland* if
 “ it had not been for this book. There was
 “ no man that would wish to give the re-
 “ viewers a greater scope than he would,
 “ but he could not justify them in making
 “ a mischievous attack on any author, they
 “ might as well attack his person, for
 “ when they scurrilously attacked his works
 “ it was injuring him in the most essential
 “ point. He did not doubt but there might
 “ be some foolish passages in it, but, when
 “ the reviewer criticises, he ought to pick
 “ out these passages, and not condemn the

“ whole for perhaps one mistake or impro-
 “ per expression. His learned friend, as
 “ well as himself, had often, unfortunately,
 “ during their professional life, said foolish
 “ things, and he should be sorry if they
 “ were to be silenced ever afterwards, and
 “ deprived of the benefits of their profes-
 “ sion, for a foolish expression. He would
 “ prove that the defendants had gone the
 “ length, in private conversation, to say,
 “ that they would exterminate the plaintiff
 “ as an author. If he proved this case, he
 “ did not doubt but the jury would give a
 “ verdict for the plaintiff, and damages, not
 “ only to the amount of the loss sustained,
 “ but to deter others from sending forth
 “ such scandalous and scurrilous publica-
 “ tions. He then proceeded to examine
 “ his witnesses.—Mr. HUNT proved that he
 “ purchased at the shop of the defendants,
 “ on the 14th March, 1808, a book entitled
 “ “*My Pocket Book*,” which he produced,
 “ and another on this morning, which was
 “ stated to be a third edition. He had in-
 “ quired from the person who sold him the
 “ book, who was the author, but he would
 “ not inform him. He also purchased a
 “ *Monthly Review*, called “*The Mirror*,” for
 “ April and June last, which had the adver-
 “ tisement of “*My Pocket Book*” inserted in
 “ them.—Lord ELLENBOROUGH here ob-
 “ served, that if a man published a foolish
 “ thing, every person had a right to say so.
 “ The liberty of the press would be com-
 “ pletely done away, if it was not the
 “ case.—Mr. JOHNSON, bookseller, St.
 “ Paul's church yard, deposed, that he pur-
 “ chased the manuscript of *The Stranger in*
 “ *France* from the plaintiff for £100.—
 “ Sir RICHARD PHILLIPS deposed, that he
 “ purchased from the plaintiff his *Northern*
 “ *Summer Tour round the Biltie* for £500,
 “ *The Stranger in Ireland* he gave him
 “ £700 for, and for his *Tour through Hol-*
 “ *land*, 600*l*. He had seen the manuscript
 “ of the *Tour through Scotland*, and would
 “ have given 600*l* if it had not been for “*My*
 “ *Pocket Book*,” which he heard had depre-
 “ ciated the works of the plaintiff so much,
 “ that it deterred him. The witness met
 “ the defendant, Hood, one day, who
 “ asked him, did he read his “*Pocket Book*”
 “ witness told him he did not, for he never
 “ read such scurrility. Hood replied, “*Lord*
 “ *he poor Sir John, we have got a rod in*
 “ *pickaxe for him, we will do for him.*”—On
 “ his cross examination by the Attorney-
 “ General, witness said he never read books
 “ of a scurrilous nature; he considered all
 “ anonymous publications as libellous and
 “ scurrilous. He printed as many books as

any man in London, but never published any without the name of the author. Although he might have read one or two numbers of "The Edinburgh Review," when it was first published, he did not recollect having read any other. When he was first in the trade, he used to attach to his advertisements the criticisms of Reviewers on books which he published, but for the last six years he had ceased to do so. As they crept into vice, he crept into virtue. He left it off, as he thought it was only encouraging scurrility. He had printed and published "Anecdotes of the Founders of the French Revolution." It was an anonymous publication, that is, it was a detail of facts, without any author's name. There was nothing libellous, nothing scurrilous, in it; he never published a libel in his life; if he had, he would be ashamed to come into that court to give evidence. He did not know that every thing it contained was fact, but it was given by the author as a plain narrative of facts. He had published "The Oxford Review;" that was also an anonymous publication, but he did it that there might be one honest review. —Lord Ellenborough here interrupted the witness, and said, that the questions put to him did not tend to make him commit himself. If they had, he would have protected him; but the voluntary evidence, or, rather, that wish to shew the pureness of his morals, had committed him; for if he, the jury, and the public, were to believe him, all other reviews were dishonest, except his own. He was laying ground for the same charge to be preferred against him that was alledged against the present defendant. —Sir Richard Phillips then proceeded and said, he was actuated by the wish that there should be one honest review, when he consented to be the publisher of "the Oxford Review." He was obliged to his lordship for his kind interference; for although imposed on by the usage of the trade, when he first commenced business, for six years it had been his study to check the scurrility of the press. He could not say that his sentiments were very refined as to honesty, but he trusted he had a little common honesty in this respect, and he hoped, while he lived, it might remain with him. He never read anonymous publications, whether Reviews or not; for he considered them all scurrilous; but if he published any thing anonymous, it was as clear from scurrilous matter as crystal water. He discontinued publishing "The Oxford

Review," as he found it did not answer; as nothing but scurrility met with encouragement from the public. —Mr. LEIGH, of the house of Mathews and Leigh, deposed, that Sir John Carr had offered to him the "Tour in Scotland" for sale, which he would have bought, and given him 400l. for, if it had not been for the unfavourable impression "My Pocket Book" had made on him. —Lord MOUNTNORRIS deposed, that he had read "The Stranger in Ireland," and "My Pocket-Book," chapter by chapter, and he had no doubt in his mind but that "My Pocket-Book" was written to ridicule "The Stranger in Ireland." The plaintiff had been recommended to him as a gentleman, and he was pleased to have found that he had spoken so handsomely of his native country, Ireland; and would have purchased a copy of the book, if it had not been so much depreciated by the publication of "My Pocket-Book." The noble lord was cross-examined by the Attorney-General, who observed, that he was happy to have the honour of addressing a nobleman of letters, instead of the knight who lived by letters, and knew nothing more of them than the livelihood which they afforded him. His lordship said, that he had read the books over with great attention, and thought "My Pocket-Book" was a fair and just criticism on the other. —Lord VALENTIA corroborated the evidence of his noble father. —The ATTORNEY-GENERAL, counsel for the defendant, stated, that he never found himself more perfectly happy than in addressing the jury in defence of his clients. His mind was perfectly at ease as to the verdict they would give. His learned friend, in the opening, had charged him, by anticipation, with what was charged against his client. But he would assure him he was mistaken; for whatever foolish expressions he had made use of, he would not criticise or comment on them. In the first place, they had the evidence of Sir Richard Phillips. The knight had either given false evidence, or he was the greatest fool that ever walked over earth. [Lord Ellenborough observed that he thought "the weakest man" would be more appropriate.] The Attorney-General then continued. He had said "the greatest fool," but his lordship thought "the weakest man" was the more proper; then let it be "the weakest man;" if Sir Richard Phillips had been living when Erasmus was writing, he would have given any money for him.

"The book published by the defendants had done nothing more than it ought to have done, and what an honest criticism ought to do. This had been proved by the earl of Mountnorris, who was going to purchase "The Stranger in Ireland, until "My Pocket Book" had shewn him its real merit, when he very properly declined to purchase it and had not his lordship given it in evidence, that he thought it, after comparing them both together, a fair criticism? The plaintiff went to Ireland, he was knighted there, and this he thought was sufficient to make him commence author. His name was to sell the book, and he dressed it out in red morocco, with a wide margin, superior print and paper, and this was thought by the plaintiff sufficient to insure a sale! And what had "My poor Pocket Book" done? Nothing more than what itself would have done—shewn its true merits. It was like a coal porter in a fashionable suit of clothes; his outside was genteel, but the moment he opened his mouth to speak, you discovered the cheat. So with "The Stranger in Ireland"—the moment you opened it, your expectations were disappointed. There never was an author of merit whose works were not attacked, but the merit of the work silenced the attacker. Socrates was a great author, and he was reviewed by Aristotle, who was also a great writer, yet it did not affect the merits of the works of Socrates. In the present case, if it was a work of merit, "My Pocket Book" would not have injured it. He was sorry to have taken up so much of the time of the court and jury, still he wished to speak to them on the subject, for the action appeared more grotesque than the frontispiece complained of. What could be more ridiculous? A book is published, open to the inspection of every person, containing the most nonsensical ideas that could enter the brain of man, another person criticises it, he turns it into ridicule; and prevents a portion of the public from throwing away their money upon nonsense. In doing this, the critic had done public service, and he trusted the jury would feel it as such, and give a verdict for the defendants—

LORD ELLENBOROUGH said, that every man who wrote committed himself to the judgment of the public, and every one might comment upon his work. If the commentator did not step aside from the work, or introduce fiction for the purpose of condemnation, he exercised only a

fair legitimate right. In the present case, the plaintiff had embodied himself in his work; the principal part of his tour was concerning himself, and, therefore, placing him in Dublin, and the long coach waiting for him, was not irrelevant to the subject. Had the party writing the criticism followed the plaintiff out of his book into domestic life for the purposes of slander, that would have been libellous, but not otherwise. *To reprehend just criticism would be extremely injurious to society.* If a work was sent into the world that was likely to disseminate a bad taste, or was destructive of public morals, it was of the first importance to correct and expose it. Society, in that case, was indebted to the critic—His lordship then alluded to the advancement of philosophy and science by the opposition one great man had offered to another, and repeated the observations of the Attorney General on that subject. If an individual, he said, presented the public with an outline sketch of himself, that public had a right to finish the picture, and if the criticism was a fair one, the author must take the consequences of it. His lordship added, that he did not know of any thing more threatening to the liberty of the press, than the species of action before the court, and he would again repeat, that if the public opinion complained of was a fair criticism, and the author had not twined out of the work he criticised for the purpose of slander, the action would not lie, but if the jury could see any thing personally slanderous against the plaintiff, unconnected with the work he had given to the public, in that case, the plaintiff had his right of action, and they would find accordingly.—The jury consulted together a few minutes, and found for the defendants.—This is all very true, though I do not like the words *fair* and *just*, as used here to qualify the term criticism. The distinction between the man's domestic affairs and his book is clear enough, but, as long as I write about the book and the abilities of the author and the motives, or probable motives, of his writing, and the disposition of mind which the book displays, I cannot safely trust any one to decide, whether my criticism be fair or unfair, just or unjust; that is to say, if the decision is to affect my person or property. The critic is an author as well as the writer of the book. The criticism may be criticised; and, in both cases, the public are the sole judges of what is fair, or unfair, of what is just, or unjust. Other,

wise, and if these qualifications are admissible, the courts of justice are to be looked to in matters of taste; they are to decide every literary dispute; and here, as well as elsewhere, we shall be unable to open our mouths without having a lawyer for our guide and assistant. I will not answer for the correctness of this report of the Chief Justice's speech. He might not mean, that a man was punishable, by law, for unfair or unjust criticism, and, I am in hopes, that the decision, upon this occasion, will make the stupid authors feel, that they cannot worry a man of talents to death merely because he has exposed their stupidity. — It does not appear, from this report, whether Sir Richard Phillips came forward voluntarily, or was forced forward, in behalf of his brother knight, but, to be sure, it was quite good to hear him say, that he never read scandalous or anonymous publications, when he was the sole or part owner of so many works of the latter description, when he was part owner of a *Revue*, and the sole owner of the "Anecdotes," than which there is not, perhaps, a more false and scandalous book in the English language, that is to say, if falsehood and scandal do not lose their nature when applied to French men and French women, and when they obtain circulation because they are calculated to gratify pre-conceived malice and hatred. The work of Messrs. Hood and Sharpe not only injured Sir John Carr, but Sir Richard Phillips also, for, observe, he is the proprietor of Sir John's first work, *the very first that was criticised*, and the sale of which must, of course, be greatly injured, if not totally stopped, by a criticism, which had stifled the second work in its shell. So that Sir Richard Phillips was, in fact, a person deeply interested, and, though this circumstance would not alter the *fact* which he had to state, it would naturally give a tinge to any *sentiment* that he had to express. I am, however, utterly astonished, that any word should have dropped from him calculated to throw odium upon those who endeavour to make free use of the press. What would it have been to him, if those bundles of trash, labelled "The Stranger in Ireland," had been sent, as they now, in all probability, will be, to the trunk-makers, or the paste-board mill? Was this vile rubbish worth the risk of his being exposed to the imputation of wishing to see a brother book-seller suffer for having published a book operating to his injury? I do not impute this wish to him. On the contrary, I sincerely believe him, who is a very kind and good as well as a very clever man, to have entertained no such wish; but,

certainly, his evidence, as stated in the newspapers, is likely to make the public infer such an imputation. The fact, I would almost lay my life, was this: between a bookseller and an author there necessarily arises, particularly if the latter be a person of some consequence, a greater or less degree of that sort of intimacy, which, as the fashion of the world goes, is denominated friendship. Sir John Carr appears to be a man not likely to lose any thing for the mere want of asking for, and, he would easily find the means of committing Sir Richard so far as to bring him into court with sentiments favourable to his cause. The moment a man is lashed, or exposed, he, according to the cant of the day, cries out *libeller*. Libeller is echoed by his friends, and, after hearing this in half a dozen places, he naturally begins to turn himself towards the law for redress, especially if he find himself incapable of defending himself with his pen. It was thus that the quack in America acted towards me. He began the publications. He issued his destructive prescriptions through the newspapers. I answered his publications, I reduced him to silence, and finally drove him and his death-doing practice out of the city. Unable to defend himself, he had recourse to the lawyers, and, with the assistance of such judges and jurors as are to be found in great abundance in his country, give me a dose almost as injurious as he would have sent me from his own shop. Of all the acts, of which a man can be guilty, none is so mean, none is so base, none is so truly detestable, as that of seeking, through the law, vengeance for a literary defeat. If this were to be tolerated, if exposing a man's *al titus* to ridicule were to be deemed libelling, and to be punished as such, who, unless he had a long purse, and a body of men, would dare to attempt the task of criticising the works of a rich man? Every wealthy fool might publish his trash in perfect security, and that, too, without being under the necessity of treating and bribing the Reviewers. No man would dare expose his folly or impudence, for, at any rate, the tormentors of the law would be set upon the culprit, who, as a punishment, would be half-immured in his defence. There would be nothing, however infamous as well as foolish, that a poor writer would dare to comment upon with freedom. He must write in trammel so tight as to render his efforts of little or no effect. There would, in short, be a general license for folly and wickedness, when backed by wealth, and still there would be scoundrels so impudent, as to call upon us

to deny ourselves almost the necessaries of life, and to expose life itself, for the purpose of preserving, what they would still call *the liberty of the press*. The evil would go yet further; for the rich bookseller would become a persecutor as well as the wealthy fool who writes. His purse would be a shield for a dozen or two of dull doctors whom he keeps in his pay, and by the means of whose imposture-like performances he increases his fortune. Well might Lord Ellenborough say, that "he knew of no thing more threatening to the liberty of the press than this species of action."—But, how stands the case with regard to publications touching the words, or conduct, of persons in general, and particularly members of the government? Is it not dangerous to the liberty of the press to lay it down as a maxim, that their *abilities* are not to be ridiculed; that you are to say nothing at all which hurts their *feelings*, without exposing yourself to punishment? Reports of trials are, in general, not very correct; the whole of the places where trials are held are so crowded with lawyers, to whom, indeed, they are almost exclusively appropriated, that it is extremely difficult for any reporter to obtain the accommodation necessary for the making of notes. I do not, therefore, give the words of my motto as words actually uttered by Lord Ellenborough, but merely as words published in the several news papers, as having been uttered by him, upon the occasion alluded to. As such, they must have produced a great deal of effect; and, there is no doubt in my mind, that the doctrine they contain has encouraged Sir John Carr, knight, to bring the action, the fate of which is above recorded. Let us hope, however, that this dangerous doctrine is now exploded as completely as if the Whigs had kept their words after they got their places, and made it a subject of discussion in parliament; for, I believe, it will be very difficult to produce any solid reason, why a man should have the liberty to hurt the *feelings* of an author any more than to hurt the feelings of a minister of state; why he should be allowed to ridicule the *abilities* of the former any more than the abilities of the latter; why it should be an offence worthy of *penal visitation* in the former case any more than in the latter case. I cannot discover any grounds for a distinction; and, therefore, I conclude, that if we should, by any accident, see a fool in office, we are at liberty to expose his folly, and to convince the nation, that the management of their affairs is in bad hands. Indeed, the real use of the liberty of the press is to cause the exposure of weak and wicked

public servants. It is of comparatively trifling consequence what men publish in books. Five hundred people, perhaps, never saw, or heard of, Sir John Carr's trash; and, if it could have been read by the whole nation, it is not likely that it would have done either harm or good. But, in the ability and honesty of men in office, every person in the country is deeply interested, and therefore ought to be regularly and minutely informed upon the subject. Upon matters of *taste*, in books, of what consequence is it whether the people are well-informed or ill-informed? But, upon matters closely connected with the prosperity and honour of the country, it is of great importance that they should lack no information that can possibly be communicated to them. Well, then, how is this information to be given? How, if not through an unshackled press, a press restrained only from uttering *falsehood*, according to the old language and practice of the law? Suppose I had been in battle with a general, and had seen him run from the enemy, beating him in swiftness as shamefully as a March hare beats a lurcher; suppose I had seen this, or received good information of it, would it not be very necessary to make the fact known, in order to prevent such a winged-heeled fellow from again exposing the lives of the army and bringing disgrace upon the nation? Suppose I had an opportunity of knowing several men, pretending to office and power, to be totally unqualified for any business and totally unworthy of any trust; would it not be very useful to communicate my knowledge to the public? Or, suppose me to have merely an *opinion* relating to public men, how do we arrive at the best chance of forming correct notions as to things unknown, except it be by expressing our opinions to one another?—Nor, can I see what mischief could arise from carrying the same liberty into the discussions relative to the private affairs of men. Suppose, for instance, I say, that Mr. such an one is a contented cuckold; that he has received proof quite sufficient that his wife has had a child by another man; but that, in consideration of a good sum of money, paid him by the principal cuckold, he holds his tongue, and, as the old saying is, puffs his horns in his pocket. This is, indeed, to suppose a strong case; but, such a case may *possibly* exist; and, if it does, should not such a man be pointed out? Ought not the mean scoundrel to be held up to the ridicule and scorn of the world? What other way is there of correcting such disgraceful and pernicious vices? Suppose no

to know a man upon the point of becoming a bankrupt, why should I not state the fact? What harm can arise from it? And if, upon any occasion, I speak what is *false*, there is the law to punish me, and to make compensation to the person whom I have slandered.—It is said, that you would, by allowing a liberty like this, set every neighbourhood together by the ears. Why should it be so? I can discover no reason for it. It is to deny the excellence of *truth*, to suppose that an unrestrained expression of the truth could be productive of injury. It is fitting that all men and women and actions should be generally known for what they are; and, it appears to me, that to express a fear at the promulgation of truth, is to foster falshood, and to offer a screen for all sorts of vices. There are many vices and crimes, too, that the law will not reach, yet they ought to be repressed, and how are they to be repressed unless men dare communicate freely their knowledge to one another? I publish that such an one is a liar. If what I assert be false, my falshood can be made appear, and I am punished in one way or another; but, if what I assert be true, is it not useful, that it should be known?—Upon this principle the law of England formerly proceeded. The indictment of a person for a libel always stated, that he had uttered what was *false*; falshood was essential as a ground work of the charge. As we have grown in refinement our ears have become more delicate, and it is now sufficient that the words are *scandalous* and *malicious*, qualities which it is not easy to define, and which are, indeed, mere matter of opinion. What one man thinks scandalous and malicious another man does not think so; but, all the world are agreed with respect to falshood and truth. These admit of *proof*; the others do not. Against a charge of falshood evidence can be brought; but, as to *scandal* and *malice* they must be left to surmise, to the *opinions* of a jury; and thus a salvo is provided for the consciences of men who would be afraid of point blank perjury. As the law now stands, you may not *speake the truth*, for fear of *doing mischief*. There is something so repugnant to reason in this, that I cannot be brought to consider it as wise. We all pretend, that to obtain truth is our great object. We all pretend to detest disguise, hypocrisy, and all the various sorts of falshood. If we have servants to hire, tradesmen to employ, acquaintances to form, our first step is to obtain a true account of them; and why, then, should the law forbid us to communicate to the public at large all the informa-

tion we possess? In order to make out a defence of the contrary doctrine, some have supposed, that, if every one were at liberty to publish all the truth that came to his knowledge, the prints would be filled with anecdotes of domestic occurrences, with which the world have nothing to do. Either such occurrences are interesting to the world, or they are not; if the former, they ought to be known, if the latter, the world would not attend to them, and the promulgation of them would soon meet its just punishment in the contempt which would fall upon the promulgator. To prevent the publication of truth is to confound, the wise with the foolish, the honest man with the rogue, the brave man with the coward, the virtuous with the vicious. Where there is no press, or no shew of freedom allowed in using it, the people expect to hear no truth through that channel; but, where the liberty of the press is a subject of boasting, they may well expect to hear the *whole* truth, and, if they hear it not, they are deceived with a shadow.—Nothing can be more worthy of punishment than the publication of wilful *falsehood*. I would, with all my heart, make this crime transportation, where it seriously affected the reputation of any man, in whatever rank of life. To the *feelings* of a person, *falsely* accused, ample vengeance is due; but, if I speak no more of a man than I can *prove* to be *true*, am I to be branded as a ruffian who has no regard for the feelings of my neighbour? Shall a fool be looked upon as having the feelings of a wise man, a speculator the feelings of a man of integrity, a reprobate the feelings of a saint? Aye, say some persons, you think, then, that it is only the innocent whose feelings are to be considered, but, you cannot wound the feelings of the innocent; *it is only the guilty that feel*. Hence Lord Mansfield's maxim, I suppose: "the greater *er the truth* the greater the *libel*," according to which maxim it is a greater libel to call a highwayman a highwayman, than to give the same appellation to a person perfectly free of every crime. This is the unavoidable consequence of making it a crime to publish truth; and, in my opinion, of all the means of debasing and corrupting a people, none is more efficacious or more speedy, than that of giving them a press, through which truth has not a free circulation.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—The intelligence from Spain seems to indicate, that, let the result be what it may, there will be an arduous contest. This I most earnestly pray for; because, without such a contest,

no good can arise. In his answer to the Londoners, the king says, he has no other object than that of supporting the "ancient" government of Spain. Precisely what his majesty may mean by the word *ancient*, I cannot positively say; but, I hope, he does not mean, that government who sent the Spanish army to the North of Europe; who gave up the sword of Francis I; who introduced a French army into Spain; who made Murat Lieutenant of the kingdom; and who sold the Spaniards to Buonaparte for a snug maintenance in France. It is the government, I should hope, that existed when the Cortes, or representatives of the people, used to be fairly assembled, and when the nation was not governed by a set of intriguing tyrants. This being the case I cordially agree with his majesty, and hope that his efforts will be crowned with success. If the people of Spain are to have a *despot*, I care not one straw who he is. I feel no interest in the events going on. I care not which side beats, or is beaten.—The *grandes* are going back, it seems, the lacqueys of Joseph Napoleon. This is what they ought to be. Were I in his place, I would make them black the shoes of my French servants. Nobility indeed! Here is a precious specimen of the effects of *high blood*! What an example is here! What a lesson for the nations of Europe! Talk of upstart kings and nobles; are there any of them, any of the "ale-house-keeper's sons", who have, in any one case, acted thus? What must that government have been, which was composed of wretched vermin like these? Is there any man who will openly say, that he wishes to see such a government restored? *Loyal*! aye, these base scoundrels were, I warrant it, the very pink of loyalty, and have, amongst them, sent many a man to the gallows upon the suspicion of being *disloyal*. I warrant it, they have been famous persecutors in this way. Their example, will, however, be useful, long after Joseph Buonaparte, if he should succeed, will have sent them all to clean the kennels of Madrid; for, when he is once safely seated upon the throne, he will have too much sense to keep such base wretches near his person. *Grandes*! They have been *grandes* quite long enough. The turn of somebody else is come. The soldier is abroad, as I told Sir Baalam long enough ago; and, ere he puts up the sword, he will have his share of the good things of this world.—There are, I clearly perceive, some persons, who wish to see the Spaniards beat Buonaparte, but wish not to see any change of the royal family or the government, in Spain.

Such persons may make up their minds to a disappointment; for, never will Buonaparte be beaten by men that can bear the idea of again putting on the yoke of despotism. One or the other the Spaniards must be, either the subjects of Joseph Napoleon, or their own masters, subject only to a government of their own choosing.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.—What say the "*Barley growers*" now? Barley has not fallen, notwithstanding all the predictions of Mr. Arthur Young. Nay, it has continued to rise, while oats have risen one third in price. I wonder what will be said now? What shuffle will be resorted to? I should like to hear what can be said by those who met to petition against the sugar-bill. There is, I think, an appearance of a short crop of barley and oats. The introduction of sugar will have added about 300,000 quarters to the crop, which, though hardly worth mentioning in comparison with the amount of the produce of the country, is *something*, and the bill will, therefore, have done some little good.—The clamour, which was raised, at the time that this bill was before the House of Commons, should not soon be forgotten. The agricultural people should be frequently reminded of it. They brought forth all their interest and their very best talents upon the occasion. Let it, therefore, remain as a standard whereby to judge of the degree of reliance that is to be placed upon them. I repent, that they are embodied into a *sect*. All sectaries are bigots. There is no liberality of discussion, or of thought, amongst them; their tenets are always to be distrusted, and their assertions, as to facts, are not always to be relied on. That this widely spread and powerful sect should have been beaten by the indolent West Indians is truly astonishing, and cannot be attributed to any thing but the badness of their cause.

Botley, 28th July, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

LONDON.—On the 20th July, 1808, (the mayor, aldermen, recorder, sheriffs, and common council of the city of London, waited upon his majesty, at the queen's palace (being introduced by lord Rivers, the lord in waiting), with the following address, which was read by sir John Silvester, the recorder, as follows:—To the king's most excellent majesty. The humble, dutiful, and loyal address of the lord mayor, aldermen, and commons of the city of London, in common council assembled.—Most gracious sovereign, we, your majesty's loyal subjects, the lord mayor, aldermen, and com-

mops of the city of London, in common council assembled, with hearts full of dutiful affection to your royal person, and inseparably attached to the honour and prosperity of your government, humbly desire to approach your throne, and represent to your majesty the sentiments of a free and faithful people.—While we contemplate with horror and indignation, the atrocious perfidy and wanton violence employed by the ruler of France, to reduce under his yoke the Spanish monarchy and the Spanish people, we cannot refrain from expressing our joy and exultation at the pure and animating spirit of patriotism, displayed by that high-minded and gallant nation, in defence of their dearest rights and privileges. They have appealed to the generous feelings of your majesty for protection and support, and they have not appealed in vain. You, sire, have felt, as the sovereign of a free people, who, by extending his powerful aid to a nation, struggling for liberty and independence, holds forth to the world a happy and practical illustration of the blessings which his own subjects enjoy.—The solemn declaration by which your majesty has been pleased to recognize the Spanish nation as a natural friend and ally, against the common enemy of all established governments; the frank, disinterested, and inspiring pledge which you have given, that you have no other object than that of preserving unimpaired the integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy; the wisdom, liberality, and promptitude of the measures consequently adopted by your majesty's government, have excited in our breasts the most lively and grateful sensations.—We have to entreat your majesty's acceptance of our most cordial thanks for the noble and liberal system of policy by which your councils have been, and continue to be actuated towards Spain; and we beg leave to assure you, that, in contributing to the success of your royal interposition in a cause, at once so great and glorious, and so peculiarly congenial to the spirit and feelings of your people, no exertion shall be withheld, no sacrifice shall be spared on our part, to prevent twelve millions of *fellow-freemen* from being accursed with the most galling and profligate despotism recorded in the history of the world.—In the measures which your majesty may think proper to adopt for accomplishing this great end, you may, sire, rely with the firmest confidence upon the affectionate, zealous, and enthusiastic support of your loyal citizens of London. We feel ourselves identified with the patriots of Spain; we sympathise in all their wants; we participate

in all their wishes; and we humbly beg leave to express our fervent hope, that the glorious struggle in which the Spanish nation is engaged, aided by the energies, resources, and magnanimity of the British empire, may succeed, not only in asserting the independence of the Spanish monarchy, but in ultimately effecting under the protection of divine providence, the emancipation of Europe, and the re-establishment of the blessings of peace.

To which address his majesty was pleased to return the following most gracious answer:—I thank you for your very loyal and dutiful address. I accept, with pleasure, your congratulations on the prospect opened to the world, by the brave and loyal exertions of the Spanish nation, against the tyranny and usurpation of France, and on the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and Spain.—In aiding the efforts of the Spanish nation, I have been actuated by no other motive than that of affording the most effectual and disinterested assistance to a people, struggling for the maintenance of their ANCIENT government and national independence.—I have no doubt I shall continue to receive from you and from all classes of my people, the same zealous and affectionate support which I have experienced on so many, and on such important occasions.

They were all received very graciously, and had the honour to..... *kiss his majesty's hand!*

AMERICA.—*Letter from Mr. Jefferson to the Delegates of the Democratic Republicans of the City of Philadelphia, in general Committee assembled. 25th May, 1808.*

The epoch, fellow-citizens, into which our lot has fallen, has indeed been fruitful of the events, which require vigilance and embarrassed deliberation. That, during such a period of difficulty, and amidst the perils surrounding us, the public measures which have been pursued should meet your approbation, is a source of great satisfaction.—It was not expected, in this age, that nations, so honourably distinguished by their advances in science and civilization, would suddenly cast away the esteem they had merited from the world, and revolting from the empire of morality, assume a character in history, which all the tears of their posterity will never wash from its pages.—But, during this delirium of the warring powers, the ocean having become a field of lawless violence, a suspension of our navigation, for a time, was equally necessary to avoid contest, or enter it with advantage. This measure will indeed produce some temporary inconve-

science, but promises lasting good, by promoting among ourselves, the establishment of manufactures hitherto sought abroad, at the risk of collisions no longer regulated by laws of reason or morality.—It is to be lamented that any of our citizens, not thinking with the mass of the nation as to the principles of our government, or of its administration, and seeing all its proceedings with a prejudiced eye, should so misconceive and misrepresent our situation as to encourage aggression from foreign nations. Our expectation is, that their distempered views will be understood by others, as they are by ourselves. But should war be the consequence of these delusions, and the errors of our dissatisfied citizens find atonement only in the blood of their sounder brethren, we must meet it as an evil necessarily flowing from that liberty of speaking and writing which guards our other liberties; and I have entire confidence in the assurances that your ardour will be animated, in the conflicts brought on, by considerations of the necessity, honour, and justice of our cause.—I sincerely thank you, fellow-citizens, for the concern you so kindly express for my future happiness. It is a high and abundant reward for endeavours to be useful; and I supplicate the care of providence over the well being of yourselves and our beloved country.

PORTUGAL.—*Account of recent Transactions, published at Oporto, 6th July, 1808, by authority of the partisans of the Prince Regent, now calling themselves the Government.*

The most important occurrence that could elevate the nation to glory and dignity was reserved for our days, which will serve to transmit to posterity the illustrious name of the heroic Portuguese, and to note in the records of this fine and opulent city, the immortal epoch of its restoration, and that she gave the alarm to the whole kingdom.—The most cordial love to the best of princes, stimulated all hearts in Portugal, to oppose the most unjust and most scandalous usurpation. The most unlimited oppressions, the violation of all rights, and the absolute disrespect of the most sacred duties, armed every inhabitant to shake off the tyrannic yoke that oppressed them. But the dispenser of empires had reserved to this city the prerogative of leading the way, and stimulating by its example every body to emancipate this kingdom.—For this purpose he raised amongst us persons of genius, resolution, and vigour, capable of achieving so illustrious a purpose. The fatal day that depri-

ved us of our lawful sovereign, whom the hand of the Omnipotent has preserved from the wicked one, who persecuted him, opened the way to the most disastrous events, which, after having overrun the continent with misery, desolation, and death, were about to effect the complete destruction of our happy peninsula, perfidly, simulation, and a combination of all artifices being the forerunner of this oppression and tyranny—violence and the most daring ambition, its followers of that monstrous man, the produce of the cruel revolutions, which, for these nineteen years, has upset so many thrones, and ruined so many people; who has made a traffic in kingdoms and in men; who has put on the mask of religion the more impudently to profane it; who has displayed to advantage all sorts of crimes, without being impeded by the least glimpse of morality, or kept back by remorse; that celebrated Napoleon, whom vile flattery and its followers, or, with more propriety whom the fear of his tyrannies, has raised to the most elevated unmerited titles; after having announced by his representative Junot to our desolate nation, that he would protect us, dared to conceive in his illusive ideas, and to utter without a blush “that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign in Portugal.” Unthinking man! What right, what convention authorizes this iniquity and usurpation? Who constituted Napoleon the universal tutor of kings and of nations? Who devolved on him the succession of thrones wrested by his tyranny from their legitimate possessors? Who entrusted him with that extraordinary and famous protection which authorises the spoliation of private property, and the trampling under foot of all rights and privileges, that destroys and confounds all order? The most manifest hatred arose in the hearts of the nation, on its observing the accumulation of injustice and barbarity, with the most scandalous indecency; then began the vision of protection to dissolve: forty millions of crusaders were levied on this unhappy country as an extraordinary contribution of war, a country which the absence of its beloved prince, the invasion by numerous troops, the total stagnation of commerce, and the discouragement of industry and arts, had reduced to the greatest distress: but this is not all those 40,000,000 were for the redemption of all private property; how had this been forfeited? Was it by our unbounded patience in suffering their extortions? by the docility with which their hard and oppressive yoke was borne? by the meekness with which we received our tyrants? Posterity will hardly

believe their impudence and immorality could ever reach such a length — The promised protection went on in this way. The patrimony of the temples, the ornaments of the sanctuary, the inheritance of its sacred ministers, were all insufficient for the insatiable thirst of the oppressor of the continent. The national dignity disappeared — all public employments were given to the less informed and the less worthy, who, discountenanced in their own country, shewed amongst us a matchless effrontery, and who appeared to be influenced by the most insolent pride and the most sordid avarice. Our limits prevent us from tracing the picture of the odious person styled the deputy of police in this city, it is more faithfully engraved in the indignation and remembrance of every one here. The moment of liberty was however approaching; our valourous neighbours the noble Spaniards, at length opened their eyes. The perfidious manner in which the reigning family of Spain were betrayed, roused the vengeance of that nation; and as soon as we were able, we have shewn that we still are what we have been, and what our forefathers have been before us, the most faithful and the most loyal to our prince and the most capable of restoring his wished for empire and our liberty. — At length the evening of the 18th day of June, 1808, offered the most brilliant and pleasing scene to the generous Portuguese. These faithful and valourous men, who were strangers to fear, despised all dangers, and actuated by that energy and faithful character that distinguish our nation, erected the standard of restoration, and in the name of their religion, and in obedience to their sacred oaths, proclaimed anew the most exalted and powerful prince the lord don John, prince regent of Portugal, our lawful sovereign. In this moment of glory, however, we were surrounded by dangers: a column of the French army was marching to this city; without arms, without troops of the line, and only with two hundred artillerymen and some militia, we were in extreme danger; but we had valour and genius equal to our situation. Those who endeavoured to liberate their country, have their eulogium in their own conduct. — Cannon and ammunition had been previously obtained, the necessary dispositions had been made for the defence of the bridge, and the passage of the river Douro: all the points of defence had been reconnoitred, as also all the entrances to the city. The execution of a plan was in contemplation among the Portuguese, and they had to conquer the illusions of some,

and the fear of others, and the more necessity there was for delay, the more the project was menaced with ruin. The signal for the acclamation was given and for arming; the orders were issued and executed with equal ardour in a moment; 30 artillerymen, with four field-pieces, which covered the van and rear of two bodies, of 10 men each, all that remained, prevented all opposition. The arsenals were opened, and the people took arms. Some corps of the militia were for a while irresolute, owing to the unexpected circumstances which had taken place, but these were soon determined; the royal standard was displayed, and the august name of his royal highness sounded from all quarters. All the officers whom they met joined them, and took the oath of honour, which excited enthusiasm and affection: the posts were distributed, and every one was at work; the Major Raymundo José Pinheiro, commander of the fort of St. Joan de Foz, at the mouth of the river, known for his fidelity, energy, and love for our prince, concerted the most able dispositions for defence, and for directing the people. The enthusiasm and energy cannot be described; upwards of 50,000 persons were provided with arms and ammunition; and from that night the city was in a state of defence, and waited the enemy with impatience, but he fled. — On the morning of the 19th, the protection of the Almighty being implored, and prayers of thanksgiving having been offered up with as much piety as fervour, in the cathedral of this city, a provisional government was elected, composed of the most excellent and reverend Don Antonio, of St. Joseph and Castro, bishop of the diocese, president, and eight members of the different classes, viz. of ecclesiastics, Doctor Dezembargador; provisor of the bishoprick, Manuel Lopes Loureiro; and the Doctor Dezembargador, vicar general; José Dias de Oliveira, of the military; major Ant. de Silva Pinto; and the captain commanding the artillery of the body of magistrature of the relacani, the dezembargador José de Mello Freire; judge for the crown and the dezembargador of Agravos, Luis de Sequeira de Game Ayala; of the body of the citizens, Antonio Mathew, Friar de Andrade, and Antonio Ribeiro Braga; in this junta the supreme authority is vested, until his royal highness shall order to the contrary, or the lawful government shall be restored in the capital; it is its duty to maintain the laws, usages, customs, and privileges of the nation, as far as they are consistent with the present circumstances and defence of the country. The most profound me-

disunion could not produce a more judicious election, wisdom, dexterity, energy, disinterestedness; the most marked fidelity and most acknowledged patriotism, are the distinguishing qualities that compose the character of the most excellent and reverend president, and the respective members of the supreme council. The most efficient measures have been taken for the uninterrupted security within, and defence without. The love of our sovereign and country is expressed by every tongue. The general emotion amongst the inhabitants, the continual chiming of the bells, and a splendid illumination in every quarter of the city for three nights, all announced the satisfaction with which every heart overflowed. Contributions have been voluntarily offered—valiant young men flock to the royal standard from all parts—the secular and regular clergy present a fresh and glorious testimony of their religious and social virtues; they form the corps for the defence of the state, and the guard of the city is under the command of the illustrious dean. The best order and harmony prevails amongst the inhabitants of every description, energy and valour increase every instant; these virtues must have their effect on the common enemy; he well knows that general Loyson, after crossing the Douro, has been chased by the people of Guimaraens, Braga, and Tras os Montes, that he flies with precipitation, but cannot avoid the valorous Trans Montanos, who still follow him, making great havoc in his disbanded division, killing his superior officers, and taking from him important spoils. We shall give a more circumstantial account of these successes; they strengthen us in our confident hopes that the empire of usurpation, perfidy, and seduction, will be annihilated, and that the better cause will have the better end, and that the restoration of our amiable prince will crown our wishes and bring back those days of felicity so violently interrupted.—Great are the presages of our prosperity, from the prompt re-establishment of public order, the absence of crimes, the moderation and peace that prevail among all. The government that directs us spares no pains to complete our happiness. A wise and vigilant magistrate presides in the police department, who punishes the wicked and protects the good subjects of his royal highness. It becomes us to observe a corresponding demeanour, by obeying, by confiding in our government, and by uniting amongst ourselves. Our objects are no less than the glorious re-establishment of our religion, and the restoration to the throne of our lawful sovereign.—It is

therefore necessary that the characteristic marks of these two enterprises should be kept as distinct as their ends are opposite—that as crimes rendered the French revolution abominable, so virtues shall signalize our restoration. That we may breathe nothing else but the love of our sovereign and our country, taking care not to pollute the glorious end we propose to ourselves, that of calling back to us our august sovereign.—On the 18th day of June last, the most excellent Bernardino Freire de Andrade arrived in this city, who had been nominated governor of the arms and of its district by the prince regent, and who had suspended this employment in consequence of the absence of our sovereign. He comes forth, however, as soon as his royal government is restored, and the defence of the state gives him an opportunity of displaying his fidelity, and of augmenting the glory of the royal service.

PORTUGAL.—*London, 22d July, 1808*—*Extract of two Letters received by his Excellency the Portuguese Minister, from Mr. Patrick Furlal, the Portuguese Agent at Gibraltar, June 30.*

I have the honour to inform your excellency, that on the 16th of this month the whole kingdom of Algarva rose against the French proclaiming his royal highness the prince regent, our master, for their only true and legitimate sovereign: the French governor, and all those of that nation, holding public situations under him, were made prisoners. Many of the French were killed; the rest throwing down their arms, sought their safety in a shameful flight. A supreme junta is already established in Faro, the capital of that kingdom, in the name of his royal highness, which is composed of the following persons:—President—His Excellency the Count of CASTRO MARIM. Vice-President—His Excellency the Bishop of ALGARVA. For the Clergy—The Rev. the ARCH DEAN of the SEE, and Rev. ANTONIO LUIS DE MACEDO. For the Nobility—DEZENBERGADOR JOSÉ DUARTE DA SILVA NEGRAO. JOSÉ BERNARDO DE GAMA, and JOAQUIM FELIPE DE LANDRESETE. For the People—MIGUEL de O. the younger, captain of the ordenancas, and JOAO ALEIXO. Secretary—Doctor VENTURA.

The Junta is occupied in preparing with the greatest activity the means of completing this heroic undertaking. An express has just arrived here from Tavira, from his Excellency the Count of CASTRO MARIM, requesting arms, &c. from the Governor of this place, who sent what arms, powder, and shot he could spare, having sent large quantities to Spain. Messengers have also

arrived here from Silves and Faro, making the same request, but which could not be complied with, the governor not having any to spare. The Portuguese officers who were here, waiting an opportunity to go to the Brazils, have returned, full of joy, to join their regiments in Algarva.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from p. 159.)—*Edict published in the Island of Majorca.*

Don Ferdinand VII. king of Spain and adjacent islands, &c. and in his royal name his excellency the Captain General of his army and kingdom, I make it known to the faithful and loyal inhabitants of this island, that last night I convened in my palace a meeting composed of all the constituted authorities, to lay before them the course which ought to be pursued under the existing circumstances, in which both my loyalty and the unanimous wish of the people require that we should continue to acknowledge Ferdinand VII. as our lawful sovereign; in consequence whereof, it was unanimously agreed upon, that these islands shall continue faithful to his majesty Ferdinand VII.; to which end, and that we may have the benefit of the full exercise of the rights of sovereignty in his name, as far as required, a board was appointed, which will begin this very evening to exercise the same, and publish what may be deemed conducive to the prosperity of this island. A *Te Deum* shall be sung, and then shall be a levee, royal salute, and illumination.—DON JUAN NIGUEL DE VIVES. By command of his excellency, and as secretary authorised by the board.—BAR-TOLOME JOSIAS. *Royal Castle of Palma, May 30, 1808.*

The supreme board has sent me the following letter:—Most Serene Sir,—Don Dionisio Capaz, member of this board, and an ensign in the navy, accompanied by the Portuguese captain Don Sebastian Martinez, is going in the name of this board to inform your most serene highness of the occurrences which have lately taken place, and as they are thought important, it has been deemed requisite that he should give you a verbal account of the same, that you may take the resolutions, and send us the assistance which we stand in need of.—May God, &c. &c. THE MARQUIS DE CAISIR. *Ayamonte, June 20, 1808.*

The purport of this verbal information is, that the French have been driven from the forts on the right banks of the Guadiana, opposite to Ayamonte. The inhabitants of the left, assisted by a few regu-

lars who were there, and a handful of armed Portuguese, have beaten the French by which they were garrisoned, and hoisted the Spanish flag in every one of them. The loss of the enemy amounts to 91 prisoners, and several killed.—The whole of the kingdom of Algarva is in a state of insurrection; Villa Real and Castromarin, as well as the batteries of Carnasquera and St. Anson have been taken possession of. The rebel Mallet has been handcuffed, and let down into a dry well with twenty-six other individuals: the remainder of the French troops have fled to the mountains. Tavira, Faro, and Aillon, are up in arms, and the military chests of the French have been seized: the Spanish troops above mentioned consisted of Catalonians, provincials, and a small number of Murcians.—A Portuguese captain is come to inform the board, that Algarva and the whole kingdom wish to be under its protection, in the name of Ferdinand VII.

Manifesto of the Junta at Seville, June 14, 1808.

The supreme council of government gives notice to the inhabitants of this city, and of all the districts under their command, that by several deserters who have arrived here from the French army, encamped in the environs of Cordova, intelligence has been received, that there are a great many among those troops who are desirous to come over to us, moved by the justice of our cause, but that they dare not do it from fear of being murdered in our roads and places, on account of the hatred, which, they suppose, is universally entertained against the French, and also against the Swiss, and other foreigners, who do not distinctly speak our language. The great mischief occasioned by rumours of this description ought the more to be obviated, as if we succeed to refute them, we shall not only increase our own forces, but also diminish those of the enemy, and compel them to surrender, as we shall then be thoroughly informed of the state, situation, and position which they take, and then be able to attack them with advantage, and out off their retreat. The supreme council accordingly ordains and directs, that the said deserters shall be received with the utmost kindness, and furnished with provisions and other necessities which they may stand in need of, directing them to be sent to the justices of the respective districts, and of our nearest military commanders, who will send them to this supreme council, or to the captain general of our army, should he be nearer, who will, in that case,

give them such destination as shall appear most expedient; it being well understood, that if from an indiscreet zeal, or other motive, this useful ordinance should not be complied with, the offenders shall be punished with the utmost severity, as all the people ought implicitly to rely on the vigilance of this supreme council, and on their great and gallant army. The supreme council further directs, that all Frenchmen, who reside among us, after they shall have taken the oath of allegiance, and obtained letters of safeguard, shall not be any ways molested, but shall, on the contrary, be left in tranquil possession of their property, commerce, and trade, a proceeding dictated both by equity and justice, and by a proper attention to the public cause; the justices of the different districts being nevertheless obliged to watch their conduct. And, in order that this manifesto may be universally known, it shall be posted in the usual places, and transmitted to all the justices of the different places, that they may be able to attend to the strict performance thereof.—Given in our royal palace of Alvasas, in Seville,—JUAN BAUTISTA PARDO, Sec.

General Palafox's Proclamation after the Battle of Saragossa, 17th June, 1808.

Conquerors of the haughty French!—Aragonese!—You have proved yourselves to be worthy of your name. That multitude of proud warriors, triumphant in every other part of Europe, ceased to retain the character of conquerors when they came before you. You are inferior both in discipline and numbers; because one-twentieth part of our forces have not entered into action, having been incapable of uniting. But your zeal has overcome every difficulty. The musketry in which your enemies place so much confidence, are weak instruments of their power when you appear before them: you look at them with courage, and they fall at your feet.—Aragonese! the result of our first attempt has been to leave on the field of battle 18,000 enemies, composing a complete army, which had the audacity to provoke our resentment. We have had the good fortune to get possession of all the property and baggage, of which the people have been infamously plundered, in the countries through which this army passed. Our loss consists only from 1,000 to 2000 killed, and an equal number wounded: a loss bearing no comparison to the triumph we have obtained. Their precious blood is shed in the field of glory, on their own territory; and these blessed martyrs demand new victims; let us prepare for the sacrifice.—Aragonese! be not impatient. The ene-

my against whom we fight is rash, and will afford frequent opportunities for you to exercise your skill and your courage. If, especially, the lawless bands which violate our city of Madrid, and their commander Murat, should venture to approach us, we should receive the intelligence with the highest satisfaction; we would anticipate their expectations, and meet them half way.—Aragonese! if the battle of Saragossa had been gained by these intruders, we should have heard their babbling of the victories of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, acquired by the same valour. Although the conquest we have effected has been sanguinary, yet it has been glorious. Do you consider it as a trifling commencement of your future triumphs, under the powerful assistance of your illustrious leader and patron?

Proclamation of King Joseph Napoleon; Bayonne, 20th June, 1808.

JOSEPH, KING OF NAPLES AND SICILY,
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE KINGDOM OF
NAPLES:

Providence, whose designs are inscrutable, having called us to the throne of Spain and the Indies, we have found ourselves in the cruel predicament of withdrawing ourselves from a people who had so many claims to our attachment, and whose happiness was our most gratifying hope, and the only object of our ambition. He who alone can read the hearts of men, can judge of the sincerity of our sentiments, in opposition to which we have yielded to their impressions, and accepted a kingdom, the government of which has been put into our hands, in virtue of the renunciation of the rights to the crown of Spain, which our illustrious brother, his majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy, had acquired.—In this important situation, considering that institutions are alone capable of duration, we reflected with regret, that your social constitution was still imperfect, and thought that the further we had removed from you, so much the more incumbent upon us was it to secure your present and future welfare by all the means in our power. For these reasons we have put the last hand to our labours, and fixed the constitutional statute upon principles already partially adopted, and which are more conformable to the age in which we live, the mutual relations of the neighbouring states, and the disposition of the nation, which we have employed ourselves to ascertain ever since we were called to rule over it.—The principal objects which guided us in our labours, were:—1. The preservation of our holy religion.—2. The establishment of a public treasury, &c.

parate and distinct from the hereditary property of the crown.—3. The establishment of an intermediate administration, and a national parliament, capable of enlightening the prince, and of performing important services both to him and the nation.—4. A judicial organization, which shall render the decisions of the court of justice independent on the will of the prince, and make all the citizens equal in the eye of the law.—5. A municipal administration, which shall be the property of no man, but to which all, without distinction, shall be admissible.—6. The maintenance of the regulations which we have made for securing the payments to the creditors of the state.—His majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy, our illustrious brother, having been pleased to confer upon this act his powerful guarantee, we are assured, that our hopes with regard to the prosperity of our beloved people of the kingdom of Naples, thus reposing upon his widespread glory, shall not experience disappointment.

Constitutional Statute of the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily.

Joseph Napoleon, king of Naples and Sicily, French prince, grand elector of the empire, willing to confirm, by a constitutional statute those fundamental principles, by which the monarch is to be governed, has decreed, and does decree the following:—

I. OF RELIGION—The Catholic, Apostolic, and Romish religion is the religion of the state.—II. OF THE CROWN—The crown of Naples shall be hereditary, in the right of male issue, according to the primogeniture of birth.—III. OF THE REGENCY—1. The king is a minor till he attains the age of 18 years.—2. In case of the prince's minority, the regency will, by right, devolve upon the queen: and in her absence, to a prince of the blood royal, who shall be chosen by the emperor of the French, in his capacity as head of the imperial family; and in failure thereof of a prince of the blood, the choice will devolve upon the nation.—3. The yearly salary of the regency is confined to a fourth of the grant to the crown.—4. The education of the minor king is entrusted to his mother, and in her absence, to the prince nominated by the predecessor of the minor.—The remaining articles relate to the officers of the crown, the ministers, the council of state, &c. The article respecting the parliament confines the number of members to one hundred, who are to be divided into five classes, viz. the ecclesiastics, the nobles, the holders of landed property, the learned, and the merchants.

Order of the Junta of Badajoz, 21st June, 1808.

A respectable person of this city received a letter yesterday by the post, written by a priest to his brother, to the following effect:—It is notorious that Murat, apprized that in various places they opened the mails, and killed those persons who favour the French interest, has adopted the infamous plan of writing to the magistrates elected by the people, a letter to the following purport:—*Sir, I observe what you write me, and on such a day will arrive in your neighbourhood, with the number of French troops you desire, in order to restrain the revolutionists.*—Such are the contents; and the object is, manifestly, that when the letters are opened, treason may be attributed to the new commanders, and thus their death may be occasioned, and the army of the patriots be left without leaders.—This expedient, which has been detected, gives some idea of the precaution necessary to avoid the consequence of the perfidy of Murat and his agents, who are endeavouring to spread discord and confusion among the people in every possible direction. If union and good order be not preserved, we shall never accomplish the purpose we have in view, which is to defend our religion, our country, and our beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII. Be valiant and loyal; respect the magistrates and constituted authorities; forget private resentments, and all will be attained.

Proclamation at Badajoz, 27th June, 1808.

It appears that the divine blessing again attends us and the generalissimo. Our Lady of Pilar has given us a new proof of her favour and protection. After the French had fallen in the battles of Tudella, Mallen, Gaul, and Arragon, in which places they appeared to the number of five or six thousand, an army of 12,000 French had orders to enter Saragosa on the day of Corpus Christi, and the command was, that the town should be penetrated although only one soldier remained to descend from the ramparts. By the miraculous interference of the Holy Virgin, a battle was fought by the patriots against these troops, at the distance of only a gun-shot from Saragosa. All the French were put to the sword, not a single man remained to tell the dismal narrative to his countrymen. The Arragonese fought like furies, and as they approached the enemy, they threw away their muskets and rushed upon the plain regardless of life. Four hundred horses which remained, and 27 baggage waggons, were taken after this victory. Our loss, it is supposed, has been great, but without considerable sacrifices no such triumphs can be acquired; conquest however will amply repay us the loss we sustain.—This is communicated to the public for its

satisfaction, by order of the junta. **ANTONIO REBOER, Sec.**

Extraordinary Gazette of Saragossa of the 3d July, 1808.

The day before yesterday, the 1st instant, about midnight, the French army encamped in the environs of this capital, began to bombard the town, and continued the bombardment until the evening of the following day: during which time, upwards of one thousand four hundred bombs and shells, were thrown into the place. The French cavalry and infantry attacked some of the gates; but the heroic valour of the inhabitants and troops of the line succeeded in destroying, by a well directed fire, which was kept up with uncommon briskness, all who came within the range of their guns. The neighbouring fields were strewed with the dead bodies of the French. The patriots bravely maintained their post, amidst the numberless bombs and shells which struck their batteries.—In the afternoon of the 1st instant the attack was continued by the French artillery and foot, but they were also routed with a very considerable loss.—On the 2d inst. at break of day, the attack was renewed at all points, and after having sustained a severe loss, and convinced themselves of the persevering valour of the defenders of this capital, the French troops retreated, after a fire, which lasted twelve hours, without intermission, and proved extremely destructive to their ranks. The enemy's bombs, shells, and balls, without doing any considerable mischief, merely served to increase the hatred entertained against the enemy, and to remind us of the sacred duties which we owe to our religion, our country, our honour, and our king.—The gallantry displayed by the officers and soldiers, and in particular by the artillerymen, and the officers and troops, who were stationed in the batteries and points attacked, is beyond all praise. His excellency the governor and captain general, in order to shew how much he feels concerned in rewarding distinguished intrepidity and courage, has directed the different commanders to send in a list of the officers and soldiers of the regular troops, and the mass who have particularly distinguished themselves in order to bestow on them, in his majesty's name, those marks of distinction which their eminent services deserve, and transmit to posterity the names of those worthy defenders of their country. In expectation of these particular and correct returns, he has been pleased for the present to promote colo-

nel Don Antonio Torres to the rank of brigadier general, and appointed lieutenant colonel Don Marco de Pont of the volunteers of Saragossa, and Don Domingo Laripea of the volunteers of Extremadura, who defended the gates of Postillo and Carmen, colonels in the army; captain Don Salvador Cesta, major of the corps of artillery; and Don Geronimo Pinnerio, and Don F. Bosete, ensigns of the same corps, lieutenants. The two latter arrived in the morning from Barcelona, and without taking the least repose, immediately assumed the command of the batteries of Portillo and Carmen, where they covered themselves with glory. A great number of arms have fallen into our hands, and in the possession of the French, slain in the action, many precious articles were found, of which they had robbed the churches and private houses: we have taken a great number of prisoners of war.—In the town of Exea twenty-five of the enemy's cavalry and foot were made prisoners, and brought to this capital.—By an express which left Valencia on the 30th of June, the pleasing intelligence had been officially received, that the French army, commanded by general Moncey, having approached the said capital on the 28th ultimo, the batteries opened upon them, and kept up for seven hours with such unremitting briskness, that the French were defeated with immense slaughter, and the neighbouring fields were covered with their dead. The remains of their army retreated in the utmost disorder, exhausted with fatigue, and destitute of provisions, with a vast number of wounded, on the road to Madrid, where the main body of the army of Valencia awaits them to cut off the retreat of the few who remain, and put them to the sword, in return for the acts of violence against this capital.

Appointments of his Catholic Majesty Joseph Napoleon, at Bayonne, 4th July, 1808.

Ministers.—Their excellencies Don Louis Mariano de Urquiza, secretary of state; Don Pedro Cevallos, minister for foreign affairs; Don Michael Joseph de Azanza, minister for the Indies; admiral Don Joseph Massaredo, minister of the marine; general Don Gonzalo O'Farri, minister of war; Don Gaspar Melchor de Juvellanos, minister of the interior; Count Cabarrus, minister of finance; and Sebastian Pinuela, minister of justice.

Captains of the body guards.—Their excellencies duke del Parque, grandee of Spain; duke de St. Germain, grandee of Spain.
(To be continued.)

"Leaves the dull city, and joins, to please the fair,
"The well-bred cuckolds of St. James's air."—POPE.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"CRIM. CON. — It is not of the sin and shame of the acts of adultery, which are now daily coming before the world through the courts of justice, that I mean to speak upon this occasion. They are the natural consequence of the manners of the times, and those manners as naturally proceed from the size and luxury of the metropolis, which draws together, through the means of taxation, all the wealth and all the vices of the country. It is not, therefore, from any feeling of compassion towards the cuckolds that I am led to offer a few observations upon the subject; for nine hundred and ninety nine times out of every thousand, the man who is known for a cuckold *ought* to be one. The law gives him so much power over the poor feeble framed creature whom he has married; he is so completely the master of her and of all she has; he has, if he be worthy of a wife, so decided an influence over her mind, that his cuckoldom appears to me to be almost impossible, unless from his own fault. It is a man's own business to take care of his wife. Judges and juries are not, and never were, intended, to be the guardians of any woman's chastity; and, it is the modern fashion of making them *moral censors*, which I am desirous of pointing out for public disapprobation.

—A cuckold comes into court and asks for *damages*. There are, then, two dry questions of fact before the jury: 1st. whether the act of adultery have been committed; and, 2d, what is the amount of the *real damage*, which the complainant has sustained from that act. As to the first, circumstantial evidence may certainly be sufficient; but, then, it ought to be as good as is required in cases of treason, or murder. No loose tales about dishevelled hair and rumpled clothes and the like, ought to satisfy any juror. Appearances are so often deceitful, that the very strongest should be viewed with distrust. Appearances may satisfy me, that the parties were willing and intended to commit the act; but, unless I am fully satisfied that the act has been committed, I am guilty of false swearing if I give my assent to a verdict of guilty. According to the new doctrine, however, this

fact of actual commission of the act would seem to be of little consequence; for, the great burden of the pleading against the defendant, is, that he has "seduced the *affections*" of the plaintiff's wife, which may be no crime at all, either legal or moral, no man being able to prevent a woman from liking him better than she likes her husband. Only tell a man that he is not bound by his oath; tell him that he is to decide upon *opinion* and not upon *evidence*; and you have no longer any hold upon him; all is left to fashion and to chance; or, rather, the plaintiffs in such cases, have for their jurors, a set of men who, from a reason founded in human nature, are decidedly in their favour. It was the old practice, to stick to *fact*; and, it was necessary to bring good substantial proof of the act being committed, before there was the smallest chance of obtaining a verdict of guilty. Without insisting upon this, what woman's reputation or fortune can be safe? Suppose a scoundrel wishes to get rid of his wife. He may, with the assistance of a brother scoundrel, easily obtain very specious circumstantial proof, that his wife has been guilty of adultery. Nothing is easier either to conceive or to execute. The parties accused of the crime are incapable of being examined in evidence; the woman is no party in the cause; and, in the case supposed, she may be branded as an adulteress and sent to starve, being all the while conscious of perfect innocence. — Then, as to the amount of the *damages*. The word *damages* seems, of late years, and especially as applicable to this sort of charge, to have quite lost its original legal meaning. The compensation for damage is *pecuniary*, and, therefore, the pecuniary damage should be made appear; for, is it not a most shameful abuse of words to talk of *paying* a man for his *mental suffering*? And, I should be glad to be informed, by any of the experienced cuckolds of our day, what great difference there is between *receiving payment* for the chastity of a wife, and *selling* that chastity. When the pious transatlantic quack brought an action of damages against me for taking away his reputation, though the perjured jury did not require proof of

the *falsehood* of what I had published, they did ask for proof of the *damage* sustained by the plaintiff; or, at least, such proof was given by producing witnesses to shew that his patients had left him. This was a very good thing; it was doing right to withdraw his patients from him; and Dr. Rowley, who wrote upon the subject of the quack's practice, says, I merited a statue of gold for my achievement. But, the damage to the quack, the *pecuniary* damage, was *shown*; as, in such cases, it certainly ought to be. Now, what damage is sustained by the cuckold? It is *possible* that there may be some damage sustained, in certain peculiar cases; but, it is the fashion now-a-days, not even to ask for any proof, or to produce any *evidence* to show, that damage has been sustained, though damages, in case of guilt, always make part of the verdict. If a man, being blind and being assisted by his wife in managing his business, were to lose her through the means of a seducer, it would be easy for him to make his damages appear. But, what damages can be made out by the far greater part of those who apply to the law? They have been robbed of their wives' *society* and *conversation*. These they may still enjoy, if they please; for, I'll warrant a wife of this sort *talks* none the worse for her adventure. Aye, but then comes that indefinite thing called *comfort*, which, if one can, in any case, affix any meaning to it, means, in this case, *the pleasure of being deceived*. Still we come back again to the point whence we started: the award is for *compensation*; for something to *make up* for what has been lost; and, the cuckold having lost the "comfort" he derived from his wife's society, receives from a court of law the "comfort" which is to be derived from a sum of money.—But, the fact is, that the award has, in general, according to the present practice, nothing at all to do with real damages. It is a sort of *fine* inflicted; and, in some cases, a late indge openly directed the awarding of *exemplary* damages; that is to say, the punishing of a man by way of fine, under the form of making compensation to another man for a pretended loss that he has sustained; and the language of the fraternity of "learned friends" has been, that the jury are the "guardians of the public morals." If a man were indicted for the crime of adultery, then, indeed, the jury would be invested with a character somewhat of this sort; but, no man is, and no man can be, indicted for the crime of adultery. It is a crime of which the courts of law cannot take cognizance; but, the truth is, that we

are a people completely lawyer-ridden; every thing is drawn to their shop; the press and the pulpit, which were formerly looked to as sufficient for the checking of numerous vices, are now, it seems, hardly worth notice; and, the former of the two has, by the lawyers, been so shackled, that it is, indeed, not to be trusted to for any useful purpose. Though you know a man to be a rogue, you are not to call him so, you are not to caution your neighbours against him; because, say the lawyers, "you should bring such a man to justice." That is to say, "you should bring him to our shop." But, to bring a rogue to their shop is an expensive affair; and, if the rogue be rich, it is odds but the real punishment fall upon yourself. Into the places where justice is administered, scarcely any but lawyers are permitted to enter. The great Halls of Winchester and Westminster, for instance, which were evidently constructed for the purpose of receiving a large number of persons, that, according to the maxim of our constitution, justice might be administered *in public*, are now parcelled off. The places where the trials are held are boxed up with mean-looking boards to the very summit of the roof; little passages, or rather holes, are left for people to creep in and out at; a man stands at each entrance to select the persons who wish to enter; and the inside is filled with lawyers, or retainers of the law. From the *public* the hearing of the trials is as completely kept as if the trials were held in a room locked up. Over the several passage doors, at Winchester, are written, in order to prevent confusion: "*Court*;" over another, "*Counsellors*;" over another, "*Attorneys*;" over another, "*Witnesses*;" over another, "*Jury*." But, no where do you find a door for the *public* to enter. Is this *administering justice in public*? Can this be called an *open court*? Even the information, which, at last, the public get in print, respecting trials, they are compelled to purchase from lawyers; for it is generally some briefless "learned friend" that supplies the news-papers with the reports of trials. It is the accursed funding and taxing system, which has given rise to such immense volumes of acts of parliament, that has caused so fearful a predominance of this wily and yet daring profession, and that has brought so many persons to pine away their lives in hunger, under a bob-tailed wig and a black gown. Parents, tempted by the brilliant success of comparatively a few, and by the riches which many more acquire, through the means of the law, send up their sons in swarms to be "*bred to the*

"*lar*;" but, could they see the hungry thread-bare troops that cling about Westminster Hall and the Houses of Parliament, like half-perished flies, in the month of October, about the windows of a seller of sweets, those parents would rather send their children to be bred to the making of shoes. Poor souls! I know of no sight more painful than to see forty or fifty dozen of them squeezed into a half-circle, with visages clearly indicating want of necessary food, each anxiously looking forward to catch the eye of some fortunate brethren, and having his lungs upon the cock, ready to let off in a laugh the moment a pretence is offered, however miserable that pretence may be. Poor souls! to see them bustling along, in the morning, breakfastless to court, as if anxious thousands waited their arrival, and the fate of whole families and classes depended upon their tongues; when, at the same time, both their backs and bellies can witness, that a gypsy fortune-teller surpasses them in the receiving of fees! — This multitude of lawyers is a monstrous evil. Than a man really learned in the law no one can in point of rank be more respectable. The profession of the law is not only necessary, but honourable, and ought to be held in honour. It is when this profession draws every thing to itself; when it swallows up every thing; when it confounds and destroys that which is necessary to public happiness, that it becomes hateful; and to that point it is very fast arriving in England. It is for the *Spiritual* court, or, which is still better, an unshackled expression of private and public opinion, to check and to punish the crime of *adultery*, which, in returning to my subject, I repeat it, is not cognizable in a court of law. Sir JAMES MANSFIELD, — who, before he was made a judge, had long been considered the most learned lawyer in England, has lately told the jury, that they are *not* to look upon themselves as being in the capacity of *moral censors*. This is, I hope, the beginning of a change in the practice, which has, for some time, prevailed; for if "*exemplary*" damages are given in cases of *crim. con.* why should not exemplary damages be given in cases of *trespass, assault, &c. &c.* and, then, what man would be safe? Damage is a specific thing; a thing to be ascertained; and though not to a nicety, in all cases, yet so nearly as to leave but little room for the doing of injustice to either party. The amount of damage done, can, in no case, depend on the rank or means of the party doing it. If a man be knocked down by a shoeblack, the damage is full as great as

if he had been knocked down by any of the ants' hill of knights about London; and, I should be glad to know, from some thorough-paced cuckold, whether his footman is not as able at the work of depriving him of "*comfort*," as any of the young lords, whom his wife retains or withdraws from the stews. If the footman deprives Sir Baalam of his *comfort*, why should not the footman have as heavy damages to pay, as if he had been a lord? *Why* should he not? I should like to have an answer to this question. If a footman maliciously kill your horse, worth a thousand pounds, is not an award of a thousand pounds made against him? If, in like manner, a lord kill your horse, is not the award the same? *Damage* is a word always bearing the same meaning; and, upon what principle of our law is it, then, that the award in cases of *crim. con.* is made according to the rank, or pecuniary means, of the defendant? Were I upon a jury, in a case of *crim. con.* I would eat my boots, soles and all, before I would award to a cuckold one single penny more than I believed him to have *lost* by the act of the defendant. — By a contrary practice what a field is opened for the vilest of all robbery! For my part, I can see nothing easier, if a rogue and a handsome and cunning woman are agreed, than to make a very pretty fortune by a *crim. con.* speculation, and that, too with such evidence as is now received, without the help of the sin of adultery. The jilt has nothing to do but entice a rich man into her trammels; and, without communicating the plot to any one, the husband will soon obtain evidence sufficient for the purpose of obtaining damages to the amount of thousands of pounds. The pair may then live together upon the fruit of their plunder; or, if they like it better, they may separate, and each take a share. The law of this land, which had foreseen every thing else, had foreseen this also; therefore, in speaking of damages, it means *real* damage, damage that can be *proved* to have been sustained; and not *imaginary* damage, damage that exists in the fancy; damage purely mental, and which, therefore, it is impossible to ascertain; because, though the fact be proved, one plaintiff will be deeply afflicted at what will be with another a subject of joy. A law, or a practice, therefore, which tolerates these awards of damages for the loss of "*comfort*," must necessarily be the most uncertain and capricious of all things. The doctrines we have heard, upon this subject, and the verdicts we have witnessed, cannot fail to have a tendency to render

wavering the conduct of jurors in general; to wear away those notions relative to *evidence and law*, which ought ever to remain indelibly imprinted on the mind of the juror; to put men of small capacity and little knowledge up with the idea, that they are judges in *equity*; to make a jury a mere instrument, the sport, the play-thing, of hired advocates; to expose property, character, and life, to the effect of circumstances not at all under the controul of the possessor; and, to convert the whole society into dependents, into very slaves; of the professors of the law.

LIBEL LAWS.—Before I proceed to make some further remarks upon this subject, in continuation of what was said last week, I think it proper to quote, from the *Courier* news-paper, an article relating to the way in which libellers are *handled* in Ireland. It is as follows: "In the *Dublin* paper, which we received a day or two ago, we found an article to which we think it necessary to direct the attention of the public, premising that we know nothing ourselves of the circumstances there stated. We take the account as it has been published in the *Dublin* papers:—"The editor of a paper printed in Kerry, called the *Kerry Dispatch*, asserts that "while inoffensively walking the street, he was called off by a common seicant, and, after being assailed with most opprobrious language, and the most criminal imputations, was made a prisoner, and paraded under a military escort through a crowd of at least one thousand people! He was proclaimed through that crowd as a public disturber of the peace, as a fomentor of Whiteboyism, and a leader of Whiteboys!" This conduct towards him the editor attributes to a paragraph in his paper of the 5th inst. under the head of Anniversary "Display of Orange Colours."—"The paragraph to which it alludes, we never saw, nor do we recollect ever to have seen the paper in which he was published. But it is not necessary either to have seen the paper or the paragraph to be able to pronounce a most decisive opinion with respect to the transaction in question. It requires the most serious investigation. What! when Kerry is not a proclaimed district, and martial law consequently does not operate in it, is the subject to be seized and made a prisoner by a military escort? Supposing even the Kerry editor to have been guilty of the greatest offence in his power, and supposing there were civil laws by which he might have been punished, and civil officers by whom he might have been

taken up, and carried before a magistrate. But here, (supposing the account published to be correct) we never once see the civil laws, or the magistrate or the civil officers—we see nothing but the military. If an editor of a paper, or the author or publisher of any work, may be laid hold of by the military, the freedom of the press would be merely nominal—stat nominis umbra—the parent and the child of liberty would be destroyed, and that great weapon, which has assisted so materially in establishing the freedom of Great Britain, and which is assisting so powerfully in the rescue of Spain and Portugal, would be no longer formidable. Let us take care to prevent any encroachment upon the liberty of the press. The first step against it that is taken with impunity is the first step towards slavery."—So, this gentleman of the *Courier* is for more law! The poor printer was seized hold of, abused, and paraded through the streets. The *Courier* would have preferred an indictment, or information, it seems. Every one to his taste! "Let us take care to prevent any encroachment upon the liberty of the press!" These are bold, or rather, big, words; but, how will you take care of it? and what have you ever done to assert that liberty? I never remember any thing, in this way, done by you; but, I well remember your taking infinite pains to furnish a before-hand justification for an infernal act of oppression which you strongly recommended to the attorney-general; namely, the prosecution of the author who wrote an essay, published in the *Morning Herald*, upon the *Potsdam oath* of famous memory. This I remember, and I do assure you, that I think your conduct towards that author was much worse than that of the soldiers towards our Irish brother of the press.—A correspondent, whose letter will be found below, has given me an explanation of the principles, upon which the charges, in case of libel, proceed. I was quite aware, that, in a civil action, the truth of the assertions published might be proved, and that a justification might be set up on that ground. I thank him for his information respecting Sir Fletcher Norton; but, I believe, that he will find, that the example, contrary to his wish, has been followed. This is, however, of little importance, as long as the jury are told, that, though the charge (the truth of which they are sworn to decide upon) alleges the words called a libel to be false, they are, nevertheless, in certain cases, to find the charge true, even if the words called a libel are not proved to be false, and even if the defendant is refused permission to prove them to be true. As long as this is the

case, it matters little; indeed it matters not at all, whether the indictment charges the supposed libeller with falsehood or not. This I knew very well; but, I referred to the language of indictments to shew, that, formerly, *falsehood* was essential, as the ground work of a charge of libel; and that, of course, the charge fell to the ground, if the defendant proved the truth of what he had said or published. Had not this been the law, and the actual practice, at the time when indictments for libel, in the present form, were first preferred, the word *false* would not have been inserted in them. If the law had been content with *scandalous* and *malicious*, it would have said nothing about falsehood. But, the fact is, I believe, that, until of late years (within fifty), no one ever dreamt of maintaining a charge of libel, but upon the ground of falsehood. To promulgate truth never was, formerly, held, *by the law*, to be a crime. Tyrants frequently punished men for speaking or writing the truth, and they had the ready aid of their courts and juries. But, then, these were, at the time, regarded as acts of tyranny; as such, they excited hatred, and in the end, brought, in one way or another, their proper punishment. Since the time of Lord Mansfield, inclusive, to promulgate truth is *coolly* and *gravely* laid down to be criminal. It is become a settled maxim, that *falsehood* is not an essential quality in the crime of libel; that every word of a publication may be true; that all its sentiments may be in strict unison with morality and religion; and yet, that it may be a libel, punishable by fine, imprisonment, pillory, and, if Lord Grenville's act be not repealed, by *transportation*, for the second offence. Where, then, is the *standard*? Who is to know how far to go; for how can he tell what a jury will think scandalous and malicious, and what they will think not to possess those qualities? In *what way* is that freedom (of which the Courier talks so glibly as owing its birth to the press) to be assisted by the press? Let us try it a little; suppose there to be a king upon the throne, who is bent upon establishing despotic sway, and that, aided by ministers who are of the same disposition with himself, he sets about the work without any disguise. A writer calls upon his countrymen to be upon their guard, and gives a true description of the several despotic acts which the supposed king and his abettors have been guilty of. The writer is indicted for the offence; he is not allowed to prove his innocence by proving the *truth* of what he has written; and, if the matters published be thought by the jury to be scandalous and malicious, slap goes the writer to jail, where he has plenty of

time to ruminate on the blessings of that freedom, which comes from the use of the press.—To drag in libels amongst *breaches of the peace* is an ingenious device of lawyers. “They tend to a breach of the peace, and are, therefore, criminal,” whether they contain truth or falsehood. But, how could Mr. Peltier's libel upon Buonaparté possibly produce a breach of the peace in England? Yet was Mr. Peltier convicted by a jury in the court of King's-Bench.—Well, but how will this square with the notions of the Courier, in the case above supposed? The writer, whom we have supposed to exist at a moment when an absolute despotism is about to be begun, publishes his sentiments respecting the minister who is at the bottom of the scheme. This must necessarily highly provoke such minister, and, according to the maxims now received, must as necessarily tend to a breach of the peace. Consequently, the writer goes to jail, and there end the powers of the press in protecting freedom.—This doctrine of libels is, to be sure, the most whimsical thing that ever was heard of in the whole world. The reason for punishing libels criminally, is, that they tend to a breach of the peace; so, the prosecutor comes and puts you in jail, lest he himself should be provoked to break the peace by beating you, or shooting at you! If your libel be upon the ministers, supposing you to speak the truth; that is to say, if you find just fault with the servants of the public, you are liable, according to this doctrine, to be put in jail, or to have your ears cropped off, for having, by truly stating their faults to those whom you help to pay, provoked them to commit a breach of the peace upon your body! Good lord! is this the sort of liberty of the press, which Juxta, whom every body but me reads, calls the “Palladium of free-men”? Is this the thing, which the Courier relies upon for the maintenance of freedom? Is it this, to “prevent any encroachment” upon which he so earnestly calls upon us?—The plain truth is, that, except in matters of little public importance, we dare not plainly state in print, any truth that is unpalatable. There is ONE SUBJECT, which, at this moment, engages the attention of every man, who is conversant in public affairs, or, in the slightest degree, accustomed to turn his thoughts that way. Amongst all men of all parties there is but *one opinion* upon this subject. The nation has an unanimous wish; and feels the greatest alarm, lest that wish should be set at naught. Almost every public print in the country has, after the Eastern manner, hinted its feelings and supplications, by way

of supposition, or by way of fable; but, there is no one that has dared to say what it thinks, though its thoughts are those of fourteen millions of people; and, what is more, there will not be one of these prints that will dare to ascribe the calamities and disgrace, which will inevitably follow the contempt of this national prayer, to the right cause; but, every one will again have recourse to hints and allusions and fables, or, not being bold enough for that, will hold its peace.—Reader, is not this the real state of the press?—I hold to my opinion, that nothing ought to be deemed libellous, which is not *false* as well as *malicious*. If a man be a coward or a fool, he ought to be known for such. If he be an adulterer or a rogue, why should he not be called an adulterer, or a rogue? Why should not men be known for what they are? If the person described be an obscure individual, why, the exposure of him will reach but a small distance; and, if he be in a public capacity, the exposure ought to reach far and wide. Only make the publisher *prove the truth* of all his censorious words, and, I'll warrant that he takes care what he states. But, while truth as well as falsehood may be punished as a libel, writers will naturally endeavour, by insinuations, to obtain vengeance for the restrictions, under which they labour, and which are a continual thorn in their side.

"I refrained from speaking even good words, though it was pain and grief to me." We all wish to speak our minds. It is the great mark of distinction between slaves and freemen, that the latter dare utter their sentiments, when the former dare not.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—We have, I perceive, got on our side ALI MAHOMET, who, "to show that he knows all," calls the French dogs, encourages the Spaniards to cut their throats, and to make them squeak like pigs under the hands of the butcher. What rare company we are got into at last! Well may it be said, that misery brings a man acquainted with strange bed-fellows. We are fighting for liberty aided by the pious prayers of Ali Mahomet. I have often said, that Sir Baalam, in order to keep off Buonaparte, would, if hard pushed, make a league with the devil; and, really, there seems to be but one more step to take. The *Courier* calls Ali's a "very spirited proclamation!" What a shame, to confer words of approbation upon any thing so bloody and impious!—I am greatly afraid, that this unreflecting rage against Napoleon is deceiving us all this while.—The news from Spain continues to be good. There is a fair prospect of a good long contest, such as the *vermin* cannot survive. I

shall have no hope from a short contest. In that case, the Bourbons would merely triumph over the Buonapartes, which would be of no service whatever to us, or to any part of the world. Joseph Buonaparte and the Grandedes have, it seems, gotten to Madrid without the least interruption, and, I must say, that I look upon that as an unfavourable symptom; for, in the first place, he would not have gone without a considerable army, if the country had been in a state of general insurrection; and, in the next place, it was of vast importance to the patriots to intercept his march. If you look at the map, you will perceive, that, with a mere military escort, he has gone from the frontiers to the centre of Spain. This could not have been, if the accounts we sometime ago received had been true. If there had been, as was stated, 100,000 men in arms in Arragon, is it probable, that the new king, under an escort, would have quietly passed along the skirts of that province? No; and his reception upon the road as well as at Madrid, clearly shows, I think, that, besides the rascally nobility, he has a very powerful party in the kingdom, and which party, *if the contest be between him and the old rotten despotism*, will, in my opinion, daily increase.

Botley, August 5, 1808.

LETTER FROM SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS,
RELATIVE TO THE CAUSE, *CARR* *versus* *HOOD*.

Sir;—The licentiousness of the tongue at the Bar, is so justly appreciated by the sensible part of the public, that it ought not to excite any other emotion than contempt. in him who at any time is the object of it. If in consequence of a signal instance of that licentiousness during a late Trial, I am induced to take up my pen, I am actuated solely by a respect for your numerous intelligent readers, to whom you have favoured me with the honour of an introduction.

You must be too well acquainted with the artifices practised by anonymous writers, to be surprized at learning, that the report of the late Trial between *Carr* and *Hood*, copied from a Newspaper into your last Register, was written by the very person whose pamphlet had been the object of that Trial! Hence you may readily account for the inconsistencies of which the Plaintiff and his Witnesses are by this reporter made guilty!

The words of every idle question of the Attorney General, are in this report gravely ascribed to me as the words of my Answers, and I am thus absurdly made to condemn *all* anonymous publication; * vaunt my own

* The absurdity of this statement is ap-

virtues; praise the parity of my own Books; and say other childish things which I neither said nor thought, and which in justice I beg leave to refer back to their *real* author! Indeed, the learning of the Bar on this occasion, shone RESPLENDENTLY, and we had perpetual references made to high sounding works which never existed, such as *Milton's* answer to Sir Robert Filmer, Aristotle's answer to the *works* of Socrates, and Sir Isaac Newton's *Controversy* with Descartes!

Besides making the preceding general explanation, I have to remark on one point of your own observations. You have obviously confounded two very different works, when you characterize as FALSE and SCANDALOUS a Publication of mine (many years out of print) entitled "*Anecdotes of the Founders of the French Republic*." This book was published in 1797, and consisted of a grave, chronological account of the persons concerned in the then recent events in France. Its alleged faults, were that of praising many persons, who, it since appears, were unworthy of praise, and of omitting to abuse others who were then obnoxious in this country. You, with others, have obviously confounded this work with one of very different character on the same subject, published within these two or three years by other booksellers, written by Stewarton, a French emigrant, and called the *Revolutionary Plutarch*. This work was unquestionably a disgrace to the press and character of the country, and it deserves the epithets with which you have inadvertently branded mine.

I am not disposed to enter the lists with you as a controversialist, but with respect to THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, I am persuaded we shall not ultimately disagree. I am a friend to criticism, and to the unrestrained publication of it, but I do not annex the same degree of authority to the writings of every man who sets up for a Critic. He who avows his criticisms, and who is consequently known to be, in other respects, a man of integrity and learning, obtains with me a very different degree of credit from an anonymous trader in criticism who writes in a Periodical Review, at a given price by the sheet! Still, I do not object to the free publication even of such criticisms, manu-

parent; every bookseller is constantly in the practice of publishing unexceptionable anonymous works; but there is a wide difference between anonymous invective, or abuse directed against an author or his writings which CALLS FOR RESPONSIBILITY, and an anonymous statement of scientific or historical facts, or an anonymous discussion of abstract principles.

factured as they generally are under the direction of some interested Publisher; but I must be allowed not to surrender my judgment of literary productions to critics, who come before me in so questionable a shape. He would truly be "the greatest fool that ever trod the earth," who should submit his opinions to such influence. * Availing themselves of their concealment, it is well known to those who have been behind the scenes during the getting up of an anonymous review, that books are commonly reviewed by authors themselves—by rival authors in the same branch of literature—by the personal enemy of an author—or by the most corrupt and ignorant scribblers. †

Attaching therefore no credit to such writings, is it to be wondered, that I do not waste my time in reading reviews?

And convinced as I am, that the abuse of the critical art, arising out of the concealment of the critics, has discouraged and blighted the genius of the country, baffled the cause of truth and obstructed the progress of science, is it to be wondered that when questioned on this subject, I entered

* These words and the alternative, that I had "slipped in my testimony," were extravagantly applied to me by the Attorney-General, for declaring that I did not read, and did not respect the opinions of an anonymous reviewer, and consequently was not influenced in my negotiations with an author, by the character of his works given in the reviews. I have no doubt that publishers in general entertain an equal contempt of anonymous opinions of books, and I conceive there exists little difference of opinion on the subject, among the intelligent part of the public.—Every man of letters, and every person acquainted with the details of literature, will thank me for thus exposing a craft, the practices of which are as disgraceful and as pernicious as those of advertising money lenders. The craft may furiously assail me in return, but the cause I advocate, IS THE CAUSE OF TRUTH, SCIENCE, AND LITERATURE!

† This is not a personal question, and therefore it is of no consequence to its merits that I was myself concerned for about fourteen months, as a proprietor of the Oxford Review. Nothing however is conceded by the admission, because the Oxford Review was EXPRESSLY and AVOWEDLY in terms set up as an EXPERIMENT, to try whether a review on totally opposite principles to those then in existence would succeed; and it failed, owing to its want of that severity of personal attack which it appears is a principal recommendation of anonymous criticism.

my protest against so mischievous an usurpation, in matters of taste and literature?

In justice to the respectable character and honourable views of SIR JOHN CARR, I feel it incumbent on me to explain, that he did not found his late action on the pretended criticisms in the pamphlet of which he complained, but SOLELY and EXCLUSIVELY on the *caricatures* which had been introduced into it, and which it must be universally allowed are NOVEL and NOT VERY LEGITIMATE AUXILIARIES of GENUINE CRITICISM.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

R. PHILLIPS.

Bridge Street, Aug. 4, 1808.

LIBEL LAWS.

SIR,—In reading your remarks upon the late trial of the action of sir John Carr against Hood and Sharpe, booksellers in the Poultry, for publishing a book under the title of "My Pocket-book," which is charged to be a libel upon the plaintiff sir John Carr, by which his pecuniary interest, as a writer and seller of books to booksellers, is injured, and he is therefore intitled to a compensation from the defendants for the damage he has thereby sustained, you appear to me not to have been apprized of the distinction made in our courts of justice between those civil actions for libels in which the plaintiff seeks for a compensation for the injury or damage he has received from the libel, and the criminal proceedings in the court of King's Bench, or some other court of criminal judicature, carried on in the king's name either by an indictment of a grand jury, or by an information in the court of King's Bench by the attorney-general, or by the master of the crown-office, (who is also called the clerk of the crown in the King's Bench,) after a permission given him by the judges of the court to file, or enter, such information against the supposed libeller. In the proceeding by civil action the defendant is allowed to bring proof of the facts stated against the plaintiff in the libel; and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the jury that those facts are true, the jury ought to give their verdict for the defendant: and it is only in the criminal mode of proceeding that the defendant is not allowed to bring proof of the facts contained in the supposed libel, and that lord Mansfield declared, or is reported to have declared, "that the greater the truth of the libel, the greater is the libel." And the ground of this opinion of his lordship was not "that the mental uneasiness felt by an innocent man upon reading a false charge made against him in a libel was greater than the uneasiness

felt by a guilty man upon reading a true charge made against him in a libel, or, rather, in a printed paper," but "that it was more likely to produce a breach of the peace;" the tendency to which mischievous consequence, is the whole and only foundation of the jurisdiction of the court of King's Bench to take cognizance of any published writing, whether true or false; it being the constant and indispensable conclusion of every indictment and information in the court of King's Bench and in all other criminal courts, that the action charged to be done by the accused party is *against the peace of our sovereign lord the king, his crown and dignity*. And lord Mansfield thought that an innocent man was more likely to revenge, by a duel or some other act of violence, a false charge made against him in a published paper than a man who was conscious that the charge was true, and would therefore become only more known to the public, and consequently more detrimental to his interest and reputation, by any attempts he should make to resent the publication of it. However, I believe you are warranted in asserting that even in indictments and informations for libels it was formerly the practice to alledge that the libels were *false*, as well as scandalous and malicious: and I have been informed that the first attorney-general who ventured to leave out the word *false* in an information for a libel was the late sir Fletcher Norton, about the year 1764. But, whether his successors in that office have followed his example and omitted the word *false* in the informations for libels which they have thought fit to bring, or not, I do not know: but it may, perhaps, be worth while to inquire. I must own that I wish they may not have followed his example, but may have again inserted the word *false* in their informations, and even that it may be declared, either by a solemn decision of the court of King's Bench, or by an act of parliament, to be necessary so to do, to make the information, or indictment valid. For I agree with you in thinking "that *falsehood* formerly was, and still ought to be, *essential as the groundwork of the charge*."—I will further observe that, when the word *false* was inserted in these informations, it was the usual practice of judges to refuse to permit the defendants to bring evidence to prove the truth of the facts alledged in the supposed libels, because they said the published paper might be a libel, or punishable publication, even if the facts contained in it should be true. But this reasoning of the judges does not ap-

pear to me to be just and satisfactory. For, surely, though it should be admitted to be criminal to publish true facts against a man in some cases, yet it would be less criminal than to publish them if they were false; and therefore, in order to ascertain the degree of the publisher's guilt and to enable the court to impose an adequate punishment, by fine and imprisonment, on him for his offence it would be reasonable to permit the defendant to produce his proofs of the truth of the facts stated in the published paper, and, if he cannot fully prove them, to state and prove the grounds that he has for believing that they were true. The settling of these matters upon a clear and just foundation is essential to the preservation of that important branch of public liberty, the liberty of the press. I remain your most obedient servant, J. T.—
31st July, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Appointments of his Catholic Majesty Joseph Napoleon, at Bayonne, 4th July, 1808, continued from page 192.*

Colonels of guards.—Their excellencies duke de Infantado, colonel of the Spanish guards; prince Caste Franco, colonel of the Walloon guards; marquis d'Ariza, great chamberlain; duke de Híjar, grand master of the ceremonies; count Ferdinand Nunez, grand huntsman; count Sant Coloma, chamberlain. (All grandees of Spain.)

The following chamberlains have been appointed to attend his majesty in his journey:—Their excellencies count Orgaz, grandee of Spain; marquis Santa Cruz, grandee of Spain; duke d'Osuna, grandee of Spain; count Castel Florida, and duke de Sola-Mayor, grandee of Spain.

Journal of Government, 8th July, 1808.

Government has received by the vessel which arrived this morning dispatches from Don Rangos, and from the English government, bearing date the 30th of last month, the pleasing intelligence that the said gentleman and Don Freyre experienced the most distinguished reception on the part of the government, and were received with enthusiasm by the nation; further that on the very outset of their negotiation they were offered succour of every description, which will be received within a few days, and that the English government solicits permission to establish a regular intercourse of packets in order to promote a prompt communication with Corunna. The royal government has ordered these happy tidings to be communicated to the public for the satisfaction of the

people, and that they may lift up their eyes to heaven, and offer up thanksgiving to the Omnipotent, who vouchsafes to bestow on them such important blessings.

Proceedings at Bayonne.

On the 7th of July the junta at Bayonne held their 12th meeting. It was the day appointed for the acceptance of the new constitution. In the chamber where they sat were erected a magnificent throne and a richly decorated altar, the service of which was performed by the Archbishop of Burgos. His majesty, being seated on the throne, delivered the following speech:

Gentlemen Deputies—I was desirous of presenting myself in the midst of you previous to your separation from each other. Assembled in consequence of one of the extraordinary events to which all nations in their turn, and at particular conjunctures, are subject, and, in pursuance of the dispositions of the emperor Napoleon, our illustrious brother.—The result of these sentiments will be consolidated in the constitutional act, when will be forthwith read to you. It will preserve Spain from many tedious broils which were easily to be foreseen from the disquietude wherewith the nation has been so long agitated.—The turbulence which still prevails in some of the provinces will cease, as soon as the Spaniards shall have been apprized that their religion, the integrity and independence of their country, and their dearest rights are secured; as soon as they shall discover the germs of their prosperity in the new institutions—a blessing which the neighbouring nations have not obtained, but at the expence of bloodshed and calamities of various kinds.—Were the Spaniards assembled here in one body, all of them, as having the same interests, would be animated with the same sentiments. Then should we not have to bewail the misfortunes of those who, misled by foreign intrigues, must be subdued by the force of arms.—The enemies of the continent, by the disturbances which they have excited in our country, expect to become masters of our colonies. Every honest Spaniard must open his eyes, and all must crowd round the throne.—We carry along with us the act which ascertains the rights and reciprocal duties of the king and his people. If you are disposed to make the same sacrifices with us, then shall Spain be speedily tranquil and happy at home, and just and powerful abroad. To this we solemnly pledge ourselves in the presence of God, who reads the hearts of men, and rules them according to his good pleasure, and who never forsakes those who love their

country, and fear nothing but their own consciences.

The act of constitution was then read over in a loud voice; and the members of the junta, on the question being put, unanimously declared their acceptance of it.—The president delivered a short address in answer to the king's speech, after which the several members took the following oath:—"I swear obedience and fidelity to the king, the constitution, and the laws"—The junta then attended his majesty's levee to pay him their respects upon this occasion. His majesty gave them the most gracious reception, and conversed with them more than an hour.—His majesty set out for Bayonne at six in the morning of the 9th, on his journey to Madrid. His majesty the emperor accompanied him for the first post. On the separation of the two sovereigns, the king took into his carriage M. d'Azanza, minister of the Indies, and the duke del Parque, captain of the life guards. His majesty entered Spain by Irun, and was expected to reach St. Sebastian's at two o'clock on the same day (the 9th) where he was to remain until the following day. His majesty has near a hundred carriages in his suite.—The members of the junta set off in three divisions; the first on the 8th, the second on the 9th, and the third on the 10th; each of which will alternately accompany his majesty on his journey.—The following is the act of guarantee of the new constitution of Naples:

Napoleon, by the grace of God, emperor of the French, &c. Our dearly beloved brother prince Joseph Napoleon, king of Naples and Sicily, having submitted to our approbation the constitutional statute, which is to serve for the groundwork of political legislation for the kingdom of the two Sicilies, we have approved, and do approve of the said statute, and guarantee its execution on the part of the sovereign and the people of these kingdom.—Given at our imperial and royal palace at Bayonne, June 20, 1808. NAPOLEON.

The following proclamation has been published here:

The illustrious emperor of the French and king of Italy, our dearest and most well-beloved brother, has transferred all his right to the crown of Spain, conveyed to him by the conventions entered into with king Charles II. and the princes of his house, between the 5th and 10th of May. Doubtless, Providence has given its sanction to our intentions, as it has opened to us so wide a career; it will also furnish us the necessary strength to establish the happiness

of a noble people, whom it has committed to our care. It alone can read our soul, and we shall then be fortunate when we, in answer to so many hopes, shall be able to give a proof of having accomplished the glorious task which has been imposed upon us. The maintenance of the holy religion of our forefathers, in the happy state in which we find it, and of the integrity and independence of the monarchy, shall be our first duties. Assisted by the good spirit of the clergy, the nobles, and the people, we hope again to restore the time when the whole world was full of the glory of the Spanish name; and we also hope to establish tranquillity in the circle of every family, and to confirm the happiness of the people by a well regulated organization. The establishment of public prosperity, with as little injury as possible to private interests, shall be the spirit of our administration. May our people be made happy! Then shall we glory in their prosperity. What offering can be more pleasing to us? We shall reign, not for ourselves, but for the Spaniards.—I, THE KING.—Bayonne, June 10, 1808.

Proclamation at Vittoria, 12th July, 1808.

Don Joseph Napoleon, by the grace of God, and the constitution of the state, king of Spain and the Indies.

Spaniards!—On entering the territory of a people, the government of whom Providence has confided to me, I feel it my duty to explain the sentiments which I entertain.—In ascending the throne, I rely upon finding among you some generous souls who will second my efforts to restore this people to the possession of their ancient splendour. The constitution, to the observance of which you are about to pledge yourselves by your oaths, secures the exercise of our holy religion, and of civil and political freedom. It establishes a national representation, and restores your ancient cortes in an ameliorated form. It appoints a senate, forming the guarantee of individual liberty, and the support of the throne in critical circumstances, and constituting also an honourable asylum and reward to those who shall have performed signal services to the state.—The courts of justice, the interpreters of the laws, divested of passion and favour, shall, in pronouncing judgment, be impartial, free, and independent.—Merit and virtue shall be the only claims to the holding of public offices.—Unless I am disappointed in my wishes, your agriculture and commerce shall flourish, free from those restraints which have hitherto retarded their prosperity.—Desirous of ruling according to the laws, I will be the

first to give an example of the honour which should be paid to them—I enter among you with the greatest confidence, surrounded with those meritorious individuals, who have concealed from me nothing which they have thought necessary for your interests.—Blind passions, false rumours, the intrigues of the common enemy of the continent, anxious only to separate the Indies from Spain, have plunged some of you into the most dreadful state of anarchy. My heart bleeds at the view of it; but this evil, however considerable it may be, may instantaneously cease.—Spaniards, only unite around your throne. Conduct yourselves so as that internal disturbances shall not deprive me of that time which I wish to employ in labouring for your happiness, nor deprive me of the means of accomplishing that object. I esteem you enough to persuade myself that you will make every exertion to obtain and merit that happiness, which is the dearest object of my wishes.—I, THE KING.
(*To be continued.*)

POPEDOM.—*Papers relative to the Seizure of the Papal Dominions by Buonaparte.*

No. 1. *Palace of the Quirinal, March 2.* The French commander has proceeded to such an excess of violence and outrage within these few last days, that the patience and resignation of his holiness, without being in the least altered, have yet been found to exhibit some signs of just indignation. The above commander, on a sudden seized the general post-office, with a picquet of soldiers, and displaced the superintendant, to examine all correspondence, in defiance of the public law. He incorporated by violence the troops of the Pope into the French army; he banished from Rome colonel Bracci, for being faithful to his prince; and lastly he put guards upon all the printing offices, that he might deprive the head of the church of the liberty of using the press.—Each of these attempts would be sufficient to shew what was meant by the note of February 23, which announced that the French army would direct its march to Rome, under the pretext of freeing that city from those whom it chooses to call Neapolitan brigands. Each of these attempts shews what excesses of outrage and irreverence have marked the insults offered to the dignity of the visible head of the church. But the French army has not confined itself within these bounds. In order to crown its atrocities, the French soldiers have dared to lay hands on our cardinals, have dragged them from the arms of the holy father, and conducted them to Rome as state criminals.—Violence and abuse of power

could not certainly be carried farther. His holiness, who has lately seen himself deprived of the attributes of sovereignty, who has seen his power and his dignity insulted under a thousand forms by an army which he was still willing to consider as friendly, could not however have believed that it would have proceeded to this extremity, which has, above every thing else, struck the deepest to his heart.—The holy father, who, like a lamb, has suffered in silence and with resignation this excess of insult, was roused only by this latter instance. He commanded the undersigned to write once more, and to transmit to your illustrious highness, in the strongest and most energetic language, his complaints; to lay before you all the horror of these hostile proceedings; and to represent to you how much he felt himself degraded in the face of Europe, by the violent and unheard of measures which the French army has completed in attacking the dignity of the cardinals, which is an emanation from his own. The holy father placing all his confidence in God alone, will wait in conformity with the principles of his sacred duty, to see how far the French army is inclined to abuse his meekness and his patience, and if at length it will put an end to the unmerited insults and outrages which it has committed against the sovereign of Rome, and the head of the catholic church.—Such is the positive order which the pro-secretary of state has received from his holiness, and which he feels it his sacred duty to fulfil without the least deviation.—He renews to your illustrious highness the assurance of his sincere consideration.
G. CARD. DORIA PAMFILI.—*To Signor Lesfevre, French Chargé d'Affaires.*

No. II, dated March 13, 1808, is a sharp and spirited remonstrance against the imprisonment and threatened removal of some officers of his holiness's army, who protested against its incorporation with that of France, and declared that they would not continue to serve under such an arrangement.

No. III, dated March 23, 1808, is a copy of a letter written by order of his holiness, to all the cardinals who were ordered to retire from Rome. He commands them by their allegiance not to remove from the capital, except they were compelled thereto, and not to continue their journey longer than such compulsion existed. Among these cardinals we find the name of his holiness's minister cardinal Pamfili, who was succeeded by cardinal Gabrielli.

No. IV.—*March 27, 1808.* Cardinal Gabrielli, pro-secretary of state to his holiness, has received positive orders from the holy father in person to inform your illustrious high-

ness, that the violence committed against the persons of the cardinals, natives of the Kingdom of Naples, never would have been believed, if it had not been repeated against the persons of the cardinals born in the kingdom of Italy, and the countries united to France.—The holy father cannot at present be ignorant, that it is not only intended to deprive him of his temporal authority, but that there is also a design to destroy the spiritual government of the church of Rome, represented by the sacred college, which is the senate of the sovereign pontiff.—He has seen with horror and surprise those principles and maxims which break the most sacred bands by which the cardinals are united to the Pope by all the force of a solemn oath, preceded and followed as they have been, by all the indignities to which the head of the church has only been exposed. Examples of such enormities are only to be found in the time of the republic, when Rome saw the most sacred principles trodden under foot.—If a secular prince, professing the catholic religion, and believing that he has a right to detain in his territories, as his subjects, cardinals of the church of Rome, finds himself still under the necessity of treating them with that respect due to the eminent character by which they are connected with the holy pontiff, it follows that he has no right to banish them, or to remove them by open force, thus a tearing from the chief of the universal church so many of his fellow-labourers.—This attempt, which will be a theme of reproach in the present and future age, has particularly wounded the feeling mind of his holiness, as well on account of the unheard-of insult which has been offered to the cardinal dignity, as the outrage to his holy person by which it was accompanied; his vicar and prime minister having no more been respected than the bishops who were torn from their respective dioceses.—The holy father, aware of all the evils which these cruel and violent measures must necessarily cause to the spiritual government of the church, has commanded the undersigned to protest strongly against them, and to require at the same time that the cardinals forcibly carried off against every principle of the rights of nations, be liberated. As to the rest, always resigned to the judgments of God, and confirmed by the innate testimony of a pure conscience, he will patiently support in the cause of justice the hard treatment which he has not merited, and faithful to his sacred duty, after having exhausted all his efforts to allay the tempest which shakes the holy seat, he will leave to heaven the care of protecting and defending it, and to posterity

the right of pronouncing on the justice of his cause.—Such are the sentiments which his holiness has peremptorily commanded the undersigned to express to your illustrious highness, and in performing this duty, he renews, &c. P. CARDINAL GABRIELLI. *To M. Lefebvre, French Chargé d'Affaires.*

No. V. is a note written by cardinal Gabrielli to the Pope's treasurer, containing his holiness's order to pay cardinals Saluzzo and Pignatelli, transported to the north of Italy, and whose property at Naples was confiscated, the sum of 1000 crowns each; provided the treasurer could produce so much, of which his holiness is much in doubt.

No. VI.—April 7, 1808.—This morning at six o'clock, a French detachment appeared at the gate of his holiness's palace, and the porter on duty having intimated to the officer who commanded it, that he could not permit armed persons to enter, but that if he was desirous of coming in by himself, he would not prevent him, the latter appeared satisfied. He ordered the troops to halt, and to fall back some paces. The porter then opened the wicket, and allowed the officer to enter. But he was hardly on the threshold, when he made a signal to the soldiers, who immediately rushed forward, and presented their bayonets to the porter's breast. After having gained admission by such deceit and violence, the soldiers pushed forward to the guard room of the militia of Campidoglio, in the interior of the palace, immediately broke open the doors, and seized the muskets, with which this militia were accustomed to mount guard in one of the antichambers of his holiness.—With equal violence the French troops rushed to the quarters of his holiness's noble guard, and seized the carbines which they made use of when they mounted guard in the apartment next to that of his holiness. A French officer then addressed the captain of the Swiss guards, and told him, as well as the few soldiers there assembled, that from that day, the Swiss guards were to receive their orders from the French general to which they would not consent. The same order was communicated to the commander of the stationary guard, on duty at the barriers, who also refused to acknowledge it, and was in consequence immediately sent to the castle.—In the meantime different French detachments scoured the town, and arrested and carried to the castle all the noble guards, even including their commander.—The holy father, apprised of these horrid outrages overwhelmed by the grief which they have produced, has expressly ordered the under-

signed to protest strongly against them, and to declare publicly to your illustrious lordship, that such an act adds to the measure of the insults which are pouring on his sacred person, and that he is every day more and more deprived of his rights as a sovereign.—It was not sufficient for the French army to signalize its entrance into Rome by planting cannon against the palace of his holiness, and offering such unworthy violation to his residence, but it has added to this violence, by forcing the Swiss guard, and entering with arms into the peaceable abode of the sovereign pontiff, rudely bursting open the doors, and seizing the arms rather intended for the honour than the defence of his sacred person, arresting his guards, and, in short, depriving him, by these violent measures, not only of his guards, but even his honour.—His holiness requires, in the first place, that all individuals of his guard who have been imprisoned without any reason, and contrary to every principle of right, be liberated; and he afterwards declares solemnly, that to all these outrages he only opposes and will oppose patience, and, during the time such treatment may continue, that meekness of which his heavenly Master has left him an example. His long imprisonment, and the injustice which he has experienced, have made him a spectacle to the world, to angels, and to men.—He awaits with resignation, but with an unshaken firmness in his principles, all that violence can attempt against the head of the catholic church; well assured, that any humiliation he may receive will turn to the glory of religion itself.—Such, precisely, are the sentiments which his holiness commands me to express to your illustrious lordship. He renews to your highness the assurances, &c.—P. CARDINAL GABRIELLI.

To M. Leclerc, French Chargé d'Affaires.

No. VII.—April 11, 1808.—When his holiness perceived, with no less surprise than grief, that his troops were forcibly incorporated with the French army, and that punishment was inflicted on such of them as remained faithful to their lawful sovereign, he thought it proper that his guards and the few militia of Campidoglio and of the barriera, who were not yet incorporated and placed under the command of the French general, should wear a new cockade.—The object which his holiness had in thus changing the cockade, was to signify publicly how much he disapproved the violent incorporation which took place, and to manifest his firm determination to remain neutral, and to be in no ways responsible for the actions of the incorporated soldiers,

whom he no longer considers as belonging to him. This reason was, by order of the holy father, officially notified to your illustrious lordship; and to all the diplomatic body, by whom, according to the established usages, a pattern of the new cockade, was sent.—After a preliminary declaration of this frank nature, his holiness never could have conceived that the purity of his intentions would be calumniated by the circulation of a report that the new cockade was the signal of an union against the French army, as inserted in the order of the day, which was yesterday published and posted in every quarter of Rome, as well as in the provinces.—The holy father is willing to believe that this order was the consequence of the false representations made to his majesty the emperor and king.—In fact, if the real object which his holiness had in changing the cockade had been communicated to his majesty, had he also been acquainted that the French military commander had ordered it to be worn by all the incorporated troops, he surely would not have designated it as a signal of union against the French troops, since it was worn by those very troops who composed part of the French army.—Although the holy father is well persuaded that the people of Rome and the whole world will render justice to his pure and loyal conduct, and that he is also equally certain that no one will adopt the suspicions, by which the minister of a God of peace, possessing no malice, is pointed out as conceiving projects of revolution and blood; nevertheless the horrible colours in which an act of his majesty, the most innocent possible, is endeavoured to be represented, have afflicted him with such poignant grief, that he has ordered the prosecretary of state, Cardinal Gabrielli, to complain to your illustrious lordship, and to request you, in the name of all that is true, to acquaint his majesty with the real point of view in which this change of the cockade should be considered.—The holy father, always consistent, declares solemnly, that the orders of the day, published and posted up, are highly injurious to his character, his dignity, and his rights as a sovereign; that conformable with the right which every prince has, of making their troops wear whatever distinguishing marks they think proper, he ordered the new cockade, for the purpose of shewing the world that he no longer recognised as his the troops who were incorporated with and placed under the command of the French; and that without having committed any crime, and only for having discharged their duty in

obeying their sovereign, the persons who composed his noble guards, and some other officers, have been imprisoned.—To relieve the innocent, the holy father requires and claims their liberation, which he has hitherto demanded to no purpose, and which at present he claims again.—The undersigned having faithfully performed the orders of his holiness, has the opportunity of renewing to your illustrious lordship the assurance, &c.—**CARDINAL GABRIELLI.**—*To M. Lefebvre, French Chargé d'Affaires.*

No. VIII.—*Copy of a Note from his Excellency M. de Champagne, to his Excellency Cardinal Caprara.*

The undersigned minister for foreign affairs of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, has laid before his majesty the note of Cardinal Caprara, to which he is commanded to return the following answer :—The emperor cannot recognize the principle, that the prelates are not the subjects of the sovereign, under whose authority they are born.—As to the second question, the proposal of his majesty is, and from which he will never depart, that all Italy, Rome, Naples, and Milan, shall enter into an offensive and defensive treaty, for the purpose of removing from the peninsula commotions and hostilities.—If the holy father accede to this proposal, every thing is settled. If he refuse it, he announces by such a determination that he wishes for no arrangement, no peace with the emperor, and that he is at war with him. The first consequence of war is conquest, and the result of conquest is change of government : for if the emperor is under the necessity of going to war with Rome, is he not also under the necessity of conquering it, of changing the government, of establishing another which shall make common cause against the common enemy with the kingdom of Naples? What other guarantee could he have for the tranquillity and security of Italy, if these two kingdoms were separated by a state, in which their enemies would be certain of meeting a cordial reception.—These alterations, become necessary if the holy father persists in his refusal, will take away from him none of his spiritual rights. He will continue bishop of Rome, as his predecessors were during the eight first ages, and under Charlemagne. It will, however, be a subject of grief to his majesty, to see the work of genius, of political wisdom, and of understanding, destroyed by imprudence, obstinacy, and blindness.—At the very moment that the undersigned received or-

ders to return this answer to Cardinal Caprara, he received the note of the 30th of March, which his eminence did him the honour of writing to him. This note has two objects in view ; the first to announce the cessation of the powers of the legate of the holy chair, to notify it against the ordinary forms and usages at the eve of holy week, at a time when the court of Rome, if it were still animated by a true evangelical spirit, would feel it its duty to multiply spiritual succours, and to preach, by its example, union amongst the faithful. But be it as it may, the holy father having withdrawn his powers from his eminence, the emperor no longer acknowledges him as legate. The French church resumes the full integrity of its doctrine. Its knowledge, its piety will continue to preserve in France the Catholic religion, which the emperor will always consider it his glory to defend, and cause to be respected.—The second object of the note of his excellency Cardinal Caprara, is to demand his passports as ambassador. The undersigned has the honour to enclose them. His majesty sees with regret this formal demand of passports, which the practice of modern times regards as a real declaration of war. Rome is then at war with France, and in this state of affairs, his majesty is obliged to issue the orders which the tranquillity of Italy rendered necessary.—The resolution to produce this rupture has been chosen by the court of Rome at a time when it believes that its arms are powerful enough to shew that it may have recourse to other extremities, but their effects will be checked by the illumination of the see. Temporal and spiritual authority are no longer confounded. The royal dignity consecrated by God himself is above any attack.—The undersigned wishes that the observations which he is ordered to transmit to Cardinal Caprara may induce his holiness to accede to the proposal of his majesty. He has the honour to renew to his excellency the assurances of his highest consideration.—**CHAMPAGNY.**—*Paris, April 3, 1808.*

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation of the Magistrate representing the People of Oporto, termed the Judge of the People.*

People of Porto, noble subjects of an inimitable prince, and brave restorers of his legitimate rights :—On the 4th inst. (July), you elected me (by the votes of the representatives of the corporations) representative magistrate of the people of this noble and august city. After accusing you of a misplaced

election, and imploring heaven to assist me in the faithful discharge of my duty, I crave your attention to what I am going to say.—You, on the 18th of June, performed a deed, which, when inserted in the history of our country, will, perhaps, stimulate jealousy among the ashes of those heroes who have bled for it; you have performed a miracle, permit me the expression, for to die is but natural, and the act of bringing to resurrection is an attribute of supreme divinity; and the name of our august and amiable prince having been destroyed by the treachery of a tyrant, who substituted his ~~own name~~, ordering before our eyes the commission of the most sacrilegious and most horrid of all atrocious crimes, I mean the demolition of the sacred painting, which brings to our memory the five fountains which issued on the heights of Mount Calvary, to cleanse and wash the sins of the world; I mean the five wounds of our Redeemer, offered on the plains of Ourique to our first king, emblems of honour to be blazoned on the standards; you brought every thing to resurrection on the said day of the 18th, as on this very day the name of our sovereign appears mounted high over the name of Napoleon, picturing to our imagination a true representation of the archangel St. Michael, and on this same day, ever memorable, from all parts rise instantaneously the arms of the royal house of Braganza displaying greater brilliancy than those thousand shields which are suspended from the tower of David! But what do I say? A miracle! My thoughts have misled me, the name of our august never died among us; it always retained its life, though sacredly preserved in our bosoms, where our hearts paid and devoted to him the most humble adorations; and if, by an intrusive and treacherous exaction, we rendered any vassalage to that monster of iniquities, to that man called emperor of the French, it was the effect only of a refined hypocrisy. Have we not brought to resurrection the army of Braganza, which, although they were demolished in the edifices, always existed untouched in the image of Jesus Christ, painted with his most precious blood? Yes; what we have done with the permission of heaven, has been the natural result of the Portuguese bravery and valour solely continued by the orders given to us by our august on the eve of his departure—not entirely conscious of the perfidy of the tyrant, we know the treachery of Buonaparte, marked under the cloaks of friendship; we know him to be the chief of the numerous banditti spread

over Europe; we know finally that he was an individual, without faith, belief, or religion, and this prompted us to see the opportunity approaching, when we might teach that villain what Portuguese valour, inherited from those who subdued great part of the universe, displaying their standards on almost the last barriers of the world; and this made us on the glorious 18th declare our independence, and, proclaim in loud voices, which reached heaven, the august name of our Don John VI. prince regent of Portugal; it was on this account that I saw ye, loved countrymen, like men converted into wild beasts, running towards the plain of St. Ovid, there to wait for the enemy resembling hungry wolves who run towards lambs. Your hunger is not satiated, your rage increases, and you protest you will feed on the blood of that portion of Frenchmen who infest august Lisbon; finally, nobody can repress you! Ah! what heroic traits of valour glow in the hearts of the Portonians, and what admirable examples of fidelity will they not leave to posterity! Continue then, my beloved countrymen; let the consummation of the glory of Porto be perfect. But hear me for a while, do not allow that glory to be tarnished or diminished by any action that your overleaping rage may dictate to you without reflection;—honour, let honour be our guide; let us not do any thing which may displease the supreme council which governs us; reflect that it is composed of men as wise as they are virtuous; and who toil by day and by night to support the brilliancy of our glory: yes, government is the first to lose its life for the country, and who as readily will make every traitor suffer; but order is necessary in every arrangement; let us, therefore, consult government, let us obey their directions. Government represents the prince, and who does not obey it offends the prince: if we act against their orders we destroy our own work; and it will be praising the prince at one time, and offending him at another. See that justice is a part of God, and who offends justice offends God, and then greater evils will befall us than those caused by the tyrant.—I shall not treat you as your judge in the plenitude of authority, but as your friend, and the protector of your welfare; I therefore request you will lay before me all your pretensions, which, if they exceed the limits of my jurisdiction, I shall offer them to the consideration of the supreme government, that it may resolve on your behalf. Let us not be despotic, for we offend heaven, and it endangers the harmony which should

subsist among us; let us make our enemy bite himself with envy, to see that at the same time that we are brave warriors, we love one another with reciprocity. Let no tumults or discordant voices be heard among us, but only the repeated, cordial, and harmonious clamours of, long live the prince our lord, and long live his faithful subjects.—JOAO DE ALMEIDA REBEIRO.

MOORISH PROCLAMATION—*Courage to the Christian; and to shew that we know all.*

Unfortunate christian,—Ala shews his approbation to you in several ways. You were first oppressed by a tyrant, avaricious of money, who robbed my cousin Charles of his treasures, and you of your blood. He fell, and you acted very wrong not to treat him with Zarra Zarra, which is as much as to say, not to cut off his head. Why did you not do so? Because you were asleep. Since that time you have met with another tyrant, ambitious of kingdoms, and he deprived my cousin Charles of his throne, including in the privation all his race, in order to keep the possession to himself, and to come before much lapse of time to deprive me also of my throne. Arouse, christians! Ah, French dog, why did you give opium to the christians, to get possession of the principal persons, and to effect your entry without exciting apprehension? Why did you not enter sword in hand, that your objects may be seen and the christians may treat you with Zarra Zarra? Christians, you have lost time! Desert this tyrant, as you regard yourselves. Let Seville be loyal, brave, and firm in doing justice! Christians! attack these dogs, and defend the kingdom for the son of my cousin; and let that currish nation be abhorred for ever. Courage brave christians! attack them, and let Ala the great assist you. I entreat you to defend your kingdom, for my cousin, and for the Englishmen likewise. Let all nations see this, in order that they may know who the French dog is, and that they may rise against him. Sleep no more, christians! Noble Junta of Seville, do strict and severe justice on every traitor towards the son of my cousin, and may Ala reward you.—ALI MAHOMET.—*Tetuan, June 10, 1808.*

ENGLISH ORDER OF COUNCIL, relating to the Trade with Spain.—*Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, July 14, 1808.*

Sir,—I am directed by the lords of the

committee of council for trade and foreign plantations, to acquaint you, that in consequence of a recommendation from their lordships, the lords commissioners of the admiralty have been pleased to give instructions to the admirals commanding on the Jamaica and Leeward Islands stations, and to sir Sidney Smith commanding at the Brazils, to use every means in their power, as well by stationing cruisers as by the appointment of convoys, for the protection of British and Spanish vessels employed in the trade carried on between the British free ports in the West Indies, and the Spanish colonies in that part of the world, against the attacks of French privateers; and I am to request you will communicate this information to the merchants concerned in the trade above mentioned.—I am, Sir, &c. STEPHEN COT-

AMERICA.—(Circular Letter.) At a meeting of the president and directors of the bank of the United States, on the 13th May: 1808, the following report was approved, viz.—The committee appointed to consider what measures ought in their opinion, to be pursued by the directors of this bank, respecting the stockholders of the United States' funded debt, who reside in Europe, and have empowered this bank to remit the dividends received on their account, respectfully submit the following resolution:—“That the cashier of this bank be, and he hereby is, directed to inform the stockholders of the United States' funded debt, who reside in Europe, and have empowered the bank to remit, for their account and risk, the dividends received thereon, that, during the present embargo, and the general deranged state of commerce, it will not be possible to purchase bills of exchange except at an unusually high price, which must necessarily subject those stockholders to a very heavy loss; that, under circumstances so much to be regretted, it is the desire of the directors of this bank, that the said stockholders would, as soon as possible, give positive directions to the cashier, either to continue his purchase of bills, if any can be obtained, at their current price, and to remit them as usual, to their agents, or to have the amount of their dividends remain to their credit on the books of the United States, unless they should prefer their being received and deposited for their account at this bank.

Attested, “D. LENNOX, President.”
G. SIMPSON, Cashier.

"non feeders, ramb-like figs....."—DRYDEN.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS

(SPANISH REVOLUTION — On Friday, the 5th instant, a grand dinner was given by the merchants and bankers, to the Spanish Deputies, at the City of London Tavern, at which, it appears, that the king's ministers were present. At this dinner, there were, it is said, 100 persons present; and that they had up on the table, *two thousand five hundred pounds weight of turtle*, that being merely one article of their food, another article consisting of *forty or fifty haunches of venison*. How many hundreds of wretches have worked like galley slaves, upon bread and water, to supply this gluttonous repast! It was a feast well calculated to inspire the sentiments, which were uttered in the form of toasts, and, through which toasts, the fact has been published to the world, that we are to be taxed for carrying on a war in Spain, not for the sake of giving liberty and happiness to the people of that wretched country, but for that of restoring the hateful despotism that had so long prevailed, and the last act of which was, to introduce a French army, and to give up the royal authority to Frenchmen — In any other light than as the vehicle of this declaration, the gluttonous meeting would be unworthy of notice; for, of what consequence is it to Buonaparté what we say, or think, about his attempts upon Spain? And, especially, of what consequence is it to any one, what the London gormandizers say, or think about it? Napoleon would laugh at the idea of an attack from the *turtle patriots*, who, like the animal from which they take their name, would be easily caught napping, and, if once overthrown, would quietly lie till he should find it convenient to destroy them. If we could beat Napoleon with toasts and songs and tunes and doggerel and with the hoisting of flags, we should have beaten him long ago. The last time I saw the English flag hoisted in union with that of any other nation, it was intertwined with that of France, and, in the Guildhall of this same city of London, they waved over the heads of the Mayor, the Aldermen, and Mr. Otto! Upon that occasion Buonaparté's health was, I think, the second toast, and, in point of satisfaction, given by it to the company, it hardly seemed to yield to

the cart-loads of sweet-meats, which the tawdry wives and daughters of the citizens were, with both hands at once, cramming down their throats; and, who will lay me a guinea, that, if Napoleon were to give peace and security to us, upon condition that we would leave him to work his will with Spain, a very great majority of those who devoured the 2,500 pounds weight of turtle would not jump at the offer, and express great anxiety and uneasiness for the sending away of those very Spanish deputies, who have now to support the calamity of their carcases? — The fourth toast was, we are told, "*King Ferdinand VII.*," which was, the reporter says, received with loud applause, and even with enthusiasm. To give this toast was, it is very probable, the *principal object* of the meeting. In the king's speech, at the close of the last session of parliament, there was a talk about *loyalty*, but nothing was hinted as to whom it was the object of this country to set over Spain; in the king's answer to the address of the city of London, he is more explicit, declaring that his *sole object* is to restore the *ancient government* of Spain; but, still, there was room for doubt. This meeting seems to have been regarded as the best vehicle of conveying to the public, in the first instance, the fact, that we are to pay and to fight for the Bourbons. The king's ministers were present; one of them was the orator for the Spanish Deputies; and, we may, therefore, safely conclude, that they approved of the toast. Indeed, it is well known, that, upon such occasions, the toasts and all the proceedings are generally laid down in writing, beforehand, and are submitted to the ministers, with out whose consent not a sentiment is publicly uttered. — We may, therefore, I think, look upon it as a settled point, that the object of our government is to restore the House of Bourbon to the throne of Spain, and that, too, without any limitations whatever. This I think a very unjustifiable enterprize. So far from its doing good, supposing it to succeed, I am convinced it will do harm to every nation in Europe, and particularly to *this nation*. We shall, moreover, if it be the object to place Ferdinand upon the throne, be engaged in supporting an *usurpation*; for, is it not

notorious that he *deposed* his father, and that the father has formally protested against the assumption of the royal authority by his son? "The father was *in idem*," say some; but, is that really a sufficient reason for his son's pushing him from the throne? Kings would be in a perilous way, if, upon a pretence of their being ideots, they could, at any moment, be deposed. But, we are told, that the old king *abdicated* his throne in favour of his son Ferdinand. And, has not Ferdinand since abdicated that same throne in favour of the emperor Napoleon? If one was a forced abdication the other was not less so; and, in the latter case, there has been no protest at all, while, in the former case, there was a protest. So that, if any body be rightfully king of Spain, it is the old king and not the young one, unless we allow of the validity of the several acts of abdication; and, then, Joseph Buonaparté is the rightful king of Spain.—The fact now appears to be, that there were two parties in Spain, one for the old king and the Prince of Peace, and one for the young king, then the Prince of Asturias; that the latter did, at last, prevail; that they caused the old king to abdicate his throne; and that, after Ferdinand had been frightened away by Murat, they rose in arms to resist the French and for the purpose of causing Ferdinand to be restored. It is, therefore, this party only who are fighting and writing against the French; and, I am much afraid, that their object is not that of establishing freedom in Spain. If this be the case, Napoleon will be very little affected by the surrender of Duroc and his army. He has not a *people*, but merely a faction to contend with; a faction has, and can have, no fixed principle of action; difficulties will produce disagreements amongst the leaders; and, one sweeping defeat puts an end to the insurrection. The war now appears to be not for freedom from oppression; not for the purpose of keeping out a conqueror, not for the rights of the people; but merely for a choice of despots. It is a war, in which two rival kings are contending for the mastership over an enslaved nation; and, as to the people of Spain, they have, if this be the case, really no more interest in the issue, than the sheep or the swine of Spain. These latter will not, I warrant them, be killed unless they have good flesh upon their bones; and the former will not be robbed, unless they possess something worth the taking away. If a man, or a nation, be enslaved, it is no matter who, or what, is his master. What signifies it to a Spaniard, whether his dinner be taken

from him by order of Joseph Buonaparté, or by order of Ferdinand VII? Why the man that will fight for the sake of a choice between the two must be a downright brute.—We have all along been expressing our hopes, that the *example* of Spain may have a powerful effect in France, that the French people may catch the flame, and finally shake off the yoke, which Napoleon has had the address to put upon their necks. But, if the war in Spain be carried on for Ferdinand, and, even if it should restore him to the throne, what good is that likely to do in France? What *flame* will there be for the people of France to catch? How can they to profit from *that example*? Or, is there any one so very very stupid as to suppose, that the people of France, who, in spite of all Napoleon's acts of despotism, do now possess the lands and houses of former nobility, clergy, and rich men, will, for the mere pleasure of having a change of masters, give up all those extensive and valuable possessions? If, indeed, the Spaniards were to beat Napoleon, and establish a new government, promising the enjoyment of liberty and property, then their *example* would be powerful with the French, and might lead to consequences the most important, in all the nations of Europe.—The turtle-patriots, while they are toasting king Ferdinand VII, very consistently toast Ferdinand IV, king of Sicily; but, upon such an occasion, and in such a company, what had a toast in behalf of *liberty* to do? They toasted success to "our brave associates in liberty and arms." If we are to be the *associates* of the subjects of Ferdinand, in *liberty* as well as in arms, we want no conjurer to tell us what degree of liberty the turtle-patriots would suffer us to enjoy. The turtle-patriots do, in fact, wish for none of us to enjoy any thing worthy of the name of liberty. They would execrate the cause of the Spaniards, if they thought them engaged in the cause of liberty; and, if they wish success to the arms of those who are opposed to Napoleon, in Spain, it is because they dread the effect of an overthrow of that system of government, by which the people were held in slavery the most disgraceful. If the contest is to be between Ferdinand and Joseph, my decided opinion is that the latter will remain king of Spain; and, whatever *my* wishes may be, the turtle-patriots would rather that Joseph should be king, than that the war should terminate with the establishment of a free constitution.—In toasting Ferdinand the turtle-patriots were toasting an *enemy* of their country; a king, if they insist upon his being one, who is at

war against England; for, no treaty has been made with him; no peace has been made with him, or with any person acting under his authority. It has been declared, that we are at peace with the Spanish nation; but, not a word has been said about peace with a *king* of Spain. Ferdinand is in France, and the last act which we hear of, as his, was a declaration that he had made a voluntary surrender of his authority as king of Spain, and as heir to the Spanish throne. But, the turtle-patriots wanted a something to set up against Buonaparte, and it mattered, to them, very little indeed who, or what, it was. It was a dread of Buonaparte, and not a love of freedom, by which they were inspired. They will not, however, get the nation to adopt their sentiments. Hundreds and thousands would willingly venture even their lives in the cause of Spanish freedom; but the turtle-patriots will find nobody fool enough to hazard any thing for the sake of Ferdinand VII, whom there is no man, not a speculator in one way or another, that does not wish to keep where he is, as being the fittest place for him, who gave up the sword of Francis I. —The victory of CASTANOS and DE TILLY over DUPONT is of great importance, be the object of the war what it may; for, it will tend to *lengthen* the contest; and, if there be a long contest, let us hope, that new men will arise, and, by degrees, extinguish the miserable tools of the despot. If the people have to bleed for what they win; if they suffer severely for the purpose of keeping out a foreign despot, let us hope, that they will not again yield their necks to a despot of native growth. —This COUNT DE TILLY is, I believe, a *Frenchman*, a circumstance, which, I suppose, the newspaper editors thought of too little interest to notice. In 1798, or 1799, he was amongst the emigrants in Philadelphia, where he was married, by a methodist preacher, to a daughter of the late Mr. Bingham, and which daughter, after having been divorced from the Count by an act of the legislature of the State, was, I have heard, married to a son of Sir Francis Baring. The Count, from precisely what *consideration* I know not, left Philadelphia, soon after the marriage, and it was said, that he went to Spain. If it be the same man, and I see no reason to suspect the contrary, he is now about forty years of age, a very gay and very clever man, and a man likely to be engaged in dashing enterprizes. If the Count and I were to meet again, we should hardly forbear expressing our admiration of the freaks of Madam Fortune, who chose to

send him to fight the battles of the Spaniards, while she set the family of Baring, at the head of the turtle-patriots, to celebrate his deeds in arms, and to number him amongst "our gallant associates in liberty." This shews, that, as Rousseau observes, "we are all good for something or other." Some for fighting, and some for having wives.

DUKE OF YORK. —I have lately read, in several of the news-papers, a great deal about this "illustrious person," as they all have the grace and good-manners to call him; but, though I have been long enough used to their language, I do not distinctly understand what they mean. It would seem, that there had been a design, on the part of somebody or other in the government, to send the Duke as commander in chief of our armies in Spain and Portugal; and, I supposed, of course, that this measure was to be adopted, because, at present, there was no danger of invasion, and, of course, no immediate need of any exertion of the skill and courage of the royal person in question. But, from an article in the Morning Chronicle, which has just reached me, I am inclined to think, that I have misconceived the meaning of these writers, who, though differing very widely upon almost every other subject, perfectly agree upon this. I have been not a little surprized at this uncommon coincidence in sentiment, and have made some very earnest efforts to get at a correct account of the cause of it. At first, I attributed it to the general dread of leaving this island without a Commander in Chief, at a moment so critical, when an unlucky accident to our fleet, co-operating with an easterly wind, might, in twenty four hours, have brought fifty thousand Frenchmen, with a General Brune (Lord preserve us!) at their head. But, I soon found, that this dread was not so prevalent as I had imagined; and, from the article I am about to quote, it would appear, that the objection to the departure of the royal commander had arisen from different motives. It seems, from this article, that some one has written, and caused to be printed, an address to the cabinet ministers, censuring them for listening to the public voice as to the talked of appointment of the royal soldier as commander in chief in Spain and Portugal. — "We have," says the editor of the Morning Chronicle, in his paper of the 9th instant, "seen a printed address to the cabinet ministers (which, however, we believe is only confidentially handed about), upon the subject of the appointment of his royal

"highness the Duke of York to the command of the army destined for foreign service. The object of it is, to persuade the present ministers of the crown that the judgment generally passed upon the merits of his royal highness is most injurious—that it cannot be justified by a review of his past services, but that it has been hastily formed upon the false representations of newspapers and other periodical writers, who delight in nothing so much as in severity of remark; and, in fine, that ministers, instead of suffering themselves to be guided by public opinion, ought to govern it, by acting in defiance of the popular sentiment. The writer, however, has been rather injudicious in the choice of his arguments, when it is considered to whom they are addressed, for, without affecting at all to disguise the uniform failure of the military enterprises of the Duke of York, he endeavours to shew that all his failures ought to be attributed not to any want of science in his royal highness, but to the administrations under which he acted. The siege of Dunkirk, for example, he ascribes to the silliness of Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, in suffering themselves to be deceived by a *ruse de guerre* of the cabinet of Vienna; and the unfortunate capitulation of the Helder, he represents as the inevitable result of General Abercrombie's imprudence, in allowing himself to be influenced by the advice of Johnstone, the smuggler, and the total want of judgment manifested at that time by Lord Melville, who was at the head of the war department. The former part of this insinuation is of too foul and false a nature not to be repelled with scorn by every one who recollects the exalted character of General Abercrombie, and the accusation against Lord Melville we shall leave to those to answer who feel more interested than we do in that noble person's character. But upon the whole, we do not think the present address very well calculated to make proselytes in the present cabinet. One obvious inference which the public would draw from it (were they permitted to see it) is this, that when, in the case of any great military disaster, the officer who commands is not brought before a court martial, the minister who appointed him ought to be impeached."—It is not for me, who live at such a distance from the all-enlightening metropolis, to pretend to meddle much with such "high matter." Whether, therefore, the judgement generally passed

upon the merits of the royal commander, be correct or not, I shall not attempt to decide; but, one thing I may, I think, venture to assert, without the risk of committing an error, and that is, that if, from whatever cause, the ministers have, as this newspaper insinuates, refused to suffer the royal chieftain to go to Spain after application made by him for that purpose, they are, in justice to that royal person, bound to lay that cause before the public, seeing that the royal chieftain still has the command of all the numerous troops kept on foot for the purpose of defending this country against the very same sort of enemy, that he would have to encounter in Spain or Portugal. This wretched talk of the "*uniform failure*" of the royal captain; but, without stopping to inquire into the fact, is it, if such fact be true, a good reason for not sending the royal commander abroad, and also a good reason for keeping him in the chief command at home, where the *emoliments* of the office are so very great? Would not "*failure*" here, be as fatal to us as failure in Spain? It cannot be that this is the real cause; for, if it were possible that any set of ministers would, for such a reason, not suffer a commander to go abroad, and were still willing to suffer him to remain commander in chief at home, it is quite impossible that any man, I will not say any prince of the blood, but any thing having even the outward shape of manhood, should continue in such command. Why, the dogs in the street would bark, the cats would miaow, the very chickens would cock-coe-coe, at the approach of a creature so loathsomely base. Dismiss from your mind, therefore, my honest reader, all the notions, which may have been imbibed through the insinuations of articles like that above-quoted; and believe, like a faithful and loyal subject, that there is some very sufficient and honourable reason for the royal commander's remaining at home. I beg you to remark, too, that these insinuations are thrown out by men, who are but too apt to accuse others of a want of attachment to the person and race of the sovereign. I always said, that, when it came to the pinch, we should be found to stick most steadily to the royal family. Their flatterers now show a disposition to skulk; but, I trust, we shall be firm at their side, as long as there is a feather and a drop of ink to be found.

Boileau, August 10, 1808.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.

Sir;—It is a fact to be lamented, but which we collect from daily experience, that integrity of principles and virtuous demeanour

are not always rewarded with kindness and esteem; but this reflection with a man who soars above the sordid baseness of the world, fortunately stimulates, not damps, the generous ardour of his mind. I find, Mr. Cobbett, that your sentiments upon the subject of Spanish patriotism have met with the disapprobation of a correspondent who subscribes himself "Scoto-Britannus." How long that gentleman may have plumed and cherished himself under the wing of sovereign power, I know not; but though his gratitude may be applauded in his universal zeal for potentates, not even respecting the family of the Bourbons, I cannot hold that virtue as an apology either for ignorance or wilful misrepresentation. Your correspondent's observations, in the introductory part of his letter, on the right of ceding a sovereignty, are built upon the following position, which Scoto-Britannus lays down as an axiom; namely, that "In private property no man can cede his right of inheritance or possession. This right belongs not to him exclusively, but to his family. He is a mere life renter. From his ancestors his inheritance was acquired, and to his own posterity it must be faithfully transmitted." Now, Sir, there must really be a strange vernacular property in the atmosphere of Scotland that could induce a man to make so modest and extraordinary a declaration as the present. That because a man derives an inheritance from his ancestors, it must be therefore faithfully transmitted to his posterity, is so adverse to truth, that daily and hourly experience contradicts the assertion. Do we not every day see a profligate heir dissipating the estate which his ancestor has left him? Are not men daily disposing of inheritances which they enjoy by descent, by public auction, and private contract? So contrary to the fact is the assertion of Scoto-Britannus, that the perpetuating estates in families called for legislative interference so long as four centuries ago, and the thing is rendered impossible by a solemn act of parliament. But what occurs to me, Mr. Cobbett, as the most extraordinary, is, that this strange gratuitous assertion should be made for the purpose of establishing that "a sovereign is the delegate of his subjects, to whom, according to the nature of the government, is entrusted the management of the public affairs, and the furtherance of the laws of the nation." I accord perfectly with Scoto Britannus that "a sovereign is the delegate of his subjects," but I really should have sailed round the compass many times before I should have

enforced such an opinion by a discovery that property was unalienable, from which (if it were true) the only inference I can collect is, that no act of the people can prevent the crown from lineally descending; in which case, as it should seem, the people are divested of all possible right of interfering with the crown. Whether monarchical power takes its origin from a contract with the people, or exists as of Divine right, has been for ages asserted either way, as party interest has predominated; but what judgment a dispassionate unbiassed mind would form, who, without supernatural grace, collects his information from the experience of things as they pass before his eyes in this material world, I think there can be little doubt. Mr. Hume has observed, that theory is in favour of all kingly power originating in popular contract, but that experience is against it. How it happens that the latter is true I should imagine to be this; that by the supineness and inactivity of one side of the contracting parties, the other has been suffered to establish a power which has enabled him to hold the contract at defiance; and though there be an axiom in the English constitution "that no right can exist without a remedy," yet I fear it is an axiom very often incapable of being realized. Now, Mr. Cobbett, I perfectly accord with your sentiments respecting Spain. I hold it, with you, to be the bounden duty of this country to give the Spanish Patriots the most disinterested assistance in her power. Spain is now in arms against the universal enemy of law and liberty, and it becomes every man of independent principles to aid and assist her in resisting the tyrant's grasp: and in so doing, what right there can exist to interfere in the internal regulation of the country, with whom our arms are to be united, quite passes my conception. Scoto-Britannus, who dwells in the marvellous in point of ignorance, is for making the restoration of the Bourbons a *sine quâ non* of our assistance, and as a reason, he asserts "that the practice of interfering in the regulation of internal government intimates a war in the *veriment* or ruin, either of the assisting or of the assisted;" and to exemplify this, he states an historical fact, that the ancient Britons, by calling in the Saxons and Normans to assist them in organizing their legislature, became the slaves of their assistants. How this can shew that we ought to impose on Spain, as the terms of our assistance, that Ferdinand the VIIth, or any other of the Bourbons, should be established as their monarch I profess not to have sagacity enough to peneffrate. If the people of Spain are

the delegates, in whom the power of appointing a monarch or ruler is inherent, nothing can be so clear, as, that, if they wish to be governed by a Bourbon, they will adopt that mode of government; but if they have no such inclination, and we interfere and insist on their being governed by Ferdinand the VIIth, or in any measure dictate a government to them, what are we doing but following the very footsteps of those Saxons and Normans who displease *Scoto-Britannus* for having most unprincipally subjugated the ancient Britons? *Scoto-Britannus*, (who probably nestles himself in some snug birth within the air of royalty) I rather apprehend, thinks it improper to term those slaves who have a monarch set over them, though against their inclination. But if *Scoto-Britannus* will consult the lexicon of that favourite of his country, I mean Dr. Johnson, he will discover, that slavery may be defined to be the incapacity of a sane rational mind to act according to its inclination; and that it would be as much slavery for the Spanish nation to have a Ferdinand the VIIth reign over them, if contrary to their inclination, as it would have been for the Swedes to have had a jack-boot for a prime minister, which their indulgent master, Charles the XIIth, was inclined once to afford them. I consider, Mr. Cobbett, that in affording aid to Spain; we are governed, or ought to be so, by a principle, generous in itself, and which can alone entitle our assistance to the approbation of an impartial world; I mean the principle of detestation of tyrants and despots of every description and of every climate; that, as a country enjoying more genuine liberty and freedom than can probably be found in any other spot on the civilized globe, we are anxious to disseminate that freedom to others, and to stem the strides of ghastly despotism which, in the person of the French emperor, seeks the destruction of each latent spark of liberty. If this be the basis of our conduct towards Spain, I most fervently hope it will prove successful; if it be not, the same fate will most likely accompany it, which generally attends, sooner or later, all base and servile acts; and instead of affording the future historian an agreeable theme for panegyrising the independent spirit of his country, will reluctantly compel him to throw down his pen, or what will be more grating, to blast her character by recording the transaction.—W. F. S.—*Lincoln's Inn*, August 2, 1808.

MR. COKE OF NORFOLK.

SIR,—I have been much charmed and edified by Mr. Thomas Roope's eloquent

and glowing panegyric on "Mr. COKE OF NORFOLK," which appeared in your Register a few weeks since.—I do most sincerely congratulate our "beloved representative," (to whom I am zealously attached), on the inestimable acquisition of such a partizan! He has long been strenuously supported by a great proportion of our "large-acred men," who have powerful and necessary influence over the *free suffrages* of "independent yeomen." He has also been not a little indebted to other friends, who can play with consummate skill every card of the Party Game, from the knave to the deuce. But, what are all these, compared with a Man of Genius, gifted with that magic mastery of words, which, in every free government, ancient or modern, has been known to have such astonishing effects on the minds of the people? I cannot doubt, that these voluntary and generous efforts of such a man as Mr. Thomas Roope, on behalf of such an one as "Mr. Coke of Norfolk," will very materially promote the good cause, and forward the wishes of the most truly "independent yeomen" of our county. I particularly anticipate the happiest effects, from the very judicious publication of that panegyric, in a handsome separate form, (lest your Register, Mr. Cobbett, should not give it sufficient publicity), from the liberal presentation of copies to the Coffee-rooms in Norwich,—and from the distribution of them among proper persons, (I have one) even at that "*scene that is not known elsewhere, the Sheep-shearing at Holkham.*"—Who this "Mr. Thomas Roope" is, I cannot say that I exactly know. He now first appears before the public; and, like other mighty geniuses, bursts forth at once in meridian splendour. He is obviously a very shrewd observer, a very logical reasoner, and a very fine writer. Certainly, Mr. Coke has not such another writer to his back. The *doer* of late addresses, &c. I do not think worth mentioning. But there is Dr. Parr—what is he to "Mr. Thomas Roope?" When a barrel of gunpowder explodes, certainly it makes a dazzling flash, an alarming report, a prodigious deal of smoke, and no little stink. But the first two are over in a moment, and the others last but a very short time. They are nothing to the celestial beams which permanently warm, invigorate, and enlighten. Most certainly, it is not too bold a figure, to say that "Mr. Thomas Roope" writes with a sun-beam!—Such is my decided opinion of him as an author. I can have no doubt, that he is moreover, "a gentleman of enlightened mind and libe-

"re-education," (as he tells us "all Mr. Coke's tenants are.") one of "the most learned men we can boast, and of the best practical, liberal, and enlightened cultivators of land;"—one of "the men most reputed for their agricultural knowledge;"—a "fit associate for such dignified men as Dukes of Bedford, and Mr. Arthur Young;"—most worthy to be "courted by Mr. Coke;"—and one of "the first breeders of stock of every description."—But, Mr. Cobbett, among all his excellencies, agricultural, literary, or philosophical, I am most particularly struck with these two—with that "honest pride" of conscious genius, which prompts him to pit *himself* plump against *you*, in the strife of "opinion"—and with that artful delicacy in insinuating censure, which must, I should think, make you feel ingenuously ashamed of your own blameable precipitancy, in venturing to speak as you have spoken, of the "little talents and ambition" of so great a man—whom, it seems, you "do not know!" I must, however, declare, that I am equally pleased with your candour, in inserting this elegant and spirited rebuke, which you cannot but severely feel. I am only surprized you have not cried *peccavi*, and am expecting it every week—Really, the fervour of Mr. Thomas Roope's sentiments, and the splendour of his diction, are powerfully affecting.—Pungent, stimulating, titillating, they have caused a warm and tingling glow within me—"scalpuntur intima!" And as it is obvious, that his intention was by no means to excite the *visibilty* of his readers, I can account for these feelings no otherwise, than by supposing he must have meant to provoke their *involuntariness*; that by a surer criterion than the "temperality of the pulse," he might form a proper diagnosis of the cases he has taken in hand, and consequent hopes of cure. But it should seem that you are sullenly determined not to be *cured*! Yet a second dose, though weaker than the first, is sometimes known to insure its effect. Let me try to administer it. As I despair of writing like Mr. Thomas Roope, I endeavour to compensate for my deficiency, by *quoting* him as much as possible; and may perhaps here and there, in my own diction, catch some slight whiff of that ethereal spirit, with which his pen is impregnated, and even super-saturated. So that, upon the whole, I hope we shall not have given you these repeated scorings in vain.—I desire it may be understood, that I write, though by no means in concert, yet, in the most perfect harmony and coincidence

with Mr. Roope. There can be no doubt that since Mr. Coke became "*proprietor of the immense tracts of land he now possesses*," the desert of "Norfolk" is become a paradise! These are not indeed the words of Mr. Roope, but in a compendious form convey his obvious meaning. Before that auspicious æra, who *ever* saw any "sheep," but such as disgraced the breeders of that "animal?" Who *ever* "paid particular attention to planting?" By *whom* was the "barley and turnip system introduced?" By *whom* were "layers regularly sown?" Who *ever* made the "finest wheats" grow in the "western district," which (as Mr. Roope elegantly observes) was "*conspicuous for its growth of rye*?" Who *ever* saw men mow "corn on swamps, where before they had walked up to their knees in water to mow off the rushes?" who had "farm-houses and orchards full of corn?" Who *ever* heard "an old groan for the sickle?" (which to say the truth, must be a very alarming noise to the neighbourhood.) Who, before *that time*, saw a farmer's "wife take pride in shewing the management of concerns within doors?" (for which they are so very remarkable *now*!) who *ever* knew "maids receive public gifts for their good conduct?" Who *ever* got the better of that boisterous bully the "German Ocean," till Mr. Coke got acquainted with "a map of vast geological knowledge, Mr. William Smith, mineralogist?" Who *ever* thought of *any one of a class of things*? To most of these questions, if not to all, I am well aware, that some persons pretend to have answers to give, many and diverse and all "as ready as a borrower's cap." But to every one of them, Mr. Roope and I answer promptly and decidedly, *none*—"No abuse, Hal, none; none, Ned, none; no, boys, none!" The *men* of NORFOLK has himself individually accomplished all this good; and I will presently make it as clear "as the sun-beams in a cucumber," which Mr. Roope has *not* done. What! Is he not "Knight of the Shire to represent us *all*?" Did he not tell us *at the famous barley meeting at Norwich*, of the solemn charge he had received on a former similar occasion, from that great statesman Mr. Fox; then in power, not to allow the alarming question to be agitated, but to keep his county quiet? Does not that sublime title *man of Norfolk*, (which he has been "*solicited*," to bear) in its own proper import imply, that he absorbs and concentrates in himself, all the inconsiderable good, which may perchance, have been done by others? Does he not "*reign* in

our hearts?" Do we not all "look up to him, with a fervour of esteem, and degree of veneration, which kings may envy but do not obtain?" I wish to put these questions fairly home to the heart and conscience of every "truly independent yeoman" in the county, particularly and privately. I wish most heartily I could poll them all, by this intimate and searching scrutiny: the result of it would be glorious! I would manifest from it, to all the world, how right Mr. Thomas Roope and I are, in our exclusive admiration (nay idolatry) of Mr. Coke.—I cannot but declare my especial concurrence in Mr. Roope's commendation of those very judicious particulars in Mr. Coke's conduct, which place his wisdom far above that of any other power. I mean his *disinterested* plan of making his tenants "independent yeomen;" by "long leases and favourable terms;" his building them "houses fit for the residence of gentlemen;" and "expending vast sums in the purchase of the most elegant and costly pieces of plate to stimulate industry!" Means and ends most sagaciously adapted to each other! Though such forbearance and such expenditure, taken together, may constitute a goodly revenue, the lofty mind of our *higher than noble* "patriot" feels that all is well bestowed; and, from his proud exaltation he looks down with supreme contempt, on the little-minded patricians or plebeians, who meanly and sordidly think, that such precious possessions as popularity and election-ring interests, can be bought too dear. Mr. Thomas Roope and I cordially approve and admire. I cannot, however, follow my adventurous and enraptured leader quite so far, as to say: "Would to God that every Englishman's bosom glowed with the same ambitious hopes, and I should have no fear for England's safety." On the contrary, I should have very great fear indeed. Not that I at all suspect Mr. Coke of being inclined to do any mischief; but that in that case, among so many contending and inconsistent claims of pre-eminence, there could not be room for the expansion and free play of such generous and multifarious animosity, and the whole county would, (to use a Norfolk simile) exhibit the exact resemblance of one grand battle of turkeys! A sight silly and laughable enough upon a moderate scale, but on so vast an one, it certainly could not but be productive of great alarm and danger.—I warmly join in the praise of Mr. Coke's political consistency. It is no more than barely just, to allow that in the main, prominent, and character-

istic feature of his political life, the great point of paramount importance, to which he has uniformly bent all the powerful energies of his bright and various talents, all the rich stores of his rare knowledge, all the vigorous plasticity and elasticity of his mighty mind—he has been supereminently consistent! No other politician has been so immovably firm. From the very beginning of Mr. Pitt's career, (at least, from the time of his sturdy and disrespectful *uncompliance*—*verbum sat!*) has not Mr. Coke always, without the minutest variation declared and manifested his opposition, not only to the measures, but to the man? Has he not been known to proclaim, to all whom it might concern, that he always would oppose whatever might proceed from that odious minister? Was he ever once caught tripping, like Sir Francis Wronghead, in "saying *aye* when he should have said *no*?" Has he not repeatedly quitted "the solid comforts of domestic life, and the most laudable pursuits which can engage the attention of man," and travelled post by night or by day, through fair weather or foul; no matter—so that he could but get into the house in time for the division? Nay, has he not been known (when notice has been given of another opposition-motion) even to stay several days in that abominable sink of pollution, London, amidst "transitory joys," "glittering baubles," "empty parade," and "useless routs?" And when at an awful moment, his associates in opposition (and among them the generous and noble-natured Fox) professed that every emotion of hostility was extinct within them, when they sighed or wept, and said that death had put enmity under his feet, —he rose sublimely superior to such imbecillity, and with more than Roman firmness, still holds forth an illustrious example of unshaken political consistency, more perfect than Britain ever saw before. Even to this day, has he ever been known to make a speech at any public meeting, political or agricultural, without taking occasion (often with the utmost ingenuity) of either making a direct and gallant attack, or throwing out the bitterest oblique sarcasms, on that justly detested name, that object of his rooted aversion? If such a man do not deserve the glorious title of "patriot," on whom can it be bestowed? Such consistency, characterizing the "whole career of his parliamentary duties," and "all his patriotic proceedings" (nay, constituting the main sum and substance of them, so far as the world has heard,) does not only entitle him to the thanks of the county, (or what by the courtesy of

party is called the country) but to those of the whole country; gives him a claim to the "estimable and lasting treasures of GENERAL ADMIRATION and UNIVERSAL ESTEEM." I cannot help offering sincere thanks to Mr. Thomas Roope, for *so judiciously* introducing this topic.—I come now to another subject truly magnificent; of which the world might have known nothing, had it not been for the warm zeal of Mr. Roope. How do I envy the honour he has enjoyed of dining and conversing, at the "hospitable board," in the "perfectly abode," with "foreigners" of the first rank from various parts of the "world,"—even Sovereign Princes, it seems! How does my bosom swell to catch a share in that proud and triumphant exultation, which must have been felt by wings, when they heard *crowded heads*, speak of themselves with such becoming humility, and in quick prostration acknowledge their inferiority! "*We petty monarchs of little states, could have formed no such ideas*!" This is indeed inexpressibly grand! Transcendently sublime! It absolutely overcomes me! I sink under the overwhelming emotion of supreme delight!—I trust, Mr. Cobett, we shall *after this*, hear no more of "little talents and ambition." But if you suspect that Mr. Thomas Roope and I have fabricated a specious eulogium, only to produce effect at a distance, come among us yourself! Come to our meetings! The admission is only a GUINEA! Take the evidence of your own senses! Behold our magnifications and regurgitations of intoxicating panegyric and puff! Listen to the explosive and expansive bursts of involuntary and uncontrollable applause! of enraptured and enrapturing puff! Join in our animating choral strains, patriotic, petulant, and prurient! in the grand vocal artillery of "three, times three!" Mark, and admire our homage, so humbly paid, so graciously received, that humility and condescension exactly neutralize each other, and all seems *perfect equality*. And when you have seen and heard all this, then say if you dare that Mr. Coke is not "deserving of that public testimony of esteem, the inhabitants of Norfolk have so long bestowed, in electing him their representative." Say that he "has not deserved those marks of distinction which he never received."—Say that the "kingdom contains two persons, one of whom only I believe to exist."—Say it if you dare. I defy you!—Mr. Thomas Roope, by this splendid and successful exertion of his masterly pen, has laid Mr. Coke under such especial obligations to him, that he certainly cannot be overlooked in the noble and profuse distribution of "stimu-

lating" plate. As I have done all I can to second him, I venture to express a modest and diffident hope that some slight token may be bestowed on me. If beggars can be allowed to chuse, I restrict my wishes to—a mustard pot. While at my three-legged table, I contentedly dabble in it, to give a savoury relish to my cheese, I shall hear with delight and admiration, but without envy, of the splendour of Mr. Thomas Roope; who after a sumptuous banquet (a Grand Prosecution-Dinner) at the "hospitable board," in the "princely abode," will gloriously replenish his honorary silver jordan!—"*I could add a great deal more, but less I could not well say.*" And now, Mr. Cobett, let me confidently hope, that the same candour which induced you to insert Mr. Roope's letter, will also secure admission to this, which is so exactly of the same import and tendency. In this pleasing hope I remain.—Your very obedient servant, WILLIAM SMITH,—*Neither M. P. nor Mineralogist*—*Duke's Palace, Norwich, 20th July, 1808.*

P. S. I shall feel very much obliged, if you can prevail on your friend Mr. Thomas Roope, to communicate through the channel of your Register, the senses which his dictionary affixes to the following words;—*gentleman, liberal, learned, enlightened, dignified, judicious, beneficial, perfect, patriotism improvement, admiration, esteem, encouragement.* I could add many more, but these are the most important, and are sufficient at present. The account I find of these in my dictionary (which is Johnson's, and I am afraid is in some degree *obsolete*) has puzzled me extremely; and I am afraid that by trusting to it, for want of better authority, I may have made mistakes of Mr. Roope's meaning in some places.

LETTER FROM THE AUTHOR OF "MY POCKET BOOK."

Sir;—The "licentiousness" of the pen of SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, in your last Register, ought not perhaps to excite any "other emotion than contempt;" but as "the greatest fool that ever trod the earth" (to borrow a description from the Attorney General, confirmed by my Lord Ellenborough,) may, in the very prevailing party of which he is the towering head, find some congenial souls, "*Asinus asino, et sus sui pulcher*," to admire his wisdom, and to believe his assertions, I am compelled to ask you for a corner, in which I may stand to make my defence. You have ably vindicated the right of freemen to speak the truth, and you will of course, be the last

man to deny any one that honourable privilege—honourable! I call it, notwithstanding the meed which legal wisdom has prepared for those who exercise it in our enlightened day!—I was present when SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, in his court dress, stood uninvited on the Bench, and bore witness against his neighbour, *i. e.* brother bookseller, and I appeal to every one present whether they ever saw malignity so overshoot itself; but it had its reward.—No one in the pillory (for speaking the *truth* or any *other crime*) would I think, since the custom of *lending an ear to justice* has fallen into disuse, have changed elevations with him. The severe remarks of the chief justice, and the poignant animadversions of the Attorney General, are well remembered by SIR RICHARD; but the cause, which warranted them, has, it seems, wholly escaped him.—He uttered no "*childish things*," to use his gentle terms! With this *fact*, I beg to couple his assertion, that he never read anonymous criticisms or cared any thing about them, and to add, that before me, at this moment, I have letters written by SIR RICHARD to a proprietor of a work, in which there is an anonymous review of books, and these letters complain piteously of the censure, which is there passed on some of his publications, and request a *friendly* conference with this gentleman on the subject. This being the case in one instance, perhaps we may say, "*ex uno disce*"—Latin again! I beg pardon Mr. Cobbett—but one slice is enough—we need not eat the whole of a goose to know that it is not sweet!—The principal object of my letter yet remains to be stated: "You must be too well acquainted with the artifices practised by anonymous writers, to be surprized at learning, that the report of the late trial between CARR and HOOD, copied from a newspaper into your last Register, *was written by the very person whose pamphlet had been the object of that trial.* Hence you may readily account for the inconsistencies of which the plaintiff and his witnesses are by this reporter made guilty!"—These are the words of SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS in your last Register. Now, on the honour of a gentleman, and as I value my last hopes, I never reported or influenced the report of the Trial in any newspaper or in any shape whatever; and as I have at no time been suspected by an Attorney General (not much given to jesting) to have "*slipped in my testimony*," I trust that I shall, at least on this occasion, have the preference due to my solemn asseveration.—I am, Sir,

&c. &c.—THE AUTHOR OF "MY POCKET BOOK."—August 8, 1808.

P. S. As to "the *respectable* character of SIR JOHN CARR," domestically speaking, I am as ready to believe it to be such, as SIR RICHARD is to tell me so; but I need not inform Mr. Cobbett that "*quand on parle d'ouvrages d'esprit, il ne s'agit point d'honnêtes gens, mais gens de bon sens.*"—A calf may be a very worthy calf—aye, and make a very good knight, but I have reason to believe that he would make a very sorry writer of travels, bookseller, or sheriff.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from p. 213).—*Proclamation, dated Oviedo, July 17.*

SPANIARDS!—The tyrant of France tempestuous with you, to increase the number of his slaves. His ambition, his absurd confidence, increased by the intrigues of a vizier, and by those of a weak and perfidious court, led to the project of the arrest of our august monarch, that he might obtain possession of these dominions; and what tricks and abominations were not employed to deceive our young prince, and to force him into ignominious slavery! When he sought to promote the prosperity of his people, and the happiness of his beloved vassals, he met with opprobrium, sacrilegious treachery, the ruin of his subjects, a criminal compact written in characters of blood by parricides and traitors, a thousand enormities of which Nero was incapable, all which were deliberately concerted with a haughty Vandal, who meditated our destruction. Oh atrocious violation of the rights of society! Generous Charles! Thou who didst dedicate thy best days, those days which thou owedst to the well-being of thy people, in pursuing the wild beasts of thy forests, tell us, if amongst this savage race, thou hast found any so ferocious as the horrid monster to whom thou hast thoughtlessly sacrificed an innocent family, and a faithful nation worthy the best affections of their sovereign?—By such infernal artifice, Napoleon already reckoned among his treasures the massive gold of Spain and of her Indies; as if it were as easy to vanquish a people, as to seduce kings and to corrupt courtiers. But he is deceived, and most effectually is he cheated by those who are conversant in the arts of deception. He has forgotten that we are both freemen and Spaniards, since the 19th of March, a day of as much exaltation to Spain, as it was of terror and alarm to the black eagles which presumed to fix their talons on the

gates of our capital. Happy day which you have converted to the desolation of your enemies! Look, oh Spain! down the horrible precipice that ~~perils~~ has excavated, and remember the ~~exalted~~ happiness, and the immortal renown your enemies have prepared for you—Yes, Spain, with the energies of liberty, has to contend with France debilitated by slavery. If she remain firm and constant, Spain will triumph. A whole people is more powerful than disciplined armies. Those who unite to maintain the independence of their country, must triumph over tyranny. Spain will inevitably conquer in a cause the most just that has ever raised the deadly weapon of war; for she fights not for the concerns of a day, but for the serenity and happiness of ages; not for an insulated privilege, but for all the rights of human nature; not for temporal blessings, but for eternal happiness; not for the benefit of one nation, but for all mankind, and even for France herself. Spaniards, elevate your natural courage by such sentiments! Let every tyrant of the earth perish, rather than that you should submit to despotism and to impiety. To impiety! Merciful God, let not your faithful people be exposed to such disgrace and infamy!—Spaniards!—Let every honest man arise in defence of his country; let your iron and brass be converted into thunderbolts of war: let all Spain become a camp; let her population become an armed host; above all, let our youths fly to the defence of the state, for the son should fall before the father appear in the ranks of battle; and you, tender mothers, affectionate wives, fair maidens, do not tam within your embraces, the sweet objects of your love, until from victory returned, they deserve your affection. They withdraw from your arms not to fight for a tyrant, but for their God for a monarch worthy the veneration of his people; and not only for these, but for yourselves and for your companions. Instead of regretting their departure, like the Spartan women, sing the song of jubilee; and when they return conquerors to your arms, then, and not till then, weave the laurel crown for their reception.—The love of religion, of independence, and of glory, those noble passions, the preservers of great empires, penetrate into our inmost souls. Let us all swear, by the outrages suffered by our country, by the victims sacrificed on the 2d of May, by our own swords, bathed in the patricidal blood of the ferocious Napoleon, that we will inflict the punishment decreed by the God of Vengeance.—And you, rich men, rendered selfish, not patriotic, by indulgence, do not continue in ignoble repose,

but exert your means, that peace may be secured. If debilitated by inactivity, you are incapable of enduring the fatigues of war, let your treasures supply the wants of the indigent, and the necessities of the defence of the country. And you, ye venerable orders of religion, do not ye withhold the sums necessary for the support of the common cause!

(To be continued.)

PORTUGAL.—*Manifesto, or justificatory Exposition of the Conduct of the Court of Portugal, with Respect to France, from the Commencement of the Revolution, to the Time of the Invasion of Portugal, and of the Motives which compelled it to declare War against the Emperor of the French, in Consequence of that Invasion, and the subsequent Declaration of War, made after the Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations. Dated Rio Janeiro, May 1, 1808.*

The Court of Portugal, after having kept a silence suitable to the different circumstances in which it was placed, and to the moment when the seat of government was established, conceives that it owes to its dignity and rank among other powers, a faithful and accurate exposition of its conduct, supported by incontestible facts, in order that its subjects, impartial Europe, and also the most distant posterity, may judge of the purity of its conduct, and the principles it has adopted, as well to avoid the fruitless effusion of the blood of its people, as because it could not persuade itself that solemn treaties, of which it had fulfilled the burdensome conditions, in favour of France, could become a despicable, an infant's toy, in the eyes of a government, whose immoderate and incommensurable ambition has no limits, and which has but too much opened the eyes of the persons most prejudiced in its favour. It is not in invectives, or in vain and useless menaces, that the Court of Portugal will raise its voice from the midst of the new empire, which it is about to create; it is by true and authentic facts, explained with the greatest simplicity and moderation, that it will make known to Europe, and its subjects, all that it has suffered; that it will excite the attention of those who may still desire not to be the victims of so unbounded an ambition, and who may feel how much the future fate of Portugal, and the restitution of its states, invaded without a declaration of war, and in the midst of profound peace, ought to be of consequence to Europe, if Europe ever hopes to see revived the security and independence of the powers which formerly

composed a species of republic, that balanced itself, and maintained an equilibrium in all its different parts.—An appeal to Providence is the consequence of this exposition, and a religious prince feels all the importance of it, since guilt cannot always remain unpunished; and usurpation and violence enfeeble and consume themselves by the continual efforts they are obliged to employ.—The court of Portugal, though it saw with regret the French revolution begin, and deplored the fate of the virtuous king with whom it was connected by the closest ties of blood, yet did not take any part in the war, which the conduct of the madmen who then reigned (by the confession even of the present government) forced all governments to declare against them; even when it sent succours to Spain for the defence of the Pyrenees, it always endeavoured to preserve the most perfect neutrality.—In the year 1793, the French government sent an envoy to the court of Portugal, who was received with the utmost respect, but who was not acknowledged; for then neither the principles of the law of nations, nor of public law, authorised governments to acknowledge extraordinary changes, unless they are known to be legitimate; and no nation is, in that respect, to judge for another, whilst its independence exists. The French government, without any declaration of war, or any formality, began to detain the Portuguese merchant vessels; and, after the peace in 1801, demanded and obtained indemnities for those which the court of Portugal detained, to obtain a legitimate compensation, without paying any regard to the claims and remonstrances of the Portuguese merchants. The court of Spain, which had required succours from Portugal, and which, by the confession of the French generals, was obliged to acknowledge how useful and necessary they had been, when it made peace with France, not only forgot its ally, which it ought to have caused to be declared in a state of peace with France, since the court of Portugal, in succouring its ally to fulfil the conditions of the treaty of alliance which existed between the two sovereigns, had no intention to make war against France; but what is perhaps unheard of, or at least very rare in the annals of history, Spain then made a common cause with France, to force Portugal to receive unjust and humiliating conditions of peace, nor did Spain cease to declare itself the enemy of its ally, till the moment when the treaties of Badajoz and Madrid were signed, employing even the forces of France to wrest from Portugal a small extent of territory of the province of

Alentejo, on the side of Olivenza; thus leaving to posterity an eternal monument of the wretched recompense she bestowed on an ally, who, notwithstanding the ancient rivalry of the two nations, would not fail to fulfil the conditions of a treaty of alliance which existed between them.—The treaties of peace of Badajoz and Madrid, in 1801, are likewise a new proof of bad faith in the enemies of the Court of Portugal; since the treaty of Badajoz having been signed there by Lucien Buonaparté, the French plenipotentiary, and the Prince of Peace, on the one side, and by the Portuguese plenipotentiary on the other, the French government refused to ratify it, and forced Portugal to sign a new treaty at Madrid, with much harder conditions, without being able to assign any other motives than its caprice and ambition. This latter treaty was signed almost at the same time with the treaty of London, between England and France, which moderated some conditions, too oppressive to Portugal, and fixed the limits of the coast of North America, which was confirmed by the peace of Amiens, and this consideration of England for its ancient ally, was, in the eyes of France, a new proof of the servitude and bondage in which the English government held that of Portugal.—No sooner was the treaty of 1801 concluded, than the court of Portugal hastened to fulfil all its burdensome conditions; and to shew, by the religious and punctual observation of all its engagements, how much it desired to confirm the good understanding which was re-established between the two governments, and which ought to cause to be forgotten all the injuries it had suffered, and which certainly had never been provoked on its part. The conduct of the French government was very different; as, from the first moment that peace was re-established, it required all kind of unjust sacrifices, on the part of the Portuguese government, in favour of the most extravagant and unfounded pretensions of French subjects. Europe ought then to have foreseen that its subjugation, from Lisbon to Petersburg, was determined in the cabinet of the Tuilleries, and that it was necessary to combine to level the colossus with the ground, or submit to be his victim.—After a short interval, war broke out anew between England and France; and the Court of Portugal having made the greatest sacrifices to avoid war, and the harsh and humiliating propositions of the French government, thought itself fortunate to be able to conclude, with the greatest sacrifices of money, the treaty of 1804, in which France promised, in the sixth article, as follows:—
“The First Consul of the French Republic

consents to acknowledge the neutrality of Portugal during the present war, and not to oppose any measures that may be taken with respect to the belligerent nations, agreeably to the principles and general laws of neutrality."—The French government from that time received all the advantages of such a treaty, it never had occasion to make the smallest complaint against the Portuguese government, yet was it during the same war, and after such a stipulation, that it required of the court of Portugal, not only the infraction of the neutrality, but the declaration of war, in violation of all the treaties that had existed between the two nations, and in which, in the case of war acknowledged possible, it was determined how the subjects of the two nations should be treated, and all this without Portugal having any cause of complaint against the British government, which had even given it every kind of satisfaction, when the commanders of its ships of war had sailed in that respect which was due to a neutral flag.—The Emperor of the French, in the meantime, closed one of his squadrons, on board of which was his brother, to put to sea. It anchored in the bay of All Saints, where it was received with every kind of respect, and was supplied with all sort of refreshment. Yet, what is worthy of attention is, that at the very time the French government received, on the part of that of Portugal, so many marks of friendship and consideration, the squadron burned some Portuguese vessels, to conceal its route, with a promise of indemnity to the proprietors, which promise was never performed. Europe may hence conclude the price which awaits it, should the French government acquire ascendancy by sea equal to that it has obtained by land, and may properly estimate the foundation of the complaints it so loudly utters against the British government. England never made any remonstrances against the succours granted to the French squadron, for they were within the acknowledged limits of the law of nations. But the minister of foreign relations of France has dared to assert, in the face of Europe, that Portugal gave assistance to the English for the conquest of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, while it is a fact, known by all the world, that that expedition, which sailed from the Cape of Good Hope, received from Portugal neither vessels, money, nor men, nor, in fine, any merchandise considered as contraband in time of war, and that the English squadron, during this war, obtained nothing at Rio de Janeiro, or the other ports of the Brazils, except what is not allowed to any nation, and which had

been supplied plentifully to the French squadron. The court of Portugal defies the court of France to produce any fact in contradiction to this assertion, which is founded in the most exact and impartial truth.—France received from Portugal, from 1804 to 1807, all the colonial commodities and raw materials for her manufactures. The alliance of England and Portugal was useful to France, and in the depression suffered by the arts and industry, in consequence of a perpetual war by land, and a disastrous war by sea, in which she only met with defeats, it was certainly a great advantage to France, that the commerce of Portugal should suffer no interruption, undoubtedly it was equally useful to both countries. By ravaging Portugal, by subjecting her to excessive contributions, in an unheard of manner, without war, or any resistance having been made on her part, France has not obtained that advantage which a commerce, useful to both countries, would have procured to her.—The court of Portugal might then justly, and with every kind of foundation, flatter itself that that of the Bourbons would respect a neutrality which it had acknowledged by a solemn treaty, and from which it derived such decided advantages, when it was withdrawn from its security, in the month of August, 1806, by a formal declaration of the minister of state for foreign relations, M. Talleyrand to Lord Ymworth, by which the former notified to the latter, that if England did not make a maritime peace, the French government would declare war against Portugal, and order that country to be occupied by 50,000 men. It was not with 50,000 men that the invasion of Portugal could be effected, but the Emperor of the French, who knew the security in which Portugal found herself, in consequence of the treaty of neutrality, thought he could catch her by surprise, and this was sufficient to justify his proceedings. The court of England was alarmed by the above declaration, and proposed and offered to that of Portugal all kind of succour, but France, which at that period had arranged every thing to crush the Prussian court, which then alone bid defiance to the superior power of the Emperor of the French, while a twelvemonth before it would not attack, and perhaps compulsion to receive the law, and save Europe, jointly with Russia and Austria, found means to pacify the court of Portugal which he then chose to spare, and could not conceive that a similar perfidy could be the attribute of a power, whose greatness should keep pace with that integrity and those dignified sentiments, which suit so well an exalted rank.—The war

which was afterwards continued with Russia, and which might yet perhaps have saved Europe, if the union of the governments which divide it had been as close as it should have been, still retarded the execution of the views of the Emperor of the French with regard to the court of Portugal; and it was only, by concluding the peace of Tilsit that the court of the Thulleries, in a dictatorial tone, such as might have become Charlemagne, addressing the prince whose sovereign lord he was, caused the strange demands to be made to the court of Portugal, through the medium of the French chargé d'affaires, and by the Spanish ambassadors—1st, To shut up the ports of Portugal against England 2d, To detain all Englishmen who resided in Portugal, and, 3d, To confiscate all English property, or, in case of refusal, to expose itself to an immediate war with France and Spain, because the French chargé d'affaires, and the ambassador of Spain, had orders to depart on the 1st Sept about three weeks after the said proposal was made, in case the court of Portugal should not comply with all the pretensions of the two courts. The good faith of the French government is no less remarkable, with regard to the celerity with which, after having made that declaration, and without waiting for the answer of the court of Portugal, it ordered all Portuguese merchant ships to be detained, which were in the ports of France, and by that measure actually began hostilities, without any previous declaration of war, and thus carried a far greater length all the proceedings which formed its continued topic of reproach against England which, after such a conduct, will be justly valued.—The court of Portugal might then well have adopted the known maxim of the Romans, and been convinced, that disgraceful conditions frequently saved those who refuse them, and brought destruction upon those by whom they were proposed, but on the one side it could not believe that the court of the Thulleries made, in earnest, proposals which committed both its honours and its dignity, and, on the other side, it hoped to ward off the storm, desirous of sparing the blood of its people; and placing implicit confidence in the friendship of his Britannic majesty, its old and faithful ally, it endeavoured to render the pretensions of the French government more moderate, by acceding to the shutting up of the ports, and refusing the two other articles, as contrary to the principles of the public law, and to the treaties which subsisted between the two nations, and his royal highness the Prince Regent of Portugal had no hesitation to declare, that those

articles wounded equally his religion and the principles of morality, from which he never deviates; and which are, perhaps, the true cause of the unshaken fidelity which he has experienced on the part of his subjects.—The court of Portugal then began to adopt measures for securing its retreat to that part of the Portuguese dominions which is not exposed to any invasion, the consequences of which might create alarm. For this purpose, it ordered all such ships of war as were fit to keep the sea, to be fitted out, and also directed all the English to leave its dominions, and sell their property, with an intention to shut their ports against England, in order thus to avoid an effusion of the blood of its subjects, which would probably have proved useless, and to endeavour to comply with the views of the emperor of the French, in case he should not allow himself to be softened down by that justice with which the court of Portugal asserted the rights of its independence, along with those which resulted from the treaty of neutrality concluded in 1804. The court of the Thulleries, unwilling to agree to any conciliatory measures, and having demanded not only the shutting up of the ports, but also the imprisonment of all British subjects, the confiscation of their property, and the declaration of the project to retreat to America, his R H the Prince Regent of Portugal, who knew on the one side, that his Britannic Majesty, his true and old ally, informed of all the transactions which were going on, would consent to the shutting up of the ports, in order to save Portugal from the invasion of the French, and who was convinced, on the other side, that there was no longer any Englishman in Portugal, who was not naturalised in that country, and that all English property had been sold, and even its amount exported, adopted the resolution to shut up the ports against England, and even to comply with the rest of the demands and pretensions of France, declaring, however, at the same time, that, should the French troops enter Portugal, his royal highness was firmly resolved to remove the seat of government to Brazil, which formed the most important and best defended part of his dominions. His R H then ordered the whole of his army to move to the coast and seaports, supposing that as France had essentially obtained all she demanded, she had nothing more to ask, confiding in that good faith, which ought to be considered as the fundamental principle in every government, which has ceased to be revolutionary; and feeling conscious that having done every thing in his power to secure the tranquillity of his people and avoid an useless effusion of

blood, he had fulfilled all the duties of a virtuous prince, adored by his subjects, and who, to the Supreme Being alone, has to account for his actions.—The French government there observed a line of conduct towards his R. H. and his dominions, which would be unprecedented in history, were not the invasion of Switzerland by France, in the time of the executive directory, of a similar description. Gen Junot, without any previous declaration, without the consent of the Prince Regent of Portugal, entered the kingdom with the vanguard of his army, assuring the people of the country through what he imagined, that he was going to succour his R. H. against an invasion of the English, and that he entered Portugal as the general of a friendly and allied power. He received on his journey convincing proofs of the good faith of the Portuguese government, for he witnessed the perfect tranquillity which prevailed with regard to France, and that all the Portuguese troops were on the coast. His R. H. the Prince of Portugal, surprised in such an extraordinary manner, might have rallied round him the body of troops, which were at a small distance from him, caused the English fleet to enter the port of Lisbon, and thus cut to pieces the small and miserable corps with which Gen Junot was advancing, with a degree of temerity which would have been ridiculous, had not Gen Junot, whose conduct at Venice and Lisbon has but made him too well known, relied on the feelings of a virtuous prince, who would never expose his people to the most dreadful calamities by a first success, which only could have served to chastise the audacity of a man, who like many others, abused the power with which he was entrusted, or who acted in pursuance of orders which cannot be justified.—His royal highness the Prince Regent then adopted the only measure which could suit his situation, according to the principle which he had constantly followed, to save the blood of his people, and in order to prevent the criminal plan of the French government from being carried into execution, which had nothing less in view than to seize his royal person and the whole royal family, in order to divide, at its own will and pleasure, the spoils of the crown of Portugal and the Portuguese dominions. Providence seconded the efforts of a just prince, and the unanimous resolution which his royal highness adopted to retire, with his august royal family, to Brazil, disconcerted it on the efforts of the French government, and exposed, in the clearest light, in the face of Europe, the criminal and treacherous views of a government which aims at the universal

domination of all Europe and of the whole world, if the great European powers, roused from the lethargic stupor into which they are sunk, do not make common cause vigorously to oppose an ambition so immoderate and excessive.—Since his R. H.'s safe arrival in his dominions, in Brazil, he has learned with horror, not only the usurpation of Portugal, and the pillage and plunder, practised in that country, but also the shameful proceeding of the Emperor of the French, who, as the true dictator of Europe, dries to represent it as a crime of his R. H.'s that he has removed his seat of government to Brazil, and in his faithful subjects who followed him, to have accompanied a prince, whom all his people revere, still more on account of his virtues, than of the rights of his august royal family, which he has inherited, and by virtue of which he reigns over them. His R. H. has witnessed with horror the harshness with which an attempt has been made, in an official paper, to prescribe the rights of his august royal family to the crown of Portugal, with which he will never part, and has ventured to demand of the emperor of the French, from what code of the law of nations he has drawn similar principles, and to assert such an authority, claiming to this subject the most serious consideration of all European powers, who cannot see with indifference what has here been stated, and the introduction of a new government in Portugal without his consent, as well as the raising of an exorbitant contribution, demanded from a country which opposed no kind of resistance to the entry of the French troops, and which on this very ground, cannot consider itself as being at war with him.—The most remote posterity, as well as impartial Europe, will see with grief similar transactions, the forerunners of ages of barbarism and misery, such as those which followed the downfall of the Roman empire, and which cannot be avoided, unless exertions be made to restore the equilibrium of Europe, by an unanimous effort, and with a total oblivion of all ideas of rivalry, which have hitherto been the true causes of the elevation of this monstrous power which threatens to swallow up all.—After this correct and true statement, made by his R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal, to Europe and to his subjects, of every thing which has taken place between the Portuguese and French government, and as the emperor of the French has not only invaded Portugal, and had that country under the most dreadful and almost incredible contributions, under the cloak of friendship, but has also long ago withdrawn his embassy

from his Royal Highness's court, and even caused Portuguese merchant ships to be seized, which were in his ports, without any previous declaration of war, and contrary to an express article of the treaty of neutrality, from which he derived the greatest advantages; and, lastly declared war against him, according to the report of the minister for foreign affairs; his Royal Highness, after having resigned his cause into the hands of the Almighty, whom he has every right to invoke in so just a cause, thinks it due to his rank, and to the dignity of his crown, to make the following declaration:—His Royal Highness breaks off all communication with France, recalls all the members of his embassy, if any should yet remain, and authorises his subjects to wage war, by sea and land, against the subjects of the emperor of the French.—His R. H. declares null and void all the treaties which the emperor of the French has compelled him to conclude, and in particular those of Badajoz and Madrid, in 1801, and that of neutrality in 1804; because he has violated and never respected them.—His R. H. shall not lay down his arms, unless in concert with his Britannic Majesty, his old and faithful ally, and will never agree to a cession of Portugal, which forms the most ancient part of the inheritance and of the rights of his august royal family.—When the emperor of the French shall have satisfied, in every point, the just claim of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and shall have relinquished the dictatorial and imperious tone in which he lords it over oppressed Europe, and when he shall have restored to the crown of Portugal all he has invaded, in the midst of peace, and without the least provocation, his royal highness will avail himself of the earliest opportunity to renew the connexion which has always subsisted between the two countries, and which ought to exist between nations, which will never be divided but by the principles of an inordinate ambition, which, according to the experience of ages, have also proved destructive to the welfare and tranquillity of all nations by which they were adopted.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation by Sir Charles Cotton, Bart. Admiral of the Blue, &c. Commander in Chief, dated Hibernia, off the Tagus, July 4, 1808.*

Inhabitants of Portugal.—Deputation having reached me from all parts of the kingdom, soliciting succour, aid, and assistance, and stating to me the loyal, brave, and man-

ly determination of the people of Portugal to establish the government of their lawful prince, and emancipate their country from French oppression.—I send, agreeable to your requests, ships, troops, arms, and ammunition, and have directed the standard of his royal highness the Prince Regent of Portugal to be reared, round which every loyal Portuguese is hereby invited immediately to rally, and to take up arms in so just and so glorious a cause.—To be successful, Portuguese, you must be unanimous; and, joined by your brave neighbours and friends the Spaniards, you must not be intimidated by menaces, nor seduced by promises.—Some months' experience must have convinced you of the effect of French friendship; it is now to British faith and assistance, aided by your own energy and efforts, that you will, I trust, be indebted to the restoration of your prince and the independence of your country.—
(Signed) C. COTTON.

ITALY.—In pursuance of the circular address from the government to all the prelates of Tuscany, the archbishop of Florence transmitted to all the clergy within his diocese a pastoral Letter, of which the following is a passage:—As some of those who are subject to our authority, forgetful of the most sacred duties of a Christian, have dared to take the liberty of censuring the government, we admonish you, both in public and private, to hold the sovereign in respect and honour, and by your example and instructions to encourage the faithful to obedience. Remember that the holy Apostle Paul calls kings the servants of God; and the kings, of whom the Apostle speaks, were no other than heathens and adversaries to the cause of Christ. The true Christian is the enemy of no man, much less of the Emperor, for he is aware that his majesty holds his appointment from God, and that he must love and honour him, and offer up his prayers for his preservation.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary Debates.

The Tenth Volume of the above Work, comprising the period from the Opening of the Session on the 21st of January to the 8th of April, is ready for delivery. The Eleventh Volume, which will close the Debates of the Session, is in considerable forwardness. The Appendix will contain the Annual Financial Accounts, together with other valuable Documents connected with the Proceedings in Parliament during the Session.

" Damns with faint praise. . . . " — POPE.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DUKE OF YORK.—Of all the subjects, which, for some time past, have engaged the attention of the public, no one has excited an interest so general and, to all appearance, so deep, as the talked-of appointment of the Duke of York to take command of the army destined to act in Spain and Portugal. Not to the inns, the coffee-houses, the marts, the malls, and the settled gossiping shops has the conversation upon this subject been confined. It has entered into all private circles; it has been a standing dish at the dinner and tea table; men stop each other in the streets to talk about the Duke of York's going to Spain; the eager Londoner stops, even in his way to the 'Change, to ask whether it be really true, that the Duke of York is going to Spain; nay, in the very church-porches of the country, among the smock-frocked politicians, whose conversations, as to public matters, seldom went beyond the assessed taxes, you see half a score faces thrust almost to the point of contact, in order to know "forartin if the Duke of York be a gooen to be zent to Spain." I have often wondered how this last-mentioned description of persons came to hear of the Duke of York; that is to say, how they came to know, that there was such a person in the world. Not one out of a thousand of them knows that there is such a man as Mr. Canning or Mr. Perceval. They all are familiarly acquainted with the name of Lord Nelson. This I can account for; but, I really cannot account for the perfect knowledge which they appear to have of "the Duke of York," as they call him. The fact is, however, that, in spite of whatever efforts some persons may have made to keep the deeds of the Duke hidden from the world, to put, as it were, his light under a bushel, he is, at this moment, not a bit less famous than Lord Nelson himself, and his, or the fault shall not be mine, as fair a chance of immortality. Such being the case, the discussion relative to the talked-of appointment ought not to be slovened over. We ought, before we quit it, to come to something like a conclusion, so that we may carry with us a settled opinion, which may

be of great use to be applied hereafter in the way of precedent. In my last sheet, I quoted an article of the Morning Chronicle, and made some remarks thereon. I shall now quote another, which is in the form of a letter to the editor, affecting to defend the Duke of York and to praise him; but, it is but too evidently such praise, and made use of for such a purpose, as are described in the words of my motto. The letter is long and very dull, but I wish to have it upon record, that, if the subject should ever be started again, we may refer to the sort of statement and reasoning made use of at this time.—The reader will perceive, that the letter purports to be a commentary upon a printed address to the Cabinet ministers, in which address those ministers are, it seems, censured for not sending the Duke of York to Spain in defiance of what it acknowledges to be the public opinion, but which it calls "*popular prejudice*."—"I have not seen the printed Address to the Cabinet Ministers mentioned in your paper of this day, and I sincerely hope and trust it has not fallen under the view of his Royal Highness the Duke of York. It must give the gallant mind extreme pain to find, that some despicable parasite has endeavoured to use his name, as a cover for the foulest insinuations against departed greatness; and, though I doubt not his zeal to counter danger in the great cause of rational liberty, yet that zeal cannot but be controuled by a respectful deference to the general wisdom of the nation. I say the wisdom, for although there may be some prejudice in those who attribute to his Royal Highness the failures of those expeditions which he has formerly commanded; yet the wisest and best men know, that the effect of such prejudices cannot be wholly obliterated from their own minds, still less from the minds of soldiers in general, who are to act in subordination to their commander, and whose personal safety is to depend on his judgment. It is therefore wise, so to choose our generals if possible, as that no prejudice, whether in respect to the influence of luck, or of talents, or of any other ingredient in their characters,

“ may check that full tide of confidence, without which no soldier should go into battle. Of this his Royal Highness is no doubt convinced, and therefore he has, it is said, personally declined pursuing an object which, perhaps, was once near his heart. Neither his Majesty himself, nor any of his royal offspring, have ever been deemed deficient in that courage which has always characterised the House of Brunswick, and is most becoming the rank they hold in this free country. But on various occasions it has been thought necessary to restrain their natural inclination, and to reserve the display of their personal bravery to times of still greater national hazard. No one can forget the warmth with which the heir apparent not long since solicited an ostensible command in the army, destined to repel invasion; nor the steadiness with which his demand was resisted. I believe every man in the United Kingdom honoured the prince for entertaining such a wish: many, who did so, certainly approved of its disappointment. The case is exactly the same with the Duke; but his royal highness will, no doubt, submit with dignity to a necessity which he cannot but lament, remembering the old Fabian maxim, *Fama etiam jactura facienda est pro patria*.—If this be so, what words are sufficient to express a just indignation against the wretched scribbler, whoever he be, who with the hope of recommending himself to the favour of the commander in chief, dares at once to insult the judgment, and to endanger the safety of a whole nation. Let him beware of public execration, and wisely continue to shroud his name in the obscurity which at present envelopes it. As to the ministers whom he endeavours to cajole, they ought to be the most seriously offended, both by the contemptuous opinion which he shews of their understandings, and the inevitable danger of losing their places to which he would expose them. In a free country, public opinion must be listened to; and terrible would be the vengeance against a cabinet who should dare so openly to set it at naught.—But, says the parasite, ministers ought to lead, not follow public opinion. True, an energetic minister will know how to enlighten an ignorant people, and if their salvation depend on the instant adoption of any measure, however unpalatable, he will carry it into effect. But it is the very cant of despotism to tell the people they never can be judges of right

wrong. What is meant by the people in this country ninety-nine times out of a hundred, when they approach at all towards unanimity, is right. In the present instance, it is notorious that ministers and people, ins and outs, are fully agreed in opinion; and they are all to be set right by an anonymous writer! But though he prove all that he attempts to prove, what does it amount to?—That his royal highness has the negative merit of not being the cause of certain disasters which have befallen the armies under his command. Observe, that the secretary at war may say the same of the Ferrol expedition; but this would be but a bad plea for sending him to Spain, perhaps to Ferrol itself, to animate the patriots by his presence. Observe, that General Wülfeloché (who, by the bye, canted about the newspapers too), not only might say, but did say the same of the defeat at Buenos Ayres; but it will be hardly recommended, on such a ground, to give him a command in Spain. It is thus this writer degrades his royal highness by advancing, as arguments in his favour, what would equally apply to, at least have been equally urged by, some of the worst officers in the army. But it was necessary for him to do much more. It was necessary to shew not only that his royal highness's military talents possessed the greatest positive excellence; but that they so far outweighed those of any other general in his majesty's service, and carried with them so inevitable a certainty of success, as to counterpoise every prejudice arising from his former ill-fortune, to stand in the place of the enthusiasm of his whole army, and to render it a crime in ministers to trust their own weak and limited judgment in opposition to such consummate wisdom. Now, as his royal highness's good sense would revolt at a flattery so gross, so no man who has a character to lose would dare to insult the public by avowing and putting his name to such an opinion. It is only to be lamented that private and anonymous attempts are made to produce that disagreement between his royal highness and the public at large, which no true friend to the royal family or to the public tranquillity could see without the deepest regret. I look upon it a part of the same artifice to represent his royal highness's appointment as the wish of the Spanish patriots. That it can be the wish of a true friend of Spain, while it is decidedly contrary to the judgment of Great Britain,

is an absurdity to suppose, that if such a wish has been expressed by any of the patriots, or of their deputies (which I do not believe), it has certainly been drawn from them by the falsest misrepresentation. Wishing all *due credit* to be given to his royal highness's *brave* and *patriotic* sentiments on the one hand, and all proper weight to be allowed to the great considerations of policy, which, on the other, preclude the possibility of his appointment, I trust that the question will remain finally at rest, and that the address will be treated with the contempt which it deserves. I am, Sir, &c. "CANDIDUS."—For what purpose this very candid gentleman thought proper to repeat the word *failures* so often, and always in the plural number, to which, I suppose, he would, if our language had admitted of it, have added the masculine gender, in order to make them appear as big as possible; for what purpose he has so repeatedly referred to these failures; for what purpose he has introduced the affairs of *Ferrol* and *Buenos Ayres*; for what purpose he has, in as small a compass as the case would admit of, huddled together the names of *Sir James Pulteney*, *General Whitelocke*, and *the Duke of York*; for what purpose he has had recourse to such extraneous matter I shall not endeavour to discover, nor is it, indeed, of the smallest importance to the discussion, being, as far as I can perceive, not at all connected with the main, and the solely interesting, point; which is, how far it be consistent with sound policy, nay with plain common sense, to refuse, upon the ground stated by this writer, the request, which he assumes the Duke of York made to go to Spain, and yet to keep the very same Duke "in reserve," to use a phrase of his own, to command the army at home, when, if that army should be wanted, the danger to England must be a thousand times as great as can be possibly apprehended from any failure, of whatever magnitude, in Spain. This is a point, in which every man, woman, and child must have an interest; and, it is this point, which I mean to discuss; or rather, I mean shortly to expose the folly, and, I must say it, the shocking baseness, of the writer, by whom the affirmative of the proposition has been attempted to be maintained.—But, before I proceed a step further, let me guard against any misconstruction, or misapprehension, of my meaning. Observe, then, that I do not say, that the Duke of York has offered his services for Spain; on the contrary, I proceed expressly upon the total impossibility of his having made such

an offer, because, as I stated in my last, it would be libellous in the most hateful, nay (excuse my warmth!) in the most belittling degree, to suppose, that he would, for one moment, continue to fill the office and receive the emoluments as Commander-in-Chief at home, if, upon the score of his former failures (which is the reason alledged by this writer) his offer to take the chief command in Spain had been rejected by the ministers, for whatever cause that rejection might have proceeded. Mark me well, then; I do not admit that the Duke of York made the offer in question; and, if he did make it, I scout the idea of its having been rejected upon the score of former failures. Proceeding, then, upon a mere hypothesis, let us ask this very clever gentleman; this very loyal gentleman; this very patriotic gentleman of the *Morning Chronicle*, what are his reasons for thinking it sound policy for rejecting a general for foreign service, on account of his former failures; and, at the same time, keeping that general in the chief command at home? He tells us, that, whatever may be the real fact, with regard to the wisdom or courage of a general, the effect of prejudices against him cannot be obliterated from the minds of the soldiers; whose personal safety must, in so great a degree, depend upon his conduct; that it is, therefore, wise so to choose our generals, that no prejudice, no forebodings with respect to conduct, may check the full tide of confidence, with which soldiers ought to go into battle; that, therefore, it is necessary, to restrain the inclination, which generals, against whom there exists a prejudice, may feel for foreign commands, and "to reserve the display of their personal bravery for times of still greater national hazard."—I will say, for this writer, that he deals not in the mysterious. His meaning is too plain to be mistaken. But, my good loyal gentleman; if you be not in jest; if you do not wish to be understood as speaking ironically; can you tell me *why* a want of confidence (for such you suppose to exist) should be less likely to arise in an army at home than in an army abroad? *Why* a want of confidence should be less likely to arise in times of great national hazard at home, than in a foreign camp or field of battle? Is it, that the troops, who would be employed at home, would be composed of persons more accustomed to meet with difficulties; more accustomed to dispense with a want of confidence in the skill and courage of a chief; more likely to go boldly on, without thinking of their leader; more accustomed to set, comparatively, little value upon property and

life? Is this the time? And, if it be not; if the real case be just the contrary; if confidence in the wisdom and courage of their commander, though always necessary to the success of an army, be beyond all comparison more necessary when the object to be fought for is the independence of a nation; and when the scene of action is the invaded land of that nation; if this be the case, I pray you to shew us why you should not have a mark of eternal infamy fixed upon you, for your endeavours to persuade the nation, that, though a general might not have the confidence of the army in a degree sufficient to make it safe to employ him abroad, he might be safely employed in a command at home, and that, too, at a moment "of great national hazard."—Your notion of a reserve of wisdom and courage is curious enough. Reserves are composed of that, in which, when the danger becomes greatest, men may safely confide. That, upon which we set the *greatest value* we keep as a reserve. But you would reject the offer of a general to serve abroad, on account of that want of confidence, which you suppose must arise from his former failures, and would keep him in *reserve*, that is to say, a want of confidence in reserve, for home service in times of great national hazard.—After all, however, this is merely disputing for the sake of disputation; for, as I have said before, and as I have conjured the reader to believe, it is impossible, that the Duke of York can have been cast off, or rejected, upon the ground of former failures; for, if that had been the case, it would be infernally libellous to suppose (though this loyal gentleman scruples not to suppose) that he would not, in giving way to the high feelings which he inherits from his long line of royal ancestors, have stamped his commission of Commander-in-Chief in the dirt, and, turning with disdain from the idea of filthy lucre, left the mercenary part of mankind to share amongst them, the profits which he derives from the office. What! A prince of the House of Brunswick, a son of King George the Third, while glory calls him to foreign fields, submit to stay at home to issue orders for cutting the hair off the heads of the soldiers destined for the command of other generals; to be a raiser of recruits, a superintendant general of the dress and the drill; to have the command, ay, the chief command, of soldiers so long, and no longer, than they are not wanted to do the duty of soldiers! No: again I say, it cannot be. I will not, therefore, believe, and nothing shall make me believe, though th

writer were to take his path of the fact, that the Duke of York has made an offer to serve in Spain, and that that offer has been rejected upon the score of former failures.—

I come back to my first opinion; which is this, that the Royal Chieftain, anxious, doubtless, as the Morning Chronicle observes, to shew "his zeal in the cause of liberty," might make an offer to the ministers to take upon him the chief command in Spain and Portugal; that the ministers felt it to be their duty to reject the offer, thinking, as they ought to think, that to provide for the perfect safety of England was their first duty, and thinking also, doubtless, that the defence of England could be so safe in no hands as in those of the Royal Commander in Chief, who has, so many many times, visited all the military posts and reviewed all the soldiers, many of whom have been actually engaged, under his own eye, though not in real, yet in sham-fights; that this being the ground of rejection, the Royal Commander would, of course, submit, and keep his post of commander in chief, which, in such case, was his duty, both as a subject and a patriot. In this opinion, I have been greatly strengthened by the circumstance of all his royal brothers, who are generals, remaining at home too. They have had no failures, at any rate, where-with for the Morning Chronicle to taunt them; and, one of them, it is well known, behaved most gallantly in Hanover, at the time when that happy country was invaded by the French, and when, owing principally to his royal foresight, the whole of the family plate was saved from the grasp of the remorseless invader.

"Snatch the Palladium, though the temple burn."

Indeed, with respect to the Duke of Kent, we have proof positive of the truth, which I am urging. The public saw a letter from his Royal Highness, sometime ago, requesting to be sent to Gibraltar, for being governor of which he receives the pay. This request was refused; and, as the Duke kept, and still keeps, the office and its emoluments, in addition to his pension and also to the profits of the colonelship of four battalions of infantry, must we not necessarily conclude, that his offer to go upon actual service was rejected by the advisers of the king upon the ground whereon the Duke of York's request, or offer, if it was really made, was rejected; that is to say, that the ministers thought England the first and the dearest object (and well they may think it so!) and, therefore, though they wished well to the cause of Spain, could not answer it to their consciences to aid that cause

in the sending away of the royal generals, in whom, in case of invasion, the people would, of course, have more confidence than in any other generals, and whose known skill and courage would make up for a want of discipline in the hasty levies, called forth in defence of the country.—Here, then, without seeking any further, is a very good and sufficient reason for the offer of the royal chief having been rejected. Let us, therefore, hear no more of "former failures;" and let us attribute all the insinuations of the Morning Chronicle to that party defeat, which the Whigs experienced, it is thought, chiefly through the generalship of the Duke of York.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—If it be true, that Joseph Buonaparte has quitted Madrid, there is one rascally government at an end, at any rate. There is no longer any consolidated despotism in Spain, and, let us hope, that there never will be a gain.—It being reported, that the vile nobility, who attended Joseph to Madrid, have, upon perceiving that he was likely to fall, deserted him, some of our despotism-defending prints, particularly the Morning Post, says that it thought, all along, that these nobles had been entrapped at Bayonne, had been forced to publish sentiments foreign from their hearts, and that this desertion of Joseph is a proof that the opinion here stated was correct. Now, it occurred to me, that this desertion was a proof of consummate baseness, if any such proof had been wanting; for, if the nobles had been entrapped at Bayonne, if they had actually been forced to go there, and when there to make speeches against the Bourbons and in favour of the Buonapartes; if this had been the case, they would have deserted Joseph the moment they got into Spain; but (if it be true that they have now deserted him), they stopped, we find, 'till they have reason to believe, that he will be worsted. But, the fact is, that there was no force employed to get them to Bayonne, any more than to get the royal family there. The whole tribe went upon a summons, which took the name of an invitation. There was not a French soldier employed to escort them to Bayonne; and, as to the nobles, they were not even summoned, or invited. One or two of the Bishops sent their professions of allegiance to Napoleon, without being asked for any; nay, is it not notorious, that the putting of Joseph upon the throne was preceded by applications to that effect, made by persons in Spain and not at Bayonne?—The truth is, that the wretched defender of despotism, to whose print I have referred, perceives,

or has been told, that it will be impossible for time even to wear away the infamy of the Spanish nobility assembled at Bayonne, and afterwards becoming the servants of Joseph Buonaparte, while the people of Spain are fighting for their freedom against this same Buonaparte. This writer foresees, that men in general will ask why English blood should be shed for the purpose of restoring to splendour so vile and rascally a crew. Therefore it is, that he is anxious to make his readers believe, that the Spanish nobles did all under compulsion. To be sure, it is a most confounding fact, that a whole royal government, King, Prime Minister and Nobles, all go off upon an invitation, and make a surrender of the kingdom to the enemy, while the people, the moment they are gone, take up arms to meet that enemy, and are actually proceeding in a way that would encourage one to hope, that they may not only beat that enemy, but, finally, secure the freedom of their country. This is a confounding fact indeed. It is impossible to deny it; and, therefore, all manner of shifts and tricks are resorted to, for the purpose of keeping it out of sight. Either the royal family and nobles were forced from Spain, or they were not. If the latter, then all the pretexts about compulsion vanish into air; and, if they were forced away, they were forced away in the presence of that very people who have now risen in arms to defend themselves and their country, but which people, and no part of which people, attempted to take up arms for the sake of the royal family and the nobles.—This writer, and several others of the same stamp, hardly excepting the Morning Chronicle, unwilling to utter a word that shall seem to favour the notion of Spaniards being fighting for the purpose of establishing a free government, and yet not knowing very well how to write upon the subject without now and then introducing the object of the glorious efforts which the people of Spain are making; these writers, thus embarrassed, do, I perceive, until they see which way things are likely to go, which way Whitehall and Lloyd's may settle the point, talk about the people of Spain fighting for their independence. They reprobate the idea of a nation's giving up its independence. The people of Spain, they say, are engaged in the glorious cause of independence. Not a syllable do they say about the freedom, or the happiness, of the people of Spain. Not a word about their throwing off the yoke of oppression, which they have so long worn, and which oppression has, in fact, been the only cause of, first, their degrada-

tion; and, secondly, the invasion of their country. Not a word do these writers say upon these heads, but, they ring the changes, over and over again, upon the very equivocal word *independence*.—But, what do they mean by *independence*? Do they mean, that state in which a nation or people is not dependant upon the will of another nation, people, government, or chief? If so, it appears to me, that the people of Spain, unless they are bent upon establishing an entirely new government, are acting very inconsistently, and are, indeed, shedding their blood for a purpose precisely the contrary to that which they wish to accomplish; for, as to their old government, it was always in a state of dependance upon France; and, the government which Napoleon has proposed to them seems very well calculated to provide, in time at least, against any such dependance in future. To be sure, the Bayonne Constitution, like most others in the world, will, I daresay, admit, upon a pinch, of a little alteration; but, in the meanwhile, it is impossible that king Joseph can make the country more dependant upon France than it was before; and, in words, at least, this constitution does restore to the people of Spain something like an enjoyment of freedom, something like security for property and life.—The Morning Post exclaims “What a disgrace, what an infamy, to submit to a “foreign yoke!” and, he most severely reproaches even his friends, the Bayonne Gracdes, for having, even under compulsion, given the sanction of their names to the bringing in of a mean, beggarly, foreign family, and placing them upon the throne. But, surely, my friend of the Morning Post suffers his zeal to get astride upon his reason. Surely he does not take time to reflect; if he did, he would certainly have been cautious how he had condemned, in terms so unqualified, the introduction of *foreigners* and the placing of them upon the throne; for he must have recollected, that in certain cases, such events, though accomplished, too, by the aid of foreign troops, brought in through the instrumentality of domestic nobles, are termed “GLORIOUS REVOLUTIONS.” We are here neither saying nor supposing any thing, one way or the other, about the characters of the parties introduced, or of the cause of introduction; but, we may, I think, venture to say, that the simple fact of a foreigner's being placed upon the throne of a country, and of foreign troops being brought into it, cannot, by *Englishmen*, be very decently urged as a decided proof of a *loss of independence*. Nay, I am of opinion, that it would be full as well if the Morning Post

and his fellow labourers would refrain from uttering such vehement Philippics against the introduction of foreign princes and troops. One of the standing charges against Buonaparte is, that he is *not a Frenchman*; and that he prefers having *Corsicans and Italians about his person*. This may as well remain unsaid, and I beg the writers in question duly to weigh the thing in their minds.

AUSTRIA.—If war take place between Austria and France, and we carry on the war in Spain for the restoration of the old family, then the old game is beginning again. More subsidies, more lies from Whitehall, and a result much about the same as the last.—Our villainous newspapers express a most anxious hope, that Austria is bent upon war; that, stimulated by the “glorious example of Spain,” she is resolved to make one more effort against the tyrant of the earth. The example of Spain! Why, man, do you consider what she must do, in order to begin to follow that example? She has an *Emperor*, an *Empress*, a whole *royal family*, with all the old set of courtiers, male and female; all her paunders and parasites; and every thing, of which Spain has not a fragment left. The example of Spain, indeed! Why, the Spaniards suffered a French army to come to their very capital without an attempt to resist them, and, according to *your* assertion, they suffered the French to force away their king and queen and all their princes and ministers; and, that being done, they began to fight the French, and to endeavour to eject them from their country. Now, do you really wish the Austrians to do the same? I imagine, that what you wish is, that the Austrians may follow the example of the Spaniards merely in resisting the French, leaving all things just as they now are in their government, in which wish I am decidedly of opinion you will be disappointed. I can, for my part, discover, in the people of Austria, no motive for resisting the French, which they had not previous to the battle of Austerlitz. I can discover no reason for supposing that Austria should be more fortunate now than she was then; and, I am fully persuaded, that whatever money may be sent her from this country will do us no more good than was done, by any and all of the immense sums which she has heretofore received from us.—The Austrians are composed of materials very different from those which go to the making up of a Spaniard. The Germans do not easily catch fire. They look well and long at danger before they encounter it. They act upon the wise maxim, that “the better,

part of valour is discretion." It was an observation, in America, that the Hessians always smoked their pipes as they went to the attack, but never in a retreat. They are certainly, the whole of the Germans, not less prudent, at any rate, than they are courageous; and, indeed, the whiskers, which seem to have a natural fitness to their faces, denote, like those of the cat, a characteristic cautiousness.—For these reasons, and some others that I shall not now mention, I do not think that the Austrians, if war should take place, will follow the example of the Spaniards, in making a gallant resistance to the approach of the French; and, in short, my opinion is, that if Austria now suffers herself to be hurried into a war, her royal family will share the fate of the House of Bourbon.

LIBEL-LAWS.—[Intended for insertion last week but accidentally omitted].—Sir Richard Phillips, in consequence of my remarks, relative to his evidence, in the action of Sir John Carr, knight, against Messrs. Hood and Sharpe, has, in the last week's Register, published a letter addressed to me. —I will notice the points touched upon, in this letter, in the order wherein they are placed.—I am not at all surprized to learn, that the author of the prosecuted pamphlet was also the author of the report of the trial; and that being, as Sir Richard now informs me, the real fact, I can readily suppose, that the report was by no means favourable to the plaintiff and his witnesses. This, however, does not essentially alter the case in my estimation; for, it was not so much the sort of evidence that I care about, as *the act of prosecuting*, and I am sorry to discover, even now, no regret, on the part of Sir Richard, for having been, though unintentionally, perhaps, instrumental in causing that prosecution. He who uses the press ought to defend himself solely with the press. There are people enough to bring the law to bear upon us, without our countenancing their conduct by our own example. I own that *caricatures* do not constitute a branch of *sober* criticism, and Sir Richard says, in the close of his letter, that Sir John Carr founded his action *solely and exclusively* on the caricatures. But, caricatures are things to laugh at. They break no bones. I, for instance, have been represented as a bull-dog, as a porcupine, as a wolf, as a sans-culotte, as a nightman, as a bear, as a kite, as a cur, and, in America, as hanging upon a gallows. Yet, here I am, just as sound as if no misrepresentation of me had ever been made. The fact is, that caricatures are nothing more than

figures of rhetoric proceeding from the pencil; and, as the intemperate Gillray is not in the habit of making sentences, I see no reason why he should not ridicule what he deems to be the follies and vices of the times, or of particular persons, with his pencil. It is, to be sure, very provoking to see one's self held up to public ridicule, or censure, especially if we are conscious of not deserving it; but, then, we should bear in mind, that the principle, upon which we appeal to the law for redress, will be sure to be made to apply against ourselves, if we make use of the press. It is the practice of bringing actions and preferring indictments and informations *by individuals* that has kept the several successive Attorneys-General in countenance; for, if we, particularly we who use the press, harass each other with the law, with what face can we complain when we are made subject to public prosecutions? As an *author*, therefore, Sir John Carr should have foreborne to apply to the law, though he had been mortified almost to a state of hanging. For an author, or bookseller, to appeal to the law of libels is an *act of downright treason* towards the whole of his brethren. Those who live by the press must be content to die by the press; and the press includes the works of the pencil as well as those of the pen. —I am very glad, that Sir Richard Phillips is not the publisher of the "*Revolutionary Plutarch*." That was the work I meant certainly; and a work so full of manifest falsehoods could, assuredly, never have obtained circulation, except amongst a people totally blinded by a hatred too great to have arisen from any other cause than that of cowardly fear. The greediness with which all the foul slander, all the barefaced falsehood, all the worse than Mandeville or Munchausen lies, of this book have been swallowed, is truly wonderful. The good old maxim of "giving the devil his due" has been quite thrown aside by the author, who has so impudently set truth, and even probability at defiance, that to affect to believe him is to subject one's self to the charge of being a partaker in that moral depravity, which evidently presided at the execution of every page of his work.—I most heartily agree with Sir Richard Phillips in opinion respecting *reviewers* and *reviews* in general. I have, many times, expressed the same opinion, and for the same reasons; but, he has had much more experience than I have had with "the race that write" in reviews. He must know the "*craft*" well, and I beg to leave to refer the reader (see page 205) to what he has said respecting it. I agree

with him, that every man should put his name to what he causes to be published. The pronoun *we* is, nine times out of ten, a convenient mask for cowardice or rascality, and, not unfrequently, both together. It is true, that *argument* derives neither strength nor weakness from a name, but *opinion* does; and, it is the opinion of the reviewer that the greater part of readers look after. It would be fair for an anonymous author to be subject to anonymous criticism; but, the critic of Sir John Carr's work ought to have put his name to his performance. All this, however, says nothing in favour of *taking the law* of a man for what he has published, whether it has a name or not. For the reasons, which I have before given, I always *strongly suspect* the goodness of the cause of that man, who appeals to the law of libels; and, for reasons also before stated, I must, and ever shall, regard the author, or book-seller, who makes such an appeal, as a *false brother*, as a *traitor* to the cause of freedom in general.—Sir John Carr has, however, by his experiment, done essential service to the cause of truth, though, apparently, contrary to his intention. He has put the principle to the test. By pushing it to the extreme, he has shewn the world what it really is. No man could pretend to believe, that his *feelings* were not *injured* by the caricatures contained in a criticism that actually, as it would seem, killed him dead, as an author; but, no man was bold enough to say, that criticisms on a man's works ought to be punished as a libel. This leads to another question: namely, why should the feelings of a minister, that is to say, of a servant of the public, be considered as more sacred than the feelings of an author? Why should not the *talents* of the former be held up to ridicule, as well as the talents of the latter? The author, Lord Ellenborough says, voluntarily challenges public criticism; and does not a minister do the same? Is not this the case with every man in a public situation? We have, according to the decision in the case of Sir John Carr, knight, a *right to speak our opinions freely of the talents of authors*; why, then, should we not as freely speak our opinions of the talents of a minister, or a commander? And what harm could arise from it, seeing that the press would be open for the controverting of our opinions? I mean, what harm to the public; for, it is evident, that the speaking of our opinions freely of a minister might do him a great deal of harm; but, the press being open on his side, truth would prevail, and the harm done to him would be good done to the public. The

fact is, that the *liberty of the press* has no definite meaning, it is sheer sound without sense, unless it means, the liberty of *freely publishing our opinions of the talents and character of all men in a public capacity*; and, if we are liable to be punished for so doing, can we be said to do it *freely*? The liberty of the press would, in that case, be the liberty of doing that which would subject us to fine, imprisonment, and pillory. In this way we, every one of us, enjoy the liberty of stealing and of committing murder.

JAMAICA.—The reader, will, probably, remember the evils that were anticipated from the establishment of Black Regiments, in the West Indies, and the earnest remonstrances of the people of Jamaica upon the subject. Below will be found a proof, that those remonstrances were worthy of attention. Without time to say, at present, any thing more upon the subject, I must content myself with expressing a hope, that this dangerous experiment will be carried no farther.

Badwin, 17th August, 1808.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary History OF ENGLAND,

Which, in the compass of Sixteen Volumes, royal octavo, double columns, will contain a full and accurate Report of all the recorded Proceedings, and of all the Speeches in both Houses of Parliament, from the earliest times to the year 1803, when the publication of "Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates" commenced.

The Fourth Volume of the above work is ready for delivery. It embraces that period of our Parliamentary History, which is, perhaps, the most interesting of any; namely, from the Restoration of Charles the Second in the year 1660, to the Revolution, in 1688. For this Period, the Proceedings and Debates, in both Houses, have been, for the most part, collected from the following works: 1. The Journals of the House of Lords; 2. The Journals of the House of Commons; 3. That portion of the Parliamentary, or Constitutional History of England, which contains the proceedings of the Convention Parliament, from its meeting on the 25th of April, 1689, to its dissolution, on the 24th of December following, at which epoch the editors of this able performance conclude their labours; 4. The Life of the Earl of Clarendon, written by himself, containing

some interesting Debates, in both Houses, during the period between the Restoration of the King and the banishment of the said Earl, in the year 1667, which Debates never yet found their way into any Collection : 5. The Proceedings of the House of Commons touching the Impeachment of the Earl of Clarendon, with the many Debates in that House upon the subject ; 6. The Works of the celebrated Andrew Marvell, who, from 1669 to 1673, regularly transmitted to his countrymen of Hull, a faithful account of each of his proceedings ; 7. The Debates of the House of Commons, from 1667 to 1694, collected by the Honourable Anticell Grey, who was thirty years a member for the town of Derby ; 8. The Debates in the House of Commons on the Bill of Exclusion, in the year 1680, first published in 1681, in a small duodecimo volume, and afterwards republished in 1710, and again in 1807, with the addition of the Debates in the Short Parliament held at Oxford, in the month of March, 1680-1, the proceedings of which related chiefly to the same subject, that is to say, the Exclusion of the Duke of York from the succession to the crown ; 9. Timberland's History and Proceedings of the House of Lords ; and, 10. Chandler's History and Proceedings of the House of Commons.—It will, doubtless, have been observed by most persons who have much attended to the matter, that, for the period from the Restoration to the year 1743, the two last mentioned works, that is to say, those of Timberland and Chandler, have hitherto been regarded as a regular and complete collection, and the only regular and complete collection, of the Proceedings in Parliament ; and that, as such, they have been introduced into, and enjoyed a distinguished place in, almost every public and great private library in the kingdom. Therefore, in preparing the present volume for the press, it might naturally have been expected, that considerable assistance would have been afforded by these works. It is, however, a remarkable fact, which may be verified by a reference to the proceedings of any single session, that very little assistance indeed has been received from them. To say the truth, a discovery of the extreme imperfectness of these works produced one of the motives which led to the present undertaking. On comparing their contents with those of the authentic works before enumerated, they were found to be so extremely defective and incorrect, that they could, in hardly any case, be relied upon with safety. In them, King's Speeches are, in numerous instances, either wholly omitted, or very much curtailed.

Scarcely any of the Speeches of the great Lord Chancellor, delivered at the opening of the several Sessions, though those speeches generally contain an outline of the state of the national affairs, are preserved. The Journals appear to have been rarely consulted. Scarcely a Motion or Resolution is given as it stands in those authentic records. Explanatory notes there are none ; and, in only one or two instances have the compilers deemed it necessary to favour the reader with information as to the source whence they have drawn their materials ; which would seem, indeed, to have been moulded into the form of volumes for the mere purpose of filling up a chain in a book-case.—Besides resorting to the above recited works, recourse has been had to the best historians, and contemporary writers. From Burnet, Echard, Konnet, Oldmixon, Rapin, North, Ralph, Marvell, Reresby, Trenchard, Walpole, and the Work of the late Mr. Fox, recently published, many Notes, historical and biographical, have been introduced ; and, for the sake of connexion, a short account of the principal Occurrences, during each recess of Parliament, has, where necessary, been inserted.—By way of Appendix to this volume, is subjoined a collection of scarce and valuable Tracts, purely parliamentary, taken from the State Tracts, privately printed in the reign of Charles II. and James II. ; from the Munleian Miscellany ; and from the noble Collections of Lord Somers. Through these, a more lively image of the times is conveyed, than could be received from any general description, from however eloquent a pen it might proceed. From their scarceness, it is impossible that they should, in their separate state, be generally known ; and, as the utility of them, when accompanying the Parliamentary History of the times in which they were written, must be manifest to every one, the compiler does certainly consider them as not the least valuable part of his work.

. The success of this work, up to the time of publishing Vol. III. was before stated. Its success since that time has been still greater. No work of equal magnitude, had ever so great success, in so short a space of time. The fifth volume, barring accidents from illness, will be published in October, and the sixth in December ; after which it is hoped, that a volume every three months will be regularly finished, until the work be concluded, or rather, brought down to the " Parliamentary Debates ;" which will form a sequel to it, and which will, of course, be continued in the same manner that they now are.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary Debates.

The Tenth Volume of the above Work, comprising the period from the Opening of the Session on the 21st of January to the 8th of April, is ready for delivery. The Eleventh Volume, which will close the Debates of the Session, is in considerable forwardness. The Appendix will contain the Annual Financial Accounts, together with other valuable Documents connected with the Proceedings in Parliament during the Session.

BLACK REGIMENTS.—*Kingston, May 30.*

Some degree of agitation was excited in this city early on Friday morning last, from the report of a serious insubordination having arisen in the 2d West India regiment, under the command of major Darley, stationed at Fort Augusta.—It appears that the regiment had paraded at the accustomed hour in the morning on the beach, about 300 yards from the glacis leading to port Henderson: In the fort 54 recruits were left to be drilled by a black serjeant. They were principally of the Chamba and Koromantyn nations, purchased a few months since to serve in his majesty's colonial corps; 46 of them were attached to the second, and eight to the fifth West India Regiments. The men on the beach had not been long under arms, ere a terrible war-hoop was heard, and the recruits were observed to rush out of the fort, and approach near the left of the regiment. Lieutenant and adjutant Ellis instantly rode towards them to learn the reason of the noise and what they desired; he had scarce reached the spot, before he was knocked off the horse with the butt end of some of their firelocks, and received several wounds about his head and body with their bayonets, of which he almost instantly died. Major Darley, anxious to know what occasioned the tumult, repaired directly thither; unhappily for him, he experienced a fate nearly similar, being knocked off his horse, and wounded about the body, &c. Appearances at this moment not being favourable, the officers dispatched a serjeant to the fort for ammunition, while some of them flew to major Darley's assistance; he was taken to his apartments and languished about an hour, when he expired. The ammunition having arrived, the men were directed to load, and fire on the mutineers, which was promptly obeyed, when fourteen of them fell dead, five were wounded, and two taken prisoners; twenty-one who did not appear to be active in the mutiny, instantly surrendered

without the smallest resistance. The remainder being displayed at the check the party had received, ran off to secrete themselves in the mangroves and brushwood, and there is little doubt ere this they are completely subdued or shot.—No other reason was assigned for their improper conduct by those taken, than that they had been too repeatedly drilled, and that they wished to return to their country.—Every regret for the untimely fates of major Darley and adjutant Ellis have been evinced, the service having lost in them two valuable officers. Their remains were interred with military honours, amidst the lamentations of their brother soldiers.—On the first knowledge of an insubordinate spirit having manifested itself in some of the garrison at Fort Augusta, the drums beat to arms in Spanish Town, and the St. Catherine's militia, with a degree of celerity highly commendable in them, were in a disposition for actual service. They proceeded some part of the road to the fort, but learning there was no necessity, were saved from a most harrassing and tedious march, and returned to their homes.—Brigadier-general Darby, with great promptitude also proceeded to the scene of action, with the 18th regiment, under command of lieutenant-col. Hoareman, but there being no occasion for their services, all, with the exception of the flank companies, returned to their quarters. Two men of this regiment expired on the march, supposed from the excessive heat of the weather.—Information was transmitted to the general officers in this district; and on Friday noon, lieutenant. gen. Villettes, most of his staff, and several other officers, proceeded to Fort Augusta. All the boats at the wherry wharf in this city were impressed, and took down in the evening three companies of the 55th regiment, under the command of major Halligar, where they are to remain for the present.—The principal part of the 2d West India regiment have been sent on board some of the vessels of war in Port Royal harbour, to make room for the detachments of white troops sent to Fort Augusta.

From the Kingston Chronicle.

Head-quarters, Gray's Pen, June 9, 1808.

—Sir, The public mind having been much agitated by the unfortunate affair which lately took place at Fort Augusta, in a detachment of about fifty recruits, of the 2d West India regiment, at drill, near thirty of whom rushed out of the Fort with their arms during the time the regiment was at exercise, and, before any stop could be put to them, killed their major and adjutant; the circumstances of which have been most slowly and minutely

investigated by two courts of inquiry, and by a general court martial, before which it has been fully proved that the whole of the unfortunate affair originated in a few ignorant recruits, and that upwards of twenty of them were innocent of the offence. To quiet the public apprehensions as much as possible, I send you, by the permission of his excellency the commander of the forces the sentence of the general court martial, with the consequent orders thereon.—I have only further to add, that the seven unhappy offenders were shot, pursuant to the orders, and that the conduct of the 2d West India Regiment was strictly correct and regular at the execution.—W. TONGE, Captain, Acting Dep. Adj. Gen.

Extract from General Orders, dated Gray's Pen, June 7, 1808:

At the general court martial of which brigadier general William Balfour was president, which was held at Fort Augusta on the 30th ult. and continued its proceedings until the 6th instant, by adjournment, were tried the following prisoners: Robert Hawker, Robert Wren, William Cashell, Hugh Dive, William Minott, John Stotesbury, William Gilman, Daniel Hagan, John Danger, and Thomas Moody, soldiers of the 2d West India regiment, charged with being jointly and individually concerned in a mutiny which took place in a party of recruits at drill, at Fort Augusta, on the morning of the 27th ultimo, and for violently assaulting major John S. Darley, their commanding officer, and lieutenant Thomas Ellis, acting adjutant of their regiment, in the execution of their duty, and whereby their lives were lost; and at the same general court martial were tried the following men of the said regiment, also charged with the foregoing crime, and with desertion from their regiment, viz.—Wm. Peele, John Tonge, George Dalmer, James Stubbs, William Rossiter, and Harry Cope. The court having maturely weighed the evidence against the foregoing prisoners, with what they have separately offered in their defence, is of opinion, that the said Robert Hawker, Robert Wren, William Cashell, Hugh Dive, William Minott, John Stotesbury, Wm. Gilman, Daniel Hagan, John Danger, Wm. Peele, John Tonge, George Dalmer, James Stubbs, Wm. Rossiter, and Harry Cope, are each and all of them guilty of the crimes with which they stand charged, being a breach of the articles of war, and do therefore adjudge that each and all of them do suffer death. But the court acquit T. Moody for want of sufficient evidence.—His excellency the commander of the forces approves of

the foregoing sentence. The prisoners, John Danger, Hugh Dive, William Minott, Daniel Hagan, William Peele, John Tonge, and George Dalmer, whose daring atrocity is most conspicuous, will meet their just and awful sentence by being shot to death, by a party of the 2d West India regiment, on the sands, outside of Fort Augusta, near the spot where their crime was committed, in presence of the garrison of Fort Augusta, on Wednesday next, the 8th instant, in the morning, at as early an hour as possible.—His excellency the commander of the forces greatly laments that at so early a period of his command, he is called upon to perform so painful a part of his duty; but in consideration of the dreadful example already made by the prompt and laudable exertions of the body of the regiment, whereby several of the mutineers were killed on the spot, and others severely wounded, and trusting that their crime originated in their inexperience and ignorance of the service, and through the instigation of those who so justly suffer on this occasion, and that the enormity of the offence had not occurred to them, he is pleased to respite until further orders (or until his majesty's pleasure is known) the following prisoners.—Robert Hawker, Robert Wren, William Cashell, John Stotesbury, William Gilman, James Stubbs, William Rossiter, and Harry Cope, whose portion of guilt is not aggravated by any particular acts, and whose youth and apparent contrition hold them forward in a more favourable point of view.—In the performance of this painful part of his duty, which calls for the most severe example being made, to check so flagrant and unpardonable a crime as mutiny, the commander of the forces cannot but derive some consolation from its being proved in the most satisfactory manner, on the late very minute investigation of the circumstances attending or leading to the mutiny, that it originated solely in the ferocious spirit of ignorant and undisciplined recruits; and that the regiment manifested on that unfortunate occasion a sense of loyalty and attachment to their officers highly creditable to themselves and honourable to the character of soldiers. He trusts they cannot but most sincerely lament the fate of those valuable officers, who fell victims to their zeal for the service, and their confidence in the fidelity and attachment of their men in general, which they had ever been studious to conciliate.—He strongly recommends to the officers of that regiment most forcibly to impress on the minds of the men the heinous offence for which those unhappy men suffer, and that

they will urge them to conduct themselves with good order and regularity, as the only means of wiping away the disgrace such acts must necessarily bring on any corps. By command, — W. TONGE, Captain, Acting Dep. Adj. Gen.

The grand jury of the June grand court, sitting on Monday finished the business brought before them, were discharged. Previous to their being discharged, the grand jury drew up a memorial, in very temperate language, which has been left with J. H. Bonnett, Esq. to be presented to his grace the Duke of Manchester, who is at present in St. Mary's, *praying him to communicate their wishes to his majesty's Government, that the 2d West India regiment be removed from this island.*

LÔTTERIES.

First Report from the Committee of the House of Commons, on the Laws relating to Lotteries. — Ordered to be printed April 13, 1809.

The Committee appointed to inquire how far the evils attending lotteries have been remedied by the laws passed respecting the same; and to report their observations thereupon, and upon such further measures as may be necessary for remedy thereof; and who were empowered to report their opinion thereupon, from time to time, to the house; — having been employed in collecting information, and examining witnesses on the matters referred to them; and having duly weighed and considered the same, have come to the following resolutions: — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that (in case it shall be thought expedient to continue state lotteries) the number thereof in each year should be limited to two lotteries, of not more than 30,000 tickets each; that the number of days allowed for drawing, instead of ten, the present number, should be brought back to eight for each lottery, the number fixed in 1802: that the number of tickets to be drawn each day should be uncertain, and left to the discretion of the commissioners of stamp duties, and kept secret till the close of the drawing each day, care being taken, as the lottery proceeds, not to leave too great a number undrawn on the latter days of drawing, but that one moiety or upwards be drawn on the four first days thereof. — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that no person should be allowed to deal in lottery tickets without a licence for that purpose from the commissioners of stamp duties, and that the provision to that effect, in the second section of 22 Geo. III. cap.

47, repealed in 1802, and not inserted in the late acts, should be re-enacted; with this addition, that every licensed lottery office keeper should be allowed to take out from the stamp office, in addition to his own licence, a limited number of licences for agents, with a stamp duty of about one-tenth of that paid by himself, in the proportion of two such agents' licences, for every 150 tickets shared by him at the stamp office; and that all persons should be forbidden, under a heavy penalty, to act as agents for any lottery office keeper, or to deal in lottery tickets, except persons so licensed. — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that in order to prevent persons setting up licensed lottery offices as a cloak for carrying on illegal insurances, the number of tickets required to be shared in each lottery, in order to entitle the parties to a licence, should be extended from thirty to one hundred and fifty; and that such licences should be renewed for every lottery, upon the parties continuing to share that number of tickets. — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the limitation of hours during which lottery offices may be open for the transaction of business, viz. from 8 o'clock in the morning till 8 o'clock in the evening, enacted by 22 Geo. III. cap. 47, and renewed in the lottery acts of 1802, and the three following years, but omitted in those of the two last years, ought in future to be re-enacted, without the exception therein made with respect to Saturday, when lottery offices ought to be shut at as early an hour as on other evenings. — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that all persons concerned in hawking about lottery tickets and shares for sale, in distributing handbills respecting lotteries otherwise than in the offices of licensed persons, in illuminating lottery offices for outside show, in exhibiting lottery schemes and bills upon boards, carts, or carriages, in town or country, should be subjected, on conviction before a magistrate, to a considerable penalty, and in default of payment to imprisonment for a limited period. — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the exemption of licensed lottery office keepers, from the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and police magistrates, by inserting in sec. 34 of the last lottery act, the words, "if not licensed to divide tickets into shares in the manner aforesaid," is inexpedient, and ought to be discontinued; and that such lottery office keepers ought in future to be subjected in common with other persons to such jurisdiction. — Your

committees are still engaged in collecting evidence on the subject of clandestine insurances and other illegal practices, which, notwithstanding the measures adopted at different times for their prevention, appear still to be carried on to a considerable extent; but not having finished their inquiries, they defer for the present making a final report on the matters referred to them.

Second Report on Lotteries.

The committee, &c. having made a Report to the house, in the month of April last, at the conclusion of which they informed the house, that they were still engaged in collecting evidence on the subject of clandestine insurances and other illegal practices; which, notwithstanding the measures adopted at different times for their prevention, appeared still to be carried on to a considerable extent; having collected all the evidence which they have deemed material for the formation of a judgment upon the different points submitted to their consideration, have agreed upon the following Report.—Your Committee beg to call your attention to the evidence contained in the appendix, and more particularly to that of Mr. Wood, an officer appointed and paid by government, under the title of "Inspector of Lotteries," from whom your Committee might have expected to derive the most material and satisfactory information upon all the matters referred to them; and more especially upon the steps he had lately taken in the execution of the duties of his office. It is manifest, however, that since the year 1802, when the scheme of the lottery was altered, the inspector of lotteries has performed no duties; and he has declared to your Committee that there do not appear to him to be any duties incumbent upon him to perform. Your Committee have been further informed by Mr. Wood, that he believes, by the regulations adopted since the year 1802, the evils arising from the lottery have been done away, and illegal insurances suppressed. But the examination of many other witnesses has proved to your Committee that the information so given, by what your Committee had a right to rely on as the most competent authority, is unfortunately altogether erroneous; and your Committee have collected the reasons why information more to be depended upon has not been obtained from the source in question; for the details of which they refer you to the evidence itself.—Your Committee are compelled to state, that the evils of clandestine insurance appear to them to prevail to a much greater extent than they had reason to suspect when they made their

first report in the month of April last; and it now appears fairly questionable whether the number of persons concerned in such practices has materially diminished, or the sums adventured have been at all decreased. The greater privacy with which the transactions are conducted of course makes every inquiry into their existence exceedingly difficult, whilst it produces combination, and renders the invention of any real remedy the more hopeless.—Your Committee have applied themselves with great assiduity to that part of their instructions by which they are directed to report upon such further measures as may be necessary for the remedy of the evils attending lotteries; and they submit to the house some account of the law, together with such observations and suggestions as have occurred to them thereupon.—An act was passed (22d Geo. iii. c. 47) and was intitled, "An act for licensing lottery office keepers, and regulating the sale of lottery tickets." The breach of the law was punished by penalties, recoverable before two magistrates, "and the usual powers were given for the recovery of the same, in case of non payment, by warrant of distress and sale, and for want of sufficient distress, the offender to be sent to the house of correction, for any time not exceeding six months nor less than three, unless the penalty should be sooner paid." A power of mitigation was given to the magistrates, and no penalty could be recovered, unless the offence had been committed within twelve months preceding the commencement of the prosecution.—No alteration in the law, with respect to illegal insurance in lotteries, was made until the year 1787, when an act (27th Geo. iii. c. 1.) was passed for rendering more effectual the laws now in being for suppressing unlawful Lotteries. In the preamble to the last-mentioned act, the 8th Geo. I. c. 2. the 12th Geo. II. c. 28. and the 22d. Geo. III. c. 47. are recited; and it is further recited, "that great difficulties have arisen upon the methods of conviction of offenders against the said recited acts before justices of the peace, and many evasions of the said recited acts are daily put in practice;" and it was by the 2d sect. enacted, "that from and after the passing of said act, no pecuniary penalties incurred by any person concerned in Lotteries should be recovered before any justice, but might be sued for by action in any of the Courts at Westminster, and one moiety of the penalties, when recovered, should be applied for the use of his majesty, and the other moiety to the person who should sue for the same; and power was given in every such action to

hold the offenders to bail, for any sum not exceeding £500."—All persons engaged in illegal insurance might also, under the authority of the 3d sect. of the last mentioned act, be deemed rogues and vagabonds, under the 17th Geo. II. c. 5; and power was given to the magistrates before whom any person should be prosecuted as a rogue or vagabond, to commit the person so prosecuted to the house of correction, there to remain until the next general quarter session; and the justices are then to investigate the merits of the case, and to proceed according to the provisions contained in the 17th Geo. III.—In consequence of the representations which were made, of the extent to which common informers, aided by attorneys, had abused the powers given by the 2d sect. of the 27th Geo. III. c. 1, it was enacted, by an act passed in the 33d Geo. III. c. 62. sect. 38. "That from and after the commencement of the said act, it should not be lawful for any person to commence or prosecute any action for the recovery of penalties inflicted by any of the laws touching or concerning Lotteries, unless the same should be commenced in the name of His Majesty's Attorney General; and by sect. 40 of the same act it was enacted, "that if any person should be brought before two magistrates, and should be convicted of any offence against the statute of the 27th Geo. III. whereby he should be adjudged a rogue and vagabond, the said magistrates should commit such offender to the house of correction, there to remain for any space of time not exceeding six calendar months nor less than one month, and until the final period of the drawing of the Lottery, in respect whereof such offence should be committed; and that the proceeding should be without appeal, and not removable by *certiorari*, or otherwise, into any court whatsoever."—No evidence has been given to the committee to shew what were the difficulties which occurred in the conviction of offenders under the 22d Geo. III. c. 47, and the acts recited therein; but it appears from the preamble to the 27th Geo. III. c. 1, that difficulties had occurred, and that many evasions of that act had been put in practice. It is therefore reasonable to presume that the provisions of that act had been found insufficient to suppress the practice of insuring in the Lottery. In the hope therefore of more effectually suppressing the evil, the 27th Geo. III. c. 1 was passed; but it appears from the evidence of Mr. Estcourt, and more especially from the letter from the Under-Sheriff of Middlesex addressed to him, and contained in his evidence, that the provi-

sions of that act had been perverted to the purposes of extortion, and had become productive of very serious evil.—In order to counteract this new evil, the 30th Geo. III. c. 62. sect. 38 was passed, directing that no action should be commenced or prosecuted, except in the name of the Attorney General.—In consequence of this limitation, very few actions have, as appears from the evidence given to the committee, been commenced since the passing of the last mentioned act, although there is no doubt that Insurance in the Lottery is still carried on to a great extent.—The evidence which has been given with respect to the practical inconveniences resulting from the provisions of the 27th Geo. III. proves, that it would be impolitic again to have recourse to the provisions of that act, and yet it is very difficult to suggest any middle course between limiting the power of commencing actions to the Attorney General, and giving that power to common informers. In the one case, there will probably be reason to complain of inactivity in enforcing the law, and in the other, of a corrupt and mischievous perversion of it. It might perhaps be proper to authorize the police magistrates, and the magistrates of the city, to direct actions to be commenced, when evidence to warrant that direction shall have been given upon oath before them. This however would be a novel and perhaps an improvident power to grant, and considerable difficulty would occur in carrying the principle into effect.—By the 27th Geo. III. all persons engaged in illegal insurance might be treated as rogues and vagabonds, under the 17th Geo. II. c. 5; and the magistrates had the power of committing them to the house of correction until the next general quarter sessions. It appears from the evidence given to the committee, that in the interval between the commitment and the trial, the witnesses were generally tampered with or removed, and conviction became impossible. In order to obviate this difficulty, a power was given by 33 Geo. III. to two magistrates, to commit such persons to the house of correction for any period not exceeding six months or less than one, and until the end of the drawing of the Lottery, in respect of which the offence had been committed; and the proceeding was without appeal; and not removable by *certiorari* or otherwise into any other court. From this enactment, it appears that the legislature has been under the necessity of granting very large and extraordinary powers to magistrates, in order to diminish the evil arising from insurance in Lotteries, and the circumstances which gave rise to it shew that no pecuniary

means are wanting to enable those who are engaged in this practice to evade the punishment of the law.—Your committee have to lament that it is not in their power to furnish to the House any more satisfactory result of this part of their labours: but when it is recollected that for many years past the attention of the most acute and ingenious persons, well acquainted with the whole of the Lottery system, both legal and fraudulent, under the auspices of successive ministers, have been directed to this object without success; that it has been represented to your committee, that the lottery and illegal insurances are inseparable; that the former cannot exist without the latter for its support; that a system of connivance in those acts which the law prohibits pervades all ranks concerned, from the persons contracting with government under the law, down to the meanest wretch employed in the violation of the law, and its most ordinary victim: your committee did not enter upon this matter with much prospect of success, and do not therefore feel any very great disappointment at the issue; they are persuaded the house will not impute to them any want of attention to the subject, or zeal in the execution of their duty.—In truth, the foundation of the Lottery is so radically vicious, that your committee feel convinced that, under no system of regulations which can be devised, will it be possible for parliament to adopt it as an efficient source of revenue, and at the same time divest it of all the evils and calamities of which it has hitherto proved so baneful a source.—A spirit of adventure must be excited amongst the community, in order that government may derive from it a pecuniary resource. That spirit is to be checked at a certain given point, in order that no evils may attend it—the latter object has not hitherto been attained, with all the pains which have been bestowed upon it. Your committee are of opinion, that its attainment is impossible.—The ingenuity of persons interested in breaking the law, is always upon the watch for its new enactments, and has hitherto always baffled the sagacity of the legislature. Added to which, there can be no hope of greater purity amongst the persons employed to detect and bring the offenders to punishment than has hitherto been experienced, or than now exists. The statute book is burthened with regulations entirely repugnant to the spirit of the constitution, rigorous and oppressive in the extreme, which, if they are ever executed, fall only upon the ignorant and destitute, whilst the wealthy and more profligate hold them in utter contempt: and this

unseemly state of things is allowed to continue, in order that the state may derive a certain annual sum from the partial enforcement of a vice, which it is the object of the law, in all other cases, and at all other times, most diligently to repress.—In the mean time your committee find, that by the effects of the Lottery, even under its present restrictions, idleness, dissipation, and poverty are increased, the most sacred and confidential trusts are betrayed, domestic comfort is destroyed, madness often created, crimes, subjecting the perpetrators of them to the punishment of death, are committed, and even suicide itself is produced, as will fully appear in the evidence submitted to the House. Such have been the constant and fatal attendants upon State Lotteries, and such, your committee have too good grounds to fear, will be their invariable attendants so long as they are suffered, under whatever checks or regulations, to exist?—The question naturally occurs to your committee, whether any pecuniary advantage, however large or convenient, can compensate to a state for the amount of vice and misery thus necessarily produced by the levy of it?—The answer to this question is submitted to your wisdom and deliberation. But in order that the House may come to a decision, in every view so important to the interests and happiness of the community, without prejudice, your committee cannot conclude without expressing a decided opinion, that the pecuniary advantage derived from a State Lottery is much greater in appearance than in reality. When we take into consideration the increase of poor's rates arising from the number of families driven by speculations in the Lottery, whether fortunate or otherwise, to seek parochial relief, the diminished consumption of excisable articles during the drawings, and other circumstances deducible from the evidence, they may well be considered to operate as a large deduction from the gross sums paid into the Exchequer by the contractors. On the other hand, the sum raised upon the people is much greater in proportion to the amount received by the state, than in any other branch of revenue.—No mode of raising money appears to your committee so burthensome, so pernicious, and so unproductive; no species of adventure is known, where the chances are so great against the adventurer; none where the infatuation is more powerful, lasting, and destructive.—In the lower classes, of society the persons engaged, whether successful or unfortunate, are, generally speaking, either immediately or ultimately tempted to their ruin; and there is scarcely any

corruption of life, to the idle and abandoned, that its distresses have not been aggravated by this allurement to gaming, held forth by the state. — Your committee are conscious that they are far from having exhausted all the grounds upon which it might be urged, that the Lottery ought not to be resorted to as a financial resource. The reasoning upon them appears to your committee to apply with peculiar force to the situation, the habits, and all the circumstances, of a great manufacturing and commercial nation, in which it must be dangerous, in the highest degree, to diffuse a spirit of speculation, whereby the mind is misled from those habits of continued industry which insure the acquisition of comfort and independence, to delusive dreams of sudden and enormous wealth, which most generally end in abject poverty and complete ruin. If, after all that has been stated, and a perusal of the evidence, the House shall think proper to sanction the adoption of the Lottery in any future session of parliament, your committee recommend to your consideration the various suggestions contained in their two reports for the alteration of the law, from which they are willing to hope, at least, that some beneficial selection may be made. But they cannot flatter themselves with the expectation that they have been much more fortunate than the able persons who have applied themselves with so much industry and so little success to the same subject, and to whom the public are indebted for their attempts to correct the evils which, in the opinion of your committee, can only be cured a way by the suppression of the cause from which they are derived.

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that (in case it shall be thought expedient to continue state lotteries) the number thereof in each year should be limited to two lotteries, of not more than 30,000 tickets each, that the number of days allowed for drawing, instead of ten, the present number, should be brought back to eight for each lottery, the number fixed in 1802 that the number of tickets to be drawn each day should be uncertain, and left to the discretion of the commissioners of stamp duties, and kept secret till the close of the drawing each day, care being taken, as the lottery proceeds, not to leave too great a number undrawn on the latter days of drawing, but that one moiety or upwards be drawn on the four first days thereof — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that no person should be allowed to deal in lottery tickets, without a licence for that purpose from the commissioners of stamp duties, and that the provision

to that effect, in the Lottery Act, 22 Geo. III cap 47, repealed in 1802, and not renewed in the late acts, should be renewed, with this addition, that every licensed lottery office keeper should be allowed to take out from the stamp office, in addition to his own licence, a limited number of licences for agents, with a stamp duty of about one tenth of that paid by himself, in the proportion of two such agents licences, for every 150 tickets shared by him at the stamp office, and that all persons should be forbidden, under a heavy penalty, to act as agents for any lottery office keeper, or to deal in lottery tickets, except persons so licensed — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that in order to prevent persons setting up licensed lottery offices as a cloak for carrying on illegal insurance, the number of tickets required to be shared in each lottery, in order to entitle the parties to a licence, should be extended from thirty to one hundred and fifty, and that such licences should be renewed for every lottery upon the parties continuing to share that number of tickets — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that the limitation of hours during which lottery offices may be open for the transaction of business, viz from 8 o'clock in the morning till 8 o'clock in the evening, enacted by 22 Geo. III cap 47, and renewed in the lottery acts of 1802, and the three following years, but omitted in those of the two last years, ought not to be re-enacted, without the exception therein made with respect to Saturday, when lottery offices ought to be shut at is only an hour as on other evenings — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that all persons concerned in hawkling about lottery tickets and shares for sale, in distributing hand bills respecting lotteries otherwise than in the offices of licensed persons in illuminating lottery offices for outside show, in exhibiting lottery schemes and bills upon boards, carts, or carriages, in town or country, should be subjected, on conviction before a magistrate, to a considerable penalty, and in default of payment to imprisonment for a limited period — Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that the exemption of licensed lottery office keepers, from the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and police magistrates, by inserting in sec. 34 of the last lottery act, the words, " if not licensed " to divide tickets into shares, in the manner aforesaid, is inexpedient, and ought to be discontinued, and that such lottery office keepers ought in future to be subjected in common with other persons to such jurisdiction.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.
Spanish Revolution.—Proclamation, dated Quito, July 17, 1808, continued from page 246.

What is most precious, the gold of the mine, or the blood of man? If your civic virtue should not command the sacrifice, your mercenary interest will extort it. Your incorporation, sanctified by authority, your political existence, the possession of your property, your individual security, all depend upon the success of this war. Our independence cannot be resigned until these illustrious seminaries of sanctity and wisdom are surrendered—until these solid columns of religion and of the state tumble to the earth—until the public right shall be annihilated and Spain itself subverted. Happy country! this day you receive from your favourite sons the most acceptable proofs of their tenderness and love, of their affection and gratitude, for the protection they have received from you through successive ages. To-day they return to you the riches they have received, for the splendour you have conferred, for your pious generosity, for your ardent zeal, in sustaining the religion and the customs of their ancestors,—those customs originating in the sublime morality of the Gospel, within whose sacred vase is inclosed, and will be for ever inclosed, the preservation of your empire and the power of your monarchy. Rich men of every description! Open your coffers, and discharge your duty to your country, and be confident that her ungrateful children will receive her anathema, and will not escape her vengeance—Spaniards! we all defend one common cause. We are all passengers on board the ship Independence, which is already launched, and must either swim or sink, according as she is navigated by us. There is only one mean of salvation for us, and that is, that the whole nation, armed, hasten to exterminate the banditti by whom we are invaded, and to punish them for their atrocities. Warriors! present yourselves in the field of glory. I do not attempt to excite your valour; you are Spaniards, and therefore, you are brave and honourable; but, in one respect, I may give you advice, although you are Spaniards. I recommend to you, in the name of your country, the most severe discipline, and the most implicit obedience to your commanders. Without discipline, you can neither have an army nor victory. Without discipline, valour is useless, and numbers impotent. Discipline supplies every thing, and without her

every thing must be deficient. Apprehend not then rightily; for, alas, if you are conquered, you will become the conquerors of nations, and the victims of tyranny. Do you see that these fierce pretenders rush upon us? They outrage, they lay waste, they destroy; nothing can satiate their ferocity. But if, in your turn, you should become conquerors, let the martial spirit by which you are animated be restrained within the limits of reason and justice. Let humanity, compassion, and beneficence, be the devices of your banners; above all, let not the name of Spaniard be stained by that iniquity and sacrilege which you detest in your enemies; and then your grateful country will confer upon you her abundant benefits, and your names will be engraved on the sublime edifice of Spanish independence. I may address you as conquerors, although you have not already vanquished. One province only, the cradle of heroes, the moment war was declared, filled the enemy with terror. Yes, Spaniards, from that happy instant the lion was attacked with a fever, from which he will never escape—The victory you are about to accomplish will establish an alliance between Spain and the most powerful, the most wise, and the most polished nation of the earth—with the only country which this second Machiavel could not seduce—Great Britain! The alliance that the infamous traitor broke for our misery and ruin; that assassin of our nation, that devouring monster, whose immense rapine provided an asylum for our enemy; that alliance, countrymen, has been generously restored by the only empire which has been able to maintain its honour and independence, and to which is reserved the lofty distinction of restoring enslaved Europe. Of what consequence then is the renowned power of Napoleon? The world itself depends upon the union of those two great nations.—F. P. G. D. C.

An Address to his Army, by the most Excellent Signior D. Francis Xavier De Castanos, Commandant of the Camp at St. Roche, now General in Chief of the Army of the Andalusians.

A man, upon whom flattery and meanness alone have conferred the title of hero—man full of ambition, and the petty band of slaves who surround him, have formed the great project, of subjugating us. Deception, perfidy, and treason, have hitherto been the instruments of so ill-premeditated an enterprise. The Spaniards will doubtless unite, and cause their most sacred rights

to be respected. We know, that many provinces and communities are animated with the same heroism which we ourselves have displayed, from the moment that the veil was rent asunder which covered this most iniquitous project. It is extremely important, nay indispensable, that all of us should unite to secure the attainment of so noble an object. Each and all ought to contribute all that lies in his power. This is an obligation dictated by the heart, from the moment that we remark its first emotions—Generous and heroic inhabitants of this happy town, you require not the aid of eloquence to stimulate your ardent souls. You have given, and are at this moment giving sufficient examples. Rush to the field of honour in quest of our brothers, who are soldiers by profession, that they may instruct you in the first elements of the military art, on which strength and victory principally depend. In the mean time, be assured, that your families will not be reduced to want or beggary. The opulent ranks of this place will provide for your subsistence. Fear not that the wealthy will spare their treasures. They will deposit all their services of plate in the hands of government: and when they eat and drink out of wooden spoons and earthen vessels, they will enjoy the pleasing satisfaction, that those instruments of mere luxury are destined to the defence of our religion, our king, our country, and our liberty.—Ministers of the sanctuary, be you the first to preach, and to give the example of this important confidence. Be persuaded that both ecclesiastical and civil laws admit of selling the property of the church in circumstances of such urgent necessity as the present. Convince the faithful that you are penetrated with this genuine doctrine, which, in times not so calamitous, was taught by St. Bernard; for he said, it was not conformable with our holy religion, that the church should flourish in its possessions whilst her poor, were necessitous; that she should decorate her walls with gold, and abandon her children to nakedness.—And you, mothers, worthy of so many heroes, who know how to excite the most noble and heroic passions of the human heart, hasten to present to government your jewels, your rings, and ornaments. Fear not the decay of your attractive graces; you will always be agreeable; and though your exterior decorations should be less conspicuous, you will acquire such a degree of mental perfection and heroism as to attract the esteem of every man, and to command respect even from the weak, the vicious and the profligate.—F. X. C.

Progress of King Joseph's Visit to the Frontiers.

Bribesca, July 16.—This morning his Majesty set out from Miranda. He was accompanied by the municipality and the commissioner of the customs to the boundary of their jurisdiction.—Not only did the inhabitants testify their joy by letting off fire-works, and giving concerts during the whole of the night, but also on his majesty's departure this morning they repeated these different festivities. On the road from Miranda to Bribesca, his majesty received the congratulations of the magistrates of the various places through which he passed, and on his arrival in this town, he received those of the Alcaide, the Municipality, the Chapters, the Deacon or Arch-Priest, and every person of distinction, all of whom were anxious to be introduced to him. His majesty afterwards retired as usual to attend to business. In the evening there were an illumination and fire-works.

Burgos, July 16.—His majesty this morning continued his journey from Bribesca. He gave audience on the way to all the magistrates of the different places he passed through, who were solicitous of the honour of addressing his majesty.—The king reached this city at eight in the morning. A triumphal arch, prepared in expectation of his arrival, was erected at the entrance by which he had to come. The garrison was drawn up on each side of the street, the windows of the houses were magnificently decorated, and the firing of cannon and ringing of bells contributed to make his majesty's entrance splendid in the extreme.—Several richly-caparisoned chargers were in readiness, in case his majesty had chosen to enter the city on horseback. All the officiating servants of the royal household waited upon his majesty. Soon after his arrival his majesty gave audience to the archbishop, the chapter, intendant corregidor, the consulate, the ecclesiastical colleges, and spiritual communities, together with a number of persons of distinction resident in the city and environs. His majesty conversed a considerable time with each of them; entering into the particular subjects which related to their respective functions.—Having taken up his residence at the archbishop's palace, which adjoins the cathedral, his majesty, soon after the levee, went to see the cathedral, where he was received under a canopy, with all the solemnities justly due to, and usually observed with respect to royal personages.—At six in the evening his majesty again gave audience to the above-mentioned persons, and also to a great number of officers, who had the

...all those who had the honour of being admitted to his majesty's presence, departed to their respective homes highly transported with the reception with which he had been graciously pleased to honour them, and the interest which his majesty took in the concerns of the different places he passed through.

Madrid, July 16.—Yesterday all the bells were set a ringing. At day-break there was a discharge of artillery, and in the evening an illumination took place. These rejoicings announced the king's arrival on the Spanish territory. His majesty has by this time reached Burgos, and is expected here on the 20th.

Official Letters relative to the British Officers sent to the Spanish Patriots.

Head Quarters of the Asturian Army, Stones, July 10, 1808.—Sir,—Having learned from Major Roche, the readiness you have expressed to afford the assistance of the British frigates under your command upon the coast, in the enterprize I am about undertaking, I beg to return you my best thanks for this most desirable and powerful co-operation; but I avail myself of this opportunity of repeating what I have already had the honour of communicating to you, through that officer; that it is by no means my wish that the smallest risk should be incurred by his majesty's ships, or that a single seaman should be landed.—Major Roche, who has my entire confidence, will explain to you fully the manner in which I conceive his majesty's ships under your command can render us the most effectual service.—He will also give you a copy of the signals agreed upon for communication between the squadron and the shore, as well as the fullest explanation of my intentions in the proposed attack upon the enemy at Santander.—I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed)—NICHOLAS DE LLANO PONTE—Lieut.-General in the Army of the Asturias.—To Captain Atkins, Senior Officer commanding his Britannic Majesty's Ships, on the North Coast of Spain.

His Majesty's Ship Seine, off St. Axbor, July 7, 1808.—Sir,—In communicating with you on his majesty's service, I have so much observed the justness of your ideas, and correctness of opinion, as most readily induced me to co-operate with the naval force under my command, in all your suggestions; and I beg to assure you, that I attribute in a great measure the speedy re-establishment of government, and success of

...difficulties and exertions, in my opinion I am perfectly joined to the Tower, of his majesty's ship the Digby, of the Corsack; Captain of the Eurydice; Captain Hardyman, the Unicorn; and Captain Daly, of the Comet.—The public service in which we are engaged, has called forth this mark of approbation due to your abilities and exertions, and induces me to request you will be pleased to convey it in the speediest manner to the right hon. lord Castlereagh, his majesty's principal secretary of state.—I have the honour to be, &c.—D. ATKINS, Captain of His Majesty's ship Seine, and Senior Officer on the North Coast of Spain.

To Major Roche, &c. Santander.

From the *Corunna Gazette* extraordinary, Aug 1, 1808.—[By Order of the Government]

The following official dispatches have been received by express:—Head-Quarters at Andujar, 6 o'clock in the evening, July 19, 1808.

Most Serene Signiors;—At half-past five an officer came in with a flag of truce, requesting that orders should be given to Gen. La Pena to suspend hostilities, whilst Gen. Dupont should hold a conference with Gen. Reding. I replied in the negative. A few moments after, I received a letter from Gen. Pena himself, informing me that they had solicited terms of capitulation. I grant them no other terms than that they shall be prisoners of war, with permission to the general and his officers to wear their swords, and to take with them a portmanteau each, filled with their clothes only, in consequence of the pillage which they have committed in our towns; assuring, however, at the same time, that they shall be treated with the same respect as those belonging to the squadron at Cadiz, and in a manner worthy of Spanish generosity. Whilst the details are preparing, I beg leave to acquaint your highnesses, that we have taken some cannon and prisoners, and, in short, that Gen. Dupont is completely hemmed in on all sides.—May God preserve your highnesses many years.—The Most Serene Signior XAVIER DE CASTANOS.—The Most Serene the Supreme Junta of Government.

N. B. A dispatch of the same date, and communicating the same intelligence, has been received from Signior Count Tili, a member of this supreme junta, who accompanies the general of the army.

Note of the Supreme Junta.

Seville, July 26.—The supreme junta has the most entire satisfaction to inform the

public, that by a dispatch received this day, by express, from the most excellent Signior Dr. Francisco Xavier Castanos, captain-general of the forces of Andalusia, of which a literal extract is annexed, a convincing proof is given of the military talents with which the operations have been conducted, inasmuch as the results exactly correspond with the well digested plan which had been formed. So fortunate have they been, that from the very first encounter, the enemy has continued to fly with the utmost disgrace, and his flight has been a complete rout, this effect having been produced by events which he certainly could not have prevented.

Most Serene Signiors,—In my dispatch of the 17th, I acquainted you with the state of our operations and proceedings. On the 13th, general Reding wrote to inform me, that at nine in the morning he had entered Baylen with his own division and that of the Marquis de Compeigne, which I had ordered to join him; and that the enemy were retreating from that place to Guataonnan, having left behind only a grand guard, which was put to the rout. I instantly wrote to Gen. Reding to attack Andujar in flank, with the two divisions, whilst I should attack it in front. I was preparing to execute my plan at day-break this morning, when, at two o'clock, I was apprized that the enemy were evacuating Andujar, and making a precipitate flight by the road to Madrid. I cannot conceal my surprise, that the inhabitants of Andujar did not give me the slightest notice of this movement.—Finding that the enemy were making their escape from me, I ordered General La Pena, with his division and some reinforcements, to harass their rear, a disposition so much the more proper, as I had just received a letter from Gen. Reding, informing me that he had marched from Baylen at three in the morning, with the intention of making his attack upon Andujar at eleven, so that, in consequence of his active and opportune movement, Dupont will find himself placed between these two divisions and that of General La Pena. I flatter myself that the result will correspond with the well combined dispositions of the plan.—Your highnesses may hourly expect intelligence of the intended attack of to-day, for which every thing is prepared.—I occupy this city with the division of General Jones, where I have taken a position adapted to circumstances. The enemy have left 300 sick, and it is believed that General Vedel was killed in the affair of Mengibar.—I have also received advice from Commandant Cruz, that he had proceeded with his sharpshooters to

Los Baños, in order to cover the movements of the respective divisions; and if Colonel Baldecanos has followed my instructions to him, a most favourable opportunity will occur, of occupying Despenaperros; since, in a dispatch which we have intercepted, dated the 16th, from the chief of the staff of the French army at Baylen, to the commandant of Santa Elena, the latter is directed to march to Guarraman, leaving only 500 men at that point.—May God preserve your serene highnesses many years.—Head Quarters at Andujar, 8 o'clock in the morning, July 19, 1808.—The Most Serene Signior XAVIER DE CASTANOS.—The Most Serene Signiors the President and Members of the Supreme Junta of Government.

By the same Courier extraordinary has been received a dispatch from the most excellent Signior Count de Tilly, a member of the supreme junta, which, in addition to the communication from his excellency the general in chief, mentions the deplorable situation to which the enemy has reduced the town of Andujar. It is undoubtedly a matter of surprize, however well practised these banditti are in the art of corruption, that there should be room to suspect any of the inhabitants of that place of disloyalty, or adhering to the enemy. But should these suspicions be confirmed, they may well tremble at the example which this supreme authority is preparing, in order to satisfy the public, and to prevent similar proceedings in other places which may have the misfortune to fall into the enemy's hands. This dispatch also contains the inventories of two magazines which the French left behind them at Andujar, but as it likewise mentions a third, which there had not been time to examine, and as we are in expectation of the still more fortunate results of a decisive action, the whole of the requisite details will be subsequently communicated.—JUAN BAUTISTA PARDO, Secretary.

Corunna, July 30.—Marshal Bessieres having written to his excellency Don Joaquin Blake, in the usual style of Buonaparte's generals, with the view of bringing about the destruction of this country, and the annihilation of its inhabitants, the general has, in reply, addressed to him the following letter.—

July 24.—Senor General.—I return thanks to your excellency for the humane treatment which you assure me has been given to the Spanish prisoners, and, on my part, I assure you, that the French do not mistake Spanish generosity. It belongs to your excellency and to me, to banish from our ar-

mies that ferocity which does not belong to the truly brave. Good soldiers fight with spirit, and esteem their enemies in proportion to the firm resistance they experience from them.—From your excellency's well-known character, such are, I believe, the principles by which your conduct is guided.—I am also convinced, that your excellency will know how to appreciate my frank and decided declaration, which is, that I acknowledge no sovereign except Fernando de Bourbon, or his legitimate heirs. But if it happen that this unfortunate family should be completely extinguished, I should then only acknowledge for my sovereign the people of Spain, lawfully represented in general Cortes. This manner of thinking is not confined to me alone; I express to you the sentiments of all the army, and of the whole nation, with the exception of a small number of men, who are governed by the most interested self-interest. Be persuaded that I inform you of the real state of things. Do not mistake the forced submission of some towns, occupied by French troops, for a real change of opinion in the inhabitants. Undeceive, therefore, your emperor, and if it be true that he possesses a philanthropic mind, he will renounce the project of subduing Spain. Whatever partial successes he may obtain, it is evident that his brother can never reign in this country, unless he reign over a desert covered with the blood of Spaniards, and of the troops employed in this unjust enterprize. Notwithstanding the aversion with which I view the cause you support, I assure your excellency that I entertain for you that high consideration which is due to your eminent personal qualities.—JOAQUIN BLAKE, general-in-chief of the army of Galicia.

The following has been published, by order of the government:—

On the 28th inst. Marshal Bessieres transmitted a second letter to our general in chief, to which he requested a satisfactory answer, informing him that, with all due respect to his good opinion, it was his duty to avoid the effusion of blood, it being certain that the Bourbons, whom the general mentioned, never could reign, while France and the greater part of Europe existed in their present state. He also informs the general, that he is anxious to see him, and appoints a place of interview. To this letter was sent the following answer:—July 28, 1808.

Signior Marshal,—I have, with due respect, received your excellency's letter, and have to repeat my thanks to you for having set at liberty the 4 or 500 prisoners whom you took in the battle of Rio Seco, and

whom your excellency describes as recruits of Galicia. They are nevertheless regular soldiers, being recruits incorporated with the troops of the line, though they do not wear the uniform. In explaining this circumstance, my intention is not to release myself from acknowledging the generous conduct your excellency has manifested towards those people, but to guard against the possibility of their upon any occasion receiving, in consequence of any misconception, a species of treatment which they do not deserve, and which, from the sentiments manifested by your excellency, could not but be painful to your own feelings. Your excellency will always find me disposed to alleviate, as far as possible, all the horrors of war, flattering myself that in this respect I shall only imitate your conduct. But, Signior general, I am not at liberty to agree to the conference which you are pleased to propose to me, nor to enter into any discussion upon the subject which we should have to agitate on such an occasion.—Your excellency informs me, that the Bourbon family has ceased to reign in Spain; and that, in order to replace them on the throne, it would be first necessary to destroy France, and a great part of Europe. What, then, is the great crime committed by that family? Can it be the frank, faithful, and intimate friendship and alliance, which have united it to France during the space of 13 years? But in attempting to make any reflections I exceed my limits: it is my duty to confine myself to the entreaty that your excellency will abandon the project of altering the opinion which I have already so decidedly pronounced upon the subject. Your excellency would doubtless take offence, were I to propose to you a change of party, and that you should abandon the emperor whom you have sworn to support; and most assuredly you should reflect that, upon the same principles, I ought not to listen to your excellency's proposals, nor is it fitting that your excellency should address them to a man of honour.—Such is the esteem and admiration, Signior general, in which I hold your excellency's military talents, that I glory in having opposed to me so distinguished an antagonist; and with respect to the final issue of the present struggle, I repose myself with confidence on the Divine Providence, to whom it belongs to decide the fate of armies and of nations, and who, sooner or later, will look with a favourable eye upon the most just cause which is defended by all true Spaniards.—I beg leave to repeat to your excellency, Signior Marshal, the assurances of my high consideration.—JOAQUIN BLAKE.

Proclamation to the Inhabitants of Asturias, dated Oviedo, July 26.

Noble inhabitants of Asturias! What panic terror has taken hold of your hearts? A remote danger affrights you! an imaginary invasion terrifies you!—Do you not know, that the whole power of Rome in the zenith of its splendor, and with her emperor at her head, has not been able to add this small province to her empire? Have you forgot, that the innumerable hosts of barbarians which Africa has vomited into our peninsula, have found their tomb amidst these rocks! You are, peradventure, afraid of the threats of the conquerors of Jena and Austerlitz. Away with these ideas, spread by our enemies to dishearten you. The French armies that had filled the world with their name, lie prostrate in the dust; the remainder is holding in coercion the unhappy that have been sacrificed to the ambition of their chief. In Spain we have but few soldiers, raw, inexperienced, weakened by fatigue, incapable of undertaking the conquest of an invincible country. They will face the danger if their chiefs bid them; but what will be their fate? Will they return? They will, if you refuse to imitate your forefathers; but if you attack the enemy with fury and desperation, they will be astonished, and you will immolate them like victims unable even to help themselves. They shall fall to your feet in heaps, from terror, and from the irresistible weight of your robust arms. Cast away your muskets, attack them with arms still more cruel, with implements of husbandry, with the same which your arms are accustomed to handle, and then you will shortly see the disparity betwixt you and them. The cavalry and artillery, in which their principal force consists, cannot avail them among you: all the rest is a contemptible mass, without vigour, without fortitude, at the utmost knowing to fire a musket, helpless and forlorn the moment you close in with them. Arouse! Take heart! You will have the pledge of victory with you, and be assured the French will not invade you; if they dare, we shall entomb them among the mountains and vallies that surround us. What! think you that before they reach your towns, even the nearest to Castile, they will not experience the havoc of the artillery, and of the troops that garrison our ports? The wise dispositions of the Supreme Junta, the precise and appropriate orders of the commander in chief, will they not repress the impetuosity of those ruffians, and not preserve the people against the effects which the invasion might occa-

sion? Respectable ministers of the Almighty, pastors of the people, when you hear the tremendous voice of danger, unite your flock, exhort them and conduct them to the field of honour! Generous gentlemen, ye that have such influence on the minds of the pacific villagers, when you see the flame spreading and raging among the mountains, sally forth to preserve the vallies from the conflagration, taking with you as many as can contribute to its extinction! Arouse, Asturians! and be constant in your valour: if any Frenchman escapes from the army, let him find in you the fate prepared for yourselves! Let them know at once that you will receive them according to their desert, and perhaps the timely notice will detain them; if not, rush on and confirm the lustre already hereditary to your name. Let the world know, that the Asturias have for the third time repulsed their proud invaders, and that extermination awaits them!

Placard affixed in the most Public Places of Seville, to rouse the People to the Resistance of French Domination and Tyranny.

Gallant Sevillians,—War is not always clothed in horrors; there is a kind of peace more fatal than a field of battle, drenched in blood and strewed with bodies of the slain. A townsman of your own, who has just beheld the capital of Spain in a state of slavery, which our enemies call a state of peace, has been able to compare the oppressed and degraded state of its unfortunate inhabitants with the noble attitude of defence in which Andalusia stands. A month ago, the Spaniards had lost their country. Seville has restored it to life more glorious than ever, and those fields which for so many years have seen no steel but that of the ploughshare, are going, amidst the splendour of arms, to prove the new cradle of this adored country. No, no: humanity does not shudder at the sound of war; it wishes it a thousand times more than the slow and interminable evils of slavery. Ah, says your townsman, were you to behold your brethren groaning and shrieking in the chains which perfidy has thrown around them! The most respectable citizen is exposed to suffer the insolence of the most contemptible soldier of our enemy. At every step he has to endure, at least, the insult of being eyed with the disdain of the conqueror to the conquered. The inhabitants of Madrid, strangers, at it were, and by sufferance in their own houses, cannot enjoy one moment's tranquillity. The public festivals, established by immemorial custom, the attendance on religious ordinances

are considered as pretexts for insurrection, and threatened with being interrupted by discharges of cannon. Distrust reigns in every heart, and the smallest noise makes the citizens tremble in the bosoms of their families. The enemy, from time to time, run to arms, in order to keep up the impression of terror with which they were struck by the massacres of the 2d and 3d of May. Then their pale countenances announce the recollection of the lot of these unhappy victims; all fly to their houses, lock their doors, then hardly think themselves safe. One is in fear for his children, another for his wife, and a third for his friends. Madrid is a prison, of which the gaolers take pleasure in terrifying the prisoners, by alarms, in order to keep them quiet. What a wide difference between that situation and yours, my beloved countrymen! I could not refrain from tears of joy, on viewing the city in which I drew my first breath, and to see it in a situation so glorious. The noble military ardour, the flame of patriotism, the generous love of independence, are alive in your breasts, united with the love and submission to those laws and that authority which you have established. History will delineate you as a model, of which there are few examples in the world. The power of the people has preserved to them its independence. Submission and confidence in the magistrates free them from the horrors of anarchy. You have fulfilled the wishes and hopes of all the lovers of their country. This becoming obedience has given an incredible energy to the Convention (la Junta) in whom you have reposed your confidence. Who will believe, that in little more than thirty days, and amidst the hurry and noise of war, the political, economical, and military administration of a kingdom could thus be duly organised? Such is the power of patriotism and sincerity under the guidance of enlightened minds! Seville is the terror of our enemies, the hope of Spain, and the glory of her sons.—Fly—fly to the field of honour. Happy you who can partake in the victory which is awaiting you. Fly, while there are still enemies to combat. Life or death, in such a crisis, is indifferent. You, who shall return, shall receive the reward of gratitude in the embraces of your country, which shall proclaim you her deliverers.—And you, whom Heaven destines to seal with your blood the independence of your nation, the honour of your women, and the purity of the religion which you profess, do not dread the anguish of the last moments; remember in these moments that

there are in our hearts the same feelings of tenderness, to shed over you your fervent prayers, to which the Almighty Father of mercies will lend an ear, to give you a glory superior to that which those who survive you shall enjoy. Conquer or die, noble Andalusians. There is no danger but in flight. Conquer or die, and victory is ours.

St. Yago, June 29.—The Supreme Junta of this principality hasten to communicate to this kingdom the information they have received from our deputies in Great Britain, whose government offers a succour not only to this principality, but every other principality of this kingdom, as will be seen by the annexed copy of the letter of the English minister to our deputies.

His Britannic Majesty's Declaration to the Envoy of Asturias. Dated Office of Foreign Affairs, 12th June.

MY LORDS. I have laid before my sovereign the letter which you were authorised by the junta of the principality of Asturias to deliver to me, together with the powers entrusted to you by the junta, entreating, in their name, his Majesty's assistance. His Majesty has desired me to assure your excellencies, that he feels the warmest interest in the resolution of the principality of Asturias to sustain against the atrocious usurper of France a contest in favour of the independence of the Spanish monarchy: that his Majesty is disposed to grant every kind of assistance to efforts so magnanimous and praiseworthy.—His Majesty has, therefore, ordered me to declare, that no time shall be lost in embarking for the port of Gijon the succours that you require, as being the most pressing necessary; he will besides send a naval force capable of protecting the coast of Asturias against any attempt which France may make, and of introducing troops by sea into the country—his Majesty will make further efforts in support of so just a cause.—His Majesty has also ordered me to declare to your excellencies, his readiness, to extend the same succours to every other part of the Spanish monarchy which may be animated by the same spirit of the inhabitants of Asturias, as well as his Majesty's sincere desire to renew those ties of friendship which subsisted so long between the two nations, and to direct his united efforts against any power which may evince hostile intentions against Spain, as well as Great Britain.—I recommend to your excellencies to communicate, as soon as possible, to the junta, the manner in which his Majesty has received the proposals transmitted by your excellencies. A vessel has been got

ready at Portsmouth, to carry any person you may think proper to dispatch. Will beg your excellencies to accept the assurances of my high consideration. (Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

Proclamation of Admiral Cotton.

Coimbra, July 18, 1808.

The undersigned Admiral, commanding the fleet of his Britannic majesty on the coast of Portugal, loses not a moment to make known, that he has received an express from the loyal inhabitants of Sines, and to assure them, as well as every true and loyal Portuguese engaged in a just, honourable and glorious cause, such as the re-establishment of its rightful prince, that all the support lying in the power of his Britannic majesty's fleet shall be given.—Captain Smith commanding his Britannic majesty's ship *Comus*, is charged to deliver this express, and instructed to proceed to Sines, in order to lend a prompt and immediate assistance.—The British Admiral undersigned can assure the inhabitants of Sines, and of the whole kingdom of Portugal, that the most energetic, valorous, and decisive efforts have been displayed, with the completest success to frustrate the perfidious designs of the French against the independence and even the existence of this nation. The French ships in Cadiz have been battered and compelled to surrender to the brave Spaniards; the people are in every part risen in arms, and the result cannot fail proving glorious. Similar energy must be attended with the same success in Portugal, and thus will the inhabitants of both kingdoms hold an equal right to the esteem, applause, and admiration of Europe.—The undersigned has received deputations from the provinces of the North of Portugal, already in arms, swearing to re-establish the government of their legitimate prince, and to resist their oppressors. At Oporto, Viana, in Entre Minho e Douro, and part of Beira, 100,000 Portuguese have risen in arms; and if their gallant countrymen in the South unite themselves to them, they cannot fail to overthrow the small band of Frenchmen now occupying the capital: but to vanquish, unanimity is requisite; let them not be intimidated by menaces, or be corrupted by promises; let them bravely and resolutely determine to rescue themselves from oppression, and to restore the government of their lawful prince.—General Junot has, even in his late edict, of the 26th of June, fulminated the most sanguinary threats against the inhabitants of Portugal: they are threatened with the destruction of the most loyal and populous

cities, and their inhabitants doomed to the point of the sword, by a handful of men amounting, at most, to ten thousand, bearing no comparison to the population of Portugal.—Woe to the criminal oppressors, if the loyal Portuguese encounter them fearless; the righteousness of their cause must triumph. Noble enthusiasm pervading the ranks can never be daunted, if all access to seduction be precluded. A vigorous resistance, conjoined to the energetic efforts now exerting by your valiant neighbours and friends, the Spaniards, resolutely engaged in the same glorious cause, must have the happiest issue; as yet there are thousands in Portugal anxious to emulate the deeds of their forefathers, in loyalty and glory. I repeat it to each loyal Portuguese, that all the aid of which his Britannic Majesty's fleet is capable, shall be given in behalf of a cause so just, glorious, and honourable, as the restoration of its lawful prince, in whose name the standard ought to have been raised in the south, as has been done in the north, for all the loyal to repair to.—Given on board his Britannic Majesty's ship *Hibernia*, anchored at the Mouth of the Tagus, July 1, 1808.—(Signed) CHARLES COTTON, admiral of the blue, and commander in chief of his Britannic Majesty's fleet.

Proclamation of General Castanos to the Andalusians.

Valiant Andalusians! The flame of patriotism has, in a few days, burst forth with such brilliancy, that it has consumed the oppressors of the nation.—You desire to be free, and in a moment you found a protecting government, and an army, anxious for battle and for triumph.—Those legions of Vandals, who, for a time, surprised some of your cities, which they delivered up to plunder: those insolent men, puffed up with the victories they had gained over nations that were not united; who sold by wholesale the plunder of Europe, and laid waste the most fertile fields with fire and sword, have felt what the love of country and religion can do.—Valiant Andalusians, yours is the glory of Marengo, of Jena, and of Austerlitz. The laurels that adorned the brows of those conquerors are at your feet.—Immortal glory to the hero who has renewed in the Sierra Morena the exploits of Fabius Maximus! Our children will say—“Castanos has triumphed over the French, and his glory did not fill the houses of our fathers with mourning.” Unfading laurels to the brave, who destroyed the insolent oppressors of the human race! Blessings upon the wise government that defended our

rights and prepared for triumphs!—Yet you are not Andalusians alone; you are Spaniards. Fly children of Spain! fly to your brethren on the Ebro, the Douro, and the Xucar, fly to break the chains of the captives of the Tagus, of Manzanares, and of Loboscat.—Blot out from the Spanish soil, even to the last footstep of these perfidious wretches—avenge in their blood the insults they have offered to the shade of a weak and cowardly government! Hear you not the cries of the murdered on the 2d May? Do you not listen to the lamentations of the oppressed? Are you not moved by the secret sighs of our Ferdinand, weeping his separation from his countrymen?—War and vengeance!—Tremble, tyrant of Europe, upon your throne, where you are covered with all sorts of crimes—Valiant Andalusians! Think no sacrifice too great that is to recover your king, and restore your independence. You possess a country. Be a great nation; follow the paths of glory and of virtue, which, under the God of armies, have led you to this first victory!

Surrender of General Dupont. From the London Gazette, Downing Street, August 10, 1808

A dispatch of which the following is a copy, has this day been received by the right hon. lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, from lieutenant-general Sir Hew Dalrymple, K. B. dated Gibraltar, July 24, 1808. My Lord, I enclose a Report from Captain Whittingham, containing the details of a complete victory obtained on the 19th instant, by General Castanos, over the French corps, commanded by General Dupont and Wedel, and I take the liberty of congratulating your lordship upon the glorious result of the day—I have the honour also to state, that I have received a letter from General Castanos, by the same courier, expressing the satisfaction he has received from the services of Captain Whittingham. I have the honour to be, &c. H. W. DALRYMPLE

Head-quarters, Andujar, July 21, 1808

—Sir, I had the honour to inform you, in my letter of the 17th July, that in a council of war held on that day at head-quarters, it was resolved that the division of the Marquis de Campigny should join that of Major General Reding, and that the attack upon Baylen should be undertaken with the united force of the two divisions, whilst the third division and the reserve should occupy the attention of the enemy, by a feigned attack upon Andujar. Major-General Reding entered Baylen, on the morning of the 18th, at nine o'clock; he met with little opposi-

tion. The enemy retreated towards La Carolina. The Major-General went to the Commander in Chief for orders, either to advance against Andujar, or to pursue the column which was retiring upon La Carolina. General Castanos ordered him to advance upon Andujar without delay.—On the 19th, at two o'clock in the morning, the General received information of the retreat of the French from Andujar. Lieutenant-General Pena, with the reserve, was ordered to advance immediately towards Baylen. The French began their retreat at nine o'clock p. m. 18th July. A letter from General Reding informed the Commander in Chief that he intended commencing his march from Baylen towards Andujar at three o'clock a. m. 19th July. At two o'clock p. m. the advanced guard of General Pena's division came up with the enemy. At this moment an express arrived from Major-General Reding, to inform the Lieutenant-General that he had been engaged with the division of General Dupont from three o'clock in the morning till eleven, that he had repulsed the French, and remained master of the field of battle. The guns of the advanced guard of Lieutenant-General Pena's division had scarcely begun to fire, when a flag of truce arrived, to treat upon the terms of a capitulation. The discussion did not last long—General Dupont was told he must surrender at discretion—Lieutenant-General Pena halted, and formed his division upon the heights of Umbra, distant three miles from Baylen, between four and five o'clock, General Casterrick, Aid de-Camp to Bonaparte, was sent by General Dupont with orders to treat with General Castanos in person.—At nine o'clock, p. m. Major-General Reding informed the Lieutenant-General, that during the truce he had been treacherously attacked by General Wedel, who was just come from La Carolina with a reinforcement of six thousand men; and that the battalion of Cordova had been surprised and taken prisoners, together with two field-pieces. The negotiations lasted till the evening of the 20th, and the glorious result I have the honour to inclose, as also an exact account of the killed and wounded, on both sides, as I have been able to collect in the hurry of the moment. The French themselves acknowledge the bravery and steadiness of the Spanish troops; their firmness, constancy, and perseverance, under the greatest possible privations, are worthy of the admiration of the world, particularly when it is remembered that half the army is composed of new raised levies. The Marquis Campigny is detached with his

division to take immediate possession of the passes of Sierra Morena. General Castanos deserves the highest praise for his well conceived plan, and for the cool determination with which he has carried it into execution, in spite of the popular clamour for an immediate attack on the position of Andujar. Whilst the negotiations were carried on, General Castanos received an intercepted dispatch from the Duke of Riego to Dupont, ordering him to retreat immediately upon Madrid, as the army of Galicia was rapidly advancing. This determined the General to admit the capitulation of General Wedel. *French Force*—Division of Dupont, 8000 rank and file—Division of Wedel, 6000—Total, 14,000—*Spanish Force*—Beding, 9070—Cospigny—5000—Pena, 6000—Jones, 5000—Total, 23,000*. Nearly 5000 of the French killed and wounded.—From 1000 to 1200 of the Spaniards killed and wounded.

Terms of Capitulation—The division of General Dupont prisoners of war. The division of General Wedel to deliver up their arms till their arrival at Cadiz, where they are to be embarked and sent to Rochefort. There no longer exists a French force in Andalusia (signed) S. WHITTINGHAM, 13th Light Dragoons.—N.B. The division of General Dupont is also to return to France by Rochefort.

By letters received from lieutenant-colonel Doyle, at Cornuna, and from major Roche, at Oviedo, of the 8th and 9th instant, addressed to Viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, it appears, that various letters, from respectable authorities, at Madrid, and also public gazettes, had been received, both at Cornuna and Oviedo, stating, that on the 29th ult. in the evening, the French began the evacuation of Madrid. Upon the 30th the evacuation continued, and, upon the 31st, Joseph Buonaparte with the remainder of his troops, quitted the capital for Segovia. This measure was attributed to the French having received the account of the surrender of general Dupont's army in Andalusia.—The French carried with them all the artillery and ammunition they could find means to convey, and spiked the cannon, and damaged the powder they left behind; they also plundered the places and the treasury; they were followed by the Spanish ministers who had acted under the French, and, in general, by all the French who were settled in business at Madrid. Upon the 1st of August it was believed there was not a Frenchman remaining in the capital.

* Of this total, one half peasantry.

Admiralty-Office, August 16, 1808.—Copy of a Letter from Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the Mediterranean, to the Hon W W Pole, dated on board the Ocean, off Cadiz, Aug 25, 1808

Sir,—I have the pleasure to acquaint you, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, that the French troops, under general Dupont, consist of about eight thousand men, considered themselves prisoners of war, on the 20th instant; having lost about three thousand killed in some partial actions, which took place on that and the three preceding days.—General Wedel, with about six thousand, who had arrived to reinforce Dupont, has capitulated, on condition of his corps being embarked and sent to Rochefort.—The copy of a letter from captain Whittingham to lieutenant-general Sir Hew Dalrymple, detailing the operation and its success of the Spanish forces, I beg leave to inclose.*—I am, &c. COLLINGWOOD.

Copy of a Letter from Sir Charles Cotton, Bart Admiral of the Blue, &c &c to the Hon W W Pole, dated on board the Hibernia, off the Tagus, the 31st July, 1808

Sir,—Inclosed herewith I transmit, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, copy of a dispatch received by me this day from Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood, detailing the defeat and surrender of general Dupont's army, together with the capitulation of the force under general Wedel to general Castanos, by these fortunate events the whole of Andalusia is said to be cleared of French troops. I have the honour to be, &c—(Signed)—C. COTTON

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 21, 1808.—By the Scout I informed you, that the French forces, under general Dupont, have surrendered to the Spanish army. and having to day received from the president of the supreme junta of government at Seville the official account of it, I do myself the honour of transmitting a copy of it for your information.—COLLINGWOOD.—Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart Commander in Chief, &c &c &c off the Tagus

Most Excellent Lord,—It is with the greatest satisfaction that the supreme junta informs your excellency of the happy success which our arms have had over the French army under generals Dupont, Wedel,

* See the dispatch from lieutenant-general Sir Hew Dalrymple to Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

and Gobeit, they having laid down their arms, as is set forth in the inclosed papers, which accompany this for your information, being persuaded of the noble interest your excellency takes in our most just cause.—The victory could not have been more complete, and there does not remain one Frenchman in Andalusia, there not being a single individual of the three divisions, which, by their own statements, amounted to more than 20,000 men, that has not been either killed or taken prisoner.—The rejoicing is so general and so lively, than an idea of it cannot be given, and we expect it will be the same in your Majesty's squadron, through the favour which the Spanish nation owes to British generosity.—God save your excellency—(Signed) FRANCISCO DE SALVEDRA VICENTE HORTE ANTONIO ZEMBRANO ANDRES MINAN. JUAN BAPTISTA ESCHER Secretary of State—Place of the Real Alcades of Seville, July 22, 1808—To his Excellency A General Collingwood.

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL DUPONT

The following letters form an interesting part of the official reports of Gen. Castanos. They were seized by the Marquis de Coupigny on a courier dispatched by Dupont, and were published by the supreme Junta of Seville.

To the Duke de Robigo (late General Sivarry), general-in-chief of the French armies in Spain July 15

I have the honour to inform you, that the enemy has advanced in the front of our position, with all his forces, before Andujar, consisting of from 15,000 to 18,000 men, and artillery, consisting in part of 12 pounders. While we were attacked in front, a body of 3000 men, which had passed the river below Andujar, came through the middle of the Sierra in our rear. The 6th provincial regiment was detached to combat them, and succeeded in repulsing them. Another body of from 5000 to 6000 men, which was at Villanueva, threatened our left flank. Two battalions of the 4th legion were sent to oppose them, and a brisk engagement ensued; but the enemy, in spite of his superiority, could not throw our troops into disorder, and the adjoining post, by means of which we obtained our provisions, was not insulted. In like manner, the enemy sent a considerable body beyond Menjibar, situated on the road to Jaen, by Baylen. General Liger de Lair covered this position, in order to defend the road to Carolina, and General Bedel passed it the same night with his whole division, in order to reinforce it.

I do not yet possess the necessary details, but I have reason to believe that Gen. Gobeit will have maintained his post profitably. Gen. Gobeit marched this morning to Baylen, in order to support General Bedel. His division is extremely weakened, having been obliged to detach six other battalions, three of which were stationed in the Mancha and the Sierra, for the security of the communication. It is of the utmost importance that this corps reunite itself as soon as possible. The enemy has taken a position upon the heights before Andujar. Every thing announces that to-morrow a new attempt will be made more serious than that of to-day. We shall resist to the utmost. Your excellency knows how difficult this position is, more especially since provisions are to be procured in the day with the greatest difficulty. The soldier is obliged to reap the corn and make the bread at the same time, the peasants having left the harvest to join the rebels. I implore your excellency to send the necessary reinforcements, in order to resume our operations instantly. The interests of his Majesty the Emperor and the King of Spain demand it; and it is a matter of deep regret to have given the enemy an opportunity to act offensively against us. To-day we have sustained an insignificant loss in repelling the attack of the enemy. General Bedel preserves his position, and the enemy has not yet gained any advantage over us.

To the same—July 16.

I have the honour to transmit to your excellency a duplicate of my letter of yesterday.—The enemy maintains the same position, and occupies the heights in front of Andujar. He has erected his batteries within cannon shot of our *tete du pont*. We suspect that he will renew his attack this day, and we will receive him with the most firm determination to maintain our position. General Bedel guards the road from Jaen to Baylen, and I have charged him to watch that from Jaen to Ubeda; I have also charged General Gobeit to guard the road to Carolina, as of the utmost importance in maintaining our communication with Madrid. The enemy manifests a regular plan in his attacks, and our inaction has given him courage. I believe, as I have suggested to your excellency repeatedly, that we ought to lose no time in resuming offensive operations, if not, the fire of insurrection may spread from the South to the other provinces, and the regular troops, which are dispersed, may be drawn to take part with the rebels. It is better that we, for the present, take no notice whatever

of some partial movements which may arise in some points in order that we may be able to meet with sufficient force against the enemy in the South, which is in open war against us. Further, I beg your excellency to observe, that it is more than a month since we have occupied Anaguar; that this country has been ravaged by the enemy, and that we cannot draw from it but the most scanty means of subsistence. Our troops would have had no sustenance, if the soldiers had not been daily employed in reaping the wheat, and made their own bread; but now that they are constantly under arms, they cannot employ those means. Your excellency will know how impatient the army is to resume their operations, and the moment of doing so can never come too soon. I beg your excellency to assure his majesty of the zeal of his troops in his service. Yesterday they gained somewhat more confidence. All motives concur to induce us to fight instantly a decisive battle,

To General Beliard.—July 16.

I have written to you, my dear general, the result of the affair of yesterday. We remained master of all our positions; but we confidently expect a fresh attack this day on the part of the enemy. This day is the anniversary of the victory of Tolosa, obtained over the Moors; and religious prepossessions confer great importance upon that epoch in the minds of the Spaniards.—I have written to the general in chief, that we have not a moment to lose, in order to quit a position where we cannot subsist. The soldier being under arms all day, cannot reap his corn and make bread as before, for the peasants have left their cottages and their harvests. I implore quick reinforcements; in a word, a corps of troops in one mass, and not removed from each other at too great distances. I beg you to provide for keeping up the communication, so that the division of Gohert may unite with us. If we suffer the enemy to maintain the field in the South, all the provinces, and the other troops of the line, will hasten to take the part of the rebels. A decisive blow in Andalusia will contribute much to the subjugation of all Spain. Send me medicines, and linen for bandages, with the utmost promptitude, for the enemy intercepted, in the mountains, a month ago, all the moving hospitals and the supplies from Toledo, &c.

THE CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE OF ENGLAND PRACTICABLE?—From the Corona Britannica.

Were the old and new continents under

the dominion of a single monarch—were his orders capable of being obeyed and executed along the coasts of every country on the face of the globe, and were his sovereign resolutions exempted from the interruptions of necessity and contingent circumstances, in that case the continental blockade might be practicable and effective. But that a single kingdom (or empire, if you will, though it does not command the western maritime parts of the continent of Europe) should require all the other powers, without any regard to their position, relations, and wants, to deprive themselves of the benefit of commerce, to forego the necessities and conveniences of life, to destroy their superfluous native productions, and to dispense with all the auxiliary advantages afforded by industry and navigation, is an extravagant pretension, impracticable with regard to foreign dominions, unjust and tyrannical at home. It is an established axiom, that maritime ports are the fountains of national riches, from which proceed the influx of specie, and all the commodities, both of the first necessity and of luxury. If this entrance to public happiness is shut against the human race, men must confine themselves to the native products of the soil, and, from the want of the precious metals, be reduced to general indigence. Without this resource no nation could raise itself to greatness; armies could not be maintained, nor conquests projected and executed; and hence it was always wisely conceived that that power would command the continent which should possess the dominion of the seas, and carry on a flourishing commerce and navigation. Notwithstanding these undoubted truths, France, which for nineteen years has in this respect done nothing but project the most ridiculous, quixotic, and almost impossible enterprizes, ventured to declare a continental blockade against the English, and that too before she was absolutely mistress of the coasts of Europe. The novelty of the idea surprised all those credulous beings who admire whatever is new and extravagant; but it necessarily attracted the ridicule of all true politicians, who considered it as an adventure similar to that which the illustrious hero of La Mancha undertook against the windmills, which he supposed to be the wicked enchanters of his fair Dulcinea. In fact the report of Talleyrand, the approbation of the senate, and the imperial decree of Buonaparté upon this subject, are comic originals, which would have been very fair game to such men as Plautus, Martial, &c. Engaged in a hazardous contest with Russia, Sweden, and Prussia—not absolute master of Denmark,

Spain, Austria, Portugal, and Turkey, and even before he had yet conquered Calabria, and expelled from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean the Pope and the Queen of Etruria, could any thing be more ridiculous and presumptuous than, under such circumstances, to decree that the whole continent should shut its ports against the English, and sacrifice its interests, commerce, and territory, because such was the sovereign pleasure of Napoleon. The decree, however, went forth; and the exalted imaginations of French visionaries already beheld the industrious Britons expiring under their burdens, and left to the mercy of the waves. What a sad picture did they give us of their situation! Great Britain presented nothing but inactivity, famine, discontent, and frequent insurrections; and there were some who already beheld King George on his knees, imploring peace from the hero of the age, the arbiter of the destinies! So great is the influence of falsehood, under the reign of ignorance! But the English, though excommunicated by the bull of Buonaparté, instead of declining, continued to advance in riches and strength, whilst specie was disappearing in France and Spain, and the man of opulence was compelled to eat the same breakfast with the potter, for want of sugar, coffee, cocoa, and other colonial commodities. The colonies, both Spanish and French, were, in consequence of this decree, exposed to the manifest hazard of being revolutionized, and proclaiming themselves independent. Those of his allies, who exist by commerce alone, would have been compelled, as the only means of saving themselves from total ruin, to cast off the protection and alliance of their lord Napoleon, and his armies would have run the risk of being dissolved and dispersed, in consequence of there being no more money to plunder, nor kingdoms to conquer; at the same time that having no maritime force to cope with the British, the latter would continue in the exclusive enjoyment of the commerce of the Indies, and the necessity of obtaining the productions and manufactures of Europe would compel the inhabitants of America to open their ports to the English. The project was therefore ridiculous and chimerical, and Buonaparté knew well enough that this was not the way to deprive England of the dominion of the seas, nor to deliver the ports of the continent from blockade, and to retaliate in his turn, for England had a force to keep us in a state of blockade, and Buonaparté had none to prevent it. But he longed to conquer and divide the continent among his

brothers, and devising this project, he concealed from the French his true intention, that he was dragging that nation into a field of slaughter, for the purpose of destroying kings, after having, in order that they might get rid of kings, sacrificed millions of the youth of France; and thus he disguised the private interest of his own family under the pretence of the general interest of the nation. This decree was, therefore, a political prognostic of the predicted articles of the peace of Tilsit, and the division of Europe into two empires: Buonaparté taking to himself, for the present, all that part of the continent which extended from the Vistula to Corfu, and is bounded by the Baltic, the Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic, leaving the rest to Russia; so that this project comprehended the conquest of Spain, Portugal, Etruria, the Papal States, Denmark, and the Hanse Towns, and ultimately Austria, which was the only thing wanting to complete his work of desolation. All were included in his decree of continental blockade, and this was a sweeping expedient, in order to furnish a decent pretence for the entrance of his armies, whose approach would have been preceded by proclamations, affirming that they came only, to compel the common enemy to keep within his own limits, and to conclude a maritime peace. The French appeared on the stage, and the performance commenced, and those who in the first act performed the parts of friendship and moderation, in the second boldly threw off the mask, and represented the robberies and frauds of their leader and his gang. The English, beyond all comparison wiser and more sagacious than the French, saw, in the execution of the decree of continental blockade, the destruction of the monstrous empire of France, and the recovery of the freedom of Europe and the world. They protected their allies, and left the other powers to be undeceived by experience. All of them are accordingly undeceived, and resolved to shake off the yoke. They open their hearts and their ports to the English, who are capable of affording them, in the most generous and energetic manner, copious aid of every description, and on opening the communication, they find that Great Britain, instead of being sunk into dejection and poverty, is much more flourishing and opulent than before. They blush for having placed any confidence in the French, complain of their seductive proclamations, and for ever detest and abjure their friendship. They acknowledge with shame the absurd and extravagant course which they were

...granting their aid to the continental blockade; they now hold it up to ridicule, and swear eternal friendship to Great Britain.

Proclamation issued by the Emperor of Austria, for organizing a National Levée en Masse. Dated Vienna, June 9, 1808.

We, Francis I, by the Grace of God, Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, Bohemia, Galicia, and Lodomeria, &c. &c. Archduke of Austria, &c. &c.—We have discovered to our beloved subjects, in our letters patent, of the 12th ult. our design attending the organization of the reserves, namely, the defence of the monarchy, which is to be founded on such means as to afford us the possibility of facilitating the finances of state by a reduction of the regular army.—In this design we have found it good to organize a national levée en masse, tending to defend the country.—We do, for this end, choose a period when we are in friendly relation with all the powers of the Continent—for only then, if such measures are ripe adopted, and cemented by time, can success be expected from them, in case they should become needful.—To execute these measures, we have appointed plenipotentiaries, whose knowledge, zeal, and attachment to our person and the state, have been repeatedly tried, viz. for Austria, Carniola, Carinthia, Stiria, Triest, and Saltsburgh, our aulic commissioner, Count Von Saurau.—For Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, our serene cousin, his Royal Highness the Archduke Ferdinand, with our Upper Burgrave Von Wallis and Governor Count Lazansky.—For Lower Austria, and Austria on the Rhine, our serene cousin, his Royal Highness the Archduke Maximilian, with the President Count Von Bissingen and Baron Von Hackelberg.—For Galicia, our general of cavalry, Count Von Bellegarde, and the vice president of government, Count Von Wurmsier. They have received definitive instruction as to the manner and time of execution, and will take the other requisite measures accordingly.—We expect our beloved subjects, who have always shewn in a most laudable manner their unshaken devotion and fidelity towards us, will acknowledge in that regulation the full measure of our paternal designs, and assist to carry them into effect, with all their might, as a measure inseparable from their welfare. The activity and prudence displayed in this business shall obtain our special approbation, and recommend them who shall laudably distinguish themselves in this particular.—Given in our capital and place of re-

sidence, Vienna, June 9th, in the year 1808, and of our reign, the eighth year.—**FRANCIS.**—**ALOYS,** Count Von Ugarte; First Chancellor. **JOSEPH,** Baron Von der Mark. **JOSEPH CHARLES,** Count of Dietrichstein. **JOSEPH,** Baron Von Kielmansegg.

PORTUGAL.—Proclamation of the Duke of Abrantes (the French General Junot) General in Chief of the Army of Portugal, to the Portuguese. Dated, Palace of Lisbon, June 26, 1808.

What phrenzy agitates you? Into what an abyss of calamities are you about to plunge yourselves? After seven months of the most perfect tranquillity, of the most complete harmony, what cause have you to rush to take up arms—and against whom? Against an army which was to secure your independence, which was to maintain the integrity of your country, and, in a word, without which you would cease to be Portuguese. Who can thus urge you on to betray your own interests? Do you then wish that the ancient Lusitania should henceforth be no more than a province of Spain? What can you expect in a contest with an army, numerous, valiant, and inured to war, in whose presence you would be dispersed like the sands of the desert, by the impetuous blasts of the south wind? Do you not perceive that those who mislead you, look not to what may further your interests, but solely to the means of gratifying their revenge, and, provided the continent is disturbed, what signifies it to them how much blood may flow? Should those perfidious islanders land on your territory, leave me to combat them; this is the duty of my army; yours is to remain peaceably in your fields. I pity your error; but should you persist in it, should you continue deaf to my voice, tremble; your punishment shall be terrible. Can you regret a dynasty which had abandoned you, and whose government has so humiliated you, that you were no longer ranked among the nations of Europe? What do you wish for? To remain Portuguese? To be independent? This the great Napoleon has promised you. You, yourselves, have earnestly entreated of him a king, who, aided by the omnipotence of that great monarch, might raise up again your unfortunate country, and replace her in the rank which belongs to her. Doubtless, at this moment, your new monarch is on the point of visiting you. He expected to find faithful subjects; shall he find only rebels? I expected to have delivered over to him a peaceable kingdom, and flourishing cities. Shall I be obliged to shew him only ruins, and heaps of ashes,

and dead bodies. Would we tear over a desolate country? Certainly not. You would only be an unfortunate province of Spain. Your customs, your laws, every thing has been preserved. Is not your religion ours? Has it suffered the slightest insult? Are not you, on the contrary those who violate it? You yield to the seduction and guidance of heretics, whose only wish is to destroy you and your religion. Ask the unfortunate Irish catholics what oppression they groan under in their own country, and by the orders of their own government. Is it not you who violate it, by obeying the ministers of that holy religion, (whose first precept is obedience and submission to the laws,) when they dare to instigate you to commit murder and assassination upon men who lived in the midst of you as brothers? Let them tremble! They will pay dear for the calamities which they inflict upon you; but you, Portuguese, will be the unfortunate victims of their crimes.—If there still existed a few abuses in the administration, the experience of each successive day was diminishing them. My decree of the 14th of June has already regulated an interesting branch of the finances, by settling the pay of the soldiers on a sure footing. The salaries of the administrators and judges are regularly paid. The emperor Napoleon, satisfied, in consequence of my reports, with the public spirit in this kingdom, has just remitted the half of your contribution; and it is at the instant that he is accomplishing all your wishes, that you permit yourselves to be hurried away by the influence of a few miscreants; it is at the moment of reaping the fruit of your tranquillity—it is at the instant that happiness is within your grasp, that you deliberately cast away from you even the most distant hope of it. Well! Portuguese, you have only the interval of a moment to implore the clemency of the emperor, and to disarm his wrath. Already his armies in Spain approach your frontiers; if you hesitate, you are undone. Lay down your arms; return in peace to your homes; imitate the tranquillity of your capital, and the adjacent provinces; follow your agricultural pursuits; reap that fine harvest which heaven has sent you, after so many alarms of a dreadful famine, from which I have been able to preserve you. Expel with horror from among you those wretched miscreants whose only object is the pillage of your cities. Merit pardon by prompt submission, and a prompt obedience to my orders; if not, think of the punishment which awaits you.—Every city, town, or village, which shall take up arms against my forces, and whose

inhabitants shall first upon the first alarm, shall be delivered up to pillage, shall be destroyed; and the inhabitants who shall be taken to the sword.—Every individual taken with arms, shall be instantly shot.—Done at the head quarters, in the Palace of Lisbon, June 26, 1808.—(Signed) The Duke of Anguines.

TUSCANY.—*From the Paris Papers, July 18, 1808.*

In pursuance of an imperial decree, dated the 12th of May, at Bayonne, an extraordinary junta is appointed to conduct the administration of Tuscany. It consists of general Menou, the councillor of state Auchy, and the masters of the rolls Chaban, Degerando, and Jeanet, together with the auditor Balbe Berton Crillon, secretary general. General Menou takes the title of governor, is invested with the chief command of the troops, and will officiate as president of the junta. According to a decree of the junta, the commencement of the session of the extraordinary junta will be notified to all the civil and military authorities of the three departments of Tuscany. The following proclamation to the inhabitants of that country has been ordered to be published and placarded all over the three departments:—*Tuscans! His majesty the emperor and king has been pleased to confer upon you the honour of being adopted into the great family, and of uniting yourselves to the destiny of the empire formed by his genius. Napoleon the great adopts you as his children, and the French salute you by the name of brothers.*—This adoption promises to you all the effects of the beneficent cares of our illustrious emperor—the protector of religion and morality.—You will now be happy. You will receive a code of laws, which being the offspring of wisdom and the experience of ages, secures the rights of property, and the stability of families. Your agriculture and industry will flourish. You will restore to Tuscany, the native country of a Dante, Gallileo, and Michael Angelo, the Athens of Italy, that splendour which the Belles Lettres, the arts and sciences, of which it was the cradle to modern Europe, formerly conferred upon it.—Delegated from the greatest of heroes and of sovereigns, our first wish is to merit your attachment. To attain this purpose, we have nothing more to do than to make you acquainted with, and faithfully to fulfil the instructions which we have received. Your feelings have even anticipated our wishes; and already, not less than ourselves, your esteem, love, and admire our illustrious emperor.—Tuscans!

They are good, virtuous, and a loyal people. The emperor knows and esteems you. Place your whole confidence in him. Let violent men of all parties become silent, and forego their absurd expectations. Let the brave, the wise, and the impartial classes of persons unite, and as in all other parts of France, possess one soul and one heart. It is by such conduct, that you will make yourselves worthy of being the children of Napoleon.

BRITISH ARMY—General Orders.

1st, The officers of infantry, with the exception of the mounted officers, are to wear black cloth leggings when on duty, and at all inspections and reviews.—2d, Officers are to wear their hats straight when on the parade or on duty, and not with the corners in front.—3d, The mounted officers of infantry to wear the shoulder-belt and regulation sword.—4th, Lace on the skirts of the officers' coats is contrary to regulations, and must be discontinued.—5th, The staff sergeants to be dressed according to regulations: the sergeant-major, and quarter-master-sergeant, to be distinguished only in the manner pointed out.—6th, The bugle horn players to be dressed as the drummers of the regiment.—7th, The men are to carry their great coats at inspections and reviews, as likewise on all duties.—8th, Regiments not provided with grenadier caps and pinner appointments, are to be immediately supplied.—9th, The plates on the caps of some of the corps, and the sergeants' swords and sashes, (the latter being crimson) are reported contrary to orders. They must be in strict conformity to the king's regulations, and the general officers will give orders accordingly, and see that they are complied with.—10th, The clothing is to be made up in strict conformity to the sealed patterns; and general officers, when inspecting regiments, are enjoined to pay particular attention on this head, and to report any deviation therefrom, for which commanding officers will be made responsible.—It appeared some time back, on an inspection being made of the clothing of the militia, that the coats of many regiments were so tight, particularly in the sleeves, as not to admit the waistcoat being worn, which was supposed to be the cause of the sickness which prevailed at the close of the last winter, and the early part of the spring. The colonels must be cautioned with respect to the ensuing clothing, and the general officers will be careful to see that the men have on the proper waistcoat with sleeves, which

is always to be worn, except in very hot weather. (Signed) W. SHENK, Mij. A. Assist Adj Gen I. D.

SWEDEN—From the Stockholm Gazette.

Head-quarters, Gralsby, July 27.—His royal majesty received yesterday the following report from field-marshal Count Klingenspor, dated Head-quarters, New Carleby the 20th instant.

My last report was of the 9th instant and was dispatched by messenger Brodin. Major Fleandt was since forced to retreat from Peroo and Kockous, and to fall back upon Dinkas. By this retrograde movement the rear of our army was so much exposed, that no long but a brisk attack on the enemy's main force, near Lappo, could ward off the impending danger. I therefore ordered the major general Adlercreutz to take the command of the troops assembled near Lower Hama to attack the enemy, which was done on the 14th inst. with so much success, that victory, although dearly bought, declared in favour of your majesty's troops. The enemy has retreated since that action to Salmi, and taken up there a strong and advantageous position.—Before the above expedition against Lappo was undertaken, a Swedish brigade, with a considerable park of artillery, marched under the orders of Colonel Von Essen from Socklott to Dunkar, to join major Fleandt's corps, and make a diversion in that quarter, but the enemy's position was found so strong, as to render an attack in front utterly impossible. I accordingly ordered Colonel Essen to endeavour to turn the enemy, but before he was able to perform that movement, he received intelligence, that the enemy had left the above position, and was retreating, burning and destroying all the bridges immediately after he had passed them. Colonel Von Essen is in full pursuit of the enemy, and I entertain some hope, that this operation will soon force the enemy to quit Salmi, and fall back to Knortine and Alawo.—Colonel Sandals has reported from Sawolax, that he detached major Aerehiki, with 500 men, in fifty small boats, to make an attack on nine of the enemy's gun-boats which had sailed from Kuopio: although the object of this attack, to take the above gun-boats, could not be attained on account of the enemy's superior weight of metal, and the wind coming foul, yet the enemy's gun-boats were compelled to make a precipitate retreat to Kuopio.—M. KLINGSPOR, Field-marshal and general-in-chief of the army.

"Here, not to be corrupted is the shame."—POPE.

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LETTER I.

TO THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORS

OF THE

CITY AND LIBERTIES OF WESTMINSTER.

St Austle, Cornwall, Aug. 22, 1808.

GENTLEMEN,

It is now sometime since I had the honour of addressing a letter to you. Indeed, having completely extricated yourselves from the trammels of the regularly drilled opposition, as well as from those of the ministry of the day; having, by actions as well as by words, clearly proved that you are no longer to be made the dupes of any set of trading politicians, there remained no longer any occasion for me to trouble you with my advice. It is not, therefore, with a view to convey to you either advice or instruction that I now address you. My object is to communicate to the nation at large facts, which I have recently collected, which, in time, may, if deeply imprinted upon the minds of men, become of great public utility, and I choose, as the vehicle, an address to you; first, because I am always anxious to show you marks of my respect, and, secondly, because, as it will evidently appear from the sequel, the conduct of the persons, of whom I shall have to speak, is of that sort which you, above all other men in the kingdom, have a right to canvass and to judge of.—The subject is that, in which, more than in any other, you have, of late years, shown that you took an interest; namely, *the means that are used for returning Members to the Commons House of Parliament*; but, when you observe what part of the kingdom it is, whence I address you, you will not anticipate any very striking instances of those salutary effects, which many persons were sanguine enough to expect from the excellent example, given by you, of purity of election.

On the 19th and the 20th of this month, there were two Trials, at the assizes, held at Bodmin, in this county, and, it is the facts, brought to light upon these trials, that I am about to communicate, having taken particular pains correctly to collect them.—As for yourselves, you appear to

have imbibed a thorough conviction, that, until the constitution be again acted upon, in substance as well as in form, with respect to the electing of members to serve in parliament, there will be, and can be, no really useful reform, of any kind, take place; that all the talk and all the attempts, relating to abuses, will in future, as they hitherto have, produce no other ultimate effect, than that of causing new burthens to be laid upon the people; that it is foolish, to hope for any of the political changes, which all good men would wish to see take place, until measures be adopted to give good men a chance of having a voice in the returning of those, who have the power to promote or, to prevent such changes; that, in short, while the source is foul, while that is poisoned by corruption, it must be folly in the extreme, or the basest hypocrisy, to believe, or affect to believe, that the stream can be pure. With respect to the foulness of the source, generally speaking, there are few persons who have any doubt; and, except the Edinburgh Reviewers and their disciples, including your old friends, the Whig reformers, there are no persons, not interested in the trade of votes, who do not lament the existence of the evil. All men have a general notion of the vile traffic that is carried on in Boroughs; but, notions received from general descriptions have not upon the mind the same effect as those which are received from a detail of facts, especially when that detail is of undoubted authenticity. For this reason it was that I attended personally the two trials above spoken of, took down the evidence with great care, and strictly watched the whole course of the proceedings; and, in now communicating to you, and to the public through you, what transpired and what took place upon this occasion, I am not without hopes, that something may be done towards the precluding of that deep and general abhorrence of these corrupt practices, which must precede the adopting of measures for their destruction.

In both of the cases, to which the trials related, SIR CHRISTOPHER HAWKINS, Baronet, was the principal party accused. The first was a prosecution of him and eighteen others (amongst whom was a clergyman)

by order of the House of Commons, for a conspiracy to corrupt the voters of the Borough of PENRYN, in this county. The charge was in substance this: that, in the year 1805, there was a committee formed in the borough; that this committee was composed of all the accused parties, Sir Christopher Hawkins excepted; that these parties, about the month of November, 1805, drew up a paper, which was to be, and which afterwards was, presented to Sir Christopher Hawkins; that, in this paper it was stated, in the form of stipulations, that, in return for the patronage of the Borough, to be given unto him, Sir Christopher Hawkins should, amongst other things to be by him done, pay annually to the two overseers of the poor ten guineas each, and that, besides this, he should pay to certain other persons *twenty-four guineas*, each, and to others one pound each; that this paper was, by certain persons of the committee at Penryn, taken, the day after it was drawn up, to the seal of Sir Christopher Hawkins, a place called TREWITTEN; and that there Sir Christopher agreed to all the conditions, contained in the paper aforementioned.—Before we proceed to the evidence, given in support of this charge, it is necessary to observe, that, at the election which took place in the summer of 1806, that is to say, the Whig general election, which produced the short parliament, Sir Christopher and Mr Swann, who is by some called the *luck* Swann, from his dress, I suppose, and by others more emphatically called, *lawyer* Swann, were candidates on one side, and that Messrs. Wingfield and Trevanion were candidates on the other; that the two former were returned; and, that the two latter were finally seated, it having been proved to the satisfaction of the committee who tried the merits of the petition presented by them, that the former had been returned in consequence of the bribery and corruption, stated in the charge, in order to punish which bribery and corruption the House of Commons, in pursuance of the report of the committee, issued their order to the Attorney General.—The Attorney General was, in this prosecution, represented by Mr. Serjeant LENS, aided by Messrs. JEYKELL, BOROUGH, and DAMPIER, while, on the side of the defendants, appeared Mr. GARROW, as the sender, aided by Mr. Serjeant FELL and Mr. EAST.

It was my intention not to note down any thing at all that should be said by the pleaders on either side; but, to confine myself solely to the facts which should be given

in evidence. From this intention, however, I was induced to depart, by the doctrine laid down by Mr. Serjeant Lens, the representative, upon this occasion, of the king's Attorney General, and the executor of the commands of the House of Commons. This gentleman, after some common-place observations upon the excellence of that constitution, "under which we have the happiness to live, and which has insured to us that freedom which has made us the envy of the world;" after a good deal of this, of which you have heard so much from the lips of the Pitts, the Dundases, the Roses, the Longs, the Steeles, and, indeed, from every creature which has derived its subsistence from the taxes; after a quantity more than sufficient of this general, loose, and totally indefinite common place, Mr. Lens came to something more tangible; and he said almost in the very words, in which I shall give it to you, that "it was not the object of the prosecution to check the ambition of obtaining parliamentary interest, of securing a seat for oneself, or of being in a situation to point out others to fill seats in parliament; that he would not inquire whether voting by the people was, or was not, the best source, whence to derive the right of sitting in parliament, that could be devised; that he would not say, that, if the nomination had always rested solely with Sir Christopher Hawkins, he might not always have selected persons the most proper, and that, assuredly, there was nothing to object to in the gentleman (*lawyer* Swann) who had been selected upon this occasion; that he reprobated those idle theories, which supposed no previous connection or understanding between the candidate and the electors; that if it should appear, that, by patronage, nothing more was meant, in this case, than promises of serving the electors, or any part of them, or of pointing out other gentlemen who would be able to serve them by recommendations, or other acts of benevolence, he should then say, that such patronage was not only blameless, but laudable, that he wished to awaken in the minds of the jury no dormant notions about abstract principles, but to confine their view to the practice of the constitution."—Upon this doctrine, Gentlemen, it is quite unnecessary for me to comment, at any length, in a letter to you, who have given to the nation a convincing proof, that nothing can be easier, when men have the virtue to do what the constitution prescribes, than to make the practice of it exact.

is conformable to the evidence. The evidence on the side of the alleged conspirators (said) not to signify their satisfaction at Mr. Lens's doctrine, and well they might be satisfied with it; for it was manifest enough, that what their clients were charged with was what was, in substance, *practised*, in many instances, at every general election; and, you may remember, that, at the time when the House of Commons ordered the prosecution, I took the liberty to ask, how it happened, that the advertisements, which daily appeared in the news-papers for the purchase and sale of seats, were suffered to pass, not only unpunished, but unnoticed, by the House, though, at that time, your old friends, the Whig-reformers, were in power.

The first witness that was called was BENJAMIN MOON, and his evidence was as follows. He states, that Penryn is a scot and lot borough, the whole number of voters being about two hundred; that he was a resident there in 1805, that, in 1805, a club or committee was formed, as he believes, but, it is so long ago, that he has but a very confused recollection of the matter, that he can scarcely call it a committee, that some neighbours met to spend their expences and to chat a bit in an evening, that he thinks, though the thing has almost fled from his mind, that they did talk something about Sir Christopher Hawkins, that he can scarcely remember what that something was; that he has a faint recollection that, at one time, there was a sort of talk about selecting a patron for the Borough, and he is sure he thought there was no harm in it, that Lord De Dunstanville had been the patron before, and had declined being so any longer; that he (Moon) was a member of the committee, which consisted of about 16 or 18, of which Mr Dillon, a clergyman, was one; that there was a meeting of the committee about November, 1805, that he cannot say what day exactly, it being almost like a dream to him, that the object of the meeting this day was to sit down, and have a little chat, as usual, that he does not remember, very particularly, conversation that passed that evening, recollects that certain persons (whom he names) were present, recollects that something or other was said as to what was to be done the ensuing day, and about going to Sir C. Hawkins's house, but it is in his mind like a shadow, that he went the ensuing day, or the day after that, to Sir C. Hawkins's, accompanied by some of the members of the Committee, and found Mr Dillon already there, together with two others of the Com-

mittee. He believes that he and the rest elected Sir Christopher to become the patron of the Borough, in which he could perceive no harm; thinks that a paper was produced to Sir Christopher, but cannot, if put to the rack, recollect what was said when the paper was produced, to the best of his recollection Sir Christopher took up the paper, thinks it was taken into another room by Sir Christopher, Mr Cuttcor (Sir Christopher's steward, or agent) went into the other room, his some notion that Chilcot, when he returned, brought another paper with him, something was said about Sir Christopher's becoming the patron of the Borough; saw no signature to the paper brought by Chilcot, is all in a maze, and scarcely knows what he says, thinks the other paper was signed by some one, thinks it might be signed by the parties who went from Penryn, does not know that it was signed by Sir Christopher, believes Sir Christopher read the paper, does not know that all present heard it read. "What did you hear read from the paper?" "I can recollect scarcely any thing of it. I am sure I meant no harm in the world. It was something that Sir Christopher agreed to be patron of the Borough, or something like that."

Here he appeared to the Judge, whether he was bound to answer questions *tending to criminate* himself, and the Judge having told him that he was not, Mr Serjeant Lens produced a juryman, under the Great Seal, for all the times he (Moon) might have committed in the transactions in question. A dispute between counsel, as to the extent of the effects of this plea having been decided by the Judge, the examination of Moon proceeded as follows.

"What were the contents of this paper?" "The paper related to the patronage of the borough. What else? Something about an agreement to take him up as patron of the borough. What was that something about? Why, I think, it was to agree to pay the usual sum. What was that usual sum? I believe it was *twenty-four guinees*. When Sir Christopher read the paper was it mentioned twenty-four guinees, or the usual sum? I think, twenty-four guinees. Had you ever heard this paper read before? I think I heard it read at the meeting before." He said at Sir Christopher's about four hours, dined there, and returned with others to Penryn that evening, never saw the paper since, thinks it was laid on the table of Sir Christopher, does not know who put it away, that was after it was signed."

"What became of Croggen's paper? Think Mr. STONA had it." After Sir Christopher had read the paper, he said he had no objection to it, or something similar; was at the first meeting of the Committee afterwards; does not recollect all of those who might be present; says STONA, DILLON, and some others were; it was, at this meeting, resolved to vote for Sir Christopher; does not remember any thing else that was done; does not know whether the names of ROE and HENWOOD were mentioned; cannot speak positively; ROE he knows to be a farmer, and he knows HENWOOD; this was the first meeting of the committee subsequent to the visit to Trewithen; recollects that it was resolved to vote for Sir Christopher, for the sake of peace; cannot recollect any thing else; cannot say what did pass, but something must have passed relating to the subject of the meeting at Sir Christopher's; never recollects seeing ROE at any of the meetings; does not recollect any thing very particular that was said at this meeting; believes that something was said of what ROE was to do. "What was he to do?" He was to go round and speak to the people, to the inhabitants, to his friends, to all the party, to the voters. "What was he to say to them?" Does not recollect. "What was he to do?" "To the best of my recollection he was to give them something to drink health." "Whose health?" "I believe, the peace of the Borough." It might be said Sir Christopher's health; believes it was so. "What was the sum he was to give?" Has some notion that it was twenty shillings; believes that this was to each voter that would accept of it; never heard HENWOOD's name mentioned in the Committee; has seen ROE and HENWOOD several times go about the streets together since the meeting; has seen them go into the houses of the voters; was an overseer of the poor in 1805 and 1806; received ten guineas each year, as overseer, through the hands of CROGGEN; was a voter when overseer; at Sir C. Hawkins's it was agreed that ten guineas a year should be paid to each overseer by Sir Christopher; it used to be paid by the patron; Sir Christopher said he was satisfied to do it, as it had been done before; Mr. DILLON paid the money to Mr. CROGGEN, he being a magistrate; saw Sir Christopher go about the Borough, but not, as he knows, to canvass any one.

Cross-examined by Mr. GARROW.—Had no idea that the money was for purposes of bribery; the sums given were not, by him, regarded as having the least connection,

with election purposes; did not think, at first, that there would be any opposition; voted for Sir Christopher and SWAIN; became a witness in support of the petition of Wingfield and Trevanion; had ever respected my Lord De Dunstanville, who was a most worthy nobleman; never heard of the pardon, till it came into court.

Examined by the Judge.—"Now, MOON, answer me; and recollect, that, I told you before, when you knew a thing, and say that you think it, or believe it, you swear falsely.—What was said, at Sir Christopher's, about giving the usual sum, and to whom? I don't recollect. To what description of persons? The voters. Was it twenty-four guineas each, and did Sir Christopher agree to give that sum? He said he had no objection. What persons were then in the room? STONA the elder, DILLON (he adds other names). Was it said how often twenty-four guineas were to be given? No. Was it said when? Time not specified. For what was twenty-four guineas the usual sum? Cannot tell, my lord, am sure I never meant any harm; I did not know that there was any thing wrong in it. Was that sum ever given but after an election? I do not know that it was. Did you ever see twenty-four guineas given at any time? No, my lord."—Twenty-four guineas was mentioned in presence of the defendants; they, at their previous meeting, agreed that that sum should be proposed to Sir Christopher; at the same time it was agreed to propose to him to give twenty guineas a year to the two overseers, who were both voters; it was understood, at the meeting, that the sums of twenty-four guineas were to be given to voters, not to every voter, but to each of some of them only; it was intended for the friends who voted, if they chose to take it; what he heard read from the paper, by Sir Christopher, agreed with these previous arrangements; to the best of his knowledge he heard Sir Christopher read about giving the usual sum; has no doubt of it; not quite so sure, that he heard him read about the ten guineas to each of the overseers.

Messrs. EDWARDS and WARREN, two attorneys of this county, were called to prove, the service of notices and the Speaker's warrant upon Sir Christopher Hawkins, and the other defendants, to produce the paper described by MOON; and, it appeared, from the evidence of Mr. Warren, that, when he served the Speaker's warrant upon STONA, that latter told him, that the paper (which was fully described in the warrant) had been

destroyed long since; and, that, as to the other paper, namely, the other part of the agreement, he knew nothing about where it was.

J. W. CHILCOT (the steward or agent of Sir Christopher Hawkins) was the next witness examined, and his memory appeared to be quite as good, to say the least of it, as Moon's was bad. No faltering; no hesitation; his answers were all off-hand; and, as Mr. Garrow exultingly described him, he seemed to be a witness intended by nature to form a contrast in point of memory, with Benjamin Moon — He saw the paper at Trewithen; he read it; copied it, in another room, by the direction of Sir Christopher; brought back the original and the copy and laid both upon the table; saw one paper in the hands of Sir Christopher, and the other in the hands of the Committee; saw signatures to one paper; no signatures to the original when he copied it; saw the party from Penryn all sign one paper; never saw either of the papers since that day; cannot tell which paper was taken away; last saw one paper with Sir Christopher and one with Stona; he read the paper aloud to both parties before he copied it; Stona, the Rev. Robert Dillon, and others were present; read it for the purpose for them all to hear; Sir Christopher ran his pen through some parts of the paper, and then desired him to copy it; copied it, leaving out the erased parts; the paper contained from four to six propositions, but not more than six; and, at the head, stated that its object was to *restore peace and tranquillity to the borough of Penryn*; one of the propositions was, that the patronage of the borough should be offered to Sir Christopher Hawkins; another, that Sir Christopher should, at the next election, have the power of naming a member to serve in Parliament for the borough; another, that, when there should be a second vacancy, the party opposite to the corporation, should name a member; another, that they should support Sir Christopher with their votes and interest; there was another, but is not certain whether that was in the paper at last, or not, and this related to the *supply of news-papers* for the corporation, as usual; did hear a conversation about the ten guineas a year to each of the overseers; heard of no other money propositions; about December 1806 was directed by Sir Christopher to pay expences incurred at the election; paid a hundred pounds to Mr. J. Stona, in ten notes of ten pounds each; sent the money by William Williams; has Stona's receipt.

Roe was called. This man had, by Moon, been described as a *farmer*, and I wish,

with all my soul, that my abilities were equal to the task of giving you, Gentlemen, an adequate description of this Cornish farmer. He appeared to be between fifty and sixty years of age; his stature was rather athletic; his shoulders were somewhat rounded by age and labour; his hair was coal black, intermixed with white; his complexion dark and ruddy; his lips were drawn inwards to the complete hiding of the red, which extended the latitude of his cheeks, already more than sufficiently wide; his eyes, which were piercingly sharp, were to be perceived only in glances through his long and overhanging eye-brows; and, as he mounted, with slow and cautious step, into the witness box, he turned his head from side to side, with a look as wary and as anxious as if he had thought, that, from every point of the hall, a pistol was aimed at his head. Good God, what a look! — This man, this Cornish farmer, being asked what he had to do with Stona, in April, 1806, answered, after some hesitation, that they had some *money-matters* to chat about. "What was the nature of those money-matters?" "I do not think it *safe* to *myself* to answer that question." The Judge then said. "Roe, it is my duty to inform you, that you are not bound to answer any question, if such answer shall tend to criminate yourself." "Thank you, my lord! thank you, my lord! very much obliged to you, my lord!" And thus, in repeating his expressions of self-convicting gratulation, he left the box and sunk from our sight, leaving me, for a moment, under the horrid idea, that I had, in coming over some of these western hills, in the night, been taken up by the wind and conveyed across the Atlantic; where there are, with some exceptions, a whole nation of Roes.

J. W. CHILCOT, of excellent memory, was called again after the descent of Roe, and questioned by the Judge. Does not remember what was contained in the parts struck out of the paper; Sir Christopher Hawkins said, when it was proposed to insert the condition relative to the ten guineas annual allowance to the overseers, "*no, no; she had better not insert that.*" There was a conversation about ten guineas to the overseers; has not a recollection of what was finally settled upon this head; does not know, that any thing was said about paying voters; the paper contained nothing about paying the overseers.

Here, the evidence being closed, Mr. Garrow made a long speech, which, as far as it related to the case, contained nothing, which, if given verbatim, could be at all interesting to you, as it consisted principally

of an exposure of the prevarications and self-contradictions of Moon, which were too palpable to escape the observation of any man. But, this gentleman, in the out-set of his speech, took occasion to deprecate this mode of putting men upon their trial, that is to say, in virtue of *an order of the House of Commons*. He very concisely and very ably described the several other modes of putting men on their trial, that by bill of indictment, that by information issuing upon rule from the court of kings bench, that of information ex-officio by the attorney general, of all which he highly approved, nay, he said, that if, upon this occasion either the attorney general or the learned serjeant who represented him here, had been left to exercise their wisdom upon the matter, he should not have objected to it, "but," said he, turning up his nose, "it is *not* *that* *sanction* does this charge, levelled against the same of nineteen honourable men, come before you, gentlemen? Why, verily, tossing out the back of his hand, "that of *an order of the House of Commons*." — Serjeant Lenscombe is doing the up hill cause, which he had to sustain, and especially with the defence which he had to make of the *source* of the prosecution, acquitted himself with great ability. But the serjeant, who, notwithstanding his constitutional doctrine appears to be a man of great merit, and by no means impudent, could not help feeling the cruelty of his opponent in throwing upon his shoulders a defence of his clients, the House of Commons. He appeared to feel the whole weight of it, and, as he did not venture to seek revenge, by hinting that Mr. Garrow's contempt of the Honourable House, might, perhaps, be justifiable upon principles of reciprocity, evidently laboured, to the end of his speech, under the great disadvantage of following a triumphant adversary. The Honourable House had, at this trial, the singular misfortune, to have a doubt raised, respecting its understanding, by the means which it had adopted for what is called "preserving its purity," and, when Mr. Lenscombe made use of this last quoted expression, it was quite shocking to perceive the irreverent feelings, that appeared to be excited, though, as I afterwards was given to understand, that "Honourable Gentleman, Mr. HORNER, was not only in court, but actually sitting at the bar in a black gown and a white wig.

The JURY (Mr. Justice Bailey), who, if he ever had any stoith or arrogance about him, appears to have very wisely left it all at the bar, summed up the evidence in a very

clear and impartial manner. He said, that there appeared little doubt of there having been some such agreement as that which had been described in the evidence, "and," said he, "gentlemen, it is scandalous and atrocious in itself, that men should deliberately bargain for the purchase and sale of that which the law requires should be given freely, without reward, or promise of reward, and which, moreover, they swear to give freely, and totally unconnected with a pecuniary view, but, as these acts affect society they are to be considered as still more detestable, for, if cathars can be thus sported with, it is quite impossible that we should derive from moral obligation, any security for property or life, and, as to the constitution, if acts like these are regarded as harmless, it is, though it has been, and may still be, our boast, something less, if possible, than a shadow. He told the jury that the bargain for giving ten guineas to the overseers was full as unlawful as any other part of the agreement because, it was the duty of persons appointed overseers to serve that office free of reward, or emolument, of any kind, or in any shape, that any money given to them by Sir Christopher Hawkins, in consequence of a bargain, such as had been described, could be considered in no other light than that of a bribe, under which description, indeed, came all the promised sums of this bargain, or agreement. "But," said he, "gentlemen, we must not suffer our abhorrence of the crimes charged, to lead us away from a due and dispassionate consideration of the question, whether they have by the evidence that we have heard, been brought home to the defendants? And here, gentlemen, you will perceive, that the only witness, whose evidence makes for the prosecution, is Benjamin Moon. If you believe the account which Moon, in the latter part of his examination, has given of the agreement between Sir Christopher Hawkins and the committee from Penryn, there can be little hesitation in finding the defendants guilty, but, it is my duty to point out to you why he is in no case safely to be relied on. He then went on to shew the prevarications and self-contradictions of Moon, he pointed out how his memory became clarified after the pardon had been produced, and shewed, which, indeed, was the obvious fact, that if Moon swore truly in the latter part of his evidence, he swore falsely in the former part of it, and that if he swore truly in the former, he swore falsely in the latter, so that, at any rate, this man,

upon whose evidence alone a verdict of guilty could be pronounced, had, in the presence of the jury who was to pronounce that verdict, manifestly shown that he was not to be believed.—The jury gave a verdict of NOT GUILTY, to the perfect satisfaction of all who heard the trial, because, as the Judge observed, however well they might be satisfied, that something unlawful and very dishonourable had taken place; however strong the presumptions might be against the defendants; still, it were better that they should escape, than that any man should be found guilty upon the uncorroborated evidence of such a witness as Moon.—Here I will, for the present, take my leave of this trial, with observing, that, to all the other numerous causes of impunity to bribers and corruptors, may be added this, which appears to be peculiar to them, that, when hard pushed, they frequently derive security from the infamy of their friends.

I am,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful, and most obedient servant,
WM COBBETT.

LETTER II.

TO THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORS
OF THE
CITY AND LIBERTIES OF WESTMINSTER.

Ivy Bridge, Devon, Aug 24, 1808
GENTLEMEN,

In the case, to which the second Trial related, SIR CHRISTOPHER HAWKINS, BARONET was also, as I stated before, the principal party. There were five other defendants, and, in this case, it will be necessary, with a view to a clear explanation of the transactions, in which they were concerned, to give you all their names, and, moreover, it is right that the example of the clergyman whom you will find upon the list, should not be hidden from the world. The defendants were, then, Sir Christopher Hawkins, Recorder of the Borough, and whom we are now to contemplate as the patron of the Borough of GRAMPOUND (for there appears to be no bounds to this gentleman's "laudable ambition," as Mr. Lens calls it, in this particular way), William Symons, the Mayor, the Rev. George Moore, John Croggon, David Varcoe, and George Hoyte, the four latter being Capital Burgesses, a dignity of which you will have hereafter a clearer notion.

Before I come to the particular acts, of

which these persons stood charged, you should be informed of the circumstances, which led to the commission of those acts.—For about twenty years, preceding the summer of 1806, Sir Christopher had enjoyed the uninterrupted patronage of the Borough. It appears that, at the election, which immediately followed the White resolution, at the time just mentioned, Sir Christopher took one seat for himself, and placed in the other a Mr. Fawcett, then, I believe, lately returned from Hindostan, that country so famous for breeding members of parliament; that, from some cause or other, the electors of Grampond were not satisfied with the demeanour of their new member, who failed, I believe, in discovering, after the election was over, a sufficient degree of that "laudable benevolence," of which Mr. Lens gave us a rather imperfect description; that the electors, or a majority of them, after having waited a reasonable time, complained to Fawcett of this his conduct; that Fawcett assured them, and convinced them, that the fault was not his; that he, considering Sir Christopher to be not only generally the more experienced person, but, in this special instance, much better acquainted with the usages of the Borough, as well as with the individual merits and claims of the voters, had delegated to him the full power of acting on his part; that the dissatisfied electors represented this to Sir Christopher; that he, not then foreseeing that another election was likely so soon to take place (nor during his life, perhaps, for he appears to be nearly seventy years of age), gave them but a very unsatisfactory answer, consisting of mere words, which are wind, that, however, it happened, unfortunately for Sir Christopher, that there very soon after arose a strong probability of Sir Christopher's own seat becoming vacant at Grampond in consequence of the transactions at Penryn, of which transactions you have already been made acquainted, that, upon the dawn of this probability, the dissatisfied electors of Grampond (who were a decided majority) conceived the idea of withdrawing their Borough from the patronage of Sir Christopher, and, as you heard at the time, did actually offer, in case the expected vacancy should take place, to elect Sir Francis Burdett, or any gentleman whom he might recommend to their choice, that Sir Francis declined the offer for himself, but recommended to them, upon the presumption that they meant to act upon principles quite disinterested, to elect the HONOURABLE ANDREW COCHRANE JOHNSTONE, a gentleman

man whom he regarded as having been most cruelly oppressed, and whom he was anxious to see in a situation, where he would be able to do something, at least, towards protecting others from similar oppression; that, before the proceedings necessary to produce the vacancy of Sir Christopher's seat, upon the Penryn charges, could be gone through, came the No-POPE dissolution, in April 1807, which, of course, gave the electors of Grampound an opportunity of choosing two new members instead of one, and of completely ousting Sir Christopher from his patronage of the Borough; that now Mr. Cochrane Johnstone with his brother Mr. George Augustus Cochrane, went down, and offered themselves as candidates, in opposition to one Williams, a London banker, and Alexander Baring, an American merchant, standing upon Sir Christopher's interest, and, by a very large majority were elected; that Williams and Baring petitioned against the return, and that the election was, on the 9th of March last, declared to be void; that on the 17th of the same month, another election took place, when (Mr. Cochrane Johnstone being abroad) Capt. Holmes stood in his place, along with Mr. George Augustus Cochrane, who (against the same Williams and a Mr. Teed, a Navy agent and banker at Plymouth) were elected by a majority of *thirteen*, they having *twenty-seven* votes against *fourteen* on the side of Sir Christopher's candidates; that the Mayor, however, who was one of those who were satisfied with Sir Christopher's patronage, struck off, under various pretences, as many votes at it was necessary to strike off, in order to leave Sir Christopher's members a majority of one vote; that Cochrane and Holmes petitioned against this return; and that, in a very short time afterwards, they were, by the decision of a committee of the House of Commons, placed in the seats, which had been, in consequence of the unjustifiable return of the Mayor, filled, for a few weeks, by Williams and Teed.

Now, Gentlemen, we come to the transactions which formed the subject of the trial, on the 20th instant, at Bodmin, and which took place in pursuance of a criminal information, filed in and issuing from, the Court of King's Bench, against the defendants.—You have seen, that Sir Christopher had lost the Borough; that he had lost the majority, but that he had not lost *all* the voters. There were still some, and those the leading ones, in his interest, who, for reasons quite sufficient in all probability, were satisfied with him as a patron. The object was, then, in

the autumn of 1807, to add, if possible, to the number of Sir Christopher's voters, before another election, from whatever cause, should take place. It was in vain attempted to draw over the voters of the Cochranes, who, by *what means*, I do not, observe me well, pretend to say, had attached their majority firmly to their interest. This mode of adding to Sir Christopher's voters appearing to be hopeless, another was attempted, namely, that of *increasing the number of voters in the Borough*, taking care that the increase should consist wholly of persons who would vote for Sir Christopher, or candidates set up by him. An increase was actually made accordingly, and, it was of the crime of "conspiracy and mis-demeanour," committed in the making of this increase, that the defendants stood charged.

I regret the going into further preliminary matter, but, Gentlemen, in order to arrive at a clear and correct conception of the acts charged against the defendants, it is necessary that you follow me through a description of the "constitution" of a Cornish Borough; which, for reasons that you will not find it difficult to discover, is not considered less "glorious" by the electors of Grampound, than another constitution (in its present practice) is, by Mr. Serjeant Lens and the people at Whitehall.—The body corporate of Grampound consists of a Recorder, who has no vote at elections; of a Mayor, who has a vote; of *eight Capital Burgesses*, who have votes; of an *indefinite number of free-men*, each of whom has a vote. Now, the number of free-men being *indefinite*, you will, at once, see, that the power of making new free-men is, as to electioneering purposes (and, indeed, those appear to be the only practical purposes for which the corporation exists) of the greatest importance; for, if the Recorder, or the Mayor, or any of the *few*, could make free-men at their pleasure, it is very evident, that they would, by one means or another, always get as many votes as they wanted to keep down such of the free-men as should be opposed to them. Therefore, in order to insure to the free-men the means of self-protection, in this respect, the following rules have been adopted, and have, it appears, been in usage from time immemorial. It was proved, that it is only at two fixed periods in each year that new free-men can be legally made; that these two periods are at, or near (a circumstance of no importance), Easter and Michaelmas; that upon these occasions there are other matters to transact, and that it is not a necessary consequence of

the meeting of the corporate body that any free-men at all should be made, which you will easily perceive to be the fact, from the small number of voters now in the Borough; that, these meetings are called courts-leet, or law-courts, at which the Mayor presides, assisted by the eight capital Burgesses, who are sworn to be of *good council* (good lord!) with the Mayor; by the Recorder; and by the Town Clerk, whom I shall have the honour, and no small one you will find it to be, of introducing to you anon; that, the court being thus assembled, on the days fixed, as before-mentioned, the Mayor chooses two of the Burgesses, who, when so chosen, are called *Elizors*, to be fore-man of a jury; that, the Elizors then choose a number *not less than ten*, from amongst the freemen, who, together with the two Elizors form a *jury*, which jury, having first taken an oath in the form of a Grand-Jury oath, retire to the chapel (the parish church being at a distance) and draw up a presentment, which they sign, and then deliver it to the court, that, in this presentment, they may, if they see fit, include the nomination of new free-men, which free men, so presented, acquire, at the distance of a year and a day from that time, the right of voting for members of Parliament.

In these rules, Gentlemen, you will see that there existed a complete check upon the higher against the lower order in the Borough, and you will now see how this check was got rid of. There were found to be, at the last Michaelmas court (the time when the acts charged against the defendants were committed) but *seven* free-men in favour of Sir Christopher Hawkins. It was, therefore, if the ancient custom was adhered to, impossible to procure the making of new free-men in his favour; because, at the very least, it required, for that purpose, *ten* free men in his favour. The *19th of October*, is the day fixed for the holding of the autumnal court. Previous to this day, various means are stated to have been made use of, in order to bring over the requisite number of free-men; but, these means having failed, the court, in a few minutes after it was assembled, adjourned, *without any cause alleged*, to the *26th of October*; and this, the charge stated, was for the purpose of bringing over free-men, in the mean while, by the means of bribery and corruption. The 26th arrived, however, without the expected success; now, therefore, as a last resource, it was determined to make up a jury which should be wanting in the accustomed proportion of free-men, which determination they thus executed. The

Mayor named two *Elizors*, the first of whom was *David Farcot* and the other *George Hoyte*, and these two, instead of choosing *ten or more FREE-MEN* to be their co-jurors, chose the *seven* free-men in the interest of Sir Christopher Hawkins, and four *CAPITAL BURGESSES* one of whom, by-the-bye, was a *reverend* Wm. EDWARD DILLON, and another of them, a person in his *dotage*. This jury, as might be expected, presented some persons to be *new free-men*. There were *six* of them, I believe, but the exact number is immaterial. The free men, who were in the interest of the Cochrane, presented a protest against this proceeding; the facts were afterwards stated, by affidavit, to the Court of King's Bench, and upon those affidavits, a criminal information was issued, upon which information the defendants were put upon their trial, at the time and place above mentioned, before Mr. Justice Bailly and a common jury; and I will now proceed to lay before you the evidence given in support of the charge,

The first witness that was called, after a Mr. HUNT from London, who produced certain documents containing proof of the existence of the Borough, was a person who could speak as to some customs thereof, and also as to some rather unimportant circumstances relating to the assembling and adjoining of the court-leet, on the 19th of October. And here, Gentlemen, I am forcibly tempted into a digression, which, though it will extend a letter, that already threatens to be of an immoderate length, will, I am satisfied, give you a clearer insight, as to the political state of the county of Cornwall, than you will be able to obtain from any of, or all, the publications, at this day extant. When this person's name was called, the sudden direct on of all eyes towards the spot whence his answer issued, together with the complaisant, and I wish truth would not let me add, the obsequious, look of but too many at the bar, made me conclude, that the person, about to be examined, was a *lord*, at the very least, and I could not help thinking to myself, that it was a good deal better to be a lord in Cornwall than in St. James's street. But, Gentlemen, guess, if you can, at my astonishment, when, upon the termination of the evidence of this man, to be known to whom some of the advocates, on both sides, seemed to be proud, I looked up behind me (to the side of the judge where he was standing) and perceived an *attorney*, of the name of COOPER, with a bundle of smoky papers in his hand, tied round with a bit of pack-thread! This was the *Town-Clerk* of Grampound, upon whose advice, as he him-

said that the court of the 19th of October was adjourned, and who attended as town-clerk, on the 20th of October. There was very little to excite interest in the conduct of this man, at Grampound; nor did his evidence seem to be very important; but, what the devil entitled him to the privilege of giving his evidence from the side of the bench where the Judge was sitting! I put this question to one of the counsellors, who, after having taken a moment as it were to reflect upon the probable cause, told me that Coode was the *under-sheriff* this year. Not satisfied with this, however, I applied, for further explanation, to a neighbour on my left, who, at first, answered me with a "hush, hush, hush," raising his eyes slowly towards Coode, and, at last, fixing them upon him, in a look, expressive of the veneration and awe, which, through the windows of the print shop in Pill Mall, you see so admirably blended in the representation of ABELARD kneeling before the Crucifix — In short, not to waste my and your time in minute descriptions, I found, that this man's name was Edward Coode, the partner of another attorney of the name of Charles Rashleigh, that these men, as attorneys, have the giving of, perhaps, three or four hundred fees in a year, that Rashleigh is Receiver-General of the county, and Clerk of the general meetings of the Deputy Lieutenants, that is to say, in fact, the representative of the Lord Lieutenant, that Coode is Deputy Clerk of the Peace for the county, Treasurer of the county, Town Clerk of the Boroughs of Grampound, St Michael, and Fegmy, that Coode is, almost every other year (the law prohibiting his being so every year), under-sheriff of the county, in which years, you know, the law forbids him to be an attorney, and, of course, you know, he casts his capacity of attorney for those years, taking it up again at the end of each year, that Coode is, besides, a broker, that, together or separately, these men are agents, in one way or another, for two thirds of all those who have influence in the county, that Rashleigh, whose interest put GREGGON, the late county member, in, has now put in his own nephew in Greggion's stead; that such and so generally known and acknowledged, is the extent of their power, that the common people, who are backward neither in perceiving nor ridiculing the degradation of the higher orders, call these men, one King Charles and the other King Edward — Well might my poor friend Abelaïd cry "hush"! Well might an ignorant crowd stare with admiration! But, that the bar should look obsequious! That there should

be met with, amongst gentlemen by profession, and, what is more, men of really great talents, a rivalry in this the most degrading sort of *huggery*, is a reflection, at which the mind sickens with disgust.

The next witness called was EDWARD HOAKE — Sir Christopher asked him on the 19th of October, if he would be upon the jury, he answered that he was very willing; Sir C said that he wanted to bring in a few friends, the witness told him he would vote for any of his friends, Sir C. told him that he would get nothing from the Cochranes; witness answered that he expected nothing; was then told by Sir C that, if he would go into the jury, for the purpose of voting in free men, he would always be a friend to him, this was about half an hour before the court met.

WILLIAM GORRY said, that, about two or three days before the court met, on the 19th of October, the Mayor's son came for him and Restarick, they went to the Mayor's house, Sir C was there, and the Rev. Mr. Dillon was there, Sir C asked him to be on the jury, to bring in such and such men, the six that were proposed, he answered that he would not, and that he thought there was no necessity of bringing in any freemen at that court, Sir C said, that, if he would not, he could get ten of the party to bring in half the town, if he wished it, answered that he thought he could not get one, Sir C mentioned names, attended the court on the 19th, remembers that several freemen were present ready to go upon the jury; Restarick was not present at the conversation between him and Sir Christopher.

JOHN BROWN said, that all the defendants (naming them) were present, when the court was adjourned, on the 19th, Charles VARCOE (one of the Capital Burgesses put upon the jury) was so feeble as to be unable to walk alone, Varcoe did not appear to hear his name when it was called, Varcoe's son touched his father, when his name was called, and said, "you must say, *here*, father," Varcoe, when sworn (by Mr. Coode) appeared to be in a torpid senseless state, Varcoe was told when he was to kiss the book, says, that, in Jan 1807, he heard John Croggon and Symons (who was Mayor when this transaction took place) say, that, at a former election, Varcoe was in a state of dotage, and did not know what he said, has at different times, before October, 1807, heard the Rev George Moore say, that there could not be legally put upon a jury any more than two capital burgesses; and that all, except two, must be free men,

FRANCIS BROWN corroborates the evi-

denial of John Brown with respect to the dotage and imbecility of Varcoe; he saw Varcoe sworn; he saw Sir Christopher canvassing.

PHILIP LUKE said, that, between the holding of the two courts, the Rev. George Moore came to him, desired him and his wife to go to his house, and asked them if they would rather *live well*, or *hard*; he answered, that, to be sure, he would rather live well; the reverend George Moore said he would give him a line to carry to Sir Christopher at Trewthen, told the reverend Moore that he would not accept of it, and that he would not deceive his party for a thousand pounds, the reverend Moore told him to go and consider of it; here they parted.— Being cross-examined, he said, that, on the 19th, the Cochrane party met, and that a paper was drawn up about who should go to the court and who should stay away, that the old men were to stay away, because the old men had not strength to tarry upon the jury, it was understood that no presentments of freemen were to be made it was so agreed to, they went to the court according to this agreement, believes that the object was to tire out the other jurymen, a Goyen's, on the 20th, it was, from first to last, agreed, that no presentments of new free men should be made, they confined their resolution to the presenting of free-men.

ANN LUKE corroborates the evidence of her husband as far as relates to the offers of the reverend Moore, and adds, that she was sent to communicate, and did communicate, to that very reverend gentleman, her husband's rejection of the offer.

ISAAC WATTS says, that Varcoe did not know his own relations, his victims were sent for him, as for a child, on the 20th Varcoe told Watts that he did not know who was presented, between the 19th and 20th of October, heard the Rev Mr Dillon say, while the free men were huzzing in the streets, "We will have some of them *one way* or *one way*," "yes," said Symons, the Mayor, "for all their noise, we will do for them," Croggon said, "they talk of power, but, next week, we will let them see, whether we have any power or not" Symons said, he could put off the court for three months longer if he liked, and that they would do for their twenty-seven before the next week was over, Sir Christopher, who was present at this time, said, "mark those men who are now huzzing;" Sir C. said, "mind so and so, they shall repeat of it" Witness saw George Hoyte go into Goyen's; he told witness that he would

cause him to be presented (without notice as a free man) and that he and Varcoe were to be upon the jury. Between the two courts, George Hoyte told the witness, that Sir Christopher and the magistrates (meaning the Capital Burgesses) were going to meet that evening, being the 24th of October, to settle upon who should be presented, and that, if he liked it, he should be one of the new free-men.

JAMES COOK corroborates the evidence in proof of Varcoe's dotage; says that, for two years before, the old man was in a state of second childhood.

FRANCIS BROWN says, that, between the two courts, he heard Symons and John Croggon, talk about the court, both said, that they would make a presentment of new free-men next court, whether right or wrong.

JOHN BROWN said, that Siccombe, one of the new freemen presented, was not an inhabitant of the Borough at the time; he never had a house in the place, his father, indeed, lived at Grampound, he was there only a few days before the 20th; was there merely to see his friends.

JOSEPH DEVONSHIRE, who is above sixty years of age, has never lived out of Grampound above a year, never remembers any Capital Burgesses, except the two 1805, being upon a jury of the Borough, has talked upon the subject, with many old men, now dead, and never hears them say that any such thing was.

The evidence for the prosecution, which, from first to last, was given in a manner to excite, in the mind of no one that heard it, the smallest doubt of its truth, imposed a task upon eloquent Lewis (who was in this case, the *defender* of Sir Christopher) which he did not appear to think lightly of. As he had a very animated speech of serjeant Pell to answer, and had no evidence to produce, against that *which every man must believe*, he bent his endeavours towards persuading the jury, that the offence was of a *trifling nature*, and the punishment, if the defendants were found guilty, would be *extremely severe*. In the endeavour, which were well calculated for the jury, to whom he was addressing himself he was successful, notwithstanding the charge of the Judge, who after a very minute and fair review of all the circumstances of the case, and of all the facts that were established by evidence, at the close of a trial that lasted seven hours, told the jury, that the conduct of Sir Christopher and the other defendants, in adjourning the court, in the manner in which they did, that Mr Moore's offer to Luke and his wife, that the offer of Hoyte

to make *Waters* *friction* upon the understood condition of the voting for Sir Christopher, that Sir Christopher asking Goyen to be upon the jury, for the avowed purpose of bringing in such persons as should be pointed out to him; that all this was very mean and dishonourable, and not less unlawful, because, as each jurymen was to be sworn, when he went into the jury, all these several endeavours were made for the evident purpose of causing men to act contrary to their oaths solemnly taken, endeavours upon which it was hardly possible to bestow reprobation sufficiently severe. "The point," concluded he, "upon which your verdict must turn is, however, is this, whether the court of the 19th was adjourned with *good* or an *evil* intention. If you are of opinion, that the adjournment was made from the persuasion that a fair and impartial jury could not be formed at that time, and that, to secure the laudable ends, for which the court was, or ought to have been holden, it was necessary to adjourn it, you will, of course acquit the defendants, but, if you are convinced, that the adjournment was made for the purpose of obtaining time to bring some of the freemen over to make such a presentment as would answer the self-interested views of Sir Christopher and the other defendants, then I am sure I need not observe to you, that a verdict of guilty must be the result of your deliberations."—Ten minutes, or a quarter of an hour's whispering together, on the part of the jury, prepared the audience for what was to follow, it being quite impossible, that, as to *opinion* upon the matter, there should be the hesitation of a moment. They told the Judge, that they *could not agree*. He repeated, "If you are convinced, gentlemen, that the adjournment of the 19th was made, not for any laudable purpose, but for the purpose of bringing over, by promises, or otherwise, any number of free-men to be put upon the jury, in order to make such a presentment as would be likely to add to the number of free-men, in Sir Christopher's interest, it appears quite clear to me, that you ought to find the defendants guilty."—They turned round again, and, having literally laid their heads together for about five minutes, pronounced a verdict of NOT GUILTY; upon which, at eleven o'clock at night, a very numerous and respectable audience dispersed, leaving Sir Christopher Hawkins, who was, all the while, standing behind the people in the gallery, to an unenvied enjoy-

ment of the feelings naturally arising from an acquittal so pronounced.

To apply the knowledge derived from these details, to objects of a more general nature, shall be the task of some future day. For the present, Gentlemen, I shall content myself with having made a record of transactions, so necessary to be well and universally known; and shall console myself with the hope, that the day is not very distant, when, adopting your principles and imitating your conduct, the whole of the people of England, may raise their voice for that Purity of Election, without which, as the Judge observed upon these trials, our boasted constitution is, if possible, something less than a shadow.

I remain, Gentlemen,

Your faithful, and most obedient Servant,
WM CORBETT.

DUFF OF YORK—QUEUES

SIR,—I beg leave to recommend to your notice, the following Order issued lately by his royal highness the commander-in-chief, as I think it highly deserving of being transmitted to posterity, in your valuable record of official documents. I think it unnecessary to make any observations on this Order, as unqualified approbation, mingled with strong feelings of admiration, is the only sentiment which can possibly be excited by it. It is truly pleasant to find men high in office, occupied with matters of real importance! And it cannot fail to give satisfaction to every patriotic mind, to observe that the fire, kindled by the leaders of the Spanish revolution, has lighted up a correspondent flame in the sympathetic bosom, or at least, one of the great leaders of this generous nation; and that the impediments to cordial co-operation, on our part, are now about to be removed—I am, Sir, yours, &c.

D M

General Order, Horse-Guards, July 20, 1808.

"The commander-in-chief directs it to be notified, that in consequence of the state of preparation for immediate service in which the whole army is at this present moment held, his majesty has been graciously pleased to dispense with the use of *queues*, until further orders. His royal highness desires the commanding officers of the regiments will take care that the men's hair is cut *close to their necks*, in the neatest and most uniform manner, and that their *heads are kept perfectly clean*, by combing, brushing, and frequently washing them; for the latter essential purpose, it is his

"The property's pleasure shall be added to each man's regimental necessaries.—By order of his royal highness the commander-in-chief.
—(Signed). HARRY CALVERT, Adjutant-General."

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

SIR,—In taking up the gauntlet you have thrown I, perhaps, may only prove my own weakness, and then be classed in your numerous list of vanquished knights of the quill. However, I will, withstanding all alarm poise my weak weapon, since the battle is not always to the strong. Your sentiments are clearly expressed; but, the assertions and arguments of some of your opponents coincide so ill with their proofs and conclusions, I confess, I am at a loss to discover whether they intended to advocate the cause of sugar, or of corn. At all events, their contention against the prohibition of the use of grain in the distilleries, when they admitted the existence of a partial scarcity, was ridiculous enough; and betrayed more avarice than patriotism. I allude principally, to your cotemporary journalists and to the petitioners. I cannot, however, assent to the propriety of all your remarks on the question. In your last number, you exultingly ask "what will the barley growers say now? since the bill passed it has continued to advance, whilst oats have risen one third." This, Sir, is owing to the demand for both these articles in the North, where the partial scarcity exists; to the short crop of last year and to the shutting of the Dutch ports. In your former numbers, you have argued in favour of the continuance of the bill, whatever may be the situation of the country; whether excluded from intercourse with the continent, or possessing the fruits of an abundant harvest; and on this point we differ. As a measure of general policy I deem it a bad one, since it destroys the magazine which the distilleries afford; thus rendering us more dependent on the seasons and on foreign supply; it is, assuredly, as important to become independent of both these as of commerce. That this country has produced corn enough for its own consumption, and had considerable quantities to spare, may be proved by many authorities. I will take one which will shew, that when the farmer receives encouragement he will provide for the wants of the nation. Anderson, in his Essays, states "the average quantity of all kinds of grain imported into Great Britain between 1710 and 1750 amounted to 20,976 qrs. annually; the quantity exported to 665,435 qrs.; so that the

balance in our favour amounted to 644,459 qrs. During this period, it will be observed, wheat could not be imported at the price advanced to 53s. 4d. and not even then under a duty of 16s. if above that price and not exceeding 80s. the duty 8s. But, mark the difference, in 1757 the corn laws were altered and 48s. was fixed as the import price, and the duty 6d. per qr.; immediately the exportation began to decrease and, on the average of years, between 1773 and 1793, the importation exceeded the exportation by 430,157 qrs. In 1775 the imports exceeded the exports by 972,400 qrs.; making a difference in the quantity of corn produced in the years 1750 and 1775 of no less than 2,679,659 qrs." This deficiency, amounting to about one eighth part of our consumption, cannot be attributed to any change of seasons; but to the aforementioned alterations in the corn laws. Precisely in the same manner will the interdiction of the use of grain in the distilleries operate; by abstracting a portion of demand, equal to their consumption, and thus reduce the price and the quantities produced. This, however, would not be of such importance, were no other consideration involved; for, the supply would soon proportion itself to the demand, and the farmer would receive just the same profit. But, when we reflect on the misery of dependence it becomes a matter of serious concern; and I do contend that the distilleries, by consuming annually 470,000 qrs., may be considered as a provisional depôt, containing that quantity, and which may be served out when necessity requires. Yet, we are told by those who would have the measure adopted uniformly, that this is a trifling consideration compared with the distressed situation of the West India planters; and you have recommended that each article should be brought to the still loaded with the same duties and run the race fairly. A little consideration will shew the fallacy of such reasoning. Mr. Spence has clearly proved in his pamphlet, entitled, "the Radical Cause of the Distresses of the West India planters," that, by a combination of circumstances, there are 140,000 hogsheads of sugar produced, annually, more than there is a demand for, either at home or abroad!—the committee estimate the consumption by the distilleries at 30,000 hogsheads and Mr. Bosanquet admits that this new demand would not raise the price sufficiently. This sort of relief, to be sure, would be more potent than the late order of the mighty Duskirk hero respecting pig tails and the use of flour, in the event of famine,

but its effects would be very insignificant. Why, Mr. Cobden, should the West India planters be relieved at the expense of a much more valuable portion of the community? I can see no reason. You have repeatedly stated agriculture to be the only source of wealth; therefore, is it not manifestly undermining its basis to support the unwieldy fabric in the manner you have recommended? The question, Sir, appears to be this; shall we have dear corn and independence, or cheap corn and dependence? The former is the most desirable situation; and I would suggest means to obtain it but for the fear of their giving the land owner a pretext to advance his rents; which would soon reduce us to our present state. I would, therefore, urge the propriety of distilling from grain; and, if possible, increase the quantity so consumed by laying an additional duty on the importation of foreign spirits. Your correspondent, Mr. Young, has recommended a general enclosure; but this, I agree with you in thinking, would not remedy the evil of dependence. During the reign of George II. this country annually exported an immense quantity of grain; and since the accession of his present majesty, notwithstanding there have been upwards of 1500 acts of parliament by which more than 3,000,000 of acres are inclosed, we uniformly import immense quantities. This wonderful change can only be attributed to the increase of luxury and to the extended demand for the produce of pasture: which have induced the farmer to transfer his capital to the more profitable employment. A general enclosure, I do not believe ever would take place unless the import price of wheat were considerably advanced. A deal of waste land will not at the present price pay for the labor and expense of cultivation. It is for those more deeply read in the science of political economy to consider, whether such an interference of the legislature would prove most beneficial to the proprietor or to the public at large.—I am, Sir,—With great respect,
Yours, X. Y. Derby, 4. Aug. 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from p. 315.)—**ESCAPE OF THE SPANISH ARMY SERVING IN THE BALTIC.**—*From the London Gazette Extraordinary.*
Admiralty Office, August 23, 1808.—Dispatches, of which the following are copies, have been this day received at this office, from rear admiral Keats, addressed to the hon. Wm. Wellesley Pole:

Superb, off Sproe, in the Great Belt,

August 12, 1808.—SIR—I have the honour herewith to transmit a copy of my letters to vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez, relative to the escape and embarkation of great part of the Spanish army serving in this part of Europe: an event produced as well by the honour, patriotism, and talents of its distinguished chief, as by the assistance and protection which I was directed by their lordships' orders to afford it. If the weather proves moderate I hope to disembark the greater part on the island of Langeland this day, where we have already a post of 2500 men. I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) R. G. KEATS.

Superb, off Sproe, in the Great Belt, August 11, 1808.—SIR—I have the honour and satisfaction to inform you, that by an immediate and zealous pursuit of the measures recommended in the duplicate of instructions received by the Musquito on the 5th instant, his-excellency the Marquis de la Romana, and nearly 6000 of the Spanish troops under his command, were embarked this morning at Nyborg, which place he took possession of on the 9th.—By a combination of the same plan, more than 1000 have joined us this morning, by sea, from Jutland, and another thousand are thrown into Langeland, to strengthen the post held by the Spanish forces in that island, where it is proposed to land the remainder the moment circumstances of weather will permit of our moving. The arrival of the Spanish officer in the Edgar, on the 5th, of whose spirited escape to the squadron you were informed by captain Graves, greatly facilitated our means of communication.—No doubt could be entertained of the honour and patriotism of soldiers, who, indignant at the proposal of deserting their allegiance, though surrounded by hostile battalions, planted their colours in the centre of a circle they formed, and swore on their knees to be faithful to their country. All were equally anxious of returning to it. But one regiment in Jutland was too distant, and too critically situated to effect its escape: and two in Zealand, after having fired on the French general Frison, who commanded them, and killed one of his aid-de-camps, have been disarmed.—Some untoward circumstances having occasioned suspicion, and made a premature execution of the plan necessary, the wind and current being adverse, I left the *Superb* on the 9th, and went in my barge to the Brunswick, off Nyborg, and two hours after my flag was hoisted. On the 9th the general took possession of the town.—Although the Danish garrison yielded to circumstances, an armed brig of eighteen

boats, the Pama, and a cutter, the Salseman, of twelve, moored across the harbour near the town, rejected all remonstrance on the part of the Danes, and every offer of security made by the general and myself. The reduction of these vessels being absolutely necessary, and the Spanish general unwilling to act hostilely against Denmark, such small vessels and boats as could be collected were put under the command of capt. M'Namara, of the Edgar, who attacked and took them. On this occasion I have to lament the loss of lieutenant Harvey, an officer of much merit, of the Superb, and two seamen wounded; the enemy had seven killed and thirteen wounded.—I should have noticed that the Spaniards, irritated at the opposition their friends who came to their support met with, departed in some measure from the general's intention, and fired some shot at them before they struck.—Expedition being deemed of the greatest importance, I shifted my flag to the Hound in the harbour; and as neither of the 3 ships of the line, from circumstances of the weather, could be brought near in, 57 sloops or doggers, found in the port, were fitted by the seamen, into which great part of the artillery, baggage, and stores, were embarked that night and the following day, and removed to the point of Slysphari, four miles from Nyborg, where the army was embarked safely, and without opposition, this morning, notwithstanding the very unfavourable state of the weather, and they are now under the protection of his majesty's ships at the anchorage off the Island of Spioe.—Some sacrifices of horses and stores were conceived necessary by the general; and as I considered it right, under the peculiar circumstances, to enter into the views and wishes of the marquis de la Romana, every unavoidable act of hostility was rigidly abstained from, for I did not consider it any to bring away the brig and cutter that rejected our offer of security, and I forcibly opposed our entrance into the port; and I even undertook to liberate the vessels employed as transports, provided no interruption was made by any to the peaceable embarkation of our friends.—I should be unjust to the meritorious exertions of the officers and seamen employed on this short but fatiguing service, if I neglected to represent their merits on this occasion to you; capt. Graves's services were required afloat; capt. M'Namara, of the Edgar, undertook the equipment of the transports, with the embarkation of the stores; the embarkation of the troops was made under the direction of capt. Jackson, of the Superb, and capt.

Eskeyer, of the Hound; capt. Smith, of the Deviation; and capt. James, of the Klee, were indefatigable in their exertions in the various duties I assigned them. Many circumstances having combined to make an attack on the rear probable, great precaution was necessary.—Such guns as could be brought against us were spiked, and the embarkation was covered and most effectually protected by the Minx gun-brig and the two prizes, and by the very judicious disposition of the gun-boats, under the command of capt. May, of the royal artillery, who volunteered, and whose services on this and other occasions were highly useful.—It is not easy to express the joy and satisfaction felt by every class of the army at this event; and no circumstance, I believe, could have afforded more real pleasure to us all. One, the regiment of Zamora, made a march of 18 Danish miles in 21 hours.—I transmit herewith for your further information, copies of such letters as I deemed it requisite to address to his Exc. the Marq. de la Romana and the governor of Nyborg on this occasion. The replies to the former were verbal, through a confidential officer, and the latter were made personally.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) R. G. KEATS—Vice admiral Sir James Saumarez, &c &c &c.

Note.—Since this letter was concluded, we entertain some hopes that part of the regiment in Jutland, we thought lost, has escaped to the post at Langeland, by the western channel.

Superb, off Langeland, August 5, 1808.
—SIR—I have the honour to inform you, that I have received from my government the most positive instructions to endeavour to communicate with the Spanish officers commanding the troops of that nation in the vicinity of my command, and to concert with them measures to secure their retreat from any place of embarkation which they may possess, and for placing them in a state of security until transports for their reception can be provided to convey them to Spain, for which, as well as the necessary provisions, measures have already been taken, and indeed of the arrival of them I am in hourly expectation. Until that period shall arrive, they are welcome to share in the accommodation and provisions of the ships under my command, but as that might not afford ample means at present, although I am in expectation of the commander in chief, I would suggest, under the pressure of circumstances, the removal of the troops to some of the islands in the Belt for their perfect security.—But as a measure of this

magnitude to the interests of the Spanish nation would necessarily require a concerted plan, but by attention to partial interests the general one might suffer, I request an unreserved and confidential communication, either to the ships off Nyborg that stationed off Langeland, or any of his Britannic majesty's ships in the Belt, and through the bearer of this, or by any other means. I propose sending on Sunday, unless I should earlier receive some person on board, a flag of truce, under some pretext, to the Spanish post at Spøysberg, and if this should be safely received, I wish, in token of it, a small guard might parade in some conspicuous situation at noon to-morrow, near the English ship at anchor or under sail near Spøysberg.—In my present situation it is impossible, ardently as I enter into the views of my government and the Spanish nation, to attempt to lay down any fixed plan. My services, and those of every Englishman under my command, are devoted to the cause; but before measures can be adopted, we must communicate, agree on, and combine, as far as it may be possible, the interests of the Spanish troops in Jutland and Zealand with those in Funen and Langeland. I shall keep a ship for some days off Spøysberg; and every ship under my command will be on the look-out and receive any boats that may approach them. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) R. G. KEARS —To the officers of his most catholic majesty's troops.

Superb, off Langeland, August 7, 1808.

—Sir, understanding from the Spanish officer that the accompanying paper * is the true state and situation of the Spanish troops in Denmark and its dependencies, the following, according to the various circumstances that present themselves to my view, appears to form a plan that promises the fairest prospect of success to insure their security and ultimate embarkation.—Those in Zealand I would propose to force their way to the Peninsula, of which Halskon, near Corsoir, forms the projecting point towards Sproe.—That isthmus appears capable of being defended, or at least seems to afford the means of defence for a few days, till I could remove them to the island of Sproe.—Those at Frederisca, by seizing on vessels, might possibly force an embarkation, and unite with those on Funen, which might perhaps be favoured by some movements of the troops at Odense.—Separate, or united with those in Jutland, I apprehend those in

Funen could secure themselves in the Frowe Isle (peninsula) which terminates near the island of Romsoe, of which the pass near Kurteminde appears to form the Gorge, and I could, if necessary, remove them to Romsoe; it would greatly facilitate the necessary naval operations, and might enable me to send a ship of the line towards Frederisca to favour the troops in Jutland, if those in Langeland should be thought in security on that island; if they should, the other troops might be landed at leisure on that island, and the whole embarked from thence; but if the troops at present there are incapable of maintaining themselves at that place, in that case I must leave a ship of the line and a sloop, which could, at almost any time, receive them on board, and convey them to any other place that might be approved of, till transports could be procured for their reception.—My means, (three ships of the line and half a dozen small vessels at most,) are not, perhaps, sufficient to embrace all these objects at once; but the zeal and exertion of the officers and ships' companies would greatly diminish the difficulties, and I should be much aided in lending assistance to the troops at Frederisca, if, as I have before said, those in Langeland should be considered capable of maintaining that post without any immediate support. I am aware some sacrifices of horses, and perhaps cannon, might be necessary, and we must be prepared to encounter even unforeseen difficulties; naval arrangements and movements are ever dependent, in some degree, on weather; but I should hope to surmount them all. It would, of course, be right to drive in cattle, and take whatever provisions might be practicable with the troops, as it would not only save our present supply, which, the victuallers not having at this moment arrived, is rather scanty for the Spanish army, but would put me at ease on that score, provided any unavoidable delay should intervene, and prevent my sending supplies to them on shore.—In my present uninformed state I am not in a situation to judge how far it might be in the power of, or deemed preferable by the Spanish commander, to seize on Nyborg. It would secure the inactivity of the gun-boats in that port. But such a measure might possibly involve the safety of the troops in Zealand and Jutland, by inducing the Danes to act hostilely, when otherwise they might be disposed to wink at, or make no serious efforts to impede, the quiet removal of the Spanish troops.

(To be continued.)

* Thought unnecessary now to send.

"Oh, that mine enemy had writ on a Book!"—Jon

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DUKE OF YORK—In the natural, though, perhaps, vain, hope, that what I now write may be read at a time when many circumstances, now notorious and familiar, will have been forgotten, I am induced to enter upon the subject before me with a formality of statement, which, were it not for such hope, would be absurd, or at least, would not appear quite necessary.—For some weeks past, I might say for some months, there has been a talk about sending the Duke of York, who is, and, for several years, has been, the Commander in Chief of the land forces of this country, to take the chief command of the troops sent, and about to be sent, by England, to the aid of the people of Spain and Portugal, in their present arduous struggle against the French. This rumour has excited great interest amongst all ranks of people, from the leading men in and about the metropolis, down to the very clowns in their Sunday morning chat at the church doors, and, upon this subject, though upon no other that can be mentioned, there appears to have been a perfect unanimity of feeling and of expression. The press has not been idle. It has, in all the ways that it is capable of operating, kept pace with the colloquial discussions, and, as party writers, who are opposed to each other, must have something, in each other, to find fault with, every writer appears to have made it his study to seek out, in his opponent, is an object of attack, a failure, in some respect or other, to do justice to the public sentiment upon this particular subject.—Such, with respect to the Duke of York, was the state of the public mind, when, about twelve days ago, an anonymous pamphlet of fifty-three pages, published by Mr Symonds of Peterborough, London, made its appearance, under the title of "A PLAIN STATEMENT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE MINISTRY AND THE OPPOSITION, TOWARDS HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK," which pamphlet it is my present intention to analyse and remark upon.—First, however, let me state what the pamphlet does not contain.—When I saw a thing written in the way of answer to those, who, in the bawciest of the day, are called "the libellers" of the Duke of York, I naturally expected

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to find, in this answer, something or other respecting the military commands, with which he had before been invested, because the point, and the sole point at issue, was whether, or not, he ought now to have the command in Spain, and, no one could possibly fail to perceive, that that point must be decided, in all rational and impartial minds, by the experience of the past. What was my surprize, then, to find, that the pamphleteer, the avowed defender and eulogist of the Duke, said not a word of the Duke's commands upon the continent of Europe, and did not even glance at them from the beginning to the end of his work, though of the publications, of which it was his object to complain, there was not one, which had not, in some way or other, touched upon those commands! Before all other things, therefore, it appeared necessary to clear up these matters, or, at least, to say all that an advocate was, upon such an occasion, able to say. But, instead of this what have we? Why the following canonology, which I may venture to say will long remain without an equal—"From his youth upwards, his royal highness has passed through every stage of his military career. As one has yet appeared so totally unworthy of all truth, as to question his royal highness's personal courage. Let it be omitted then, that with his acknowledged personal courage allied to the common sense, which, we should hope, no one will deny him, his royal highness has, at least, obtained the common knowledge of his profession. Let us at least allow him what is denied to no one, that he cannot have passed through such a course of study and under the best masters of the age, without having acquired what is almost necessarily acquired by every one in a similar course. Grant that his royal highness is not superior to other generals, why should he be inferior? It is known to every one who approaches him, that he is not wanting in natural talents, in a solid and just understanding, and in the art of observing, and availing himself of his observations. Let us put it, therefore, to the candour of the public, and of the gentlemen of the army, if, with such an understanding and such expe-

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"rience, such advantages of rank, and
 "with such good masters, it is not a
 "reasonable presumption, that his royal
 "highness has at least the common and
 "sufficient knowledge of his military profes-
 "sion? Surely, it is not too much to ask
 "this concession"—This is not, indeed,
 generally speaking, much to ask. The dis-
 putant who should refuse to grant it even
 in this particular case, might be deemed
 cruel, perhaps. But, suppose *he should re-
 fuse*, and suppose his refusal should be
 grounded upon a denial of those premises
 which the expert reasoner presumes all the
 world to admit? Upon this supposition
 what becomes of the argument? It is not
 thus, that men argue to conviction. Con-
 viction, by the means of argument, requires
 premises really admitted or, which is the
 same thing in effect, facts which are gen-
 erally acknowledged, and which acknowl-
 edgment is a necessary consequence of well
 known facts or events. If indeed, this
 writer had appealed to the history of the
 actions, in which the Duke has been engag-
 ed, and shewed us that there were proofs of
 what he chose to take as his premises, the
 conclusion might naturally have followed,
 but, whatever may be the fact, however
 true it may possibly be, that the Duke
 "has, at least, the common and sufficient
 "knowledge of his military profession,
 this writer has stated nothing, nothing at
 all, in *proof* of the proposition, which,
 therefore, remains a subject open to discus-
 sion, but which I do not think it necessary
 to discuss, and shall only just observe, with
 respect to the "*best masters of the age*,"
 either the writer must allude to such as are
 now under the Duke's own command, or to
 such as have been beaten, and driven from
 one end of Europe to the other, by that
 enemy, against whom we have now to
 contend. But, is it sufficient to ask us
 "why the Duke should be *inferior* to other
 "generals?" Is it right to throw upon
 the public the burthen of proof, that our
 Commander in Chief, that the person of
 whose wisdom and skill and valour so much
 must depend, that the person who is con-
 trusted with the defence of our country,
 is it right to throw upon us the burthen of
 proving, that this person is *inferior* to other
 generals? Is it upon ground like this, that
 the writer puts forward a claim to our com-
 mendation? One might have expected, that
 the writer would have stated of him, who is so
 highly employed and entrusted, and who
 receives from us so very large a salary, the pub-
 lic would have made it a point, especially
 in his proposed purpose was to remove

"public prejudices," to endeavour, at least,
 to convince us, that the Duke, the person
 who is to have the chief command in de-
 fending our properties and our lives, is *super-
 ior*, in military merit, to other generals,
 or to such other generals, at least, as we
 have in our service. If the country be not
 in danger, if there be not a strong probabi-
 lity, that this land will be invaded by a
 powerful foreign foe, why all these prepara-
 tions? Why all these forts and posts and
 barracks, why all these volunteers and local
 militia and foreign troops, why such im-
 mense expenses, why such sacrifices of every
 description? Well, then, such being the
 case, is it sufficient to ask us to prove, that
 he, who is entrusted with the direction of
 all this force, is *inferior* to other generals?
 Is this thought sufficient to satisfy us, espe-
 cially when accompanied with a charge of
libel against every one, who, for years
 past, has dared to move his pen upon the
 subject? Such a writer does, verily com-
 plain, with a good grace, "that the spirit
 "of the times is not in favour of even that
 "measured obedience, that moderate res-
 "pect to government, which is necessary
 "to the very existence of a community."
 What does he wish for? What degree and
 what limits of submission does he want?
 All that has been said, all that has offended
 him, all that has stung his gall, and roused
 his stupid and vindictive heart to the ex-
 ecuting of this miserable pamphlet, has
 consisted of suppositions, uttered in delicate
 hints and faulting accents, the effusions of
 the fears of a people, whom the love of
 life has not yet entirely forsaken.—Now
 we come to what the pamphlet *does* contain,
 and this is expressed in a very few words.
 It is a reprobable complaint against both
 the ministry and the opposition for having
 suffered the Duke of York to be "libelled,"
 as this writer calls it, by the several editors
 of papers, and other writers, in this king-
 dom, and for having done nothing in de-
 fence of his character. The person prefer-
 ring this complaint, says, that the present
 administration, for reasons best known to
 themselves, choose to detach an individual
 from their body, to put him, as it were, out
 of the protecting protection of their society,
 and to give encouragement to a public perse-
 cution of him, that any one, not acquainted
 with public affairs, would be astonished to be
 told, that the most effective officer in the state,
 he who should at least be the most effective
 officer, is represented as one who is not
 to be trusted with the execution of what
 "falls most immediately within his official du-
 ties," and when the ministers of the country

neither repel this accusation nor act upon it; do the ministers, asks he, believe it, or not? If they do, why not act upon it? If not, is there no Attorney General, or no Treasury papers? Is every possible fund of defence exhausted? He asks, whence it has happened, that, in all the friendships and enmities of parties, in all these contests of contrarieties, the Duke of York has never had even the usual advantage, being neglected by one party and passed over by another? He says, that a powerful party have been indisposed against the Duke, have withheld from him the natural and necessary protection due to his rank and station, have left him naked to the assaults of his low-minded libellers, left him without allies in his time of need; and, asks he, "in what manner has CORIOLANUS so offended both the Consuls and the Senate, that he is cast out naked to meet his fate amongst the factious Tribunes?" In the aptness of a comparison consists its merit. CAIUS MARCIUS, though of a patrician family, was urged, by his zealous valour, to serve as a common soldier, in the Roman army, at the siege of Corioli. The Romans having been repulsed, he rallied some of his comrades, fell upon the enemy, and, pursuing them in their retreat, rushed pell-mell along with them into the city, of which he thus made himself master. The resemblance between the two characters, thus far, will easily be traced; and we have only to continue it through their moral virtues. The Roman General allotted to the gallant youth the richest part of the booty; but, he would accept of nothing but the name of CORIOLANUS, one horse, and one prisoner, who had formerly been his host, and whom he instantly set at liberty. The writer of the pamphlet before us, says that the Duke of York is not fond of flattery, which, we may presume, was his sole reason for not digressing in this place to cite some such instances of gratitude, disinterestedness, and magnanimity, in the subject of his fifty-three pages of eulogium. — Having stated the fact of this disinclination, in both parties, towards the Duke, the writer then proceeds to state the cause of it; for, it will be easily perceived, that it was quite necessary to his purpose to find out a cause, other than that which the public have been disposed to alledge. This cause, then, is, he says, that the Duke had all along adhered to a settled resolution, *never to belong to any party*. And here I shall, for a while, confine myself to a mere quotation from the pamphlet, the matter being of a very delicate nature, if any thing can be called delicate coming from such a silly brute

as this writer evidently is. "Since the days of William III. there have existed in this kingdom two avowed parties; an Opposition and a Ministry. As a defence from the overwhelming predominance of either, every succeeding monarch has deemed it necessary to have a kind of Domestic Party—a kind of Closet and Family Council, whom he may occasionally interpose between even his ministry and himself. The origin of this party has been imputed to his majesty's father, or rather, to his mother whilst Dowager of Wales; but the point of fact is, that it existed in the reign of George I., and seems to have had no other origin than in its manifest necessity. It was not the creature of any design, or previous arrangement; but, as a matter of prudence, and necessary defensive policy, grew insensibly out of the very nature of things. — Now the immediate and almost necessary members of this Party, are certainly the King's Family and Household. Let it not, therefore, be objected to the Duke of York, that he has followed the course of things." — Leaving this pretty description of a government to be commented on by those who have been so long in the habit of eulogizing our "glorious Constitution," I now proceed to quote what is said about the cause of the enmity which the Opposition are said to bear the Duke. — "It was represented to his majesty, that according to the principles upon which his ministry had humbly offered their services, the public expected of them, and they conceived themselves obliged, to introduce a perfect reform in all the branches of public service—that the Army wanted this reform, and that his majesty would be pleased to consent, that a private Commission of Inquiry should be appointed to sit daily at the Horse Guards, and that the report of this commission should be presented to his majesty's most gracious consideration. — To this, likewise, his majesty consented, and his royal highness did not oppose it. The List of the Commissioners was made by the ministry, and for the sake of appearances, the name of his royal highness was not omitted. His royal highness, however, did not deem it decorous to sit on a Court of Inquiry into his own conduct. The party, therefore, and the Commission had their own President. It is not the purpose of the present Notes to enter into any detail as to the decency with which they executed this inquisition. Suffice it to say, that

"after a party, and therefore a rigorous inquiry, it was not deemed prudent either to make or to present a report. Another resolution was taken, and it was determined to attempt indirectly, and as it were by intrigue, what could not be hoped from other more direct means. It must really be matter of astonishment to all candid men, that individuals of an honourable name, and hitherto reputed to be of corresponding sentiments, should descend to such an unworthy cunning. The characteristic of a great, and a little mind, says Bacon, is, that the former takes the straight road, whilst the latter creeps wily but cowardly to its object by a bye-path.—Two measures, it is stated, were accordingly adopted by the party. The one was to represent to his royal highness, that the multiplicity of business in the office of commander in chief required that his royal highness should have some assistance, and that therefore the ministry had to propose to his royal highness a division of his department; that the branches from which his royal highness would be thus relieved, might either be put in commission, assigned to certain boards, or supplied by individuals;—that in the latter case the ministry would consider it as belonging to them to recommend, but that the nomination should be in his royal highness. That it was not amongst their wishes to diminish any thing of the patronage of his royal highness, or to detract any thing from the splendour of the commander in chief. But that from regard to his royal highness, and from a deep consideration of the value of his royal highness's time as commander in chief in the higher offices of his department, it was the anxious wish of the ministry to relieve his royal highness from the subordinate details.—A negotiation was accordingly commenced with his royal highness upon these grounds; in the course of which his royal highness learned what was intended by these "subordinate details," and minor branches." His royal highness, in a word, learned, that these subordinate details, and minor branches, were such as to reduce his office to a mere cypher, and leave him, as commander in chief, in a situation about as active, as necessary, and as important, as the master of the horse. His royal highness very naturally felt himself offended at being entrapped even into a negotiation in a business so adverse to his personal interests and military character; and the ne-

gotiation was accordingly broken off with abruptness and mutual disgust.—It is a reasonable subject of surprise, therefore, that thus beset, thus assailed at once by the open hostility of some, and the insidious friendship of others, his royal highness deemed it necessary to throw himself upon the immediate protection of his royal father?—The proposed measure of the Grenville party was thus defeated by the immediate interposition, not to say the command of his majesty. But this ambitious party, though thus disappointed, were not defeated; they invented another rallying post, and the words "military council, and military board of supervision," were distributed as the watch word of the party. The idea was quickly circulated through all the ministerial papers, and the cry of a party was magnified into the popular voice. The people, it was said, demanded a military council, and the nation would be lost, unless the inexperience of the commander in chief was assisted by a board of military supervision. It was moreover insinuated in one or more of the papers of the party, that his royal highness was not averse to the appointment of such a board. Every thing, in a word, was put in motion to work upon the popular mind; and to those who know of what inflammable materials the people of England are made, it is needless to insist that so many engines were not ineffectual.—Nothing could be more unpleasant than the situation of his royal highness during all this turmoil of intrigue and faction. His open assailants were of a class with whom his royal highness could not, consistent with his personal dignity, enter into a contention. In what manner, for example, could he oppose the attack of newspapers, the assault of paragraphs, and the storm of diurnal invective? Every newspaper was in the hands of the reigning party, or if one of them boasted of its independence, it usually proved its claim by a daring attack on his royal highness. This abuse was usually introduced in terms expressive of the "candour and reluctance" of the writer. They were unwilling (good creatures!) to wound the feelings of any individual, and particularly of one in every respect so meritorious as his royal highness; but in common candour they were compelled to acknowledge, that the perilous situation of affairs called for unusual vigour in the military department, and that his royal highness would be much relieved, by the ap-

pointment of a military council. The similarity of all these paragraphs, and certain words which were common to all, seemed to bespeak their common origin, and the public hearing the same thing said on all sides, and by all parties, began to conclude that there was something in it; and the press, in pamphlets and reviews, echoed back the clamour of the daily journals. —The author then goes on to speak of the complaints made by the Duke to the ministers, upon the subject of these attacks, but of complaints we shall notice here and by. At present our attention is called to a paragraph of the pamphlet, which is extremely mysterious, but which, perhaps, the reader will make shift to comprehend. "In this manner, in this urgency for a direct inquiry on one side, and this refusal to grant it on the other, passed away the whole period of the late administration, until some time about the conclusion, when it was deemed necessary, from *policy expediency*, and from motives which require no explanation, to make CERTAIN PROPOSALS to his royal highness. To these proposals his royal highness *may be presumed* to have answered, that it was the settled maxim of his life to *belong to no party*, but to consider himself as the servant and subject of the king; —that he moreover did not agree in opinion with his majesty's ministers upon the points in agitation; but did not deem it necessary to explain himself more fully. That with respect to any OPPOSITION AGAINST HIM his royal highness might have added, that he was at a loss to understand *what could be intended by it*, as his majesty's ministers, in all his royal highness's demands for inquiry, had repeatedly disavowed their knowledge of any such personal hostility. Under all circumstances his royal highness could, we think, see no sufficient reason for departing from the settled maxim of all his former life, —to consider himself as a member of the royal family, and the sovereign alone. That, least of all, therefore, could his royal highness have any will or opinion in contradiction to that of his father —Within a few days after this latter negotiation, the Grenville and Fox party had ceased to be ministers, and his majesty had summoned others to his council. —It may be collected from this statement, that neither in the commencement, nor in the conclusion of the Grenville administration, could this party be considered as friendly to his royal highness. This statement, moreover, may pos-

sibly account for one part at least of the general hostility against his royal highness. —After some personal remarks, in which Earl Grey is represented as arrogant, Earl Moira no wiser than he should be, and Mr. Windham as inconstant to his friendships, the pamphlet proceeds to state, that the Opposition consider the Duke as having had a share in their dismissal; but he denies the fact, and says: "The late ministry were dismissed solely because they personally offended, and contradicted in a point of conscience, his majesty. His majesty had no council but his own mind. He had taken his resolution when he summoned the attendance of the Duke of York. He conceived himself as having been deceived by Earl Grey; he accordingly declined seeing that nobleman. The Duke of York, it is understood, merely obeyed the commands of his father, *when he signified by letter his majesty's pleasure that Lord Howick should not come to Windsor.*" —He then proceeds to state the cause of the hostility of the present ministry towards the Duke of York, which statement I shall give in his own words:—"With respect to the Ministry, his royal highness is about as favourably situated as with the Opposition. The enmity of the one may be as easily accounted for on the ordinary passions of mankind, as the other. His royal highness, however, we presume, cannot complain that the existing administration are not friendly to him. Friendship is not a thing of right on one side or of obligation on the other. He never, we believe, sought the friendship of ministers, and therefore has no complaint that he does not possess it. There is, however, or at least there should be, a middle term between friendship and enmity. Where, therefore, is the justifying cause for the conduct of administration? —When his majesty had resolved to constitute a new administration, if public report may be credited, *his royal highness had it in command from the king to inform the duke of Portland of his majesty's intentions.* His royal highness, it is said, executed his majesty's commands in person. He is said to have repeated only the words of the king, and distinctly to have informed the duke of Portland, that he was to consider his royal highness in no other point of view than as the messenger bearing certain words of his majesty; that he had no list, and no authority to designate any individual whatever. In a conversation which followed, the same reports add, *his royal high-*

"ness distinctly gave his grace to under-
 "stand, that he wished to have no concern
 "whatever with any party, farther than to act
 "sincerely and cordially with any men whom
 "his majesty might call to his confidence.
 "—When the Ministry was formed, if the
 "Writer of these Notes be correctly inform-
 "ed, it was intimated to his royal highness
 "by the duke, that his recommendation, in
 "a certain appointment, would be attend-
 "ed to; upon which his royal highness is
 "again said to have replied, that he had
 "merely executed the wishes of the king;
 "that he wished to be considered as forming
 "no part of any administration whatever;
 "that if any difficulty occurred as to a suit-
 "able person for the appointment in ques-
 "tion, his grace would do well to consult
 "with lord Hawkesbury, who had the
 "king's commands in detail.—Such, we
 "will presume, was the share, and such
 "the only share, which his royal highness
 "had in the formation of the existing ad-
 "ministration. It may be collected from
 "these particulars, that on this, as on every
 "other occasion, his royal highness never
 "departed a moment from his settled reso-
 "lution, never to become a component
 "part of any ministry.—Some time after
 "the formation of the cabinet, his royal
 "highness, we have heard, had an appoint-
 "ed conference with one of the members of
 "administration, in the course of which a
 "subject of much interest to his royal high-
 "ness was introduced. To this his royal
 "highness is reported to have replied, that
 "it was in the power of any member of ei-
 "ther house to bring it forward; that he
 "wished not to influence either the one
 "way or the other; that the papers should
 "be ready when called for; that he certain-
 "ly did not wish the ministry to take any
 "part against him; that as the subject it-
 "self would be brought forward as a party
 "question if brought forward at all, the mi-
 "nistry might perhaps, deem it their duty
 "to take some share in the debate. Through
 "all these transactions, his royal highness
 "must have been at a loss to discover any
 "thing which could reasonably indispose
 "the ministry against him. The adminis-
 "tration, indeed, had endeavoured in vain
 "to annex his royal highness, by a distinct
 "pledge, to their own immediate party.
 "But his royal highness could have no sus-
 "picion, that, by adhering to the uniform
 "maxim of his life, he must necessarily
 "give offence to any party whatever. His
 "royal highness, moreover, never hesitated
 "to avow, that he would always persevere
 "in that line of acting which he should

"know to be conformable to the sentiments
 "of his majesty.—It is from this period,
 "however, that must be dated the origin
 "of the ministerial alienation. The ministry
 "seem resolved to compel every one to take
 "a party—even his majesty's sons must
 "fall within the ranks.—His royal high-
 "ness, we will presume to say, is perfectly
 "unconscious of having given any personal
 "offence to Mr. Canning, or any of the
 "ministers; yet, if any judgment may be
 "formed from the conduct of these gentle-
 "men, they seem to have entertained no in-
 "considerable personal animosity against
 "his royal highness. Party-feeling seldom
 "proceeds so far as the unwearied persecu-
 "tion of individual enmity. There have, in-
 "deed, been instances, in which the whole
 "weight of a party has been brought to bear
 "against an individual; but in these cases
 "some reasonable cause might be assigned
 "for such excess of bitterness. But in what
 "has his royal highness so offended all,
 "that he is not only deserted by all, but
 "persecuted by all? Surely there must
 "be some cause beyond what appears."
 "—Then follows an eulogium upon Lord
 "Castlereagh, and upon Lords Hawkesbury
 "and Liverpool, who are acknowledged to
 "have yielded protection to the Duke against
 "the workings of faction.—Here, then,
 "we have stated the causes, which, according
 "to this writer, placed the two parties in
 "enmity to the Duke of York, which causes
 "appear to me to be quite insufficient to pro-
 "duce such an effect. The Opposition, in-
 "deed, if they suppose, that the Duke con-
 "tributed towards putting them out of their
 "places, depriving them of so many good
 "things, may well dislike him; but, then,
 "unfortunately for the argument of this writ-
 "ter, he himself states, that the inventions
 "of malice and slander against the Duke
 "were exhausted by the Treasury writers,
 "under the Whig ministry, long before there
 "was any notion of their place being in dan-
 "ger; and, it appears, as we shall see in
 "detail, by-and-by, that, if this writer is to
 "be believed, the Duke made frequent and
 "fruitless complaints to that ministry respect-
 "ing the attacks made upon him in their jour-
 "nals. So that the pretended slander, ma-
 "lice, and libelling, all existed before there
 "was any proposal of a party nature made to
 "the Duke. And, as to the present ministry,
 "how could they be seriously affected by his
 "declining to become one of their party? They
 "wanted no support, and, if they did,
 "it surely was not the way to obtain it, to side
 "with persons who slandered the Duke, who,
 "they had every reason to believe, possessed

such powerful influence in a quarter so important to be conciliated. There is no sense in this accusation against either of the parties. The cause of what is called hostility is quite inadequate to the producing of such an effect. And what is this hostility? *How and when* has it appeared? I have perceived no hostility, in either of the parties, against the Duke of York, and except upon one particular point, I have observed in the daily prints, no inclination to criticise either his general or particular conduct. On the contrary, I am greatly misinformed if, upon the occasion of Col. Cockburn Johnston's court martial, that gentleman was able to get inserted, in any one of those papers, a very mild, and even a very humble representation of the hardships which he conceived himself to have experienced; nay, I state as a fact, that he was unable to get inserted, except in one or two papers, and there by the means of heavy payment, *even a false statement of the fact of his honourable acquittal*. So that, it does not appear, that, in either party, there ever existed any settled disposition to annoy the Duke of York. This writer forgets all the good, which the "brieling edit" tells, as he calls them, have said of the Duke of York. He and his Duchess have been the almost constant theme of their praise. They could not walk up my street together, but the conjugal circumstance was noticed in detail, even to motions and glances. All his birthday festivals, all his reviews, all his motions have been noticed, and at every notice there is appeared to be, a wish in the sycophancy of the different editors. Nay, I defy this writer to refer me, even at this day, to one single paragraph in any daily paper, containing a censure, or even a free remark, upon the conduct or the character of the Duke of York. What does this writer want, then? What does this half idiot, for such he must be, want of the poor degraded press? Does he want it to expose itself to the contempt of even the lowest of the rabble? What does he want? I should like to have his answer to this question.—Now we come to notice the complaints, which this writer says, were made by the Duke to the Whig ministry, and what he says is very well worthy of being remembered.—"These incessant attacks could not but very seriously affect his royal highness, and after having maintained a dignified reserve as long as human patience could support it, he at length found it necessary to demand an inquiry into his conduct.—Nothing could be so ridiculous as the affected astonishment of the ministry upon this demand.

"Who has presumed to attack the interests or the reputation of your royal highness?" *There are laws in the country to which your royal highness may appeal. Why should there be a formal inquiry where there is no formal charge? Why should the ignorance or indignity of the daily papers be raised into the consequence and dignity of having called forth an official inquiry?* It is a thing has been said or written against your royal highness, of which all his majesty's ministers must solemnly disavow even any knowledge, the Attorney General should be ordered to think to commence a prosecution, and if your royal highness be unwilling personally to give your instructions to the officer of the crown, *they may be given to the treasury, by your royal highness's secretary*. But his majesty's ministers would think themselves deficient in a due sense of what they owed to their own dignity as his majesty's councillors, if they adopted a popular rumour as sufficient grounds for an official inquiry."—Well, this was pretty well, I think. What more did this writer wish them to do? He will tell us directly, in speaking of what he says has been the conduct of the present ministry, upon a similar occasion.—"It may be urged, indeed, in reply to all that has been said above, that the attacks complained of, have not been made with the knowledge, and still less with the consent or concurrence of his majesty's ministers—that they are all of them to be honourable men to concur in such a system of anonymous attack: that such a system, moreover, could answer no conceivable purpose—that the ministry are too strong in public opinion and confidence, to require the assistance of such unworthy arts. In a word, that such a persecution, and so indirectly put into operation, can have no purpose, and therefore that it is a reasonable inference that it has no existence.—To this it must be answered, that when his royal highness made similar representations, under the late ministry, the answer was uniformly, that his majesty's ministers were totally ignorant of the very existence of the facts alleged, that the law was open to his royal highness, and that the Attorney General might be instructed to prosecute, that they had no influence or authority over the free press; and that they advised his royal highness to hold all such libellous accusation in the contempt which it merited.—It is notorious, however, notwithstanding all

"this disavowal, that the free press, as it
 "is called, and as it should be, is almost
 "equally divided between the two leading
 "parties in the country, and that the mi-
 "nisters and the opposition have the same
 "influence, NOT TO SAY AUTHORITY,
 "over them as if they were THE ACTU-
 "AL EDITORS. Has any instance ever
 "occurred, in which a *fillet* from Down-
 "ing-street has been refused admission, and
 "if required, an ample confirmatory com-
 "ment, through all the Treasury papers?
 "And will any, either of the ministry or
 "the opposition, declare, upon their hon-
 "our as gentlemen, that they have no
 "authority or weight with the public pa-
 "pers? Whence does it happen, that the
 "honour of parties is not the same with
 "that of individuals, and that a party will
 "assert conjunctively, what every indi-
 "vidual of that party knows to be false?
 "Why is there not the same point of hon-
 "our with a party as with an individual?
 "—The indecent language in the daily
 "papers, is certainly not from the mouth
 "of the ministers. It is impossible that
 "men of honourable stations should
 "descend to such terms, and so such an-
 "onymous acrimony. We are persuaded
 "that his royal highness most fully acquits
 "his majesty's ministers of any immediate
 "participation in such libels. But the
 "encouragement, the countenance, the im-
 "punity of these libellers, is the efficient
 "cause of the whole. Would the Editors
 "of the Daily Papers thus write, *unless*
 "*they were persuaded that they were ad-*
 "*vocating a cause generally pleasing to*
 "*their patrons?* As to a legal remedy for
 "this torrent of libel and invective, though
 "a jury of his countrymen would visit the
 "libellers with merited punishment, his
 "royal highness, we believe, will not be
 "lightly persuaded to introduce a practice
 "which he has never approved. There
 "have been perhaps already too many go-
 "vernment prosecutions, and a precedent
 "may thus be constituted, which, much to
 "the injury of the free press, may be here-
 "after acted upon. *Add to this*, that there
 "may be innumerable allusions, innu-
 "endoes, and even assertions, which may
 "have substance enough to wound, and
 "that most deeply, but are *not palpable*
 "*enough for the visitation of the law.*
 "The libellers of his royal highness have
 "been too long practised in their school,
 "to commit themselves to the hands of a
 "jury. Let any man of honest feelings
 "read some of the cold blooded articles
 "which have lately appeared in many of

"the daily papers, and then answer, if his
 "indignation be not moved by their savage
 "malignity—yet are these libels conceived
 "in terms so studiously picked and culled,
 "as to elude the just vengeance of the law.
 "—How many subjects, moreover, are
 "there which, however grossly offensive
 "to all honourable feeling, cannot be pro-
 "duced to the publicity of a legal trial.
 "Let any man put it to his own mind—how
 "many slanderous reports are daily in
 "circulation to the ruin of the peace and
 "character of their unhappy object, but
 "for which the sufferer is yet unwilling to
 "make his appeals to the laws of his coun-
 "try. *There is a necessary and indiscrimina-*
 "*ting publicity in law, from which a mind*
 "*of any delicacy cannot but avert.* His
 "royal highness has indeed suffered much,
 "but he will suffer still more, we should
 "think, before he can persuade him-
 "self to call on the *laws of his country.*
 "—So, here we have an expression of this
 "writer's wishes. He seems to allow, that
 "nothing has been said of the Duke that even
 "our libel law can lay its fangs upon, or, at
 "least, with a fair chance of success; and,
 "therefore, as the newspapers are, as he says,
 "as completely at the command of the two
 "parties, as if the leaders of those parties
 "were the actual editors; and, as, with re-
 "gard to the Treasury papers, "a billet from
 "Downing Street is never refused admit-
 "tance, accompanied, if required, by an
 "ample confirmatory comment," he would
 "have had orders issued from Downing Street,
 "to those papers, to insert certain billets, and
 "to refuse others, relating to the Duke of
 "York.—This writer must be an enemy of
 "the Duke, under the mask of friendship;
 "for, is it possible to form an idea of any
 "thing more low, more mean, more shabby,
 "more scurvy, more dirty, more base, than
 "going to a ministry, and asking them to ob-
 "tain the publication or the suppression of pa-
 "ragraphs, respecting him, in prints, which
 "he must regard as being edited by the most
 "venal of mankind? As if he had said to him-
 "self: no; the law will not do; the law can-
 "not find any hold in the publications against
 "me, and besides I do not like the publicity
 "of law; I will, therefore, have recourse to
 "corruption; I will, by the means of influ-
 "ence purchased with the public money, get a
 "good word from those whom I despise.
 "This is what this writer imputes to the Duke
 "of York, and this he does under the mask
 "of friendly compassion. This he does under
 "the pretence of defending the royal chief-
 "tain against the attacks of his calumniators.
 "I do not believe, that any act more base

was ever before imputed to any human being. If such be the friends of the Duke, well may he, with the poet, call for a defence against them; and, if the contents of a paragraph, in the Morning Post of the other day, be correct, he means to try the force of the law upon this villain, at least, who, though he complains of anonymous slander in others, takes special care all the while, to keep his own name out of sight. What! go sneaking to the ministry to beg of them to speak a good word for him to the editors of the newspapers! Foh! it is so rank, it so stinks of meanness, that one's bowels are disordered at the thought, especially when imputed to a modern "CORIOLANUS." I am not for appeals to the law, respecting matters of this sort; but, something should certainly be done by the *real* friends of the Duke of York, to convince the world, that this part at least, of the pamphlet's statements is false. I, for my part, shall anxiously wait for the contradiction, and shall hasten to give it to the world. What! (I cannot get it out of my mind) go to the ministry to supplicate their interference with the public papers! It is such an abominable story, such atrocious slander, that, surely it will be speedily contradicted. Why, if this statement be not proved to be untrue, who will ever again pay attention to any thing which those papers may say in favour of the royal soldier? Will not the public have reason to suppose, that the parties have, at last, been prevailed upon to issue their orders to the newspapers? It must be contradicted and it will, and I beseech my readers to watch, with me, for the appearance of the contradiction.—This supreme ass of a writer, after having accused the editors of ignorance, malice, and so forth, and candidly acquitted the ministers of any direct share in the "libels," as he calls all the publications not flattering to the Duke of York, tells his readers, that many of these editors are "even well-wishers to his royal highness, and few, or none, of them have any personal enmity against him. But," adds he, "his royal highness has the misfortune to have been the topic of the day; they are compelled, therefore, to say something of him, and they consider it as their duty to render that something as palatable as possible to their patrons." Here, then, the ministers, or, at least, the leaders of the parties are the *sole cause* of this hostility of the press against the Duke of York. But, this same writer has confessed, that Lords Hawkesbury and Liverpool had taken the Duke under their protection, he pronounces a high eulogium upon Lords Castlereagh and

Eden, and boasts that the Duke has the friendship of the Duke of Portland. So here are *one* of the Secretaries of State, the Secretary of State for the war department, the Lord Chancellor, and the First Lord of the Treasury, and yet the Duke has *no friends*. He is "neglected by one party" and passed over by another." How happens it that these persons have nothing to do with the press? Did the Duke apply to them in vain? Why could they not have interfered, if any one could, to alter the tone of the press? This man contradicts himself. He does not know what to say. It is evident that he knows he is stating falsehoods. But, he must be half an idiot at least, or he never would have put pen to paper.—The challenge which he throws out to the editors is curious enough. "Let them," says he, "produce a distinct charge, and they shall have a distinct answer; but, whilst they only heat about the bush, in what manner is their desolatory malice to be brought within the pale of an argumentative defence?" Within the pale of the *law* you mean, cunning and spiteful idiot as you evidently are. That is the pale wherein you want to see them. Will you, malicious and vindictive coward, insure them from that pale? This is what you should do before you challenge them to a "distinct charge." How many miscreants have we seen challenging the press in this way, and, the moment, they could get a hold, appealing, not to the force of reason, not to the test of truth, but to the fangs of the law, and that, too, by a form of process which prohibits the accused from urging, in his defence, the truth of his statements.—The editors, poor fellows! How wise we are, are we not? What vile scoundrels we are, for not speaking out plain upon all occasions!—It is stated by this writer, towards the conclusion, and that too in a very peremptory tone, that the Ministry and the Opposition *must disavow* the attacks of the press upon the Duke of York. We shall see, now, whether this disavowal will be made. The pamphlet has certainly stated some very ugly things about the conduct of the *parties*. He has represented them as contending for the favour and the patronage of the Duke, and, being unable to gain him to themselves, have, out of revenge, persecuted him. He has stated pretty plainly, that Mr. Canning paid his court to the Duke; that that gentleman voluntarily made professions of kindness towards the Duke; and that Lord Moira and Mr. Windham did the same. It would be a shame to suppose that a wretch like this has

spoken from *authority*; but, he may have heard some rumour upon the subject. We shall see, when parliament meets, whether the *disavowal* will be made, and it will be well worth while for us to keep a good look-out for it. — Upon the subject of a contest in the present cabinet, this writer has the following passage: "With such opinions, so freely avowed, and so notoriously acted upon, whence can originate the absurd suspicion said to be so current amongst his majesty's ministers. That his royal highness had any share in the *friendly emulation* of the two members of the cabinet, whose inconsiderable differences, much to his royal highness's satisfaction, have been of late happily composed. His royal highness, we believe, was not even asked to take any part in the contest, and least of all, to take that unfair part which is inferred in the language of the vague rumour. The *noble person* in question would seem to gain his purpose, it is purpose he had by such arts—his commanding abilities—his habits, and knowledge of business, distinguish him eminently. If there be any one who would most passionately scorn the indirect aid of the alleged intrigue and who certainly stands in no need of it, it is the person in question. *His Majesty incurs the worth of such a servant, and will not easily rather deprive himself of it, or by withholding any merited gratification diminish the zeal of his servant.* Upon this subject, therefore, we will most decidedly say, that his royal highness had no concern whatever, and that he knew not that the emulation existed, except by general report. The hint of *preference* is here pretty broad, and the rebuked rival will, doubtless, take care what he is about, if the facts alluded to be true. We see through all this, that it is clearly the opinion of this writer, that the Duke of York is, in fact, the master of the destinies of all the men whom the king employs, under the name of ministers, and that, if they displeased him, they fail not, sooner or later, to meet with punishment. — But, in the meanwhile, the press, tame and humble as it is, indutry as are its columns when the subject is any one of the royal family, is, in this writer's opinion, too bold. It is not yet humbled enough. It is not yet sufficiently corrupt, or at least, it is not yet enough under the control, as this writer thinks, of the Duke of York. The complaint against the minister, is, however, very unjust in one point of view, for, if the Duke will be of *no party*, if he will be a *member of no mi-*

nistry, what claim has he to the protecting influence of any party or ministry? If he is as this writer says he is, of the "*domestic party, the closet council*," why, it is to the closet council, of course, that he ought to look for a protecting influence, and not to the parties, against each of whom, by turns, this closet council is to be opposed. Nothing can be more reasonable and fair than this. — But, it is very strange, it is wonderful, that the Duke of York should stand in need of any protecting influence with the press. What protection should he want? If the press say of him what is *not true*, why do its sayings *not answer*? For this writer does not pretend, that any thing in favour of the Duke, his ever, in any quarter, been refused admission, and, besides, if the sayings be false, the falsehood will appear of itself, in every hot time, when the promulgators of it will sink into merited contempt. This wise writer's hint, with laying it down as a maxim "that no character is so obnoxious to *unjust reproach* as those of the *great*, and that the pedestal upon which public characters are raised into more conspicuous view, renders them, at the same time, more assailable objects of envy and malignity." If to publish *truth* were not criminal in law, this maxim might hold good; but, I appeal to the reader, whether it holds good amongst us, at this time, and whether he does not see daily proofs of the fact, that the *great* do, without any one's venturing to comment upon their conduct, that which would render common men subjects of loud and general censure. Oh, how many instances are now at the point of my pen! How base, how cowardly, and yet how insolent is it in any one to accuse the poor writers in England of a *propensity to assail the great*. — Amongst all the anecdotes, in which this writer has thought proper to deal, he does not seem to have paid much attention to that which related to the subject the most generally interesting to the public, namely, the supposed disputes in the cabinet respecting the Duke of York's going to Spain, which he slightly touches upon, at the end of his pamphlet, thus: "The point of fact is, perhaps, that such appointment was *never solicited* on the one part, or offered, except *formally*, on the other. If the *nature of the service* had been such as to *require* the employment of the Commander in Chief, the ministry would, doubtless, have intimated it to his royal highness." Aye, aye, I dare say they would, I dare say they would. It is all very well. The ministers did not, then, I suppose, think that the *nature of the service*

was such as to require the employment of the royal chief, in which opinion they will, I believe, be joined by most men of sense. It appears to be quite an easy job to beat the French in Spain. CORIOLANUS should be reserved for desperate enterprises and a time of peril.

—But, why did this at once soft-brained and malignant writer return, just as he was coming to a close, to the subject of the Duke's military character? Why could he not let that sleep? "His royal highness," says he, "would doubtless deem it an indirect injustice to himself, to enter into any vindication of his professional capacity. Nor will the friends of his royal highness so dignify the tribe of libellers, as to join issue with them upon a point of this kind. His military character will neither depend upon their conviction, nor be injured by their decision."—Indeed? Why, then, did you, at the outset of your miserable pamphlet, spend so much time upon this vindication? You there, in your way, endeavoured to convince us, by reasoning, that the Duke of York was a competent general; and now you tell us, that to endeavour to produce such conviction would be an injustice to the Duke. Such are the inconsistencies, into which men fall, when they write without principle.—In conclusion, this wretched writer tells us to appeal to the army for the character of the Duke. The army! The army! What! to the whiskered or the shaved part of the army? To the men with long tails or the men with no tails? To the men in muffs and tippets or to those in high-crowned caps? To the army! Are you not ashamed, insolent as you are, to bid us make such an appeal. No: we are bound by no rule of this sort. We are not to be told to judge of any commander from what those *under his command* will say of him; but, from his deeds, wherein we know him full as well as they can. Oh, caitiff, you deserve to be skinned for what you have said upon this part of your subject. To tell us, that the Duke's "*best reward* is the love of the army!" Why, what is the army itself, but a body, whose conduct is a proper subject of criticism with the public? The army may be most competent to judge of the character of *commissaries or barrack-masters*; but of those who command in battles, the public can judge as well, or better, than the army.—I must not conclude this article without noticing one very material circumstance. I now perceive, at a moment when I have not time to go through a comparison of the whole, that I have been copying from

and commenting upon, a *second edition* of this pamphlet, and that, in the passage, relating to the "*domestic cabinet*," this second edition differs very materially from the first edition. In the *first* edition, the latter part of the passage runs thus: "Now, the immediate and almost necessary members of this party, are certainly the king's family and household. From whom else, indeed, should a family council—a domestic cabinet—be composed, but of the members of the family of those who must necessarily have a community of interest, and sympathy in feeling? *The heir apparent alone, for very obvious reasons, is seldom a member of this closet council; all the other princes are almost necessarily in the immediate confidence of their sovereign and father. Let it not, therefore, be objected to the Duke of York, that he has followed the course of things, and, with the QUEEN, is at the head of the KING'S FRIENDS.*"—All the words here distinguished by *italic characters* are left out in the second edition. This was found to be a little too much. It was found (by the writer, I mean, of course), that, to make our gracious Queen a politician, and one too of a junto, or cabal, to work even against the ministry selected by the king, would not do. This part, therefore, was, in the second edition, expunged.—The Morning Chronicle asserts, that this pamphlet "has evidently been written under the eye, and published with the sanction of the Duke of York! Nay," adds the Chronicle, "we conceive, that it must have had the concurrence of the *highest authority in the kingdom.*"—And, while it is saying this, observe, this paper protests solemnly against ever having libelled the Duke of York.—I, on the contrary, look upon this pamphlet as coming from the very *lowest and dirtiest* source in the kingdom. Aye, the very dirtiest of all possible sources. What! attribute to the Duke of York and the King (Lord preserve us!) a pamphlet, which describes the whole of the royal family, together with others unknown, as being embodied in a sort of permanent conspiracy against the very ministers, whom the king selects to manage the affairs of the nation, through whom he acts, and the *responsibility* of whom is, we are told, the great security for our property and our lives! Attribute this pamphlet to the dictation of the Duke of York and the approbation of the king, and yet to resent the accusation of being a libeller! Verily the Morning Chronicle surpasses in assurance even the writer of this pamphlet, of which I shall now take my

leave, feeling no small degree of satisfaction at having had this opportunity of proving, by deed as well as word, the falsehood of the charge, preferred against me by this writer, of entertaining dislike towards the royal Commander in Chief.

Bolton, 1st Sept. 1808.

SPAIN.—DUKE OF YORK.

Sir ;—The enormous magnitude of the preparations which are now making by ministers for the assistance of the cause of patriotism in Spain, and the millions of sums which the country must inevitably be called upon to sacrifice in order to render that assistance effectual, are contemplated by the people of these kingdoms with a painful mixture of exultation and alarm. They are viewed with the feelings of the most triumphant satisfaction by all the sound-hearted part of the community, because they regard them as demonstrative of the mature state of revolutionary feeling in that country ; under the confidence that those to whom our resources are entrusted would not waste them on a cause which they had not good reason to believe was properly understood, and unanimously adopted by the whole Spanish population.—By the *revolutionary* feeling, I mean to describe that state of public sentiment, which is awakened to a conviction of the necessity of great and salutary changes in the fabric of the constitution, and to an abhorrence both of the searching and iron despotism of Napoleon, and of the filthy, corrupt, and stagnating influence of the superannuated dynasty of the Bourbons : a feeling, in short, which prompts an enslaved people to exclaim with one voice, in the language of Alcibiades to the profligate senate of his country :

" Till now you have gone on, and filled the time
" With all unnecessary measure ; making your wills
" The sceptre of justice ; till now myself, and such
" As sleep within the shadow of your power,
" Have wandered with our travell'd arts, and
" Brav'd
" Our sufferance vainly : now the time is flown,
" When cringing marrow, in the line of wrong,
" Cries, of itself, ' No more ! ' Now beardless
" Wrong
" Shall sit and pant in your great chairs of ease ;
" And purry insolence shall break his wind
" With fear and horrid flight."

SHAKESPEARE.

Such are the images which now, it is to be hoped, agitate the dreams of every patriot in Spain ; and such the accents to which his fancy moulds the sound of the trumpet which calls him forth to the conflict ! And he that would dissipate such high thoughts—he that would whisper base and ignominious conditions as the price of our coope-

ration—who would refuse to assist them in dashing to the earth the chains which the murky Cyclops of France are now forging for them, until they shall passively have thrust forth their wrists to the gripe of that iron which has hitherto entered so deeply into their soul,—“ a clearing cure be that man's inheritance to all generations ! ”—

But, in the midst of all this exultation, is heard the whisper of apprehension and alarm. The last stake for the deliverance of Europe is now about to be played : Britain is about to shed the blood of some of the bravest of her sons in the contest ; and is pouring out with zealous prodigality the fruits of her industry into the military chests of the patriots : and yet, in the moment of making all these sacrifices, the public, it seems, is not by any means fully and finally apprised of the individuals who are to be entrusted with the awful responsibility of command. In this interval of irritable and sensitive anxiety, when probably the deliverance of Spain is a theme which warms the heart of the humblest labourer or mechanic over his ale, the ear of the nation is still abused and disturbed by certain rumours, intimating, that an illustrious and royal duke “ has not so rendered to the prejudices of the people,” but had pertinaciously insisted on the command in one of the expeditions that is expected to leave our coasts.—The prejudices of the people !! Why, surely, Sir, that illustrious personage must have been most scandalously libelled by those who have attributed to him either language or sentiments so insulting to the best feelings of this loyal and generous nation. Our prejudices all lie in *precisely an opposite direction*. The claim of royalty to all great and amiable qualities is with us immediately allowed—* * *

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* * * * *—While, however, I humbly venture to state my objections to the appointment of the illustrious duke to any foreign command, my *prejudices* do not blind me to the merits to which he is justly entitled. The late enlightened General Order, which has issued by his command, for cashiering the *Queues* of all the privates and non-commissioned officers of his majesty's forces, and the addition of a Sponge to their appointments, for the purpose of keeping their heads clean, claims a very large portion of the public gratitude ! Whatever share in the deliverance of Spain (should it take

place) is to be attributed to this masterly and laudable measure, must unquestionably be due to the sagacity and judgment of the illustrious personage. Still, however, I should beg leave to suggest a doubt as to the prudence of recommending our patriotic allies to imitate our example of enlightened and convenient reform, by dismissing their *moustachios*, since it might possibly be productive of some awkward consequences, by interfering with their *national prejudices*.
—I am, Sir, &c.—A B—London,
Aug 6, 1808

TO SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, KNIGHT

DEAR SIR RICHARD,—After carefully collating the different reports, in the news papers, of the trial, CARR versus HOOD, and from my own recollection, I do not hesitate to say, that your assertion respecting the garbling of that report is not true.—The absurd nonsense you advance, about Reviews, hardly deserves notice. That your Oxford Review, your Public Characters, your Travels in Spain, and all your other publications, are manufactured in the way you represent, no one who knows Sir Richard Phillips, or is acquainted with his tricks, can doubt.—All the world knows that the Star, the Statesman, and other newspapers, inserted a "*Life of Sir Richard Phillips*," WRITTEN BY HIMSELF, and were PAID for so doing.—But, for such a man as you, to take credit to yourself for "*posing a craft*," of whom you and the Crosbys and the Cundees and the Murrys and the Hoggis, and the other *manufacturers* of publications are in hourly dread, is the *ne plus ultra* of assurance.—As I do not mean to take up much time in convicting you, good Sir Richard, pray answer me the following questions, and I will inform you and Mr Cobbett's readers, whether or not "You waste your time in reading Reviews."
—Did you not threaten to withdraw your employment from GILLET, the printer, because he printed the number of the Critical Review, in which PRATT'S HARVEST HOME is cut up? Did you not send your man, Hucklebridge, to the publishers of the Edinburgh Review, to solicit the perusal of a late number, as you understood they had received some by coach? Does not GILLET get some other printer to print those sheets of the Satirist, which interfere with your interests? Did you not dispatch your brother-in-law, SURR, when you returned from a city feast, on June the 30th, at 11 o'clock at night, to warn the wholesale booksellers, not to sell that month's Satirist? Did you not, at a considerable expense to

yourself, get your attorney to send Circular Letters to the poor, innocent, booksellers of Margate, Ramsgate, Brighton, and fifty other places, threatening them with the utmost severity of the law, if they dared to vend the said publication? Upon your oath, could you say that you neither purchase nor borrow the Reviews monthly, from Symonds, or any other bookseller? For what reason did George Woodfall send you, in a way that I will not describe, out of his printing office? In waiting for answers to these questions, I have the honour to be, dear Sir Richard, your obedient humble servant—
ECHO—London, August 11, 1808.

MR BFWLEY'S LETTER TO SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS

MR COBBETT, —As a sincere admirer of every thing, which, in these times of toppery and ostentation, wears the semblance of modest demeanor, I beg to be permitted, through the channel of your widely circulated Register, to pay a tribute of undissembled homage to your new correspondent SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, and to sympathize with the votaries of genius and learning in regretting the harsh and unhandsome treatment with which he has been assailed from the rude dialectic weapons of the law. With regard to the late Trial which has excited such universal attention, the World of Letters has been held in admiration both of the disinterestedness and the prudence of SIR JOHN CARR, who gave it birth, and of SIR RICHARD'S dexterity, who embraced, upon this occasion, the opportunity of enlightening us with his opinions of Literature and Criticism. These opinions are now gone forth, and will stand for ever, like axioms in the Mathematics, clear and indisputable. They will at once regulate and fix the taste of the timid scholar who distrusts his own judgment, and happy will that controversialist be who can render his polemical warfare successful, and give a death-blow to the arguments of his antagonist, by citing the oracular and unerring judgment of the learned Knight in support of his own decisions. Strange, indeed, it is, Sir, that the public, in an age like this, which has ironically been termed civilized and accomplished, should have been so blind and bigotted as never to have desecrated the varied erudition, the exquisite taste, and acute wit of that immaculate production, the Oxford Review, until, alas! the monarch of literature, Sir Richard, whom God long preserve! conferred disgrace and denision on us all, by pointing to its untimely death-bed. Let the guardian, however, of this interest-

ing *these* take courage and be comforted. Milton lived in ungrateful times, and many years rolled away before the merits of Paradise Lost were known or acknowledged; and, even in our own days, Chatterton too impatiently bore the churlish fang of necessity, and crushed the germs of his mighty genius before they had blossomed into maturity. **Even so, Sir Richard** The Oxford Review, which emanated from his genius, has been strangled in its infancy—the oracle of wisdom and of science is dumb, and well has the learned Knight revenged himself upon the World of Letters for its cold neglect, by relinquishing it to utter and hopeless ignorance.—But, Sir, I have been hurried away into this eulogium upon my illustrious friend, by the warmth of my feelings, and had almost forgotten the original purport of my letter. In the Trial alluded to above, Sir Richard was asked, “Whether he ever read or suffered his opinions to be influenced by the criticisms of the Edinburgh Review?” Sir Richard answered, upon his oath, “That he never read anonymous scurrility;—that, upon the first appearance of the Edinburgh Review, he had looked into it, but that he had not read it for these six years,” &c. Now, Sir, it is with ineffable sorrow I relate, that no longer ago than the year 1805, a book entitled “A Voyage round the World, &c.” was written by John Turnbull, and published by Sir Richard Phillips. This book is criticized in the Edinburgh Review for January 1807; and I have seen again and again a part of this criticism, which is extremely favourable, affixed, by way of recommendation, to the advertisements of the book in the public papers, and which advertisements are all evidently superintended by, and subscribed with the name of, Richard Phillips! The Attorney General, who, upon the trial, seemed neither to be awed into admiration by the impressive grandeur of Sir Richard’s Court Dress, nor to consider him any more a *man of letters* than his *postman*, told the Jury with very bad manners, that “Sir Richard had either slipped in his evidence, or was the greatest fool that ever trod the earth.” No candid man can accredit either of these insinuations; but that slander may be silenced and abashed, I hope Sir Richard will condescend to give an explanation of the mysterious circumstance to which I have alluded.—In the mean time, I have the honour to subscribe myself, with homage bordering on idolatry, his most obsequious and devoted admirer,—GEORGE BEWLEY.—Oxford, August 16, 1808.

TO SIR FRANCIS BUXTON, BART.
SIR.—I beg leave to offer to your consideration some remarks on the language imputed to you by the newspaper reporters of the debate which took place in the House of Commons on the 8th of June, on the bill entitled “The Stipendiary Clergy Bill.”—Your speech, Sir, is ~~very~~ *wisely* given; but in no report that I have seen can I discover that regard for first principles, and that reprobation of abuse, which characterise your observations on other topics; and highly as I respect the man, who in this age of venality and supineness, stands forward the firm, upright, and unvarying assertor of the genuine principles of the English constitution, I cannot but regret that he should overlook the principles on which our ecclesiastical establishment is founded.—For what purpose, let me ask, was the church of England instituted? Was it that it might become an engine of state—that it might extend the influence of the crown by placing at its disposal the most valuable benefices? Was it that an asylum might be afforded to the helpless or unworthy relatives and friends of the peers and wealthy commoners of the realm? If so, I could at once understand, had it been put into the mouth of any one else, what you are reported to have said, about “overturning the whole system of clerical property,”—and “similar encroachments on the property of lay improPRIATORS.” Coming from you, Sir Francis, this language would still be unintelligible. But if, as it has always been declared, the church was founded that the Christian religion might be preached to all ranks of the community, in its genuine, its uncoloured purity, where is the wrong, in making such alterations in the “system of clerical property” as will render that property more subservient to the object in view? Property, I conceive, was connected with the church, that it might be so subservient; and the legitimate use of it, is to provide the needful maintenance of a body of men, whose business it is to apply themselves *exclusively* to the ministerial office: and we find by different statutes, that in furtherance of this intention, the clergy are invested with certain privileges, and subjected to certain disabilities, “in regard of their own continual attendance on their sacred functions”—or as it is elsewhere expressed, that they may “attend the more closely to the service of Almighty God.”—We know, however, that in numerous cases the revenues of the church are very differently applied. It is unnecessary to inquire from

what sources the ecclesiastical property has sprung—If it be correct that it professedly originated in the principle I have stated, (and this I believe will not be disputed) I contend that it is the duty of those who have the power to see that it is made use of in conformity with that principle. Yet, Sir, much against practice in the state of giving large salaries to men for performing the duties of certain offices, which are in fact filled by clerks, it much reduced though still sufficient salaries, this you justly term a prostitution of the public money. But where, let me ask, is the difference in the principle of appointing rectors who never visit their parishes? In the effect, indeed, I see a difference by no means to the advantage either of the church or of the object of its institution, for how many of the stipend curates are consumed, by an anxiety to feed their families, to neglect the sacred function which has been intrusted to them by their overpaid superiors—the intention of the privileges and disabilities, to which, as already stated the body of the clergy is by law made liable, being thus entirely defeated.—It appears to me to be a matter of no importance by whom is held the power of disposing the livings of the church, so that laws exist to direct the manner in which it shall be exercised, and that it is exercised accordingly. Whether these livings in the property (we would, I think, to say in the trust) of the church, or of lay proprietors be it remembered that their revenues are wholly or in part derived from the public, and that certain duties are annexed to them, by the performance of which the public expect and have a right to expect to be benefited. But if those who possess this power (who, I repeat, should only be considered in the light of trustees) apply any part of these revenues to the use either of themselves, or of men who though ordained of the church receive neither their incomes nor ought to belong to them save on their emoluments, how can the cause of religion be served, and what is the result which the public seek from the establishments? It is fit, therefore, that authority should somewhere exist to inquire by whom the revenues are received and how the duties are performed, and I partly approve of “the Stipendiary Curates Bill,” because to a certain point it would have given effect to this authority, but I also had objections to it. These, however, did not arise from its interference with the property of the church. For the reasons already given, the shape of strong parliamentary regulations, is, I think, much to be wished for. My opinion is, that it was not sufficiently comprehensive—

—it did not go far enough—it should have been framed to compel the clergy to do their duty *each for him self*—to oblige the intitled lords to reside in their several dioceses—to be careful whom they admit into holy orders, but to see that when admitted the whole birth should be benefited or not, faithfully discharged their solemn obligations. This, however, would, under present circumstances, be too much to expect, and I own I was glad to see even an attempt to distribute the salaries of the clergy on a strictly merit in conformity with the rules of morality.—If the higher order of the clergy are still to live by the labour of their curates, surely these (I say it with all due reverence to the Christian benevolence of ecclesiastical proprietors) ought to derive from the same source a comfortable subsistence for their families and themselves. I know not, Sir, whether you would call this overturning “the whole system of clerical property,” but would it not lead to a purification of that system, which would render it more worthy of the religion it is intended to support.—You object to the additional power which would have been given by the bill in question to the bench of bishops, and to the attendant extension of the undue influence of elections to which clerical freeholders are already subject. Sir, I admit the full weight of these objections, and I do not mean to lessen it when I remark that they apply with nearly equal force to the power and influence now existing. If you could entirely destroy that power and influence, I might perhaps force I should to the argument I am about to advance, but I consider it only as a comparatively inconsiderable increase of an existing evil which would probably in a great measure remove an evil of vast and growing magnitude. Unquestionably this might be more effectually accomplished, (and without incurring your objections), by placing the power in the hands of the laity, which the bill would have given to the bishops. But this I only presume *en passant* to mention. Were I to propose it, I might revive the cry that “the church is in danger,” and I should be sorry to disturb Mr. Pease in the formation of his vigorous schemes or in his consultations with his mitred friends.—I may be allowed, however, to express my regret that the stipendiary curates bill should have afforded another proof of the influence of “the junta behind the throne.”—That this subject should undergo a more ample discussion is not merely desirable, it is in my mind essential to the welfare of the establishment. The church, Sir, is more in danger from the mode pursued of appointing her ministers and of applying her resources,

than from the united zeal for proselytism of all the sects; and those who pretend to be so staunchly her friends would better evince the sincerity of their professions by endeavouring to bring about a reform, than by joining in the factious and vulgar bawl of "no popery." When the offices of the church are thus considered as so much property which, without regard to the duties annexed to them, may be bought and sold, how can we be surprised that offices in the state, and seats in the House of Commons should also be taken into the estimate of individual wealth? They are all abuses belonging to the same system, they have a common origin, and are employed for a common purpose. Do you imagine, that when a rectory is sold, the welfare of the parish is consulted? Far from it: you might as well suppose that attention is paid to the interest of the public, when places and boroughs are transferred from one possessor to another. No, Sir; it is well if the parish do not suffer by the change. There are, I am aware, some cases which form honourable exceptions to his character; but so few are they, as to be scarcely worthy of mention, unless it be as examples of private excellence exerted for the public good.—We are taught to regard our ecclesiastical and civil establishments as monuments of the wisdom and virtue of our forefathers—with more propriety may we look upon them as *the remains*. But when we hear that the friends of this young nobleman, or that young commoner, who has wasted his substance in riot and extravagance, are about to provide for him by procuring him a living, a place, or a borough, how can we avoid being reminded of two stupendous almshouses, where high-born mendicants are charitably received! I request your attention, Sir, to the foregoing letter, and am, with every sentiment of respect—A FRIEND TO RADICAL REFORM.—*Liverpool, Aug. 20, 1808.*

POOR.—MITCHAM.

SIR;—As the reduction of the poor's rate is become an object of such national concern, not merely on pecuniary considerations, but because it tends to debase and enervate the minds of the lower orders of the people, who were once considered, and ought now to be the strength of the country, I was pleased to see you relate in your valuable work, an account of some gentlemen who had been successful in lessening the burthen, and reforming the abuses of their respective parishes. You gave this relation in honourable testimony of their zeal, to shew the thing is practicable if ably

executed, and to excite resident country gentlemen to the same laudable exertion. Allow me, Sir, to introduce another case to the notice of your readers as a further stimulus.—The parish of Mitcham in the county of Surrey, had for many years been suffering the dictatorship of Methodists and members of the Suppression of Vice Society, under whose government the poor were fed on cheap provisions, rice and dried herrings; a walk was raised two-fifths of a mile over the common, for the saints to visit and pray with the idle and profligate at the workhouse; eternal complaints were made by the paupers to the bench of magistrates, the rates were from 12 to 14 shillings in the pound, and the parish were nearly £700 in debt.—About 5 or 6 years ago a Mr. Moore, the lord of the manor, having some hundred acres of freehold, and occupying some hundreds more, felt the increase of poor rates oppressively himself, and listening to the complaints of the neighbourhood, although he had an exemption from parish offices, yet offered himself to be one of the overseers; having held the office for 3 years he paid off the old standing debt, reduced the rate from 5s. to 5s. 6d., and left £160 in hand though the rate was burthened with the half bounties for militia men, and the maintenance of their wives and families, which had not been the case in his predecessors' time; though he apprenticed out with parish fees between 30 and 40 of the children who before had been "fed with the bread of idleness," and though he at a very considerable expence repaired the workhouse.—His first step was to compel 2-5ths of the able but idle paupers to maintain themselves, who had been supported without work at public expence, merely because they affected saintship; the rest, who were not incapacitated by age or infirmity, were employed in labour according to their abilities. No householder was excused paying rates for religious or political party's sake; every man renting above £5 per annum was compelled to pay his share of the burthen; the lower orders thereby feeling the obligation they were under to the larger renters for their larger share of the compulsive subscription, which they were least likely ever to be benefited by themselves: thus the poorer part became concerned in keeping the rate low; while the actual paupers were rendered more comfortable, are better fed and clothed, are kept in habits of industry and led to sober habits of religion. (To be continued.)

"Curls are not cannons, hair-powder is not gun powder, tans are not bayonets. Are these the arms and ammunition, by which the enemies of his majesty are to be defeated?" — SUNDAY

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS

PORTUGAL — Of the victories, obtained over the French, in Portugal, by the English army, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and which victories are detailed in the official papers contained in this sheet, it is unnecessary to attempt to speak in praise; but, as far as we can judge from the accounts yet received, they certainly reflect the greatest honour on the army as well as on the commanders of every rank. It was, in my opinion, fully proved before, that our troops, when well commanded, were far superior to the French troops. I never regarded the assertion of that superiority as an empty boast. There were always reasons why our troops should be intrinsically better, and there was abundant experience to verify the theory. But, now, I should imagine, it will be very difficult for the French, though masters of the press of Europe, to prevent that fact from being acknowledged all over the world. In this point of view alone, then, our success is of vast importance. The victory, though not more glorious than the action, is, in this as well as in other points of its consequences, near and remote, of far greater importance to us than the victory of Austerlitz, which gave no new turn to the war, excited no great degree of feeling in the nations of Europe, and did not, in the least, arrest the progress of the French arms or diminish their fame or the dread of those arms which universally prevailed. — The consequences of this victory will be, first, a thorough conviction in the mind of every man in this kingdom, that the French, when met by us upon any thing like equal terms, are pretty sure to be beaten, which conviction will produce a confidence in our means of defence which did not unequivocally exist before; it will dissipate all the unmanly apprehensions about the threatened invasion, and, of course, it will, in a short time, relieve the country, in great part at least, from the inconvenience and distress, which, in so many ways, arise from the present harassing system of internal defence. Secondly, this victory, gained under such circumstances, will take off from that dread, in which the French arms have

been so long held in other nations, and particularly in the southern parts of Europe. Thirdly, it will confirm the confidence of the Spaniards, will make them even bolder than they were, will make them despise as well as hate the French. Fourthly, it will not only diminish the military and pecuniary means of Napoleon, but will render him timid; it will make him hesitate, it will fill him with apprehensions; it will enervate his councils, the consequence of which may be his total overthrow, particularly as his rigorous maritime and commercial regulations are so severely felt in all the countries under his control. Amongst the minor consequences of this victory (taking for granted that it will lead to the total evacuation of Portugal by the French) will be a speedy and bloodless settlement of our dispute with America, which is costing us something in precautionary measures. The American trade to Spain and Portugal was very great, and to trade thither *now*, as well as with the colonies of those countries, we can, if they behave well, give them leave. — The next of the ministers in sending out this expedition, in their plan of operations, in their choice of a commander, and in every part of this enterprise, no man of a just mind will, whatever be his sentiments in other respects, attempt to deny. They would, if the thing had failed, have been loaded with no small share of the blame; it would, therefore, be the height of injustice to withhold from them their share of the praise. Indeed, it cannot be denied, that almost the whole of their measures, with respect to foreign countries, have been strongly marked with force, promptitude, and vigour. Ten O'Connell in Council, against which Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Roscoe, and the Barons, so bitingly weighed, have been one cause, and not a trifling one, of the events in Spain and Portugal, in which countries we could not have entered had not the people been with us, and that the people were with us, arose, in great part, from those despair-creating effects, which were produced by the Orders in Council, which orders they could not fail to ascribe to Napoleon, nor could they fail to perceive, that,

while he possessed their country, there was not the smallest chance of their being relieved from those effects. How false, then, have events proved to be the reasoning of Lord Grenville and Mr Roscoe and Mr Baring, that the Orders in Council would make us detested by all the suffering nations, and would tend to strengthen the power of Napoleon over them! I could easily refer to the passage, wherein I contended, that the Orders in Council would naturally have the effect of striking the authority of Napoleon in the conquered, or dependant, states, by producing unbearable distress. I, indeed, wished for a still greater stretch of maritime power. I wished an interdiction to be issued against all those not in alliance with us. I wished the whole world to be told "As long as you suffer I will command all the land, England will command all the sea," and from that sea she will permit none of you to derive any, even the smallest advantage, or comfort. But, without this, the ministers really have done what they said they would do, they have brought things to a crisis, they have got rid of that benumbing, death like lingering, which had been the characteristic of our warfare for so many years, and, if they follow up their blows, it is not impossible, that, after all the senseless adulation which has been bestowed upon speech making ministers, we may see the conqueror of Europe, the king and queen maker, toppled from his stool by the Duke of Portland. Now is the time to recall the public attention to the doctrines of Mr Whitbread and Mr Roscoe. I should now like to see, from the pen of the latter in particular, an essay on the wisdom of making peace in 1806, and another upon the moderation of Napoleon, both of which were the subjects of his dull pamphlet. I should like now to see him attempting to convince the manufacturers, that they would have gained by a peace made in 1806, and that they would have enjoyed their gain, in peace and safety. His doctrines, luckily for the nation, did not prevail. The common sense of the people taught them that his doctrines were false. He could not make them see any prospect of real peace, and, though the conqueror was still borne upon the wings of victory, though a refusal to submit to his terms was followed by a still greater extension of his power and of our glories, yet the nation said, "Go on he must if he will, for, until the state of Europe be changed, England cannot enjoy a moment's real peace." By the measures of the present ministers, the great question, which every one was afraid to moot, was at once really

put: can England exist independent, and in defiance, of all the civilized world, or can she not? This question, the most interesting that ever was started, has now been decided, and for this decision, so glorious to us and to our country for ever, we have to thank the men who are at present in power. — But, if these victories, and if a continuation of success, is not to have the effect of diminishing the sacrifices that the people make, if they are not to put an end in time, to the system of red-contributions and forts and barracks in England, I shall regard them as being of little use. I do not expect or wish, that these precautions, little as I may think of their efficacy, should all at once be thrown aside, but, I do hope, that, as soon as all reasonable men are perfectly satisfied, that there is no longer the smallest danger of invasion, the ministers will be able to show a disposition to restore the country to its former state of confidence in itself, to abridge the enormous expences of an establishment which now costs about twenty millions annually, and to render the ruling influence less of a military nature. The army, or at least the part of the nation under military rule and influence, is too large to be consistent with the principles or the practice of freedom. Regarded as the means of emergency it is not so odious, but, if it were to be attempted to keep such a force on foot as a permanent establishment, we might at once, bid adieu to the hope of ever being a free people, and, in fact, we should have made all those sacrifices and our countrymen would have bled only for the purpose of forging and rivetting our own chains. By degrees, which succeed each other very rapidly, a military nation gets into a military government. It is quite impossible to separate the things in idea, and as impossible to separate them long in fact. They are interwoven in their nature. — The expence too is enormous. Every parent who leaves a hundred pounds in legacies to his children, has to reflect, that six or seven of those pounds are now deducted for purposes of a military nature. To maintain such an army, with all its numerous retainers, and all its pretences for expenditure, must alone, in time, leave the individual proprietor little to call his own. In short, it must eat him out of house and home. — Therefore, in rejoicing at the success of the army, in applauding the wisdom and bravery of all concerned in the enterprise, I must say, that no small part of my satisfaction arises from the hope, that, in the end, this success, with the others, by which I trust it will be followed, will produce a diminution

of the army and its expences.—That we should continue a military nation, as long as the necessity exists, there can be no doubt; and, that we should afterwards have a general and permanent plan of military defence is what I wish for; but, that we should have a large permanent army, commanded by officers appointed and cashiered at pleasure; that we should have such an army an hour longer than is absolutely necessary to our security from the attacks of a *foreign* foe, I hope no man will be found to assert; especially after the glorious example given us by the patriots of Spain, who have proved to the whole world, that a people rising in defence of their country, though without discipline and without appointed leaders, are more than a match for the bravest and most skilful enemy.

SPAIN.—In speaking of the probability of Buonaparte being overthrown, and in expressing satisfaction at that probability, I must always be understood as including the condition, that his sway is succeeded by a free government; because, if people are to be slaves, it is a circumstance of no consequence at all whom they are slaves to, except that it is less dishonourable to bend the knee to a famous conqueror than to a silly creature, who has never done any thing but eat and drink. If the nations, who, to all appearance, are breaking his chains, have the wisdom and the virtue to drive out despotism of every sort along with him, then they will and ought to succeed; but, if the wars against him be carried on by a cabal, by a faction whose object is to exalt themselves, they not only will fail but they ought to fail. The work of opposing him is but just *begun*. What is done is nothing, if not well followed up. To be sure, a defeat of him who has so long been accustomed to meet with uninterrupted success is an excellent beginning. He has, however, been defeated before now; and his army, under other commanders, has been defeated: yet, he recovered that; it produced little injury to him in any way. What line of conduct he may adopt with regard to Spain and Portugal, whether he may send large armies thither, or may leave them for a while to see the result of those internal differences which he may naturally expect to see arise, and which he will not fail to endeavour to foment, is quite uncertain. It will, however, be a great error in us to act as if we supposed, that he had given up the idea of placing kings of his own family upon the thrones of Spain and Portugal. He is not easily turned from any of his projects; and it would be a dreadful mistake to suppose,

that, because our newspapers laugh at him, he is really, all at once, in consequence of the loss of thirty or forty thousand men, become an object of contempt. The internal affairs of Spain cannot be easily arranged and settled. The patriots have pronounced their old government an *infamous* one; they have stipulated with the people for a *reform of abuses*; they have demanded an *assembling of the Cortes*. If there are no interested motives to come athwart the intended reformation, the little confusion that will arise will be of no consequence; but, if there are; if private interest and not public good be the object of the leaders, Joseph Napoleon will yet be king of Spain and the Indies, in spite of all that we can do to the contrary. I am, I must confess, sorry that Napoleon does not seem disposed to send armies into Spain. I wish the war there to be long and arduous; for, if it cease now, the people will have gained very little indeed, especially if any of the rags of the old government are brought back again. Nay, it is very probable, that they may be worse treated than they were before. The despots will conclude, and with reason, that the people are fashioned to despotism. They will have got a new lease of their enjoyments and their abuses; and the people will be more wretched than ever. All the old corrupt crew will be in power. There will be no example given to the enslaved nations of the world, except that of a people having shed their blood for the apparent purpose of perpetuating their own slavery; of calling back despotism amongst them, after they had got rid of it. A struggle of some length would have made the people of Spain think no more of FERDINAND than they would think of a fly. Such a struggle must have called up hidden talents and virtues. Now there appears to be a sickness in the councils of the Juntas; and of this, it is very probable, Buonaparte may take advantage. What we ought to wish for is a new and vigorous government in Spain; a government upon principles precisely the opposite of those whereon Napoleon's government is built and maintained; a government that would be a living example to all the nations whom he has enslaved. He has in his clutches the chief of that government which we seem to desire for Spain. Who is to make him give that chief up; and, if he does it, upon what *conditions* will he do it? It is easy to see what a turmoil must arise out of this single circumstance. While Ferdinand is in France, unless all idea of making him king be abandoned, there never can be any peaceable

settlement of affairs in Spain. If, in the midst of those divisions of opinion that will inevitably arise, as to what ought to be done, Napoleon send an army of a hundred thousand men, his brother will be seated upon the throne with very little difficulty. It appears to me, therefore, that the thing to be desired, is a *new government*, established as soon as possible, unless Buonaparte immediately send his armies; for, in that case, there will want very little of government until the war be over, and then it will be found, that the talents and virtues of the nation have, of their own accord, formed the sort of government required by the state of the country. There are some who talk of FERDINAND as if he had been fairly chosen by the people of Spain, who had first put down his father. The Morning Chronicle, of the 2d instant, has, upon the subject, a long-winded article, which concludes thus: "The Spaniards are fighting for their national independence, and for their legitimate sovereignty—but what constitutes the *legitimacy* of FERDINAND VII.? That which made WILLIAM III. the legitimate sovereign of this country, '*the choice of the people*.'" "They have set aside his father by *forcing* him to abdicate his throne, because he was incapable and unworthy to reign. Instead of embarrassing themselves, like the French, with speculative theories of government, they have chosen his son as his successor, as the English chose the son-in-law of JAMES II.; and we have not a doubt, that their privileges will be assured, as ours were, by a Bill of Rights. Their conduct ought to operate, both as a warning to kings, and an encouragement to every people; and if princes do not profit from the lesson, their subjects will, we trust, follow the example of the Spaniards."—Now, I should like to know what evidence there is of *the people* of Spain having given their voice for the young king. Never has there appeared the slightest foundation for the assertion. The people had nothing at all to do with the matter. The old king was turned out by a band of armed men; he was, indeed, *forced* to abdicate his throne; but it was by a cabal at court, and with which cabal the people of Spain had nothing to do. The son, having assumed the kingly office, afterwards abdicates it in behalf of Napoleon; so that, if he really was chosen by the people, he gave up what the people had given him, and Joseph went to Spain in virtue of the people's choice. With those who stick to Ferdinand there must always this embarrassment exist: they must either acknowledge in him a *want*

of *legitimate right to reign*, or they must openly avow the doctrine, that the people have, at all times, a *right to cashier their kings*. As to saying, that the Spaniards chose the *son* of the old "unworthy" king as the English chose the *son-in-law* of their unworthy king; the very existence of such persons was a matter of accident. Suppose these kings had had neither sons nor sons-in-law, were the people to have gone to the more distant relations? Suppose they had been able to find no distant relations; what was then to have been done? Does this right of cashiering kings, or, to use the more gentle phrase of the Morning Chronicle, this right of "*forcing* kings to abdicate," exist only in cases where the said kings happen to have relations? Will the people at Whitehall admit the right of cashiering kings? If they do not, where will they find a justification for any attempt that may be made by us to place Ferdinand upon the throne, during the life of that father, who protested against the violence which compelled him to abdicate? But, coupling the cause of Spain with that of this man; we get ourselves into difficulties, from which it will not be easy for us to get clear. Nor should I be at all surprized, if, bye-and-bye, we should see all our present hopes blasted in consequence of some act of pertinacity relating to the sort of government which we, or our rulers, desire to have established in Spain.

DUKE OF YORK.—I had, I thought, entirely done with this subject in my last sheet; and I now revive it merely to point out to the public a striking proof of the falsehood of the pamphlet there noticed. It charges the daily papers with malice against the Royal Chieftain. It represents them as encouraged by both the parties, the *ins* and the *outs*, to assault him; to misrepresent, ridicule, and degrade him. Now, let us see how this charge is justified by the conduct of the official paper of the Opposition. That paper, upon the first appearance of the pamphlet, said: "It has evidently been '*written under the eye, and published with the sanction, of the Duke of York*.' Nay, we conceive, that it *must have had the concurrence of the highest authority in the kingdom*." Here, then, it unequivocally imputes the pamphlet to the dictation, if not the pen, of the duke, and to the approbation of the king. On the 2d instant, this same paper says: "We have already noticed the public and authentic disavowal of the '*Statement*' lately published, under the assumed character of a defender of his royal highness the Duke of York.

To this disavowal, which every class of our readers must have seen with pleasure, we think ourselves bound to add the positive contradiction of all the material facts stated in this publication. The gross and absurd falsehoods which it contains in every page, could not possibly proceed from any man having any knowledge of what really has passed respecting the Duke of York in the last two years. The private conversations and political intrigues which it affects to detail, are throughout complete fabrications and gross impositions on the public credulity. But we wish particularly to assure the public, that there is not the least foundation for the assertion, that any such inquiry, as is therein mentioned, into the conduct of his royal highness, has been at any time carried on, at the instigation of one party, or defeated by the protection (as it is most improperly termed) of the other—a statement which both, we are sure, will be equally ready to deny, and the contradiction of which is due in justice to his royal highness. As warm and zealous advocates for a free press, we lament to see it abused for the circulation of such impostures, and we think it our first duty to expose and detect them.”——

So! This all very fine, Sir; but, if it was your first duty to expose and detect this imposture, how came you to delay the performance of that duty so long? Nay, how came you to give countenance to that imposture, by stating to your readers, that the book was evidently written under the eye of the duke, and must have had the approbation of the king? Be so good as to answer that.——Oh! you were deceived yourself; you were amongst those whose credulity was imposed upon by this imposture; and, being now undeceived, you wish to undeceive your readers. But, Sir, whence have you drawn the information, which has enabled you to give a “positive contradiction” of all the material facts stated in the publication,” and to “assure the public” that there is not the least foundation for the statement about an inquiry into the “conduct of his royal highness?” Whence have you drawn this information? Through what channel has this illuminating influence broken in upon you? And how came you, the great oracle of the party to whom you appertain, to have been, until this happy moment, lost in darkness? Truly, if such be the character of your mind; if you are subject to such fits of obscurity of intellect, it will be well for your readers, ere they place reliance upon your statements and

opinions, to ascertain with precision the state of the moon.——But, Sir, this plea of subsequent information will not, I am sorry to say it, save your credit. For, in both these articles, you give an opinion, nay, you make assertions, not upon hearsay, not upon extraneous information, but (mark it well) upon the internal evidence of the work in question. In the first article you say that it is evident that the duke dictated the work, and that it must have had the king's concurrence. That is to say, the work was of that nature and was so written, that the duke and the king must necessarily be at the bottom of it. Now, then, how do you characterize this same work in your second article? Well may you turn your eyes away from the quotation that you perceive coming! How, I say, do you characterize the work which you had, but a few days before, ascribed to the Duke of York and the king? Why, by asserting that it contains “gross and absurd falsehoods in every page.” That is to say, taking both your articles together, the duke has evidently dictated and the king must have approved of, a work containing “gross and absurd falsehoods in every page.” Is this, Sir, a specimen of that respect, which you are pleased to profess towards the royal family?——To the assertion, that the falsehoods are gross and absurd you do, indeed, add, that “they cannot possibly proceed from any man having any knowledge of what really has passed respecting the Duke of York;” and, as the king and the duke must have known what did pass, you thus ward off the charge of imputing the gross and absurd falsehoods to them. But, there is still a difficulty, which you do not seem to have perceived when the loyal fit was upon you; and that is, that the falsehoods, if gross and absurd, must have so appeared to you when you imputed the work to the Duke and the King, or, that you are a person not capable of perceiving falsehoods, however gross and absurd, until they are pointed out to you. You now tell us, that the falsehoods, in every page, are so gross and absurd, that they could not possibly have proceeded from any man having any knowledge of what has really passed respecting the Duke of York. There is an impossibility in the thing. You want no reasoning or facts to convince you of it. You at once see that it must be so. Yet, only about ten days before, you told me and all the rest of your ardent admirers, that these things, which you now call “gross and absurd falsehoods” had evidently been written under the eye of the duke, had been published under his sanction, and

that the work *must* have had the concurrence of the king! Who is to believe what you say in future? What reliance is to be placed upon your sense or your sincerity? —You tell us, in conclusion, that there is no foundation whatever for the assertion, that any such inquiry as that mentioned in the pamphlet, into the conduct of the duke has been, at any time, carried on, at the instigation of one party, or defeated by the protection of the other; and you add, that you are *sure*, that both parties will be equally ready to contradict the statement of the writer. It is possible that you may have received such assurances; it is possible that you may have been ordered to communicate such assurances to the world; but, how are we to believe you? How are we to know, that you will not at some time hence, flatly contradict what you now say, and call it a gross and absurd falsehood? The truth is, that you, very unwisely, imputed the pamphlet to the duke and the king; you found yourself embarrassed by this hasty imputation; your party have, I dare say, censured your want of discretion; and, in this second article, we see you endeavouring to extricate yourself, at the expence of your understanding or your sincerity.

SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS.—When, upon a former occasion, I had to notice the conduct of this gentleman, as relating to the action for a libel, brought by Sir JOHN CARR, Knight, against Messrs. Flood and Sharpe, for publishing a criticism upon a work of Sir John's, I had not been informed of many circumstances, which have since come to my knowledge, and which do certainly exhibit Sir Richard in quite another light than that of a man, who would wish to see the principles of freedom cherished in England. It appears, from the report of the Trial, now published at full, and some parts of which report I shall more fully notice hereafter, that Sir Richard was, if not an adviser, at least an approver of the prosecution, a fact, which, had it not been proved in so clear a way, I could not have believed. What! one bookseller approve of the prosecution, or, rather the persecution of another, and that, too, for publishing a criticism upon a work of which he himself was become the proprietor! A near relation of his has, it seems, prosecuted the editors of a catch-penny work called "*THE SATIRIST*," for a criticism upon a child's book, which those editors represented as having an immoral tendency; and that *six-pence* damages were obtained. It is further asserted in print, that Sir Richard himself preferred a *bill of indictment* against the same Satirists

for something said by them of him, and that the bill was *thrown out*. The consequence of all this has been a pretty general feeling of resentment against him, in all those who have any thing to do with the press, and that feeling, so far from having been awed into silence by his endeavours for that purpose, has shewn itself in literary attacks from various quarters and of various descriptions, from a two-shilling-and-six-penny pamphlet down to a half-penny ballad. His attention is now drawn from the odious caricature of Sir John Carr to the many, wherein he himself cuts the principal figure. He cannot take up a newspaper without seeing some paragraph or advertisement inviting the reader to a laugh at his expence. The very walls in the streets he sees covered with notifications as to where and when the public may be entertained in the same agreeable way. One author has employed his pen in writing a burlesque account of him, entitled, "*Memoirs of the public and private Life of Sir Richard Phillips, Knight: By a Citizen of London and Assistants*." His old friends the Satirists, who, probably, wrote the book for the purpose, have taken it up as a subject to review; have chosen to consider it as a *serious* statement; and have thus made it a two-edged instrument for the purpose of goading him and his family, no part of whom, whether wife or child, do they spare, though it is not at all improbable, that some of them may have often satisfied their hunger at his table. They go so far as to say, that he has been "in the habit of attaching an *alias*" to his name, and that he "once went by the name of Philip Richards." The pretended biographer, after relating, that Sir Richard, when he lived at Leicester in the capacity of a hosier, had his premises destroyed by fire, adds, that he "*had insured his property not many months before*, and that, when every one supposed him ruined, he rose like a phoenix from his ashes." Upon this the Satirists say, by way of note, that in 1795, Sir Richard received £1,500 from the Phoenix fire-office; and they then proceed to complain of the biographer for being silent upon "the *supposed* cause of the conflagration;" after which they add: "perhaps our biographer never heard, that his hero, soon after the accident, wrote to a friend, stating to this effect: '*that, although it was very true the fire office had amply remunerated him for his losses, yet, that it was such a glorious opportunity for taking advantage of the public feelings, who did not know his premises had been*

insured, that he intreated him instantly "to promote a subscription in his favour;" and yet we have been told, that such a letter "was written, and is not yet destroyed." As to what these writers say about Lady Phillips, of whom they would evidently have said harm if they could; about Sir Richard's vanity, and other foibles; about his squabbles with authors: these are not worth notice; but, the charges above made, with respect to the *name* and the *fire*, as I dare say they can, so perhaps they may, receive a serious contradiction from, and in the name of, the person against whom they are brought. But, above all things, I would advise Sir Richard not again to resort to the law. He has quite enough of means in his own hands wherewith to expose any *falsehoods* that have been, or may be published against him; and, he may rest assured, that, whatever anger he may feel against the promulgators of those falsehoods, the most effectual way of inflicting punishment on them, is, except in very particular cases, to leave them to that avenging hunger and thirst, to satisfy the cravings of which they have recourse (for the want of talents whereby to attract attention) to any means, however base, of obtaining notoriety. When one contemplates the mean trick to which these men have resorted, in writing a book for the purpose of having it to review, and making the book and the review a puff for each other; and especially when one sees them unnecessarily introducing the wife of the person whom they are assailing, and who is, in no way whatever, concerned in the transactions of which they complain; when one sees them resort to means of annoyance so very low, it may well be a question with Sir Richard whether he ought to condescend to contradict *any* of their assertions; for, it must be evident to every man of sense, into whose hands their work may chance to fall, that there is no falsehood at which they will stick. These men have no principle. They hate not any vanity that Sir Richard may have. They hate him because he has a dinner and shoes, they having neither. They are said to be six or eight authors, whom he has been obliged to discharge for stupidity, a statement strongly corroborated by the superabundance of malice and the plentiful lack of talent, visible in the pretended biographer and in the reviewers of his performance. What, in the name of common sense, had Sir Richard to do with prosecutions of literary vermin like these, who write by the foot, who come to the pay-table of a Saturday night, like weavers or tinkers; whose

master must long ago have discharged them, had not Sir Richard indiscreetly furnished their collection of trash with an interesting topic; and to whom, in all human probability, he would, ere his Shrievalty had been at an end, have had to dole out their daily allowance of water and bread. The generality of readers have not the most distant idea what miserable creatures those are, who are employed to work upon publications of this sort. Their names are cautiously disguised, and that for more reasons than one. Their retients are more secret, and far more filthy, than those of the fox or the poet. I would bet the worth of their work, that all the clothes upon all their backs would not sell for fifty shillings. This is precisely that sort of writers, whom Peter Pindar describes as being to be bribed with "buckets of broth and pounds of bullock's liver." And yet, by creatures like these has Sir Richard Phillips been goaded even to the point of *appealing to the law*! This is what I dislike. Had he resorted to the horse-whip, the pump, or the horse-pond, why, I should have said, that it was foolish, to be sure, but that men cannot always command their passion. But, to appeal to the law; to do that which might keep in countenance the fools and rogues, who, when properly spoken of, charge the speaker with a *crime*; to join the band who walk without being spit upon, merely because truth is a libel; to attack that press which he, as well as any man, knows to be at its last gasp; to avail himself of his elevation to mount his brethren with lawyers' spurs. This is what I cannot forgive, and it is what he will repent of to the end of his life.—The Trial, in the case of Carr against Messrs. Hood and Sharpe, is one of the most important, nay the most important, that has taken place in my memory, and I am glad to see that it is fully and ably reported. According to the doctrine here laid down, both by the Chief Justice and the Attorney General, one man may, not only innocently, but *laudably*, ridicule the person and the talents of another. Not only freely examine them and criticise them, but ridicule them. The whole of the Trial is important. I do not mean as an exposure of Carr and Sir Richard Phillips, but as containing the principles of the Judges and the Attorney General respecting libels; and it will be matter of wonder with me, if the Booksellers do not form a *FUND* for the circulation of it *all over the kingdom*. An edition might be printed for *three-pence* each; each bookseller might take a number proportioned to the extent of his business; some copies, or one at least, might be put

into every parcel sent off from every shop; and thus, in the course of a year, every man who can read would have read it. This is no loose essay upon the libel-law. It is the practice of the law. It is what the Attorney General and the Chief Justice have said and what they have laid down as law. Towards a fund for this purpose I shall be very happy to contribute my share; for I am certain that there has not, for years, any publication appeared calculated to do so much good.—To fall upon a man already down, or to join in a general outcry, is not my practice; nor have I any desire, in what I recommend, to annoy Sir Richard Phillips. I think it of great public consequence, that this Trial should be universally read. As I observed before, the action, out of which this trial grew, was founded upon the new principle, namely, that *WHATSOEVER HURTS A MAN'S FEELINGS is to be considered as libellous*. The trial has completely set this principle aside; and, in fact, we are much obliged to Sir John Carr for having put the principle to the test. Until Sir John did this, there was no man who could tell whether he dared criticise the works of any author. Indeed, according to the principle laid down, and acted upon, he did not dare do it, without running a risk of punishment. Good God! What would have been said by POPE and SWIFT, if any one had said to them: "It is well for you, that you live in this age; for, in that which will succeed, to ridicule a fool or a knave, will subject men to all the tortments of the law; and, there is scarcely one single sentence, that either of you have written, especially where you touch upon the character or conduct of public men, that would not, to a certainty, shorten your lives, and, perhaps, your ears, before you died." What would Gay have said, had he been told, that his Fables, in the next age, would have subjected him to ear-cropping? Yet, the nation was as well-governed then, as it is now, and, as to matters of literature, it was far greater than it now is. Were a man to write now as Pope and Swift wrote, he would have the full cry of Bond Street and St. James's against him. He would be called ruffian and assassin. He would be accused of coarseness, grossness, personality. He would be called an enemy to politeness, taste, refinement, and human happiness. I have often wondered, that some of the descendants of the rogues and fools whom they lashed, have not prosecuted the re-printers and the sellers of their admirable satires, which, were they written in the

present day, would be deemed infamous libels. They had no idea that to write and publish *truth* was a crime. The whole tenor of their works proves, that, so long as they confined themselves to the stating of what was *true*, they entertained no apprehensions as to the consequences. Upon the topics connected with *royalty*, too, they were no more squeamish than upon others. They were afraid of no *constructive* libels; nor, if they chose to express their disapprobation of the conduct of kings and princes, did they fear the accusation of *disloyalty*. Why, if either of them, had written, in the present day, what both wrote at the beginning of the last century, he would long ago have been transported, under that act of parliament, for which we have to thank, principally, Pitt and Lord Grenville. Yet, as I observed before, the times they lived and wrote in were very glorious times for England; such times as England has not since seen; times in which she shone more, both in arms and in letters, than she ever did before, and than she is likely to do again.—The rogues and fools in public life have powerful motives for cramping the press, and all the rogues and fools in private life are naturally of their party. It must be so. Vice and folly, of whatever description, hate the light. Popularity is their natural enemy. Public prosecutions lead to private prosecutions; and why not? If a man is to be punished for exposing the vices or follies of a person whom the public employs, why should not the exposé of a private person be punished? It is detestable to tell us, that regular government cannot be supported without this sort of prosecutions. To tell us, that a government cannot subsist without laws to punish the publication of *truth*, is, in fact, to tell us, that that government subsists by falsehood and fraud.—Besides, if a government cannot subsist without such prosecutions, it never can long subsist with them, unless it becomes a complete despotism, which is a state of constant warfare between the government and the people, and which, as we have recently seen in many instances, will subsist no longer than the people are without an opportunity of casting off its authority. If the government subsist with the wishes of the people, what need has it of prosecutions for any animadversions upon its conduct? And, of what *use* are the prosecutions? Suppose, for instance, some one accuse the government of tyrannical conduct. If his assertion be unsupported by proof, none but the very ignorant part of the nation will believe him; and, even on

their minds, he will produce no lasting impression. If he speak *truth*, it is not only proper that he should speak freely and without danger; but, the prosecution of him, in that case, and by a form of process which does not admit of his pleading the truth in his defence, must have, as to the government, an effect ten thousand times worse than if he had not been prosecuted; such a prosecution proving, not that the government was innocent of the charge, but, tending to prove that it was guilty, and that the person prosecuted has been the victim of vindictive guilt. And, in cases, where his assertions are void of proof; assertions which hardly any one will believe; such assertions gain credit from the mere circumstance of their author becoming an object of prosecution. Nothing can, by what is called a criminal prosecution, be obtained *favourable* to the reputation of the prosecuting party. His innocence cannot be proved. The form of proceeding, according to the present practice, does not admit of it. What does he get, then? A glutting of his vengeance, a gratification of his vindictive feelings, and the hope of being able to prevent future detection and exposure. But, those who, perhaps, only despised him before, will now hate him; and this hatred, justly sticking to him through life, will amply supply the place of future exposures. His escaping censure will ever after be attributed to the dread of punishment in those who are able and willing to censure him. Thus, he will always be regarded as guilty, even to a degree, perhaps, beyond the truth; and every just man will see, with pleasure, the hour of his misfortune and destruction. — It is now rather more than a year ago, since a gentleman, who had been most shamefully misrepresented and belied in the newspapers, and who had indeed, been distinctly accused of very heinous offences, wrote to me an explanation of the circumstances of the case, and intimated, in conclusion, his intention of appealing to the law. I participated in his indignation against the publishers; but, conjured him not to appeal to the law; because, now, or in a short time, the whole nation would be convinced of the falsehood of what had been said against him, whereas, if he prosecuted, the whole nation would have doubts, at least, upon the subject. He followed my advice. He suffered the web of falsehood to be spun out, and he has found, that not a human creature in England believes one of them. It is in reason that it should be thus. Truth, give it fair play, will always triumph over falsehood. Pit them against one another, giving them

both the free scope of the press, and there is no fear but the former will prevail. Every man does, every man must, know this; and, as every man is quite at liberty to answer those who attack him in print, and every man has the ability to state plain facts in his defence, his appealing to the law always is, and always must be, a circumstance conveying suspicion, that *he wants truth* wherewith to repel the attack. — As to *ridicule*, good lord, what would DRYDEN, POPE, and SWIFT have said, had they been told, that, in their country, it would become a crime to wound men's feelings by holding them up to ridicule! Ridicule is a thing that *will not attach where it ought not*. I defy Mr. Gillray to turn Lord Nelson's skill and courage into ridicule. You may attempt to ridicule any thing. This master of the art has tried his talents upon Sir Francis Burdett and his Westminster procession; but, if he would make a candid confession, he would tell us, that that was amongst the most unsuccessful of his efforts; he would tell us, that not a soul, except, perhaps, Mr. Baldwin, to whose name the folks at Whitehall prefix the infantine appellation of *Billy*, ever thought this piece worth carrying home. There must be the ingredients of ridicule in the thing ridiculed without which, to attempt to ridicule it, is like attempting to strike fire out of clay. Well, then, ridicule is, in all cases, not only innocent, but laudable; because, that which is ridiculous ought to be ridiculed. What must the world think of the man, or set of men, who can come into a court of justice and demand reparation, or vengeance, for having been *laughed at*? Who, like CALIBAN, can come and say: "Mark how he mocks me; I pray thee, my lord, bite him to death?" It is, and always has been, I suppose, the fashion of babies to run to their parents with complaints of being laughed at; but, for grown up men to do this; for knights and other great folks to fall into the practice; for courts of law and justice to be made the instruments of their childish resentment: this, were it not but too true, would be ridiculous indeed. What is that reputation? What can that reputation be worth? Whose care, or protection, can it merit, if it be not sufficient to stand the test of ridicule? — An *indictment*! An indictment preferred against a book-maker or a bookseller; an *indictment* against the press by one who had so long thriven by the press, and who now had so much of that press at his command, together with abundance of talents to make use of it! Of a *fool's wrath* the world has long been taught to beware; but, who

would have expected a prosecution of this sort at the hands of Sir Richard Phillips! Vanity, pure vanity, has been the undoing of this gentleman. It has filled him with a feverish anxiety about what the world says of him. Curse on the gold chain and the glass coach and the gaudy liveries. Is it possible that they could turn the head of a man of sense! One would have thought that he had had opportunities enough of witnessing the ridicule attending the annual nobility of the city. Lords for a year, and then lords no more. Well, he was duly warned of the consequences. The last day I had the pleasure of seeing him, which was in February, I parted with him, in Fleet-street, with these words: "God bless you, Phillips, and preserve you from the honours of knight-hood." When I read the paragraph, giving an account of his hand-kissing scene, I was sick. I foresaw, as I thought, all the fooleries that were to follow; but, I really did not anticipate a prosecution of those, whose low and malignant envy, such honours were so well calculated to set in motion; much less did I ever expect to see, in Mr. Phillips, a spirit of persecution against his brother booksellers and against the press in general.—There is only one way of recovering the blows, which he has invited, and which are now falling upon him as thick as those of the muleteers upon the knight of the woeful countenance; and that is, holding both his tongue and his pen, until his justly offended adversaries are wearied with the exercise of belabouring him; for, the more he struggles the faster and harder will they strike, nor can he reasonably expect them to cease, while they perceive, in him, the least appearance of the remains of life. Pursuing the course that I have pointed out, he may, by degrees, be able to creep forth again; but, if his indiscretion shall give to the warfare any considerable duration, the consequences of it will stick to him to the end of his days:

"Sacred to ridicule his whole life long,
"And the sad burden of some merry song."

There is not a poet of any size, but will try his hand upon him. His name, with ridicule attached to it, will find its way into all sorts of publications; and, long after he himself will have returned to his native earth, his story will live as a warning to all those, who shall be suspected of a disposition to screen their vanity from ridicule by a prosecution in a court of law.

Bottley, Sept. 8, 1808.

POOR.—MITCHAM.

(Concluded from page 384.)

It may be alledged that the paupers

are now farmed at 4s. 6d. per head; that is certainly true; but it is in the parish house, by a man under the control of the officers, who visit the house constantly; and the best refutation against any charge on this head is, that formerly incessant complaints were made by paupers for ill-usage, and mismanagement, and since the present establishment, not a single murmur has been heard by the magistrates; all are satisfied, except those who assumed the title of lady patronesses to the snivelling children of the workhouse, that were formerly taught nothing but to hymn out a sort of blasphemous and fulsome flattery to them, at the parish expense; but are now sent into the world apprenticed to respectable tradesmen and put in the way of obtaining an honest livelihood. The reduction from 14s. the extreme of the rate formerly, to 5s. 6d. the extreme of it ever since, is in itself a benefit of such consideration as entitles Mr. Moore to public thanks; but the leading youth to habits of industry, compelling the idle and profligate to labour, instead of canting for their support, is a work of such superior merit, as entitles him to the thanks of every good man, who loves his country; and if his example be generally imitated, I should hope and expect to see the time again, when the poison of soup-shop charity and the quackery of affrighted benevolence, shall cease to debase the sentiments and expectations of the poor; and every cottager in the lowest situation, shall with true English independence exult, "I have brought up my children to honest labour, and, thank God! without being indebted to the parish."—I am, Sir, yours, &c.—JOHN—Aug. 9, 1868.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—From the London Gazette Extraordinary. (Continued from p. 352.)

But if the principles of this plan should be approved of, and deemed feasible by those in command, I would recommend the movement to be general. That it be agreed to act upon it in all its parts the same day, except a discovery should take place, in which case each part should act immediately without hesitation.—I acknowledge I should have little expectation of the success of any negotiation for the peaceable removal of the troops. But a declaration immediately after the movement shall have commenced, of the peaceable and unoffending object in view, accompanied with a threat of retaliation in the event of any hostile opposition on the part of the Danes or French, might perhaps

be found advantageous.—In stating the naval force at present under my command, it is right to observe, I am, in expectation of more ships, and have been informed that a sufficient supply of provisions for all the Spanish troops is now on its passage to me.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the marquis de la Romana, commander-in-chief of the Spanish troops in Denmark.

N B. I have just heard that the expected supply of provisions is in part arrived, which obviates difficulties on my part.

Brunswick, August 9, 1808.—Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of this morning, and to congratulate you and the Spanish nation on the firm and manly step you have taken on this important occasion. Circumstances of weather unavoidably prevent the arrival of two ships of the line, now in sight. I send captain Graves, of the Brunswick, informed of my ideas, to see what uses can be made of the vessels at present in Nyborg. In my present situation I can receive nearly fifteen hundred men on board: and, under all circumstances, it appears to me the most advisable to convey the troops with all expedition to Langeland; and, as it appears to be the opinion of your aide-de-camp, that you will be in a situation to maintain that island, and to take post there till the arrival of transports to embark the army, I shall order seamen in to man twenty of the snacks at present in the port, and more as the ships arrive. I apprehend the baggage and artillery had better be embarked in them, and moved out under my protection. Among the Spanish troops perhaps seamen may be found; and I would suggest the propriety of the immediate establishment of a marine corps on the most extensive scale possible; and I request your excellency to keep in mind that the embarkation of water and provisions with the troops, in our present circumstances, is of great consequence. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the marquis de la Romana, commander-in-chief of the Spanish troops in Denmark.

Brunswick, off Nyborg, August 9, 1808. Sir,—His excellency the commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces in Denmark, having deemed it expedient, under the present circumstances, to take possession of Nyborg, my duty naturally calls me to a co-operation with the troops of that nation, and a consequent frequent communication with the town of Nyborg. To place your excellency as much at ease as possible respecting the line of conduct that may be adopted in the

present event by the English admiral commanding in the Belt, notwithstanding the hostility of this day, I have the honour to inform you, that I have given the strictest orders to all under my command, to observe towards the inhabitants of Nyborg the utmost civility; and it is my wish to abstain from every hostile and offensive act, so long as no hostile and offensive measures are pursued by the troops of Denmark or France against those of Spain; but if any opposition should be attempted either by the Danes or French to the peaceable and unoffending object in view, namely, the quiet embarkation of the Spanish troops, I shall certainly, though most reluctantly, take measures which it is to be apprehended might occasion the destruction of the town of Nyborg. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the governor of the town of Nyborg.

Hound, Nyborg Harbour, August 10, 1808.—Sir,—It must be evident to your excellency, that as my entrance into the harbour of Nyborg was hostilely opposed, I am bound by no absolute law or usage to abstain from hostilities, and to respect the property of the inhabitants: but although neither one nor the other could be better secured than by the word of a British officer, still it must be evident to your excellency, that under existing circumstances the Spanish general has occasion for several of the small craft in port, and that unless the masters and crews of them will lend their aid to equip and navigate their vessels, it may not be in my power to secure them from injury; but if they will, I pledge myself, after the service on which they are required, and which will be of short duration, shall have been ended, that I will not only use every means in my power to secure them from injury, but grant passports to them all to return in safety. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the governor of the town of Nyborg.

Superb, off Langeland, August 13, 1808.—Sir,—I have detained the Euryalus a few hours, for the further satisfaction of assuring their lordships, that the whole of the Spanish troops taken off by his majesty's ships at Nyborg, will be landed in the course of this afternoon at Langeland.—A convention has been entered into between his excellency the marquis de la Romana and the governor of the island, which, on one hand, enjoins abstinence from hostility, and, on the other, a sufficient supply of provisions; provided the island, which is fertile, can produce it. I am, Sir, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—The right hon. W. W. Pole, &c.

VICTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL. From the London Gazette Extraordinary.

Downing-Street, Sept. 2, 1808.—Dispatches, of which the following are copies and extracts, were last night received from lieutenant-general sir Harry Burrard, and lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, dated from head-quarters, at Lourinha, addressed to viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, and brought by captain Campbell, aid-de-camp to sir A. Wellesley: *Extract of a Letter from Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, dated Head-Quarters, at Caldas, the 10th of Aug. 1808.*

I marched from Lyria on the 13th, and arrived at Aliobaga on the 19th, which place the enemy had abandoned in the preceding night; and I arrived here yesterday. The enemy, about 4000 in number, were posted about 10 miles from hence, at Borica; and they occupied Brilos, about 3 miles from hence, with their advanced posts. As the possession of this last village was important to our future operations, I determined to occupy it; and as soon as the British infantry arrived upon the ground, I directed that it might be occupied by a detachment, consisting of 4 companies of riflemen of the 60 and 95th regiments. The enemy, consisting of a small piquet of infantry and a few cavalry, made a trifling resistance and retired; but they were followed by a detachment of our riflemen to the distance of 3 miles from Brilos. The riflemen were then attacked by a superior body of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment to which they belonged, which had now advanced to their support; larger bodies of the enemy appeared on both the flanks of the detachment, and it was with difficulty that major-general Spencer, who had gone out to Cebedos when he had heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that village. They have since remained in possession of it, and the enemy have retired entirely from the neighbourhood.—In this little affair of the advanced posts, which was occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit of the enemy, I am concerned to add, that lieutenant Bunbury, of the 2d battalion of the 95th, was killed, and the hon. Capt. Pakenham wounded, but slightly; and we have lost some men, of whose number I have not received the returns.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Action at Lourinha. Aug. 15, 1808.—5th batt. 60th foot, 1 rank and file killed;

5 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—2d batt. 95th foot, 1 rank and file missing.—Officers killed and wounded. 95th foot, lieutenant Bunbury killed; captain the hon. H. K. Pakenham wounded.—G. B. TUCKER, Dep. Adj. Genl.

Head-quarters, at Villa Verde, Aug. 17, 1808.—My Lord, The French general Laborde having continued in his position at Roleia since my arrival at Caldas on the 15th inst. I determined to attack him in the morning. Roleia is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front, at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldas, and is closed to the southward by mountains, which join the hills, forming the valley on the left, looking from Caldas. In the centre of the valley, and about 8 miles from Roleia, is the town and old Moorish fort of Cebedos, from whence the enemy's piquets had been driven on the 15th; and from that time he had posts on the hills on both sides of the valley, as well as in the plain in front of his army, which was posted on the heights in front of Roleia, its right resting upon the hills, its left upon an eminence, on which was a windmill, and the whole covering four or five passes into the mountains in his rear.—I have reason to believe that his force consisted of at least 6000 men, of which about 500 were cavalry, with 5 pieces of cannon; and there was some reason to believe that Gen. Loison, who was at Rio Major yesterday, would join Gen. Laborde by his right in the course of the night. The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the army having broken up from Caldas this morning, was formed into three columns; the right, consisting of 1200 Portuguese infantry and 50 Portuguese cavalry, destined to turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear; the left, consisting of major-general Ferguson's and brig. general Bowes's brigades of infantry, three companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, and 20 British, and 20 Portuguese cavalry, was destined, under the command of major-general Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Cebedos, to turn all the enemy's posts on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his post at Roleia; this corps was also destined to watch the motions of Gen. Loison, on the enemy's right, who, I had heard, had moved from Rio Major towards Alcoentre last night. The centre column, consisting of major-general Hill's, brig. general Nightingale's, brig. general Craufurd's, and brig. general Fane's brigades, (with the exception of the riflemen detached with major-general Ferguson), and 400 Portuguese light infantry, the British and Portu-

guese ~~by~~, a brigade of nine-pounders, and a brigade of six-pounders, were destined to attack n. Laborde's position in front.—The columns being formed, the troops moved from Obidos about 7 in the morning. Brig. gen. Fane's riflemen were immediately attached into the hills on the left of the valley, to keep up the communication between the centre and left columns, and to protect the march of the former along the valley; and the enemy's posts were successively driven in. Maj. gen. Hill's brigade, formed in three columns of battalions, moved on the right of the valley, supported by the cavalry, in order to attack the enemy's left; and brig. generals Nightingale and Craufurd moved with the artillery along the high road, until at length the former formed in the plain immediately in the enemy's front, supported by the light infantry companies, and the 45th regiment of brig. gen. Craufurd's brigade, while the two other regiments of this brigade (the 50th and 91st), and half of the 9-pounder brigade, were kept as a reserve in the rear.—Maj. gen. Hill and brig. gen. Nightingale advanced upon the enemy's position, and, at the same moment, brig. gen. Fane's riflemen were in the hills on his right; the Portuguese infantry in a village upon his left; and maj. gen. Ferguson's column was descending from the heights into the plain. From this situation the enemy retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost regularity and the greatest celerity; and notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss in the plain.—It was then necessary to make a disposition to attack the formidable position which he had taken up. Brigadier-general Fane's riflemen were already in the mountains on his right, and no time was lost in attacking the different passes, as well to support the riflemen as to defeat the enemy completely.—The Portuguese infantry were ordered to move up a pass on the right of the whole; the light companies of maj. gen. Hill's brigade and the 5th regiment moved up a pass next on the right; and the 29th regiment, supported by the 9th under brig. gen. Nightingale, a third pass; and the 45th and 82d regiments, passes on the left. These passes were all difficult of access, and some of them were well defended by the enemy, particularly that which was attacked by the 29th and 9th. These regiments attacked with the greatest impetuosity, and reached the enemy before those whose attacks were to be made on their flanks: the defence of the enemy was des-

perate, and it was in this attack principally that we sustained the loss which we have to lament, particularly of that gallant officer, the hon. lieut. col. Lake, who distinguished himself upon this occasion.—The enemy was, however, driven from all the positions he had taken in the passes of the mountains, and our troops were advanced in the plains on their tops. For a considerable length of time the 29th and 9th regiments alone were advanced to this point, with brig. gen. Fane's riflemen at a distance on the left; and they were afterwards supported by the 5th regiment, and by the light companies of maj. gen. Hill's brigade, which had come up on their right; and by the other troops ordered to ascend the mountains, who came up by degrees. The enemy here made three most gallant attacks upon the 29th and 9th regiments, supposed, as I have above stated, with a view to cover the retreat of his defeated army; in all of which he was, however, repulsed; but he succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing, principally, to my want of cavalry, and secondly, to the difficulty of bringing up the passes of the mountains with celerity, a sufficient number of troops, and of cannon, to support those which had first ascended. The loss of the enemy has, however, been very great; and he left three pieces of cannon in our hands.—I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops throughout this action. The enemy's positions were formidable, and he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe, that although we had such a superiority of numbers employed in the operations of this day, the troops actually engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of maj. gen. Hill's brigade, being a number by no means equal to that of the enemy; their conduct, therefore, deserves the highest commendation.—I cannot avoid to take this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgements for the aid and support I received from all the general and other officers of this army. I am particularly indebted to maj. gen. Spencer for the advice and assistance I received from him: to maj. gen. Ferguson for the manner in which he led the left column, and to maj. gen. Hill, and brig. generals Nightingale and Fane for the manner in which they conducted the different attacks which they led. I derived most material assistance also from lieut. col. Tucker and lieut. col. Bathurst, in the offices of deputy-adjutant and deputy-quarter-mas-

ter general, and from the officers of the staff employed under them. I must also mention that I had every reason to be satisfied with the artillery, under lieutenant-col. Robe. I have the honour to be, &c.—

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of Lieut. Gen. the Right Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K. B. on the 17th of Aug. 1808.—Head Quarters, Lourinha, Aug. 18, 1808.

Gen. Staff, 1 capt. killed.—Royal Artillery, 1 capt. killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—Royal Engineers, 1 capt. wounded.

1st Brigade, Maj. Gen. Hill.—5th Foot, 3 rank and file killed; 1 major, 1 lieutenant. 2 sergeants, 39 rank and file wounded.—9th Foot, rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant. col. 1 maj. 1 capt. 1 ensign, 3 sergeants, 49 rank and file wounded; 12 rank and file missing.—38th Foot, 4 rank and file wounded.

2d Brigade, Maj. Gen. Ferguson.—26th Foot, none killed or wounded.—40th Foot, 1 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.—71st Foot, 1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

3d Brigade, Brig. Gen. Nightingale.—29th Foot, 1 lieutenant. col. 2 sergeants, 31 rank and file killed; 1 maj. 3 capt. 3 lieutenants, 6 sergeants, 105 rank and file wounded; 1 capt. 3 lieutenants 1 sergeant, 1 drummer, 32 rank and file missing.—82d Foot, 6 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant. 1 sergeant, 17 rank and file wounded.

4th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bowes.—6th Foot, 1 captain, 2 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—32d Foot 1 rank and file killed; 3 rank and file wounded.

5th Brigade, Brig. Gen. Craufurd.—45th Foot, 1 ensign killed; 1 lieutenant. 9 rank and file wounded.—50th Foot, 2 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—91st Foot, none killed or wounded.

6th, or Light, Brig.-Gen. Fane.—2 Battalion, 59th foot, 1 sergeant, 6 rank and file killed; 3 sergeants, 25 rank and file wounded; 7 rank and file missing.—5th Battalion, 60th Foot, 8 rank and file killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 staff, 5 sergeants, 34 rank and file wounded; 16 rank and file missing.

Cavalry.—20th Light Dragoons, 1 horse killed; 3 rank and file, 2 horses wounded.—Total, 1 lieutenant. col., 2 captains, 1 ensign 3 sergeants, 63 rank and file, 1 horse killed; 1 lieutenant. col., 3 majors, 6 captains, 8 lieutenant. 1 ensign, 1 staff, 20 sergeants, 295 rank and file, 2 horses wounded; 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 sergeant, 1 drummer, 68 rank and file missing.

Names of Officers killed, wounded, and missing, on the 17th of August, 1808.—

General Staff, Capt. K. J. B. [unclear], 3d regiment foot guards deputy assistant adjutant general killed.—Royal Artillery, captain H. Geary killed.—Royal Engineers, Capt. H. Elphinstone badly wounded—5th Foot, Major Ernes slightly wounded, Lieut. Doyle wounded.—9th Foot, Lieut.-Col. Stuart severely wounded; Major Molle wounded; Capt. Saukay wounded; Ensign Nichols wounded.—29th Foot, lieutenant. col. the hon. G. A. F. Lake killed; Majors G. Way and Thomas Egerton wounded; captains P. Hodge and A. Patison wounded; lieutenants R. Birmingham, St. John W. Lucas, and R. Stannys wounded; Capt. G. Tod missing; lieutenants W. Birmingham, A. Newbold, and T. Langton missing—6th Foot, Capt. John Curry, slightly wounded.—45th Foot, Ensign Dawson killed; Lieut. Burke slightly wounded.—82d Foot, Lieut. R. Reid dangerously wounded.—60th Foot, Lieut. Kiety slightly wounded; Ensign Dawes slightly wounded; Adj. De Gilso slightly wounded.—95th Foot, Capt. Creagh slightly wounded; lieutenants Hill and Cortman slightly wounded.

Abstract of the above Return.—4 officers killed; 20 officers wounded; 4 officers missing; 3 non-commissioned officers and drummers killed; 20 non-commissioned officers and drummers wounded; 2 non-commissioned officers and drummers missing; 63 rank and file killed; 295 rank and file wounded; 68 rank and file missing; 1 horse killed; 2 horses wounded.—Total, officers, non-commissioned officers, rank and file, and horses killed, wounded, and missing, 482.—G. B. TUCKER, Dep. Adj. Gen.

Head-quarters at Lourinha, August 18, 1808.—MY LORD;—Since I wrote to you last night, I have heard from brig. gen. Anstruther, that he is on the coast of Piniche, with the fleet of victuallers and store ships, in charge of Capt. Bligh, of the Alfred, with a part of the force detached from England under brig. gen. Ackland, in consequence of the receipt of orders which I had left at Mondego Bay for gen. Ackland, which he had opened. I have ordered brig. gen. Anstruther to land immediately, and I have moved to this place, in order to protect his landing, and facilitate his junction.—Gen. Loison joined: gen. Laborde in the course of last night at Torres Vedras; and I understand that both began their march towards Lisbon this morning. I also hear that gen. Junot has arrived this day at Torres Vedras, with a small corps from Lisbon; and I conclude that the whole

of the first army will be assembled between Torres Vedras and the capital, in the course of a few days. I have the honour to be, &c. — (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Head-quarters, Maceira, Aug. 21, 1803.
MY LORD;—The report which I have the honour to inclose to your lordship, made at my request by lieut. gen. sir A. Wellesley, conveys information which cannot but prove highly gratifying to his majesty.—On my landing, this morning, I found that the enemy's attack had already commenced, and I was fortunate enough to reach the field of action in time, to witness and approve of every disposition that had been, and was afterwards made by sir A. Wellesley; his comprehensive mind furnishing a ready resource in every emergency, and rendering it quite unnecessary to direct any alteration.—I am happy, on this occasion, to bear testimony to the great spirit and good conduct displayed by all the troops composing this gallant army in this well contested action.—I send this dispatch by capt. Campbell, aid-de-camp to sir A. Wellesley, no person being better qualified to give your lordship's information.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HARRY BURRARD, Lieut. General.—To the Rt. Hon. Lord Castlereagh, &c.

Vimiera, August 21, 1803.—Sir,—I have the honour to report to you, that the enemy attacked us in our position at Vimiera this morning.—The village of Vimiera stands in a valley, through which runs the river Maceira; at the back, and to the westward and northward of this village is a mountain, the western point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha, and the northward, to Vimiera. The greater part of the infantry, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th brigades, were posted on this mountain, with eight pieces of artillery, maj. gen. Hill's brigade being on the right, maj. gen. Ferguson's on the left, having one battalion on the heights, separated from the mountain. On the eastern and southern side of the town is a hill which is entirely commanded, particularly on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to the southward and eastward, on which brig. gen. Fane was posted with his riflemen and the 50th regiment, and brig. gen. Anstruther with his brigade, with half a brigade of six-pounders and half a brigade of nine-pounders, which had been

ordered to the position in the course of last night. The ground over which passes the road from Lourinha commanded the left of this height, and it had not been occupied, excepting by a piquet, as the camp had been taken up only for one night; and there was no water in the neighbourhood of this height.—The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley between the hills on which the infantry stood: both flanking and supporting brig. gen. Fane's advanced guard.—The enemy first appeared at eight o'clock in the morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left upon the heights on the road to Lourinha; and it was soon obvious that the attack would be made upon our advanced guard, and the left of our position; and maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the heights, on the road to Lourinha, with three pieces of cannon; he was followed successively by brig. gen. Nightingale with his brigade and three pieces of cannon; brig. gen. Ackland with his brigade, and brig. gen. Bowes with his brigade. These troops were formed (maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade in the first line; brig. gen. Nightingale's in the second; and brig. gen. Bowes and Ackland's, in columns in the rear) on those heights, with their right upon the valley which leads into Vimiera; and their left upon the other ravine, which separates these heights from the range which terminates at the landing-place at Maceira. On these last-mentioned heights, the Portuguese troops, which had been in the bottom near Vimiera, were posted in the first instance, and they were supported by brig. gen. Craufurd's brigade.—The troops of the advanced guard on the heights to the southward and eastward of the town were deemed sufficient for its defence, and maj. gen. Hill was moved to the centre of the mountain on which a great body of the infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve to the whole army. In addition to this support these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their right.—The enemy's attack began in several columns on the whole of the troops on this height; on the left they advanced, notwithstanding the fire of the rifle-men, close to the 50th, and were checked and driven back only by the bayonets of that corps. The 2d battalion, 43d regiment, was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which leads into Vimiera; and part of that corps having been ordered into the church-yard to prevent them from penetrating into the town. On the right of the

position they were repulsed by the bayonets of the 97th regiment, which corps was successfully supported by the 2d battalion 52d regiment, which, by an advance in column, took the enemy in flank.—Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy on our advanced guard by their own exertions, they were attacked in flank by brig. gen. Ackland's brigade in its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a cannonade was kept up on the flank of the enemy's columns, by the artillery on those heights.—At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion from this attack with the loss of seven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number of officers and soldiers killed and wounded. He was pursued by the detachment of the 20th light dragoons, but the enemy's cavalry were so much superior in numbers, that the detachment has suit red much, and lieutenant Taylor was unfortunately killed.—Nearly at the same time the enemy's attack commenced upon the heights on the road to Lourinha. This attack was supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with the usual impetuosity of the French troops. It was received with steadiness by maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regiments; and these corps charged, as soon as the enemy approached them, who gave way, and they continued to advance upon him, supported by the 82d, one of the corps of brig. gen. Nightingale's brigade, which, as the ground extended, afterwards formed a part of the first line; by the 29th regiment, and by brig. gen. Bowe's and Ackland's brigades, while brig. gen. Crautuid's brigade, and the Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height on the left.—In the advance of maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade, six pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and wounded.—The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover a part of his artillery, by attacking the 71st and 82d regiments, which were halted in a valley in which it had been taken. These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley to the heights, where they halted, faced about, fired, and advanced upon the enemy, who had, by that time, arrived in the low ground, and they thus obliged him again to retire with great loss.—In this action, in which the whole of the French force in Portugal was employed under the command of the Duke D'Abrantes (General

Junot) in person, in which the army was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually engaged, he has sustained a signal defeat, and has lost 13 pieces of cannon, and 23 ammunition waggon, with powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, and twenty thousand rounds of musket ammunition. One general officer (Beniere) has been wounded and taken prisoner, and a great many officers and soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken.—The valour and discipline of his majesty's troops have been conspicuous upon this occasion, as you, who witnessed the greatest part of the action, must have observed; but it is a justice to the following corps to draw your notice to them in a particular manner, viz.—the royal artillery, commanded by lieutenant col. Robe; the 20th dragoons which had been commanded by lieutenant col. Taylor; the 50th regiment, commanded by Col. Walker; the 2d battalion 65th foot, commanded by maj. Travers; the 5th battalion, 60th regiment, commanded by maj. Davy; the second battalion 43d, commanded by maj. Hull; the 2d battalion 52d, commanded by lieutenant col. Ross; the 97th regiment, commanded by lieutenant col. Lyon; the 36th regiment, commanded by col. Burne; the 40th, commanded by col. Kemmis; the 71st, commanded by lieutenant col. Pack; and the 82d regiment, commanded by maj. Eyre.—In mentioning col. Burne, and the 36th regiment to you upon this occasion, I cannot avoid to add, that the regular and orderly conduct of this corps, throughout this service, and their gallantry and discipline in action have been conspicuous.—I must take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the general and staff officers of the army. I was much indebted to maj. gen. Spencer's judgement and experience, in the decision which I formed, with respect to the number of troops allotted to each point of defence; and for his advice and assistance throughout the action.—In the position taken up by maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade, and in its advance upon the enemy, that officer shewed equal bravery and judgment; and much praise is due to brig. gen. Fane, and brig. gen. Ans'ruther, for their gallant defence of their position in front of Vimiera, and to brig. gen. Nightingale, for the manner in which he supported the attack upon the enemy, made by major-gen. Ferguson.—

(To be continued.)

"We must allow a latitude to the free discussion of the merits and demerits of authors and their works; otherwise we may talk, indeed, of the liberty of the press, but there will be in reality an end of it."—Report of Lord ELLENBOROUGH'S Charge.

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TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
LORD ELLENBOROUGH,
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COURT
OF KING'S BENCH.

MY LORD;

Either that *liberty*, of which we have boasted, and do boast, so much, is a mere sound, invented by politicians for purposes resembling those for which priests invented relics and penances, and for which methodist preachers pretend to inspiration; either the whole thing is, in short, a specious and delusive fraud, or the result of the Action, recently tried before your lordship, in the case of Carr against Flood and Sharpe, is not only of greater importance to the nation than the recent victories over the French, in Portugal, but of greater importance than would be a series of victories, by which Buonaparte should be overthrown. For, what do we promise ourselves, as the fruit of such victories? Why, the secure enjoyment of our lives and property; security from that oppression, which we should, in all probability, experience at his hands. This, after all, is the sole end of all our sacrifices and of the dangers and sufferings of our countrymen who are in arms. There is no other rational purpose that we can have in view. This being the case, I am pretty confident, that the public, when they duly reflect upon the matter, will be convinced, that, on the 25th of July last, a greater victory was gained for England under your lordship, than has been gained, by land or sea, for many years past.

The doctrines, laid down by your lordship, upon this memorable occasion, seem, indeed, to have been restricted as to their application. They seem to have been, rather carefully, confined to "*authors and their works*;" but, in pursuance of the purpose for which alone I now address you, I shall, I think, succeed in convincing your lordship, that this restriction cannot subsist, consistently with reason and justice. I have, below, given an abridgment of the Report of the Trial, in which I have retained *all* that was said by your lordship; but, that

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we may have the matter fairly before us, I will here shortly state the substance of your doctrines, supposing what you said to have been correctly reported; for, as to myself, I, of course, who was not present at the trial, can state nothing from my own knowledge. I take this report as I find it; I lay it before my readers as being a report given, in print, by another person; I take it up, I treat it as a book; and, if it be what it professes to be, it contains the words uttered by you upon the occasion referred to.

The first of these words I have taken for my motto. The next time you speak, you say, that we must really not cramp observations upon authors and their works; that they should be liable to exposure, to criticism, and even to ridicule, if their works be ridiculous; that, otherwise, the first who writes a book upon any subject, will maintain a monopoly of sentiment upon it; that thus vice and error will be perpetuated, and so we should go on to the end of time; and that you cannot conceive that an action is maintainable on such ground. Upon Mr. Garrow's observing, that, though an author's book might be ridiculed, the critics had no right to endeavour to destroy him altogether as an author, your lordship said, that you did not know that; that, (speaking in the interrogative form) suppose a man published a book injurious to public morals, of infinite mischief to the public taste, containing bad maxims of government, or any thing else that ought to be decried, are we not at liberty to expose that work? Aye, and expose the author of it too, as far as he is connected with the work, and that in the most pointed language of wit, humour, or ridicule; that, a critic, in such case conferred a benefit on the public; that the destruction of the author's reputation was nothing; that it was a reputation which ought to be destroyed; that it was idle to talk of the liberty of the press, if one man might not write freely upon the work of another; that, if there had been an attack upon the moral character of the author, or any attack on his character unconnected with his work, the law would have afforded him protection. Upon Mr. Garrow's saying, that the defendants had not destroyed Carr's reputa-

tion, *fairly*, your lordship said that he must show that it was *not fairly* done; and, upon his replying, that the *caricature* was a proof of unfairness, your lordship bade him go on with his case.—In your charge, after having repeated your sentiment respecting the public utility of writing down bad books, you said, that this, however, was applicable to *fair and candid* criticism; that, as to the *loss* sustained by an author from such a cause, it was what you, in the law, called *damnum absque injuria*, a *loss which the law does not consider as an injury*, because it is a loss which he ought to sustain, a loss of fame and profits to which he was never entitled; that, if it were otherwise, you did not know where we were to stop; that you knew of nothing that more threatened the liberty of the press, in the days in which we live, than to give encouragement to this species of action; that, however, you wished not to be misunderstood, for that, if there had been any thing in the criticism, of a libellous tendency, *wholly foreign to the work*, or unconnected with the author of it, as embodied in it, the action was maintainable; that neither yourself nor the jury had ever appeared before the world in the character of an author, or at least you never had; that, if you had, you should not think yourself entitled to maintain an action against any body else, who ridiculed your work, and proved it to be ridiculous; that, in fine, if the jury thought, that the criticism was *upon the work*, and upon the author as connected with the work, and not written by way of calumny upon him *as an individual*, you were of opinion that the action was not maintainable; that if, on the contrary, they should be of opinion, that the criticism was written against the author, *as a man*, and unconnected with his work, then you thought the action was maintainable.—After the verdict was given, your lordship (a thing not very common, I believe) thought it necessary to caution the audience against a misunderstanding of what had passed. “I hope nobody will understand, from the result of this trial, that there is the least countenance given to *slander*, or to ridicule any author, any more than any other individual, unless such ridicule be connected with his works, and the author is embodied with his work; for courts of justice are as tender of the moral characters of all men, whether they be authors or not, as they are firm in the maintenance of the right of every individual, to give a free opinion, on every publication of a literary work.”

It is, my lord, into the reasonableness

and the justice of these *reservations* and *restrictions* that I now propose to inquire. First, as to the qualification of the word “criticism.” Your lordship would have it to be *fair*, and, in one place, it would seem, that you insist upon its being *candid* as well as *fair*. I always thought, that the words were synonymous; but, whatever be their meaning, they express that quality which you hold to be necessary, in order to justify the criticism, though the author be embodied in his work. But, my lord, be this quality what it may, *who* is to tell us whether it exist or not? Evidence can be given as to *truth* or *falsehood*; as to the obedience or disobedience of any law; as to the performance or breach of any well known moral duty; as to any thing, in short, that is clearly defined and settled. About what is *fair* who can say that any thing has been settled? Where is the standard whereby we are to judge of *fairness*? It is evident that there can be no such standard, and that the point must always turn upon mere opinion. What would this question of fairness come under, then, the *law* or the *fact* of the case? Who would settle the point, the judge or the jury? “*One of the jury*” upon this trial, appeared to have a great desire to shew himself learned in the law; but, it will hardly be contended, that juries, or that courts of justice, can be, or ought to be, made into supervisors of the *taste* of the press. A tyrannical judge in America added the quality “*decent*,” as essential to publications to be tolerated. Who was to be the judge of the *decency*? There is a maxim, which says, “miserable are those who are subjected to laws of *uncertain operation*.” Indeed, where the operation is not uniform, and where the principle is not clearly laid down and well known, it is an abuse of words to call the thing *law*, which always implies something whereby a man’s duties or rights are defined. About this reservation, however, I think we need not be very uneasy, as the result of the trial, together with the opinions of your lordship, decidedly in favour of that result, enables us to proceed to the length of impugning to a man (no, not a man, an author) all sorts of folly; to exhibit him as a fool, a limerick and a vagabond in point of property; and, lest our pages of letter-press should fail, to call in the distorting aid of the pencil to effect our purpose. This has been deemed *fair* criticism; and, therefore, it will, I imagine, be very difficult for us to make use of any, that can, without departing from the principles, upon which this case was decided, be deemed *unfair*.

But, the person ridiculed must, it would

seem from this report of your lordship's language, be not only an author of a written and published work, but, he must also *embody* himself in the work. What is meant by this embodying work I do not very clearly perceive. In other places it is said, that he is to be ridiculed no farther than he appears in *connection* with his work; and that, unconnected with his work, he is to be treated with all the tenderness which the law takes care to provide for the individual. But, my lord, who is to settle these nice points of connection and incorporation? How am I to know what is meant by this connecting and embodying? Suppose I were to take up a book written for the purpose of persuading me, that I am very wrong indeed in objecting to the ministry of the day; suppose this work has for its author some man who lives upon the taxes and whose wife lives upon them too; suppose the whole family to be chock-deep in sinecures and reversions; must I not speak of these; must I not expose the author's motives for his work; must I not, if my pen fail me, call in the aid of the pencil to exhibit this author in the act of picking John Bull's pocket with one hand, while he holds up, in the shape of a pair of trowsers, his book in the other hand; must I not hang a label, marked *plunder*, out of his pocket; and must I not put his wife and children in the character of sturdy pipers, jeering those from whom they receive their daily bread? Assuredly I ought to do all this; and yet this author might so write his book as not to *embody* himself with it, in any shape whatever; and I might be told, perhaps, that his places and pensions had nothing at all to do with the merits or demerits of the ministry; that I had gone into a subject foreign to the book; and that, therefore, I ought to be punished as a libeller; whereas it would appear to me quite necessary to go into these matters in order to shew the *motive* of the author, and that for the purpose of preventing his book from doing public mischief.—It is not at all necessary for an author to *connect* himself with his book. He need not write in the form of such connection. He may, like the newspaper people and the reviewers, write in the style royal, and call himself *we*; or, he may unite in the impersonal altogether. There are very few instances, in which an author can be said to embody himself in his work. It can, indeed, only be when he relates his own adventures, or gives an account of transactions, in which he has personally borne a part. And why, my lord; why, I beg leave to ask, should this

particular description of authors be exposed to ridicule more than any other description? Why is it so very necessary to expose them folly and destroy their reputation? Of what particular harm is their success? In what way is it entitled to any extraordinary quantity of legal reprobation? Why should these fools be outlied any more than the rest? Your lordship may see a very sufficient reason for the disinclination; but, I confess that I can see no reason at all for it. Every man, who writes and publishes, challenges the criticisms of the world. The very act of writing the book embodies him with it. It is his act. It belongs to him. It is the picture of his mind. It is a part of himself. The critic has a right to take the man and the book together, and to criticise them, and, if he pleases, ridicule, or endeavour to ridicule them both. If he has not this right, he has no right at all; he is never safe; and he had better lay aside his pen. If he himself be foolish in his criticism; if he be unfair, or malignant, why, the world, who will soon perceive it, will not fail to punish him in the only suitable manner, without any of the aid of judges and juries.—There was a still further qualification, too; not only must the man have published his acts, or his work; but, he must have embodied himself with the work, and the work must be *ridiculous*. All this must be seen to exist before the ridicule could be justified. But, here again we have our old difficulty; *who* is to determine, whether the work be ridiculous or not? The jury are to judge of the alleged offence under the direction of the judge; but, it will not be pretended that this is a tribunal, wherein to try the merits or demerits of a literary work. What, then, becomes of this qualification? The critic will say, that the work is ridiculous; the author will say that it is not; even the public may be divided upon the point; and who in all the world is to settle it? Your lordship says, and very truly, that it is of great public utility to expose ridiculous works, and to destroy the reputation of their authors; but, if I should be engaged in an act of great public utility of this sort, how should I fare if your lordship and the jury should happen to think that *not ridiculous*, which I took for ridiculous? How am I to know that you will be of my opinion? And must I not, then, be continually in a state of uncertainty; and must not a press, thus shackled, be infinitely worse than no press at all? The fool or rogue runs no risk, either in his writings or publishings; while his critic is never safe for a moment. Sir John Carr saw this, and, therefore, he

thought to terrify his critic into silence. Your lordship has now set your face against this species of action; and, it was high time; for if it had succeeded, even the most stupid part of the people would have laughed at the talk of "*the liberty of the press*." That talk would not have deceived any creature capable of counting its fingers.

The most important restriction, however, relates to the quality, or, rather, the *profession*, of the person censured, or ridiculed. Sir John Carr had evidently conceived, that the feelings of an author were no more to be hurt with impunity than the feelings of any other sort of man; and, as he had heard, that it was a libel to hurt the feelings of any person, by the means of the press, he expected, of course, to hear your lordship reprobate the conduct of his critics. He could not have anticipated what took place. It was quite just and reasonable, to be sure, that he should be told, that his work was liable to ridicule; that the ridicule naturally grew out of the demonstrations of his own want of talent; that if it were forbidden to ridicule such a work and such an author, great public mischief would therefrom arise, and that the liberty of the press would be a farce too contemptible to be borne. All this was very right; but, he had heard it laid down, that the line of interdiction began when the feelings of any person were hurt. No matter who or what he was. No matter what his actions or his character. He had heard of no restrictions, reservations, or qualifications; he had been told; he had heard it laid down as a maxim of law; he had heard it so laid down in a charge to a jury; he had seen a verdict of guilty given upon the principle; and that principle, without any qualification, was, that no person had a right to use the press for the purpose of turning into ridicule either the talents or the person of any one; and that, where ever a publication wounded the feelings of any person, there the line of interdiction began. He had heard of no exception with respect to authors and their works. He had proof that both his talents and his person had been turned into ridicule. He had proof, that, in a picture as well as in words, he had been exhibited to the public as a man of most despicable talents, as a frothy fool, as a lunatic at large, as a sort of literary vagabond. He had clear proof of all this; he had proof besides, that he had, from this attack, sustained a special damage to a considerable amount; and it was quite impossible for any one not to be convinced, that his feelings had, by the alleged libel, been severely wounded. Well,

then, as he had heard it laid down as a maxim of law and justice, that it was a crime to ridicule the talents or wound the feelings of any person, why should not he bring his action *as well as another*?

Why, for the reasons stated by your lordship. Most excellent reasons you have given us, why his action should not be maintainable; but none at all, that I can discover, why the complaints of persons, *not authors*, should be any more attended to than his. None, that I can discover, why the act of book-writing should be more exposed to criticism than any other of the acts of men; none; no, none at all, why authors should not have feelings as well as other people; nor any reason whatever why the talents of others should not be exposed to ridicule as well as the talents of authors. It is necessary, as your lordship well observed, to expose and destroy a silly or wicked book, and the reputation of its author along with it, because such books do great public mischief, and because, if not put down by exposure, they would continue to do mischief to the end of time. But, my lord, there are good books as well as bad ones; there are authors whose works do good instead of mischief; and, therefore, I can see no reason whatever why the act of book-writing should be more exposed to public censure and ridicule than any other act of man.

Your lordship was so good as to signify that the liberty of the press was something very valuable to this nation. Not in direct terms, indeed, but by implication your lordship certainly did say this. Now, may I take the liberty of asking your lordship in what way you think it can operate to the advantage of this nation? In the way of praise; in bedawbling all the rich rogues and fools of the time with praise as well as all the wise and virtuous men? Hardly this. In confining its praises to the wise and the good? This would be very laudable, and might be of some little use; but, then, the word *liberty* would be without a meaning; for the devil is in it if we need ask for leave to praise any one, particularly if he be in a public capacity, or in any capacity, which must make him desirous of possessing the good opinion of the world. If your lordship means, as I think you must, that the liberty of the press is valuable, as the means of detecting and exposing vice and folly; then, give me leave to say, that it cannot, consistently, I will not say with justice and reason. . . . but it cannot consistently with common sense, with bare common sense, be restricted to authors and their writings; for what would the thing

then amount to but this: a *liberty* possessed by the press of combating its own vices and follies, and of doing nothing more? Such a press would be totally unworthy of praise, or of protection of any sort. To speak of such "*liberty*" as a valuable thing; to make it a matter of boast; to hold it up as one of the means of preventing the people from being enslaved, would be an instance of absurdity surpassing any of those pointed at in the works of sir John Carr. Why, my lord, this is a sort of liberty, that the Emperor Napoleon grants to his press; and, why should he not? He would be a fool indeed if he cared what authors said of *one another* and of *one another's books*. It may be an amusement to him to witness their quarrels; and, in this way, the press may be, with the public, as useful as a puppet-show, or any thing else that serves to produce a momentary oblivion of their cares and their sufferings. All that Napoleon forbids his press to do, is to meddle with him, his government, his army, his navy, or any of his family. That is all. The press may *praise* all these indeed; it has full *liberty* to do that; but, it must neither *censure* nor *ridicule* any one of them; it has no liberty to do that; and it is honestly told so; there is no sham in the case; no delusion; no talk about liberty of the press; those who write and publish are plainly told, that if they meddle with these matters, they shall be punished; and, accordingly, they do not meddle with them, nor are they guilty of the base hypocrisy to *pretend* that they have a free press.

It must, I think, my lord, be quite evident, that, if censure and ridicule, if exposure of vice and folly, if depreciating talents or character, were to be allowed only in cases where the party assailed was the author of a book, or a public writer of some description, the *liberty* of the press could, at the utmost, effect no other good object than that of counteracting the vices and follies of the press itself; it could not possibly produce any balance in favour of the press, which, in that case, could, as far as related to *freedom*, be of no possible use. Suppose, for instance, that I write a book, containing principles subversive of the constitution, and that some critic exposes both me and my book to such contempt, that the book is at once destroyed and my reputation is ruined. I am rightly served, and the critic is, it now would seem, not exposed to the fangs of the law; but, it would be quite silly, upon an occasion like this, to boast of the liberty of the press as a public good; for, supposing the critic to have completely succeeded, all

might be done in the matters which they were before, and *where they would have remained if no press at all had existed*. Your lordship very judiciously cited the instance of Mr. Locke and sir Robert Filmer, and observed that the former did great good in writing down the latter; though, between you and I, my lord, I much question, whether, if Mr. Locke lived in the present day, he would be much of a favourite. But, what mighty thing did Mr. Locke do here? He answered sir Robert Filmer; he put him down. I doubt the fact; for Filmer's principles are much more in vogue than those of Mr. Locke. But, admit the fact, all that Mr. Locke did, with the aid of the press, was to prevent sir Robert Filmer from doing *harm* with the press. Between them the press, at the very best, could do *no good*, and it might do some harm. Who would not think a man foolish, aye, "the greatest fool that ever walked the earth without a leader," who should keep a fox in his poultry-yard, and a dog to watch the fox; and who should boast of the valuable services rendered him by the dog? "Why, "you stupid ass," his neighbour would say to him, "for what do you keep either dog or fox; why not hang them both up at once; and give to some really useful animal the food by which they are sustained?"

I shall be told, perhaps, that the press is of great public utility independent of this sort of use of it. That it communicates a great deal of knowledge to the public at large; which would, were it not for the press, be confined to the possession of comparatively a very few persons. This may be true; but, this is not our subject, my lord. We are talking about the *liberty* of the press. It is not the right to write and to print and to publish, upon which I am taking the liberty to address your lordship, but *the right to censure and to ridicule*, by the mighty means of writing and printing and publishing. There are a multitude of books, as connected with which the *liberty* of the press has no meaning. In lifting up my eyes, the first books I see before me, are Marshall's Gardening, Pontey's Pruner, Bonnycastle's Algebra, Code Diplomatique, Vauban's Fortification, and Daniel's Rural Sports. Why, my lord, the *liberty* of the press has no more to do with books like these than it has to do with the making of shoes or the blacking of shoes; and, as I have, I think, pretty clearly shewn, that it is to prove oneself void of even common sense to set a value upon the liberty of the press, if that liberty is to extend no further

than the censuring or ridiculing of productions of the press itself, there must, it appears to me, be another meaning attached to this word *liberty*, as connected with the press. By the word *liberty* we always conceive a something, to which there are some persons who have a dislike. When we talk of securing our liberties, we should talk downright nonsense, if our hearers did not suppose, that there were some persons, somewhere or other, who were likely to be enemies to those liberties. The two ideas are inseparable. You cannot talk of liberty, without supposing the fear, nearer or more distant, of slavery. What other sense is there in the word liberty? Why talk about any such thing? In short, political liberty has these two meanings: *freedom from oppression*; and, *the legal right of doing certain things which may be displeasing and even injurious to others*. The great end is freedom from oppression; but, to secure this, it is indispensably necessary, that men should be legally protected in doing certain things that may hurt the feelings and injure the fortunes of other men. This implies a natural and a necessary opposition of interests as well as of feelings. One part of the community are necessarily opposed to another part; and, are we to be told, that if one part *feel wounded* at the censure or the gibes of the other, that the latter is to be liable to legal punishment? All our notions about the liberty of the press, the whole history of it, tell us, that it means a legal right, in any man, freely to examine, in print, into the character, talents, and conduct of any other man (especially if that other be in a public situation) and, if he please, to censure or ridicule such character, talents, or conduct. It has *now* been decided, that this is the meaning, as far as relates to authors and their works; but, I have, I think, proved, that if this be all, the liberty of the press could not possibly be of any public advantage, and that to boast of it would be to hold ourselves up to the scorn and contempt of the world. The press is daily boasted of as the great instrument in the cause of political and religious freedom. But, my lord, I am in a fever to know *how it can possibly be so*, if writers are to be punished every time they *hurt the feelings* of another man? To the press is ascribed the reformation of the church in this kingdom. Now, my lord do you not think, that the authors of the day *hurt the feelings* of the monks and friars whose tricks they exposed to the deluded people? Well, then, if those authors have been legally punished the moment they be-

gan their exposures, do you think that the reformation would ever have taken place? Nay, is it not impossible that it should have taken place, through the means of the press, or, that the press should have at all contributed towards that great and memorable event? "Aye, aye, very true," some precious speculating, corrupting, double-distilled knave may tell me, "but there is *now* no reformation wanted; there is now no delusion, no trick, no hypocrisy, no humbug, going on, either in religion or "politics." Well then, if this be the case, of what can anybody be afraid? If there be nothing to expose, there can be no exposure. If all our ministers are wise and able, all our senators incorrupt, all our generals brave, all our priests pious, and all our princes exemplary in their conduct, how is it possible for any man to hurt their feelings by remarking upon their talents, their character, or their conduct? What a thing it would be, by lord, for a government to say to the people: "You have a right to freedom; to secure your freedom it is essential that you should enjoy liberty of the "press; by the liberty of the press you "will check, in time, every encroachment "on your freedom; but, *our feelings* must "necessarily be hurt by a disclosure of the "fact that we are making such encroachments and, by the lord! if any of you "hurt the feelings of any one of us, you "shall be thrown into jail, and, perhaps, "have your ears cropped off into the bargain!" What a thing would it be for a government to say this to a people? And what a people must that be, to whom a government would venture to say it? Is there a man in the whole nation who believes, that the emperor Napoleon would dare to say such a thing to any of those nations, whom we, with perfect truth, call his slaves? No; even that master in the arts of tyranny would not, at the head of his army, tell the most crouching of his slaves, that they had *liberty* to do that, for which, if they did it, he would chop off their ears and make them end their days in prison. This is a pitch, my lord, at which no openly avowed despotism ever yet arrived.

In certain observations, which, upon this subject, I offered to my readers at page 271 of this volume, I stated, that, as to the *injury* which is done to any one by exposing him to ridicule, it ought to be *considered* as no objection to the ridicule; because, the injury to him might be a *great advantage to the public*. I was much pleased to see this stated by your lordship, who described it, in the case in question, as a damage which

the law did not regard as an injury. You said, that it was a damage which the exposed author ought to sustain; that the critic had taken from him gains and reputation to which he was never entitled; and that, though it was a damage to him, it was, as in the case of Sir Robert Filmer, a great advantage to the public. Your lordship did, indeed, clog this excellent doctrine with the words *author* and *literary work*; and, in the charge, you observed to the jury that neither they nor *you* had appeared before the world, in the character of an author, or at least, that you never had; which observation came immediately after you had been laying down the right to censure and ridicule authors. But, my lord, we shall find, I think, from the *reason*, upon which this right was founded by your lordship, that the right must apply to all other persons as well as to authors. The doctrine was this: men have a right to expose and to ridicule published works and the authors thereof as far as connected with such works; they have a right to proceed so far as totally to destroy the reputation and the means of livelihood of such persons; and, instead of being legally punished for it, are entitled to commendation. Now for the reason why: *because, if this were not the case, bad morals and bad principles of government and other bad things might be taught, and might be established and perpetuated, to the great and lasting injury of the public.* Well, then, my lord, censure and ridicule, through the means of the press, is here justified, because they are useful in preventing injury to the public. That is the reason why they are to be tolerated, and even highly commended; and, it appears to me utterly impossible for the most ingenious man alive to assign a reason why the press should not be employed to censure and ridicule those acts of other persons, as well as of authors, which tend to produce an injury to the public. It is but a very small part, comparatively, of public mischief that proceeds from the press; the far greater part of it comes from those who have the miserable press under their controul; and shall not they be exposed as well as a poor silly writer of travels? My lord Mountnorris, who very wisely read the Knight's book previous to a purchase of it, was, by the "Pocket Book," induced not to complete the purchase. Now, my lord, if I should hear that it was intended to make a commander of some stupid fellow who was also a coward, would it not be right in me to expose his stupidity and his cowardice, and thereby prevent, if I could, his being made a commander, and his bringing injury upon

the public? Suppose me to see a man appointed to any office, who, in my opinion, is totally unfit for it, and who, of course, must produce an injury to the public by remaining in it; should I not, upon the principle laid down by your lordship, have a right to censure and ridicule him, to endeavour to bring others over to my opinion, and thus to put him out of his office, and to destroy that false reputation, by the means of which he obtained it? Yes: I am sure your lordship will, and must, say yes; for you must perceive, that the higher the office, the more necessary it is that it should be faithfully and ably served. What was the work of this wretched knight? What was it to the public whether his trash continued to be circulated or not? Mr. Garrow, who seems to have been almost in as piteous a plight as his client, told the jury that Sir John had not meddled with politics, or parties. I'll be sworn for the poor soul, that he had no earthly object in view other than that of gaining a comfortable livelihood; and, his works could not have made a very great noise in the world, as even the bare name of them or their author never reached me, until I read the account of the trial. Now, my lord, of what importance was this work to the public? Not a millionth part of so great importance as one single word in any one of the dispatches or proclamations or speeches of any one of the ministers; and, if we are not *freely* (that is to say without being *liable to be tried* for it) to censure and ridicule them, when, in our opinion, they merit it, of what service is it to the public that men of sense and wit are allowed to fall upon a poor defenceless thing like Sir John Carr? Would it not be a sad mockery to call that *liberty of the press*? Liberty of the press means liberty of opposing, as far as the press will go, the views of those who are in power. It has been called "an arm in the hands of the people;" it has been called "the guardian of freedom;" but, how in all the world is it to guard freedom, if it be allowed to touch nothing but acts like those of poor Carr?

I trust, my lord, that the consequence of this trial will be a right way of thinking with regard to the use of the press. Your lordship has got through a great part of the difficulty, and I am confident, that another decision or two of this sort, will make the rogues and fools shy of courts of law. Their pretensions were at war with nature. All honest men hate rogues, and all men of sense laugh at fools. It always has been so; and it ought always to be so. It is the only means of preventing roguery and folly from becoming predominant. The practice of

the law of libels has given rise to a sickly taste. It is impossible to give a true description of a fool or knave without exciting a cry of *illiberality*. Every thing, not conveyed in dark hints, or the meaning of which is not spread out till it be lost in a multitude of words, is called *personal*. The shop-keeper, the half-sexed thing that stands behind the counter, echoes the charge preferred by the painted coxcombs and strumpets that lounge about the streets; nay, the very chamber-maids, who, not unfrequently represent their mistresses in more characters than one, mince up their mouths, and exclaim against *personal reflections*. Good lord! What shall we come to at last! Of all the enemies of "personal reflections," however, I know of none so zealous, as your old fat steady fellows in and about town, who, after having spent three-fourths of a life in back-biting, fraud, and money-getting, are cajoled into the snares of some penniless syren, with whom they retire to finish their days under the torments of jealousy. These grave gentry, who have nothing to do but render all the world as cursed as themselves, are generally great readers of newspapers and great babblers about *law*, to assist in the administration of which they have a constant desire. Whoever calls fool, knave, or cuckold, they take for an enemy; they make common cause against him; for, upon their devoted foreheads the next blow may fall. Your lordship said truly, that it was good policy to resist this species of action. It was indeed; for, if Carr had succeeded, I should not have been at all surprized to see actions brought, bills of indictment preferred, and informations laid, for libels upon cats and dogs.

With great gratitude towards your lordship for the promulgation of your doctrine of the Liberty of the Press, as applied to authors, and with a sincere wish that you may live to apply it to all persons and all cases whatsoever,

I am your lordship's most humble and most obedient servant,

WM. COPPEL FT.

Botley, 15 September, 1808.

CHEAP EDITION OF THE TRIAL, CARR *versus* HOOD AND SHARPE.

* In my last number, I expressed a hope, that the Booksellers, who are so deeply interested in the event of the above Trial, would form a Fund for the circulation of it all over the kingdom. I have now the satisfaction of informing my readers, that the hint has been taken, and that a Cheap Edition of the whole Trial is now printing off, to sell for *three pence* each, or *eighteen shillings and nine pence per hundred*, to those who purchase for distribution. Thus, if the business is properly managed, as I am confident it will be, not fewer than Fifty Thousand Copies will be circulated throughout the country.

ABRIDGMENT OF THE TRIAL, IN AN ACTION, IN WHICH SIR JOHN CARR, KNT. WAS PLAINTIFF, AND MESSRS. HOOD AND SHARPE, DEFENDANTS: DAMAGES LAID AT £2,000. THE TRIAL TOOK PLACE IN GUILDHALL, ON THE 25TH OF JULY, 1808, BEFORE LORD ELLENBOROUGH AND A SPECIAL JURY: TAKEN DOWN IN SHORT HAND BY THOMAS JENKINS.

This abridgement shall contain all that is material. The reader will find in it every principal point touched upon by Mr. Garrow, the leading counsel for the plaintiff; the whole of sir Richard Phillips's evidence; and the whole of what was said by the Judge, and by the Attorney General, who was the leading counsel for the defendants, with the sole exception of what the latter said by way of return for the trade-like compliments paid him by Mr. Garrow, and which interchange of compliments I omit for the sake of decency.

The case, as stated by Mr. Garrow, was this. That sir John Carr (whom hereafter I shall call *Carr*, not perceiving that he has any right to claim the cramming up of my pages with his lengthened name), was the author of several works, which he had sold for considerable sums of money; that he was about to publish a new work of the nature of his former works, which had hitherto been well received by the public; that, at this juncture the defendants published the libel in question, called "*My Pocket Book*;" that the evident object of this work was utterly to destroy Carr as an author, in which object it must succeed unless censured by the verdict of the jury; that the "*Pocket-Book*," besides ridicule in words, contained several caricatures, exhibiting Carr in the most ludicrous light; that he was here represented as a stupid writer, a gleaner of insipid stuff, a fool, a lunatic, and as so nearly like a mere vagabond, as to carry about his wardrobe in a pocket handkerchief; that the defendants had said, that they had a rod in pickle for Carr, and that they would do for him; that the effect of all this had been a clearly proved damage to Carr; that sir Richard Phillips had, merely from the effect of this attack, been deterred from purchasing the intended new work, for which, otherwise, he would have given £700; and that there must necessarily have arisen to the plaintiff other damages, of which it would be impossible to estimate the amount.

The evidence first given was to prove the publication of the "*Pocket Book*," and then evidence was produced of a *continuation*

of the publication after notice of action, which evidence in aggravation having been objected to by the Attorney General, the following conversation took place between the Judge and Mr. Garrou.

Mr. Garrou—The ground on which I object, is this—I say, that these defendants meant to publish to the world, a work the object of which is, to render sir John Carr ridiculous—I say, this publication of these defendants, is false and scandalous. Can it be doubted that I may prove, that the defendants have continued that publication, to show the extent of the injury, and the sp. of the offending party?

Lord Ellenborough—But we must allow a latitude to the free discussion of the merits and demerits of authors, and their works; otherwise, we may talk indeed of the liberty of the press, but there will be in reality an end of it.

Mr. Garrou—Suppose I had a wen on my neck, or had any other deformity. Am I to be held up to ridicule, to gratify the malice of an individual, who chooses to be my enemy, and is that individual to continue to expose me, after notice given to him of his misconduct? That notice is given to him by the service of a process, which is the commencement of the action.

Mr. Attorney General—The answer to all this is, that you can bring another action, if you are damaged by any subsequent publication.

Lord Ellenborough—We must really not cramp observations upon authors and their works. They should be liable to exposure, to criticism, and even to ridicule, if their works be ridiculous, or false, the first who writes a book upon a subject will maintain a monopoly of sentiment and opinion upon it. You must never shew the absurdity of it, although the absurd, that is, you can never do it with effect. This would tend to the perpetuity of error. A bad book might appear, it would propagate error, and so we should go on to the end of time. How any body could conceive that an action is maintainable, for publishing a work, exposing another work to ridicule, is to me surprising. Reflection upon personal character is another thing.

Mr. Garrou—I am not contending that the defendants may not endeavour to show, that the plaintiff's book is a ridiculous one, but they must not endeavour to destroy the plaintiff altogether, as an author.

Lord Ellenborough—I do not know that. Suppose a person publishes a book containing sentiments that are injurious to public morals, of infinite mischief to the public

taste, or bad maxims of government; or any thing else that ought to be decried; and we not to be at liberty to expose that work; aye, and expose the author of it too, as far as he is connected with that work, and that, in the most pointed language of wit, humour, or ridicule, the more pointed and forcible, the better? He who does so, if the work be ridiculous, or a bad one, confers a favour on, by procuring a benefit to, the public. That it destroys the reputation of an author, and puts an end to the circulation of his works, is nothing, if his works be worthless. Mr. Locke published an answer to sir Robert Filmer, would any body give twopenny, after that, for the works of sir Robert Filmer? What then? was Mr. Locke to be made the subject of an action, for destroying the reputation of sir Robert Filmer? Not at all. It was a reputation, that ought to have been destroyed, and was destroyed, for which the world has been greatly indebted to Mr. Locke. I really do not know where we are going to. To talk of the liberty of the press, if one man may not write freely, on the work of another, lest he should destroy the reputation of that other, would be idle. Shew me an attack, on the moral character of this plaintiff, or any attack on his character, unconnected with his looks, and I shall be as ready as any man, who ever sat here, to protect him in that character, but I cannot hear of malice, on account of turning his works into ridicule.

Mr. Garrou—They prevent the sale of all the plaintiff's works, by this immoderate ridicule of him, by wholesale, as an author.

Lord Ellenborough—They do so. They depreciate his character as an author, conceiving they have a right to do so.

Mr. Garrou—Then let them shew that they have done it fairly.

Lord Ellenborough—No, they do not. YOU must shew that they have done it unfairly.

Mr. Garrou—So I do, my Lord, by the exhibition of this frontispiece, which shews, that this book is of a fair criticism, but a malignant mind.

Lord Ellenborough—Go on with your case.

Evidence was then given to prove that Carr was the author of other works. Lord Valentia was called to prove, that the "Pocket Book" was intended, in his opinion, to expose Carr's Irish Tour to ridicule. Lord Mountmorris, under whose name a letter has been published stating that he "attended *sol*ly, and conscientiously

on behalf of sir John Carr," said, upon his oath, that "he had read the *Pocket Book* " and also the *Stranger in Ireland*, that he " had compared them both chapter and " chapter; that he considered the former " as intended to ridicule the latter; that the " caricatures are so strongly drawn, that it " was impossible to mistake their application " to sir John Carr; and, finally, that he " should have bought the *Stranger in Ire-* " *land*, but would not after reading the " *Pocket Book*, the latter having depreci- " *ated* the former so much in his opinion."

In a cross-examination, which appears to have been gone into by the Attorney General for the purpose of obtaining a repetition of this evidence so complimentary as well as useful to his clients, Lord Mountnorris said, in terms, if possible, still more explicit, that, after a most attentive perusal of both the work and the criticism, he was induced by the impression produced on his mind by the latter not to purchase the former, though he was before disposed to make that purchase.

Sir RICHARD PHILLIPS's Examination might have been very short; but, owing to his own indiscretion, it was rendered very long; and as he appears to have been considered as the *real cause* of the action against Messrs. Hood and Sharpe, the whole of this Examination shall be given. He was examined by Mr. Dampier, and cross-examined by the Attorney General.

Q. Did you, sir Richard Phillips, purchase of sir John Carr, a book called, "The Northern Summer; or, a Tour round the Baltic?"—A. I did.

Q. And also a "Tour through Ireland, and another along the Rhine?"—A. I did.

Q. They are all in quarto, I believe?—A. They are.

Q. What was the purchase money for each?—A. The price of the first was fixed by Mr. Hayley, who introduced sir John Carr to me.

Q. Will you state the sums which you paid for these books?—A. Four hundred pounds for "The Northern Summer; or, Tour round the Baltic," and in consequence of a small increase in the quantity, I added another 100l. of my own accord.

Q. So that he had 500l. for this book?—A. Yes, he had. Mr. Hayley, of whom I have a high opinion, settled the price of that book.

Q. Then as to "The Tour through Ireland." What did you pay for that?—A. I gave sir John Carr 600l. for that, and a conditional 100l. more I think, on the second edition; or, on the sale of a cer-

tain number—but previous to the whole of that number being sold—(considering that it would be sold), I gave sir John Carr 100l. more. So that he had 700l. for the "Tour through Ireland."

Q. What did you give him for the other book, which you purchased of him, "The Tour through Holland?"—A. The same price. It is a sort of rule with booksellers, (at least it is so with me)—that when we are satisfied with the work of an author, we give him, for similar works, the same as we did before, without any treaty.

Q. So that you gave sir John Carr 600l. for "The Stranger in Ireland, and, if it went through a second edition, you were to give him 100l. more; which you did?"—A. Yes.

Q. Now, sir, have you seen a work of his called, "A Tour in Scotland?"—A. I have seen it in a manuscript; sir John Carr has put it into my hands.

Q. It is a work prepared now for publication?—A. It is.

Q. Now sir, when you saw that, had you seen the present book, called "My Pocket Book?"—A. Yes, I had.

Q. Did you at any time, see one of these defendants, Mr. Hood?—A. I frequently saw him.

Q. So as to have a conversation with him, concerning this work—I mean the book, called "My Pocket Book?"—A. I have met Mr. Hood, and he has spoken to me particularly on the subject of the book called "My Pocket Book."

Q. Will you state to us, what he said to you, on that subject?—A. He began by asking me "how sir John Carr did?" I said he was very well. He went on to ask me, have you seen or read, "My Pocket Book?" I answered him by saying, "I never read any *scurrility* of that kind."

Q. Did he make any answer to that?—A. He did. He said, "the Lord have mercy upon sir John Carr: we have a rod in pickle for him: we will do for him:" or, "we will do his business;" or words to that effect. I believe the words were, "the Lord have mercy upon him, poor sir John," or some phrase of that sort, was thrown in—"we will do his business," or, "will do for him."

Q. Do you know, whether this book, called "My Pocket Book," has been extensively circulated?—A. I have reason to believe it has been very actively and industriously circulated. I have seen it in the windows of booksellers, attracting some attention in consequence of a ridiculous frontispiece; and booksellers are some of them apt to expose works of this nature, on

account of the oddity of appearance in them

Q Has it been circulated, in what they call "the trade circulation, and sale?"—**A** I do not attend trade sales myself, and I cannot speak to that, but I can speak to this—that the whole edition was offered to the trade, at the trade price, and, that a thousand copies were so to be disposed of, as appears by this catalogue

Attorney General—You must say nothing to us about this catalogue, for it is not evidence

Lord Ellenborough—Certainly not, you must prove that publication is well as every other publication by the actual sale. The catalogue is nothing.

Mr Dampier—**Q** Was this work, called "The Tour through Scotland, or whatever other title it might have—offered to you for sale?"—**A** Yes it was

Q Did you buy it, or did you decline it?—**A** The impression which was made on my mind, in consequence of the publication of the book, called "My Pocket Book," and the activity with which it was circulated, (as I perceived from the manner in which it was advertised) together with the conversation I had with Mr Hood, was such, that I certainly declined to buy it

Q What was the reason of your declining to buy it?—**A** I certainly declined to buy it, in consequence of the publication of this book, called "My Pocket Book"

Q Had you, before you were aware of this publication made any offer of any sum of money, for that work of Sir John Carr which you saw in manuscript?—**A** Not at that time.

Q Did you at any time?—**A** Sir John Carr, subsequent to this, proposed and offered it to me, for 400*l*. together with the contingent advantage as before, but I declined it. If this libel had not been published, I should have given Sir John Carr the same as he had for the former works, for it is a custom of our trade, unless something happens to make us dissatisfied with the author's work, to give him the same sum, for every similar work, as he had for the preceding one—and had I purchased this work, now in manuscript, of Sir John Carr, I should certainly have given him 600*l*. for it

Cross examined—**Q** You state yourself not to be a reader of *scurrility*?—**A** I certainly do, I wish to read nothing of that kind.

Q As you state yourself not to be a reader of a thing of that kind, I take it for granted, you never publish any thing of that sort?—**A** I mean, that I never read *anonymous scurrility*. If I see the name of a

respectable author on a title-page, it becomes another thing

Attorney General Do not overpower me, sir Richard Phillips, by a multitude of words, or by answering my questions before I put them to you, especially by references to innumerable writings

Q I take it for granted you never read the Edinburgh Review?—**A** I have seen the Edinburgh Review—but I pay no respect whatever to that, or to any other work of anonymous criticism

Q I take it for granted then, sir Richard, that criticism owes its effect to the circumstance of a knowledge of who the author is?—**A** It certainly ought to do so, to my mind criticisms should always bear the names of the authors. I do not generally consider that *furtivum* which is anonymous.

Q When did you publish these works of Sir John Carr?—**A** I published the first work, "The Northern Summer," I suppose in 1803 or 4, "The Stranger in Ireland," in 1806, and the "Tour in Ireland," in 1807; "The Tour in Scotland," I saw in 1808—the present year

Q As you do not read criticism, except you know who the critic or the author is, I take it for granted, you do not attend to the Edinburgh Review. If Sir John Carr has been praised or censured in the Edinburgh Review, I take it for granted you do not know it?—**A** I never saw it

Mr Gifford—I object to the introduction of the Edinburgh Review. It is no evidence.

Lord Ellenborough—I understand the Attorney General's question to be to this effect—to take the Edinburgh Review as a mere illustration of the present subject.

Mr Carron—If it be either directly complimentary to, or directly detracting from the merit of Sir John Carr as an author, the Edinburgh Review may be referred to as evidence of the opinion of literary persons, as to the merit of Sir John Carr, as an author, but, I submit to your Lordship, that otherwise it is not evidence in this cause

Lord Ellenborough—The merit of taking away this out of the Edinburgh Review, but the Attorney General is cross-examining the witness, as to his acquaintance with that publication. I see nothing in the course of this examination, which calls upon me to stop it

Attorney General—I ask Sir Richard Phillips, whether he knows that this book has been reviewed by the Edinburgh Reviewers?—**A** I do not know it. I do not read the Edinburgh Review

Q You do not know there is such a publication

tion, perhaps, as the *Edinburgh Review*?—*A.* There is such a publication, certainly, but I do not recollect that I have read the *Edinburgh Review* at all, except some parts of the first volume. I thought some of it scurrilous, and I abhor scurrility.

Q. Now, as you think this publication, which is complained of, is scurrilous; as you abhor scurrility; and, as you know it to be anonymous; you do not soil your pure mind with the perusal of it—are there any reviews published by any persons which are not anonymous?—*A.* None that I recollect, at this moment, there was one sometime ago by *Dr. Maty*.

Q. But you do know there is such a publication as the *Edinburgh Review*?—*A.* I do.

Q. Do you know whether there is such a publication as the *Annual Review*?—*A.* I know there is such a publication.

Q. Is that anonymous?—*A.* That has a name.

Q. Now, as you do not read scurrilous anonymous writings, and as that is not anonymous, since it has a name, perhaps you do read the *Annual Review*?—*A.* Never, now; I have looked into former volumes of it, but I never read it now; it is a very ponderous publication, which I do not read, because I have not leisure.

Q. Have you had a large sale of *Sir John Carr's* works?—*A.* A very respectable sale; a very considerable sale, of the first work. Of "the *Tour in Ireland*," and of "the *Tour round the Baltic*." I have sold, I think, very nearly 1500 copies.

Attorney-General.—I think, *sir Richard*, that your reprobation of anonymous criticism, cannot be too much commended—certainly, nothing should be published without a name—it is proper we should always know who to resort to, in case any thing be published which is not proper.

Q. Pray, *sir Richard*, was, there not a review called "The *Oxford Review*?"—*Yes.*

Q. Who published it?—*A.* It was printed by a person at *Oxford*.

Q. Very likely: but who published it in *London*?—*A.* I was the publisher in *London*.

Lord Ellenborough.—Here, I think I should caution you, *sir Richard Phillips*, for although I do not know what that publication contained, it may contain something for which you may be responsible, and which may lead you into difficulty; we are here treading upon tender ground; you are not bound to answer any thing which may tend to involve yourself in difficulty.

Sir Richard Phillips.—I thank your Lordship, but I shall certainly answer any

question which the *Attorney General* chooses to ask me; I never printed a line, to my knowledge, which was calculated to hurt the feelings of any person living.

Lord Ellenborough.—It is my duty to caution you, *sir Richard*, and to tell you, that you are not bound to avow that you are the publisher of any work, which may contain any objectionable matter. You are entitled to a protection as a witness. You have laid yourself open already to many questions, which could not have been regularly asked of you, had you not chosen to avow yourself publisher of the work just alluded to.

Attorney General.—There was a work intitled "Public Characters," I believe?—*A.* There was.

Q. And you published it, I believe?—*A.* I did.

Lord Ellenborough.—By the name of it, that is a work very likely to be extremely delicate; I caution you, once more, how you admit yourself to be the publisher of such works; you are not bound to admit any such matter. You appear to me to be admitting too much: I now give you notice, that I shall not caution you again. You have just admitted yourself to be the publisher of a book called "Public Characters," that, from the title of it, is likely to contain a great deal of very delicate matter.

Sir Richard Phillips.—I repeat again, my lord, that I have no disinclination to avow every thing that I ever published. I never published any work which I should be ashamed to avow in this place.

Attorney General.—On that ground, *sir Richard*, you will tell me, whether you published a book called "Public Characters of the French Revolution?"—*A.* I do not know of any book under that title. There was a book published in 1796, by myself, giving an account of the Founders of the French Republic—but it was a plain narrative of facts. It was a chronological account of public men, who had figured away in France, in the course of the revolution. It was published with a view of giving an account of such persons—there was no scurrility in it, certainly.

Attorney General.—No scurrility?—*A.* Certainly none, that I am aware of.

Mr. Garrow.—My lord, I rather think I ought to object to this, as an entirely wrong course of proceeding. One would think, from the course which my friend, the *Attorney General*, is now taking, that *sir Richard Phillips* was the plaintiff, instead of *sir John Carr*, for my learned friend seems, now, to be going into the public life and character of *sir Richard Phillips*. *Sir John Carr*, the

plaintiff upon this record, has nothing in common, nothing to do with sir Richard Phillips. They have no connection with each other, except that the one of them is the author, and the other the publisher, of a certain work, and then, my lord, how can any part of the life of sir Richard Phillips be evidence upon this issue between sir John Carr and these defendants?

Lord Ellenborough.—I do not know any thing of what is common, or what is not common, between this plaintiff and this witness; but, you see here, that sir Richard Phillips is the purchaser of this work; which is reviewed, or, if you please, censured, by the publication of the defendants. On the credit of the author of this work, of which sir Richard Phillips is the purchaser, depends the sale of the unsold part of that work, that is, of the edition now on hand; and this evidence, which he is now giving, that he is the proprietor, and consequently interested in the sale of this book, does not indeed go to his competency, but has a strong bearing on his credit, as a witness; and therefore the Attorney General should, I think, be allowed a larger scope than he should otherwise have, in his cross-examination. He has put to sir Richard Phillips many questions, to which sir Richard does not choose to demur, but to which he is certainly entitled to demur; he chooses to say that he is the publisher of many of these works, after the caution which he received from me. I wish he would be guided by other discretion than his own.

Mr. Garrow.—All this, my lord, is very well, as between the Attorney General and sir Richard Phillips; but, I submit, has nothing to do with the interest of my client.

Lord Ellenborough.—More or less I think it has—it has some reference to it certainly.

Attorney General.—Q. You have very properly uttered your sentiments in reprobation of all criticism which is anonymous—and you are the publisher of a book which gives us the character of those persons who figured in the French revolution. Pray what was the title of that book?—A. "Anecdotes of the Founders of the French Republic." It was published ten or twelve years ago; it was merely a matter-of-fact book; there was no scurrility in it whatever.

Q. Then it contains nothing but an account of facts within your own knowledge?

—A. No, not so; I was not the author, but the publisher.

Attorney General.—And yet you say it is a mere narrative of facts; how can you say so, unless they are facts within your own

knowledge?—A. It was a mere plain narrative of facts.

Lord Ellenborough.—How do you know them to be facts, if you were not present at the transaction?—A. It was certainly a narrative of what the author stated to me, and what I considered to be, facts. It was like every other book of grave biography and history.

Attorney General.—I think we have now got pretty well rid of the book, which you call the "Narrative of Facts."

Q. You were publisher of the Oxford Review?—A. Yes.

Q. You had nothing anonymous in it of course. Pray what were the names of the Oxford Reviewers? Were they known to the public?—A. They were not.

Q. You say you would not put your name to any thing that was anonymous, or a scurrilous publication. And you say that you published "Anecdotes of the Founders of the French Republic." And you say that you, yourself, published the Oxford Review, which was anonymous?—A. Yes; but they had not the character of the works which I have reprobated.

Attorney General.—I'll be sure; for you state that those were facts which you published in your "Anecdotes of the Founders of the French Revolution." And you state also, that you were not the author, but merely the publisher of that book. Pray was that book anonymous?—A. Yes, but not scurrilous.

Q. No, not scurrilous, God forbid?—A. Yes, God forbid. I thank you for the phrase.

Attorney General.—You say there is such a book as the Edinburgh Review, which is anonymous, and the Annual Review, which is not anonymous, which is published, I believe, by Mr. Aikin. Now, did it ever occur to you, when you were so much interested in the credit of sir John Carr's works, to enquire what Mr. Aikin, who is not an anonymous writers, says of his works?—A. In respect to periodical criticism of the anonymous kind, I ought to say that I have neither time, nor inclination, to look into it; nor do I often look into the Annual Review. It is a ponderous volume, and if I had inclination, I should not have time to read it.

Q. The Oxford Review, I take it for granted, you read, since you were the publisher of it?—A. Yes.

Q. I take it for granted, you had the honesty to subscribe your name to that opinion?—A. I shall never withhold my opinions. I published the Oxford Review

from a desire that there might be a fair review. My wishes and my feelings suggested to me, that there ought to be at least one honest review in the country. A number of gentlemen at Oxford, united their labours to write for it; and it was printed there, under their direction, and published by me in London. It had no scurrility in it whatever; but I found that a review which had no personal abuse, would not succeed, and therefore I discontinued its publication.

Q. That was your feeling, and such your reasoning?—A. Yes.

Lord Ellenborough.—That is, you are now slandering all publishers but yourself. That is calling all other reviewers slanderers. I wish you would attend to the advice of others, whose prudence you seem to want.

Sir Richard Phillips.—My lord, I know a great deal about reviewers!

Attorney General.—Q. Perhaps you never, in advertising a book of your own, annexed to it any commendation of reviewers?—A. I have not done so for many years, I was in the habit of doing it formerly, but I have not done it for many years. I became ashamed of the practice, and I left it off.

Attorney General.—That is, you grew up into virtue, as they fell into vice.

Lord Ellenborough.—This is saying, that every publisher is dishonourable but yourself. Pray do not arrogate to yourself all the virtue in the publication of books. Are you aware of the effect of your testimony? You have, just this instant, told us, that you have been doing that of which you are ashamed. And that you discontinued it, because you were ashamed of it. Answer the questions plainly without these comments.

Sir Richard Phillips.—My lord, I have endeavoured to do so. I have said that I formerly published advertisements of books with the characters of reviewers annexed to them. It was the ordinary practice of the trade. I have said, that I discontinued it, and I did so. And I have said that I left it off because I was ashamed of it, and I am so.

Attorney General.—Q. At what time did you change your system. Will you swear, that within these last six years, you have not published a book annexing to its advertisement, the commendation of reviewers?—A. Yes, I have no doubt I have. It may have happened within these two or three years, perhaps, but this has arisen from accident. We keep our old advertisements standing in the form in which we

have been used to send them to the newspapers, for five or six years together. So that an advertisement may latterly have gone into a newspaper with the same paragraph in it, of the commendation of the reviewer, a long time after I had determined to discontinue that practice.

Q. You know of the Annual Review, and there is the Monthly Review?—A. Yes.

Q. And there is the Eclectic Review, and the Critical Review?—A. Yes.

Q. Now, I ask you, there being this number of reviews, have you never looked into any of them to see if sir John Carr's work was reviewed by them?—A. I do not recollect to have done so, within the last twelve months.

Q. I ask you whether you have not looked into them concerning "The Stranger in Ireland"?—A. I do not recollect to have seen "The Stranger in Ireland," noticed in more than one review. I have seen it, in some review; I do not recollect which it was.

Q. What was the character given of it in that review?—A. I think, in the review in which I saw it, it had a very good character.

Attorney General.—Now, sir Richard Phillips, I will ask you another question; have you not yourself assigned as a reason for not publishing this work of sir John Carr's, which you have seen in manuscript, "The Tour in Scotland," "That sir John Carr was worn out"?—A. I never used the phrase.

Q. Nor any thing like it?—A. No, nor any thing like it.

Q. You never have assigned that as a reason for not publishing that work? Nor any other reason except that of this publication, called "My Pocket Book," and these imputations cast upon the genius of the author?—A. I have been asked by booksellers, questions which they had no business to ask me, about sir John Carr's works, and conceiving such questions to be impertinent, I have said to such booksellers, "that my public engagements would prevent me from embarking in such publications, and I have given that answer in tenderness to sir John Carr."

Q. Have you read "The Tour through Scotland"?—A. I have looked into it, but not read it through.

Q. It is finished?—A. It is.

One of the Jury.—Q. I think, Sir Richard, you told the booksellers that your public engagements would prevent you from embarking in such publications; and that you gave that answer out of tenderness to sir John Carr. Pray what was that tender-

near?—*A* Because I would not have it understood that any work of that kind, (meaning such works as "My Pocket Book") had had an effect, which appeared to me to be so prejudicial to his character.

Attorney-General—I will deal candidly with you, Sir Richard. The person to whom I alluded, when I asked you whether you had not said, "Sir John Carr was worn out," is a Mr. Muirry. Now I ask you, did you not say so to him?—*A* No, I did not, that I recollect.

Q Will you take upon yourself to say, upon your oath, that, to Mr. Muirry you did not say "that Sir John Carr was worn out"?—*A* I could not say such a thing.

Q Do you swear positively, that you did not say that "Sir John Carr was worn out"?—*A* I certainly do say, that I did not say so.

Attorney-General—May it please your lordship gentlemen of the jury, I could, certainly, make many observations on the very many ridiculous passages which are to be found in the works of Sir John Carr, and which fully justify the ridicule of this book, of which he complains. But I abstain, the case is so rich with ridicule without it, that it would be bad taste to take that course. There is so much in the dramatic personae, that it renders every thing in the way of ridicule superfluous—first we have Sir Richard Phillips, who has given us evidence of his being either one of the greatest fools that ever lived under the sun, or that he is not to be credited on his oath. I say it appears from his own testimony, either that he has given us false evidence, or that he is the greatest fool that ever walked upon the face of the earth—without a guide.

Lord Ellenborough interposing—Weakest, perhaps weakest.

Attorney-General—The weakest man that ever walked upon the face of the earth without a keeper—Damasus would have given any thing for him when he wrote his *Encomium Monæ*—or Pope, when he wrote his *Dunciad*. If the author of the *Dunciad* were now living, he would have changed his hero—If we were living in the days of Pope—we should have a new edition of the *Dunciad* after this scene. Sir Richard Phillips tells us, that he is publisher of three of these voluminous works, which have been exhibited to you as the productions of Sir John Carr. He has told you, that he had given large sums of money for them. That he was about to open a negotiation with Sir John Carr, for the purchase of another work, and he tells you, there are I think

five different reviews, the object of which is, to treat of the merits or the demerits of different publications as they appear in the world, and that they must rise or fall, in a great measure at least—that is, fail of success, or succeed with the public, according to the impression produced by these periodical publications. This must be the case with 'The Stranger in Ireland,' as well as any other work. And Sir Richard Phillips I am, interested in pocket, as to the credit of that work with the public, tells you, that he never looked into any one of these reviews. He felt that, as soon as he said it, to be a strong thing to be said by a bookseller. For a man who derives emolument from the credit of authors—who eats and drinks their labour—lives upon it—He felt himself bound to account for this strange expression—He does account for it—"I never mix myself," says he, "with anonymous publications. That is, in substance this, is, one of virtue preserved from open popularity of that kind. I care not how much beneath me, that I let it be. I am proud of my mind mightily content with doing them. Have you read the *Oxford Review*?" "I have formerly read it, do not now. I have two objections to it, first, that they are anonymous, and that they are scurrilous," and yet he admits, that himself was proud of *Anecdotes of Public Characters in this Country*, and, "A Collection of the Characters of the French Republic." It is the publisher himself of these two works, and he is both anonymous—but he says, that he bore mention of scurrility—"and indeed these are facts—a simple narrative of facts." Did these facts, Sir Richard, happen to fall within your own knowledge? Answer me that plain question—"No, no, no, far as the authors of the works alluded to me." That is what Sir Richard Phillips calls a narrative of facts! so much for Sir Richard Phillips's narrative of facts, and so much for his abhorrence of scurrility. Now for his abhorrence of anonymous publications—I feel, he says, and so he ought to feel—so ~~must~~ ought to feel—"an abhorrence of anonymous scurrility," and yet he publishes two books which are anonymous—whether they contain any thing that is scurrilous, we will not here stop to inquire. But we now come to the Reviews—he holds them in great abhorrence. I suppose some of his publications have been roughly handled by them. But who was the publisher of the *Oxford Review*?—Himself, and here he elevated himself above all other

booksellers; for, says he, "I published the Oxford Review, that there "might be one honest review in the kingdom," consigning all others, Dr. Aikin's and the rest, to ignominy—placing himself upon a pedestal, looking down on others and degrading them altogether—a condition in which he is not intitled to place himself. Now, gentlemen, is sir Richard Phillips that pure, immaculate character which he states himself to be?—I put it to you, thus—do you believe he swears truly when he swears, that he became the publisher of the Oxford Review, merely for the purpose of giving to the public one honest review in this kingdom? Do you believe that he swears truly when he swears that?—Gentlemen, I told you that sir Richard Phillips was either a witness who had tript in his evidence, or else, that he is a man the most infirm in judgment that ever walked on the face of the earth without a keeper. He states to you, that he would have given the same sum for the work of sir John Carr now in manuscript that he gave for the others, had it not been for the publication of this book called "My Pocket Book." He tells you, there are five Reviews, in all of which, he knows, as well as any body, that this work must be handled as others are, but so little does he read reviews or anonymous criticisms, that he hardly looks at them, and he hardly looked at this work, called "My Pocket Book," and yet he tells you in the same breath, that in consequence of these petty comments, as he calls them, of this book, "My Pocket Book," he declined to buy the other work of his favourite author sir John Carr. But for this scurrilous little work, he would have given sir John Carr £700 for the work which he now has in manuscript. Now, I do say, either that is not true, or sir Richard Phillips is the weakest and the most absurd creature that ever crept on the face of the earth. I could not conceive, had I not seen it, that a man could have made a figure so foolish. I cannot conceive, that a man should so act against his interest, as knowing there were these reviews and publications, and knowing how the next book of sir John Carr might at least be handled, and yet would have given £700 in the first instance for this manuscript of sir John Carr's, if it had not been for this little book, "My Pocket Book," which sir Richard Phillips tells you, at the same time, is a contemptible little work, and which, if that be true, could have had little, if any effect upon the public mind. I have been led into this mode of reasoning from the ground which sir Richard Phillips has thought fit to take.

He has arrogated to himself all the honour in the kingdom, as far as it regards the publication of books, and reviews of books. What standard shall I take to judge of the propriety or impropriety of this publication, called "My Pocket Book;—as containing just or unjust criticism on the work of Sir John Carr, called "The Stranger in Ireland?" I will appeal to my Lord Mountnorris, who has a high personal respect for the author of the book, called "The Stranger in Ireland," and partial towards the subject of it. The truth is, that Sir John Carr went to Ireland well recommended. He received there the honour of knighthood—and knighted, fine clothes and genteel manners, are an introduction into genteel circles, and gain a high name for a while, to an author, and may be a short substitute for genius, to a person who chooses to figure as an author. He thought his name would uphold his book, but that will never do long, unless the book can uphold his name. Sir John Carr thought that his book would pass on account of his name. And it very nearly had. My Lord Mountnorris had very nearly got himself into the scrape of buying this book of Sir John Carr's called "The Stranger in Ireland." He would have done so, but from the circumstance of his having seen this book, called "My Pocket Book." And here I think my Lord Mountnorris has some reason to complain of his friend Sir John Carr, and of those who gave him that name. Not that I mean to insinuate that Sir John Carr is unworthy of the honour of knighthood; I am speaking of him merely as an author, and in that view, knighthood may sometimes have the effect of a false token. "*Cum pulchris tunicis sumet nova consilia et spes.*" But what effect has this book called "My Pocket Book," had on the public mind? Why, my Lord Mountnorris, who has a personal respect for Sir John Carr, shall answer that question. He said that understanding Sir John Carr to have spoken handsomely of Ireland, and feeling an interest in that subject, he was disposed to buy the book; but he read this criticism, and having read it, he read the book which was the subject of it. He then compared them with each other—what was the effect of his doing so? Why, that he would not buy the book. Why did he not buy the book? Because it had been so successfully ridiculed. How came it to be so successfully ridiculed? Perhaps you can guess. My Lord Mountnorris had like to have reposed too much confidence in the name of the author. But having looked at

then having compared them with one another, that is, he compared the book of Sir John Carr with the manner in which it had been turned into ridicule, he said to himself—"This work of my friend Sir John Carr will not do for me—I will not buy it." This is putting things to the test—this is exactly the use of criticism, which is preventing those who have not seen, from buying bad books. This is a proof that in the judgment of my Lord Mountnorris, a man of erudition a friend to the author too, and partial to his subject—thinks the book, after an attentive perusal of it, not worth buying. My Lord Mountnorris did not content himself with reading this criticism, but he read the book itself, and after perusing both, he found the book of Sir John Carr so ridiculous a work that he would not buy it, for he did not choose to be laughed at by those who might see it in his library.—I do not complain of those who purchase books without having read them, or hearing something of their character from men of judgment; but those who, like my Lord Mountnorris, take the precaution to peruse a book before they buy it, are, I think, a great deal more prudent. My Lord Mountnorris has shewn us the utility of criticism; and I think he has shewn us the justness of the criticism here complained of.—Gentlemen, I think this case a great deal too clear to require any farther observations. I confess I had brought my mind up to saying a good deal on the subject of Sir John Carr's literary labours. I had been almost tempted to do so; but I think it has become unnecessary after the evidence you have heard. I might have compared the works of Sir John Carr with authors of antiquity whose works have been treated with ridicule. There was Socrates, and Aristophanes criticised him; but his doctrines were not the less published on that account. *Why? Because the ridicule did not affect his fame. It is because works are ridiculous; that ridicule affects them.* Whoever sends into the world a book, gives to the public a right of dealing with the contents of that book as the contents deserve. If the book be a work of genuine merit, *no attack upon it, however violent, or however ingenious, will do it any permanent injury.* If, on the other hand, it be a work which has for its support, nothing but knighthood—a large margin—hot-press—gilt leaves morocco and binding, it really never can stand the test of criticism,

and the sooner it is sent into the shelves the better. The public are indebted to the author who so disposes of it; for the public have an interest in the discouragement of bad books, almost as much as in the encouragement of good ones. It has another good effect—it shews those who have not, otherwise, means of discovering the true character of a book, how to save their money. Such is the effect of genuine criticism, and a very valuable thing it is to the public. I have my learned friend's concession; that fair and manly criticism, even if you do not agree in opinion with the critic, is not to be complained of. I think my Lord Mountnorris has proved this to be of that character.—Gentlemen, I will detain you no longer. I am quite satisfied that you will be of opinion, that this book, although severe, was published in the spirit of fair criticism, and, of course, that your verdict will be for the defendants.

Lord Ellenborough.—Gentlemen of the jury; this is an action brought by sir John Carr against these two defendants, booksellers of the names of Hood and Sharpe, for having published, what he contends to be a work intending to turn him into ridicule; and he alleges in his declaration, that he has suffered special damages on account of this book; that he, being about to sell another work to sir Richard Phillips, that bookseller declined to purchase that work; on which account he could not sell it, whereby he lost the considerable advantage which has been stated to you.—Now, gentlemen, before we advance to the work itself, let us look at the principle of this species of action. Every person who writes any book, and publishes it, of whatever description it may be, commits it to the public; any person may comment upon it, upon its principle, upon its tendency, or upon its style—may answer, and expose to ridicule its character, if it be ridiculous—and may do the same thing with the author, as far as he is embodied in the work. Now this publication of the *Travels* of Sir John Carr, makes "a description of the place where he is," a principal part of the work. He is taking his departure from Dublin; and he speaks of himself in a manner that connects himself with the work. The book published by the defendants takes notice of this part of the plaintiff's work, and it is exhibited in the print, and it refers to parts of sir John Carr's book wherein expressions are used similar to those used in the present publication. It is contended that

this work of the defendants should not be suffered, because it is ridiculous, immoderately, the works of the plaintiff. Why, gentlemen, if the thing itself be ridiculous—if the principle of it be bad—or, though the principle be unobjectionable, if the work itself be ill digested—bad composition—written with bad taste, or otherwise defective, so as to deserve the character of a “bad book,”—it is doing great service to the public to write it down; such works cannot be too soon exposed—the sooner they disappear the better. I speak this without prejudice to the work of sir John Carr, for I have not read a word of it. It may be, for aught I know, excellent. It would be unfair in me to censure what I have not read, like the sheriff—God forbid I should do so; the books of this gentleman may be very valuable works. But this I say:—whatever character his works merit, others have a right to pass their judgement upon them, and to censure them, if they be censurable, and to turn them into ridicule, if they be ridiculous. If there were no such right, we should have no security for the exposition of error; bad systems of philosophy would not be written down, as that of Des Cartes was by Newton; and bad systems of government would not be written down, as that of sir Robert Filmer's was by Locke. After Mr. Locke had published his work upon government, against that of sir Robert Filmer, I dare say this sheriff, sir Richard Phillips, would not have given a shilling for the book of sir Robert Filmer, if it were a publication of the present time. What then? Could any body maintain an action against Mr. Locke for his publication, for writing down the fame of sir Robert Filmer? Certainly not. Mr. Locke did great service to the public by writing down that work; and, indeed, any person does a service to the public, who writes down any vapid or useless publication, such as never ought to have appeared. It prevents the dissemination of bad taste, by the perusal of trash; and prevents people from wasting both their time and money. I say this, however, as applicable to *fair and candid criticism*, which every person has a right to publish, although the author may suffer a loss from it. It is a loss, indeed, to the author; but is what we in the law call *Damnum absque injuria*; a loss which the law does not consider as an injury, because it is a loss which he ought to sustain. It is, in short, the loss of *fame and profits*, to which he was never entitled; and the person who occasions that loss, by fair criticism, is not guilty of that species of conduct which subjects him to an action in a court of justice.

Why then, let us suppose that the plaintiff in this action has lost the benefit of selling his Scotch Tour, now in manuscript, to sir Richard Phillips; if he has lost it, by *fair criticism* upon his former works, which criticisms have rendered his writings ridiculous, he must abide by such loss, it being his fate to sustain it by *fair criticism*. This I take to be law. If it were otherwise, I do not know where we are to stop. No man will be at liberty to expose the works of another, however ridiculous. I think we ought to resist a complaint, against *fair and liberal criticism*, at the threshold; I think it is our policy, in every view of the thing. I do not know any thing that more threatens the liberty of the press, in the times in which we live, than giving too much encouragement to this species of action. But do not let me be misunderstood; for I do not mean to say, that if there was any thing in the book, published by the defendants, of a libellous tendency, wholly foreign to the work, or unconnected with the author of it, as embodied in the work; if there was any thing in it, tending to render him ridiculous, unconnected with the work, the action is maintainable. Neither you nor I have appeared before the world in the character of an author, at least I have not; but, if I had, I should not think myself entitled to maintain an action against any body else, who ridiculed my work, and proved it to be ridiculous. If any person chooses to exhibit a picture, which was itself ridiculous, another cannot be liable to an action, for pointing out wherein it is ridiculous. If another chooses in his work to draw a picture of himself, to place himself in a given situation, another person has a right to finish that picture by exposing it to ridicule, if it be ridiculous; and by criticising upon the words which the author has made use of. If, therefore, you think this is a criticism of the work of this author, and of the author himself, as far as he is connected with the work only, and not written by way of calumny upon him as an individual; I am of opinion that this action is not maintainable. But if you are of opinion, that this work is written against this author, as a man, and unconnected with his work, then, my opinion is, that the action is maintainable. We do not find, that there is any charge here on account of the work being anonymous. In a word, if you are satisfied, that this criticism is levelled at the plaintiff's work, and at the plaintiff himself, only, as he is connected with, and embodied in, the work, I am of opinion that he must take the consequences of it; and, indeed, it does not appear to have done any material injury.

the apparent sense of the criticism, who considered the criticism so extremely clever, that after having read it, and the work to which it referred, chapter by chapter, he says, "I should have bought the one, but for the other;" which is equivalent to his having said, that he thought the volume, to which the criticism referred, not worth buying; and, if you think so, gentlemen, you will find a verdict for the defendants.

One of the Jury—Is there any thing in the defendants' book of a libellous tendency, by way of personal attack on the character of the plaintiff, unconnected with his publications?

Lord Ellenborough.—Something has been referred to of that kind; but nothing has been laid before us in proof of it. The plaintiff appears to be placed in a ridiculous situation, in a groupe of figures. He might have been so described by words. If any thing had been said of this plaintiff reflecting on his character, unconnected with this book, I should have told you that, in my opinion, it would have been a libel, but we have no proof of that.

One of the Jury.—If it be contended, that there is any personal reflection upon the plaintiff, in this book, unconnected with his writings, we must go through the contents of it.

Lord Ellenborough.—We have no proof that there is.

The jury without a minute's consultation, returned a—**VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANTS.**

Lord Ellenborough.—I hope nobody will understand, from the result of this trial, that there is the least countenance given to slander nor to ridicule any author, any more than any other individual, *unless such ridicule be connected with his works, and the author is embodied with his work*, for courts of justice are as tender of the moral characters of all men, whether they be authors or not, as they are firm in maintenance of the right of every individual, to give a free opinion, on every publication of a literary work.

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

SIR;—You very rightly estimated the feelings of the author of the *Aegis*, when you concluded that the events in Spain, (which have shewn how a nation is to be defended, and how Europe is to be delivered) as proving that the principles laid down in that work, were the principles of nature

and reason. These feelings are the more justifying, inasmuch as he shall confess that he had not contemplated Spain, as the country in which a successful resistance to France was most likely to originate. The great aim of his essay was to awaken his own country to a sense of her danger, in trusting her defence too much to a standing army, as well as to the excess of her independence, and even criminal indifference, in suffering her ministers and parliament to waste, in respect of aiming, the clear principles of the constitution, without remonstrance, or expostulation. Those of our statesmen who talked of armed citizens being only "depositories of panic," and of an organised population being to a regular army of invaders "an unresisting medium," may now feel that they have errors to acknowledge, but the author of the *Aegis* is well content with the Spanish illustration of his English text—It is not a little to his purpose that, prior to the fall of the Spanish Bourbons, and the Prince of the Peace, the armies of Spain had never been held up to us as models, formed in the school of the great Frederick, that the Corsican had artfully drawn the flower of the Spanish army, such as it was, out of the country, and employed it in the north of Europe; and that with his influence at Madrid, we may be sure that that army had, for a considerable time past, been neglected as much as possible. We knew not, indeed, any thing of its strength; but have seen no evidences of its having been considerable. It has been stated to us, that Castanos himself was at first only at the head of 3 or 4,000 men; and, either in postscript or a note to the letter of our own commissioner, Capt. Whittingham, reporting the surrender of Dupont and Weill, we were told that "one half" of the Spaniards were "peasantry." Be that, however, as it may, we have grounds for understanding, that a junction of the English force of 6,000 men under Gen. Spencer was offered, but declined by Castanos, who felt justly confident of his strength, when we know the firm and dignified conduct of the Spaniards, in declining English assistance for reducing the French fleet at Cadiz, our private intelligence respecting a similar conduct in the other case becomes the more credible. Had Spain been provided with a regular force, in any degree considerable, a place of such importance as Saragossa could not have been wholly without them; and yet Palafox, Captain General of Arragon, in his letter

to the council of Castile after the retreat of the French from Madrid, expressly says: "Regarding myself, I have been more critically situated than any other commander, being *without a single soldier*, and placed within immediate reach of the enemy, from my proximity to his frontiers, and liable to be attacked from Catalonia, Castile, and Navarre."—Although Spain, so different from the cases of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, was completely taken by surprise; and had her country, from Pampluna to Cordova, absolutely in the power of French arms, and a French force also master of Cadiz, before she knew that Napoleon was her enemy; yet, to her immortal honour, we hear but of one instance of the armed population, which of course had been very hastily collected, giving way in battle; and even then the disaster produced no ill effect; the patriots soon rallied, and the French veterans were shortly after conquered and made prisoners. Even where the general was "without a single soldier," so far are we from hearing that his armed patriots were a mere "depository of pacific," that the French armies in their repeated attacks on Saragossa were uniformly repulsed with great slaughter; and Palafox was even able to make detachments "to Catalonia, Navarre, and other provinces," as he himself states. The French emperor indeed, like a certain English statesman, judging an armed population, to be "*an unresisting medium*" to his invincibles, directs his deputy usurper to proceed to Madrid, and very coolly appoints the time for his arrival; but, by the counter-march which was so precipitate, as barely to allow time for packing up the stolen regalia, it is probable those two great men, Napoleon and Mr. Windham, may by this time have changed their opinion, on the subject of "*an unresisting medium*." Very far am I indeed, from pretending to superior discernment; but, I lay claim to have pointed out ten years ago the *right* means of effecting "the deliverance of Europe;" my words were these: "Turning then to the *map*, we see Europe of a size to take care of herself; adverting to the *constitutions* of the governments which are opposed to each other, we know, that it is by alliance, not with the English treasury, but with their own degraded subjects, the courts of Austria, Germany, and Muscovy, may effectually withstand the arms of France. Whether the frontiers of the republic be marked by a Rhine, or a rivulet, it were in the way of hostility, equally impassable

to her, were but Germany a free and an "armed nation.*"

A stronger contrast, between the effect of right and of wrong principles of defence, than what we have witnessed in the north and the south, human history cannot afford. The instruction I hope, will not be thrown away upon us. Were the emperors Francis and Alexander, ruling over about sixty millions of the European population, to give their debased subjects real freedom, by the introduction of representative assemblies, like the cortes of Spain, or the house of commons of England, and were they likewise to organize what we call a *posse comitatus*, would not France be instantly stripped of all her terrors? Would she not then see sprung up around her from the south to the north of Europe, an adamant wall of warriors; a wall she could not pass; warriors she would have no stomach to provoke?—Could any longer kings or emperors tremble, when the Corsican lion put out a paw, or was heard to growl? And would they not then contemplate him with the same composure as we contemplate a caged lion in the tower? Would the licentious soldiery of France, half monkey half tyger, any longer scamper over all countries doing ridiculous mischief mingled with rapine and carnage, authors of human calamity, objects of human curses? Would her terrified tributaries any longer submit to her insufferable arrogance? Would any prince out of the pale of France thenceforth dare to play the tyrant? Would any people endure it? And would not the French themselves, too little sedate for teachers of liberty, then be taught it? The pillaging occupation of their armies gone, they would no longer feel the curse of conscription. Their vain-glorious humour no longer played upon to the torment of Europe, and their energies compressed within national limits, those energies might be expected to recoil upon the artful tyrant who has misapplied them, extorting from him that sober, solid liberty, of which his craft, aided by their vanity and vices, has hitherto defrauded them.

Such, Sir, I take to be the rational process for effecting Europe's deliverance; and as infallible as it is simple. On no other principles can it be effected. As to a mere balance of power between despots, to call that by the name of deliverance, would be a profanation of the faculty of speech by which we are distinguished from brutes. If on right principles we cannot be aiding in

extending true deliverance beyond the Pyrenees, let our country cease to mingle in the counsels of despotism; let her decline its pernicious alliance, let her not repeat her expensive follies, by joining in its corrupt and hateful projects, let us leave the weak and the wicked to fight themselves the battles of their own selfish ambition, claiming with warm affection to our virtues and giving them our best counsel and our best aid towards the establishment of their liberties.

Spain, having for her salvation snatched up her arms, has at this moment actual freedom. The mode of its preservation is simple. She has only to give permission to her arms bearing, by an organization of her population to that end, on the principles of an English posse comitatus, and to re-adopt her correct principles equally simple. These being the foundations on which her future liberties must stand, her first cortes ought to assemble under instructions from their constituents, to make these the primary objects of attention, is the fundamentals of their recovered constitution. Spain so acting, will have nothing to fear from France, although abutting upon her very soil and territory, all the way from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean sea, a distance (according to some maps) of nearly three hundred miles. Could this be the case with any despotic government so circumstanced, whose subjects felt no interest in its defence? But armed, free, and proud! and dependent, may Spain stand, despising the Corsican's utmost power, as much as she taunted his pettiness, and disdain his alliance. What she has to expect, should her arms and her freedom be again neglected, she well knows. With such an ally so strong in Europe, so rich in America, and with the command of the ocean, we may be well content. But we must recollect that England is only separated from France by a channel, which is a barrier, is more easily passed than the Pyrenees, and that, unless we have the counterweight with this ally the virtuous lists of emigration, in perfecting our own security through the medium of arms and liberty, we shall neither do our duty to them, nor to ourselves, nor to our posterity.

So acting, how could England and Spain be long without peace? And so continuing to act, must not such peace have in it the principle of permanence, whatever might be the conduct of other powers?

Should the despotic sovereigns be too void of intellect, and too much the tools of corrupt statesmen, to be capable of acting right, that ought not to induce us to act

wrong. If too inveterately despotical to make their people free, let them, say I, remain themselves the slaves of the Corsican! Not with my consent should in that case an English guinea be spent, nor a drop of English blood be shed, to better their condition. If too much of tyrants to give, for the sake of their own emancipation, freedom to their people, they deserve to be hurled from their thrones, and the sooner the better. Should that happen, their subjects might probably enough be roused, as the Spaniards have been, to assert their own rights. Lame and patient under the tyranny to which by habit they have submitted, French immobility and insolence might prove a snare for their phlegm, and provoke them to an overwhelming resistance, which must produce that deliverance of Europe, of which their contemptible sovereigns had been incapable.

The distinction between spurious and genuine wisdom, which is so beautifully inculcated in Scripture was never perhaps more conspicuous than in what we have witnessed, teaching Europe's deliverance. Sovereigns, statesmen, generals, and the sages of diplomacy having neither thought nor cared about honesty and morality, much less the liberties of mankind, and being confounded by the failure of their unnatural projects, are completely bewildered, but the moment it is taken up by a people, is a question of human right and human feeling, the mystery vanishes, and the practicality of the object with ease and certainty becomes manifest. This is one of those things which, although long hid from the wise and prudent, is now revealed to babes.

As expediently as could reasonably be expected, we call the provinces of Spain about forming a common junta, for giving union and consistence to measures for the common good, and times ever where tending also to the formation of one grand national cortes. But, recollecting what the sword has done for them they must never forget their obligations to it. Between defence by laws, and defence by the sword, there is this distinction: the former can be managed, and is best managed, by representatives, but the latter cannot. The nation which hires a soldiery to fight for it, gives itself matters instead of retaining servants. Legislation is the work of the few, selected for wisdom and honesty, and requires only periodical meetings in a single hall or chamber; but defence, whether against insurrection, rebellion, or invasion, is equally the business and the duty of all who are able

to use a weapon; and is not perfect, unless there be permanent and equal preparation at all times and in all places; according to the admirable principles of our *posse comitatus*. Every country must have arms and laws, that is, its sword and its parchments. If the parchments be stolen, the sword compels the robber to surrender them back: but when the sword is once stolen, the robber is sure to take the parchments also; and a government once become despotic, soon becomes weak. Always keeping in mind that the superior energy of the French army was the immediate effect of liberty, and was afterwards kept up by genius, feeding its vanity with victory after victory, over armies which had not a like energy, let us turn our attention to the states which France had to encounter. Had the feeblest of these, Prussia, been free, we may easily conceive, from what we have seen in Spain, that her repose would not have been disturbed; whereas, notwithstanding the high reputation of her troops, we have seen her conquered even before the enemy entered her territory; and that, by a force not consisting of one Frenchman to fifteen Prussians capable of bearing arms. To humble Austria, took only one man to twenty, of those which freedom would have brought into the field; as to reduce Russia herself to a condition so dependent that a saucy Frenchman, at St. Petersburg, was more like the prime minister of the Czar, than the ambassador of another state, did not require one French soldier to thirty fighting men of those Russians who were able to draw the sword. Such is the radical weakness of despotic governments!

While warring only with brother despots the Corsican, Sir, seems the very enchanter of a romance. He smites the pompous machinery of his foe, it is shivered to fragments, and he marches onward, as though none had opposed him. But the moment he meets armed freedom, he is constrained to halt, his enchantments fail, and victory, under whose guidance he had been the scourge of tyrants, now waves the banner of liberty in hostility, his legions are given to the edge of the sword, or to captivity, and himself to shame and anguish of soul; those very legions which had mowed down as stubble the regular defenders of despotic thrones become themselves stubble to embattled patriots. Thus the chains, with which the perfidious Corsican thought to have irrevocably bound to his footstool the Iberian nations, there to administer to his restless ambition, are suddenly snapped asunder, and the whole secret of Europe's deliverance is seen to be—*arms and liberty*;

—a secret, the earlier knowledge of which might have saved our country hundreds of millions, streams of blood, and no small mortification: and what must it not have saved to the suffering continent?

After the full light which the magnificent achievements of the Spanish patriots has cast on the questions of national defence and European deliverance, we must be curious to observe the future conduct of our own statesmen, relative to those objects. Will they be any better disposed than heretofore to a right system? Will they open their eyes to the truth? Or, will they obstinately shut them, and resist conviction, by still appearing ignorant that liberty is the proper motive, and arms in free hands the proper means? If they cannot shew that the former is not the right motive, and the latter not the right means, how can they avoid using their honest endeavours to reform the infamy of our elections, to purge the land of its abominable borough corruptions, and to renovate the ancient vigour of the constitution, in its *posse comitatus*?

Keeping in mind, that a balance of despotisms is not a deliverance of Europe, I hope that Englishmen will be no more taxed, for hiring emperors to fight in a cause, in which triumphant success would only rivet more closely the fetters of their own miserable subjects.—I remain your obedient servant,

J. CARTWRIGHT.

September 6, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

RUSSIANS IN FINLAND—*The following is extracted from one of the official Reports, describing the hideous Proceedings of the Russians in Finland. Dated Wasa, July 14, 1808.*

As soon as the Swedish troops were known to approach Wasa, the civil governor, Emine, and the commandant of the town, major-general Kuiper, as well as his deputy major Stegeman, decamped, so that major-general Demidoff had the command there during the engagement; when this was over, and the Swedish corps had retreated, the inhabitants, who had been exposed to all the horrors and mischief of a constant fire of musquetry and cannon, which killed and wounded many in their houses, expected some respite; but almost immediately after, general Demidoff gave orders to plunder the town; which was done in the most cruel and diabolical manner, under his personal direction and presence; and that of the civil governor Emine, and general Kuiper, who had returned, when they found that their army had retained posses-

sion of the place. These scenes of murder, wanton cruelty, and devastation, continued until the 30th of the same month, without the least intermission, except for a few hours, while lieut.-gen. Rajewski happened to stop in his way through the town, who expressed his utmost detestation at their conduct, and gave orders that the sacking and plundering of the town should cease; but he had no sooner left the town, than these murderous proceedings recommenced, and the soldiers divided themselves into larger and smaller bodies, and thus occupied the whole town. Their usual mode of proceeding was, to fire a volley of musquetry through the windows of the houses, and then to rush in, and with the bayonet destroy whoever was to be found that had not time, or could not hide themselves in the cellars, under straw or in the barns, outhouses, lofts, or garrets, and afterwards to plunder and carry away whatever was of any value.—All windows, furniture, china, glassware, and every article that could not be removed to answer any of their purposes, were broken and utterly destroyed, and all this under the eye and presence of the officers, who went about, and encouraged them, calling out *dobra* (bravo), *varuscho* (charming). No distinction whatever was made as to churches or a hovel, between the highest or lowest of the people; ladies of distinction, women and children of all sorts, the sick and wounded, the aged and prisoners of war, all fared alike, all were treated in the most inhuman, cruel, and detestable manner, and all were plundered. The supplications, upon their knees, with tears and intreaties, of many of the most respectable ladies in the town, to obtain safeguards, was treated by that worse than wild tyger gen. Demidoff, and that complete monster in human form, governor Fimine, who were galloping through the streets to give vigour and activity to the havoc and devastations carried on by the soldiers, with a broad grin of contempt, or the most brutal conduct, and at best with unmanly threatenings, "that if they ventured to say a word, the town should be burned, and levelled with the earth."—As a barefaced excuse for these cruelties, and for this irreverence to the Swedish nation, the Russian commander alledged that some of the inhabitants of the town had fired from their houses on the Russian troops—an accusation equally false and ungrounded as the report circulated by some evil-minded persons, that the inhabitants of the town had fired from the windows on the Swedish troops. All weapons in the town and belonging to private persons were long before

taken from the inhabitants, so that none of them had a single fire arm left.—In the country about the town, the conduct of the enemy was no less cruel and barbarous; they plundered and burned villages, destroyed fields and meadows; insulted the unhappy inhabitants; inconsolable widows and mourning children; fathers, sons, brothers, and friends, carried away and punished in the most abominable manner; grief, lamentation, misery, and despair, and the town itself, formerly so flourishing, now plundered, are the first objects that present themselves to the traveller, and inform him by what sort of enemy these places have been visited.—I. E. VON SCHOLTZ.—Dep. Id. lieut. of the county of Wasa.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation by the Commanders in Chief of his Britannic Majesty's Forces, employed to assist the loyal Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Portugal. Dated Lameo, Aug. 4.*

People of Portugal!—The time is arrived to rescue your country, and to restore the government to your lawful prince. His Britannic majesty, our most gracious king and master, has, in compliance with the wishes and ardent supplications for succour from all parts of Portugal, sent to your aid a British army, directed to co-operate with his fleet already on your coasts.—The English soldiers who land upon your shores, do so with equal sentiments of friendship, faith, and honour.—The glorious struggle in which you are engaged is for all that is dear to man, the protection of your wives and children, the restoration of your lawful prince, the independence, nay, very existence, of your kingdom, and for the preservation of your holy religion: objects like these can only be attained by distinguished examples of fortitude and constancy.—The noble struggle against the tyranny and usurpation of France will be jointly maintained by Portugal, Spain, and England, and in contributing to the success of a cause so just and glorious, the views of his Britannic majesty are the same as those by which you are yourselves animated. (Signed) CHARLES COTTON.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Proclamation of the General commanding the Portuguese Army, to the Soldiers of the French Army in Portugal.

Soldiers of the French army! The moment is now arrived to speak openly to those who hitherto have refused to listen to the language of reason. Open your eyes, Soldiers, to the deep abyss of evils which have grown under your feet, through the foolish ambition of your emperor, the un-

policy, the avarice, the sanguinary barbarity, of your generals. Listen to the voice, the cry of an army which has proved a man may be a soldier, and yet humane; that in the same heart may be united the most intrepid bravery, with religion and morality. What do you hope for from the Portuguese armies, the brave English, or the high-spirited Spaniards, our dear allies, sworn enemies to your government, which, with the greatest atrocity has outraged the one and persecuted the other! To forge chains for your country, or to perish in the field of battle. What a frightful alternative! It is nevertheless your fate; but an allied and betrayed prince! but an hospitable and pillaged people! but a pacific and assassinated nation, demand our vengeance! There remains but one way of avoiding so cruel a calamity! Abandon your colours, come and join our army. If you do so in the name of the prince and in the name of the people, I promise, that you shall be treated as friends, and that you shall one day have the pleasure of returning to your friends and to your families, who are distracted with grief at having lost you. The advice can neither be considered as contrary to honour or duty, if it is properly understood. But, soldiers, if there be any among you who are so insensible to the sweet emotions of religion and humanity, that they will not leave their posts—(such monsters are at least a heavy burden to the universe)—they are well worthy of the cause they defend, and the recompence that awaits them. Soldiers, make your determination while you have an opportunity—ours is made. Dated at the Head-quarters of the Portuguese Army, Aug. 10, 1808. (Signed) BERNARDIM. FARIRE D'ANDRADE.

VICTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL.—From the *London Gazette Extraordinary*, concluded from page 416.

Lieut. col. G. Tucker, and lieut. col. Bathurst, and the officers in the departments of the adjutant and quarter-master-general, and lieut. col. Torrens, and the officers of my personal staff, rendered me the greatest assistance throughout the action—I have the honour, &c.—(Signed) A. W. WELLESLEY.

N. B. Since writing the above, I have been informed that a French gen. officer, supposed to be gen. Thebault, the chief of the staff, has been found dead upon the field of battle. A. W.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General the right hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K. B. on the 21st of August, 1808.—Head quarters, Fmiera,

Gen. Staff, 1 capt. wounded.—Royal artillery, 2 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded.—Royal engineers, 1 lieut. missing.—20th light dragoons, 1 lieut. col. 19 rank and file, 30 horses, killed; 2 serjeants, 22 rank and file, 10 horses, wounded; 1 capt. 1 drummer, 9 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

1st brigade, major-gen. Hill.—5th foot, none killed or wounded.—9th foot, none killed or wounded.—38th foot, none killed or wounded.

2d brigade, major-gen. Ferguson.—36th foot, 7 rank and file killed; 1 capt. 3 lieuts., 1 ensign, 1 staff, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 34 rank and file wounded; 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file missing.—40th foot, 6 rank and file killed; 1 capt. 1 lieut. 2 serjeants, 28 rank and file wounded; 6 rank and file missing.—71st foot, 12 rank and file killed; 2 capt. 4 lieuts. 1 ensign, 1 staff, 6 serjeants, 56 rank and file wounded.

3d brigade, brig. gen. Nightingale.—29th foot, 2 rank and file killed; 1 cap. 1 serjeant, 10 rank and file wounded.—82d foot, 1 lieut. 7 rank and file killed; 2 serjeants, 51 rank and file wounded.

4th brigade, brig. gen. Bowes.—6th foot, none killed or wounded.—32d foot, none killed or wounded.

5th brigade, brig. gen. Craufurd.—45th foot, none killed or wounded.—91st foot, none killed or wounded.

6th brigade, brig. gen. Fane.—30th foot, 1 capt. 1 serjeant, 18 rank and file killed; 1 major, 3 lieuts. 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 61 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—5th bat. 60th foot, 14 rank and file killed; 2 lieuts. 1 serjeant, 31 rank and file wounded; 10 rank and file missing.—2d bat. 95th foot; 1 serjeant, 5 rank and file, killed; 1 ensign, 13 rank and file wounded; 3 rank and file missing.

7th brigade, brig. gen. Anstruther.—2d bat. 9th foot, 3 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, 14 rank and file wounded.—2d bat. 43d foot, 1 serjeant, 26 rank and file killed; 1 major, 3 lieuts. 5 serjeants, 2 drummers, 68 rank and file wounded; 1 drummer, 12 rank and file missing.—2d bat. 52d foot, 3 rank and file killed, 1 lieut. 2 serjeants, 31 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—97th foot, 4 rank and file killed; 1 major, 1 lieut. 2 serjeants, 14 rank and file wounded.

8th brigade, brig. gen. Ackland.—2d or queen's, 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file wounded.—20th foot, 1 lieut. killed; 1 lieut. 5 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—Royal staff corps, none killed or wounded.

Total, 1 lieut. col. 1 capt. 2 lieuts. 3

serjeants, 128 rank and file, 30 horses, killed; 3 majors, 10 capt. 19 lieuts. 3 ensigns, 2 staff, 27 serjeants, 4 drummers, 466 rank and file, 12 horses, wounded; 1 capt. 1 lieut. 1 serjeant, 2 drummers, 46 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, on the 21st of August, 1808.—

Gen. Staff, capt. Hardinge, of the 57th foot, deputy assistant quarter-master-general, wounded. — Royal engineers, first lieut. Wells, missing. — 20th light dragoons, lieut. col. Taylor killed; capt. Eustace missing. — 20th foot, lieut. Brooke killed; lieut. Hogg wounded. — 29th foot, brig. major A. Crough wounded. — 36th foot, capt. Herbert slightly wounded; lieut. Hart, Lought, and Edwards, slightly wounded; ensign Bosell slightly wounded; lieut. and adjutant Poveah severely wounded. — 40th foot, capt. Smith slightly wounded; lieut. Frankley slightly wounded. — 43d foot, major Hearne wounded; capt. Ferguson, Brock, and Haverfield wounded; lieut. Madden wounded; ensign Wilson wounded. — 50th foot, capt. A. G. Cooke killed; major C. Hill wounded; lieuts. J. Kent, J. Wilson, and R. Way wounded. — 52d foot, capt. Ewart wounded; lieut. Bell wounded. — 60th foot, lieut. C. Kirk wounded; L. Reith wounded. — 71st, capt. A. Jones slightly wounded; major Mackenzie slightly wounded; lieut. J. D. Pratt severely wounded; lieuts. W. Hantley, R. Dudgeon, and A. S. McIntyre slightly wounded; ensign W. Campbell slightly wounded; acting adjutant R. McAlpine severely wounded. — 82d, lieut. R. Donkin, killed. — 95th, lieut. Pratt, wounded; ensign W. Cox, wounded. — 97th, major J. Wilson wounded; lieut. E. Kettlewell wounded.

Abstract of the above return — 4 officers killed, 37 officers wounded, 2 officers missing, 3 non-commissioned officers and drummers killed, 31 non-commissioned officers and drummers wounded, 3 non-commissioned officers and drummers missing, 128 rank and file killed, 466 rank and file wounded, 46 rank and file missing; 43 horses killed, wounded, and missing. — Total officers, non-commissioned officers and drummers, rank and file, and horses, killed, wounded, and missing, 783. — G. B. TUCKER, Dep. Adj. Gen.

Return of Ordnance and Ammunition taken in the Action of the 21st instant — 1 six-pounder, 4 four-pounders, 2 three-pounders, 4 five-and-half-inch howitzers. 2 ammunition waggons, 21 Portuguese ammunition cars, 40 horses. 4 mules. — The above is only the number already received in the park: but, from several accounts, there are eight more

taken from the enemy. The ammunition waggons and cars contain a portion of powder, shells, and stores of all descriptions, and about twenty thousand pounds of musket ammunition. — W. ROBE, Lt. Col. commanding Royal Artillery.

SPANISH REVOLUTION. — (Continued from p. 405.) — *Official Account of the Surrender of General Dupont. Dated Baylen, July 22, 1808.*

To His Excellency Don F. H. Castanos, Commander in Chief of the Army of Andalusia.

Most Excellent Sir, — Subsequently to the dispatch which I had the honour to transmit to your excellency, on the 17th inst. relative to the attack made by the division under my command, on that of Gen. Gohert (killed in the action), which was dislodged from all the positions it had occupied, as far as the proximity of Baylen, and completely defeated, and to the motives which had induced me to fall back on Merjibar, I re-passed on the evening of the same day the river of Guadalequivir, and took a position on that night, in which I was joined next morning on the 18th by the second division under the command of the Camp-Marshal the Marquis de Compigny. We jointly broke up for that city, with a view to attack the enemy if he occupied it. — Immediately on my arrival, in compliance with your Excellency's orders, I disposed the columns of attack with a direction to Andujar; but at three o'clock in the morning of the 19th, and when our troops were forming for the march, Gen. Dupont, with his army, attacked our camps, and opened a fire with his artillery, in the hopes undoubtedly of taking us by surprise; but with the celerity of lightning, the troops of the different divisions, led on by their intrepid chiefs, rushed to all the points of attack, assisted by artillery; the shock was so vehement, that the first company of horse, and also foot, suffered greatly from the enemy. At the break of day our troops were already in possession of the heights, which they had occupied before, and the enemy attempted his attack on various parts of the line, having the advantage of forming his columns under the cover of our fire, by the superior position he occupied, under protection of his artillery — He has been driven from all points, and even pursued in defiance of all his vigorous attacks, which he reiterated without any further interruption than what arose from occasional recession and the formation of new columns, until half-past twelve o'clock of the day,

when, overcome by fatigue, without having been able to gain ground, although he had at intervals broke our lines of defence with the courage peculiar to troops so accustomed to vanquish, and even arrived at our batteries, which were served on this day in a manner that astonished and terrified the enemy, and of which there are few parallel instances, as they not only instantaneously dismounted his whole artillery, but annihilated every column in measure as they presented themselves, still protecting the points attached, and varying its positions according to the exigency of circumstances.—The first attack was made by Gen. Dupont, who, with the other generals, placed himself at the head of the column, under the fire of the artillery, and was sustained with a firmness truly admirable, but with no better success, for by the account on the enemy, he had fourteen guns dismounted, two thousand men killed, and a vast number wounded, among whom are Gen. Dupont himself, with two other generals.—Under such circumstances Gen. Dupont begged to capitulate. Hostilities were accordingly suspended in both armies and it was stipulated that each should maintain its respective position. The fruits of the valour and perseverance of the generous troops that compose these two divisions, are the total rout of the enemy, the army of Dupont being made prisoners, and that of Wedel being subjected to the same fate, without any other distinction than that of the latter receiving their arms at the time of their embarkation only, for having taken position against military law, during the suspension of arms conceded to him and to his commander-in-chief.—The camp-marshal marquis de Compigny, chief of the second division, has not only, in concert with me in the direction of the movements of this day, contributed to their successful termination, but having selected the corps of which I have made mention, he led them in person to the hottest points of the three general attacks, and secured by his judgment and gallant example the said happy result.—Brig. Gen. Don Francisco Benegas, chief of the van of my division, placed on my right wing, disposed with skill, and much presence of mind, the proper corps and artillery on all the points attacked by the enemy, and ably contributed to repel him in all his partial successive attacks, as well as in the last general and obstinate one, by which he attempted to turn the said wing, at the same time that he was attacking the centre.—[The remainder of this document is merely recommendatory of the

regiments and individuals who distinguished themselves on the occasion.]—(Signed) REDING.

Letter from the Most Illustrious Senor Don Raphael Thomas, Bishop of Santander, and Regent of the Province of the Montañas, to the right hon. Lord Castlereagh, Principal Secretary of State to his Britannic Majesty. Dated Cumillas, near Santander, July 23, 1808.

My Lord;—Having been appointed regent of the province of Santander, and president of the general assembly thereof, which, in the name of Ferdinand the seventh, governs and defends it against the invasion of the French, or rather against that monster of all monsters, Napoleon Buonaparte:—I feel the utmost satisfaction in having the honour in quality of regent, of manifesting to your excellency the high respect and sincere gratitude, which (in common with all this province) I owe to the magnanimous sovereign, of whom your excellency is deemed worthy to be minister, for the frank intercourse, and generous supplies, tendered by the British nation to this province, by major Roche, in his majesty's name.—Nothing can contribute more strongly to cement the harmony and amicable intercourse which happily now exists between both nations, than such generous conduct: or can contribute more effectually to shake off the oppression which Spain labours under, owing to the artful intrigues of that infamous chief of robbers, assisted by our ancient bad government.—It will be a source of infinite gratification to me, and to every good Spaniard, to see a cordial and reciprocal good understanding established between Great Britain and this country.—I beg leave to repeat, my lord, my best acknowledgements for what has already happily taken place, and to express my hopes that your excellency will encourage, by such means as shall appear most expedient, a commercial intercourse between both nations, under the protection of a British flag; and here I owe it, in justice to the commanders of his majesty's ships upon this station, to say, that they have the strongest claims to our esteem, for having shewn every disposition to promote the intentions of the British government; but, more particularly, I beg to have the honour of recommending to your excellency's notice major Roche, whose exertions in fulfilling his majesty's gracious and generous views towards this country, have been unremitting—and who, in this frequent intercourse I have had with him, has conducted himself entirely to my wishes.—Accept, my lord, the assurances of my

gratitude, respect, and consideration: and may the Almighty prosper all your excellency's undertakings!—**RAPHAEL THOMAS.**

Flight of King Joseph. From the Oviedo Gazette Extraordinary.

Madrid, Aug. 2.—On the 20th ult. about four o'clock in the evening, it was reported that Joseph Napoleon was marching, and that all the troops in the city were following him. This report was confirmed by the movements made by the French milliners and all those of that nation who did not belong to the army. The same evening they withdrew from the hospitals, and conducted to Retiro all the infantry soldiers. They put in requisition all the carriages and horses that could be found, and the troops prepared to march. In fact, that very night and on the morning of the 30th, a greater part of the army, the sick, milliners, tradespeople, &c. of the French nation set out. On the whole day of the 30th, there followed preparations for the march of Joseph and the remainder of the army. He dined at half past four in the afternoon in order to proceed, in the dusk, to the town of Chamartin. The carriages were harnessed and repaired to the count of the palace, the coachman and mule-drivers, and the attendants of the royal carriages had appeared! On which account Joseph could not depart that night, and was obliged to suspend his journey to the morning of the 31st, when he departed on horseback, as he was unable to put the carriages in motion. The same morning he took from the stables all the mules, horses, and harness, and shamefully sold all at the lowest price. In the evening of the same day, they forced open the gates of the public treasury and bank, putting the people in such terror, that we passed a most anxious night, thinking that a general pillage was about to take place. They took from these buildings above fourteen millions. At two in the morning of the 1st instant was heard a cannonade, which, though at first it was taken for a fatal signal, was in fact but the precursor of the brightest and happiest day that ever rose over Madrid. On this signal all the guards were withdrawn, and all the French filed off towards the parade, whence they marched off. Scarcely did day appear, when all the people ran through the streets, and the posts of the guards, but nothing was to be found. They passed to the Retiro, and there they found only a few dying wretches, and here and there a dead body. They beheld with amazement, the ditches, palisades, and terrible batteries, directed against this city. The gun-carriages were in flames, above 70 cannon were spiked, and about

2000 barrels of powder thrown into a large pond. The inhabitants of Madrid, on seeing themselves delivered from this destructive apparatus, gave thanks to the Supreme Being, and immediately began to assume for their badge, the portrait of Ferdinand VII.

Madrid, Aug. 6.—Yesterday the junta of council and alcaldes of the court, ordered that every one, from the age of 16 to 50, should immediately enlist and take up arms; but we are assured that this order will not be put in force, owing to the arrival of two aids-de-camp from General Castanos; and to-morrow a *Te Deum* is to be sung. It seems the French have taken the road to Navarre: and besides having put their mules and horses to feed on our corn, they have burned all the Indian corn, and sacked the towns. This is the manner in which these ungrateful wretches have repaid us for the reception they got from us; but this ought not to astonish us, as they do not regard the welfare of their own nation. A well-known milliner, in this city, sought the protection of her own countrymen, and proceeded with the army, carrying with her many millions, the fruit of the ridiculous Spanish taste for French fashions; but on the road her protectors robbed her, violated her person, and afterwards murdered her! A party of Andalusian smugglers who left this place in pursuit of the French, were fortunate enough to overtake some sutlers that were with the army, and took from them 700,000 reals with other effects. Two close coaches entered here, and went immediately to the new palace, where they left the equipage that they were conducting. They went afterwards to the jail of this city, where they lodged the people that were in the carriages, without our being able to know to this moment who they were.

Madrid, Aug. 10.—The armies of Valencia and Arragon entered this city yesterday. They came with the intention of driving out the French, and have now followed them towards the frontiers. All the troops that were in the garrison have accompanied them, so that the police of this city is now carried on by the inhabitants, from which duty no one is exempt, not even the ecclesiastics.—An enlistment has been ordered, comprizing all males between the ages of 15 and 50, without any exception.—The 24th will be a grand day in this capital and its vicinity, for on that day Ferdinand the VIIth will be proclaimed here and at Toledo.

Madrid Gazette Extraordinary.

This was published in consequence of

tumults taking place after the departure of the French. We can only give the substance. It is signed by the governor Don Bartolome Munoz. It commences with an animated appeal to the Castilian character, and beseeches the people, at a moment when Fame is publishing the glorious victories of their brother Patriots over the invincibles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, not to stain the reputation of the country by disturbances. It then proceeds.—“The fate of the innocent victims of the 2d May, whose blood is still streaming on our ground, ought to warn us. The infamous perpetrator has escaped us (Murit), but the vengeance of Heaven will overtake him.”—The gazette concludes with orders for raising men in the different parishes, and regulations of much energy connected with this measure. It enacts that an alcade shall, with a notary, go round each parish, and in each enter the names of those who may voluntarily enlist, specifying their age and occupation, their wish either for the infantry or cavalry, what description of arms they may be in possession of, and whether they undertake to subsist themselves, or den and pay. Those who do not proffer personal service, are to specify whether they will undertake to supply arms, money, or clothing. It is, however, intimated, that if the country shall want their services, all from the age of 15 to 50 shall be enlisted without regard to their consent or refusal. Such persons as have already been in the army, are to specify whether they are incapable of further service, and the rank they formerly held.

*His Excellency Don Gregorio De La Cuesta
To the Junta of Salamanca.*

Excellent Sir! The general directorcy of the port of Madrid has under yesterday's date communicated to me by express, that on the 30th of July a considerable stir was observed among the French troops in the capital, amounting to 22,000 men, which announced a general retreat, which is attributed to the disturbances in their government, and to the notice which they had received of the capitulation of their army in Andalusia under the command of general Dupont. Within 61 hours of their having been apprised of such event, they have effected their departure from the capital, with all the sick that were able to follow together with all the French natives resident in Madrid; so that the capital has been completely freed of all Frenchmen, of whatever character or description: Even the last division passed, on the first, by the Inn de Pesadilla, distant four leagues from the court. Their march will be slow, on ac-

count of the immensity of baggage and incumbrances, arising chiefly from the spoliation of his majesty's palaces and the town, which they have plundered, as well as the general treasury and treasury of consolidation.—GREGORIO DE LA CUESTA.—Quarters general at Munoz, Aug. 5d 1808.

Trait of Generosity of an Englishman.

Letter addressed to Messrs. Don Channel, Benito de Cannedo, and Don Felix Gonzalez Pola, citizens at this royal consulate of Corunna:—Corunna, August 10.—Gentlemen,—You will be pleased to receive, and deliver in my name, the sum of reals Veillon 45,170:17 to the supreme Junta of this kingdom, in order to the same being employed as they, together with the existing authorities in Spain, which have formed a common cause against France, shall best direct. I have the honour to be, &c. FREDERIC GRELLOT, of London.

Circular Letter transmitted by the Council of Castile to the several provincial Governments of the Country, dated Madrid, Aug 4.

Excellent Signer;—Madrid, which has groaned during more than four months under the heavy and irresistible yoke of the French army, begins to breathe again, through an especial interference of Divine Providence; and the council which could not fail to be involved in a great degree in the consequences of this subjection, avails itself of the first moments of its liberty to state its sentiments to your excellency. It is certain, that these cannot but correspond with the immutable loyalty and the indelible love of justice and reason which always constituted its character, and have gained it in all times the confidence of the nation. It is this which has supported them in the midst of the greatest dangers, and added firmness to the constancy with which they refused to recognise the king whom the most monstrous perfidy had designated from them, further, perhaps, than circumstances justified. The supreme tribunal does not

doubt that your excellency will be convinced of this truth, as well as of the sincerity with which it has now the felicity to be able openly to avow, that firm resolution which it had always kept, to support with all its power its lawful sovereign and his rights, and those of the nation, as declared by the law. The sentiments and desires of the most faithful city are the same, and the council submits them to the general judgment of the nation. At the same time, that it carries into effect all the means which the present critical circumstances permit, it will adopt, in conjunction with you, the plain and measures of defence which may be prac-

ticable—weak and insufficient, certainly, as its own resources are without the prompt and efficacious aid which it promises itself from your excellency.—With respect to the measures of another kind which without doubt will be necessary for the salvation of the country, and its elevation to that rank to which it rose in the times of its prosperity, it belongs to the council merely to rouse and

prities of the nation, with which it will co-operate by contributing for the general welfare, its influence, its counsel, and its knowledge. As it is not possible to adopt, under the present extraordinary circumstances, the expedients pointed out by the laws and customs of the nation, the council will not occasion delay by elaborately suggesting what might perhaps be the fit means of fixing the representation, and ascertaining the opinion of the nation; and confines itself for the present to the indication of a measure in which it would concur with the greatest satisfaction, viz.—that your excellency would be pleased to send, with the greatest dispatch, deputies who enjoy your entire confidence, and who, acting in concert with the persons named by the Juntas of the other provinces and the council, might confer on this most important object, making such arrangements that all projects and expedients proceeding from this common centre may be as expeditious as the end to be attained may require.—Your excellency has displayed such striking proofs of your constant attachment to the king whom Providence has given us, and of your ardent zeal for the honour and fidelity of the nation, that the council cannot but expect with entire confidence, that your sentiments will concur with those of the other provincial Juntas, to whom it has this day transmitted the present manifesto: and that you will continue to evince the same solicitude and zeal you have hitherto shewn, as well in dispatching to the council and capital the prompt aid of troops, which will shelter them from fresh oppression, as in uniting the aid of your authority and ability—that of his supreme council, in concerting measures for the defence of the whole nation. May God preserve your excellency many years!

Proclamation of the Council of Castile, to the People of Madrid, on the Departure of the French.—Aug. 5.

Generous and worthy people of the capital of Spain! The council addresses you, and before it states its sentiments to you, it asks—are you capable of availing yourselves of the misfortunes of your country in the critical state in which it now is, to perturb

its tranquillity, and add to the calamities of its situation? Your noble conduct corresponds, as might be expected, with the valour and virtue which form your character. The council rejoices that you follow the advice it formerly gave you, and that you trust in its paternal solicitude. Continue, faithful Spaniards, to be calm, that the worthy chief, and the magistrates who preside over you, may meet all the dangers which can occur, and fulfil with exactness all their obligations. When fame admires and publishes the victories of our valiant countrymen over the invincibles of Muego, Austerlitz, and Jena, it is not possible that you could commit the shameful act of warning yourselves by the conflagration of their houses and effects. Such actions would fill with horror the virtuous armies which are surrounding us for our protection. They have left their properties to defend ours; they have abandoned their hearths, and been lavish of their lives, because they would not endure the slavery of our good king, and the death of the monarchy; and it is through their efforts only that we are free from a perfidious enemy who persecuted us. We are not so perfidious (you will answer), that while they are approaching, covered with glory and the blood of the enemy, we should forget our obligations, and occupy ourselves solely in judging arbitrarily of the fidelity and conduct of our fellow countrymen. This is the language of honour, which characterizes you: do not forget it. Yes! it is the malevolent, who cover their depredations, their conflagrations, and their homicides, on such mournful occasions, with the pretext of justice, without reflecting, that it is not lawful for any one to be, of his own authority, the administrator of justice. The supreme tribunal assures you, that if there have been among us any traitors to their sovereign and their country, it will avenge their crimes, and if they merit it, cast them away, as unworthy of the name of Spaniards. Judge no one, for that renders you liable to sacrifice many innocent. Adore Divine Providence, which has known how to humble in an instant the proud, and which will as little suffer to remain unpunished incendiarious and assassins.—Worthy citizens! good men! and true patriots! Arm yourselves against the iniquity of those who purpose to grow rich with your property, the price of the sweat of your brows. The council watches for your safety. Lend them aid, and rebuke those who assume the false title of neighbours, but are mere vagabonds, who, flying from before their own magistrates, conceal

their vices amid the confusion of the capital. Already your victorious countrymen are near, crowned with laurels, which will not fade in the course of future ages. All Europe has been surprised at the progress of their rapid victories. Arragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, La Mancha, Estramadura, Murcia, Carthagea, Castile, Leon, Asturias, Santandur, and Galicia, have shed around them never fading glory. Already they have raised numerous armies; already they have defended the principal points of Spain; already they have secured the chief maritime ports, and captured ships and squadrons at Carthagea. We owe all to God, and our Lady, the Virgin, who have protected our cause. Let us, therefore, cast off our lethargy, and purify our manners, which were arrived almost at the pitch of complete corruption. Let us acknowledge the calamities which the kingdom and this great capital have endured, as a punishment necessary for our correction. The innocent victims, whose blood has streamed from their native soil, have implored forgiveness for us. The one immortal and omnipotent God of armies has heard their supplications, and is appeased. Will it be just that we should now commit new abominations, robberies, insurrections, and excesses? There cannot be a being of so great ingratitude as to think this. Unite, virtuous Spaniards, to receive, as soon as possible, the reward of your heroic fidelity. —The government, and the faithful provinces, will be filled with joy, when the council exhibits before you and all Europe the constant firmness with which the men of honour, the most elevated nobility, the superior tribunals, and the chiefs of the nation, have sustained your cause, and the rights of the throne. Not a few individuals among them have been led by fraud and force far beyond the limits of Spain; and, though without liberty, and exposed to the severest insults, they have proved the inflexibility of their loyalty, and the religious purity of their opinions. Distrust even their signatures, which have been circulated among you, and wait with patience for the testimonies of their conduct. The principal author of these calamities is free, and beyond your jurisdiction; but heaven will not permit him to remain unpunished. —And you, ye victorious armies of Spain! fly and protect this capital which longs for you. Till then it has no other defence, than in the heart of the kingdom, and the recent departure of the enemy. Let us together prostrate ourselves before the sacred altars of our God, and return him thanks for his wonderful mercy. Here your fathers, your mothers, your brothers, and your friends,

await you, to embrace you, and proclaim you our deliverers. O how happy that day! how true that joy! Wipe away your tears, you disconsolate widows, and you wretched orphans, who have lost those whom you loved! Your fathers, and your faithful husbands, died in the field of honour, in the defence of their country; they perished, but their memory shall not perish. Here you will meet with generous and grateful souls, who will provide for your maintenance, as your husbands and fathers provided for theirs. The Spanish nobility are distinguished for their generosity and greatness of soul, and will not deny a debt as flattering as it is just. God grant that no evil-minded persons may frustrate, by their excesses and rapine, such laudable intentions, and fill this city with lamentation and mourning. Worthy neighbours! it is for you we act: live in confidence that the council and all the magistrates of this capital will protect you, and will deliver over the guilty to the severest punishment. God grant that there be no occasion to draw the sword of justice; let it be employed against the enemies of the nation—against the oppressors of our liberty, and against those who, violating their promise, avail themselves of our defenceless state to sacrifice us. May it please Heaven to grant, speedily, the fulfilment of those desires which are engraved on the hearts of all Spaniards, and those of its council! —D. BARTOLOME MUNOZ.

Proclamation to the Biscayans.—Dated Bilbao, Aug. 6.

Noble Biscayans!—The bitter grief which oppressed your hearts, at seeing your native land threatened with the odious yoke of the most cruel slavery, has at length broken through the barriers which the irresistible force of circumstances had imposed upon you; yes, your sufferings are now at an end; and a generous youth, full of holy ardour, are flocking with eagerness to their standards.—You called for chiefs to command you; and you now see placed at your head men celebrated for their talents and military knowledge, who will conduct you as were by the hand to victory. The creation of a presiding junta, to direct your operations, has been one of the principal objects of your careful attention. Here you possess it, addressing you in the language of truth. —Inhabitants of Biscay! cast your eyes back on the ages which have passed, and you will see your ancestors at one time repulsing the Carthaginians; at another destroying the hosts of Rome; at one period was granted to them the honourable distinction of serving in the van of the army; at

mother, the privilege of citizens. Imitate the glorious examples of your so worthy progenitors.—Yet know that absolute subordination to your chief, and severity of discipline, are the first of martial virtues, without which none can present themselves with the hope of success in the plains of honour. The junta promises itself that you will possess them in an eminent degree.—Let the unholy voice of party passions for ever disappear from among you: and let the suggestions of envy hold no sway in your bosoms. No; let a perfect and indissoluble union reign among you. Your interests are the same—the sentiments which animate you alike—and the cause which you defend, common. Will you, therefore, seek to turn your force against your brethren and countrymen, and to give the victory to your enemies? Perish so disgraceful an idea! Let the liberty and property of individuals be most religiously respected, and let the province of Biscay preserve the purity of its customs, even in the midst of the din of arms.—Biscayans! The religion of your fathers, according to whose holy maxims you have been educated—the country to which you owe your existence—the Lord (or Sovereign) which the constitution and the laws have prescribed to you—these are the important objects which claim your attention, and oblige you to march out to the glorious conflict. Can you bear to be the victims of one man's ambition who has endeavoured to enslave all Europe? No; you were not born for slavery.—Hasten then to give the most undoubted proofs of your valour and patriotism, and rely upon all the assistance which the junta can afford you. May your temples be surrounded with laurels of victory, and your name be immortal in the annals of Biscay! (Signed) D. MATIAS HERRERO PRIETO D. JUAN J. SEPH DE YERMO. D. FRANCISCO BORJA URTADO DE CONQUEA, &c. D. JOSE XAVIER DE GOITIA, Secretary of the Junta: *Proclamation of our Holy Father Pope Pius VII. to the Catholic Spaniards.*

Beloved Children;—You who deplore at the foot of the altar the wounds given to religion—You who are still mindful that we form one people of brethren, join we, the vicar of Christ; approach ye families, the remnant of vast destruction, to the throne of my predecessors, to see me, like Daniel, surrounded by lions; preserved hitherto by the inscrutable designs of Providence—I see the vessel of St. Peter entrusted to my care, combated by the fierce apostate, whom myself have placed on the throne, and who, like a degenerate son, pants for the destruction of his mother, the

church, to whom he had sworn fidelity at her altar. But let us draw off the veil that covers so great iniquity. The first victim that was sacrificed to his ambition has been your shepherd. Rome, the centre of faith and the shield of religion, has been prostituted. The idol Dagon has been united to the cruel Antioch of our days to accomplish the destruction of religion, which is the great bar to his perfidious designs. However, do not despond. The successor of St. Peter is still extant, though overwhelmed with affliction; groaning under his chains, he lifts his eyes and tremulous hands to heaven, imploring incessantly the protection of the God of hosts over his flock!—Oh! the happy effects of religion! In this fatal situation, my soul, penetrated with Christian feelings, learns with transport and surprise, that Spain, happy Spain, has remained true to her religion and king. I hasten, my beloved children, to surmount the shackles by which I am depressed, to transmit to your kingdoms the circular that will testify to you of my gratitude. Arouse, and combat, like David, the imperious Goliath of our times.—Valorous Spaniards, sons of the church, come and break the chains of your shepherd. Already my heart assures me of your sensibility; do not tarry; raise the standard of faith; victory invites you; come then to your brothers in bondage. Raise your tents, and pursue the usurper of nations. Enter into the heart of his dominions, and follow him to the remotest limits of the earth. Shew to the nations of the North that oppression is in its agony, and let the Spanish sword strike the decisive blow on the guilty head. Compassionate the ill-fated kingdom of France, condole with its people; and they will assist you to overwhelm her traitorous tyrant. Oh, with what transport will the Catholic Ferdinand learn the intrepidity and heroic loyalty of his subjects! The strait situation to which he is, like myself, doomed, precludes the means to him of manifesting the sentiments of his magnanimous heart. I feel not the strength of saying more. If I survive the calamity, and you spill your blood for religion, your country and monarch, to whom I supplicate from heaven all happiness, the world shall be witness to my gratitude.

The Supreme Council of Castile to the Capt.

General of Aragon. — Aug. 4, 1808.

SIR—After having laboured for four successive months under the most grievous oppression, this capital has at last been so fortunate as to be liberated from the numerous French troops, which had invaded its precincts and vicinity. The council which

has groaned under their galling yoke, would deem itself wanting to its duty, if, accrediting you and your gallant companions in arms as the deliverers of the country, it did not hasten to manifest to you its satisfaction, and the sentiments with which it hath been constantly animated, and has the happiness to express at present. From the first moment of its liberation it has taken all the measures, that circumstances have allowed, to direct to the common cause, the loyalty and ardent vows of this faithful capital and its whole district; these however, for the present, will not be such as the zeal of the council and of this city would wish; they will be insufficient to the putting them free from fresh oppression.—The council doubts not but your excellency will coincide with them in this request, and contribute to the safety of the capital and its public departments, with all the efficacy in your power; and the illustrious proofs of zeal and conduct already most amply by you manifested are a sufficient assurance to them that you will adopt the means to the exigency of the circumstances.—To his excellency the Captain General of Arrogan, Don Joseph de Palafox y Melzi.—By command of the council.—ARIAS MON.

Answer of his Excellency the Captain General of Arragon, Don Joseph De Palafox y Melzi, to the Council of Castile.

The notification which you, under date of the 4th instant, have communicated to me in the name of the council, and of which I had already the knowledge, has afforded me the most heartfelt gratification. Considering that the inhabitants of the capital, who have endured the most intolerable vexation, owing to their loyal attachment to their sovereign, which will eternally redound to their honour, are now freed of their invaders, it gives alike to me, and to the good inhabitants of this kingdom universally, cause of happiness and exultation.—The unalterable integrity of the council, the dignity of its ministers, and the wise policy of which there has been ere now ample demonstration, has rendered that court respectable even abroad. In the melancholy circumstances in which Spain has been placed by the most unparalleled treachery recorded in history, this court has not fulfilled its duties; many of the individuals of which it was composed have most satisfactorily justified themselves, whilst others, perhaps allured by the seductive promises of the enemy, or enstained by the perversity of their disposition, have either remained irresolute,

or even taken part against their own country: of this I have had sufficient evidence; and to my inexpressible sorrow have I known them direct the operations of the enemy, and witnessed them approach with effrontery the walls of Saragossa, write inflammatory papers, and propagate doctrines dishonourable to the Spanish name.—I am aware that the council has not been at liberty to act freely, and that they have been constrained to serve only as organs of the dispositions of that execrable government; but the general will of the nation having once been expressed, it would have been highly important if they had transferred themselves to the provinces, and made common cause with them, were it only to withdraw their sanction from the circulation of the scandalous and deceptive writings which have made their appearance: and to this no insuperable obstacle appears to me to have stood in their way; or had there been any, the common interest and welfare of the nation ought at any rate to have risen paramount to every private speculation.—It is now nearly two months that this city has been encompassed by the enemy; by the baseness of whose conduct we discern that they make crime their study. To rapine, violence, turpitude, and iniquity, they have added ferocity, by sacrificing even infants—the sick and wounded; nay, their very benefactors. They have bombarded this heroic city in a cruel manner; and though their irruption into this kingdom has been well avenged, we have, nevertheless, not repulsed them without spilling the blood of many a brave and virtuous defender of the country, and without involving many others in distress. Regarding myself, I have been more critically situated than any other commander, being without one single soldier, and placed within immediate reach of the enemy, from my proximity to his frontiers, and liable to be attacked at once from Catalonia, Castile, and Navarre; but in despite of all, our love for king, country, and religion, has made me contemn all dangers, considering timidity and irresolution as tantamount to the greatest crime. I have spared some assistance to Catalonia, to Navarre, and other provinces, who have cheerfully acted with me, and claimed my protection, and I have happily been enabled to repel the enemy, which I trust shortly to put to flight, if any part of the wreck shall remain. Then I shall fly to the succour of the capital, if needful, which I request you to represent to the council for promulgation.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.—There is an irksomeness in beginning to write upon a subject, which has already been fully discussed, more especially when the whole of those, to whom one's remarks are addressed, have made up their minds upon it, and when there appears nothing to be offered in opposition to their opinion. Nevertheless, from the consideration, that the Register may be preserved, owing to its bookish form, somewhat longer than most of the other periodical publications of the political kind, I shall state my opinion of those transactions, which are recorded in the Government Gazette, inserted in another part of this sheet, and which have excited so general a feeling of dissatisfaction.—When we took that view of the situation of affairs in Portugal, which was exhibited to us in the official papers of Sir Arthur Wellesley (inserted at page 407 of this volume); when we beheld the prowess of our soldiers, in the battles, of which those papers speak; when we were told, that the French had, besides the advantage of a perfect knowledge of the country and of long preparation, the still greater advantage of an excellent position whence to make, or where to sustain, an attack; when we were told, just in so many words, that, “in this action, in which *the whole* “ of the French force in Portugal was employed under the command of the Duke “ of Abrantes in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and “ artillery, and in which not more than “ *half of the British army* was actually engaged, the French sustained a *signal defeat*, and lost thirteen pieces of cannon, “ twenty-three ammunition waggons, with “ powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, “ and twenty thousand rounds of musket “ ammunition.” When we were told all this, and were informed, that, immediately after this brilliant success, *our army was augmented to nearly double* what it had before been, we naturally expected, that, by the next arrival, seeing that the enemy could receive no supplies, either by land or by sea, we should be informed of his surrender at discretion.—Sir Arthur Wellesley's account has been praised for its *clearness*. I must confess, that I saw nothing like clearness in it. I saw no where any explicit

statement respecting the positive amount of the French force in Portugal. The way, in which I, were I a commander upon such an occasion, should proceed, would be this: The enemy had, in this country, such and such force; they were distributed thus and thus; my force was such and such, and thus and thus was it distributed. Then I should come to an account of my preliminary operations; next to a detail of the engagement; and should conclude with a view of the strength and situation of each party after the engagement. This is the course uniformly pursued by the French in their accounts of their military operations, which, in every quality, except that of falsehood, are well worthy of our imitation, but which, upon this occasion, we have, I am afraid, imitated in the exception and not in the rule.—From such an account, which is too confused to be readable were it not for the sake of the exhilarating substance, one cannot pretend to say what was the exact force of the French in Portugal. Those who have taken the pains to collect the fact from scraps, here and there dispersed, state the French force at fourteen thousand men previous to our attack of them, and at ten thousand men after that attack, which ended in a “signal defeat” on their part. Sir Arthur Wellesley's force was seventeen thousand men. He did not lose a thousand; and, since the battle, he has been joined by other generals and their troops, raising our army to the strength of *thirty thousand* men, or thereabouts.—Well, then, if it be true, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with only *nine* thousand men (the “*half*” of his army), beat “*the whole*” of the French force, in spite of all the advantages enjoyed by the former, of previous local familiarity, long preparation, open retreat, choice of position, and choice of the moment of attack; if this be true, had we not a right to expect, nay, had we not a right to claim and to demand at the hands of the commander in Portugal, when he had thirty thousand men, the capture, or the total destruction, of the remains of the French army in Portugal? Had we not a right to demand at his hands, the sending of Junot and his army prisoners of war to that England which they had so often threatened to invade, or the making of them foot for

crows and kites in the land of our ally which they had invaded and laid waste? I have never been eager to encourage the indulgence of sanguine expectations in the people; but, if any nation ever had a right to expect any thing, this nation had a right to expect a result such as I have described. —Instead of this, what have we? To go through the several articles of these, "*Conventions*," would be useless. To be fully sensible of the disgrace which they affix upon us, and of the lasting injury, which we, as well as our allies, must sustain from them, we have only to read them. They speak for themselves in a language too plain to be misunderstood. The short view of them is this: The French had an army in Portugal, which army, though completely masters of the country at first, had so plundered the people and had so outraged their feelings of every kind, that, at last, its situation became perilous, and that, too, at a time, when, from the unexpected resistance of Spain, it became next to impossible for it to receive supplies. We go to the commander of this army, having at our back a force three times as great as his, and having already beaten him with less than a third part of that force, and with him we agree to find shipping to carry him and his army to a place of convenience in France; to carry also, his artillery, his horses, his baggage, his immense plunder, and to take each man and gun so prepared with all requisites as to be able to begin a battle the moment they are landed, and even at sea; to take, lest his baggage or plunder should consist of immovable articles, the said articles in the way of purchase or exchange; to provide effectually for the security of the persons and property of all those, whether French or Portuguese, who may have taken part with the spoilers, therein engaging to use the forces (sent for the deliverance of Portugal and for the punishment of its plunderers) so as not only to secure impunity to every villain engaged in such plunder, but also to secure to him the legal possession and disposal of what he had thereby acquired, that is to say, if the house and goods of a faithful Portuguese have been confiscated and sold by the French to a traitor, to that traitor we guarantee the quiet enjoyment of such house and goods. Is not this the plain fact? Talk to us of the *surf*, and of the *equinox*. Why, if there had been a *mine* under you and the match lighted ready to blow you into the air, you might to have spurned at such conditions; conditions, which you have received at the hands of him whom you, in your bragging

bombast, call a vanquished enemy. Yet, this is not all. As if it were not sufficient for us to be disgraced in the eyes of the world, and for the Portuguese to be injured as much as it was in our power to injure them; as if this were not sufficient, a *pretence* (for it appears to be merely a pretence) is found for our engaging to make "*the Spaniards*," not the Patriots of Spain, not the Spanish Nation, not any thing dignified or honourable, but to make "*the Spaniards*" set at liberty, "*restore*," as if they had stolen them, all "*the French subjects*" detained in Spain and not taken in battle. That is to say, all the horde of spies, intriguers, fomenters of discord, plunderers and cut-throats, who have been the principal cause of all that the people of Spain have suffered, and who are held in durance, not only because they are capable of still doing mischief, but, doubtless, as a security for the lives of such Spaniards as may, without being taken in arms, fall, or have fallen, into the hands of the French. What right had we, and that too without reference to *numbers* of persons, to make any such stipulation with respect to Spain? Whose authority had we for it? By what instrument had the people of Spain placed their honour and their safety in the hands of our "*Chevaliers du bain*?" What *power* have we to cause such a stipulation to be fulfilled? The promise is like that which a man makes when a foot-pad has him down and holds a knife across his throat. Did the men who made this promise *beat* the Duke d'Abrantes; or were they like the curs, who, having felt the bite of the mastiff, lose all confidence in their numbers, and, though they bark victory, suffer him to retire in quiet, carrying off his bone to be disposed of at his leisure? No: not so, for they complaisantly carry the bone for him.—The naval yields, in no respect, to the military convention. The Emperor Alexander, who is carrying on a desperate and blood-thirsty war against our really faithful and very brave ally, the king of Sweden, had, with a view of co-operating with the French in their project for "*restoring the liberty of the seas*," or, in other words, destroying the maritime predominance of England, sent a fleet round into the Tagus. For the return of this fleet to Russia, the priests of the Greek church have been saying mass and burning incense any time these nine months past. Our "*Chevaliers du bain*" seem to have been penetrated with the supplications and offerings which had hitherto been used in vain; and, though they did not send the fleet home; though they

were not quite so far overboard by the Duke d'Abrantes as to raise the blockade and to let the fleet come out and go home, they took care to stipulate, that the officers and men of the fleet should be immediately carried back to Russia, without any impediment to their being at once employed to fight against us, or against our ally the king of Sweden; that all this should be done at *our expense*, and that we should take care of the *ships*, so as to have them to deliver up at the conclusion of the peace. The Eastern warrior, Sir Arthur Wellesley, had, in his part of the negociation, agreed to let ships and all go home; but, then, there was the *chance*, at least, of their meeting with an English fleet at sea. This chance, however, was small; for, the start which he had allowed them, would have enabled them to make a French port before our fleet off the Tagus could overtake them; they might, too, have fallen in with some of our detached ships, who could be in expectation of no such event; and, in any case, a meeting with them might have cost us lives worth more than those of all the "Chevaliers du bain" that ever existed. It must, therefore, be confessed, that what was finally agreed to was a little less bad and less disgraceful than what the conqueror of the Nabob Vizier of Onde had, as far as he was empowered, made an article of the famous convention. — But, besides the heretofore unheard-of title and language of this naval agreement, where were the circumstances that could justify it? The fleet was completely in our power. There was scarcely a possibility of their escaping. In a few weeks, unless cowardice seized our army, the batteries, under which the fleet lay, must have been in our hands. Or, whether they were or not, the fleet could not escape. Sir Charles Cotton, therefore, is full as culpable as Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Wellesley: for, though he did not agree to the terms at first proposed, he agreed to terms very disgraceful to us and injurious to our allies. "The surf and the approaching equinox!" Shades of all the thousands and hundreds of thousands of English seamen, who, without a millionth part of the motive, have perished in braving the waves and the winds and the shoals and the rocks, come forth from the deep and hear this! "The surf and the equinox!" Why, it is like the language of the chicken-hearted secretary of Charles XII, who, letting drop the pen, upon part of the room being torn away by a cannon-ball, and being asked by the king why he did not proceed, exclaimed, in a trembling

voice, "the ball, your Majesty!" "What said the king, "and what of the ball?" "The ball said nothing about your writing." In a man like this, strong apprehension at danger so very imminent was not only excusable, but naturally to be expected; but, to the commanders of British forces, by sea as well as land, pleading the surf and the equinox as an excuse for having assented to terms confessedly not such as could have been wished for, is enough to fill the nation with anger approaching to madness. — There was, Dalrymple says, doubts whether Sir John Moore's division could be safely landed at that season of the year; but, it appears, that these doubts were not founded, because they were safely landed *before* the Convention was signed. But, suppose it had been certain that they could not be landed? Wellesley (for it is time to have done with long names) had, as he says, beaten the *whole* of the French force with *one half* of his, and his army had received an augmentation *before* Sir John Moore arrived. What, then, had the landing of Sir John Moore's division to do with the matter? Indeed, it would seem to have been better for him not to land, but to wait for orders from home. At any rate, however, landed he was before the convention was signed, so that the excuse is completely nullified. — Then comes the excuse about provisions. "It was doubted, "whether the supply of so large an army "with provisions from the ships could be "provided for, under all the disadvantages "to which the shipping were exposed." The Knight's grammar is, to say the least of it, quite equal to his logic. What, then, it would seem, that here was an army sent to Portugal, without due precautions taken as to finding it in food? For, observe, the difficulties and dangers of the seas are, upon such occasions, always taken into view at the war-office and the admiralty. But now, we are, it seems, to be told, that, after all the immense expense of this armament, after an expense of preparation such as never was heard of before for such an enterprise; after all this, we are to be very coolly told, that there were doubts as to the possibility of supplying the army with food, even for a fortnight or three weeks! Let us see: there were, after Sir John Moore landed, about thirty thousand men. Could not these men have been fed for a fortnight or three weeks, without producing a famine in Portugal, even supposing it impossible to get any thing at all from the ships? Can Dalrymple say, that there was not already a week or ten days' provision in the army? It will be proved, I think, that there was.

But, upon the very face of the thing, this excuse is worth nothing. They were in a friendly country; they wanted no force for foraging, or for obtaining accommodations of every sort, the sea was not only open to them, but they had the exclusive possession of all its shores, if the "surf" prevailed to-day, or this week, why, it would not continue for ever, and, when it ceased, the flour or other provisions that might have been got from the Portuguese, could have been returned with interest, for, it is not pretended, that there was not an abundance on board the ships. But, how did the Duke D'Abrantes, as Wellesley calls him (for the first time that any Englishman has called him so); how did the Duke D'Abrantes, to call whom by that title was a cruel insult to the oppressed and plundered Portuguese, how did Wellesley's Duke D'Abrantes make shift to get provisions, not only for the "fortnight or three weeks" to come; not only as long as he might remain besieged, but how had he made shift to find provisions for many months before, and that, too, let it be observed, *without the possibility of any communication with the sea?* The Duke D'Abrantes, a titl taken from a city and territory of Portugal, in which Wellesley acknowledges to be his due, the Duke D'Abrantes had fourteen thousand men, about a thousand horses, and, probably, about six or seven thousand men, on board the Russian fleet and other ships, all these Wellesley's Duke D'Abrantes made shift to provide with every thing *and to lay up stores for a siege*, and that, too, amongst a people decidedly hostile to him, and in this in that very country, where our "Chevaliers du bain" were under mortal apprehensions of being strived to death from the mere hostility of the surf, though they had a friendly people to oppose to, a sea always open, and an England at the distance of ten days' sail.—Dalrymple will hardly pretend, that Junot had collected *all* the provisions of the country and carried them to his "strong position." But "they were but a come scarce." May be so. But, will any man believe, that just at the end of harvest, or indeed, at any time, provisions for such an army for a few weeks, might not have been *borrowed* in Portugal, where our inclination to, and our means of, repayment were so well known? What avail these, our reputation and our means, if they were not to be resorted to upon an occasion like this? Is it not notorious that there are other ports in Portugal besides Lisbon, that into these ports we could have entered; that our means of conveyance, in all manner of

vehicles, was so great as to leave nothing to fear upon that score; and, would the Portuguese have wanted any thing but the simple promise of repayment to induce them to afford our army ample supplies of provisions, as to the *kind* of which there could have been no difficulty to apprehend, seeing that the position of our army must necessarily have remained nearly the same? So that, view it in whatever light we please, this excuse about provisions appears to be the most futile ever made by mortal man.—The great plea, however, that upon which the "Chevaliers du bain" mean to make their stand, appears to be that of *gaining time*. So eager were they to be in Spain, that they thought nothing at all of Portugal. Their capacious minds, accustomed to travel over the vast regions of the East, were impatient under the confinement to a little plot of land on the shores of the Atlantic. Now, as to *gaining time*, if that is to be considered as a positive good, then one way of obtaining it is to decamp, and, if they had shipped off, if they had not caught a Tartar in Wellesley's Duke D'Abrantes, they would certainly have gained time, though they would, it must be confessed, have left Portugal just as they found it, except that the land would have been enriched with the bodies and the blood of some of the bravest of their countrymen. Well, then, this gaining of time may be an *evil*; and now let us see what it was in this case.—Dalrymple says "my opinion in favour of the Convention was 'principally founded' [not founded principally, and I wish he had set Junot at defiance as much as he does sense] 'on the great importance of time, which the season of the year rendered peculiarly valuable, and which the enemy could easily have consumed in the protracted defence of the strong places they occupied, had 'terms of Convention been refused them'" *Terms of Convention*, Sir Knight, is a new phrase, invented, I presume, to avoid the assertion that the terms of the convention were the only terms that the Duke would accept of at your hands. But, to continue in proceeding backwards, in the examination of this excuse, on what is founded the assertion, the *unqualified* assertion, that Junot could *easily* have consumed time in a protracted defence? Is it founded upon your knowledge, or your opinion, that he had plentiful stores of provisions for his men, horses, and fleet, supplies got in a country wherein you were afraid of starving? Or, did you apprehend, that he would be able to obtain supplies in defiance of Cotton's fleet, your army, and the universal hatred and hostility of the peo-

ple of the whole of Portugal? "Strong places?" I never before heard of any in Portugal. Had you been before Lisle, Brisac, or Maastricht, you could not have written in language more desponding, even if the country around had been filled with your enemy's friends and adherents. Had you not battering cannon? Had you not an ample portion of artillery, the best constituted and the best supplied in Europe; an abundance of ammunition of all sorts; a large fleet to apply to for aid of every description; your word to pass as current as gold and silver for the hire of labour, materials and implements of every kind; were you not as well situated, in every respect, as if you had had to carry on a siege of Dover? And yet, you talk of strong places, *easily* defended to a protracted duration. The question now comes: *since when* did these places become so very strong? Junot found no difficulty in getting into them, when he entered Portugal with that same army, which Wellesley told us, he had beaten hollow, only a few days before you made the convention; nay, he marched into them, or, rather, over them. They have been very quick, then, it seems, in growing into places of such adamantine materials.—Well, now for the *time* that was to be gained. You do not tell us what good purpose that time was to answer; but, some person, who has taken upon him your defence, has suggested it to the public in the following words, to which the Courier newspaper says it is "*desired* to give insertion." Now, then, let us see this great purpose that you had in view in this sacrifice of honour to the gaining of time.—"The public seem much disappointed that the terms of capitulation granted Junot and his forces have been so disadvantageous to our interests, and perhaps justly, were it not that there might have been some *secret motives* and *very strong ones*: supposing, for instance, Junot had possession of a strong post, and it was doubtful if he might not have defended it for a fortnight, three weeks, or a month, or *perhaps much longer*, was it no object to gain that time in the situation that Spain is, with reinforcements pouring down from all quarters of France, to strengthen the enemy in Biscay and Navarre, and to have a disposable force so large as that which would otherwise be employed in Portugal, to throw into the assistance of the Spaniards in that quarter? Were they able by our assistance to drive the enemy beyond the passes of the Pyrenees, before he has time to collect his forces, would not that be a greater object

"in the ultimate success of the war, as it does it not materially add to the probability of doing this by assisting them with this force three weeks or a month sooner than we could have done had we not accepted of the terms so complained of as granted to Junot."—Mark here; we accept of terms in one line, and *grant* them in the next. No, no. The "*Chevaliers du bain*" did not grant. They accepted, and in that sort of way in which an apprentice boy accepts of a Monday morning's threatening, while the strap or the walking-stick is shaken over his shoulders.—So, these heroes might have their *secret motives*? They might want to get into Spain to stop the progress of the armies of Napoleon? But, would it not have been as well to send Junot and his army and the Russian fleet to England first, with a request to be ordered to march into Spain; for, even now we shall see, that the army will be able to leave Portugal very little sooner than they would, if they had waited the result of a siege of even a month's duration, while there appear no grounds for believing, that the siege could have lasted for a week, under the direction of brave and skilful assailants.—This is the least part of the objection, however; for, the army of Junot, an army so formidable as to produce the convention that we have been examining, is to be landed precisely at that point, whence they can most easily march into Spain; and so, finding ourselves unable to dislodge him from a place where we were certain of capturing him and preventing the possibility of his doing further mischief either to Spain or Portugal, we let him loose, in order to have the *chance* of beating him in the Pyrennees. No, not so; we do not let him loose; we carry him round at our proper expence; we carry all his arms, horses, baggage, plunder, and we put him down in a condition, not only to march off to Spain, but we fill even his pouches with sixty rounds each, that he may be ready instantly to begin the battle.—Besides, is it not evident, that, though Portugal is evacuated, it must still, in a certain degree, be left to our defence. Can the *whole* of our army quit Portugal instantly? Can that country, in the state in which it now is, be left without from ten to twenty thousand English troops? We shall see that it cannot; and we shall see, that we have carried, in Junot's army, more men to fight against Spain, than we can send from Portugal to the assistance of the Spanish People.—If this be so, where shall we find words to express our indignation at this pitiful plea of

gaining time, when we take into view the other part of the Convention, which makes us carry, at our expence, five or six thousand Russian seamen to fight against the Swedes; when we reflect on the vast means of conveyance and of acceleration, in every way, that we lose by the employment of our ships of war and transports in carrying home the Russians and the French; and when we consider how much more ten thousand of the conquerors of Junot would have been worth in Spain than twenty thousand of those who have purchased his return home with sacrifices so great? What we wanted, what our allies wanted, what the general cause wanted, was, not a month sooner possession of the fortresses of Portugal, but a signal defeat, a humiliation, of a part of Napoleon's army. We wanted an instance of triumph, a proof of victory, which no one could gainsay. We wanted the boasting threateners of invasion brought hither; we wanted Junot and his army in England, and to bear our commanders say to the people: "There are your invaders, go and look at them." This is what we wanted. This would have spoken conviction to the minds of Englishmen, of Frenchmen, of our Allies, and of the whole world. This is what true policy dictated; this is what would, at once, have presented itself to a high and enlightened mind, though it appears never, for one moment, to have entered the mind of either our generals or our admirals. Such an example, such an irrefragable proof, of the great power of England, would have given her such consequence in the world; would have placed her so high in the opinion of all mankind, that it is impossible for a man who loves his country not to hate those who have prevented its existence. In speaking of the victories in Portugal, I reckoned (at page 386) amongst its consequences, this: "that it would diminish that dread, in which the French arms had been so long held in other nations, and particularly in the Southern parts of Europe." But, this miserable Convention, dictated to us in terms so haughty and insolent, and in which we recognize the title of Emperor and King in Napoleon, will not only undo all that was done by those victories, but will confirm that dread which it was so great an object to remove; for, to what cause, other than that of a conviction of a decided superiority in the French armies, can this convention possibly be ascribed? And, after this, after seeing us thus act; after seeing us so shamefully betray the interests of our allies of Portugal and Sweden; after seeing us make a convention, in which all the dearest interests

of the Portuguese were so deeply involved, without even consulting any one of the Portuguese commanders or chiefs, who can be weak enough to believe, that the Spaniards will trust a British commander? If they imbibe a distrust of us, and that they must be but too evident, who knows what effect that may have upon their councils; how many it may cause to waver, who should otherwise be firm; how many it may lead to abandon the contest; in how many ways it may operate in favour of Buonaparte's plan of subjugation? Never can we expect such another opportunity of turning the tide of the war. The power of doing this was put completely in our hands; that power we have most shamefully thrown away, and we must take the consequences of such foolish and dastardly conduct — The sorry lives of those, who have thus disgraced our country, and ruined our cause, would do us no good. They would not restore to this world one of the brave men who fell in acquiring the means of terminating the war in Portugal with so much honour and advantage as might have met in its termination, nor would they restore to the pockets of us at home the immense sums which have been, in that war, expended for a mischievous purpose; but, no one will deny, that something ought to be done; that law and justice, in some shape or other, ought to call these commanders before them. Whitelocke suffered (slightly indeed) for his silliness, or his cowardice, or both together; but, he was beaten, at any rate. He did stop 'till he was beaten, before he signed terms, to which none but a beaten army could submit. These commanders have not waited for that imperious cause of submission. They have volunteered in disgrace. They have made a sacrifice of their country's honour and interests, without being able to set up the smallest plea of necessity. Whitelocke's expedition was a thing of dubious importance. There were many, among whom I was one, who thought that all that there was to regret in his failure was the mere loss of lives. But, here was an object of such vast consequence, and of a nature so unequivocal, that it was impossible for any man, having only a common feeling for the honour of his country, not to have it deeply at heart. Every man seemed to say, every countenance bespoke the sentiment: "Now is the time; we are now striking the blow, that is to fix the character of our country, and that is to be the source of noble emulation in the hearts of our children's children." This blow our gallant countrymen had proved that they were able to strike; their sword

was uplifted, and, at the moment when they were about to let it fall, their arm is unnerved, and those whom their valour destined to be the captives of their country, may now become its plundering invaders.—With respect to this enterprize there was an unanimity of sentiment, a cordiality of wishes, an absence of party feeling, such as I do not recollect to have witnessed upon any former occasion. Amongst us, who have opportunities of addressing the public in print, there was not a man, as far as I could perceive, who did not discover great anxiety for the result, and who did not join in hearty applause as far as applause was due, of both the commanders and the ministers. Such is the unanimity and such the feeling of *disapprobation* now; and, while I do not wish to insinuate that the ministers have any desire to withhold justice from the nation, I must express my opinion, that, if they were to make the attempt, they would be guilty of an act of insolence so outrageous, that, if the people were to bear it, they would deserve to be swept from the face of the earth.—Leaving the responsibility of the War-Secretary as a subject for future discussion, the only point, upon which, at present, there appears to be any difference of opinion, is this: *whether Wellesley is a participator with Dalrymple, or not?* The negative has been strongly insisted upon by the numerous, the powerful, the active, and the audacious friends of the former, who, after having used their influence for the purpose of obtaining detached paragraphs in the newspapers, beginning with an assertion that he was at *forty miles distance* when the armistice was signed, have at last, in the Morning Post newspaper, found a person, who, in his capacity of editor, has inserted, *as his own*, a defence evidently written by some one closely connected with the person defended.—Now, then, let us see what this defence is made of.—The pretended editor sets out with a few silly remarks upon the measures themselves; but, very quickly comes to the chief, and, indeed, the only, object of his writing, thus:—“Here it becomes us to consider who are the persons responsible. The responsibility attaches to his majesty’s ministers on the one hand, and the commander of the forces on the other. It is presumable that when ministers sent such an immense force to Portugal as near 37,000 men, their object was to enable the general to whom they gave the command, completely to reduce the enemy, and compel them to surrender; and if they have not limited and tied up

“their general, but left him to obey those terms which the greatness of his force intitled him to demand, they are totally unimpeachable. It is, therefore, on the commander of the forces, and the whole responsibility remains. But the Conventions, though the one was signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the other by Col. Murray, are to be considered as the work of Sir H. W. Dalrymple, and of Sir Hew Dalrymple alone. The commander-in-chief of an army is alone responsible to the nation for what is done by the army. He acts under the king’s orders, and all the army under their commander’s orders. The supposing any other principle, the supposing that there was a separate responsibility in any part or member of an army from that of its commander-in-chief, would be to set up distinct commands and authorities, and would justify division and mutiny. Supposing Col. Murray’s name had been subscribed to the first Convention, would any man have considered Col. Murray as responsible for the treaty? No; he would have considered Col. Murray as merely ministerial, and as giving authentication to the dictates of his commander. Upon what principle then is Sir A. Wellesley to be esteemed responsible, if Col. Murray would not have been so? Had Sir A. Wellesley a distinct, separate, independent authority to make Conventions with the enemy? Could he take a measure, or agree to an expression of his own, without the commander-in-chief’s approbation? Could he have modelled an article, proposed a condition, or insisted on a principle, which the commander-in-chief did not sanction? Could he have refused to have let the treaty in all its parts have been managed and worded as the commander-in-chief pleased? It is obvious, he had no such power. It is clear, then, that, as to the Convention, whether he proved or disapproved of it, whether he negotiated every line, or never read a word of it, he is in no sense whatsoever responsible. Sir H. Dalrymple was commander of the forces; in him alone all discretion, all authority was placed, and on him alone all responsibility rests. But it is said, if Sir A. Wellesley did not approve the Convention he ought not to have signed it. Is it meant by this, that when an inferior general officer differs in opinion with his commander, he is to disobey him? Or if he obeys, is he to couple that obedience with a public dis-

"play of his disapprobation? An inferior
 "general will often cheerfully acquiesce in
 "the decision of his superior, when per-
 "haps, were he himself commander-in-
 "chief, he would act very differently. This
 "flows from the very nature of two situa-
 "tions; the commander and the command-
 "ed. The latter not being responsible for
 "his opinions will not be tenacious of them;
 "he will easily submit to the decision of
 "his superior, because his acquiescence
 "neither leads to censure nor to praise,
 "nor is he vested with responsibility, or
 "liable to examination or trial. With re-
 "gard to Sir A. Wellesley's opinion, it is
 "known, that if his advice had been fol-
 "lowed on the 21st, he would have pur-
 "sued the routed army of Junot, and never
 "have let him rest till he had destroyed it.
 "When the line of pursuing the enemy
 "was dropped, and negotiation admitted,
 "he was then superseded in command, and
 "had only to follow the plans of Sir Hew
 "Dalrymple, for he had no plans of his
 "own to follow. This subject, however,
 "lies in a short compass. Can Sir A.
 "Wellesley be brought to trial, for sign-
 "ing a Convention according to the instruc-
 "tions of his commanding general? He
 "cannot. How absurd then to impute
 "blame to an officer, for an obedience to
 "the invariable rules of discipline, and to
 "his submission to which it is not possible
 "he can be brought to trial!"—I can go no
 "further—What! The Wellesleys; the
 "high Wellesleys; the haughty Wellesleys,
 "accept of this Old-Bailey-like defence!
 "This worse than any defence ever set up by
 "pious caitiff, tutored by attorney that
 "ought to have been hanged as many times as
 "he has hairs upon his head! What! "Ah!
 "you may say what you like, but you can-
 "not take the law of him. He is not in-
 "dictable. There is a flaw in your pro-
 "ceedings. His head is safe from the
 "noose!" Why, if there be any thing
 "that can add to the just indignation and re-
 "sentment of the public, it is a defence like
 "this. "You cannot get hold of him: you
 "cannot bring him to trial!" I appeal to
 "the reader, whether he ever heard, or read,
 "of any thing so base as this.—Yes, there
 "is a very wide difference indeed between
 "Wellesley and Murray. The latter was
 "merely the agent of the commander-in-chief;
 "he was a field officer, and had no command
 "in the army; he was not one of those
 "who would be consulted as to what ought
 "to be done, or who would be called into
 "a council of war. Whereas the former
 "was not only one of that rank to be consult-

ed, to be one of a council of war, but he
 had had the previous command; he had
 been commander-in-chief until but a few
 hours before he entered upon the negotiation
 of the armistice; he was in possession of
 all the local knowledge, of all the knowledge
 relative to the force and condition of the
 enemy, that was possessed in our army; and
 of course, if he agreed to, or sanctioned
 his signature, what was injurious to his coun-
 try, he was, and must be held to be respon-
 sible for the act; or, at least, must come in
 for his full share of the responsibility.—
 Great pains, the reader will perceive, is taken
 to produce the belief, that Wellesley was a
 mere instrument; a thing having no will of
 its own; a machine moved by the great
 Dalrymple; and, in a subsequent part of
 the article above quoted, the writer says,
 that he was no more responsible "than an
 "attorney's or banker's clerk would be for
 "signing an obligation of his master." Oh!
 the gentle, the submissive, the humble-
 minded Wellesley! Well, this man, when-
 ever he dies, ought to be preserved in pickle;
 for such a Wellesley I never heard of before.
 "An attorney's or banker's clerk!" This
 is a defence well worthy of him who signed
 the armistice with General Kellerman.—
 But, come, let us see to what point this doc-
 trine of automaton submission would carry
 us. The proposition is this: that an officer,
 inferior in command, is not, and cannot be-
 come responsible, for any thing, be it what
 it may, which he does by the command of
 his superior, if the thing done be not con-
 trary to "the articles of war." Articles of
 war! Oh, shame! So then, because the
 express statute cannot be cited against him,
 he is to be holden up as an innocent man!
 But, to illustrate the effect of this doctrine,
 suppose Dalrymple were to order Wellesley
 to shoot the king. Would not the latter, as
 well as the former, be hanged for high trea-
 son? Well, then, there are things which
 an inferior may not do at the command of
 his superior; yet, the shooting of the king
 is nowhere expressly prohibited "in the ar-
 "ticles of war." Suppose, in the armistice,
 it had been agreed upon to surrender the
 whole of the British army, in Portugal, to
 Junot, at discretion. Would not every one
 of the generals, nay every colonel or com-
 mander of a corps, who should have obeyed
 an order to fulfil such an agreement, have
 been shot, in a few days after his landing
 in England? Yet, there is, in the "arti-
 "cles of war," nothing expressly forbid-
 ding such surrender. Both these sup-
 posed acts, and all other acts contrary to the
 honour and interests of the country, are

forbidden in the engagement of fidelity, and in the articles relating to the faithful discharge of duty; but they are nowhere expressly pointed out. The real question is, then, whether the agreeing to the armistice was, or was not, an act, which, to every rational mind, must have manifestly appeared to be detrimental to the nation. "If this question be decided in the negative, then, not only Wellesley, but all the parties concerned are innocent; but, if it be decided in the affirmative, they are all guilty, and he the *most* guilty, because he, who *alone* could possibly be well acquainted with all the local and other circumstances, was the first to set his hand to the agreement. — The writer of this defence says, in another place, that very great mischief might have arisen from an open rupture between our commanders. In the plural, observe, though, but a moment before, we had been told, that there was but *one* commander. We are told, that if Wellesley had publicly declared his disapprobation of the terms of the agreement, "the discord, which must have ensued between him and the commander-in-chief would have unquestionably embarrassed all the future operations of the army." What! the disapprobation of so mild, so gentle, so unassuming, so humble, so submissive a thing as an "attorney's or banker's clerk"! Could this thing's disapprobation have embarrassed all the operations of an army, under a chief whose nod was law? Incredible! No; we cannot be made to believe, that a *machine*; though composed of flesh and blood, or of flesh and bones rather, could have produced any embarrassment in the operations of an army. If it stood in his way, Sir Hew (what a name!) could have put it into an arm chest, or thrust it into any hole or corner, and amongst any of the dead stock of the army. When a man has a bad cause; when he is put to the *inventing* of reasons, he is pretty sure to contradict himself. — Hitherto I have proceeded upon the supposition, that Wellesley really did no more than obey the orders of Dalrymple; that the latter was the great mover in the affair; and that the former only aided and assisted. The contrary, however, I think, clearly appears to have been the fact; but, first let us hear what further this famous defender has to say. — "Sir Arthur Wellesley, in fact, *privately* protested against the armistice in the strongest terms; he distinctly declared his objections to the commander-in-chief, and tried all in his power to prevent him from granting the terms he did to the

enemy. Sir A. Wellesley *proven*, nor had any concern *whatsoever* in writing the armistice: it was negotiated with Keilmann by Sir H. Dalrymple himself (indeed it was dictated and written in French by Keilmann), and was afterwards signed by Sir A. Wellesley, in obedience to the positive order of Sir H. Dalrymple, the commander-in-chief. — It is a curious fact, not unworthy of remark, that Sir H. Dalrymple had intended to be the first instance to affix his own signature to the armistice; but that he refrained from doing so, and ordered Sir A. Wellesley to sign it, at the instigation of the French general, whose views in such a requisition it does not require much penetration to discover. Sir A. Wellesley therefore is no more responsible for the terms of the armistice, than col. Murray is for the terms of the Convention; or to carry the comparison still further, than an attorney, or banker's clerk would be for signing an obligation of his master. It has been urged, that Sir A. Wellesley might have told the commander-in-chief, that he would sooner go into arrest than put his name to such an instrument, but under the firmest conviction in his own mind (which, if coolly considered, will be found to be the simple fact), that he was merely acting under the positive orders of the commander-in-chief, he signed it as he would have done any other military order which did not appear to him to be contrary to the articles of war, or the established laws of his country, in preference to commencing open hostilities with his commander-in-chief — the very day after he superseded him. Sir A. Wellesley's refusal to sign the armistice, would by no means have prevented the conclusion of it, but the discord which must have ensued between him and the commander-in-chief would have unquestionably embarrassed all the future operations of the army. These are *strong facts*; but they are most substantially and literally true, and perfectly corroborated by numerous letters from the most distinguished officers of the British army in Portugal. These letters also all agree in stating, that Sir A. Wellesley most distinctly declared his opinion that the expediency of permitting the French to capitulate at all, was occasioned solely by the dilemma into which the army had been brought by its being prevented, contrary to his plans and wishes repeatedly urged, from following up the victory of the 21st,

in which case, the whole French army must inevitably have been destroyed, instead of being enabled by *that fatal delay* to retreat to the passes, and to concentrate themselves in forts in their rear, which it might consume *the whole of the winter months* to beat them out of. At the conclusion of the action of the 21st, the head quarters of the French at Torres Vedras were four miles nearer to the right wing of the English army, which had not been engaged, than to the French defeated army, in consequence of Junot's having exclusively attacked our centre and left wing. It therefore amounts almost to a certainty, that if Sir A. Wellesley had been permitted to push forward agreeably to his plan and request, he must inevitably have arrived before them, occupied their posts, and annihilated them as an army."—There is, after this, a crying paragraph about "*party animosity*," than which charge nothing ever was more false, as every man in the country will testify.—So, here, the few weeks of Sir Hew are swelled out into "the whole of the winter months"! And where was Junot to find *provisions* for the whole of the winter months? Were his army and his horses and his fleet to be fed by ravens; or had they collected food sufficient, in that very country where our fine commanders were afraid of being starved in a week or two?—So, if Wellesley had been permitted to go on, he would have destroyed the French army. Now, *who* prevented him? His victory was won on the 21st of August. Sir Harry (another slang name!) tells us, that though he arrived while the battle was going on, he left all to Wellesley; and Wellesley's friends in England took special care to inform the public, that he, and he alone, had the claim to the merit. Accordingly, those who express their joy and approbation by the use of the bottle, drank "the brave Sir Arthur Wellesley and his army." Nobody's name was heard of but his. Sir Burrard did not pretend to have any share in the merit, and we gave him credit for his modesty. Well, then, *who* stopped Wellesley? Who prevented him from "*pushing on*?" The Duke D'Abrantes. That cruel Tartar. It was he, or it was nobody, that so suddenly arrested the progress of our dashing "*Chevalier du bain*." For only look at the *dates*, which are always very troublesome things, when men have to lie through a cause. Who, upon reading what I have quoted above, would not suppose, that a month, or, at least, many days, had elapsed between the battle of the 21st and the signing of the ar-

mistice; seeing that, before the latter took place, the French had had time "to retreat to the passes, and to concentrate themselves in the strong forts?" Who would not suppose, that several days, at least, had elapsed? But, the fact is, that the battle was fought on the 21st, and the armistice agreed upon and signed on the 22d. There could not possibly be *any* more than *twenty-four hours* between the battle and the armistice; and, observe, Sir Burrard left Wellesley to do as he pleased on the 21st; he had all the then army under his command; he might have gone on if he would; and his stupid defender, appearing to forget these *really* strong and undeniable facts, calls the 21st a *fatal day*.—Now, as to poor Sir Hew, when did he come upon the stage? Not till the 22d; not till the day after "*the fatal day*;" not, to use his own words, till "*a few hours* before general Kellerman came." So that, it is, I think, as clear as day-light, that Wellesley was controuled by nobody, that he was held back by nobody; that he was, as to all practical purposes, the commander-in-chief, until the very moment of General Kellerman's arrival; and that, as he has had all the praise, so he is entitled, to all the blame for whatever, deserving blame, took place previous to the moment.—There remains now to be noticed; what this defender says about *private* protests and *private* letters. He asserts, that Wellesley privately protested against the armistice, and that Dalrymple turned a deaf ear to his advice. Against this assertion, which is quite bare of all authority, let us put the probabilities of the case. And, I ask the reader; I put it to the plain good sense of the public, whether it be probable, or hardly possible, that Sir Dalrymple, who had arrived at head quarters but a few hours, and who had been in the country not many hours; who could know little, or nothing, of local circumstances or of other circumstances to be taken into consideration; who was a person of no great fame, and who carried with him no other weight than that of his mere rank: I put it to an impartial public, whether it was probable, whether it was possible, that this man, should, under such circumstances, come in with his boots on, and his hands and face unwashed, and take, not only the actual operative command upon him, but take up the pen, before he sat down to eat or to drink, and settle, upon his own unassisted opinion, an agreement which was to determine the fate of the whole of the enemy's army and fleet; that he should do this, not only without advice, but against the advice and the se-

solemn protest of one notoriously the favourite of the ministers, notoriously backed by a host of powerful friends at home in and out of parliament, and not less notoriously of no very unassuming disposition, especially on the morrow of his gaining a brilliant victory; that he, a prudent old man, should not deign to consult with, but should reject the advice of ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~advisers~~, may, and make him, like an attorney's or banker's clerk, set his hand to, as being the negotiator of, terms penned by the French General, and against which hateful terms he had made a solemn protest; I put it to the sense of any man who hears me, whether this be possible? Away, then, with all the lies about private protests and private letters. There is no proof produced of the existence of any such protest; while there is the strongest presumptive proof, that no such protest ever was made. Besides, have we not the internal evidence of Dalrymple's dispatch? What does the old gentleman say? Why: "As I landed in Portugal entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army, and many circumstances of a local and incidental nature, which, DOUBTLESS, had great weight in deciding the question, my OWN opinion in favour of expelling the French army from Portugal, by means of the Convention, was, such and such." Why this "doubtless?" He does not pretend to have had a decided opinion of *his own*. Would he have thus spoken, if he had despised the protest of Wellesley? The thing is not to be believed by even the most credulous and most stupid of mankind; and I beseech the honest part of the public, I beseech all those who feel for the honour of their abused country, to be upon their guard against the arts of that sink of falsehood and corruption, which is now stirring to its very entrails for the purpose of misleading the public mind and palsying the arm of justice.—"Private letters from the army" have been trumped up, and published without signatures; it was stated, in several of the papers, that, when the armistice was signed, Wellesley was at the distance of forty miles from head quarters; but, there are two facts, which I am particularly anxious to impress upon the minds of my readers; the first of which is, that the Morning Post newspaper, in which has appeared the dirty defence of Wellesley, was, in the autumn of 1806, the property of a company of persons, chiefly East Indians, and that Mr. Paull having accused one of these persons, a man who had been high in office under Lord Wellesley, of causing certain articles to be

put in that paper against him, the person accused, whose name was Robinson, who lived in Devonshire Place, acknowledged, in a letter to Mr. Paull that *he was a part proprietor*, which letter I saw and read. I have not heard, that the paper has changed proprietors, and my firm belief is, that it has not.—The second fact is, that, in the Gazette Extraordinary, containing the documents relating to the late transactions in Portugal, that document, that most important document of all, the armistice, which was signed by, and which was evidently the work of, Wellesley, was inserted in the French language, unaccompanied with a translation, while all the other documents, to none of which his name and seal were affixed, were inserted in English only; a thing as unprecedented as the motive of it must be obvious to all the world. Until the ministers have had time to show, that they had no hand in this; that some of their underlings were bribed to do it; I will not accuse them, or suppose them guilty, of an act of partiality so shockingly base; but, unless this be done by them, upon their heads the charge must finally fall, and, in the mean while we should be upon our guard, every man should endeavour to warn his neighbour, against the effect of that powerful and infamous influence which is now at work for the purpose of bringing Wellesley off in safety over the mangled reputations of the other commanders.

Bolley, 22 Sept. 1808.

P. S. I have below, inserted, upon this subject, a letter, and an article from the Times newspaper, both which I beg to recommend to the perusal of my readers.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

SIR,—I cannot doubt that you, who have been so often the eulogist of British valour, and the assertor of British honour, and who have lately descanted with so much force and justice upon both, will open the pages of your Register to whoever shall wish to expose to public observation transactions by which the honour of our country is impaired, and the glory of her brave defenders tarnished. That this has happened by the Convention concluded by our commander in Portugal is, unfortunately, not a matter of doubtful surmise or hypothesis; it is a fact notorious to every class of the community; it is felt by every man throughout England, from the cabinet minister to the cottager; it is at this moment the subject of universal grief and indignant reprobation in all parts of this capital.—How is it, Sir, that mi-

have been made before their own eyes, and the spirit of the nation at large, into the generals they employ?—Not a man amongst us doubted that Junot and his army would be brought prisoners to England; and we anticipated with a very pardonable, if not a laudable exultation, the arrival here, as captives, of some of Buonaparte's best troops commanded by his best generals. General Kellerman is the man to whom the honour of the victory at Marengo in a great measure belongs.—How did it happen that Sir A. Wellesley, on the very day after his memorable victory, when he was fully able to appreciate the relative means possessed by himself and his enemy, should agree *“that the French army should in no case be considered as prisoners of war, that they should be conducted back safe to France, and be left in undisturbed possession of what they call their private property?”*—Good God! Sir! Is the good old maxim, that one Englishman is a match for two Frenchmen, to be reversed? Or what was there to prevent 30,000 Britons from making half the number of Frenchmen surrender at discretion? The possession of the forts, the strong position at Cintra, the want of victuallers, cannot be listened to. Had the French army victuallers to attend them when they entered the country as enemies? Could not we, who were the friends and deliverers of the Portuguese, rely upon their assistance for a fortnight's or even a month's supply of provisions? At a time too when all the north of Portugal was open to us. Have the French armies had victuallers to attend them in their campaigns in Germany, Poland, and Dalmatia?—After the battle of the 21st we were, or we might have been, at the heels of the French army, with our bayonets in their loins; and, if properly pursued, even without the aid of cavalry, they would have had no time to take up or strengthen a position at Cintra. Junot knew this, and therefore endeavoured to stop us by negotiation. He has accomplished by address what he in vain attempted with the sword. Portugal was no loss to his object: *that every bat man in his army knew must be lost: but he waited to save his troops, to keep unclipped the wings of the French eagles. He has succeeded, and in so doing he has pared the nails of the British lion. He has transferred to his own brow the laurels which his opponent has thus declared himself unworthy of. Indeed, he has done himself immortal honour, and our army has sustained a disgrace, which I only hope is not indelible. We admire CORNWALLIS for his masterly retreat with 5 sail of the line before*

13; and shall we refuse our enemy the applause due to him for escaping from a situation ten times more critical? Buonaparte will not withhold his praise, and you will soon see these conventions held up to the world in the Moniteur amongst the most glorious trophies of the French army.—Our troops are now in possession of the forts of the Tagus;—ask our sailors and engineer officers what time it would have required to occupy them by force.—Were any thing wanting to Junot's triumph on this occasion, look at all the details of his stipulations; they contain demands which one should have thought no British officer would for a moment have listened to. If his garrisons march through Portugal, they are to be accompanied by British commissaries to provide for their subsistence. When they embark, all the horses are to be carefully embarked with them. Why, Sir, our commander has positively engaged to carry home a larger number of French horses, than were sent from England with Sir A. Wellesley's army; by whom these Frenchmen have been beaten: and whilst we are told, that that officer had no more cavalry with him, because horse transports are so scarce or so dear, and whilst we are actually prevented by these causes from sending out all the cavalry we wish for the future operations of the campaign, our general has most generously undertaken to convey to France 800 French horses.—But, it seems, our transports are not good enough for *“His excellency the French commander in chief, and the other principal officers of the French army.”* Our generals and officers may sail about the globe in West-Indiamen, or colliers; but Junot and his friends, *forsooth*, must be accommodated on board ships of war.—If they had been brought prisoners to England, this might have been a proper distinction, and the emblem on the admiral's bow would have felt complacency at the freight; but that his majesty's ships should be sent into an enemy's port to land an enemy's army, and to have it said there, that we brought them so far because we could not make that army prisoners, is really exposing the ships to dishonour, and his majesty's officers to a degradation, which it is hardly in human nature to support.—Ask lord Mulgrave and lord St. Vincent, or any other lord of the admiralty, if our ships are fit for this sort of service.—It is a known fact, that many of our public ministers, representatives of his majesty, have been exposed to great inconvenience and even danger, for the want of this very accommodation which is to be obtained for General

Junot; they have been told that packet-boats, or bye-boats, or fishing-boats, are good enough; nay, Sir, the conqueror of Maida, Sir John Stuart, with difficulty obtained for his accommodation a small brig of war, when he last went out to take the command of our army in Sicily: but M. Junot must pompously sail into Rochfort in a British 74. If there is a large portion of French insolence to the formation of this demand, there is in yielding to it a degree of pusillanimity, which, as an Englishman, I am altogether ashamed to characterise. — But, it is not only the Frenchmen, their horses, their arms and baggage, their 60 rounds of ammunition, that we are thus to take care of for them;—but *all* their private property, nothing of which can be taken away, must also be secured, landed on the coast of France, and, I suppose, insured at Lloyd's, at his majesty's expence, against the dangers of the seas:—a pretty employment this for British seamen!!! Except the sight of the Danes voluntarily and for money assisting us in fitting out their own ships last year at Copenhagen, I never, since I was born, heard of any thing so mean and so dastardly. — Junot may have squeezed any sum out of his duchy of *Abrantes*, his followers may have extorted with thumb-screws moidores or ingots of gold from the unfortunate Portuguese, his coffers may be full of the produce of that rapine and plunder which has been long since denounced, to the vengeance of indignant Europe,—YET ALL IS TO BE SACRED! The British seamen and soldiers, the conquerors of *Vimeira*, the deliverers of Portugal, are to aid and abet these most atrocious robberies. They are to make themselves accessories of the fact. They are to receive the stolen goods, and to convey them to a place of safety!!!—Either the French are or are not robbers and plunderers. If they are, Englishmen are now their accomplices. — What will our good friend and ally, the Prince Regent, say to all this? What will he say, when he learns, that we have not only thus prevented his subjects from recovering their stolen goods, insured an asylum and indemnity to the robbers, but that we have, in fact, wrested from him the sovereignty of his country? For, if this convention, this surrender of British honour, be fulfilled, his royal highness is not at liberty to call to account any one of his subjects who may have been foremost in giving aid and assistance to an invading enemy, and whose treachery may have afforded that enemy the means of prolonged resistance when attacked by the allies of his royal highness. — That these shameful terms were not extended to

secure, and render them inalienable, is due, not to the spirit of our military negotiation, but to the resistance of Sir Charles Cotton. The convention which he signed with the Russian admiral is second in impropriety only to that concluded with Junot, but at least he has not returned the enemy's ships to their country with 60 rounds of cartridges to each gun. — To have agreed to the conditions set forth in the 7th article of the armistice shews such an absence of judgment, of spirit, of common sense, that I really can hardly believe my eyes when I see Sir A. Wellesley's name put to it. — Whilst we are thus spontaneously, and without condition, giving up the whole French army, who ought to have been considered as our prisoners, what have we done for our friends the Spaniards? Look at the 16th article of the definitive convention. You will there find, that, in exchange for the Spanish troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon, which are thus graciously delivered to him, our commander-in-chief engages to obtain from the Spaniards a number of civil and military Frenchmen detained in Spain in consequence of certain occurrences in that country. If the British general receives a civil answer to his requisition on this head, it can only be in favour of the peculiar situation in which Spain now stands towards this country. At all events, he will be told, that before he again ventures to negotiate on military matters, he should take a lesson from Castanos. — I write, Mr. Cobbett, in some haste, and therefore can notice only cursorily these and other points that have excited my grief as well as my surprise. — The putting H. I. and R. My. Napoleon I. (whom this country has never officially acknowledged in that capacity) by the side of our most gracious sovereign; the leaving the French in possession of Lisbon till the embarkation of their second division; the engagement to interpret every doubt in favour of the French army; the whole tenour of the 16th article; the 20th, which relates to hostages; the impropriety of a lieutenant-colonel of the army stipulating, without authority, for Sir C. Cotton, whose flag was flying at the main-mast head; all these things afford, in addition to what I have already said, ample and abundant matter for regret, and, as I think, for censure on those who acted for this country. They all bear the appearance of a beaten and despondent mind. If the French had been our conquerors, instead of we theirs, these articles could not have been worded more to their advantage. — But, I must not ask to occupy too much of your

hereafter
 regard to the subject. One topic only,
 but that a most important one, I will yet
 revert to. It seems that on this, as on other
 occasions, the public is to remain in doubt
 who is the author of so much mischief and
 calamity. One naturally looks to the com-
 mander-in-chief as the responsible person :
 In furtherance of this idea, Sir A. Wellesley's
 friends assert, that he had not only no share
 in framing the conditions, but that he even
 protested against them, and that he signed
 the armistice only at the positive and pe-
 remptory command of his superior officer.
 If he should hereafter be able to substantiate
 this assertion, it will absolve him from
 blame, whilst twofold vengeance will be
 called for on the head of Sir Hew Dalrymple.
 But, I own to you, I cannot believe this
 story ; nor can I believe, until it is proved,
 that Sir H. Dalrymple is so empty, so vain,
 so self-conceited a character, as to have insisted
 upon such a measure, in opposition to Sir
 Arthur's advice. His own dispatch, and the
 armistice itself, contain internal evidence to
 the contrary. He could have assumed the
 command of the army but a very few hours
 before the armistice was signed ; it *must*
 therefore have been done by the advice of his
 predecessors in command. On this point,
 however, the British public must and will
 have full and undisguised information —
 Here, then, is a new, and I trust it will be an
 efficacious lesson, to our military and naval
 commanders, not to outstep the boundary of
 their functions. Since when is it that gene-
 rals at the head of their armies, instead of
 fighting, are to make treaties, or conven-
 tions, and to convert themselves into diplo-
 matic ministers, issuing full powers, which
 they do not themselves possess, to their
 subordinate officers? This right and power
 used to be reserved to the sovereign ; and
 generals contented themselves with simply
 agreeing to or refusing the terms of capitu-
 lation proposed by their opponents. — I
 was in hopes that the capitulation of Copen-
 hagen would have been a sufficient warning
 of the ill consequences of deviating from
 the old established rule ; but I now confess
 that it requires more faith than I am master
 of to continue my confidence in that man
 as a negotiator (however meritorious he may
 be in other respects) who has set his name
 to, and been the prime mover in, two such
 unwarrantable transactions. Perhaps, if his
 Majesty's ministers had taken proper notice
 of the former of the two, they would not
 now be subject to the mortification of join-
 ing in the universal censure of the latter.
 I am, Sir, your humble servant, — AN
 ENGLISHMAN. — London, 10th Sept. 1808.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL. — From THE
 TIMES Newspaper, of the 19th Sept.
 1808.

The Convention of Lisbon still continues
 to make every tongue eloquent, and every
 heart bleed, in those parts of the island
 where the *Extraordinary Gazette* has found
 its way ; and as we farther learn, throughout
 the army of Portugal, whose labours have
 terminated so unsuccessfully. The honour
 of the country has been sacrificed, its fairest
 hopes blasted, the reputation of its arms tar-
 nished, the resources of the enemy increas-
 ed and concentrated, the plunder of our
 allies sanctioned, the pride of our invinci-
 ble navy insulted, and the feelings of our
 gallant seamen injured and corroded beyond
 expression. One can feel, therefore, but lit-
 tle inclination to laugh at the authors of such
 wrongs. Who can think, without tears of
 rage and bitterness, of an English fleet at
 this moment employed in carrying home a
 well appointed French army, along with their
 colours, arms, ammunition, baggage, and
 plunder, in order to unite in a fresh expedi-
 tion against the liberties and honour of Spain?
 A curse, a deep curse, wring the heart and
 wither the hand, that were base enough to de-
 vise and execute this cruel injury on their
 country's peace and honour. But all the
 world is now calling out, who gave Dalrym-
 ple, and Burrard, and Cotton, their ap-
 pointments? The country should have cal-
 led out as loudly as we did, who gave
 Whitelocke his appointment? and then the
 occasion for clamouring now would have
 been removed — Dalrymple and Burrard
 would never have had their appointments.
 But why are these men to be singled out?
 They are not the only persons implicated in
 the mischief. Come forth, Sir Arthur
 Wellesley! You are the man who first sig-
 ned, in the 5th article of your treaty, " that
 " the French army should in no case be con-
 " sidered as prisoners of war " to the man
 who had the very day before conquered
 them! but, above all, you signed that article
 of an armistice, by which you agreed that an
 enemy's fleet should ride in safety in the
 Tagus; " after our army and fleet had ob-
 " tained possession of the town and port of
 " Lisbon!" Human credulity can hardly
 believe that any thing so monstrously inju-
 rious to your country could have entered into
 the heart of the basest of her sons, and still less
 into yours, which we believe to be proud and
 imperious enough. You might as well have
 signed, that Portsmouth and Plymouth
 should be neutral ports for an enemy's fleet
 to ride in. If the situation of your affairs
 had obliged you to stipulate for the safety of
 an enemy's army, what obliged you to pro-

vide for the security of an enemy's fleet? you might, without risk, have left that where you found it, and as you found it. For ten long months had it been blockaded in the Tagus; its escape, on all the principles of human calculation, was impossible, and, indeed, nothing short of two battles won by a British army, and one treaty signed by a British general, could at last have set it free. We then observed, while we are appreciating the disgraces of our naval and military negotiators, that Sir Charles Cotton has only sent the Russian seamen home—Sir Arthur Wellesley would have sent home both the men and their ships, and actually signed a treaty to that effect. Sir Hew Dalrymple consented that the French army should be landed in the north of France; but Sir Arthur Wellesley agreed, without any such specification (art 5), "that the French army should in no case be considered as prisoners of war, that all those of whom it consists, should be conveyed to France, with arms and baggage, and all their private property of every description, no part of which should be wrested from them." The final convention, therefore, is but built upon the provisional armistice, and is really restrictive of its most injurious stipulations. But chiefly, Sir Arthur Wellesley is the first man with a British uniform upon his back, that has put his signature to the bottom of a treaty, at the head of which stood the recognition of "his Imperial and Royal Majesty Napoleon I." What his Royal Majesty George III may say to this, we know not, but we hope and trust it will be some bar to the admission of one whom we could mention, into the *Royal Party*, the *Family Council*, the *King's Friends*, and that those who have overturned thrones, and demolished potentates, in the eastern hemisphere, will at least be viewed with some jealousy, in their acknowledgement of regal and imperial titles, in the western, which their country does not acknowledge. Sir Arthur Wellesley having, therefore, sent home the French army, has now nothing left but to bring himself home, and meet the greeting aspect and kindly salutations of a country grateful for those favours of which his superiors in command were the immediate dispensers, but of which he was a distinguished participator—Before we conclude, we will say a few words on Sir Arthur Wellesley's appointment to this command. The public, it is true thought better of his talents than they have been found to deserve. But those who elevated him to his situation had nearer opportunities of

observing, and ought to have been more justly the extent of his capacity, and the firmness of his mind. It is in vain, therefore, to say, that some part of his disgrace is not reflected on his patrons: and we are the more anxious that this should be understood, because we see the same influence, which has raised him, still exerted to protect him. Why was his preliminary treaty sent to the press in French only, as if, while he acknowledged the legitimacy of his Napoleon's title, he had owned the pre-eminence of the language which the Corsican speaks? Why, but to circumscribe as much as possible the knowledge of his previous concessions, and to make it appear that Cotton had liberated the Russian seamen, that Cotton had sent them to man the Swedish flotilla which was captured at Sweabourgh; that Dalrymple had sent home the French army, with all their baggage and ammunition, to join in the destruction of Spain, that Dalrymple had given them up their plunder? Whereas Wellesley's treaty stipulated all this, and moreover, that the chief port of a kingdom should be open to its own enemies. When, therefore, the commanders of this wretched expedition are brought to their trial, let them meet with fair and impartial dealing; let not the proceedings of one of them be given to the public in a language which it does understand, while those of another are veiled in a tongue which it does not understand such conduct is infamous. And, above all, let there be no procrastination in the punishment of delinquents who have grossly injured three kingdoms, England, Sweden, and Spain, and let us wipe off the imputation of treachery, under which we must most justly suffer with all our allies, if we do not take ample vengeance on those who have dared, by a shameful convention of arrangement, and, in defiance of their country's most solemn obligations, to assist Russia in manning her fleets against Sweden, and France in augmenting her forces against Spain.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.—From the *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Friday, Sept 10

Downing Street, Sept 16, 1808.—A dispatch, of which the following is a copy, was received yesterday evening from Lieut. gen. Sir Hew Dalrymple, commanding his majesty's troops in Portugal, addressed to Lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, brought by capt Dalrymple, military secretary to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Head-Quarters Cintra, Sept 21, 1808.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.—When this is the subject of discussion, or remark, I can take no motto; for I have endeavoured, in vain, to recollect a transaction, feigned or real, of so detestable a character. History supplies us with nothing like it; nor has the imagination of the poet, as far as I am acquainted with poetical works, yet invented a set of acts and circumstances bearing any resemblance to those connected with this atrocious Convention.—The public have felt, and do feel, properly upon the subject. Indignation so universal was certainly never expressed upon any former occasion within the memory of man. The country people, who are, in general, very slow in moving, and amongst whom there are but few political events that are capable of exciting an interest sufficient to produce a warmth of expression, have been completely roused by this event; and, even down to the very labourers, they vent their execrations upon the heads of the miserable authors.—It is right that the ill-treated, the betrayed, the sacrificed, Portuguese and Swedish nations should know, that such is the feeling of the people of England; that in many places, the bells of the churches have been rung muffled, as upon occasions of public mourning; that many of the public prints have assumed the signs of mourning; and that every public paper in London, ~~has~~ excepted, and that ~~one~~ the property of a company of persons chiefly East Indians, has reprobated, in the most decided manner, and in a language evidently coming from the heart, all the articles of the Conventions, and especially those articles which contain stipulations injurious to the interests and the honour of our allies. There is a paragraph in the *Courier* newspaper of yesterday, which I cannot refrain from putting upon record, as amongst the means, which may, I hope, in time, wipe away this national infamy.—“In this period of general humiliation and disgrace, the provincial papers vie with those of the metropolis in the expression of their surprise, their sorrow, and their indignation. Many that we have received have encircled the *Extraordinary Gazette with a broad black line*. One has prefixed to it *several gal- lows, with bodies hanging to them*.

“Some cannot find words strong enough to express their rage: others burst forth into such a strain as this: ‘Oh, England! unhappy England! all thy struggles are vain! Thou mayest assemble thy courts martial, but, it is all in vain! Some power, more than human, smites thy commanders with blindness, as, at the prayer of Elisha, God smote the Syrians. Oh, thou incomprehensible Being! in whose hands are the destinies of empires, if thou hast doomed this kingdom to sink beneath the overwhelming power of France, yet let not the wisdom of her sages, the piety of her saints, the blood of her heroes and her martyrs, plead with thee in vain. Let her not fall the victim of baseness! but if she must sink for ever into the ocean of time, suffer a solitary ray of glory to mark the spot where once was England!’—Let Europe and the world judge from these specimens how deeply the whole empire feels and mourns its irretrievable disgrace.”—Yes, I hope, that Europe and the world will acquit the people of England, at any rate, of any share in this unparalleled infamy. They hesitated not, one moment, to express their indignation; it came forth, at once, from every mouth; and the press has been the faithful reporter and recorder of what was uttered by the tongue. The people of England and the people of Portugal have both alike been injured; they have both been abused; they have both been insulted: but, the former have it in their power to cause justice to be done upon their injurers, a power which the latter have not. To shew, therefore, that we are in earnest; to convince “Europe and the world,” that our indignation is not feigned; to prove our sincerity, we ought, from all parts of the kingdom, to address the king, or to petition him, and, in our addresses or petitions, to implore him to take measures for speedily bringing to trial all those, who may have taken a share in the hated transactions in Portugal. This was the mode formerly pursued by Englishmen, under similar circumstances; this all the world knows we may do if we will; and, if we have not the will to do it; if we have not the spirit to move one inch in the way of practice, the world will give us very little credit for all our fine professions. The.

plain state of the case is this: we all say, that our commanders have affixed lasting disgrace upon our country, and have most basely injured and insulted our allies, whereat we express our sorrow and our indignation in words almost too big for utterance; our right to petition the king to cause those commanders to be brought to trial is notorious; and, if we do not exercise that right, upon this occasion, the world will, and ought to, look upon us, not only as hypocrites, but as accessories, after the fact, to the deed which we have cursed, in every form of words in which a curse can be conveyed.—In the City of London, I perceive, that that very public-spirited and excellent man, Mr. Waithman, has given notice of his intention of moving, at the next Common Council, an address to the king, upon the subject. The City of London may, perhaps, give the tone to other places; but, I must confess, that the country appears to me to be very tardy in this respect; much more so than it was in addressing the king, in the tone of congratulation and applause, upon what, amongst other things, this same famous army of ours was intended to do. For my part, resolved that no portion of the disgrace, however small, shall adhere to me, I, as a freeholder of Hampshire, hereby invite other freeholders to join me in a requisition to the High Sheriff of the county, to call a county meeting, for the above purpose. I request any freeholders, who may be disposed to join me, to signify such their disposition by letter, directed to me, at Botley, near Southampton. I will go to any part of the county to concert with any five or six other freeholders, if no greater number should offer: or I will do any thing in my power to effect the object in view. I shall be much better pleased to see the thing originate elsewhere, and with leading men in the county; but, if no one at all join me, and if no requisition be made from any other quarter, previous to the *fifteenth of October*, I myself will then make the requisition; and, if a meeting be not thereby obtained, I will then present, in my own name, and in my own person, if possible, a petition to the king for the purpose above-mentioned. Let the infamy fasten where it will, none of it shall stick to me.—Will any one tell me, that, in these military matters, the Crown is to be left to itself; and will any sycophant pretend, that, to interfere in such matters is to encroach upon the royal prerogative? Without resorting to reasoning, or to any of the numerous precedents that might be cited, we know this; all of us have this

it in our memories, that it is more than two months, since almost all the counties, cities, and boroughs in the kingdom, did actually address the king upon the subject of the *military measures* he was adopting with regard to Spain and Portugal; they thanked him for his speech, wherein he expressed his intention of aiding the Spaniards and Portuguese; and this, observe, was done with the approbation, and at the notorious instigation, of the ministers of the king. And, shall we not, now that this promised and applauded aid, this aid, for the intention of yielding which the king was thanked; now that this aid has, by what we all deem the misconduct of our commanders, been rendered abortive, after costing the nation sums so immense; shall we not now approach the king with our prayers that he would cause legal and public inquiry to be instituted in order to ascertain to what, if to any, degree those commanders are guilty? This we have a right to do; reason bids us exercise the right; no man, of even the most slavish principles has ever called the right in question; and, if we do not exercise it, in vain shall we have used high-sounding words of sorrow and of rage; for, by the common sense of mankind, we shall be set down as pretenders and hypocrites.

What I have now said, is what I should have said in my last sheet, if I had had time. And, if it would have been proper then; if the active, the decided, the practical condemnation of the late Conventions in Portugal, would have been necessary to the restoration of the national character, under the knowledge then possessed by the public, how much more imperious is the call upon us become, now that we are acquainted with facts, of which we were before ignorant, and which render the transaction beyond all comparison more disgraceful to our country and more injurious to our allies than it before appeared to be, though it then appeared to be too bad, to admit of reprobation commensurate with its demerits?—It appears, from a publication in the newspapers just received, that the Portuguese Ambassador in London has received dispatches from the Regency of Portugal, commanding him to make a strong remonstrance against the Conventions; that the people of Portugal were not less indignant at the terms of these Conventions than the people of England are; that not any Portuguese of any description were consulted upon the subject of the Conventions; and that, so great was the dissatisfaction in Portugal, that apprehensions were entertained, that, if our generals

attempted to suffer the French to carry off their plunder, open and violent opposition would be made by the Portuguese. But, there are other alleged facts of a still more serious nature, which facts I find stated in the Times newspaper of the 26th September, and which, if they shall prove to be well founded, cannot possibly leave a doubt in the mind of any man living, as to the motive, by which Wellesley, at least, was actuated. The facts, as thus given, are, 1. that Wellesley, when he first landed, upon being applied to for the arms, sent out for the use of the Portuguese patriots, refused them, in consequence of which refusal more than three fourths of the patriots were prevented from taking part in the action against the French; 2. that, even those patriots who were armed, were not brought into action, but, on the contrary, in one case a body of 1,500 of them were put aside to make way for a corps of British, and, in another case, during the battle of Vimiera, the whole of the patriot force, under their general FREIRE, was removed to the distance of more than six miles from the scene of action; 3. that no merit has been, by our general, ascribed to any of the individual exertions of the patriots, but, on the contrary, that, in some instances, the merit, due to them, has been given to the English soldiers; 4. that, at the battles so much talked of, there were 18,000 English to 12,000 French troops, and that, while the Portuguese think that victory in such a case was no subject for boasting, they deny, that, the Convention taken into consideration, any conquest was achieved; 5. that, just before the last engagement, the patriots having consumed all the bread they had in their grain, their general applied to Wellesley for a single day's bread, but that this application was rejected, though the army of the latter had a great abundance, upon which rejection the Portuguese general shortly observed: "then we will fight without bread;" 6. that, as soon as the Convention had placed the forts and capital in our hands, our precious commanders hoisted the British flag in them, as if we had been the principals in the war, nay, as if we had been the re-captors of the country, and the Portuguese people had been consigned over to new masters, and that this trait of insolence had excited such loud and general expressions of indignation, that our banners were, as it were by compulsion, taken down soon after they were raised — Upon this last-mentioned fact, this most of all cutting indignity upon the Portuguese nation and their sovereign, the Morning

Chronicle has remarked, that it must have proceeded from *insanity*, and that, if justified, the authors ought to be brought forth, bled, blistered, and put into dark cells. This is one way of avenging ourselves on them for their mischievous arrogance, their insolent presumption; but, I am not for any thing bearing the resemblance of a jest upon a subject so serious, so replete with matter of national grief, shame, and disgrace. What! Admitted as *auxiliaries*, received as assistants in the work of deliverance; landing under professions of disinterestedness and *generosity*, we not only make a convention without the advice, without the consent, without the knowledge, of the regency or of the commander of the Portuguese forces or of any Portuguese in authority; but, having so done, we, in virtue of that convention, hoist our flags upon the ramparts of Portugal, with as little regard for the feelings of either the people or their sovereign, as if we had been in the country of the Tanjoreans or the Polygars. And, then to draw down the flags by the way of compulsion. First to raise the emblem of valour for the purpose of base insolence, and then to lower it from motives of fear! Verily, if this be forgiven, the ass of Isachar greatly yields to us in the virtue of patience. Why, the flags, used upon this occasion, ought, if the fact be true, to be burnt by the hands of the hangman, or put to uses the most vile that the imagination can invent. — If, however, the previous facts be true, for which I do not, as yet, take upon me to vouch; if it be true, that the arms were refused, that the patriots were studiously kept in the back ground, that their merits have passed unnoticed, and that a day's bread was refused them in the hour previous to the action; if these facts be true, the hoisting of our flag over their heads is no more than a suitable winding up of the climax of insolent contempt; and the whole series, as well as the concluding act, prove, that, from the outset, it was resolved to treat the Portuguese after the manner, in which we have treated the miserable sovereigns and slaves of the Indian peninsula.

The Portuguese general, FREIRE, has entered a formal Protest against the Conventions made by our generals and admirals, which protest I here insert, as I find it in the Times newspaper of the 26th of September. — "I protest, in general, on account of this treaty being totally void of that deference due to his royal highness the Prince Regent, or the government, that represents him; on account of what

"may be hostile in it to the sovereign authority and independence of this government, and for all that may be against the honour, safety, and interests of the nation: and, in particular, I protest against what is stipulated in the following articles:—ARTICLES I, IV, and XII, "Because these articles determine the surrender of Portuguese fortified places, stores, and ships to the English forces, without solemnly declaring that this surrender is momentary, and that it is intended they should be immediately restored to the Prince Regent of Portugal, or the government that may represent him, to whom they belong, and in whose aid the English forces came as auxiliaries!—ART. XVI. Because it permits the residence in Portugal of the individuals mentioned in it.—ART. XVII. "Because it attempts to tie down the government of this kingdom, not to bring to justice and condign punishment those persons who have been notoriously and scandalously disloyal to their prince and their country, by joining and serving the French party: and, even if the protection of the English army should be allowed to screen them from the punishment they have deserved, still it should not prevent their expulsion, whereby this country would no longer have to fear being again betrayed by the same men.—FIRST OF THE ADDITIONAL ARTICLES. This article can by no means bind the government of this kingdom, as no reciprocal conditions are stipulated. —I protest finally, on account of the want of attention to the safety of the inhabitants of the capital and its environs, nothing having been stipulated in their favour to insure their not being still vexed and oppressed by the French during their stay—not even an equivalent for what is established by Art. XVI and XVII, in favour of the French and their followers.—And to these heads I limit my protest, in order not to make too long a list, passing over other objects of less importance, such as the concession of 800 horses, which was made without considering that they almost all belong to Portugal, and thus cannot be considered as property of the French; that of the magazines of the army, filled at the expence of the country, and consequently only belonging by fact, not by right, to the unjust occupants of the country.—(Signed) BERNARDIN FREIRE D'ANDRADE—Head-quarters, at the Encarnation, Sept. 14,

"1808."—Now, before we make any remark upon this protest, which, of itself, proves how worthy this general was of being consulted, and of having great deference paid to his opinions and his wishes, I beg leave to recall to the mind of the reader a fact, which he may have forgotten, but which is of great importance as viewed in connection with the facts now come to light. It is this: that, some days after the news of the battle of Vimeira arrived, a report prevailed, that a convention had been made with Junot *by the Portuguese Regency and Commanders*, which convention was described to be nearly what the real convention has turned out to be. This report was stated in all the English newspapers; and, in their comments upon it, they expressed their hopes, that our commanders would not consent to its execution. They called it "a French trick;" they expatiated on its invalidity; and they threw out hints not very complimentary to either the *sense*, the *courage*, or the *integrity* of the Portuguese Regency and Commanders. Well, then, this supposed act of theirs, is the real act of our commanders. Good God! where, if these men are not brought to trial, and that speedily, shall we hide our heads?—The protest speaks for itself. It would be useless to go over it in detail; but, there is one thing, of which, from the bare perusal of this paper, the public must, at once, imbibe perfect conviction, and that is, that it is impossible, that there can be any harmony between our generals, our Convention-making Commanders, and the Commanders of the Portuguese forces; and that, if Portugal were again to be attacked by the French, the defence of it, by the forces and the commanders ~~now there~~, would be a thing not within the compass of probability. Nay; it is not at all improbable, that what has here been supposed may be the least of the mischiefs to be apprehended. It is hardly possible, that, in the necessarily exasperated state of the public mind in Portugal; in that state of mind described to us in pretty authentic intelligence; it is, in such a state of the public mind, hardly possible, that our army should be suffered to remain there, under their present commanders, in security from insult, to say nothing of the danger of actual assault. This being the case, it is matter of some surprize with me, that the ministers have not taken the earliest opportunity of apprising the public, that they have *recalled* the makers of the Convention; for, that *they have not done it* would be shocking to suppose. Yet, when I think of the partial publication in the Official Gazette; when I

think of the leaving out of the translation of the armistice; and when I observe, that not a word is said, in any of the ministerial papers, about *recalling* the generals, I must confess, that I have my fears of some invention being resorted to for the purpose of screening them. That Wellesley cannot be screened *alone* is evident. He must take his fate with Dalrymple; nay, my opinion is, that the last-named old gentleman will be able to produce convincing proof, that he was a mere tool in the hands of Wellesley. If this be the case, the very bottom of the sink of corruption will be stirred up, in order to bring them all off clear. The first thing to be thought of, however, is the state of things in Portugal, where there can be neither peace nor safety as long as the convention-making generals remain there; and, let it be observed, that, though our ministers might not be able to prevent the conclusion of the Convention, they will be answerable for whatever mischief may arise from our Convention-making generals remaining in possession of the command beyond the earliest moment, at which they had it in their power to deprive them of it, after they received the accounts of the shameful transactions, of which we have been speaking. Let them, therefore, look to this. If they persist in keeping such men in the command, they ought to be, and they will be, objects of general execration.—There are, doubtless, many exaggerated reports; but, it is by no means incredible, that the Portuguese army may, as has been stated in some of the public prints, “have taken a menacing position, and “have distinctly intimated to Sir H. Dalrymple, that they will resist the fulfilment “of the Convention; nay, more, that they “will consider any movement of the English army, with a view to facilitate the “embarkation of the French force, as an “hostile act.” If this be so, I wonder how the old gentleman felt at the intimation? I see nothing dishonourable, nor at all unfair, in the Portuguese doing this. They were no parties to the Convention. They never were consulted upon the subject. They had invested our generals with no diplomatic powers. They had never put the country under their command. They never recognized them either as rulers or representatives. Suppose, for instance, the Convention had contained an article recognizing the kingly authority in Junot. Is there any man upon earth, who will contend, that the Portuguese would have been bound to acknowledge him as their lawful sovereign? No: it is clear, then, that our generals could not bind them

in any thing; that they could stipulate legally for nothing which they had not, out of their own means, and without contravening the rights or the wishes of the Portuguese, the power of fulfilling. Why, good God! suppose they had stipulated to give England to Napoleon, Wellesley's recognized “Emperor and king;” must we have suffered him to come and take it? The idea is too absurd to be entertained for a moment; yet they had just as much right to give away England as they had to give away Portuguese property.—They must, if the Portuguese resist the fulfilment of their base Convention, be in a fine stew, as the old women call it. I dare say, Sir Hewy would give his mull and his boots into the bargain, had he never quitted Gibraltar; and our dashing “Chevalier du bain” would part with a trifle, had he remained amongst the tawny slaves of Hindostan, where men are mowed down like wheat-ears.—Should this resistance (which God send!) take place, how the haughty Wellesley must be amazed! He will not be able to treat the Portuguese after the manner of treating the poor souls in India. How disconcerted he must look! I think I see him now. What! the people whom he did not deem worthy of partaking in the glory of his battles, forbid him to execute his Convention!

We have now, amongst the other documents that have come to hand, a letter from Wellesley to the Bishop of Oporto, which letter, when the reader has seen it, will convince him of the truth of all I said, in my last, respecting the participation of Wellesley in the transactions of the 22d of August. It is dated at the camp of Ramahal, on the 24th of August, and its contents are as follows:—“May it please your “Excellency: I have the honour to inform “your excellency, that the army under my “command defeated general Laborde's division on the 17th instant, and, on the 21st “instant, the whole of the French army united, under the command of General Junot, “at Vimiera. The loss of the enemy in “those actions was very considerable. Last “night he sent general Kellermann to confer “with General Sir H. Dalrymple, who concluded an agreement with the said General “for a suspension of hostilities, until the conclusion of a Convention for the total evacuation of Portugal by the French troops. This “agreement contains *nothing remarkable*, “with the exception of a provision for securing the neutrality of the port of Lisbon and the Russian quadron. Permit me to congratulate your excellency on the approaching “conclusion of the misfortunes which have

"so much afflicted your country, and to the recovery of which your excellency's zeal and solicitude have so much contributed. "I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration and respect, your excellency's most humble and obedient servant, "ARTHUR WELLESLEY."—Now, where are the liars with their "*letters from the army*," and their "*protest*"? There was nothing even remarkable, except the part to which even Cotton would not assent; and he congratulates the Bishop upon that, against which his friends here swear that he solemnly protested.—Pray, reader, bear with me, while I trace along the course of these villainous lies; while I ferret out the political vermin that are gnawing at the heart of the country.—On the 16th of September the news of the disgraceful Convention was published in an Extraordinary Gazette.—By recurring to the newspapers, it will be seen, that, as far back as the 11th, a rumour of the Convention prevailed. On the 12th it was stated that there had been a Convention made; but, that it had been done by the Portuguese Regency; that it was a clever French trick, and that *our* generals were not (no, no, faith!) men to be imposed upon by any such device. On the 13th, the Courier had the following remark upon this supposed Convention: "Though we have been unable to trace this rumour to any authentic source, yet we must confess that it is a *manœuvre* or *trick perfectly in the French character*. Junot might *hope* by such a capitulation to get off with his plunder and save the Russian squadron, and he might think that, however we might object, we could not refuse to abide by it. Nothing to be sure would be *weaker* in the Portuguese Regency, knowing of our approach to their assistance, than to conclude a Convention of such a nature. The very proposal to capitulate on the part of Junot would, we should think, have made them perfectly sensible that he had no hopes of making an effectual stand against the British force advancing against him. Besides, our character as allies, and allies acting with such *vigour* and *DISINTERESTEDNESS*, would have dictated to the Regency the propriety of entering into no terms to which we should not be a party and have given our consent."—Reader, does not your blood boil upon reading this? Thus did this paper, unwittingly, but very justly, pass sentence before hand upon Wellesley and his associates.—On the same day, there appeared, in several of the papers, a paragraph, varying its shape

in the different papers, which paragraph stated, that, in consequence of Sir A. Wellesley having been superceded, and his advice having been rejected, the victory of the 21st was not followed up, and the enemy was enabled to concentrate his forces and to take strong positions. This is the identical lie, which has since been repeated, and which was, I trust, completely detected and exposed, in my last, where it was shown, that Wellesley had, agreeably to Sir H. Burrard's dispatch, the whole and sole active command during, and *till after*, the battle of the 21st. But, observe the time of this lie's appearing. It was a day, if not two, after the ministers had received intelligence of all that had been done. Wellesley's friends had got hold of it; and they instantly set to work, with their usual activity and impudence. On the 16th, when the news, as communicated through the Mayor of London, made its appearance in the public prints, it came side-by-side with paragraphs, stating, that there had been a misunderstanding amongst our commanders in Portugal. But the best way is to take one of these, with a particular reference. The Morning Chronicle of the 16th, had this paragraph: "These accounts seem to justify the reports which have been for some days in circulation, respecting a *misunderstanding* which is represented to have taken place between our military commanders in Portugal. Sir A. Wellesley in particular, is mentioned, as being *extremely dissatisfied with the proceedings which have taken place since he was superseded in the command*, and it has been said even that he was about to return home in disgust. But whatever foundation there may be for the former part of the rumour, the *high character of this distinguished and gallant officer* makes it impossible to believe the latter. We understand, that *when the capitulation was signed, he was at above twenty miles distant from head quarters*."—When, however, the Gazette came out, and exhibited to us the name of this same "*high-charactered and gallant officer*," at the bottom of the most infamous of the documents, a circumstance of which his friends, even those of the highest rank, could not be aware, until they saw the documents; when the Gazette came out, it was time to change the lie; and, it was then asserted, with as much assurance as his absence had before been asserted, that he was compelled to sign the armistice; that he had solemnly protested against it; and that he was, therefore, not at all responsible for what had been

done. Corresponding with these assertions, there were published several pretended "letters from the army," insinuating, that Dalrymple and Burrard were fools, at least, saying that their arrival had spoiled all, and praising Wellesley to the skies. But, now we have, under Wellesley's own signature again, a proof that he approved of what he had signed in the armistice, and that he considered the terms of that document, which terms have filled all England as well as all Portugal with grief and rage, that he considered those terms, which his friends take the devil to witness that he protested against at the same moment that he signed them, we have now, as if he had been resolved to raise a blush upon the cheek of even his hardened advocates, we have now, under his own hand, the proof that he regarded those terms as a matter of congratulation. And, observe, that he writes this letter to the bishop, before he knew that Cotton would not agree to the neutrality of the Russian fleet and of the port of Lisbon. It is the thing in all its worst light that he approves of, and upon which he presents his congratulation. — And how came *Wellesley* to be the person to write to the bishop? Why not Sir Hew Dalrymple? This circumstance, though, at first sight, it appears trifling, is of great importance, because, it shows that, though superseded in form, he, in fact did keep the command of the army. How came he to write to the bishop? Whence should this arise, but from that arrogance, which had prevailed ever, and borne down, every person and every thing that came in its way? — In short, there remains not, in my mind, the smallest doubt of his having been the chief, nay, the cause, of all the mischief that has been done. There are some who ascribe a still worse motive to him than I am inclined to ascribe, and, it must be confessed that the acknowledgment of the emperor and king of Italy together with that of the "Duke of Alentejo," might justify any suspicions, but, the motive I think imputable to him, supposing him not to be either a downright fool or coward, is that of a determination to gratify his own insolent ambition, and to keep all others in the shade, cost what it might to his country, to the country of our allies, or to the great cause of Europe in general. Doubtless his country paid for this arrogance, this insolence, but, when we cast our eyes back but a little, we must confess, that, great as is the punishment, the country richly deserves it. Ah! we now feel, do we, what it is to protect, cherish, and pamper such men? We

have not yet done with this sort of feeling. We have yet new indignities to encounter. I am told, indeed, and from what I deem good authority, that "the ministers and the king are as indignant at the conduct of "our commanders as I am." It is very natural that they should be so, but, I am, nevertheless, fully prepared to witness a series of the basest arts to which villainy, backed by a heavy purse, ever yet resorted. That these arts will not succeed, I think very probable, yet, again I beseech the public to be upon their guard against them.

With respect to the consequences of the Convention in Portugal, some of them have already been pointed out, but, there is one which forces itself upon us in a way not to be denied immediate observation, and that is, the delay in sending out the troops to the assistance of the Spanish patriots. Sir Hew told us, that the hastening of troops to Spain was, in his mind, the chief advantage of the Convention. The Convention was signed between five and six weeks ago. Is there any man who believes that a single English soldier has yet left Portugal for Spain? *There is not,* we know, had been spent without any step being taken to fulfil the Convention, or at least, without any of the French troops having been embarked, and should there be no impediment from the Portuguese it will, in all human probability, be a month from this time, before a regiment can be marched off. But, if there *should* be an impediment, what will, in that case, be the delay? Why four times as great, perhaps, as could have arisen from a reduction of the French army, and a sending of them to England prisoners of war. — But, why are not the Convention making generals recalled? Can any one affect to believe, that our army, under these men, either will or can do any thing good, in Spain or Portugal? Spain and Portugal have made common cause against a common foe, the latter has protested against our conduct, it has, in the person of its chief commander, accused us openly of having usurped the rights of its sovereignty and having sacrificed its interests to the safety and impunity of its foreign and domestic foes. This protest has, by this time, been read in every town of Spain. Is it to be believed, then, that the Spaniards will suffer the Convention-making generals to enter their territory? — No time should, therefore, be lost in recalling those generals. Do not want of one to take the command, the *Sergeant*, who is said to have refused the *unitch and purse* of general Bernier, as a bribe for setting that

general at liberty, would do very well. That man, I'll engage, would never have signed the armistice of the 23d of September.—It is clear, that the recall of these men ought immediately to take place; and, I repeat my astonishment, that it has not already been announced to the public, as a measure in the course of fulfilment. But, there is more besides this to be done, in order to reinstate us in the confidence of the Portuguese and Spaniards, who will hardly be satisfied with the disclaimer, however strongly and generally expressed, of the public in England. They will require a disclaimer on the part of *our government*; and, surely, they will not have to wait many days for a formal, a public, a solemn Declaration, in the name of the king, expressing his grief for what his generals in Portugal have done; giving the strongest assurances, that the like shall not again be done; and, to give weight to these assurances, a distinct intimation, that the parties, against whose conduct the Portuguese have protested, shall, with all the speed that the impartial administration of justice will admit of, be brought to trial. Nothing short of this will afford us a chance of restoration to the confidence of the nations in question; nations upon whom the enemy is now pouring down with immense force, and who, if they need our aid at all, must need it at this moment. What a wide difference there would now have been in our prospects; how different would they have been from what they are, if this shameful Convention had not been made; and, if our commanders had, from the first, acted with the discretion, with that respect for the feelings of the Portuguese, which the circumstances of the case rendered so peculiarly appropriate. I perceive, in the Gazette which has reached me to day, an account of a very gallant exploit of my LORD COCHRANE; but he does not take all the merit to himself; you hear from him not a word of bragging; he talks of no wonders that he and his crew have performed; but he takes care not to omit the mention of the good conduct of the Spaniards. "The castle of Mongal," says he, "an important post, completely commanding a pass in the road from Barcelona to Gerona, which the French are now besieging, and the only one between those towns occupied by the enemy, surrendered this morning to his majesty's ship under my command. *The Spanish militia behaved admirably, in carrying an outpost on a neighbouring hill.* Lieut. Home, with the marines, took possession

of the castle, which, by means of powder, is now levelled with the ground. The rocks there are blown down into the road, which in many other places is rendered impassable to artillery without a very heavy loss of men, if they determine to repair them.—I inclose to your lordship a list of the prisoners and of the material part of military stores; *all that could be of use to the Spanish militia have been delivered to them.*"—This is the manner, in which a brave, a wise, and modest man acts and speaks. He leaves his commander and his country to determine the degree of his merit and the importance of the particular service. Oh, had we had my lord Cochrane at Ramahal, we should now have had Junot and his army in England! The conduct of Sir Samuel Hood, in the Baltic; his judicious proceeding after the action; every thing that we now see of gallantry, or wisdom, or modesty, in our commanders, serves as a contrast to what has taken place in Portugal, where, more than in all other places put together, we stood in need of the practice of these virtues. To be overbearing and vain-glorious is, too, so opposite to our national character; it is so to belye our country! Well, we have now a pretty good lesson upon the consequence of committing our interests and our honour to the keeping of a fighter of nabob viziers; and, if from that lesson we do not profit, we merit to be treated like the subjects of those same nabob-viziers.

Here I should have dismissed this subject, until, at least, it had been seen what the ministers really intended to do: but, I must add a few words upon the conduct of the Morning Post newspaper of yesterday. It will be remembered that, in my last, I stated a fact about the *propriety* of that paper, which fact was of great importance, considered in connection with the defence which that paper has attempted to make for Wellesley. Instead of anything in answer to that statement, what do I find? Why, a silly letter of two columns and a half in length, controverting my opinions about the *Spanish Revolution*, and which letter the editor acknowledges to have had in his hands for a month past; as if, by controverting those opinions, he should prove my statement, relative to his paper, to be untrue.—In the same paper, there is a long article, the object of which is, to cause it to be believed, that the censure now bestowed upon the conduct of Wellesley proceeds solely from a *spirit of party*. Now, let the ministry betake them quickly to political repentance, if this be true: for, of this

"party" are the whole nation, some half hundred of nabob beaters excepted; and, of course, their exit is at no great distance. But, as to the fact; is it not notorious, that *all* the papers, without a single exception, gave Sir Arthur Wellesley great praise for his victories? And, as to myself, I put them, in point of consequences, upon a level with the battle of Trafalgar. I also appeal to the reader, whether *all* the editors did not, until they saw the Gazette, publish, in some shape or other, an expression of their opinion, that he had had no hand in the Convention. Let us take one particular instance, however. If it be the work of party, then it must be the work of that party, which is opposed to the party of the Wellesleys; that party, then, is the Opposition; it is well known, that the Morning Chronicle is the official print of the Opposition; and, in the Morning Chronicle of the 16th, the day before it could see the Gazette, there was a paragraph, as has been already seen, stating that Wellesley was *dissatisfied with the Convention*, and that he was "*above twenty miles from headquarters when it was signed.*"—Did this look like party work? It is a false and base pretence. There has appeared nothing of party-spirit in the discussion; and now, as in the case of Lord Melville, an attempt is made to draw men's minds from the merits of the case by imputing motives of party to those who are calling for justice upon the person accused. It is of great consequence, that the public should be upon its guard against this sinister design. The mind of a good man naturally revolts at the idea of *party persecution*. This laudable feeling in the English public has often proved a shield for the guilty; and, therefore, we should be very careful to ascertain that we have grounds for such a feeling, before we admit it as an inmate. It is not, observe, pretended, that poor Hew or Burrard have been assailed from party motives; and why not they as well as their associate? This same Morning Post accuses them most boldly; aye, and it does it, *because there is no other way of defending Wellesley.*—Let us, however, keep upon our guard against deception; let us keep our eye upon those who have power to act efficiently: let us see what they do; and then let us pass our judgement.

Bolley, 29 September, 1808.

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT ON NATIONAL DEFENCE.

SIR,—Now that the press of Spain has become free, and that we see both emulation and controversy enlightening the Spa-

nish mind, we may be confident that such books and public papers of England, as can be serviceable in their present struggle, will find their way thither. The best of our newspapers will be imported for the relations they contain of public events; but as they are heavily laden with advertisements, and stuffed with frivolous trumpery, which we ourselves could not endure were it not pinned on the back of public intelligence, while your Register is free from any such alloy, is wholly devoted to political discussion and state papers, and is conducted with a degree of principle to be looked for in vain in the other papers alluded to, it may be expected that it will not be overlooked by the Spanish Patriots; on which account it is to be hoped you will continue your observations on Spanish affairs; which is the more desirable, as, in the common cause in which we are now embarked with that nation, it will be difficult to imagine any discussion on government which can benefit Spain, that will not at the same time benefit England also; a circumstance which can very rarely occur, in respect of those despotic governments with which our own is but too frequently allied.

Since my last, Sir, new and brilliant facts have arrived from Spain, in confirmation of the doctrines laid down in the *Aegis*, on the subject of the arms-bearing of a people, towards proving that an armed population, instead of being to regular armies an "unresisting medium," is in reality a wall of adamant. If a truth so founded in nature, and so apparent to any unperverted mind, be, in the defence of Spain, thus already manifested, the author claims no merit for having maintained the doctrine. All he does claim, is, not to have incurred the demerit of suffering, without resistance, truth to be beaten down by the presumptuous dogmas of the adversaries of public liberty, nor to be silenced by the vociferations of the corrupt panders of despotism; who, in the service of one faction or another, have not only monopolized a large proportion of our newspapers, but have well stored with their pernicious writings the shops of our booksellers.

The facts now in my thoughts are those contained in the dispatch of the Count de Caldagues, to the captain-general of Catalonia, transmitted from Tarragona, and inserted in the "*Times*" of the 24th instant. The French, it seems, besides having the command of the Pyrenean Pass near the Bay of Roses, were in possession of the fortress of Figueras, very near the mountains, and also of the city of Barcelona, at

the distance of about 15 or 16 leagues, with the strong fortress of Monjuí by which it is overlooked; and had now laid siege to Gerona, situated in the intermediate space between those places. Under these circumstances, and keeping in our recollection the vicinity of the scene to France itself, the Count advanced for the purpose of raising the siege. "On his arrival at the town of Castilla, he found that he could muster about 6000 men in arms, and though there were among them only about 300 veterans, and but a very few more that were formed into companies of miquelets, he did not hesitate a moment to attack the enemy, upon a system adapted to the nature of his and their force." The enemy is stated to have been "from 7 to 8000 infantry, and from 8 to 900 cavalry," under General Duhesme.

Now admitting, (even against the express evidence of the dispatch), that the French might not have been superior in number to the army by which they were attacked, and admitting likewise that the besieged Geronians the selves were to be accounted as part of the Spanish force, yet, according to the doctrine of an armed population being to a regular army an "unresisting medium," the Spanish Patriots who attacked this army of accomplished regulars, in a position between two strong fortresses in their possession, and very near the French gate into Spain, and protected also by a body of cavalry to which they themselves had none to oppose, ought to have been put to a shameful flight, or, had they been mad enough to have rushed upon destruction, ought to have been cut to atoms and annihilated. But, on the contrary, these regulars, having every advantage on their side, are borne down by "the skill and valour of the patriots, their line of battle is broken, one part seeking their safety in Figueras and the other within the walls of Barcelona. It seems probable that the "300 veterans" of the Spanish were no part of a distinct corps, but individuals who, in consequence of the rule of the Spanish army, of existing for limited service, were found among the population now armed and organized; but, be that as it may, and whether serving together, or (as more probable) in the capacity of non-commissioned officers, here is an army of volunteers with a few veteran individuals in its ranks as can be supposed ever to happen, and yet, so far is it from being a mere "depository of panic," that it "attacks the enemies' batteries with the bayonet, with such ardour and celerity, they have scarce time to think of resistance, they

are defeated, they perish, or fly under the impulse of terror"—They attempt to rally, "in order to reconquer what they had so ignominiously lost," but it is impracticable. Although a remnant of their force is preserved by their protecting cavalry, yet, leaving behind them artillery, small arms, ammunition, wheat, and plunder, and carrying off "30 waggons filled with the wounded," in the course of the night after the battle, which had "commenced at 7 in the morning and lasted until late in the evening," they seek for safety in flight. But here again, so keen was the pursuit that they had to sustain "various encounters on the road to Barcelona, in all of which they proved to be in a state of complete disorder, and, at every step of their progress, many of them paid the forfeit of their lives, so that their dead almost touched each other as they fled, until their arrival at Barcelona, with a remnant of about 800, for the preservation of which a corps advanced from that city." Of what befel the other division which fled to Figueras, in an opposite direction, the writer of the dispatch does not appear to have been acquainted, but he had informed us that both divisions were "pursued by Milans and Glairos, in the routes which they had respectively taken," whence we may naturally suppose that those who fled to Figueras did not escape unpunished.—Such, Sir, are the facts, but what is the moral?—It is that which is everywhere inculcated in the *Ægis*, that a regular army, necessary as it may be for invading other countries, or for foreign service of every kind is *not necessary for a nation's defence*. Nor will it be any impeachment of this doctrine, should Spain, now she has got a general Junta or Regency, increase her regular force in any degree to which her finances may extend. The raising of the siege of Gerona and the defeat of Duhesme will still remain upon record to prove, *that a regular army is not necessary for the defence of a nation*.

I am, nevertheless, Sir, well aware of sound reasons why Spain, under her present circumstances, may adopt the expedient of increasing her regular force. Her militia is on a bad model, she never had such a system as the English posse comitatus. Perfect as in its own nature that system is, yet even in England a plan for restoring it to "full vigour and energy," according to the wish of Sir William Jones, has got no nearer adoption than being in manuscript, as the draught of a parliamentary bill. Meanwhile, Spain has not a moment to lose. Although armed patriots,

fighting for the liberties of their country, will ever be greatly superior to any mercenary enemies, even number for number, man for man, whenever the battle comes to be decided by *the bayonet*, yet, in manœuvring and tactics, regular troops who are soldiers and nothing else, and whose whole time is devoted to soldiership, ought to have a superiority over a patriot militia, who are citizens as well as soldiers. On this account Spain will probably augment her regular force. But the more she reflects on her present situation, which imperiously demands every arm that can wield a weapon, the sooner she will discover that her main reliance must not be on regular armies. In proportion as her defenders shall be numerous, she may dispense with superior skill in manœuvring; for, after all that ever was or ever can be advanced in support of military science in manœuvring, such science is but a substitute for physical strength, whereby the regular gains the flanks of his less expert adversary, or some equivalent advantage: but when the contest is between an *army* and an *armed nation*, the flanks of the latter never can be turned. It is superior in front; it will soon have a great force on each flank of the invader; and, if he dare to advance, it must likewise occupy his rear with troops through which he never can cut his retreat. In short, under circumstances in which manœuvring can be of no avail, the time and the money that have been spent in their acquisition have been thrown away; for the invader cannot avoid a decision *by the bayonet*, in which case, as before observed, he must be, man to man, inferior; and when, likewise, he must be surrounded by thrice or four times his number, his destruction must be as certain as any demonstration in Euclid; for, independent of the operation of the bayonet in the hands of an enraged people, warring themselves on mercenary instruments of despotism attempting their subjugation and slavery, invaders, once hemmed in by surrounding armies of patriots, cannot long have either food or sleep. When we are comparing regulars and a patriot militia, it is always to be presumed that the latter are to be taught to use fire-arms, so as to destroy enemies without danger to friends, and the necessary tactics for each man keeping his station in any necessary evolution of his battalion. This is very soon taught, and this is all that is essential, except mere attention, and a steady obedience to what is ordered. Law, and a sense of the necessity, must therefore soon make as good soldiers of a patriot militia as the defence of a

country can require. And the same law can furnish artillery in any number, and provide for its education.

But, Sir, there are some amongst us who are, it seems, troubled with an apprehension, that all this gallantry of the Spanish people is to prove of no avail towards bettering their political condition. They see nothing encouraging in the *nature* of the contest; nor any thing to hope as to the *result*. Differing in opinion on these points with those by whom such sentiments are entertained, and wishing every question now applicable to Spain to be brought into discussion, as, in my judgment, such discussion were good both for Spain and for England, the following observations solicit a place in your Register.

First, then, touching the *nature* of the contest, I do not apprehend, that, on the part of the Spaniards, the war against the Bonapartes is a mere war of the priests, for preserving the sway they have over the minds of the people, which would soon cease under a French government. Neither can I be persuaded, that all the exertion and animation I see on the part of many Spaniards of rank, in rousing their countrymen to arms and leading them to battle, is a mere factious effort for either restoring the corruptions of the Bourbon government, or for placing the government exclusively in the hands of the aristocracy.

Some individuals, indeed, may be wholly influenced by selfish and factious motives; and some tincture even of such motives may possibly be mingled with more generous sentiments in the minds of others; but, from the peculiar nature of this case, so calculated in all respects to inspire a real patriotism, and furnishing so glorious an opportunity for the complete deliverance of Spain, it would be an impeachment of the common sense and taste of all the enlightened men of that nation, as well as of their virtue, to believe they could resist the temptation of being real patriots on such an occasion. In what other way can a Spaniard, at the present juncture, rise to eminence? Spain must either receive the French yoke, or she must resist. She must either fall, or triumph. There is no medium. And she has no means of a successful resistance, but in arms and liberty. Is not this enough to fire every Spanish mind with patriot virtue? And when that high-minded people shall have thus, after a bloody struggle, repelled the French usurper, will it be possible for their leaders to descend from that lofty freedom they must then possess, to crouch again under the despotism of royal drivellers, or the

infamous corruptions of Godoy? This is what I cannot believe. On the authority, indeed, of one who is near the scene of action, I am taught to believe, that, notwithstanding the respect paid to the name of Ferdinand VII., the object of the most distinguished leaders is a complete reformation of government, as a basis of real liberty, and it seems reasonable to conclude that this must be the case, when we reflect on the gigantic power of the invader, and on the impossibility of animating the people by *any other hope or motive*, to that patience under suffering, to that enthusiasm in the cause, and to that contempt of danger and death, which are indispensably necessary to success.—And why are we not to conceive it possible that even in a Roman Catholic country, and one in which the nobles do not want pride, a priesthood and a nobility should be capable of patriotism? Those nobles who secured us Magna Charta were proud enough in ultramoun, they were Roman Catholics, and had moreover at their head a Romish priest, a bishop, and cardinal—Stephen Langton. But the fact is, that whatever might be the leaning of their own inclinations against popular freedom from the prejudices of their respective orders, they were in a situation in which they had to choose between favouring real public liberty, and submitting their own necks to a hateful and disgusting yoke. And are not the priesthood and nobility of Spain now in the same predicament? So much, then, for the nature of the contest.

I come now to the *hopes* which may be entertained of a beneficial result. What, indeed, is there not to be hoped for, when we see a nation, as one man, fly to arms, on an attempt against its independence? I perfectly well know the essential difference there is, between independence and liberty—between Spain being exempt from the domination of France, and enjoying a truly free government of her own choosing. Undoubtedly a government merely Spanish, that government might indeed be independent while the nation might be enslaved. Spain lately was. But is it to be believed that her despotic government under the Bourbons having been annihilated, and the whole nation having taken up arms to save itself from the despotism of another family, Spain should be so besotted as to wade through her own blood to place herself in her late abject slavery again? Those who have faith enough to believe this, must be as expert at believing as any pope on earth could wish.—Is it not evident, that the armed union, which shall be sufficient to re-

sist France, must be all powerful to recover those ancient liberties which the Spanish nation, with extreme indignation, saw torn from them by Charles V. and his gloomy son? And when the French armies shall be repelled, and the modelling of the government shall be in the hands of the victorious patriots, without either the presence of royal personages debauched by power, or their corrupt minions, to counteract their designs for the public good, can any human being doubt of their best endeavours to establish it on the solid foundations of political liberty, protected by a national Congress? Upon the whole, in the armed population I see the materials of success, in the general junta, just assembled, the means of organizing, harmonizing, and directing these materials, and, in their now free press, the mental nutriment for supplying energy and enthusiasm.—The honest mass of every people, who have virtue enough to fight for their country, are ever ready to fix a government, and all they want as leaders of strict and sound knowledge and integrity, for preserving what is intrinsically good.

A little reflection on the constitution of human nature, and on that faculty of reason which places us above the condition of the brute creation, will convince us that this must be so. And there seems good ground for concluding that, on the present occasion, there is sufficient virtue among the higher classes in Spain, to establish that union between the nobility and the commons *the want of which caused the loss of their liberties under their former monarchs*, and the peculiar degradation of the nobles.

At the period now spoken of, there was among the commons of Spain more knowledge on the subject of civil government than among any other people in Europe, those of England not excepted, and, had not the extravagant pretensions of the nobility, imbibed from the feudal system, which had proved the bane instead of the preserver of the ancient liberties, then prevented a cordial union between the two classes, Spain would probably have set an example to mankind, which was reserved for England a century and a half afterwards. I do not mean of expelling a tyrannical king; but of declaring the rights of a people, and laying thereon the foundations of government. Between the events alluded to and the present there are striking resemblances. The Spanish sovereign was absent from his dominions, by the ill conduct of his ministers he had lost the esteem and affection of his subjects, the people, exasperated by many injuries, had taken arms, *though with-*

out concert, almost by general consent." Their first care "was to establish some form of union, that they might act with greater regularity, and pursue one common end."—"Assuming the name of the holy *Junta* or association, they proceeded to deliberate concerning the state of the nation, and the proper method of redressing its grievances." Happily for Spain, in the present juncture, their king cannot now follow the example of her then absent monarch, who, in circular letters to all the cities, endeavoured by mild but insidious language to divert them from their purpose; while, to the nobles, whom before he had treated with contempt and endeavoured to humble, he wrote others "exciting them to appear with vigour in defence of their own rights, and those of the crown." By these letters, by seeming concessions, and other flatteries, he but too well succeeded with this order of men.

"The *Junta*, relying on the unanimity with which the nation submitted to their authority, elated with the success which hitherto had accompanied all their undertakings, and seeing no military force collected to defeat or obstruct their designs, aimed at a more thorough reformation of political abuses." What we in England have called a Bill of Rights, they termed a Remonstrance. It contained between thirty and forty articles, amongst which were these;—"That no foreign troops shall, on any pretence whatever, be introduced into the kingdom;" doubtless meaning to prevent soldiers from the king's German dominions being brought into Spain to favour arbitrary designs; "that all new offices created since the death of queen Isabella (Charles's grandmother) shall be abolished;—that the crown shall not influence or direct any city with regard to the choice of its representatives;—that no member of the Cortes shall receive an office or pension from the king, either for himself or for any of his family, under pain of death, and confiscation of his goods;—that each city, or community, shall pay a competent salary to its representatives for his maintenance during his attendance on the Cortes;—that all privileges which the nobles have at any time obtained, to the prejudice of the commons, shall be revoked;—that the lands of the nobles shall be subject to all taxes in the same manner as those of the commons;—that indulgences shall not be preached or dispersed in the kingdom until the cause of publishing them be examined and approved of by the Cortes;—and that the king shall ratify, and hold as good service done to him and to the kingdom all the proceedings of the *Junta*."

Unfortunately, Sir, the nobles, who, instead of obstructing, had favoured or connived at their proceedings, while they confined their demands of redress to such "grievances" as had proceeded only from kings and ministers,* no sooner perceived that their own exorbitant privileges, especially the exemption of their estates from all public taxes, were thought grievances, than they fell off from the cause of reformation and liberty, and, by siding with the crown against the *Junta*, encouraged Charles in the prosecution of his views; whereby he in the end completely established that absolute dominion which has now for nearly three centuries kept their order in a state of mortifying degradation, and lain so heavily on the loins of the whole Spanish nation.

When too late, they became sensible of their error; and it is to be hoped that their posterity of this day, who have now the most favourable opportunity, that was ever presented to the patriots of any nation, to establish its freedom on sure foundations, will prove more virtuous. The bitter remembrance of the despotism that has been experienced, with all its oppressions and abominations, which have in all ways proved the direst curses of their country, must surely have power to inspire them with a sincere desire of now cordially uniting with the commons, in a dispassionate view of those principles of government under which the rights of all classes are secured, and by which the political liberty, prosperity, and happiness of a nation can alone be provided for. I do not mean to disguise, that the Spanish commons of that day, when they discovered fraudulent practices for counteracting their patriotism, were in some instances more governed by their passions than their reasons; thereby furnishing the nobles with an apology they eagerly caught at for their conduct in not having united with them; which, had they done in time, would doubtless have secured to the nobility every modification of the "Remonstrance," which could in reason have been required.

When, as I have said, it was too late, the Spanish nobles, in the year 1539, then sensible of the error of their former conduct, "demanded a conference with the representatives of the cities concerning the state of the nation," and made representations to the king; but he was then become too strong for their united opposition. He dismissed the Cortes of Castile, then assembled at Toledo, "with great indignation," and "from that period neither the nobles nor the prelates have been called to these assemblies, on pretence that such as pay no part of the public taxes, should claim no

vote in laying them on. None have been admitted to the Cortes but the procurators or representatives of eighteen cities. These, to the number of 36, being two from each community, form an assembly which bears no resemblance either in power or dignity or independence to the ancient Cortes, and are *absolutely at the devotion of the court in all their determinations.*"

In the constitution manufactured by Buonaparte at Bayonne, this skeleton of representation, for a nation of 8 millions of souls, is carefully copied; whereas, in the year 1390, forty-eight cities of only Castile sent their deputies to the Cortes, to the number of 125, as they chose more or fewer according to their population; and it made part of the claim of the national Junta above-mentioned, that each city of Spain should send three.*—The circumstances of government, and the state of the national revenue and expenditure, not having in those days opened the eyes of mankind to all the uses of legislative representation, the Spanish Junta of 1520, demand "that the Cortes shall assemble once in three years at least, whether summoned by the king or not, and shall then inquire into the observation of the articles now agreed upon, and deliberate concerning public affairs;" and here again nearly three centuries afterwards, and when, for the purposes of salutary government, annual legislation is become as necessary as an annual harvest, the Corsican lawgiver was pleased to grant, that the Cortes shall meet *once at least in three years*; but he took especial care that it should only assemble by summons of the king; and that, unless by his order, it should neither be dissolved, nor prorogued, nor even *adjourned*; and he was to dismiss it when he pleased; so that, although its meeting should have been according to the letter of such a constitution, the moment it should attempt to deliberate on any point not pleasing to the king, who would be sure of the earliest intelligence of what was going on in such an assembly, of whom its president was to have been of his appointment, he was to have the power of dissolution. Its votes were to be taken by ballot; so that no member could know how another voted. Its sittings were not to be public; so that no constituents could have the smallest knowledge how their representatives conducted themselves; and the publishing

of any of its proceedings, either votes or opinions, either in print or writing, even by a member of the Cortes, was to be punishable as an act of insurrection. After an attempt so diabolical, it should seem probable that ere a Buonaparte can be established on the throne of Spain, the nation must be more than half exterminated. It was thus that he was to improve upon the government of the Bourbons! It was thus that he was to reform Spanish abuses! It was thus that he was to exalt the character of Spain among the nations!

In my last letter I touched on the essentials of such a government, as can alone confer freedom on Spain, and enable her to defy the power of the Corsican. Those essentials are, a national arming on the true principles of freedom, and a legislative assembly on the true principles of representation. In neither of these particulars must Spain expect full instruction, from recurring to her own annals in times past. In respect of the former, her best model was the *Holy Brotherhood*, or *Santa Hermandad*, first instituted in the year 1260. This was a mere voluntary association of the cities for protection in travelling, and to establish a martial police, for reforming the anarchy, rapine, outrage, and murders, which had grown out of the inherent defects of the feudal system, and the frequent civil wars between the crown and the nobility, as well as between baron and baron. The association was supported by contributions exacted from each city; it raised a considerable body of troops; it pursued criminals, and it appointed judges to try them. Although displeasing to the nobles, it took root, and so well answered the ends of its institution, that it acquired a sort of prescriptive establishment, insomuch, that it afterwards received the entire countenance of Ferdinand, as a valuable counterpoize against the barons, whose power he desired to reduce; and he even extended its authority beyond those parts to which it had till that time been restricted. On one occasion the Hermandad furnished that prince with 16,000 beasts of burthen, together with 8,000 men to conduct them. It has still an existence in Spain, for purposes of police: but when this institution is compared with that of the English *posse comitatus*, which was coeval with the constitution, and therefore an elder brother to the feudal system; and which, under the organization of Alfred, became the most perfect system of police the world ever experienced, while it was not only consistent with, but the very soul of political liberty;—when, I say, the Spa-

* It appears from the Magna Charta of John, signed in the year 1215, that there were then *four* knights of the shire in each English county; a circumstance overlooked by the Yorkshire reformers in 1760.

nish Hermandad is compared with the English posse, it is too defective to serve as any model for the present day; whereas that ancient institution of our own country wants only to be revived and cherished as it deserves to be, to constitute the most perfect defence of which a nation can by any possibility be capable; for, it is to be remembered, that it does not exclude the employment of any number of regular troops which exigencies may require, and it is capable of furnishing every other species of martial force that can be wanting, and under such discipline as the safety of the state may render necessary; and notwithstanding the neglect it experiences, *because of its perfect congeniality with national liberty*, those by whom it is understood, know it to be the only system which, in the day of trial, can put at the disposal of the government the entire strength of the nation; and with such admirable effect and precision, as to bring into action, for the public defence, every particle of the physical strength of its population, with perfect order and regularity.

Now, Sir, with regard to a future representation of Spain in a Cortes, it is certain, that although she may look back to periods of freedom with instruction as well as with pride, she has many reasons for not binding herself down to any precise precedent in her ancient practice; for, prior to the æra when her political liberties were overturned, there had been no general Cortes for all Spain, and there were material diversities in the laws of the several kingdoms of which Spain is at this time composed. Down to that æra likewise, representation had been in use among the northern nations, which bore down the Roman empire, rather as an indisputable right, than as a system of refined policy; rather as that which they felt to be necessary to liberty, than that of which they had studied the nature as a science. It is not therefore to be wondered at, that in Spain, as well as in every other nation to which representation was known, its distribution was not originally regulated by correct notions of equality; nor its purity and independence so guarded, as experience has known to be necessary. It has been only in consequence of the wicked and unceasing arts and efforts of arbitrary princes and corrupt statesmen, either altogether to rob the nation of this shield of freedom, or to render it useless to the people, and an instrument of mischief in the hand of the prince, that the learned and the virtuous have studied it scientifically, as by far the most important branch of civil government, next to a free militia. Among the defects

of former times in Castile, touching representation, it seems that the city of Toledo and perhaps others, did not even elect their deputies; but that the citizens cast lots, and those two on whom the lots happened to fall, served in consequence. The absurdity, however, of such a proceeding became apparent, when, during a public agitation between the Emperor Charles and his Spanish subjects, or on a point affecting their liberties, the lot fell on two persons known to be devoted to the Flemish faction. On this unfortunate event, the citizens refused to grant a commission in the usual form; and proceeded to elect two other deputies, whom they empowered and instructed to repair to Compostella, in Galicia, to protest against a Cortes for Castile being there held, as against law. I cannot, however, omit an admirable practice which ought to be in use with every nation that enjoys representative freedom; it was the custom for a Castilian deputy, when he returned from the Cortes, to assemble his constituents and give them an account of his conduct.—The quotations made from Spanish history are from Dr. Robertson.—I remain, Sir, &c.

Enfield,

J. CARTWRIGHT.

27th Sept. 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.—*From the London Gazette Extraordinary, continued from Page 513.*

Art. I. There shall be from the present date a suspension of arms between the forces of his Britannic majesty and those of his imperial and royal majesty Napoleon I, in order to treating for a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army.—II. The generals in chief of the two armies, and the admiral commander-in-chief of his Britannic majesty's fleet off the mouth of the Tagus, shall fix upon a day whereon to meet on such point of the coast as shall be thought fit, in order to treat for and conclude said Convention.—III. The river Sirander shall form the line of demarcation between the two armies: Torres Vedras shall not be occupied by either.—IV. The commander-in-chief of the British army shall engage to include the Portuguese armies in this Convention, and their line of demarcation shall be from Leira to Thurmar.—V. It is provisionally agreed, that the French army shall in no case be considered prisoners of war; that all those of whom it consists shall be conveyed to France, with arms and baggage, and all their private property of every description, no part of which shall be wrested from,

them.—VI. No individual, whether native of Portugal or a country in alliance with France, or of France, shall be molested for his political conduct; they shall be protected in their persons, their properties respected, and they shall be at liberty to remove from Portugal with what belongs to them within a stipulated time.—VII. The neutrality of the port of Lisbon shall be recognised with regard to the Russian fleet: that is to say, when the British army or fleet shall be in possession of the city and port, the same fleet shall not be molested during its continuance there, nor obstructed when leaving it, nor followed after it shall have quitted that port, before the time prescribed by the maritime laws.—VIII. All the artillery of French calibre, as also all the horses of the French cavalry, shall be transported to France.—IX. This suspension of arms shall not be broke without forty-eight hours notice.—Made and agreed upon by the fore-mentioned Generals.—(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY. KELLERMANN, Gen. of Division.

Additional Article.—The garrisons of the places occupied by the French army shall be included in the present Convention, if they shall not have capitulated before the 25th instant. (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY. KELLERMANN, Gen. of Division. (A true Copy)—A. J. DALRYMPLE, Captain, Military Secretary.

Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army.

The generals commanding in chief the British and French armies in Portugal, having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22d inst. for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the under-mentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names, viz.—On the part of the general in chief of the British army, lieutenant-col. Murray, quarter-master general; and on the part of the general in chief of the French army, M. Kellerman, general of division, to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus. These two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow:—Art. I. All the places and forts in the kingdom of

Portugal, occupied by the French troops, shall be delivered up to the British army, in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.—II. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and, on their arrival in France, they shall be at liberty to serve.—III. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France, between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively.—IV. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils, supplied with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery, arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the convention.—V. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospitals, or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner, all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.—VI. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is however fully understood that the means of conveyance for horses at the disposal of the British commanders are very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon; the number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed six hundred, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed two hundred. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.—VII. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV. No. 15.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

The merit of the ministers in sending out this expedition, in their plan of operations, in their choice of a commander, and in every part of the enterprise, no man of a just mind, will, whatever be his sentiments in other respects, attempt to deny. The would, if the thing had failed, have been loaded with no small share of the blame; it would, therefore, be the height of injustice to withhold from them their share of the praise."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XIV. p. 386.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.—This subject may now, until the makers of the Convention return home, receive its dismissal, every material question relating to it having been discussed, and having been pretty clearly decided in the public mind. It is settled, that the thing was, in itself, disgraceful to our arms; that it was, in its effects, injurious to our allies of Portugal in particular, and to those of Spain and Sweden; that it was insulting, to the last degree, to the Prince Regent of Portugal and to his faithful adherents; that there existed, not only no necessity for making it, but that obvious policy pointed out an exactly contrary course; and, lastly, that the blame is equally divided between Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Wellesley, the latter, if any difference, meriting the greatest share.—We have, however, to consider what share of blame attaches to the *ministers*, and particularly the *war minister*, for having made such appointments; and, I think, the words which I have taken for my motto, and which were written before any one had the smallest doubt of the final success of the expedition, will fully justify me in imputing to them no small share of blame.—It has always been the practice of the public to blame the ministers for the follies or vices of those whom they appoint to command; and, that this is generally just no one will deny; because, in a state of things, where there are so many temptations for them to seek, in such appointments, their own or their party's interest, in preference to that of the public, there ought to be some check upon them, which check is to be found only in that responsibility, which the public has a right to demand at their hands. Were there no blame, in cases of this sort, to attach to them, with what reason can we expect that they will ever make good appointments, unless we choose to suppose, that wisdom, courage, and integrity are inseparable from parliamentary interest? That every minister must *wish* to see his military and naval plans succeed is evident enough; but, the mo-

ment a. expedition is on foot; that is to say, the moment any lucrative and honourable appointments are to be made, that moment is he assailed with applications, backed by such arguments as are not to be treated with contempt, unless he choose to run the risk of being out voted, and of losing his place, his emoluments, and his power. This being the case, it is quite reasonable that there should be a check upon him, in this respect. He appoints, at last, whom he pleases to appoint; but, then, it being notorious, that his interest may be affected in his appointments, he becomes responsible to the public for the disgrace or the injury it may sustain from the misconduct of those whom he selects, and invests with commands.—Upon these principles the public have always proceeded. The late ministers were blamed for the folly, or the cowardice, of their commanders in Egypt and in South America; and, why should not these ministers be blamed for the conduct of Wellesley and Sir Hew? As to Sir Hew, I had never heard any harm of him, to be sure; but I had never heard any good of him, because, until the Portuguese expedition, I had never heard his uncouth name pronounced in my whole life. His being utterly unknown to every body, except, perhaps, that silly part of the public, who waste six or eight minutes every day in reading what is called "the *court news*," was of itself a reason for his not being appointed to the command of an expedition of such immense importance to the country. It is said, with what truth I do not know, that he is a relation of Mr. George Rose. If this be the fact, we need not wonder so much why he was selected. But, be this as it may, the ministers *knew him well*, or they did not know him well: if the former, they sinned in appointing a man whom they knew to be unfit for a great command; and, if the latter, they sinned in committing the honour of England and the welfare of her allies to the hands of a man, whom they did not well know. It is their business, they are paid well for it, to examine into, to ascertain,

to make themselves sure, as to the character and abilities of those whom they invest with high authority, and on whom they bestow large emoluments. When we complain of the weight of taxes, and of the great sums which public men receive out of the fruit of our labour, we are always reminded of the arduous duties they have to perform and of the weight of responsibility that rests upon their shoulders; and, we are asked, whether any man, possessing great talents and high rank, can be expected to exert those talents for the public and to incur such heavy responsibility, without the security of a suitable compensation. I appeal to the reader, whether this be not, upon such occasions, the argument constantly used. Well, then, if the men, whom we pay at such an enormous rate, and who, if they serve us but for a few years, are saddled upon our devoted ass-like backs for life, accompanied, perhaps, with paniers containing their wives and children; if these men be so wonderfully gifted as to merit all this, have we not a right to expect, and even to demand, at their hands, the selection of proper commanders? Have we not a right to demand proofs of their discriminating powers, of their judgment, and of their firmness in resisting applications, which, if yielded to, would be injurious to us? And, when is it that we are to call upon them for their far famed "responsibility," if not when we have suffered an injury from the conduct of persons appointed by them? If this be not the true meaning of ministerial responsibility, what is its meaning? If they are to appoint whom they please to command our troops; if they are to commit our honour and our safety to the hands of their own relations, or to those of others who will vote for them in the parliament house, and if, when that honour and that safety have been sacrificed, we are to be told that the ministers are not responsible, I beg leave to be informed of the cases, wherein they acknowledge responsibility.—Wellesley was well-known to them. It is notorious, that he was an inmate with them. I believe he is, even now, one of the principal officers of the government of Ireland. They must have known him well; and, as to their saying, "*who would have thought*" him capable of taking the lead in such a deed as that committed in Portugal, we are not so to be answered: "I should have thought; many others would have thought it; and, at any rate, it was so. That is enough for us." Wellesley was *one of themselves*; chosen from their own body; they had previously committed the government (for his was the really effi-

cient office) of a third part of the kingdom to his hands; they must know his character and every part of his character well, or they were too stupid to be entrusted with the management of the affairs of a parish. And, shall they not now be responsible for his conduct? He was, I repeat it, *one of themselves*. He went out as their immediate representative. Shall they not, then, be answerable for what he has done?—The ultimate consequences of the Convention cannot yet be known: but, we know, that it has filled our allies in Portugal with disgust and indignation, and that these *must* operate to the injury of both nations is certain. We know also, that the sending home of five or six thousand Russian officers and seamen *must* be injurious to Sweden as well as to ourselves. And, as to Spain, we have the strongest reason to believe, that our conduct in Portugal, must excite suspicion and distrust amongst all our allies, more especially amongst those in Spain. There, if our troops are now sent, our commanders will, in all human probability, have little or nothing confided to them. Spain, who looks up to us for assistance of every sort, is just in that state, in which *distrust* is most likely to be fatal. Can any man reasonably hope, that we have not excited distrust of us, by our conduct in Portugal? And, if we have, who will take upon him to say, that, from the date of the Convention, the ruin of the Spanish cause began? We see, that Buonaparté is making great exertions for the reduction of Spain. The people of that country cannot be unaware of the danger. If they distrust us, they will cool in spite of all the boasts at the London Tavern and all the odes of poet Fitzgerald. How different would the feelings of Spain as well as of England have been, at this moment, had we *captured* Junot and his army? In short, if the Spanish patriots should be subdued; if their cause should now begin to be deserted, it may, in great part, be fairly attributed to this Convention. And, shall the people of England call upon no one for responsibility? Shall those, who appointed the commanders, and who had so many persons amongst whom to choose, plead not guilty to this heavy charge?—If Spain fall, let England take care. "*Colonies!*" Napoleon Joseph is not fool, is not ass, is not stupid beast enough to set any value upon them. Give him Spain, and he will very willingly leave in our hands the mines that have hitherto proved a curse to Spain; and will leave us, as a make weight in the bargain, all the feuds, the commotions, the expensive and bloody wars, which would inevitably arise out

of our possession of those colonies. Should Spain fall, is there any man who will say, that that fatal event has not been accelerated by the Convention in Portugal? And shall not the ministers be responsible for the conduct of those who made that convention?—"Why *whom* were they to choose?" Oh, insulted nation! It is not for them to ask thee whom they were to choose; but for thee to ask them, whether they could not have made a better choice out of a Staff establishment that costs thee nearly a *million sterling* a year. It was for thee to ask them, whether that Staff, which exceeds in number the whole of the standing army of England in the reign of Charles II, would not afford generals enough for the command of thirty thousand men, without taking one of the ministry of Ireland for the purpose. This is by no means the least mortifying part of the story. We are a nation be-generalled from head to foot. There is scarcely a parish wherein some general does not reside. "The general and his aide-de-camps" make the dust fly from one end of the country to the other; and yet, when we find fault of an appointment of generals, we are asked, "why, whom were the ministers to choose?" We have sent only about a tenth part of our force to Portugal, and if we could not find good commanders for them, what is to become of the rest? "A *military nation*," indeed! We are a pretty military nation, if, when only a tenth part of our force be sent out, and that, too, upon a service the most important, we are unable to select generals better than those, who made the Convention in Portugal, and when one pleads in favour of the ministers, is, that they had not the means of making a better selection. — There has been, as far as the public can perceive, nothing done yet in the way of *recalling*. Nothing has been done; not even the previous steps, have been taken, for the purpose of doing the nation justice. There has dropped from the ministers not one word, tending to shew, that they have a design to do us justice. Their intention appears to be, to let the thing remain quiet; to say nothing and do nothing; to let the public rage exhaust itself, and when it has died away, to smuggle in the commanders, having given them and their friends an abundance of time for the contriving of excuses of all sorts and sizes. This may, very probably, succeed; but, if it should, it will bring with it one source of consolation, at any rate, that, in future, the success of Napoleon will become a matter of indifference. — Remember, reader; always remember,

that, in the Official Gazette, which contained the documents relative to the Convention, the *armistice*, which was the most important of the documents, because it was the basis of all the rest, was inserted in the *French* language only, while all the others were inserted in the *English* language only. It was Sir Arthur Wellesley who negotiated and signed the armistice; and, the ministers at home, his colleagues in office, publish that document to the people of England in the *French* language only. One other fact, pray, note down and remember; that we pay a man, called "the *GAZETTE WRITER*," three hundred pounds a year out of the taxes; though, as you must perceive, he has nothing to do but merely to see that publications of this sort are correct. Neither the ministers, nor any of their writers, have attempted to say, that this partial insertion was owing to *mistake*, or to the misconduct of their *underlings*; we have, therefore, a right to conclude, that it was wilful, and to draw, from that fact, the natural inference, which is, that they mean to shelter Wellesley. This, however, they cannot do, unless they shelter Sir Hew. Sir Hew will speak in his own defence, I warrant him; and, he will find, at his back, the same interest that procured him the command. Come, come, then, Sir Hewy, and let us hear you. "Had I three ears I'd hear thee;" but the ministers will, I dare say, take care, that none of us shall hear you for some time yet to come. They will let us *cool* first. Their study, at present, seems to be, not so much to overcome Buonaparté as to overcome us. Instead of the defence of the country, they seem to be thinking of the defence of its generals. Poor Whitelocke, had you no friends at home! What! could you not muster up a single half dozen of hags to rattle over the pavement intrigue for you? Unfortunate and careless man, not to provide for a safe retreat, in case of disaster! Another time (for there can be now no earthly objection to your being sent out the chief in command) you will, I dare say, profit from the experience now before you, and will, above all things, take care, that you negotiate in *French*. — Below will be found two letters upon this subject, which I beg leave to point out to the attention of my readers. The first touches upon some points that had escaped me, and puts several questions, to which I should like to hear an answer given. His praise of my endeavours might have been spared; and, upon a future occasion, if he should think proper to address the public through me, I shall be obliged to

him to refrain from the like, because a plain unvarnished declaration of acquiescence in opinion, and of approbation of my conduct, is better calculated to answer the purpose in view, and is much more gratifying to myself.—The second letter is the vehicle of sentiments precisely the opposite of those contained in the one just mentioned. It evidently comes from a friend, if not relation of Wellesley; and, though, for the greater part, it consists of a repetition of the statements and reasoning, which I have already quoted from the Nabob's Gazette (commonly called the *Morning Post*), and which I have, I trust, pretty completely refuted, there is a point or two, upon which it touches, that I cannot let pass unnoticed.—The writer appears to be of opinion, that what I have written is likely to produce an effect hostile to his friend, therefore he endeavours to find out for me a motive for misrepresenting his conduct. He says, that my hatred of the Wellesleys for having been the firm friends of the late Mr. Pitt has induced me to disfigure facts in order to injure Sir A. Wellesley in the public opinion. Now, in the first place, I never knew the Wellesleys as adherents of Pitt, that famous talker being, fortunately for the nation, dead before they came flocking home from India, where they had been so long engaged in glorious wars against the native Viziers and Aumils. But, how does this imputation tally with the notorious fact? Did I, when the news of the victory, in Portugal, came, seem grudging of my praises of the commander's conduct? Did I not attribute the victory to him alone; and did I not put the victory upon a level, as to its probable consequences, with that of Trafalgar? Should I have done this, if my hatred against the Wellesleys, on account of their attachment to Pitt (or rather to their own selfish views through Pitt) had so completely subduced in my mind all sense of impartiality and of justice. There were two lights, in which the Portuguese victories might have been spoken of; there were two lights, in which Wellesley's dispatches might have been exhibited to the public; and, if I chose that which was, in both cases, most favourable to Wellesley, will the public believe, that I have since been actuated by motives of personal or party hatred? When am I to hear the last of this hatred of mine against the friends of "the late Mr. Pitt?" I can publish no account of speculation, of folly, or of cowardice; I can detect or expose no rascal whatever, but I am instantly accused of being actuated by motives of hatred on account of the party's friendship

for "the late Mr. Pitt." No matter that I publish well-known facts; that I extract from official reports or accounts; that I quote their own speeches or pamphlets; that I prove by the fairest and clearest of arguments; still the answer to me is, not that I have stated falsehoods, not that my reasoning is unsound; but, that I harbour a rancour against the party on account of his attachment to "the late Mr. Pitt." I believe from my soul, that, if, being driven from higher game, one of the speculating gang were to be taken in the act of robbing a hen-roost, or picking a pocket, he would plead in his defence, that his prosecutor was actuated, not by his love of justice, but by his hatred of the offender, on account of that offender's attachment to "the late Mr. Pitt." This is coming to a fine pass, indeed! Why, we shall be told, anon, that the cuckoldom, which has of late, been, unhappily, so rife amongst the sect, is to be ascribed to the same malicious motive. It is base and silly to talk of party motives in such a case; and, it is always a proof of a bad cause, when the defendant answers the proofs or arguments of the accuser by a mere imputation of malicious motives. I may be a very malicious and implacable man, and I may hate the Wellesleys; but, the question now is, whether, with respect to Portuguese Wellesley's conduct I have reasoned fairly upon acknowledged truths, or not? If the latter, let it be shown; if the former, this writer may be assured, that his client will derive but little advantage from any imputation of motives that his imagination is able to invent.—This writer says, that Wellesley did protest *privately* against the Convention, and, for proof of his assertion, he appeals to the many "private letters that have been received from the army," which private letters I had, as the reader will bear in mind, represented as base fabrications. Now, says this acute gentleman, "you have called them *lies*, but you will find it difficult to make the public believe that so many persons of high honour would have concurred in the statement of what was totally false." So I should; but he forgets, that it has not yet been proved, that any letter from a person of high honour, or that any letter at all, has been received from the army, containing such a statement. Extract upon extract from such described letters have, indeed, been published in many of the news-papers, and particularly in the Nabob's Gazette; but, where have we seen any voucher for their authenticity? Has there appeared one with *any name* to it?

Has there appeared one with the name of either the writer or the receiver? No: and the man, who, in the letter before me, takes upon him to argue upon the pretended *facts* contained in those letters; takes upon him to assert that their authors are all persons of high honour; even this man has the prudence not to favour either me or the public with his name. Is it after this fashion that I proceed? Have I dealt in such nameless, unowned, bastard like documents? No: I have taken the official papers, have reasoned from their contents, and have, as premises, resorted to no facts, which are not universally admitted to be true.— By way of conclusion, I will point out a light in which this pretended protest did not betray its nature, and in which it does not appear to have stricken even the editor of the Times newspaper, who has displayed so much acuteness and literary powers of every kind, in the course of this interesting discussion.—The statement of the friends of Wellesley, which statement is, in substance, repeated by my correspondent, is this:—Obedience is the soul of an army; a commander of an army must be as absolute as the Grand Turk; Sir Arthur Wellesley has been brought up in the school of obedience; he knew how great an injury it must be to the service, if he *publicly* protested against the convention; and, therefore, he confined his opposition to a protest *privately* made to the commander in chief. This is what they have said in his defence, over and over again, in various forms of words. Now, then, without asking whether the Wellesleys were remarkable for their obedience to the East India Directors, let us put the sincerity of this defence to the test. He protested *privately*, lest, by a public protest, he should create a division in the army, and thereby do great injury to the service. Now, ye canting hypocrites, if such were the fact and such the motive, how came you in possession of the knowledge of this protest? You are his close friends, perchance, and so he wrote home, unlocking his bosom to you, easing his agonized heart by communicating to you the proof of his innocence? No. This will not do; this will not serve your turn; for, you have told us before, that the facts relating to this protest have been communicated by the *officers of the army*. So that, taking the whole of your own statement as true; admitting all that you assert, Wellesley, who was convinced that the making of a public protest would be greatly injurious to the service, made a private protest to the commander-in-chief, and then, made an underhand

communication of that protest to the officers of the army. Attempt no shuffle, I beseech you. Let your friend be where he is. You have already besmeared him from head to foot; and, if your efforts at whitewashing are continued much longer, he will come out of your hands as black as a crow.

SPAIN.—Upon the affairs of this now most interesting part of the world there is a letter, written by Major Cartwright, and published in the last number of the Register, to which I beg leave to refer the reader. He will there see how the people of Spain formerly thought and with what spirit they acted, in matters relating to domestic freedom. It is surprising how strong a resemblance there is between what they sought to establish, in the reign of Charles V, and what was established in England a century later. I sincerely wish, that Major Cartwright, who with the experience of three-score, writes with the clearness and the vigour of the prime of life, and whose reasoning and eloquence come recommended by unquestionable disinterestedness and integrity, may succeed in his zealous and unwearied endeavours to rouse the feelings and direct the judgment of the present patriots of Spain.—I am not, nor can any rational man be, without some very serious apprehensions as to the result of the contest that is now about to begin; but, if a provisional government, capable of calling out and directing the force of the country, be speedily organized, I shall have great hopes of final success, notwithstanding any reverses that may, at the out-set, be experienced by the Spaniards. For, we seldom have heard of a whole people being subdued, if they were animated with one soul, and if that soul was bent upon obtaining freedom. The thing to be most feared is, that this all-powerful motive may not universally prevail; that the nobles, or the priests, or both, may look beyond the immediate object of the struggle, and may be grudging in their offers to the people, and also in point of confidence in their intercourse with them. If this should unhappily be the case; if the people should be treated with coolness, disgust will speedily succeed, the cause will soon fall to ruin, and those attacks, which in the other case, would have called forth the latent fire of patriotism, talent, and valour, will at once, extinguish every motive of resistance. It is quite shocking to think of an ancient nation consisting of so many millions of people being made over to, and taken possession of by, a man who was, but yesterday, a person unknown in the world; but, he comes backed with

terrible power, and to resist that power there must be a motive, and an adequate motive too.—In speaking of the operations of the war, the Fabian example of the Americans has been cited. But, we should bear in mind the vast difference in the circumstances. The nature of the two countries is, in the first place, very different. America was assailed by an enemy, who had all his troops, his horses, and his artillery, to send across the sea, a distance of, at least, a thousand leagues, and, it sometimes happened, that five or six months elapsed between the embarkation and the landing. Besides, the enemy whom America had to resist was of a very different character. We used no fire; we sacked no towns; we did not carry the torch in one hand and the sword in the other. Our generals were not Massenas and Junots. A standing toast at our head-quarters used to be, “a long war and a merciful one.” The Lanneses do not give such toasts. No: the Spaniards will want men very different from the Washingtons and the Lees. They will have to fight day after day and every day, and to withstand that terror, which the destructive progress of an army, accustomed to pillage and to all sorts of cruelty, cannot fail to inspire in the minds of the weaker part of the nation. — We must not, therefore, conclude, that the Spaniards will succeed, because the Americans did. If, indeed, we could prevail upon Buonaparte to send against them such generals as we sent to America (and we might be able, perhaps, to point out *some such* for the service), the Spanish cause would be safe; but, as things are, it must be confessed, that the struggle is an object of the utmost anxiety; and, it behoves us to think sometimes of what *our* measures ought to be, if the result should seat a Buonaparte upon the throne. — I like not, I must confess, the seeming banking after FERDINAND VII. The Spaniards have declared the late government to have been an infamous one. What sense is there, then, in their talk about a man, in whose person they must intend (if they intend to do any thing with him) to restore that government? I do not understand this. He has abdicated the throne; he has given up his claims to the sovereignty of Spain, in terms as explicit as a man can possibly use. There appears to be something like infatuation in carrying on a bloody war for him, or in making his restoration any part of the objects of such a war. This is, with me, a chilling circumstance. It takes largely from the ardour I should feel in the Spanish cause; for, after all, it is the good of the world in general and of Spain and of

England in particular that one ought to have at heart. I observe, that, in several of our writers, a *hatred of Napoleon* is the predominant feeling; and, what is the worst of it, the far greater part of them do not discover hatred of him in his character of *despot*, but in his character of *conqueror*. Now, it is, I presume, in the former character, that he is the most decidedly entitled to *our* hatred; but, then, the difficulty is, that there are *other* despots, whom we profess not to hate at all. We ourselves have been great conquerors in our day. There are the Nabob Viziers, the Nizams, the Sultans, and a long list of sovereigns of one sort and another, whom we have conquered, whose territories we have invaded, and whose subjects we have taken to ourselves, not forgetting some small portion of their *property*; and we have seen, that, instead of curses upon the head of the divers conquerors, we have heaped thanks, praises unbounded, and pensions and titles not a few. Come, come, then; let us not be so unjust as to hate and execrate this man in his character of conqueror. In his character of despot, with all my soul; in his character of despot-maker; in his character of ally of Russia of the rabble of rascals upon the Rhine; in this character I agree to him as much as any man living.—If we hate him as a despot, we cannot wish to see a despotism, of any sort re-established in Spain. The name of the man who is to be at the head of the despotism, if a despotism it is to be, is of no consequence to the Spaniards, nor is of but very little consequence to us. People have often carried on bloody wars for a choice of despots; but, then, each despot was present and active himself. In short, it is absurd to suppose, that, at this day, any nation will undergo fire and sword for the sake of an absent person, whose former government they have called infamous; and, if this absurdity should be attempted to be persevered in, I think, it is very clear, that the Spaniards will be subdued.—This, it seems to me, is the point, upon which the fate of Spain will turn. Uncommon, unheard-of, exertions are required; new courage, new talents, new genius, are demanded. To call these forth powerful motives must exist, and these motives must make their way, at once, to the hearts of even the lowest orders of the people. A choice of despots; a mere choice of persons to whom the people are to be slaves, appears to me to be no motive at all; and hence, I conclude, that, if the leaders in Spain persevere in professing to make war for the restoration of their former

despot, they will be defeated, and that Joseph Napoleon, though the son of a green-grocer, will stand at the head of their new family sovereigns. God forbid that this should be the case; but, if the struggle be made for no better purpose, the failure of the Spaniards will be a subject of regret with those only, whose fears of the conqueror have deprived them of the power of reflection.

Botley, 6th October, 1808.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

SIR;—Ough, the firing of the Park and Tower guns to be considered as a signal of joy or of grief, Mr. Cobbett?—Ought they ever to be fired, or can they be so, without an express order from the ministers? And when the public do hear these guns, are they bound to conclude that ministers see cause for rejoicing; that they are thus informed of the arrival of some glorious news; and that the firing of the guns is the means by which the ministers intend to convey to the people their own joy and exultation at the happy tidings they have received?—Is nine o'clock at night an unusual hour for these guns to be fired?—And if unusual, is it reasonable for the people to expect news unusually good and glorious?—In such a case is it natural to be unusually anxious, and impatient for the Gazette?—The next question I would beg leave to ask you, Mr. Cobbett, is this—Who is Sir Hew Dalrymple? This is a question I have in vain asked of all I am acquainted with, and I fear it is a question which will puzzle all the big wigs in this kingdom. There is no doubt, however, but that Junot and Kellermann could answer it. Sir Hew's name became immortal (to mention *no one else* at present) on the memorable 30th of Aug. last; a day which never can be forgotten. Who can wish to know more of Sir Hew? Read his Convention. Is that not enough?—Is it the Commander-in-Chief, or the ministers who appoint, or ought to appoint the general, who is to act in the important situation of commander of 30,000 men; and to have the sole and entire disposal of so large and fine an army as the British forces in Portugal?—Are those who do appoint in such a case *responsible*, entirely, or in any degree, for the conduct of him whom they have appointed? If they are not responsible for his acts, who is? and to whom are the people to look for redress?—In selecting a general fit for a duty of so high, so important, and so honourable a nature, in the execution of which, the interests of the country at large, and the honour of Great Britain, are so intimately

connected, should very great circumspection, much consideration, and infinite care and anxiety be shewn?—If that be so, and when a commander-in-chief of such an army is appointed, ought not his character to be perfectly well known, and his name quite familiar to the public? Should they not also be familiar with his former glory and exploits, with his talents, his vigour, his enterprise, and his prudence? Above all, ought not the army to be, (that is the soldiers) very well acquainted with him? Ought they not to have a confidence in him? Ought they not to feel that he is able to command them?—Was there ever an occasion, when all these things should have been more particularly attended to than in selecting a general to command our brave troops in Portugal? Was it not upon the success of the first blow we were to strike in this glorious contest, that almost every thing depended? If it failed, and failed through dishonour and baseness, what could we expect? Had we a right any longer to look for trust or confidence on the Continent? Could the brave people in whose cause we were fighting look upon our *military* assistance, but with mistrust and apprehension? In effect, they might say “*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*” —I now come, Mr. Cobbett, to a very important part of the subject, and one which, at the present moment, occupies no small share of public attention; I mean the question with respect to Sir Hew and Sir Arthur, which I think will resolve itself into this: either that Sir Arthur is *completely innocent* or infinitely *more guilty* than Sir Hew Dalrymple. Let us inquire the *truth*.—Was the actual command taken from Sir Arthur the *instant* that the battle of Vimeira had terminated? And if so, by whom was it taken? Certainly not by Sir Hew, for his own dispatch declares the contrary, and begins thus: “I have the honour to inform your lordship, that I landed in Portugal, and took the command of the army, on Monday the 22d of Aug. the *next day* after the battle of Vimeira.” Now, then, we have the fact that Sir Hew only landed on the 22d. Who therefore had the command of our army, our *victorious* army, from the actual termination of hostilities on the 21st till the arrival at Cintra of Sir Hew on the 22d? And what was done during that period? Upon the answer to these questions the whole will turn. Till we hear the contrary, we are bound to believe that Sir Arthur retained the command. I will, therefore ask, *what was Sir Arthur doing?* How was his

army employed, during that most important interval? His friends say, that he was *burning to push on*. Was he so? That precious interval then, *was so employed*? Did he, then, after his splendid victory, and without *losing an instant*, give orders for the troops following up their well-earned success, by immediate pursuit? Did he *prove* that he was "burning to push on"? Did he *instantly* march towards Lisbon in order to *cut off the retreat* of the vanquished Junot (I beg his grace's pardon, I mean le Duc D'Abrantes) and in order to prevent the possibility of his concentrating his force in strong positions? Was, or was not, all or any of these things done? Was that very precious interval in *any way* made use of?—I have *not* asserted that Sir Arthur *did have* the command during this period, but as we know that Sir Hew had *not*, it remains to be shewn whether upon this occasion the culprit was Sir Arthur, or Sir Harry. On the head of one or the other of these two, will fall the whole consequences resulting from the inactivity, or want of decision and promptness which then took place, which must have prevented our gallant army from intercepting the French from Lisbon, and from following up the decisive blow which had been struck. The not having done which, and the not having intercepted the French from Lisbon, are allowed to be the only reasons why any Convention became necessary, (or rather was *thought necessary*) *he* therefore, (be he who he may) the man who produced this state of things, whose scandalous conduct rendered such a humiliating alternative necessary, is *far more guilty* than the man who *merely ratified* the damned agreement.—Whilst I am always for permitting fully "*Palmar qui meruit ferat*," at the same time I am equally desirous that *Culpam qui meruit ferat*. And grieved as I should be to blast the fresh laurels on the victorious brow of Sir Arthur, still, justice, and the injured honour of this country, require, that the culprit, be he who he may, should be openly dragged forth to public view and to public investigation. We have already seen that there *must have been* most criminal conduct somewhere between the 21st and the 22d, that Sir Hew is completely out of that scrape, and that it is entirely between Sir Harry and Sir Arthur. Now let us suppose that Sir Harry, notwithstanding his generosity on the field of battle, did however supersede Sir Arthur the moment that the French began to retreat; and let us suppose that Sir Arthur's advice was rejected—then, on the following day, the 22d, Sir Hew arrives, and takes the com-

mand from Sir Harry, and then, as his dispatch says, "*a few hours after my arrival*, General Kellermann came in with a "flag of truce," &c. and immediately after—"The inclosed contains the several articles "*at first agreed upon and signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Kellermann*."—Pray how were these articles *agreed upon* and signed by Sir Arthur, whom we have supposed to have had no command since the termination of the battle of Vimeira? Are we to suppose, that Sir Hew *requested* Sir Arthur, as being conversant with the then state of affairs, to enter into some terms of agreement; and are we to suppose that he was left entirely to his own judgment and discretion? Or, are we to suppose that on being so requested, he strongly urged to Sir Hew, the *fatal* consequences to be dreaded from any suspension of hostilities, that he implored him to listen to nothing short of unconditional surrender, and that he did every thing in his power to prevent any Convention from being acceded to?—That Sir Hew then *commanded* him to sign that which his heart revolted at? Are we to suppose this?—And are we then to suppose that tamely and tacitly, with much gentle resignation, the gallant Sir Arthur obeyed the detested order?—Now which of these two, is the most probable case? The former which supposes him to be only requested, and left to act according to *his own judgment*; or the latter in which he is *harshly commanded* and left without a particle of discretionary power? Is it not on this, that the whole merit or demerit of his conduct as to the *signature* rests?—But I will now ask you, Mr. Cobbett, whether *you* would consider the *request* of a commander-in-chief as tantamount to a *command*? Next, whether a command even, should always, and without exception, be implicitly and tacitly *obeyed*?—Should the command of a superior in *no instance* be departed from? Is there *no latitude* in *any case* allowed? And supposing all these to be answered by declaring that nothing but passive and implicit obedience, can be tolerated by the military law, I would ask you, are there *no situations* in which it would be both honourable and even noble to disobey an express command? And if it might be honourable and even noble in some situations to disobey a command, might there not also be circumstances under which it would be both *criminal and base* to obey an express command? Indeed, your last Register has already declared your opinion on this subject. If any one insisted on this meek, humble, non-resisting obedience, as being *indispensable* according to

the military law, I would beg to know where such womanish obedience could stop. For instance: when Kellermann was fairly about it, stipulating on the one hand, and getting every stipulation as quickly agreed to on the other—no matter how framed or how worded—why did it not occur to him, to stipulate that the duke his master, with the whole of the French army, artillery, &c. should be immediately conveyed in English transports to the coast of Ireland, (a frigate or 74 being provided for his *grace*) and there be disembarked with all their baggage, plunder, &c. &c. and be supplied with *sixty rounds* per man and gun? Why did this not occur to him? Of course it would have been agreed to, and by the convenient non-resisting rule of obedience, the victorious Sir Arthur would, good pliant soul, have put his hand, when *so required*, to such a stipulation!!! Having so done, he might then have resumed his situation as commander-in-chief in Ireland with *great éclat*—and with “No Popery” as his watch-word, have had the infinite satisfaction of again encountering his Portuguese antagonists on British ground. Indeed he might, in that case, possibly, have beheld, the *imperial* flag, of “his *imperial and royal* majesty Napoleon I. waving over the turrets of Dublin castle! And his *grace* of Abrantes might have then *himself become an emperor, a catholic emperor*. Strange that all this did not occur to Kellermann; whose fertile and comprehensive mind seems to have been always “*in utrumque paratus*.”—Since writing the above, a most *unfortunate* letter of Sir Arthur's has made its appearance before the public, in which (*mirabile dictu!*) he even *congratulates* the Portuguese on the Convention, in which he sees “NOTHING REMARKABLE”!!! Gracious God! Can the conqueror of Vimeira think so?—As to the conduct of ministers on this occasion, I think we have yet no reason to doubt, that they will act with the same vigour and promptitude, which, happily for this country, has already marked their career. It is but doing them justice to say, that as a whole (however much I may object to certain component parts) they have done more, and with more spirit, in their short reign, than any administration, which I can recollect, to have done in the same period.—The *firing of the guns* ought to be accounted for!—I cannot entirely dismiss this subject without taking notice of what you have written, Mr. Cobbett, respecting it. And although that damned Convention in Portugal, which can never cease to be thought of with curses and execrations by every Englishman, and all

that is any way connected with it, fires me with indignation, and chills me with horror at the bare recollection, still, notwithstanding this, I have been able to read your excellent account of the ignominious transactions in that quarter with some degree of pleasure and satisfaction; a melancholy pleasure indeed and a mournful satisfaction! Your plain, but nervous language; your unbiassed, but manly conclusions; your just, but ardent colouring, give to the whole of your statement a tone and character, which cannot fail, even to the remotest times, to make every true Briton's heart bleed within him when he peruses it—whilst at those honest bursts of indignation which it here and there exhibits, he will be roused to madness, will feel his whole soul on fire, and will call down curses and vengeance on those who were the authors of his poor country's disgrace and ignominy. To have *all the circumstances* which preceded this fatal Convention (at which name “*horresco referens*”) fairly detailed, and recorded in clear and unambiguous language, was fit, was necessary. Every one who has read your last week's Register, will, if they do you justice, readily admit, that few could have executed this *so well, and none, I am sure, better*.—I am always, Sir,—P. C.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

SIR,—Amidst the burst of general and violent indignation, which is so universally felt by the whole nation, at the termination of the campaign in Portugal, and in which you so largely participate; permit me to point out some circumstances, which have been either designedly or inadvertently overlooked. All the public writers have poured out the most virulent invectives against every part of the Conventions, without once advertent to the very important advantages which have been gained. This is not just. I am not, Mr. Cobbett, about to defend the conventions; I think with you that they are highly disgraceful, to those in particular who concluded them, and, also, to the nation at large, as far as it can be considered as a party to them. But, let us not shut our eyes to the services which *have* been performed; let not a blind and inconsiderate passion, hurry us on to deprive ourselves of the consolation of thinking, at least, that something really essential has been effected. We certainly had a just right to expect the absolute surrender of the French army. The general atrocity which has marked the conduct of the French in every part of Europe, and in Portugal in particular, together with the victories of Sir Arthur Wellesley, de-

manded a different result. But after all, will you say that nothing *has* been gained? Is getting the French army out of Portugal, even at *any* rate, *nothing*? Is neutralizing the Russian fleet *nothing*? Is enabling our army to act in Spain, without an enemy in its rear, *nothing*? Is not the Corsican usurper, preparing an immense force, with which he hopes to overwhelm the Spaniards? And, was it not of the utmost consequence, that our army should be free of the enemy in Portugal as soon as possible, that it might be enabled to give effectual and timely assistance to Spain? These appear to me to be great and important advantages; and, notwithstanding they cannot be put in competition with those which we have lost, yet, they are not to be overlooked and considered as nothing. A most objectionable part of the convention seems to be, suffering the French army to carry off its ill gotten plunder; this is unpardonable, and demands the severest reprehension; for, independent of the sanction which is thereby given to robberies the most atrocious, it must have an effect on the Portuguese highly inimical to this nation. They will consider themselves as sacrificed by us, and, we shall also, I fear, be identified with robbers and thieves. Surely a severe and rigid scrutiny will be made into this matter; the honour and character of the army, as well as the wounded feelings of the people require it. You have treated this subject, Mr. Cobbett, with your usual ingenuity; yet I cannot but think, that you have suffered your zeal to outrun your discretion. You undoubtedly feel highly indignant on this occasion, as every true Englishman must, who feels for the honour of his country; but yet, let justice be done. In order to render the transaction as odious as possible, you decry Lisbon, as a place of strength, and, think, that if Junot had chosen to defend himself in that place, it would not have been any material obstruction to the march of the army to assist the Spaniards. You, Mr. Cobbett, ought to understand these matters better than I do, having, to your praise be it spoken, had military experience; but, have you ever seen Lisbon? have you examined its forts? its fortifications and means of defence? and, if you have not, how can you speak so positively of its weakness? of the facility with which it might have been taken? and assert that there are "no grounds for believing, that the siege could have lasted for a week?" If our general had been of the same opinion, it cannot be believed that he would have signed such a convention. You say, that you never heard of any strong

places in Portugal. Will it be denied that Lisbon possesses some strong places? Are there not forts, which have effectually prevented our fleet from entering the Tagus? And, can it be possible, that a place of such vast importance as Lisbon should be without the means of resisting an enemy for a considerable time? Your position that Junot entered the place without any trouble will avail you nothing, for the Portuguese never even attempted to defend it, and it fell an unresisting prey to the lawless invader. Very different, I apprehend, would have been the case, if the French had determined on defending it, and the utmost efforts and skill of our brave army would probably have been baffled for some weeks; and, what at the present moment is of the utmost consequence, been also prevented from giving that prompt and timely assistance to the Spaniards, which the noble cause they are embarked in so imperiously demands. This circumstance carries conviction to my mind, that the measure of obliging the French to evacuate Portugal speedily, even at *any* rate, was a measure of the most urgent necessity, and may ultimately be of the utmost importance to the general cause. I therefore am convinced, that three objects of the greatest consequence have been obtained; viz. clearing Portugal of the French; neutralizing the Russian fleet; and enabling our army to march into Spain, without an enemy in its rear. These are facts and cannot be controverted; and, although I am particularly anxious to impress you with an idea of their importance; yet, I do not bring them forward, as any defence of the conventions; but, merely, as some alleviation of the great disappointment which the public has experienced, and to prove that amidst much evil, *some* good has been obtained.—I am very sorry to see that your hatred to the Wellesleys, as having been the firm friends of the late Mr. Pitt, has carried you the length of stigmatizing Sir Arthur Wellesley, as the author of the conventions, and of giving a false colouring to the transaction. You have employed many words and much sophistry to accomplish this. But let us, Sir, clear away the rubbish and attend only to facts. I apprehend, the grand main spring, which regulates and directs the operations of an army, to be obedience. Every thing resolves itself into this. Every officer is bound strictly to obey the commands of his superior in every thing connected with the army. Obedience is the very life and soul of an army, and without which it would be a mere shadow, a thing of no value. We have only to look at the armies of the Grand Turk,

to be convinced of the truth of this position. This, Sir, is so positive a truth, that you cannot deny it; you *must* allow it me; and on that ground I mean to shew the futility of your arguments. Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 21st of August, gains a victory over the French army, in which even *you* have not attempted to deprive him of the merit of having, with a part of his force, defeated double the numbers. During the engagement, Sir Harry Burrard (his superior officer, observe) arrives; the instant he joined the army, Sir Arthur's command was virtually at an end. Now, mark; Sir Harry Burrard says, that he found Sir Arthur's dispositions so excellent, that he had no occasion to alter them, (or words to that effect) which is explicitly declaring, that he *did* possess the power, if he had had the inclination, thereby declaring himself what he actually was, the superior officer; nay, even the dispatches were written to Lord Castle-reagh by Sir Harry Burrard in that capacity. If, therefore, my position of obedience is correct, Sir Arthur's responsibility was actually at an end, on the 21st; he had no longer the command of the forces; he had no longer a will of his own; but was positively bound to obey the orders of Sir Harry Burrard. We are also informed that numerous letters from some of the most distinguished officers in the British army, agree in stating, that "Sir Arthur Wellesley most distinctly declared his opinion, that the expediency of permitting the French to capitulate at all, was occasioned *solely* by the dilemma into which the army had been brought by its being prevented contrary to his plans and wishes *repeatedly* urged, from following up the victory of the 21st; in which case the whole of the French army *must inevitably* have been destroyed, instead of being enabled by that fatal delay to retreat to the passes, and to concentrate themselves in forts in their rear, which it might consume the whole of the winter months to beat them out of." You then triumphantly ask, "who stopped Wellesley?" I answer, Sir, Harry Burrard. The moment the battle was over, Sir Arthur could not possibly act for himself; he had nothing to do, but to obey Sir Harry Burrard, his superior officer; and, on him, in my opinion, the whole responsibility rests. It *must* be he who prevented Sir Arthur from pursuing the enemy. Who else had the power? let me ask. I positively say, no one. Sir Hew Dalrymple had nothing to do with it. He did not land till the 24th, and the armistice was signed on the 22d. I have heard from very good

authority, that the ministers are satisfied with Sir Hew Dalrymple's conduct; and, say that he could not have acted otherwise than he did. What they say, and think of Sir Harry Burrard, is another matter. In order to complete your plan, of throwing all the odium on Sir Arthur Wellesley, you affect to discredit the numerous letters which are said to have been received from some of the most distinguished officers in the British army, and I assert them to be lies. You must produce very strong and sufficient evidence of this assertion, before you can expect it to be given credit to. I cannot think, Mr. Cobbett, that you think so yourself; for you *must* know, that, when *numerous letters* from men of character and high honour, *all agree* on the same subject, that it *must* be a fact; and these letters will and ought to obtain credit, amongst that part of mankind, who will not suffer their understanding to be overpowered by any sophistry however ingenious, or with a cloud of words. The very circumstances of the case furnish strong presumptive evidence of their truth. It must occur to every one, that the defeat of the French should have been instantly followed up, by detaching that part of the army which had suffered least, in order to cut off the retreat of the flying enemy; and I firmly believe, from the knowledge we have of the vigour and capacity of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that had he not been prevented by a superior power, it would have been done, and the disgraceful conventions prevented.—I am always concerned Mr. Cobbett, to have occasion to differ in opinion with you, for I greatly admire your talents; but even Homer sometimes nods: and if I ever take the liberty of stating my sentiments in opposition to yours, I trust that you will receive them with kindness.—OBSERVER.—Sept. 27th, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.—*From the London Gazette Extraordinary, continued from page 544.*

VIII. The garrison of Elvas, and its forts, and of Peniche and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon: that of Alameda at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.—IX. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are entrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country, at the expense of the British government under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when

the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.—X. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked it in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.—XI. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.—XII. The forts of St. Julien, the Bugio, and Cascais shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries, as far as the Lazaretto or Trofuria on one side; and fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall also the harbour and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almada, Peniche, and Palmela, shall be given up, as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the meantime the general in chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.—XIII. Commissioners shall be named on both sides, to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.—XIV. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.—XV. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever, of the French government, against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops in the month of Dec. 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled, and all sequestrations laid upon their property moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.—XVI. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be pro-

tected. Their property of every kind, moveable and immoveable, shall be respected, and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army, or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose. It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only, however, in so far as regards leaving the port; and that none of the stipulations above-mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.—XVII. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of the country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders: they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government; they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.—XVIII. The Spanish troops, detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without being taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.—XIX. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.—XX. Hostages of the rank of field-officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officers of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the officers of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.—XXI. It shall be allowed to the general in chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to convey him to Bourdeaux and Rochefort.—XXII. The British admiral will be invited

to accommodate his excellency the commander-in-chief, and the other principal officers of the French army, on board of ships of war.—Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808. (Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general. KELLERMANN, le général de division.

Nous Duc D'Abrantes, général en chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions la présente convention définitive dans tous ses articles, pour être exécuté selon sa forme et teneur. (Signé) LE DUC D'ABRANTES. Au quartier général de Lisbonne, le 30 Août.

Additional Articles to the Convention of August 30.

Art I. The individuals in the civil employment of the army, made prisoners, either by the British troops, or by the Portuguese, in any part of Portugal, will be restored as is customary, without exchange.—II. The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines, up to the day of embarkation; the garrisons up to the day of evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual form to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army from the above-mentioned periods, till their arrival in France, under the condition of their being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army.—The provisions on board the ships of war in possession of the French army, will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines in the fortresses.—III. The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.—Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 30th day of August, 1808. (Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general. KELLERMANN, le général de division.

Nous Duc D'Abrantes, général en chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions les articles additionnels à la convention et contre pour être exécutés suivant leur forme et teneur.—LE DUC D'ABRANTES.—(A true copy.) A. J. DALRYMPLE, captain, military secretary.

Admiralty Office, Sept. 16, 1808.

Captain Halsted, first captain to the squadron under the command of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart. commander-in-chief of his majesty's ships and vessels on the coast of Portugal, arrived yesterday at

this office, with dispatches from the admiral to the hon. Wellesley Pole, of which the following are copies:

Hibernia, off the Tagus, Sept. 3, 1808.

Sir,—Inclosed herewith, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, is a copy of a convention,* entered into by lieutenant-colonel Murray, and general Kellermann, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army; such convention having been ratified by lieutenant-general Sir Hew Dalrymple, myself, and the French commander-in-chief. British troops, consisting of the 3d and 42d regiments, were on the 2d instant landed, to occupy the forts of Cascais, St. Antonio, St. Julien, and the Bugio, and no time shall be lost to embark the French troops, agreeably to the said convention.—Captain Halsted, first captain of this ship, and captain of the fleet, who is now the bearer of dispatches to their lordships, respecting the Russian squadron in the Tagus, is in full possession of my confidence, and will be able to explain to their lordships the motives inducing me to ratify the convention in question, as well as give any further information that may be thought necessary.—I have, &c. (Signed) CHARLES COTTON.

* A copy of the convention inclosed in the letter from sir Hew Dalrymple.

Hibernia off the Tagus, 4th Sept. 1808.

Sir,—Herewith I have the honour to inclose to you, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, a copy of a convention entered into by me with vice-admiral Seniavin, commanding the Russian fleet in the Tagus; by which it will appear to their lordships, that such fleet has been surrendered to me, to be held by his majesty as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a peace between Russia and England.—I have charged captain Halsted, first captain of the *Hibernia*, and captain of the fleet, with the delivery of this dispatch to their lordships: he was sent by me to negotiate the convention with vice-admiral Seniavin, and will be able to explain every particular. To captain Halsted I feel greatly indebted for his able advice and assistance upon all points of service; his zeal and diligence have been exemplary, and entitle him to my highest commendation.—Rear-admiral Tyler has been directed to superintend the first division of the Russian fleet, which I purpose ordering under his protection immediately to Spithead: to him (since with me) I have been indebted for every assistance, and to the captains, officers, and crews of those ships, that have been employed throughout a tediously protracted

blockade (by whom every exertion has been made with a degree of cheerfulness doing them infinite honour,) I feel extremely grateful, and deem it my duty to offer every possible testimony of my approbation in their favour.—I have, &c. (Signed) C. COTTON.

Articles of a Convention entered into between Vice Admiral Seniavin, Knight of the Order of St. Alexander, and other Russian Orders, and Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart. for the Surrender of the Russian Fleet, now anchored in the River Tagus.

ART I. The ships of war of the emperor of Russia now in the Tagus as specified in the annexed list, shall be delivered up to admiral sir C. Cotton, immediately, with all their stores as they now are, to be sent to England, and there held as a deposit by his Britannic majesty, to be restored to his imperial majesty, within six months after the conclusion of a peace between his Britannic majesty, and his imperial majesty the emperor of all the Russias.—II. Vice-admiral Seniavin, with the officers, sailors, and marines, under his command, to return to Russia without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services; to be conveyed there in men of war, or proper vessels at the expense of his Britannic majesty.—Done and concluded on board the ship *Twerday*, in the Tagus, and on board his Britannic majesty's ship *Hibernia*, off the mouth of that river, the 3d day of Sept. 1808. (Signed) DE SENIAVIN. CHARLES COTTON. (Counter-signed by command of the admiral), L. SASS, *assesseur de college*. (Counter-signed by command of the admiral), JAMES KENNEDY, secretary.

Lists of the Ships referred to in the foregoing Convention.

Twerday, vice-admiral Seniavin, captain du 1st rang *Melayoff*, of 74 guns, and 736 men.—*Skoroy*, captain du 1st rang *Schelling*, of 60 guns, and 521 men.—*St. Helene*, captain du 2d rang *Bitchenscoy*, of 74 guns and 598 men.—*S. Cofael*, captain du 2d rang *Roshuoff*, of 74 guns, and 610 men.—*Ratvizan*, captain du 2d rang *Rtishchoff*, of 66 guns, and 549 men.—*Silnoy*, capt. lieut. *Malygruin*, of 74 guns, and 604 men.—*Motchnoy*, capt. lieut. *Rasvosoff*, of 74 guns, and 529 men.—*Rafael*, capt. lieut. *Bytchenscoy*, of 80 guns, and 646 men.—*Fregatte Kilduyn*, capt. lieut. *Dournoff*, of 26 guns, and 222 men.—*Yarowslaval*, captain du 5d rang *Milkoff*, of 74 guns, and 507 men. Total 5685 men. (Signed) MALIVJEFF, le capitaine de Pavillon.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from page 486).—*Victories in Saragossa. From the Oviedo Gazette Extraordinary, Aug. 23, 1808.*

Saragossa, a town which we cannot mention without the most lively emotion, has completely humbled to the dust the lofty eagles of the French. The arms of the French did not find there an Ulia, but a St. Jean d'Acre. Let us, therefore, contribute to preserve the memory thereof, by publishing the following official papers and manifestoes:—

Most Serene Sir,—The enemy, after so many obstinate and fruitless attacks on this city, renewed the bombardment on the 3d and 4th instant, throwing a great number of bombs into the place, and doing considerable damage. On the 4th, without discontinuing the bombardment, they attacked with twelve pieces of cannon, one of our batteries, and after the most glorious defence, which lasted until eight o'clock, the enemy carried the battery, and entered the town; yet without getting possession of our artillery, which we saved.—In the neighbouring streets the enemy met with the most vigorous resistance, and the slaughter was so great among them, that the remembrance of this action must at all times prove extremely painful to them. They are confined to a small space which they occupy in the city, and, with the troops which I expect from Valentia, within two days, I hope I shall be able to give a good account of the enemy's corps, whose defeat will administer comfort to the inhabitants, whose intrepid firmness I admire. They will forget their past and present sufferings, and I shall feel perfectly consoled. God preserve your highness many years!—JOSEPH DE PALAFOX Y MELZI. Head quarters, Saragossa, Aug. 10, 1808.

To the Lord of the Supreme Council of Asturias.

Most Serene Sir,—I have the satisfaction to inform your highness, that the French army, which for these two months has inflicted the severest sufferings on this city, and whose conduct has been most abominable, fled this morning at break of day, leaving in our possession an immense quantity of artillery, ammunition, provisions, and other effects. During the night, the enemy made a fresh attack within the city, from the small space which he occupied; but he was routed by the valiant defenders of this town, and his defeat was so complete, that he fled with the utmost precipitation.—This very night a division of 4000 excellent troops moved from this place to

cut off the enemy's retreat through Navarre, where they will be joined by other troops and the armed peasantry of that country; and the 6000 men that I expect to-morrow from Valentia, joined by 4000 men of the army formed on Catalay-ad, will, I trust, be able to overtake the enemy's rear, in order to chastise and prevent them from committing on this march their usual robberies and vexations.—This fortunate event has been this day celebrated with the ringing of bells, and to-morrow the Te Deum will be sung to offer up thanks to the Most High.—It is of great importance to accelerate the meeting of the deputies of all the provinces of Spain, and I think it would be expedient to appoint for that purpose a day in the next month of September. I have given the same advice to the rest of the general and supreme councils in the whole kingdom; and should you coincide with me in opinion on this subject, I hope you will acquaint me with it.—JOSEPH DE PALAFOX Y MELZI. Head-quarters, Saragossa, Aug. 13, 1808. *Manifesto, dated Head-quarters, Saragossa, Aug. 15.*

After so many days of pain and affliction, the period has at length arrived, which I could expect, from the firmness and valour with which you have defended this illustrious capital.—Having witnessed the shameful flight of the French slaves, who have abandoned the artillery, ammunition, and provisions, which their detestable rapacity had heaped up, let us now perform our principal duty, and offer up thanks to the Omnipotent who has inflicted condign punishment on those wretched soldiers who profane the temples, outrage the sacred images of the Divinity; and are such strangers to morality, that they are not worthy to have any intercourse with the rest of mankind. Let us leave their emperor to the remorse and afflictions which are the lot of the wicked, and beseech the Most High, that he may vouchsafe to bless again our arms, that the two armies which are in pursuit of the fugitive robbers, may complete their destruction.—The fields of Saragossa, its gates, and even its streets, are stained by the blood of 8000 Frenchmen, who have paid with their lives for the temerity of their chief. This is the fruit which the French have reaped from their entrance in Arragon. All Europe, nay, the universe, will hear with horror the names of their generals, Le Febvre and Verdier, who, unmindful of the good treatment which the French prisoners, and all the natives of France experienced in Arragon, have committed the utmost atrocities. They very justly appreciated the difference

between the system of an ambitious and treacherous government, and that of a nation which cements its felicity by the fairest principles of justice, and considers not as real enemies those who took no share in the delicious combat of their government. France will long deplore the calamities which the war with Spain has prepared for her; and cannot recollect, without the deepest sense of shame, the means employed to carry it on.—Husbandmen, artisans, orphans, aged and religious persons, ye who have been reduced to indigence and misery in consequence of your fields being fired, your houses destroyed, and your property, which, however small, constituted your whole fortune and all your comfort, robbed by the French, be easy; you have the good fortune of living in Spain, and yours is the glory to have defended the capital of Arragon, whereby our enemy was prevented from desolating the rest of this beautiful province: you bore up with resignation under your sufferings, and disregarded your private interest in order to promote the general good. I cannot look with indifference on deeds of heroism like yours, nor omit any opportunity of procuring you relief. I have very particularly charged the intendant general of the kingdom, D. Lorenzo Calbo, as soon as the most pressing occupation of the present period shall permit it, to relieve your wants by every means in his power; and I depend on the generous feelings of all Spaniards, and on the liberal sentiments of our beloved king, that all possible exertion will be made to indemnify you for your sufferings and losses.—PALAFOX.

Manifesto of the Junta of Seville, August 3, 1808.

The defence of our country, and of our king, that of our laws, our religion, and of all the rights of man, trodden down and violated, in a manner which is without example, by the emperor of the French, Napoleon I. and by his troops in Spain, compelled the whole nation to take up arms, and to chuse itself a form of government; and in the difficulties and dangers into which the French had plunged it, all, or nearly all, the provinces, as it were by the inspiration of heaven, and in a manner little short of miraculous, created supreme juntas, delivered themselves up to their guidance, and placed in their hands the rights and the ultimate fate of Spain.—The effects have hitherto most happily corresponded with the designs of those who formed them. The provinces have armed themselves; some have formed large armies of veteran troops, and have united to them the enlisted pea-

sants; all, or nearly all, have fought and are fighting against the French in behalf of their king, Ferdinand VII. with a valour and a constancy, of which neither Greece, nor Rome, nor any other nation of the world, had any idea. The French are really amazed and terrified, and the hopes of conquering them are as sure as human certainty can reach.—The only thing which can impair or frustrate them, is discord, and the want of union among the provinces themselves. Hence the supreme junta paid its first attention to remove that danger, with which view it printed and published the official paper, entitled *Precautions*, which it communicated in every possible manner to all the provinces of Spain. The bringing this plan to perfection, and carrying it into complete execution, is now more than ever necessary. Our enemies are anxious to foment our divisions. Human passions, personal interests ill understood, the ignorance, the weakness, the blindness of men, may, perhaps, without their knowing it, assist the evil designs of our enemies, and thus destroy a beginning so glorious, and facilitate and consummate the entire ruin of Spain. This it is that we are endeavouring to guard against, urged only by the most sacred motives, by our honour, by our loyalty as affectionate subjects, by our duty as Spaniards, by our faith as Christians; and here we protest before God and man, whose aid we invoke with all fervency, that we will write nothing but what is dictated to us by the love of our country, the preservation of our king, and of our rights, not mingling with it any thing that appears to partake of passion, of interest, or of any other personal motive; but being always ready to hear the opinions of the other provinces, and to amend our own errors, wherever it shall be shewn that we have committed any.—Be it the chief care to avoid every thing which is not absolutely necessary, and which may serve to sow the seeds of disunion in the provinces, and to excite divisions among them; and of this nature we esteem all conversations about the royal house, and of the order of succession in different families which derive a right from it. There is no person so ignorant of the history of Spain, and of the manner in which the throne has been occupied, as not to know the changes which have taken place in the succession. It is also known what are the legislative proceedings upon this point; what the manner in which endeavours were used to introduce

an alteration into them; the different pretexts for this alteration; and, lastly, the final settlement which was made by the cortes of 1789, and which ought in future to be the rule.—But are we in a situation to talk of these matters? Long live our king and indisputable sovereign Ferdinand VII. and long live his august brothers, heirs of the crown, after his attested decease. Why then anticipate those enquiries which can only be necessary in default of these? This anticipation may produce, by the diversity of opinions which it creates, a cruel disunion, which, of itself alone, will utterly ruin the only aim and object which Spain at present has in view, and that is, its own entire and independent preservation for its sovereign lord and king, Ferdinand VII. and his undisputed successors; and, with its king, the preservation of its own rights and laws, and the unity of the holy Roman Catholic apostolical religion, which it has gloriously professed and defended for so many ages. It is therefore, both absurd and dangerous to dispute about the succession in cases evidently remote; all the provinces of Spain ought to confine themselves in this respect to this general expression—“*Hereditary succession according to the fundamental laws of the monarchy.*”—Not so is it with the second question moved by the various juntas of the kingdom, which certainly keeps the people in a state of inquietude and agitation, is the continual object of public conversation, and may produce divisions fatal to the generous design, and the virtuous obligation into which we have entered of defending ourselves against our enemies, and of preserving our country, our king, our monarchy, our laws, and our religion. This second question is—*is there a necessity for creating a supreme government, which may unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the restitution of king Ferdinand to his throne?*—This supreme junta declares openly, that from the beginning to the present time it has been persuaded that such a supreme government is altogether necessary, and that without it the country is in danger, and its enemies will find means of completing its ruin; and the reasons of this determination and declaration are so evident, and present themselves with such clearness to the eyes of all, that they cannot fail of convincing all who have the least notion of public affairs, or a correct insight into the nature of man, the passions which move him, and the order of human affairs in all ages.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV. No. 16.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

In the London Gazette Extraordinary, in which were published, by the government, the several documents relating to the five Conventions in Portugal, the Armistice, which was the basis of all that followed, and which, as far as it was departed from, in the subsequent negotiations, was rendered less injurious and disgraceful; this Armistice, which was, on our part, negotiated by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and which bore his signature; this Armistice was published, was, by the government, communicated to the people of England, in the French language only, while all the other documents were, in the very same Gazette Extraordinary, published in the English language only.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL. — The fact, a statement of which I have placed at the head of this present Number of my work, should be constantly borne in mind by every man in this disgraced and abused country. It has been the subject of much conversation and inquiry; it was a thing, of which the ministers must have been desirous to give, or cause to be given, a satisfactory explanation; it is notorious, that a whole month has now elapsed without the appearance of even any attempt at such explanation; and, therefore, the public are justified in concluding, that their intention, from the first, was to do all in their power to screen Wellesley, let what would become of his associates in the never-to-be-forgotten transaction. Whether they will persevere in this their evident intention we shall soon see; probably I shall be able to perceive it even before this article be finished; for, the hero of Oude being arrived, his newspaper will not be long in making known to us what we have to expect with respect to him. — In the meanwhile, let us attend to some points which have escaped us. — The dispatch, giving an account of the victories in Portugal, were dated on the 22d of August; the bearer of that dispatch could not have come away before that day; on that very day the armistice was negotiated and concluded, and yet the bearer of the dispatch brought no account of the armistice. Was not this something very singular? Say, that the bearer was ready to come off in the morning, and that the armistice was not concluded until night. But, if there were no vessel ready to send off with another messenger at night, why was not the bearer kept until night, that the consequence of the victory as well as the victory itself might have been announced to us at the same time? What injury to the service could possibly have arisen from the delay of a few hours in the departure of this messenger? Nay, what possible inconvenience could have therefrom arisen? Sir Arthur

Wellesley would not, indeed, have enjoyed the praises of this gulled nation for the space of a week; a strong and unjust public persuasion, in his favour, would not have been excited; but that is all, that is all the mischief that could possibly have arisen from the delay. — But, was there a delay? I doubt it. Did not the bearer of the dispatch bear also the account of the armistice, in substance if not in form? It is my opinion that he did. Ships do not move off at a moment's warning, like post-chaises. The armistice must have been concluded before the bearer of the bragging dispatch left Portugal; and, though it would have been of little use, perhaps, to send forward the document in due form, yet the substance of it might have been added to the dispatch, and it is not credible that it was not added. My belief, therefore, is, that the substance of the armistice was made known to Lord Castlereagh through the bearer of the dispatch; and that he, not being bound to communicate that substance to the public, suffered us to go on, for as long a time as possible, applauding the conduct of Wellesley. — I do not wish to strain any thing. I have no other motive; I can have no other motive, than that of a desire to see impartial justice done; but, this appears to me to be the fact, and, if it be so, the public ought to bear it in mind; because it is a circumstance strongly corroborating the opinion, now generally prevalent, that the ministry, or a part of them at least, have intended and, probably, do intend, to screen Wellesley at all events. — From motives, which will, by-and-bye, become apparent enough, the friends of Wellesley are now questioning the practicability of reducing Junot within any reasonable space of time; and a correspondent, whose letter will be found in another part of this double Number of the Register, sets himself seriously to work to controvert the opinion which I gave, to wit, that, after reading Wellesley's dispatch, we had a right to expect, by the next arrival, an account of the unconditional

surrender of the French. Did any one imagine, that, by the "next arrival," I meant, or could mean, the very next vessel that should come into port from the shores of Portugal? I meant, by the next bearer of dispatches from our army; the next bearer of any intelligence of importance; and, I appeal to the language of the press, at the time Wellesley's dispatch was received, for a proof that such was the expectation generally entertained.—But, was it a *reasonable* expectation? That is the question; and it is, observe, a question which lies entirely between *Wellesley* and the public, the other commanders having had no hand in the "bragging dispatch."—My correspondent now tells me of *twenty* or more than twenty thousand men, whom Junot had under his command. But, Wellesley told us, that, with *half* his force, before he was joined by Burrard, he beat "the whole of the French force, commanded by the Duc d'Abrantes in person." I should like to have seen him when he penned this last quoted sentence. "By the Duc d'Abrantes in person!" How he braced up, I dare say, and repeated the words to himself, with an air of pomposity so inseparable from his sect "In person!" Why, if there had been an army of a hundred thousand men, commanded by emperors, the language and manner could not have been more pompous. Some one has observed, that the giving of this title to Junot proceeded solely from the vanity of Wellesley; as if nothing short of a Duke were worthy of the honour of measuring swords with a Wellesley; and, indeed, it seems difficult to attribute to any other motive, this cutting and flagrant insult to a prince and a people, whom we went out to rescue from insult and oppression. To return from this digression: it matters little what were the numbers of Junot's force at the date of the negotiation; for, whether many or few, "the whole" of his force had been beaten by "one half" of the force of Wellesley, and we know, that the force of the latter became double in number, or nearly double, previous to the signing of the Convention. It is a fact pretty generally known, that when transports are demanded, *double tonnage* is expected. Besides, the number is now swelled out with all sorts of persons, persons, who, observe, shut up in forts, would have been a dead weight upon him; and yet my correspondent chooses to believe, that Junot could have brought twenty thousand men into the field, though it was positively stated, that he retreated with his whole force before one half of Wellesley's army; that is to say,

before less than nine thousand men. After all, however, we return to the point: be his force what it might, the whole of it was beaten by about one third of the force that we had at the time of making the Convention; the whole of it was beaten but the day before by one third of that force, amongst whom were the very men who had beaten him; this is the fact, or... Wellesley told this nation, this credulous and abused nation, a shameful lie.—Well, says this new defender of Wellesley, but of what avail would have been a superiority of force? We should not have made Junot surrender any thing the sooner on account of great superiority of numbers.—No? Why then, the complete power of cutting off succours and of preventing the chance of sallies would, in the hands of our generals, have been useless? Besides, what are this gentleman's ideas of a siege? It is, for the most part, a very vulgar affair: an affair much more resembling ditching and draining than any thing else; and, as two labourers will do twice as much at ditching in a day than one labourer will do, so thirty thousand men will, in the same space, do twice as much at making trenches, approaches, and batteries, as fifteen thousand men. We have, moreover, the authority of that great man, Sir Hew, one of whose motives for coming to terms with Junot was, that there was a *doubt*, whether Sir John Moore's division could be landed at the time. Now, acceding to the notion of my correspondent, more men were not only not necessary, but absolutely useless for the purpose of any operation that could, at the time alluded to, be in contemplation.—But, for the purpose of *storming*, would not superiority of numbers have been an advantage? Or, has not this mode of attack yet found its way into the practice of our armies? Why do we raise all these men; why do we pay *ten thousand officers*; why have we a staff superior in numbers, and very far superior in expence, to Buonaparte, if we are never to hear of any enterprize of this sort? The greater part of the forts in Portugal, if my information be correct, were things to be taken by storm, with the loss of perhaps a thousand men for each attack of this kind; and, it will require very ample and very credible evidence to convince me, that, with such an army, with thirty thousand men, so able-bodied and so accustomed to labour, with such a train of artillery, and with the whole of the strength, labour, and resources of the country at our disposal, not to mention a considerable army of Portuguese actually embodied; it

will require much indeed to convince me, that, with such means, our generals might not, in the course of one week, have carried a mine under the rampart of Junot's strongest fortress. There would have been no regular investiture necessary; no line of circumvallation; none of the precautions usually adopted in cases of regular siege; because sallies and succours were out of the question. Did ever man conceive, that, under such circumstances, a breach could not be made in six days? Never; and, when my correspondent reminds me of Sagossa and other open towns, which have exhibited to the world instances of long and successful resistance, my answer is, that it has not been owing to the strength of the place, but to the strength and courage of the defenders. Let him shew me an instance, wherein the assailant had, with a third of his force, beaten the assailed but the day before, and had all the country around for friends, while his enemy had nothing but enemies within and without; let him shew me an instance like this, wherein a successful, or a long, defence has been maintained, and I will say, that he has advanced something worth listening to; but, for an instance of this sort he will search history in vain.—As if for the purpose of furnishing us with a striking instance of the miserable shifts, to which the partizans of Sir Arthur Wellesley are driven (for he must, at last, stand responsible for the Convention), this writer reminds me, that the people of Lisbon, the dear good folks of Lisbon, were at the mercy of Junot; and, that it was our duty to prevent him, by any means whatever, from committing any cruelties upon them, which cruelties he might have committed, if we had refused him such terms as he demanded. It is pity that this argument has been so long delayed; for it would have applied equally well against sending the expedition to Portugal, where it has, at an enormous expence, purchased us deep disgrace, and done infinite injustice and injury to our allies of Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Indeed, it would apply against every attempt to drive the enemy out of any town or place. It is a sweeping argument; the universal argument of the coward: "I would attack you, but I am afraid of the consequences." What! did not Junot well know, that, at last, he must become really responsible for all the cruelties he committed upon the people of Lisbon? Did he not know, that we had cords to hang with and muskets to shoot with? Or, was he apprized, by any means, that we were so gentle a people, or had committed our armies to the care and command of generals so

gentle, that he had only to play the bully, the robber, and the murderer, and had nothing to apprehend in the way of retaliation? Judge, reader, of the badness of a cause, in support of which such an argument is resorted to.—But, as the reader will perceive, we are now, it seems, to answer those who defend the Convention, not those who execrate the Convention and defend Wellesley. Reader, we have heard the defenders of Wellesley assert, in the most positive manner, that he *protested* against the Convention, and against any compromise at all with the French; that he had nothing to do with negotiating the armistice which he signed; that the French general wrote it out with his own hand; that Dalrymple, at Kellerman's request, *commanded* Wellesley to put his signature to it; and, that, after very earnest remonstrances, he finally yielded obedience to the hateful command. Those defenders have plied us with dissertations upon military discipline; they have told us, that absolute power in the chief and implicit obedience in his inferiors are the soul of an army; and, calling in the terrible to the aid of the persuasive, they have reminded us, that if poor Sir Arthur had disobeyed the mighty Sir Hew, the latter might have run him through the body! Did they not assert and reason thus? Nay, the gaudy, chariot-lounging, the painted and piano-playing strumpets about town, who, as part of their regular calling, deal in the pathetic as well as in lies, trumped up a story of Sir Arthur's going upon his knees to prevail upon Sir Hew not to bring such a disgrace upon his country. Did not his defenders say, that he was to be considered, as to the Armistice, as no more responsible than the clerk of an attorney or a banker, who signs a document or draft in the name of his master? Did they not throw all the blame, all the responsibility, upon Sir Hew, whose fame they blasted, and whose carcase they threw down before us, to be trampled and spit upon? Did they not, in support of their great assertion respecting the Protest, first publish and then quote, as from vouchers of undoubted authenticity, numerous extracts of "*letters from the army*," the whole of which extracts spoke of the famous Protest, blamed Sir Hew and Burrard, but were particularly strong and clear as to the Protest? Every sycophant in London had this Protest upon his lips. Protest, Protest, "*the gallant Sir Arthur's Protest*," the "*Conqueror of Vimeira's Protest*!" This was the cry hrough the regions of Whitehall, and was faithfully echoed by the punks of the squares.

—Well, then, now he is come; not *re-called*, but *come*. He is come home to tell his own story. We, before, called upon his defenders to produce us his Protest; but we now call upon himself. Now, then, Mr. "*conqueror of Vimeira*;" now, then, "*gallant Sir Arthur*;" now, then, you whose friends have hazarded political infamy for your sake; now, then, produce this Protest to us; and, if you cannot, tell us, whose labour, whose sweat and pain and misery have supported the vast expence of the expedition; tell us *why* you signed the armistice of the 22d of August, after having beaten with "*half*" your force, "*the whole of the French force*, commanded "*by the Duc D'Abrantes in person*." Come, Sir, none of your haughty Eastern airs. None of your disdainful silence. That will not serve your turn. Your friends have asserted, that you made a *Protest*. Where is it? Shew it us. Tell us of what it consisted; or acknowledge that those friends, in wittingly asserting what was false, with a view of saving your reputation at the expence of your associates, have proved themselves to be the very greatest scoundrels that ever infested the earth, and that they merit the gallows and the gibbet more than any malefactor, whose name and deeds stand recorded in the annals of Newgate. "*Letters from persons of high honour in the army!*" Vile miscreants! To go thus coolly and deliberately to work in the hatching, the completing, and the publishing of a set of corresponding lies! It is impossible to proceed. No words can do justice to conduct like this.—The reader will perceive, that the same set of worse than felonious villains are now at work upon "*further letters from the army and navy*." The *protest* is not now spoken of. The tone is softened. *No great blame* upon any body, except the poor Portuguese. Take a specimen.—"*Extract of a letter from an officer of distinction on board one of his majesty's ships, just arrived from Lisbon*.—Yesterday I got some papers, in which I perceive Sir A. Wellesley's conduct in the suspension of arms, is most unjustly confounded with the final treaty. The first, he signed at the immediate desire of Sir Hew Dalrymple; but with the latter he had nothing to do at all. The whole was contrary to his opinion. The motives by which he has been influenced, are highly honourable to his feelings. In short, your newspapers are all *ill informed* of the state of affairs at the time; and I believe most persons will be astonished when they know that the French embarkation, after

all their losses, amounted to 25,000 men. And you may depend upon it, the Portuguese army availed ours nothing; and there never was a symptom of revolt in favour of us. I mean not to defend the treaty—it is a disgraceful and an infamous one; but as the principal object was obtained, there need not have been the outcry which appears to have been made in the country. As to the Russian fleet, that is in our possession. I think, if Sir C. Cotton had not orders from home, he has done wrong; but if our generous conduct is the means of forwarding our negotiations for a peace with Russia, it will be hereafter considered as "*a good act*."—I beg the reader to look upon this as a sham letter; but, what a pretty fellow this officer of "*distinction*" must be, if the letter be real. You see, the fellow, who has been base enough to palm this letter upon the public, dares not name either the writer, or the ship that he is on board of. All that is here said about *fine feelings*, an *ill-informed press*, and the *policy of not fighting*, is to be sure, but too characteristic of but too many "*officers of distinction*;" yet not of the navy. The slander upon the Portuguese, however, is worthy of marked reprobation. It was exactly thus, that the Pittite crew uniformly treated the French royalists. They first inveigled them into a state of dependance; and then they belied and betrayed them. Does the man, who has published this pretended letter "*from an officer of distinction*" in the navy, think that such statements will not be resented by the Portuguese? But, what cares he? He has his pay for the use of his dirty columns, and that is all he wants.—Well, but what are *we* doing? What part are we acting? We, the people of this fine "*free country*," who live under a constitution that is, as Pitt used to say, at the end of his speeches, "*the greatest blessing that a benign Providence ever bestowed upon man*." Upon himself, I suppose, he meant. But, what are we, free fellows as we are; what are we doing? We have been talking for a long while; we have been fretting and fuming and scolding and crying like women, or rather like Italian men, like Jews and Genceve, who, when they are kicked and cuffed, scold and run and run and scold. Here it will end, and that our masters well know. There has been a little stir, owing to Mr. WATKIN, in the city of London; but, we shall not now see the example followed, as it was, the other day, when the object was to praise the conduct of those in power. Then we had

Old Rose galloping down into Hampshire, calling meetings, and assembling his sycophants from far and near. Now they are as still as mice. Over a bottle, the servants being gone and the doors shut, they look wise, shake their heads, assume a bluff countenance, and begin to talk big; but, the reptiles dare not stir an inch. One wants a sinecure, another a pension, another a place for his son, another a contract, another a living, another a ribbon or a star. They dare not stir. They are the basest slaves that ever disgraced the earth. Let them be told, that the ministry wish them to address, or petition, against the Conventions in Portugal, and you will see them pouring forth in hundreds, as bold as heroes, looking as big and talking as bold as if every individual of them felt himself strong enough to overset a church steeple. Oh, the base wretches! Well, they suffer for it. They are pretty decently peculated upon, and their continual anxiety, their constant fear of displeasing, their perpetual dependance, is a sort of hell upon earth. Yet, now, you shall hear these miserable slaves talk about freedom, about the birthright of Britons, and about our glorious constitution, in as good terms as you could wish to hear. This is a part of their punishment. They are compelled to belie their hearts. They are slaves, and compelled to assume occasionally the appearance of being free.—This does not apply to Hampshire alone. It is, with very few exceptions, applicable to the whole kingdom. There is, it appears, to be a meeting in *Essex*, and, if it produce a good, plain, manly complaint, unaccompanied with nauseous common-place flattery of the king and his family, which would be no less dishonourable in him to receive than in the county of *Essex* to offer, it will be a fit subject for commendation; but, it will not, I am afraid, meet with much imitation. The same influence that sent Wellesley and his comrade Convention-makers to Portugal; that influence which has done so much upon other occasions, will not fail to be exerted now. Indeed, it exerts itself. It is sown all over the country, as regularly as corn is sown in a field. Seventy millions a year are, in one way and another, spent by the government. The government employs and pays all, and it receives all. There is a chain of dependance running through the whole nation, which, though not everywhere seen, is everywhere felt. There is not one man in one thousand who does not feel the weight of this chain. Army, navy, church, the law, sinecures, pensions, tax offices, war and navy offices, Whitehall,

India-house, Bank, contract, job, &c. &c. Who is there, who is not himself, or who has not a son, a brother, or some relation or other, employed and paid by, dependent for bread upon, the minister of the day? Those means by which men formerly maintained their sons and relations, and by which a country gentry were supported in a state of independence, are now drawn away in taxes; and, in order to find a maintenance, those sons and relations must now go and serve the ministry, in some capacity or other; must go and crouch to them, and receive from them, in the shape of pension or of hire, a share of that income, which has been drawn, in taxes, from their parents, or other natural supporters. This is the state in which we are. There needs no trouble, on the part of the ministry, upon an occasion like the present. They know well, that the country *cannot* stir; because they know that, generally speaking, he who stirs must, if they please, starve. Hence it is, that our anger seems always to evaporate in noise; that, like a mob, we hollow and bawl and threaten *when no one can distinguish one of us from the other*, and that, the moment we are put individually to the test, we, by conduct, if not by words, deny having had any share in the clamour. And, does it become us to scoff at the slavery of other nations? We are exceedingly bold in reproaching the French with their abject submission; but, let me put this question to you, reader: What do you think the French government would have done, had its generals made such a convention as ours have made? Pause a little, and then answer that question. Well, now for another. Suppose, that the French government had not discovered any anger at such conduct in its generals, but seemed, as far as the people could judge, to be resolved to screen them; what do you think the French *people* would have done in that case? "Held their tongues," say you. So they would, and so shall we. That is to say, they would have gabbled about the disgrace in their coffee-houses and at their tables, but would have said not a word to their government; and what have we done more? And, if our conduct be, in effect, the same as theirs, under similar circumstances, would have been, of what consequence is it, what difference is it as a question of *freedom*, whether men be kept in awe by the terrors of the naked sword, or by the terrors of starvation? Of all the proofs of a state of slavery, none is so complete as that of *not daring to complain when one is aggrieved*. The French, we say, dare not complain,

and therefore we call them slaves. Well, then, if we *do not* now make our complaints, we are in this dilemma: either we dare not complain, or we dare; if the former we are slaves; if the latter, we are the basest of hypocrites. 'Who will believe in the *reality* of our sorrow and indignation at the Conventions in Portugal? What Portuguese or Spaniard or Swede will be fool enough to give credit to any of our noisy professions of regard for the interests of our allies? No one. Not a man of the three nations. We must *do something*; or, whatever we may think of ourselves, they will look upon us as a people pretty fairly represented by the convention-making generals. To this we may make up our minds. The world will hear none of our excuses. They will not be able to hear the piteous stories of those who have places and pensions and contracts and jobs, who have sons to push forward, who have manifold dependents for whom to provide. Of all these the world will hear nothing. The world knows that we have made a great, a loud, a furious clamour against the Conventions in Portugal; that world has been told that we are a people perfectly *free*; and, if we do not *act* as well as make a mob-like noise, the world will have the good sense and the justice to regard us *as slaves*, or *as hypocrites*.—It is said, that Sir Hew is arrived. It was time; for, in my opinion, his *Proclamation* is even worse than the Conventions. What! take upon us to rule the country and *punish the people*, unless they submit to men set over them by us! But, I have not time to go into this subject at present.

SPAIN.—We have, then, at last, sent an *envoy* to Spain. In the first place, we have sent the very man, Mr. John Hookham Frere, who was there when the last quarrel with Spain took place, and when we attacked and seized their richly-laden ships, before a declaration of war had been made.—In the next place, *to whom* do we send him? Why, the Gazette tells us, that "the king has been pleased to nominate and appoint the right hon. John Hookham Frere to be his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to his catholic majesty Ferdinand the VIIth. and has been pleased to direct him to reside in that character at the seat of the central and supreme Junta in Spain." So. We do acknowledge, then,—that a man may be legally unkinged, and that another may be put up in his stead? Thus is the doctrine of cashiering kings, which gave so much offence, some years ago; and the promulgation of which caused so many persons to be punished in England,

openly recognised by a solemn act of the government of England. Ferdinand and Charles are both alive; they are both out of Spain; they are both in France; both have abdicated the throne in favour of the Buonaparte dynasty. Now, why do we prefer Ferdinand to Charles? Why simply for this reason, because *the people*, or some of them, say that they wish to have the former, while none of them say that they wish to have the latter. It is pretended, that Ferdinand's right to the throne is founded upon the abdication which Charles made in his favour; but, Charles, the moment he was out of the hands of Ferdinand and his partisans, *protested* against that abdication, and declared that it was extorted from him with the knife at his throat. Upon that abdication, therefore, we can build no right for Ferdinand, without, by the same act, destroying the superstructure; for, if Ferdinand, by the abdication of Charles in his favour, became rightful sovereign of Spain, Joseph Buonaparte became the rightful sovereign of Spain in virtue of the abdication of Ferdinand. Both abdications I believe to have been extorted; but, while we have a protest of the abdicating party against the former, we have none against the latter. Were he at liberty, we should, I dare say, have it; but, we are not quite sure of that, while we are in actual possession of the protest of poor old Charles. It is clear, therefore, that, in point of hereditary right, Charles is king of Spain; and that, in acknowledging the latter to be king, we have acknowledged a right in the people of Spain to cashier their kings.—But, the most interesting point is this: why do we choose to send an envoy to *any king* of Spain? From the first I have feared, I have expressed my fears, that the contest, as far as we were concerned, would be another contest for a *king*; and, who can say how far the leading men in Spain may, by *our interference*, have been induced to make it a war for a choice of kings, instead of a war of freedom against despotism? It was not, observe, until after *our agents* went to Spain, that there was much talk about Ferdinand. Until then a *reform of abuses* was the main object which the people appeared to have in view; and the public will recollect, that they spoke of their "*late infamous government*," uncoupled with any exceptions whatever.—It must be acknowledged, that an English minister is to consider, how, in this war, the exertions of England are to be made most effectually to contribute towards the permanent safety and greatness of England, provided no wrong be done to any

ally. If, therefore, it appeared, that to make war for Ferdinand was the most likely way of succeeding in this object, it was right to make war for him. But, I do not think, that this *did appear*. To me it has always appeared, that, for Spain to frustrate the views of Napoleon, to baffle and to mortify and to humble him, and to give an encouraging example to the rest of Europe, the war should have been a war of freedom against despotism. Between Joseph and Ferdinand many people will see but little difference; and many more will ask, what government could have been worse than that which the Spaniards themselves have declared to have been infamous?—It seems to me, therefore, that the English ministry ought to have wished that the names of Ferdinand and Charles should be totally left out of the contest.—It is not to be believed, that *the people* will fight and endure for the sake of either of their kings. They *must* perceive, that the result of the contest is of comparatively little importance to *them*; and, the moment they do so view the thing, there is an end to their exertions.—But, so think not Lloyds' and Whitehall. They are for a war for a king. Good luck to them; but, they will be kind enough to excuse me, if I feel a little less anxious for the fate of the man, who surrendered the sword of Francis I. to "His Serene Highness, the Grand Duke of Berg," than I felt for the fate of so many millions of men, who appeared to me to be fighting for that freedom, which a set of degenerate despots had so long withheld from them.—There has appeared, and will be inserted below if I have room, a paper, entitled an EXPOSITION OF FACTS, (relating to the usurpation of the crown of Spain by Napoleon) from the pen of DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, who, it must be confessed, has been most advantageously situated for the purpose, having been Secretary of State for foreign affairs, to the three kings, Charles, Ferdinand, and Joseph, and who is now in high favour, it would seem, with the Junta and with our people. Mr. Pedro tells a tough story. Much too tough to be examined in the time that I have, at present, to spare for the purpose; but, I must say, even now, that there wants a good deal to convince me, that it is that "true and artless tale," that the London newspaper editors appear to think it. "A man cannot serve two masters," says the Gospel; but, Don Pedro has served *three*. Bother me not, ye whining calumniators, with your insinuations that I dislike this man

because he has exposed Buonaparte; insinuate or say or swear what you will, you shall never make me affect to believe what appears to me to be incredible, merely because it comes from a man who attacks Buonaparte. Falsehood is falsehood, if spoken of the devil himself.—Don Pedro not only served three masters, but was confided in by all the three. He gives us an account of some conversations between him and Napoleon, and the Courier (I believe it is) observes, that we cannot have a better *proof* of his integrity, than the fact, that Napoleon reproached him for having too much of that quality. May be so; but, we really are, as yet, destitute of any *proof of that fact*; unless we take Mr. Cevallos's assertions for proofs, as the country folks in the House used to do with those of Pitt. Of one fact, however, we are quite certain, and that is, that Mr Cevallos was chosen by this same Napoleon to be a confidential servant of king Joseph; and, I ask the reader, whether he believes, that this choice would have been made, if Napoleon had found the person chosen to be so firmly attached to his honour and to the welfare of Spain?—Mr. Cevallos will have very much to answer me; but, for the present I shall content myself with a question or two. 1st. Was he carried *by force* to Bayonne? 2d. If he was not, how came he to repair thither at the request of Napoleon, after having been so intimately acquainted with all the previous machinations and detestable perfidies of Napoleon? 3d. How came he, who was the confidential minister of Ferdinand, to suffer that king to go to Bayonne without using his utmost endeavours to prevent it? 4th. How came Ferdinand to give up the sword of Francis I. to the "Grand Duke of Berg?" And, 5th, how came Mr. Cevallos himself to write and publish paper upon paper, addressed to the people of Spain, assuring them that all their jealousies of the French were groundless, for that the views of the Emperor were of the most friendly and affectionate sort; and this, too, at a time, when the "machinations" were going on, and when he was intimately acquainted with those machinations?—When Mr. Cevallos, or any one for him, has answered these questions, I have some more ready to put to him. But, whatever may have been the conduct of Buonaparte; however wicked and perfidious that may have been, I think, that it is evident enough, that Mr. Cevallos has all along had a desire to be upon the *strangest side*; that he deserted Joseph, because he

was persuaded that he was become the weakest; and that the whole story, some falsehood some truth, was written for the purpose of making his peace with the Spaniards and of again getting possession of power and emolument.—Now, reader, divest yourself, for a moment, of the desire to hear Buonaparte accused of infamous acts, and say, whether this be not, to all appearance, the real truth; and, if that should be your opinion, you will not, I am persuaded, think that there is virtue enough in this Exposition to make it “a lever wherewith to raise the world against the Corsican Usurper;” but will, perhaps, think with me, that the principles of political freedom, laid down as the basis of the cause in Spain, is the only lever, by which that nation, and, by their example, the rest of Europe, can be raised effectually to oppose a military despot.—Aye, the truth is; the truth that speaks with “voice trumpet-tongue,” though those in power will not hear it, is, that to raise the world against the despotism of Napoleon, you must show the world, you must give the world to see and feel, *something better than the despotism of Napoleon.*

Botley, 12th Oct. 1808.

CONVENTION OF PORTUGAL.

SIR;—It is impossible not to be satisfied, for the most part, with the clear, candid, and able manner in which you have examined the Articles of the Convention of Lisbon, and stated your opinion on the several circumstances connected with it, as far as they are hitherto authenticated; and, although you are very successful in applying the light to the flaws and hollow parts of several of the excuses urged in palliation of the act, you, nevertheless, do not appear to advance reasons sufficient to support your assertion, “that the people had a right to expect an unconditional surrender.” After detailing the difficulties surmounted, and advantages obtained at the battle of Vimiera, you say: “When we are told all this, and were informed that immediately after this brilliant success, our army was augmented to nearly double what it had before been, we naturally expected, that, by the next arrival seeing that the enemy could receive no supplies by land or sea, we should be informed of his surrender at discretion.” Now, I cannot see how this could naturally be expected by the next arrival. It was clear from the London Gazette, announcing the repulse of the French at Vimiera, that the Tartar Junot was enabled to retire unmolested to his strong position, and there to

concentrate his forces. Nay, the newspapers for several succeeding days contained invectives against Burrard for not permitting Wellesley to pursue and destroy the French army. And it is not necessary here to inquire whether any, or what advantage, was to be obtained by the pursuit, or, if any favourable moment was neglected, to whom the crime of such neglect attaches. It is sufficient to the consideration of the present question, that the possibility of Junot's safe arrival in his strong hold was placed beyond all doubt on the 3d September, and re-echoed throughout the kingdom in the interval between the 3d and 17th September. You state, that Junot's army, after the battle, might be 10,000, and the English 30,000, or thereabouts, which is, perhaps, nearly correct. The same scraps also, from which we ascertain that the cheek-scratched Duc D'Abrantes retreated with 10,000 men, inform us that nearly 3,000 men were left in these strong places, and that 7,000 Portuguese soldiers were in the French service, men who never attempted to prevent Junot's returning to his entrenchments. There were besides 5,600 Russian soldiers, unoffending neutrals certainly, men who would not engage in active hostility, as some of the papers have asserted; poor harmless creatures, who only confined 5000 Spanish soldiers on board their ships! These, collectively, compose a very formidable force; and allowing for every exaggeration, there appears no reason to doubt, but there were 20,000 men on whose active services Junot could rely. And I am even now entitled to ask, knowing the resolute and Tartar-like character of the Duke, and considering that his immense plunder was a most powerful motive to obstinate resistance, whether his situation was so deplorable and despair-creating, as to justify the public in expecting his surrender at discretion by the next arrival; an arrival, recollect, which was looked for a week before the 17th September: I shall, however, examine the reasons adduced by you in support of this general opinion. You ask, “since when did these places become so very strong? Junot found no difficulty in getting into them when he entered Portugal with the same army, which Wellesley told us he had beaten hollow, only a few days before you made the Convention; nay, he marched into them, or rather over them. They have been quick then, it seems, in growing into places of such adamantine materials.” It is almost unnecessary to observe, that this is no proof that the position was not strong when the English army appeared before it; nay, it is

no proof that it was not strong when Junot entered it at first; and with you rests the onus probandi. I do not purpose to enter into a detailed account of the circumstances under which Junot entered, and took possession of Lisbon; nor do I intend to quote the Prince Regent's Manifesto, and a variety of other documents to prove how he could have been resisted; and I am not aware of any reason why it may not be admitted, though contrary to the fact, that there was not, at the time Junot entered Portugal, one parapet in the whole kingdom, from behind which resistance could have been made with greater advantage than in the open field, if resistance had been determined on. There can, indeed, be no analogy between the situation of the French and English armies at the times they respectively entered the country. But since when did these places become so very strong? There is no reason to be astonished; Junot has been in Portugal long enough, and has not wanted means, without supernatural aid or the interposition of a necromancer, to erect fortifications, from which to dislodge him by the next arrival would require all the skill of English officers, and all the intrepidity of British soldiers. But, Sir, every account since Junot's arrival most fully concurred in representing him as particularly sedulous, in repairing the old, and erecting new fortifications, and that he had rendered his position almost impregnable; and I never saw any statement, which tended in the slightest degree to invalidate their claim to general belief; and, certainly, there were not a few individuals who, previous to Sir Arthur's landing, entertained very alarming apprehensions as to the result of the attack, if such had been found unavoidable. You then ask, "Was Junot's army to be fed by ravens?" I cannot immediately find the passage, but something to this effect. If you were as successful in proving that Junot was not supplied with, nor had any means of procuring provisions for his army, as you are in exposing the hollow and groundless reasons entertained by our generals as to the impracticability of obtaining a supply for the English army, I should determine not to trouble you with these observations, although the question, as it respects the public, would still remain the same. The newspapers, however, furnished us with various accounts of Junot's having collected a large quantity of provisions; and there was no great reason to believe, that a French army would starve while there were between 2 and 300,000 Portuguese inhabitants in Lisbon, people whom we went to assist, not to distress, to

defend, and not to assail. This was a most perplexing situation for our army, and Junot would take especial care to increase the difficulty to his utmost. Now, had the before-mentioned statements of the immense strength of Junot's position, and his abundant supply of provisions been disproved instead of meeting with a confirmation, in the unqualified assertion, "that Junot could easily have consumed time in a protracted defence," it would avail nothing to your argument. And unless you convince us that every individual of the public, who naturally expected an unconditional surrender was, in forming such opinion, convinced that Junot had no formidable entrenchments to fly to, and no supply of provisions; it will not assist you, if you can even prove that Sir Arthur could have marched into Lisbon with no more obstruction than one of your readers into Mr. Bagshaw's shop, and would have been as cordially and politely welcomed. You proceed—"Well, then," say you, "if it be true that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with only 9000 men, beat the whole of the French force, in spite of all their advantages, have we not a right to expect, nay, had we not a right to claim and to demand, at the hands of the commander in Portugal, when he had 50,000 men, the capture or the total destruction of the French army in Portugal, and if any nation had any right to expect any thing, this nation had a right to expect a result such as here described?"—It is true policy in a general to whom the defence of a strong place is entrusted, and who has at his disposal a force more than necessary for its defence, to march out and attack the army advancing to the siege, if the circumstances, under which he is to make the attack, are such as to justify him in expecting a favourable result; and in the event of his sustaining a repulse, retreat to his position is secure. On the contrary, it would evince a great want of skill in the general, who would march out when his force was scarcely sufficient to garrison the place, where success was not certain. Junot, in his plan of attack on the 21st, and in his resistance at Roleia, appears to have been perfectly satisfied that he should succeed. It fortunately was not the case, but his retreat was not prevented. What was the effect? The English army was enabled to blockade him, and prevent his incursions into the country; he could not again meet them in the field; but it did not follow that an English army would be able to expel him from his forts. A crowd of instances might be collected to prove, that men who had been beaten in

the field, had successfully defended a fortified place; but those of more recent occurrence, will perhaps be more convincing. We have not yet ceased to deplore the fate and admire the courage of the Spaniards, defeated at Rio Seco, and our tongues still vibrate with the praises of the undisciplined defenders of Valencia, Gerona, and Saragossa; places certainly not more formidable than the forts and entrenchments of Portugal. Now, I do not mean to insinuate that our troops could not reduce Junot; but their amounting to 30,000 would not prevent less bloodshed. Do you believe, that if Lille, Maestricht, or Brissac, were properly garrisoned and commanded, that the besieging army would experience less loss, if they were ten times the number of the blockaded garrison? We also know, that in the battle of the 17th, when our army forced the passes of Roleia, only 6000 men could be brought to bear; and it is probable, that if Loison and Laborde had effected their junction before the attack was made, we should have experienced a very alarming loss. I think no one will deny, that the public had the means of satisfactorily ascertaining that Junot effected his retreat after the battle of the 21st; that the places to which he retired were strong by nature and art; that he had a plentiful supply of provisions, and that his force after his defeat was still formidable; and the probability of reducing him not much greater than when the forces first sailed, recollecting, that at that time it was generally reported and believed, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would land at Peniche, and immediately invest the place. Impressed with the belief of these facts, I really cannot see how the public could anticipate the result, such as they did anticipate, and as you have related, till the public will declare that condition might not be granted which would be preferable to the certainty of great loss in the attack of these places, and the chance of failure; till it can be proved that it was the public conviction, that our army would have been able to continue the blockade without much difficulty, that their services were not wanted in any other quarter; till, in short, it can be proved, that the public was certain that there were no secret motives, and those very strong ones, to influence the determination of our commanders to agree to a conditional surrender. So far, I think, you will allow unconditional surrender could not reasonably be expected by the public, and that our commanders were, so far, prematurely disgraced; but I most perfectly concur with the now

general opinion, that except in the most distressing circumstances, nothing can justify our commanders for having acceded to the present Convention; it is, I fear, a Convention which has affixed to the British army and nation a stigma so indelible, that no event, however favourable, can wholly remove it, or prevent its suggesting the most agonizing reflections. We are, however, well aware, that great public calamities and individual misfortunes, have not unfrequently given rise to, or been accompanied by circumstances which, in the progress of time, have very materially contributed to diminish the pernicious effects apprehended at their occurrence; and it is some consolation, that the people have not suffered their reputation to be sullied without a murmur; that the same page of history which records this infamous and insulting Convention, will also relate the virtuous indignation felt by a people jealous of their honour; will rouse the lethargic, and animate the torpid of succeeding ages, by a glowing description of the patriotism which prevailed in every rank; will detail the people's vehement and unceasing cries for vengeance on those who dared to degrade their character, and debase their dignity. And although it is highly probable, that the immediate consequences of this Convention will be highly disastrous, it is not impossible that it may produce some beneficial effects. It will shew the world the feelings and character of Englishmen; it will powerfully instruct our military commanders, that the honour of a nation is not to be surrendered with impunity. Since the commencement of the French revolution, no treachery however base, no infamy however atrocious (and unfortunately many equally, nay, more iniquitous than the Convention of La Bon may be enumerated), ever produced in the countries where they happened complaints so general and unqualified as in the present instance. The consideration of these circumstances will afford more than a transient gleam amidst the immense gloom; will prove more serviceable than a solitary spar, when threatening waves surround. I feel confident that I have been considerably too prolix and tedious, that many of my remarks are totally unnecessary, and others not sufficiently elucidated; but as I have not time to condense and arrange them, I shall leave them to your candid and unprejudiced consideration. I cannot, however, conclude without expressing my regret, that any circumstances should exist which could prevent our having, what we certainly very much wanted, and which you have energe-

tically expressed, "an instance of triumph, "a proof of victory, which no one could "gainsay."—I have the honour to remain, Sir, &c.—C.

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

SIR;—The *Edinburgh Reviewers*, in their bulky pamphlet of April, 1809, under the guise of reviewing two publications, written by gentlemen, whose names, I believe, are wholly unknown to the public, a Mr. Rylance and a Mr. Lingham, are pleased to enlighten the world with their thoughts, upon the subject of the late emigration to the Brazils. Upon this topic, I feel no interest in controverting their opinions, as they are of course the echo of the speeches in parliament, of that faction upon whose fortunes their own depend; it being now no secret to any one that the positive overbearing and dogmatical paradoxes, which have so peculiarly distinguished the *Edinburgh Review*, proceed from a small knot of young friends, who hunt after the good dinners and other good things of those accomplished statesmen, Lords Holland and Henry Petty. The subject, upon which I at present address you, Mr. Cobbett, is the language, which, in the article above-mentioned, these gentlemen have made use of upon the subject of Libel; language betraying at once the base slavish spirit of which they are composed, and the determined hostility which animates them against all the assertors of the Liberty of the Press. It seems, that these authors, whose pamphlets form the pretence of the review, Mr. Rylance and Mr. Lingham, unfortunately agreed in nothing but in each dedicating his work to the Liverpool Solomon, Mr. Roscoe. Upon every point, relating to the subject of the Portuguese emigration, they differed in their sentiments. Mr. Lingham, to use the words of the review, "kept quite clear "of the least appearance of faction; while "Mr. Rylance, without any material qualification, except perhaps his praise of "Mr. Roscoe in the dedication, adopted "the precise line of argument, taken by "the persons in opposition to the present "ministry." This was difference enough to regulate the judgment of these candid, and impartial critics. Mr. Rylance became, of course, the favourite, and Mr. Lingham, as a man swayed by no party motions, but bold and independent enough to write from his own understanding, was, of course, to be run down. If, however, on the present occasion, the *Edinburgh Reviewers* had confined themselves to literary strictures only, however partial and corrupt those strictures

might have been, I should not have called your attention to them. But will you believe it, Mr. Cobbett? in consequence of Mr. Lingham, who in his book, according to these critics' own account, "kept quite "clear of the least appearance of faction," having characterised the other gentleman by a few expressions not by any means unusual in political controversy, and none of which, from their analysis of his publication, I think it is pretty clear, were misapplied; such as "obscure pamphleteer," "unauthorized tool of a party," and the like; I say, will you, Sir, believe it, that these worthy disciples of the Whig school, these pains-taking underlings of the present Opposition, these Scotch preachers of political liberty, are actually for letting loose the dogs of law upon poor Mr. Lingham, and amercing him with fines, penalties, imprisonment, and the pillory, for having failed to acknowledge the eminent consequence of this Mr. Rylance and his perfect independence, (which, be it observed, these reviewers themselves impeach) for having dared to publish the truth of him, and to speak of him as he deserves. They introduce their whining complaint, and garbled quotations of Mr. Lingham's "abusive language" with this sentence: "Some passages, we are "pretty sure, would subject him to punishment in a court of justice:" and having finished their extracts, they conclude:—"We have little doubt that the above passages, are themselves libellous." Is not this monstrous? Why, the action lately brought by the Duke of Bedford's Knight, (I forget his name) was nothing to this. Irritated feelings in being shewn to be a dunce, and disappointed expectations in not getting from his task-master his usual hire, to a certain degree palliated the resentment of that wretched book-maker. But what have these reviewers to urge in extenuation of this gratuitous recommendation of legal proceedings? Mr. Lingham did not charge *them* with a systematic and scandalous perversion of their duty, with a base and profligate bias either for or against every author whom they noticed; Mr. Lingham did not say of *them*, that their malignity against most authors was to be equalled only by their interested adulation of a few; that their wanton and scurrilous attacks on respectable writers in general, were balanced only in infamy by their gross and unblushing panegycs upon the members of their own fraternity; that, throughout the whole of their career, their pens have been vilely prostituted to party purposes, in which task their inconsistency has been as notorious as their corruption,—

the grovelling sycophants of power and place,—the admirers of Pitt, when living, and of his opponents, when dead. These, or similar charges, Mr. Lingham never insinuated against the Edinburgh Reviewers. One does not see therefore why *they* should feel so sore, why *they* should so strongly sympathize with Mr. Ryland, cry out the senseless yell of libel, and call for punishment in a court of justice! Really, Mr. Cobbett, the coincidence between the time of this publication (April, 1809) and the commencement of the knight's law-suit, and the identity of their sentiments upon the subject of libel, are so marvellous, that I verily suspect some of these *young friends*, who perhaps may belong to the profession of the law, were his counsellors upon the occasion, advised the action, as the phrase is, and perhaps assisted in getting up the cause. The knight, I dare say, has since heartily repented of having acted upon the opinion, from whatever quarter it proceeded; and the Edinburgh Reviewers, since the unfortunate failure of his experiment, are probably now ashamed of the detestable persecuting spirit so wholly inimical to the liberty of the press, upon the expression of which I have animadverted. In making these animadversions I have no other object in view than to vindicate that palladium of our rights, without the secure enjoyment of which you, Sir, have so often observed, that our boasted freedom is nothing worth. At the same time I feel an apology to be due, for the length to which my observations have extended, a length to be justified only by the importance of the subject itself, which will, I hope, plead my excuse, and bestow a temporary consequence even upon these insignificant individuals, Messrs. Ryland and Lingham.—Yours, &c.—P. D.—*Sept. 24, 1808.*

EXPOSITION OF THE PRACTICES AND MACHINATIONS WHICH LED TO THE USURPATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EXECUTION, BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DISPATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY FERDINAND VII.

At a period when the nation has made and continues to make the most heroic efforts to shake off the yoke of slavery attempted to be imposed upon it, it is the duty of all good citizens to contribute, by every means in their power, to enlighten it with respect to the real causes that have brought it into its present situation, and to

keep up the noble spirit by which it is animated.—To make known to Spain and the whole world the base means resorted to by the Emperor of the French to seize the person of our king, Ferdinand VII, and to subjugate this great and generous nation, is a duty well worthy of one who, like myself, is in a condition to discharge it; inasmuch as circumstances placed me in a situation to be an eye-witness of the events which preceded the catastrophe of Bayonne, and in which I bore a part. It was not in my power to do this before, in consequence of personal restraint, and from not having collected the documents necessary to accredit my statement. Some are still wanting, which it was necessary to burn, in consequence of dangerous circumstances, in which every thing was to be feared; others have disappeared through the various incidents connected with that unhappy period; but those which I now present are sufficient to prove the atrocious violence committed against our beloved king, Ferdinand VII, and the whole nation.—Though the conduct of Spain towards France since the peace of Basle, a very interesting portion of its political history in these latter times, is intimately connected with the important events which form the subject of this Exposition, it is not necessary to dwell even upon its principal periods. It will be sufficient to state what the whole nation, and all Europe, know, that the political system of Spain has constantly been during this time to preserve friendship and the best understanding with France, and to maintain, at all hazards, the ruinous alliance concluded in 1796.—To attain this end, there is no sacrifice which Spain has not made; and as the preservation of the Prince of the Peace in the high degree of favour he enjoyed with Charles IV. depended in a great measure upon the continuance of this system, it was maintained with the greatest constancy and indefatigable attention. Fleets, armies, treasure, every thing was sacrificed to France; humiliations, submissions, every thing was suffered, every thing was done to satisfy, as far as possible, the insatiable demands of the French government; but the idea never once occurred of preserving the nation against the machinations of an ally, who was overrunning Europe.—The Treaty of Tilsit, in which the destiny of the world seemed to be decided in his favour, was hardly concluded, when he turned his eyes towards the West, and resolved on the ruin of Portugal and Spain; or what comes to the same purpose, to make himself master of this vast peninsula, with a view of

making its inhabitants as happy as those of Italy, Holland, Switzerland, and the league of the Rhine.—At this very time, the Emperor was revolving in his mind some designs fatal to Spain (for he began to disarm her), by demanding a respectable body of our troops to exert their valour in remote regions, and for foreign interests. This he effected without difficulty, and there was placed at his disposal a gallant and picked force of 16,000 men of all descriptions.—The enterprize of making himself master of Spain was not so easy as Napoleon imagined. It was, above all, necessary to find out some pretext for carrying into execution the daring and gigantic plan of subjugating a friendly and allied nation, that had made so many sacrifices for France, and which this very Emperor had praised for its fidelity and nobleness of character.—Nevertheless, being accustomed to act with that disregard to delicacy in the choice of his means, which is characteristic of the man who imagines that the conquest of the whole world, the destruction of the human species, and the havoc of war are conducive to true glory, he resolved to excite and foment discord in the royal family of Spain, through his ambassador at this court.—The latter, though perhaps not initiated in the grand secret of his master, succeeded in seducing the prince of Asturias, our present king and master, and suggested to him the idea of intermarrying with a princess related to the emperor. The affliction which his highness laboured under from a conjunction of circumstances, as lamentable as notorious, and his anxiety to avoid another connection into which it was attempted to force him, with a lady selected for him by his greatest enemy, and on that account alone the object of his aversion, induced him to acquiesce in the suggestions of the ambassador, but with the stipulation that it was to meet the approbation of his august parents, and under the impression that it would strengthen the friendship and alliance then subsisting between the two crowns. His highness, actuated by motives so cogent in a political point of view, and yielding to the solicitations of the ambassador, wrote accordingly to his Imperial majesty.—A few days after our beloved prince wrote this letter, occurred the scandalous imprisonment of his august person in the royal monastery of St. Laurence, and the still more scandalous decree which was issued in the name of the king, and addressed to the council of Castile. There are very strong reasons to believe, that the unknown hand that frustrated this feigned conspiracy was some French

agent employed to forward the plan which Napoleon had formed.—Fortunately the Spanish nation was deeply impressed with its situation, entertained a just opinion of the good disposition and religious principles of their prince of the Asturias, and suspected instantaneously that the whole was a calumny fabricated by the Favourite, as absurd as it was audacious, in order to remove the only obstacle which then opposed his views.—It is already known, that on the imprisonment of the prince of Asturias, his royal father wrote to the Emperor, no doubt at the suggestion of the Favourite, complaining of the conduct of the ambassador Beaumharnois, in his clandestine communications with the prince of Asturias, and expressing his surprise that the emperor had not come to a previous understanding with his majesty on a subject of such pre-eminent importance to sovereigns.—As the imprisonment of the prince of Asturias, and, above all, the most scandalous decree fulminated against his royal person, produced an effect completely contrary to the expectations of the Favourite, he began to be afraid, thought proper to recede, and to mediate a reconciliation between the royal parents and their son. With this view, as is stated in the Abstract of the Escorial Cause, circulated by the Council in consequence of his majesty's orders of the 8th April, he forged certain letters, and made the prince of Asturias sign them while a prisoner, which being delivered into the hands of the royal parents, were supposed to have softened their hearts; and by these singular means did this innocent prince obtain a nominal liberty.—This was the state of affairs when a French courier arrived at the royal palace of St. Laurence, with a treaty concluded and signed at Fontainebleau on the 27th of Oct. by Don Eugenio Isquierdo, as plenipotentiary of his Catholic majesty, and Marshal Duroc, in the name of the emperor of the French. Its contents, as well as those of the separate Convention, constitute Nos. 1 and 2 of the documents annexed to this Exposition.—It is worthy of observation, that the department of the ministry, of which I was at the head, was totally unacquainted with the measures taken by Don E. Isquierdo, at Paris, as well as with his appointment, his instructions, his correspondence, and every part of his proceedings.—The result of this treaty was to render the Emperor master of Portugal with very little expence; to furnish him with a plausible pretext for introducing his armies into our peninsula, with the intent of subjugating it at a proper opportunity, and to put him in

immediate possession of Tuscany.—The Favourite was to have for his portion the Algarves and Alentejo, in full property and sovereignty, but the emperor's answer to the letters of the royal father had not yet arrived; it was completely uncertain what it would be, and this filled him with fear and anxiety.—The intimate relations which the Favourite maintained at that period with the Grand Duke of Berg, through the medium of his confident Isquierdo, flattered him to a certain degree with the hope that every thing would be settled to his wishes, though the interposition of a few millions might be necessary. But neither the Favourite nor his confident knew the real intentions of the person they were treating with at Paris. In fact, the instant the emperor found that the Favourite had committed himself, and the royal parents were brought into discredit, he shewed no disposition to answer his majesty's letters, for the purpose of keeping them in suspense, and inspiring them with dread, in the hope that they might form the resolution of withdrawing, though at that time he had not completed his plan for taking an advantage of such an occurrence.—The Grand Duke wrote to the Favourite, that he would employ every means to support him, but that the negotiation was rendered very delicate, owing to the extraordinary attachment which prevailed in Spain towards the prince of Asturias, and the consideration due towards a princess who was cousin to the Empress, and in consequence of the part the ambassador Beauharnois, her relative, took in the business. (1).—Now it was that the Favourite began clearly to discover how much his credit had sunk, and he gave himself up for lost, in consequence of being deprived of the support of his imaginary protector, the Emperor of the French. There were no means now neglected by him to endeavour to ingratiate himself with the Grand Duke of Berg; every sort of expression, every kind of deference was employed for this purpose; and the more effectually to avert the impending storm, he prevailed on the royal parents to write to the emperor direct, and to request his consent to the marriage of one of his cousins to the prince of Asturias.—Meanwhile the Emperor of the French appeared to be very much dissatisfied with the conduct of Isquierdo, and kept him at a distance, in order to cut off this direct mode of commu-

nication, and to make himself more impetenable.—His Imperial majesty set off on a journey to Italy, with that studied parade which all Europe has witnessed, giving it such an air of importance, that it was to be presumed he was going to fix the destinies of the world. But there is reason to surmise, that his real object was no other than to divert the general attention to that quarter, for the purpose of misleading the other states, whilst his real designs were directed to the invasion of Portugal and Spain.—This artifice and dissimulation did not, however, prevent the discovery of one of the articles in the Secret Treaty of Fontainebleau, by his expelling, with the greatest precipitation, from Tuscany, the Queen Regent and her children, and plundering the royal palace, and seizing all the public funds of a court that was ignorant of the existence of such a treaty, and had committed no act of forfeiture.—Whilst the emperor kept Europe in suspense by his journey to Milan and Venice, he thought fit to answer the letters, which he had some time before received from the royal father, assuring his majesty, that he never had the slightest information of the circumstances which he communicated respecting his son the prince of Asturias, nor ever received any letter from his royal highness. (2). Nevertheless his majesty consented to the proposed intermarriage with a princess of his family, undoubtedly with an intention of amusing the royal parents; whilst he was sending into Spain, under various pretexts, all the troops which he had then disposable, and was studiously propagating an idea that he was favourable to the cause of the prince of Asturias, and thus endeavouring to captivate the good opinion of the Spanish nation.—The royal parents, struck with terror which this conduct of the emperor naturally inspired, and the Favourite being still more astonished, opposed no obstacle to the entrance of the French troops into the peninsula; on the contrary, they gave the most effectual orders that they should be received and treated even on a better footing than the Spanish troops.—The emperor, under the pretence of consulting the security of these troops, ordered his generals, by stratagem or force to get possession of the fortresses of Pampeluna, St.

(1) All this appears from the correspondence of the Favourite with the Grand Duke, which the latter carried off from the office of the secretary of state, during his lieutenantancy.

(2) Compare this statement, with the contents of the letter (No. 3), from his Imperial majesty to King Ferdinand, in which he acknowledges having received the letter written to him by the Prince of Asturias, on the suggestion of ambassador Beauharnois.

Sebastian, Figueras, and Barcelona, which alone could present any obstacle to an invasion. They were accordingly taken by fraud and surprise, to the indignation and sorrow of the whole nation, to which the French still affected to profess friendship and alliance.—The emperor, conceiving himself already master of all Spain, and thinking the time had arrived for accelerating his measures, thought proper to write a letter to the royal father, complaining in the bitterest terms, that his majesty had not renewed his application for an imperial princess for his son the prince of Asturias. The king was pleased to return for answer, that he adhered to his former proposal, and was willing that the marriage should immediately take place.—Some important proceeding was still necessary to carry the project to a degree of maturity, and the emperor not willing to trust it to writing, thought he could not find a better instrument than Don Eugenio Izquierdo, whom he had detained in Paris in a state of great dejection and terror, that had been artfully impressed upon him for the purpose of his more effectually executing his commission, by impressing the royal parents and the Favourite with the same feelings.—In this state of things, the emperor ordered Izquierdo to repair to Spain, which he accordingly did, in a very precipitate and mysterious manner. According to his verbal statements, he brought no proposal in writing with him, nor was he to receive any, and he had orders to remain only three days.—On his arrival, under these circumstances, at Aranjuez, the Favourite conducted him to the presence of the royal parents, and their conferences were conducted with so much secrecy, that it was impossible for any one to discover the object of his mission; but soon after his departure from this capital, their majesties began to shew a disposition to abandon the metropolis and the peninsula, and to emigrate to Mexico.—The recent example of the determination taken by the royal family of Portugal, seemed to have fully corresponded with the views of the emperor, and there is reason to think that his imperial majesty promised himself a similar success in Spain.—But he must have been very ignorant of the Spanish character to flatter himself with such expectations. Scarcely had the first reports gone abroad of the intention of the royal family to abandon their residence, a resolution clearly indicated by the many preparations which were going on, when discontent and fear were depicted in the most lively colours in the features of all the inhabitants of the capital, and of all

ranks and classes of persons. This alone was sufficient to induce their majesties to refute the rumour, and to assure the people that they would not abandon them.—Nevertheless, such was the general distrust, such the magnitude of the evils which must have resulted, and such and so many the symptoms of a determination to emigrate, that every one was on the alert, and all seemed to be impressed with the necessity of preventing a measure pregnant with so many mischiefs. The danger increased, and the fears of the public kept pace with it. The consequence was, that the commotions of Aranjuez, on the 17th and 19th of March, burst forth like a sudden explosion; the people being led by a sort of instinct of self-preservation. The result was, the imprisonment of the Favourite, who, without the title of king, had exercised all the functions of royalty.—Scarcely had this tempestuous scene taken place, when the royal parents, finding themselves deprived of the support of their Favourite, took the unexpected but voluntary resolution which they had for some time entertained to abdicate their throne, as they accordingly did, in favour of their son and heir the Prince of Asturias.—The emperor, ignorant of this sudden event, and perhaps never supposing that the Spaniards were capable of displaying such resolution, had ordered prince Murat to advance with his army towards Madrid, under the idea that the royal family were already on the coast, and on the point of embarking, and that far from meeting the slightest obstacle on the part of the people, all of them would receive him with open arms, as their deliverer and guardian angel. He conceived, that the nation was in the highest degree dissatisfied with their government, and never reflected that they were only dissatisfied with the abuses which had crept into the administration of it.—The instant the grand duke of Berg was apprised of the occurrences at Aranjuez, he advanced with his whole army to occupy the capital of the kingdom; intending, no doubt, to profit by the occasion, and to take such steps as should be best calculated to realize, by any means, the plan of making himself master of Spain.—In the meanwhile, the mysterious obscurity of the emperor's projects, the proximity of his troops, and the ignorance in which Ferdinand VII. was of the real object of the emperor's approach, induced the king to adopt such measures as appeared to his majesty best calculated to conciliate the good-will of the emperor. Not satisfied with having communicated his

accession to the throne in the most friendly and affectionate terms, the king appointed a deputation of three grandees of Spain to proceed to Bayonne, and in his name to compliment his imperial majesty. He also appointed another grandee of Spain to pay a similar compliment to the grand duke of Berg, who had already arrived in the vicinity of Madrid.—One of the contrivances which the French agent immediately had recourse to, was to assure the king, and to spread the rumour in all quarters, that his imperial majesty's arrival might be expected every moment. Under this impression, the necessary orders were given for preparing apartments in the palace suitable to the dignity of so august a guest; and the king wrote again to the emperor, how agreeable it would be to him to be personally acquainted with his majesty, and to assure him with his own lips, of his ardent wishes to strengthen more and more the alliance which subsisted between the two sovereigns.—The grand duke of Berg had in the meantime entered Madrid, at the head of his troops. He was no sooner acquainted with the state of affairs, than he began to sow discord. He spoke in a mysterious manner of the abdication of the crown, executed by the royal father in favour of his son, amidst the tumults of Aranjuez, and gave it to be understood, that until the emperor had acknowledged Ferd. VII. it was impossible for him to take any step that should appear like an acknowledgement, and that he must be under the necessity of treating only with the royal father.—This pretext did not fail to produce the effect which the grand duke intended. The royal parents, the moment they were informed of this circumstance, availed themselves of it to save the Favourite, who remained in confinement, and in whose favour prince Murat professed to take an interest, for the sole purpose of flattering their majesties, mortifying Ferd. VII. and sowing fresh matter of discord between the parents and the son.—In this state of things, the new king made his public entry into Madrid, without any other parade than the most numerous concourse of all the inhabitants of the capital and its environs, the strongest expressions of love and loyalty, and the applauses and acclamations which sprang from the joy and enthusiasm of his subjects—a scene truly grand and impressive, in which the young king was seen like a father in the midst of his children, entering his capital as the regenerator and guardian angel of the monarchy.—The duke of Berg was an eye-witness of this scene; but far from abandoning his plan, he resolved to

persist in it with greater ardour. The experiment upon the royal parents produced the desired effect; but whilst the beloved king, who came to the throne under such good auspices, continued to be present, it was impossible to carry the plan into execution. It was, therefore, necessary to make every effort to remove Ferdinand VII. from Madrid.—To accomplish this purpose, the grand duke every moment spread reports of the arrival of a fresh courier, with accounts of the emperor's departure from Paris, and that he might be speedily expected to arrive in this capital. He directed his efforts in the first instance to induce the infant Don Carlos to set off to receive his imperial majesty, upon the supposition that his highness must meet him before he had proceeded two days upon his journey. His majesty acceded to the proposal, being influenced by the purest and most beneficent intentions. He had no sooner succeeded in procuring the departure of the Infant, than he manifested the most anxious desire that the King should do the same, leaving no means untried to persuade his majesty to take this step, and assuring him that it would be attended by the most happy consequences to the king and the whole kingdom.—At the same time that the grand duke of Berg, the ambassador, and all the other agents of France, were proceeding in this course, they were, on the other side, busily employed with the royal parents to procure from them a formal protest against the abdication of the crown, which they had executed spontaneously and with the accustomed solemnities, in favour of their son and legitimate heir.—His majesty being incessantly urged to go to meet the emperor, painfully hesitated between the necessity of performing an act of courtesy to his ally, which he was assured would be attended with such advantageous results, and his reluctance to abandon his loyal and beloved people under such critical circumstances.—In this embarrassing situation, I can assert, that my constant opinion, as the king's minister, was, that his majesty should not leave his capital until he received certain information that the emperor was already arrived in Spain, and was approaching Madrid; and that even then, he should only proceed to a distance so short as not to render it necessary to sleep one night out of his capital.—His majesty for some days persisted in the resolution of not quitting Madrid until he received certain advice of the emperor's approach; and he would have probably continued in that determination, had not the arrival of general Savary added greater weight to the reiterated solicitations of the grand

duke, and the ambassador Beauharnois.—General Savary was announced as envoy from the emperor, and in that capacity demanded an audience from his majesty, which was immediately granted. At this audience he professed that he was sent by the emperor merely to compliment his majesty, and to know whether his sentiments with respect to France were conformable to those of the king his father, in which case the emperor would forego all consideration of what had passed, would in no degree interfere in the internal concerns of the kingdom, and would immediately recognize his majesty as king of Spain and the Indies.—The most satisfactory answer was given to general Savary, and the conversation was continued in terms so flattering, that nothing more could have been desired. The audience terminated with an assurance upon his part, that the emperor had already left Paris, that he was near Bayonne, and on his way to Madrid.—Scarcely had he left the audience chamber, when he began to make the most urgent applications, to induce his majesty to meet the emperor, assuring him that this attention would be very grateful and flattering to his imperial majesty; and he asserted so repeatedly, and in such positive terms, that the emperor's arrival might be expected every moment, that it was impossible not to give credit to his assertions. It was in fact very hard to suspect that a general, the envoy of an emperor, should have come merely for the purpose of deception.—The king at length yielded to so many solicitations, and so many flattering hopes and assurances; and his love of his subjects, and ardent desire to contribute to their happiness, by putting an end to this dreadful crisis, triumphed in his generous heart over every feeling of repugnance and apprehension.—The day appointed for his majesty's departure arrived. General Savary, affecting the most zealous and assiduous attention to his majesty, solicited the honour of accompanying him on his journey, which, at the farthest, could only extend to Burgos, according to the information which he had just received of the emperor's approach.—During his absence, supposed to be only for a few days, the king left at Madrid a supreme junta of government, consisting of the secretaries of state, and presided over by his uncle, the most serene infant Don Antonio, in order that the urgent affairs of the government should be attended to.—General Savary followed him to Burgos, in a separate carriage; but the

emperor not having arrived there, he used every exertion to induce his majesty to continue his journey as far as Vittoria. Various discussions arose as to the course which ought to be pursued; but artifice and perfidy contended with honour, innocence, and good faith; and, in so unequal a strife, the same benevolent intentions which drew his majesty from his capital urged him to proceed to Vittoria.—General Savary, convinced that his majesty had resolved to proceed no farther, continued his journey to Bayonne with the intention undoubtedly of acquainting the emperor of all that had passed, and of procuring a letter from him which should determine the king to separate himself from his people.—At Vittoria his majesty received information that the emperor arrived at Bourdeaux, and was on his way to Bayonne. In consequence of this advice, the infant Don Carlos, who had been waiting at Tolosa, proceeded on to Bayonne, whither he had been invited by the emperor, who, however, delayed his arrival some days longer.—Nothing particular occurred at Vittoria, except that the supreme junta of government at Madrid, having written that the Grand Duke of Berg had imperiously demanded that the Favourite should be released and placed in his hands, his majesty did not think proper to comply with this demand; and in communicating this determination to the junta of government, enjoined them to enter into no explanation with the grand duke respecting the fate of the prisoner (3).—In the meantime, general Savary concerted with the emperor in what manner they should prepare to give the finishing blow; and while the French troops in the vicinity of Vittoria were making suspicious movements, he made his appearance in that city, with the letter No. 3, to his majesty from the emperor.—To the contents of this letter, which were neither flattering nor decorous, general Savary added so many and such vehement protestations of the interest which the emperor took in the welfare of his majesty, and of

(3) Every body knows that the prisoner was at length delivered up to the French and conducted under an escort by them to Bayonne. This step was solely owing to an order from the junta of government yielding to imperious circumstances and the peremptory menaces of the grand duke, as is stated more at large in the appendix to this publication.

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Spain, that he even went so far as to say : ' I will suffer my head to be cut off, if, within a quarter of an hour of your majesty's arrival at Bayonne, the emperor shall not have recognized you as king of Spain and the Indies. To support his own consistency, he will probably begin by giving you the title of highness, but in five minutes he will give you that of majesty, and in three days every thing will be settled, and your majesty may return to Spain immediately.'—His majesty, however, hesitated as to the course which he should take; but anxious to redeem the pledge which he had given, and, above all, to relieve his beloved subjects from the cruel anxiety in which they were, he banished from his heart every apprehension of danger, and shut his ears against my counsels, and those of other persons in his train, as well as to the supplications of that loyal city, and determined to proceed to Bayonne; his royal mind being incapable of suspecting that a sovereign, his ally, should invite him as a guest, for the purpose of making him a prisoner, and of putting an end to a dynasty, which, so far from having offended him, had given him so many striking proofs of its friendship.—Scarcely had his majesty set foot on the French territory, when he remarked that no one came to receive him, until, at his arrival at St Jean de Luz, the mayor made his appearance, attended by the municipality. The carriage stopped, and he addressed his majesty with the most lively expressions of the joy he felt at having the honour of being the first to receive a king, who was the friend and ally of France.—Shortly after, he was met by the deputation of the three Grandes of Spain, who had been sent off to meet the emperor; and their representation, with respect to the intentions of the emperor, was not the most flattering. He was, however, now too near Bayonne to think of changing his course, and he therefore continued his journey.—There came out to meet the king the prince of Neufchatel and Duroc, marshal of the palace, with a detachment of the guard of honour which the citizens of Bayonne had formed to attend the emperor, and they invited his majesty to enter Bayonne, where a place had been prepared for his residence. This residence appeared to all, and was in reality, but little suitable to the rank of the august guest who was to occupy it. This remarkable and expressive neglect formed a singular contrast with the studied magnificence which the king had employed in making the preparations at Madrid for the reception of his ally.—His majesty was doubt-

ing what could be the meaning of a reception that he so little expected, when he was informed that the emperor was coming to pay him a visit. His imperial majesty arrived, accompanied by a number of his generals. The king went down to the street-door to receive him, and both monarchs embraced each other with every token of friendship and affection. The emperor staid but a short time with his majesty, and they embraced each other again at parting.—Soon after marshal Duroc came to invite the king to dine with his imperial majesty, whose carriages were coming to convey his majesty to the palace of Marac: this accordingly took place. The emperor came as far as the coach-steps to receive his majesty, embraced him again, and led him by the hand to the apartment provided for him.—The king had no sooner returned to his residence, when Gen. Savary waited on his majesty to inform him that the emperor had irrevocably determined that the Bourbon dynasty should no longer reign in Spain; that it should be succeeded by his; and therefore his imperial majesty required that the king should, in his own name and that of all his family, renounce the crown of Spain and the Indies, in favour of the dynasty of Buonaparte.—It would be difficult to describe the surprise with which the royal mind of his majesty was affected, and the consternation with which all those who were nearest to his person were struck at hearing of such a proposition. His majesty was not yet recovered from the fatigues of a toilsome journey, when the same man who had made him so many protestations of security at Madrid and on the road, who had drawn him from his capital and his kingdom to Bayonne, on pretence of adjusting matters of the greatest importance to both states, and of his being recognised by his imperial majesty, had the audacity to be the bearer of so scandalous a proposal.—On the following day, I was sent for by the emperor to his royal palace, where I found the minister of foreign affairs, M. Champagny, waiting to enter upon a discussion of the proposals verbally stated by general Savary. I instantly complained of the perfidy with which so important an affair was proceeded in; representing that the king, my master, came to Bayonne, relying on the assurances given by general Savary, in the name of the emperor, and in the presence of the dukes del Infantado, S. Carlos, D. Juan Escobiquiz, and myself, that his imperial majesty would recognize him at the very first interview between the two sovereigns in the imperial palace of Marac; that when his majesty expected to witness the

realization of this promised recognition, he was surprised with the propositions above alluded to; and that his majesty had authorised me to protest against the violence done to his person, in not permitting him to return to Spain; and as a categorical and final answer to the solicitation of the emperor, that the king neither would nor could renounce his crown in favour of another dynasty, without being wanting in the duties which he owed to his subjects and to his own character; that he could not do so in prejudice to the individuals of his own family, who were called to the succession by the fundamental laws of the kingdom; and much less could he consent to the establishment of another dynasty, which ought alone to be called to the throne by the Spanish nation, in virtue of their original right to elect another family upon the termination of the present dynasty.—The minister of foreign affairs insisted on the necessity of the renunciation which had been proposed, and contended that the abdication signed by Ch. IV, on the 19th of March, had not been voluntary.—I expressed my surprise that the king should be importuned to renounce his crown, at the same moment that it was asserted that the renunciation of his father was not his free act. I wished however not to be understood as entering into such a discussion, as I could not acknowledge the smallest authority in the emperor to intermeddle with matters which were purely domestic, and peculiarly belonging to the Spanish government; following in this respect the example of the cabinet of Paris, when it rejected as inadmissible the applications of his majesty, the royal father, in favour of his ally and first cousin the unfortunate Louis XVI.—Nevertheless, desirous of giving to truth and innocence a testimony which they alone had a right to exact, I added, that three weeks before the disturbance at Aranjuez, Ch. IV, in my presence, and that of all the other ministers of state, addressed her majesty the queen, in these words: “Maria Louisa, we will retire to one of the provinces, where we will pass our days in tranquillity; and Ferdinand, who is a young man, will take upon himself the burden of the government.”—I represented to him, that, on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, no violence was done to his majesty, in order to extort an abdication of his crown, either by the people who had risen purely from the apprehension that his majesty was going to remove to Seville, and thence to America; or on the part of his son, the prince of Asturias, or any other persons; of which facts the mi-

nisters of the *corps diplomatique*, as well as all the persons about the court, were fully convinced, since all of them congratulated and complimented the new sovereign, with the exception of the French ambassador, who pretended that he had not been furnished with the necessary instructions, disregarding the example of his colleagues, who were as little provided with instructions from their respective courts.—I concluded with proving to him that the renunciation of the royal father was only the consequence of his majesty's predilection for the tranquillity of a private life, and his persuasion that his constitution, enfeebled by age and habitual indisposition, was incompetent to support the heavy burden of the government.—This irrelevant objection having been got rid of, Mr. Champagny stated, that the emperor could never be sure of Spain, in case of a new war with the powers of the north, while the Spanish nation continued to be governed by a dynasty, who must regret to see its elder branch expelled from the monarchy of France.—I answered, that in a regular system of things, such prepossessions never prevailed over the interests of states, and that the political conduct of Ch. IV, since the treaty of Basle, afforded a recent proof that sovereigns paid little regard to family interests, when they were in opposition to the interests of their dominions; that the friendship between Spain and France was founded in local and political considerations; that the topographical situation of the two kingdoms was of itself sufficient to demonstrate how important it was for Spain to preserve a good understanding with France, the only state on the continent of Europe with which she had direct and very extensive relations, and consequently that every reason of policy induced Spain to maintain a perpetual peace with France. Besides, what ground of suspicion had the emperor with respect to a nation, who, to considerations of interest, add the inflexible and religious integrity with which at all periods, according to the admission of French writers themselves, they had preserved their federative system?—I added, that there were reasons no less important why France should not endanger the continuance of that harmony which prevailed since the treaty of Basle, with equal advantage to herself and to Spain; that the Spanish nation, whose generosity and affection for their sovereigns were proverbial, if from a principle of fidelity they had submitted to the caprices of despotism, when covered with the veil of majesty, would, from the operation of the same principle, display their well-known

valour, when they saw their independence, and the security of their beloved sovereign, violated; that if unfortunately France should commit so atrocious an insult, that power would lose an ally whose armies, fleet, and treasure, had in a great measure contributed to her triumphs; that England, which had in vain attempted to shake the good faith of the Spanish cabinet, for the purpose of separating her from France, would avail herself of such a conjuncture to diminish the force of her enemy, and to augment her own, by pacific relations with a power which she would assist with money and with her forces by land and sea, in the glorious enterprise of defending our independence, and the security of our king and natural lord; that the feeble colonies of France would not in that event find the maritime forces of Spain employed in obstructing the plans of conquest entertained by Great Britain; and that the commerce of that power must inevitably come into competition at the Spanish market with the French merchandise, which is now peculiarly favoured.— Besides these considerations, having a direct relation to the interests of both states, I expatiated on others no less cogent, and connected with the character of the French cabinet.—I reminded the minister, that, on the 27th Oct. last, a treaty was signed at Fontainebleau, wherein the emperor guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Spanish monarchy as it then was; that nothing had since occurred which could justify its infraction: on the contrary, that Spain had continued to add new claims to the confidence and gratitude of the French empire, as his imperial majesty himself had confessed, by the praises which he bestowed on the good faith and constant friendship of his intimate and first ally. What confidence, I added, can Europe place in her treaties with France, when she looks to the perfidy with which that of the 27th of Oct. has been violated? And what must be her terror when she sees the capitious means, the seductive artifices, and the false promises, by which his imperial majesty has confined the king in the city of Bayonne, in order to despoil him of the crown to which, with the inexpressible joy of his people, he has been called by the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and the spontaneous abdication of his august father. Posterity will not believe that the emperor could have given so great a blow to his own reputation, the loss of which will leave no other means of concluding a war with him, than that of total destruction and extermination.—This was the state of the discussion, when the em-

peror, who had overheard our conference, ordered us to enter his own cabinet, where, to my great surprise, I was insulted by his imperial majesty with the infamous appellation of traitor, upon no other ground, than that, having been minister to Ch. IV, I continued to serve his son Ferd. VII. He also accused me, in an angry tone, of having maintained, in an official conference with General Montion, that my master, in order to his being king of Spain, did not stand in need of the recognition of the emperor, although that might be necessary, in order to continue his relations with the French government.—His imperial majesty manifested still greater irritation on account of my having said to a foreign minister, accredited to the court of Spain, that if the French army offered any violation to the integrity and independence of the Spanish sovereignty, 300,000 men would convince them that a brave and generous nation was not to be insulted with impunity.—After this ill treatment which I met with, which was as satisfactory to my own feelings, on account of the real causes of it, as it was painful on account of the royal personage, whose interests were in question, his imperial majesty, with his natural asperity, entered into a conversation upon the points which had already been discussed. He was not insensible to the strength of my reasons, and the solidity of the arguments by which I supported the rights of the king, his dynasty, and the whole nation; but his majesty concluded by telling me, "*I have a system of policy of my own. You ought to adopt more liberal ideas; to be less susceptible on the point of honour, and not sacrifice the prosperity of Spain to the interest of the Bourbon family.*"—His majesty, distrusting the apparent complacency with which I received the attention which he was pleased to shew me, as I was taking leave of him, sent to inform the king, that upon the subject under discussion a more flexible negotiator would be necessary. Whilst his majesty was considering whom he should appoint to succeed me in this negotiation, one of the many puppets who played their parts in this intrigue, introduced himself to the Archdeacon D. Juan de Escoiquiz, and persuaded him to pay a visit to the minister Champagny. He accordingly went, under the impulse of a most zealous regard for the interests of his majesty, and prevailed on the minister of the foreign affairs, to communicate to him the most recent propositions of the emperor, which the said Seigneur Escoiquiz immediately put into writing, and a literal copy of them will be

found in No. 4, of the annexed documents. —In this state of things, his majesty, impressed with the qualities which adorn the most excellent Seignor, Don Pedro de Labrador, formerly minister to the court of Florence, and honorary councillor of state, invested him with full powers and suitable instructions, which may be seen in No. 4, ordering him to present them to the minister of foreign affairs, and to demand his full powers in return, and that the proposals of his imperial majesty should be communicated in an authentic manner. Both those demands were rejected by the minister Champagny, under the frivolous pretext that 'they were matters of form, being wholly unconnected with the essential object of the negotiation.'—Seignor Labrador insisted on the importance of both the one and the other requisites, especially in a matter of such great consequence, adding that without them he could discuss no subject, and that the king his master required them to vary the instructions, if necessary, that had been given him; but always in vain. Notwithstanding this, Seignor Champagny talked of the last propositions of the emperor, which were somewhat different from those presented by general Savary, but not less irritating and violent; and he concluded with telling Seignor Labrador that the prosperity of Spain and his own were at that moment within his power.—This minister answered that he would communicate to the king his master these new proposals. He made those reflections upon them which his talents, his zeal for the service of his sovereign, and for the good of his country, naturally suggested; and he stated that the welfare of his sovereign, and that of the nation, were inseparably united. He added, that to these two objects he had directed all his attention in various situations; and, lastly, he said that he readily admitted that his own prosperity depended on the issue, because his fidelity to the king of Spain, and to his native country, as well as the reputation he had acquired by the faithful discharge of his duty, were connected with it. Seignor Labrador, before he terminated the conversations asked M. Champagny if the king was in a state of liberty? To which the French minister replied that there could be no doubt of it. On this, Labrador rejoined, 'then he should be restored to his kingdom.' To this the Frenchman replied, 'that, in respect to his return to Spain, it was necessary that his majesty should have a right understanding with his imperial majesty, either personally or by letter.'—This answer, added to the other circumstances,

left, no doubt in the mind of the king, that he was actually at Bayonne in a state of arrest; however, to give more ostensibility to this violence extended towards his majesty, I sent a note (No. 5) by his royal order, to the minister for foreign affairs, telling him that the king was determined to return to Madrid, to tranquillize the agitation of his beloved subjects, and to provide for the transaction of the important business of his kingdom; assuring M. Champagny at the same time, that I would continue to treat with his imperial majesty, on affairs reciprocally advantageous. No answer was given to this communication, nor had it any other effect than to increase the caution and vigilance before applied for the detention of his majesty.—Señor Labrador was certainly not a fit person for their purposes, for he was immediately got rid of under the pretence of his not holding a rank corresponding to that of Monsieur Champagny, and that his natural disposition was too inflexible.—The tricks of diplomacy could not prevail over the firmness of the king, or the zeal of his representatives, and the individuals of his royal household, who deliberated at a council (his majesty being present) upon the interests of the king and the nation; so that the emperor saw himself under the necessity of changing his plan, in order to accomplish his purpose, and he wished that the royal parents should depart for Bayonne, in order to make them the instruments of the oppression and disgrace of their son. For this purpose he ordered the Grand Duke of Berg to employ all his arts to accelerate their journey to Bayonne.—The royal parents required, that the Favourite should precede them in their journey, and the grand duke made various applications to the junta of government to obtain his liberty. The junta had no authority to liberate him, having in this point been laid under positive restraint by his majesty's orders from Vittoria, as has been already mentioned; but the council misled by the suggestions of his imperial majesty, and intimidated by the threat that the grand duke would obtain by irresistible force what would not be conceded as a favour, the junta ordered the release of Don Manuel Godoi, who was immediately conveyed to Bayonne, under an adequate escort. The decree No. 6, in the hand-writing of the king, is an authentic proof of the detergrination of his majesty as to this particular.—The royal parents undertook their journey, and proceeded in it with too much rapidity for the unhappy state of health of Ch. IV.; but the inexorable will of the emperor had

determined that it should be so.—What his imperial majesty undertook was a most arduous task. It was necessary to his purposes to deaden the sensibility of the king; to destroy his affection for his first-born, which the most infamous court intrigue ever contrived had not yet wholly extinguished. Further, it was necessary, that these loving parents, affectionate to some of their children, should, with respect to him, substitute for their natural tenderness the most frigid and cruel indifference. To fulfil the purposes intended by Napoleon, in the end, with respect to the royal parents, they must become the instruments of misery, correction, and imprisonment; they were to become the jailors of their children. His power, by triumphing over all the feelings of nature, accomplished his purposes.—I have proved that the abdication of the royal father at Aranjuez was a spontaneous act, and that the motive to it was the partiality of his majesty towards his disgraced favourite. In Bayonne, he told the king, his son, that he did not wish to return to the throne of Spain; notwithstanding that, he desired his majesty should renounce the crown, to make a present of it to the emperor; that is, to present it to a sovereign, who, in part at least, has been the origin of the difficulties of Spain, the only cause of the loss of our squadrons, the mover of the disturbances at court, and in the nation, and of the intended journey of the royal family to Seville, and from thence to America, prevented by the explosion of the 17th of March.—I leave to the wisdom of the sovereigns of Europe to judge whether it be possible that a monarch, affectionate to his children, highly enlightened, penetrated deeply by the principles of religion, and pious without superstition, could without violence forget for a moment all his duties to his family, and proscribe his whole dynasty, to call another to the throne, for whom he has no esteem, and, on the contrary, detests, as the plunderer of those thrones which have come within the reach of his ambition. If such be the change, it is the most extraordinary revolution that history has presented to the world.—Ferdinand VII. over-awed, a prisoner, and controuled by circumstances, on the 1st of May made a conditional renunciation of his crown, in favour of his august father. (No. 7). To this followed the letter of the royal father to his son (No. 8), and the very discreet answer of the royal son to the father, (No. 9).—On the 5th of the same month of May, at four in the afternoon, the emperor went to visit the royal parents, and continued in conference until five o'clock, when

king Ferdinand was called in by his august father to hear, in the presence of the queen and the emperor, expressions so disgusting and humiliating, that I do not dare to record them. All the party were seated except king Ferdinand, whom the father ordered to make an absolute renunciation of the crown, under pain of being treated, with all his household, as an usurper of the throne, and a conspirator against the life of his parents.—His majesty would have preferred death; but desirous not to involve in his misfortunes the number of persons comprized in the threat of Ch. IV. he assented to another renunciation, (No. 10), which bears on its front all the indications of constraint and violence, and which in no respect answers its purpose, to colour over the intended usurpation of the emperor.—These are the only instances of renunciation in which I have interfered as minister and secretary of state. That which is spoken of at Bourdeaux, I have not the least knowledge of; but I know the emperor, in the last conference with king Ferdinand VII. said to his majesty, "*Prince, il faut opter entre la cession et la mort.*"—"Prince you have only to choose between cession and death."—With respect to the rest, the whole world is apprized that Ch. IV. renounced the crown to the emperor at the time that the prince of Asturias, his brother the infant Don Carlos, and his uncle the infant Don Antonio, were forced to surrender their rights. The emperor, now believing himself proprietor of the crown of Spain, placed it on the head of his brother Joseph Napoleon, king of Naples.—It has already been explained, that although the king left his court for a few days, he thought fit to sanction a junta, of which the infant Don Antonio was to be president, with full powers to determine for him and in his royal name, all subjects that would not admit of delay. Every night I sent a courier to this junta, communicating what appeared necessary for its information and direction.—When the king arrived at Bayonne (and on the day of his arrival; the ambitious and violent intentions of the emperor were communicated to him) I began to fear that the extraordinary couriers would be intercepted, as was found to be the fact. Among the various disputes that I had with the minister, Champagny, on the different accidents that occasioned the detention of the cabinet couriers, the answer that he gave me to a remonstrance of mine is sufficiently remarkable. It is to be seen among the documents in justification. (No. 11.) In this situation of things; I took the precaution of

sending duplicates by different conveyances. By such means, I succeeded so far as to give information to the junta of government of the arrest and oppression to which the king had been exposed.—It was easy to foresee that the freedom of the junta would not be respected, since, notwithstanding all the offers and assurances of the emperor, the liberty of the sovereign was violated at Bayonne; and that the noble designs of some members of the same assembly would be obstructed (although boldly declared) by the irresistible power of the representative of the emperor. To this, no doubt, is to be attributed their not having consulted upon the awful condition of the kingdom, and the remedy for such a calamity, as well as not having appointed a junta to assume the regency, in a place where the bayonets of the enemy could not penetrate.—The king was surprized that the junta had not written; and by the following post, when his majesty had come to a determination in consequence, without losing a moment, I sent a royal order to the junta, that they should execute whatever was expedient for the service of the king and the kingdom, and that for that purpose they should employ all the powers which his majesty would possess if he were himself resident in the kingdom. (6).—Nothing could be written that could be more intelligible. The security of the means of communication diminished every moment; for I could not expect that the emperor would regard the sacredness of a correspondence, since he paid no respect to the person of the sovereign to whom it was subservient.—The junta, notwithstanding, thought it was necessary to consult his majesty, and to obtain his orders as to various measures which appeared to them necessary for the salvation of the country; and for this purpose they sent to Bayonne a confidential person of known zeal in the royal service, to transmit verbally to the king the following propositions:—1. Whether his majesty thought fit to authorise the junta to substitute, in case of need, some person or persons of their own body, or otherwise, to hold a council in a secure situation, where it could freely act; and they intreated his majesty to signify who should compose the council for that purpose, should he think the measure expedient. 2. Whether it was the wish of his majesty that hostilities should

be commenced against the French army; and in that case, when and how the purpose should be executed. 3. Whether it were likewise the wish of the king that we should endeavour to prevent the entrance of more French troops into Spain, by guarding the passes on the frontiers. 4. Whether his majesty thought it would be right to convoke the cortes, for which purpose a decree of his majesty would be necessary, addressed to the royal council.—It being possible that at the arrival of the answer of the king, the junta would not be at liberty to act, they asked whether any chancery or audience of the kingdom should be empowered, which was not within the reach of the French troops. Further, if the cortes should be assembled, on what subjects of discussion it should proceed.—The person charged with these propositions, arrived at Bayonne on the 4th of May, at night; he came to me immediately, and having disclosed to me his business, I introduced him to his majesty without losing a moment.—The king having taken into consideration the four propositions submitted to his attention by the junta, sent in answer two royal decrees in the morning of the following day, the one written by his majesty with his own hand directed to the junta of government; the other signed by his majesty ("Yo el Rey") addressed in the first instance to the council, and next to any chancery or audience of the kingdom which should not be under restraint.—These original decrees dispatched by me with all care, and under secure conduct, it is well known, arrived in the hands of one of the members of the junta, who is now absent, and whose name was first mentioned; but the junta is apprized that he made no use of it, nor did he ever send to the council the decree which was addressed to it. (7).—The minutes of these two decrees are not in my possession, because the critical situation of the king at

(6). The cabinet courier conveying this royal order was intercepted, on which account I sent a duplicate, which was received by the junta, the memorandum of which I have not been able to preserve.

(7) When these two royal decrees came to the hands of the junta, the grand duke of Berg had been for some days president; and the affair of the 2d of May had taken place. The emperor after the departure of the royal parents, precipitately and indecently forced from the capital all the members of the royal family, and sent them to Bayonne. But yet he had to take the important step of taking complete possession of the government, in order to which the bloody scene of the 2d of May was exhibited, a scene of horror and iniquity, similar to what the modern French have executed in other countries with similar designs.

Bayonne, and the necessity of avoiding the exposition of his views, obliged me to destroy them. Notwithstanding this, I preserved them in my memory, and they are testified and certified by the three secretaries of his majesty, D. Eusebio Dardaxi y Azara, D. Luis de Onio, and D. Evaristo Perez de Castro, who were with me at Bayonne, and saw and read the two original decrees, the substance of which is as follows:—The king said to the junta of government that he was not in a state of freedom, and consequently incapable of taking any measures for the preservation of the royal person and the monarchy. On that account the junta was entrusted with most ample powers to repair to any place that should be deemed most convenient; that in the name of his majesty, and representing his own person, they might exercise all the functions of sovereignty; that hostilities should commence the moment when his majesty should proceed to the interior of France, which he would not do, unless obliged by violence. Lastly, that in such a case, the junta should prevent, in the best manner they could, the introduction of more troops into the Peninsula (8).—In the decree directed to the royal council, and next to any chancery or audience, his majesty said, that, in the situation in which he found himself, deprived of his liberty, it was his royal will that the cortes should be assembled in such place as should appear most convenient; that at first they should occupy themselves exclusively in attending to the levies and subsidies necessary for the defence of the kingdom, and that their sittings should be permanent to determine what should be done on future events (9).—The disgraceful

(8) The perfect agreement between the recommendation of the king given to the junta, in his royal decree of the 5th of May, and the determination of his faithful vassals, is very remarkable. We have seen that all the provinces of the monarchy rose spontaneously to resist the oppressor, without having any knowledge of the will of their sovereign.

(9) "We, the three secretaries of the king, for decrees, certify, that we have seen and read in Bayonne, the two original decrees sent by his majesty Ferdinand VII. on the 5th of May, in this year, which are mentioned above; and the substance and contents of them, as far as we can recollect, is the same as is here stated.—EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI Y AZARA.—LUIS DE ONIO.—EVARISTO PEREZ DE CASTRO."—*Madrid, Sept. 1, 1808.*

means, of which the emperor availed himself to obtain the renunciation of the crown of Spain in his favour, have already been known; but the violence of Buonaparte to accomplish his purposes did not terminate there. Blinded as he was by the extravagance of his ambition, he could yet discern how easily these acts of renunciation would be disposed of; and therefore he endeavoured to confirm them by the means of a council, which he called a national assembly, and which was to be convoked at Bayonne (10).—He named about 150 Spaniards, of different classes, conditions, and corporations, to constitute this assembly, but only about 90 were convened. A part of these, representing some cities, tribunals, or public bodies, brought with them instructions in the nature of powers given them by those whom they represented, but wholly insufficient to answer the purpose intended. The ministers of the council were without any powers or instructions whatever, a precaution adopted by this tribunal in conformity to the opinion of its commissioners, in order to avoid all involuntary compromises. Most of the deputies had no other powers than merely an order to take their departure, and many of them did not belong to any public body, or acknowledged class of the community.—The emperor fully expected, from the acquiescence of these individuals, a mask under which to conceal his usurpation. But he was utterly deceived. Instead of finding weak men convenient to the designs of his mercenary ambition, he was met by ministers incorruptible, grandees worthy of their rank, and representatives who were faithful defenders of the interest and of the honour of their country. They all, with one accord, informed him that they held powers much restricted, that they were not the legitimate representatives of Spain, and that they could not compromise her rights.—These and other similar reflections were treated with insolence in the tribunal of the usurper, who, far from being discomfited, put into activity all the means of oppression, flattering himself that by victories on the

(10) It is well known that this junta was assembled at Bayonne, according to printed notice given on the 19th of May, to treat, as it was said, of the means of securing the happiness of Spain, but in fact, to propose the continuance of all the evils of the former system, and such reforms and alterations as were most likely to destroy the whole country, and every province belonging to it.

one hand and corruption on the other, he should so colour over injustice that he would not be considered by the world as the subverter of general tranquillity.—I do not enter into the particulars that occurred in this congress; but one of the ministers of the council of Castile, who does so much honour to his robe, will satisfy the curiosity of the public as to this particular.—I ought not to speak of what I have suffered for my king and country: the truth is, I have not suffered, for all I have done has been required by my most sacred duties. It was to me the highest satisfaction to see my lodging in Bayonne surrounded by the satellites of government: to these spies succeeded, who abound always where those are in authority who in history usurp the characters of heroes. My steps were reckoned—my visits observed—espionage, under the mask of compassion, approached to examine the secrets of my soul; but nothing disturbed the tranquillity of my mind. What I could not behold with patience, was to see myself condemned to a confinement within the frontier of France, until the emperor should consider that my narration of the scandalous proceedings could not destroy the lofty fabric of the new Spanish monarchy. In vain, for two months, I applied to the minister for foreign affairs with the utmost importunity to be permitted to return to my beloved country; the determined resistance I made to the attempt of usurpation made the French government deaf to my entreaties, believing, not without good reason, that I should endeavour to inflame heroism in my country, denominated insurrection in the journals of Bayonne.—In such unfavourable circumstances, a mode presented itself to me of avoiding a state of indefinite banishment. Such were the repeated entreaties of Joseph Napoleon that I should continue with him in the situation of minister, to which I acceded with repugnance and from constraint, but without prejudice of my right to abandon it at a convenient opportunity.—This opportunity occurred the moment I set foot in Madrid. From that instant I only thought of availing myself of the most early means of resigning my new character, which I did in the manner shewn in document No. 12.—Joseph Napoleon could not be grieved at the disappearance of a minister who so frequently opposed his wishes (11).

(11) I may particularly instance the affair of the oaths, when Joseph Buonaparte arriving at Madrid, wanted to compel every body to swear allegiance to him; and that

and who, in the opinion of some of those who immediately surrounded him, was a Quixote in his maxims, who could not comprehend the sublime intentions of the greatest of heroes in favour of the regeneration of Spain.—I have shewn in this narrative with clearness and fidelity, the series of the principal events in this important epoch, carefully avoiding to enter into minute particulars foreign to my object, or which should make this exposition too prolix; and I have endeavoured to place before my readers, in its true point of view, all the injustice and violence with which the French government has conducted itself towards our beloved sovereign and the whole nation.—It has already been proved, that the renunciation of Ch. IV. in favour of his son Ferdinand VII. is vitiated in no respect. In the slight sketch which we have drawn of the perfidious and deceitful arts with which the emperor has made the progress we have seen, the series of atrocious insults offered to Spain, and to the unfortunate king Ferdinand VII, remains depicted in indelible colours.—The emperor alarms Ch. IV. in order that he may induce him to take flight for America, with all the royal family, and abandon the peninsula to the former; he lights up the flame of discord between the royal parents and their child, in order to debilitate Spain, dividing it into parties, after having disgraced the royal persons; he draws Ferdinand VII. from his court by false promises; he makes him captive in Bayonne; and when he saw that the virtue of the young king knew how to resist his designs, and that Ferdinand could not be induced to renounce his crown, he occasioned him to be brought to Bayonne, with all the other personages of the royal family, as if to present them bound before the imperial tribunal, which was both judge and party in the same cause. He endeavours to deprive the parents of the sensibilities of nature, and forces them to become the instruments of the oppression of their child. From the latter he extorts a renunciation (the most irregular and illicit transaction amongst the affairs of men), and by a series of abdications exacted by the same illegal and violent expedients, he believes that he has become the proprietor of the crown of Spain; he transfers it to his brother, without considering the infamy to which he would be exposed in the cabinets of Europe, by the usurpation of the throne of a monarch, his friend and ally.—Who can doubt from

of the banishment of the council of Castile to Bayonne for its noble resistance.

this clear evidence, that the renunciation executed by Ferdinand VII. in favour of his august father, and that which succeeded in favour of the emperor, are absolute nullities? Who will doubt, but that, if the last should have emanated from a free exercise of the will, the rights of the dynasty of Bourbon are not prejudiced by it? Who does not know, that in case of the extinction of such a family, and by the very establishment of the Spanish monarchy, the nation alone can invite another dynasty, or can introduce such a form of government as it shall most approve?—In another part of this narrative I have shewn, that Ferdinand VII. was too honourable to suppose that the emperor could entertain such atrocious designs. The king desired to free Spain from the oppression of the French troops; it was promised him, that this and all other matters should be regulated with the emperor, and that he should return to his kingdom with the fruit of his exertions for the good of his vassals; and no hour of his life was unseasonable to him to exert himself for their happiness. This I saw, and can testify. During his confinement, nothing afflicted his generous heart so much as the sufferings of his people; and when his liberty began to be doubtful, he adopted the means the most agreeable to his paternal solicitude: such was the order which he gave for the regency, naturally sought when his freedom was interrupted; and such was the demand that the Cortes should be assembled to determine those questions, which in their proper places have been noticed.—Valour and patriotism have successfully armed the whole nation in its own defence, and for the protection of their legitimate sovereign, although the people had no knowledge of the will of their beloved Ferdinand as to this movement. That patriotism, united to wisdom, will now impel them irresistibly to perform with promptitude the most important work of the central government or regency, which may administer the affairs of the kingdom in the name of his majesty.—Thus will be completed for the advantage of all, the last expression of the will of the king, which he condescended to use the moment before he was forced to renounce the crown; thus will the nation be preserved from this dreadful tempest; it will have exhibited before Europe an example of loyalty, honour, and generous energy, which will be the subject of admiration in every age and in every country.—Madrid, Sept. 1, 1808.—PEDRO CEVALLOS.

DOCUMENTS.

No. I.—*Secret Treaty between his Catholic*

Majesty, and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the high contracting Parties stipulate every thing respecting the future Condition of Portugal.—Fontainebleau, October 27, 1807.

We, Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitution, Emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, having seen and examined the treaty concluded, arranged, and signed at Fontainebleau, October 27, 1807, by general of division Michael Duroc, grand marshal of our palace, grand knight of the legion of honour, &c. &c. in virtue of the full powers conferred by us upon him for this purpose, with Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, honorary councillor of state and of war to his majesty the king of Spain, who was also furnished with full powers by his sovereign, which treaty is of the following tenor:—His majesty the emperor of the French king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, and his Catholic majesty the king of Spain, wishing to regulate by common consent the interest of the two states, and to determine the future condition of Portugal, in a way that shall be consistent with sound policy as to both countries, have named for their ministers plenipotentiary; that is to say, his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, general of division Michael Duroc, grand marshal of the palace, grand knight of the legion of honour; and his Catholic majesty, king of Spain, Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, his honorary councillor of state and of war, both which ministers having exchanged their full powers, have agreed as follows:—Article I. The province of Entre Mino y Duero, with the city of Oporto, shall be made over, in entire property and sovereignty to his majesty the king of Etruria, with the title of king of Northern Lusitania. II. The province of Alentejo, and the kingdom of the Algarves, shall be made over, in entire property and sovereignty, to the Prince of Peace, to be by him enjoyed under the title of prince of the Algarves. III. The provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estramadura, shall remain undisposed of until there be a general peace, to be then disposed of according to circumstances, and conformably with what may be agreed upon between the two high contracting parties. IV. The kingdom of Northern Lusitania shall be held by the descendants of his Majesty the king of Etruria hereditarily, and according to the laws of succession which are established in the family

on the throne of Spain. V. The principality of the Algarves shall be held by the Prince of Peace hereditarily, and according to the laws of succession which are established in the family on the throne of Spain. VI. If there should be no descendants or legitimate heirs of the king of Northern Lusitania, or of the prince of the Algarves, these countries shall be disposed of by investiture by the king of Spain in a manner so that they shall never be united under one head or annexed to the crown of Spain. VII. The kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves shall acknowledge as protector his catholic majesty the king of Spain, and in no case the sovereigns of those countries shall make peace or war without his consent. VIII. In case that the provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estramadura, held in sequestration, should devolve at a general peace to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which the English have conquered from Spain and her allies, the new sovereign of these provinces shall have, with respect to his catholic majesty the king of Spain, the same obligations as the king of Northern Lusitania, and the prince of Algarves, and shall hold them under the same conditions. IX. His majesty the king of Etruria cedes the kingdom of Etruria, in full property and sovereignty, to his majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy. X. As soon as the provinces of Portugal shall be definitively occupied, the different princes who are to possess them shall mutually appoint commissioners to ascertain their natural boundaries. XI. His majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy guarantees to his catholic majesty, the king of Spain, the possession of his dominions on the continent of Europe, situated to the south of the Pyrenees. XII. His majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy, engages to recognize his catholic majesty, the king of Spain, as emperor of the two Americas, when every thing is ready for his majesty's assuming that title, which may be either at the general peace, or at farthest within three years therefrom. XIII. The two high contracting powers shall mutually agree upon an equal partition of the islands, colonies, and other transmarine possessions of Portugal. XIV. The present treaty shall be kept secret. It shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Madrid, within twenty days, at the latest, from the date of its signature.—Done at Fontainebleau, October 27, 1808 (Signed) *DuROC*.—*E. IZQUIERDO*.

We have approved, and do hereby approve, of the preceding treaty, and all and every of the articles therein contained. We declare it to be accepted, ratified, and confirmed; and promise that it shall be inviolably observed. In witness whereof, we have executed these presents, signed with our own hands, and sealed with our imperial seal, at Fontainebleau, the 29th day of Oct. 1807. (Signed) *NAPOLEON*. The minister of foreign affairs, *CHAMPAGNY*. The secretary of state, *MARET*.

No. II.—*Secret Convention concluded at Fontainebleau between his Majesty the King of Spain and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the two high contracting Parties adjust all that relates to the Occupation of Portugal.—At Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807.*

Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitution, emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, having seen and examined the convention concluded, arranged, and signed, at Fontainebleau, on the 27th of October, 1807, by the general of division Michael Duroc, grand marshal of our palace, grand cordon of the legion of honour, &c. &c. in virtue of the full powers with which we thereto conferred upon him, on the one side; and on the other side by D. Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, honorary councillor of state and of war to his majesty the king of Spain, equally furnished with full powers by his sovereign—the tenor of which convention is as follows:—His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, and his catholic majesty the king of Spain, being desirous of entering into an arrangement with respect to the occupation and conquest of Portugal, according to the stipulations of the treaty signed this day, have appointed, viz. His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, the general of division Michael Duroc, grand marshal of his palace, grand cordon of the legion of honour, and his catholic majesty the king of Spain, don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, his honorary councillor of state and of war, who, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the following articles.—I. A body of French imperial troops, consisting of 25,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, shall enter Spain, and march direct for Lisbon: they shall be joined by a body of 3000 Spanish infantry and 3000 cavalry, with 30 pieces of artillery.—II. At the same time a division of Spanish troops, consisting of

10,000 men, shall take possession of the province of Entre-Minho-Douria, and of the city of Oporto; and another division of 6000 men, also consisting of Spanish troops, shall take possession of Alentejo, and the kingdom of Algarves.—III. The French troops shall be subsisted and maintained by Spain, and their pay shall be provided by France during the time occupied by their march through Spain.—IV. The moment that the combined troops have entered Portugal, the government and administration of the provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura (which are to remain in a state of sequestration) shall be vested in the general commanding the French troops; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of France. The provinces that are to form the kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves, shall be administered and governed by the generals commanding the Spanish divisions which shall enter the same; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of Spain.—V. The central body shall be under the orders of the commander of the French troops, to whom also the Spanish troops attached to that army shall pay obedience. Nevertheless, should the king of Spain or the Prince of Peace think fit to join the said body, the French troops, with the general commanding them, shall be subject to their order.—VI. Another body of 40,000 French troops shall be assembled at Bayonne by the 20th of November next, at the latest, to be ready to enter Spain for the purpose of proceeding to Portugal, in case the English should send reinforcements therein, or menace it with attack. This additional corps, however, shall not enter Spain until the two high contracting parties have come to an agreement on that point.—VII. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at the same time with those of the treaty of this date.—Done at Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807. (Signed) DUCOC.—E. IZQUIERDO.

We have approved, and hereby approve, the foregoing convention, in all and every of the articles therein contained, declare it to be accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and pledge ourselves that it shall be inviolably observed.—In witness whereof, we have executed these presents, signed with our own hand, countersigned and sealed with our imperial seal at Fontainebleau, the 29th October 1807. (Signed) NAPOLEON. The Minister of foreign affairs, CHAMPAGNY. The secretary of state, H. MARÉT.

No. II.—*Letter from his Majesty the Empe-*

ror of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine.

My Cousin,—I have received your royal highness's letter. Your highness will have been already convinced, by the inspection of the papers of your royal father, of the regard that I have always manifested towards him. Your highness will permit me, under the present circumstances to address you with frankness and sincerity. I entertained an expectation that, on my arrival at Madrid, I should have persuaded my illustrious friend to make some necessary reforms in his dominions, which would give considerable satisfaction to the public feelings. The removal of the prince of Peace appeared to me to be indispensable to his happiness and the interests of his people. The events of the north have retarded my journey, and the occurrences at Aranjuez have supervened. I do not constitute myself judge of the events which have taken place, or of the conduct of the prince of the Peace; but certain it is that it is very dangerous for kings to accustom their subjects to shed blood, and to take the administration of justice into their own hands. I pray God that your highness may not one day find it so. It would not be conformable to the interests of Spain, to proceed severely against a prince who is united to a princess of the royal family, and has so long governed the kingdom. He no longer has any friends. As little will your royal highness find any, should you cease to be fortunate. The people eagerly avenge themselves for the homage which they pay us. Besides, how could the prince of Peace be brought to trial, without implicating in the process the king and queen, your royal parents? Such a proceeding would foment animosities, and excite seditious passions, the result of which might be fatal to your crown. Your royal highness has no other right to it, but what you have derived from your mother. If the cause injures her honour, your royal highness destroys your own claims. Let not your highness give ear to weak and perfidious counsels. Your highness has no right to try the prince of Peace. His crimes, if any are imputed to him, disappear, and merge in the prerogatives of the crown. I have frequently expressed my wishes, that the prince of Peace should be removed from the management of affairs. If I did not persevere in my applications, it was on account of my friendship for king Charles, and a wish (if possible) not to see the weakness of his attachments. O wretchedness of human nature! imbecility and error! such is our lot! But an arrangement may

take place, the prince of Peace may be banished from Spain, and I may offer him an asylum in France.—With respect to the abdication of Charles IV. that event having taken place at the moment when my armies were in Spain, it might appear in the eyes of Europe and posterity that I had sent all those troops merely for the purpose of expelling my friend and ally from his throne. As a neighbouring sovereign, I ought to inform myself of all the circumstances which have occurred, before I acknowledge his abdication. I declare to your royal highness, to the Spaniards, and to the whole world, that if the abdication of king Charles be voluntary, and has not been forced upon him by the insurrection and tumults at Aranjuez, I have no difficulty in regarding and acknowledging your royal highness as king of Spain. I am therefore anxious to have some conversation with your royal highness on this subject. The circumspection which I have observed for the last month upon this point, ought to convince your highness of the support which you will find in me, should it ever happen that factions of any kind should disturb you on your throne. When king Charles informed me of the events of the month of October last, the communication gave me the greatest pain. I flatter myself that my representations contributed to the happy issue of the affair of the Escorial. Your royal highness is not altogether free from blame: of this, the letter which you wrote to me, and which I have always wished to forget, is a sufficient proof. When you are king, you will know how sacred are the rights of the throne. Every application of an hereditary prince to a foreign sovereign is criminal.—The marriage of a French princess with your royal highness, in my opinion, accords with the interests of my people, and I more especially regard it as a circumstance which would unite me by new ties to a house, whose conduct I have had every reason to praise since the time that I ascended the throne. Your highness ought to dread the consequences of popular commotions. It is possible that assassinations may be committed upon some stragglers of my army; but they would only lead to the ruin of Spain. I have learnt, with regret, that some letters of the captain general of Catalonia have been circulated at Madrid, and that they have had the effect of exciting some irritation. Your royal highness knows the inmost sentiments of my heart. You will perceive that my attention is occupied by various points, which require to be finally decided; but you may be assured that I shall, under all circumstances, conduct my-

self towards your person in the same manner as I have done towards the king your father. I beg your royal highness to be persuaded of my anxiety to bring every thing to a happy conclusion, and to find opportunities of giving you every proof of my affection and esteem. My cousin, I pray God to take you into his high and holy keeping.—(Signed) NAPOLEON. *Bayonne, April 16, 1808.*
No. IV.—*Instructions furnished to his Excellency Don Pedro Labrador.*

Most excellent Signor—Your excellency is acquainted with the propositions made on the day of the king's arrival in this city, and of what passed at the conference in which I discussed them with the minister of foreign affairs. The propositions recently made by the latter, differing in some respect, but no less inadmissible, are of the following tenor:—1. That the emperor has irrevocably determined that the Bourbon dynasty shall no longer reign in Spain. 2. That the king shall cede his rights to the crown both in his own name and that of his sons, should he have any. 3. That should this point be agreed upon, the crown of Etruria shall be conferred upon him and his descendants, according to the terms of the salique law. 4. That the infant Don Carlos shall make a similar renunciation of his rights, and that he shall have a right to the succession to the crown of Etruria, in default of issue of the king. 5. That the kingdom of Spain shall henceforth be possessed by one of the brothers of the emperor. 6. That the emperor guarantees its complete integrity, and that of all its colonies, without suffering a single village belonging to it to be separated from it. 7. That in like manner he guarantees the preservation of religion, property, &c. &c. 8. That should his majesty refuse those propositions, he shall remain without compensation, and his imperial majesty will carry them into execution by consent or force. 9. That if his majesty agree and demand the niece of the emperor in marriage, this connection shall be immediately secured on the execution of the treaty.—These propositions were discussed in the junta where the king presided. I there stated my opinion, which was adopted by your excellency and the other members, and approved by his majesty who is desirous that instructions should be prepared for your excellency accordingly. Your excellency knows that promises the most flattering, and assurances the most positive, were made and given to the king by the grand duke of Berg, by the ambassador of France, and by general Savary, by direction of the emperor, who said that no ob-

struction would arise to his acknowledgment as sovereign of Spain; that nothing was desired hostile to the preservation of the integrity of the kingdom; and you are apprised that these representations drew him from Madrid to pay his compliments to his intimate ally, who he supposed would return with him to the capital, from the statements of those three, and where splendid accommodations were provided for the emperor. The journey of his imperial majesty was deferred; but the king, seduced by new promises, made by general Savary in the name of his imperial majesty, continued his progress to this city.—Your excellency should ask M. Champaigny if the king be at full liberty, and if he be so he may return to his dominions, and give audience to the plenipotentiary, to whom the emperor may confide his powers. If not free, your excellency knows that every act is absolutely nugatory; and consequently whatever may be agreed will have no other effect than to stain the reputation of the emperor before the whole world, the eyes of which are fixed upon his conduct, and who knows what Spain has already done in favour of France.—I have shewn to your excellency the treaty of the 27th Oct. last, by which the emperor has guaranteed the integrity of Spain in the person of the king, with title of emperor of the two Americas. Nothing has intervened to destroy this treaty; on the contrary, Spain has added new claims to the gratitude of France.—The king has resolved not to yield to the importunity of the emperor; neither his own honour, nor his duty to his vassals, permit him to do so. These he cannot compel to accept the dynasty of Napoleon; much less can he deprive them of the right they have to elect another family to the throne when the reigning family shall be extinct.—It is not less repugnant to the feelings of the king to receive, as a compensation, the crown of Etruria; for, besides that that country is under the authority of its legitimate sovereign, whom he would not prejudice, his majesty is contented with the crown that Providence had given him, has no wish to separate himself from his subjects, whom he loves with paternal affection, and from whom he has received the most unequivocal proofs of respectful attachment.—If on account of this refusal the emperor should think fit to resort to force, his majesty hopes that Divine justice, the dispenser of thrones, will protect his just cause, and that of his kingdom.—As your excellency is deeply penetrated with these principles, and has already displayed them with

that energy with which justice arms the man of probity, and the zealous friend to his king and country, it is needless for me to detail prolix instructions for your guide, you being a minister, in whose patriotism and affection to the royal interests his majesty reposes full confidence.—God preserve your excellency many years.—PEDRO CEVALLOS. (For Don Pedro Gomez Labrador).—*Bayonne, April 27, 1808.*

No. V.—*Official Dispatch from Don Pedro Cevallos to the Minister of State of the Emperor of France, of the 28th April, 1808.*

Most Excellent Sir,—Although the agitation of mind, to which the whole Spanish nation would have been subject, has hitherto been restrained by what has been printed and published by the grand duke of Berg, and by all the French generals in that country, indicating the sentiments of peace and good understanding which the emperor of the French and king of Italy was desirous of maintaining with the king my master; and also on account of the assurances which the ambassador of his imperial majesty in Madrid, the grand duke of Berg, and general Savary, had given to his majesty of the approaching arrival of the emperor in the said city; on which account, the king determined to proceed to Burgos to meet him, to shew this public mark of his affection, and of the high esteem he had for his person—it has now become impossible longer to answer for the tranquillity of such a numerous people; especially as they are apprised that the king has been six days in Bayonne, and they have no assurance of his return to Spain. In such a state of affairs, his majesty must be anxious for the repose of his beloved subjects, and for this purpose to return to their bosoms to tranquillize their agitation, and attend to the heavy demands of public business, as his absence would expose his people to incalculable mischiefs, which would fill his heart with the most poignant grief. This speedy return, his majesty promised in the most solemn manner to his people, grounding his engagement on the assurances of the emperor, that he should shortly be restored to his country, and acknowledged to be her sovereign by his imperial majesty.—His majesty has, therefore, ordered me to communicate to you these observations, for the purpose of your submitting them to the consideration of his imperial majesty, whose approbation they will doubtless meet; and his majesty, my master, is ready to treat in his dominions with his imperial majesty on all convenient subjects, with such per-

son as the emperor should be pleased to authorize for that purpose. (*)

No. VI.—*Royal Decree addressed to the Supreme Council of Castile by Ferdinand VII.*

Soon after the prince of Peace was arrested, frequent and earnest entreaties were made by the grand duke of Berg, by the ambassador of France, and by general Savary, in the name of the emperor, my intimate ally, that he should be delivered up to the French troops, that he might be conveyed to France, where his imperial majesty would order him to be tried for the offences he had committed. These solicitations were generally accompanied with threats in case of a refusal to carry him off by force. In Vittoria they were repeated with equal importunities; and I wishing to form the most prudent determination, consulted with the duke of Infantado and the Infant Carlos, with don Juan Escoiquiz, and with don Pedro Cevallos, my principal secretary of state. This minister, on that occasion, said: "Sire, if I were to yield to my own personal feelings, I should immediately recommend the surrender of the prince of Peace. But such a sentiment ought to be stifled, and in truth I do stifle it when I contemplate the duty you owe to your own sacred person, and the obligations you are under to administer justice to your subjects injured by don Manuel Godoy. This obligation is essential to the sovereignty, and your majesty cannot disregard it without treading under foot whatever is most respectable among men. Under this view, I think you ought to answer the emperor, informing him, at the same time, that your majesty has offered to your august parents to save him from the penalty of death, should he be capitally convicted by the council. By your compliance with this proposal, your majesty

will give to the world a proof of your magnanimity; to your beloved parents a proof of your affection, and the emperor will be gratified in observing with what wisdom you discharge the demands of justice, and conciliate the expectations of his imperial and royal majesty."—All approved of this salutary advice, and I did not hesitate a moment in adopting it, and proceeded to act upon it. —I communicated it to the council with the fit circumspection to serve for their information and direction; and also that they may take the most active measures to protect the houses and families of the four denounced persons —I THE KING Bayonne, April 26, 1808 —To the president of the council. No. VI. — *Letter of the King to his Father, Charles IV.*

My honoured Father and Lord—Your majesty has admitted that I had not the smallest participation in the proceedings at Aranjuez, intended, as is notorious, and as your majesty knows, not to disgust you with your throne and government, but to maintain both, and not to abandon the vast multitude whose maintenance depends upon the throne itself. Your majesty also told me that your abdication had been spontaneous, and that if any one should attempt to persuade me it was otherwise I should not believe them, for it was the most pleasing act of your life. Your majesty now tells me, that though your abdication was certainly an act of your own free will, you nevertheless reserved in your mind a right to resume the reigns of government when you should think proper. I have therefore inquired of your majesty, if you were disposed to resume your sceptre, and your majesty has replied that you neither would return to the throne or to Spain. Notwithstanding this, your majesty desires me to renounce in your favour a crown, conferred upon me by the fundamental laws of the kingdom, on your free resignation of it. To a son who has always been distinguished for his love, respect, and obedience to his parents, nothing that can require the exercise of these qualities can be repugnant to his filial piety, especially when the discharge of my duty to your majesty, as a son, is not in contradiction to the relation I bear, as a king, to my beloved subjects. In order that both these, who demand my highest regard, may not be offended, and that your majesty may be pleased with my obedience, in the present circumstance, I am willing to resign my crown in favour of your majesty, under the following limitations:—1. That your majesty will return to Madrid, whither I shall accompany you and

(*) This dispatch was not answered, and produced an effect precisely the contrary of what might have been expected in a regular course of things. The spies within, and the guards without the palace were doubled. The king for two nights, endured the insult of an alguazil, who, stationed at the door, ordered his majesty and the infant Don Carlos to retire to their apartments. The first time the insult was offered, the king complained in severe terms, on which the governor employed polite language, and manifested much disapprobation of such conduct; but this did not prevent the repetition, and probably this offensive circumstance would have been repeated, had not the king abstained from going out at night.

serve you as the most dutiful son.—2. That there a cortes should be assembled; or, if your majesty should object to so numerous a body, that all the tribunals and deputies of the kingdom should be convoked.—3. That in the presence of this council my renunciation should be executed in due form, and the motives stated which induced me to make it. These are, the love I bear to my subjects, and my wish to make a return for their affection towards me, by securing their tranquillity, and relieving them from the horrors of a civil war, by means of a renunciation, having for its object your majesty's resumption of the sceptre, and your return to govern subjects worthy of your love and affection.—4. That your majesty should not be accompanied by individuals who have justly excited the hatred of the whole nation.—5. That should your majesty, as I am informed, be neither disposed to reign in person, not to return to Spain, in such case, that I should govern in your royal name as your lieutenant. There is no one who can have a claim to be preferred before me. I am summoned thereto by the laws; the wishes of my people, and the love of my subjects; and no one can take more zealous and bounden interest in their prosperity. My renunciation, confined within these limits, will appear in the eyes of the Spaniards a few proof of my preferring their preservation to the glory of governing them, and Europe will deem me worthy of governing a people to whose tranquillity I have shewn myself ready to sacrifice whatever is most flattering and alluring in human estimation. That God may preserve the important life of your majesty for many happy years, is the prayer of your loving and dutiful son, who prostrates himself at your royal feet.—FERDINAND.—*Bayonne, May 1. 1808.*

No. VIII.—*Letter from Charles IV. to his Son Ferdinand.*

My Son—The perfidious counsels of the men who surround your person, have placed Spain in a critical situation. The Emperor alone can save her.—Ever since the peace of Basle, I have been firmly persuaded that the essential interests of my people were inseparably connected with the preservation of a good understanding with France. No sacrifice has been omitted by me in order to obtain this important object. Even when France was under the direction of ephemeral governments, I suppressed my private feelings and listened only to the dictates of policy, and the welfare of my subjects.—

When the Emperor re-established order in France, great difficulties were removed, and I saw new motives to continue attentive to the former system of alliance. When England declared war against France, I happily endeavoured to continue neuter, and to preserve to my people the happiness of peace. England afterwards possessed herself of four of my frigates, and made war upon me, even before it had been declared; and then I was under the necessity of opposing force to force; and the calamities of war, to my subjects, were the consequence.—Spain, environed by coasts, and indebted for a great portion of her prosperity to her ultra-marine possessions, suffered by the war more than any other state. The interruption to her commerce, and all the destruction incident to such a situation, affected my subjects, and some of them had the injustice to attribute these events to my ministers.—At last, I had the happiness to see my kingdom tranquil within, and free from inquietude, so far as respected the integrity of my dominions, I being the only one among the kings of Europe who sustained himself amid the storms of these later times. Spain yet enjoyed this tranquillity, not then obstructed by those councils which have misled you from the right path. You have too easily permitted yourself to be misled, by the aversion of your first wife towards France; and you have thoughtlessly participated in the injurious resentments indulged against my ministers, against your mother, and against myself.—It was now necessary to recollect my own rights as a father and a king. With this view, I caused you to be arrested, and I found among your papers the proof of your crime. But at the commencement of this career, I melted at seeing my son on the scaffold of destruction, and I admitted my sensibility to be excited by the tears of your mother. I forgave you, notwithstanding my subjects were agitated by the deceitful expedients of a faction, of which you have yourself been the declared leader. From that instant I resigned all the tranquillity of my life, and was compelled to add to the distresses I felt for the calamities of my subjects, the afflictions occasioned by the dissensions in my own family.—My ministers were calumniated to the Emperor of the French, who believing that the Spaniards were disposed to renounce his alliance, and seeing the discord that prevailed even in the bosom of my own family, under various pretences, inundated my provinces with his troops.

(*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV. No. 17.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1808. [PRICE 10D

In the London Gazette Extraordinary, in which were published, by the government, the several documents relating to the late Convention in Portugal, the Armistice, which was the basis of all that followed, and which, as far as it was departed from, in the subsequent negotiations, was rendered less injurious and disgraceful; this Armistice, which was, on our part, negotiated by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and which bore his signature; this Armistice was published, was, by the government, communicated to the people of England, in the French language only, while all the other documents were, in the very same Gazette Extraordinary, published in the English language only.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL. — Sir Hew Dalrymple is arrived. He landed at Portsmouth on Tuesday last, the 15th instant; and, if I am rightly informed, his reception was not a bit more favourable than that which the citizens of London lately met with at St. James's. The reader knows, that Portsmouth abounds in government dependents of various sorts and sizes; yet, Sir Hew had to pass through hisses more loud and general than ever assailed the actors of a damned play. It is said, that so great was the indignation and so violent the apparent intentions of the populace, that it was thought necessary to surround the General with men, armed with pistols and swords. This was but a scurvy reception for a commander of an expedition; and, I must say, that I give the populace but little credit for it, seeing how *silent* they have been upon former occasions, when a similar feeling was called for. Sir Hew Dalrymple is looked upon as a man without powerful friends. Therefore it is that he is assailed. It is base to complain of him without, at the same time, complaining of those, whose example he has followed as closely as circumstances would permit. There is, it seems, to be a meeting in the County of Hants; but, no address, or petition, will have my vote, unless it point at all those, whose deeds have brought disgrace upon the arms of England. — Sir Arthur Wellesley came to Plymouth, and he had the discretion not to make any great noise upon his landing. He snuggled it in, in the Plover sloop, and off he went, as fast as post-horses could take him, to that place where one man is not known from another; and where a man may walk about and be hidden at the same time. This must, however, have been a little mortifying to the high Wellesley. It was not thus that he used to enter Calcutta. He must, upon hurrying out of the wherry, at Plymouth, in order to bundle himself into the post-chaise, have looked back, with longing eyes, to the

triumphal arches in India, and to the hundreds and thousands of gilded barges, that used to attend him and his high brother, in their excursions upon the rivers of "our empire in the East." I dare say, that he began to wish himself back again in that country of "glorious wars;" in that country where we always come off victorious; in that country where we are great conquerors; in that country where there are no *Frenchmen* to fight against; in that country where there is no "licentious" press, and whence any man, be he who he may, is liable to be transported, at a moment's warning, if he dare to print or speak any thing displeasing to the Commander-in-Chief. If the late Convention, or one like it, had been made in that country, no man would have dared to utter even a whisper of disapprobation. In a country so situated as to its laws, it is very easy to be a great commander. The newspapers, and all the things printed in that country, are, before they are struck off, taken to a person appointed by the ruler, who strikes out with his pen all that he disapproves of, sometimes inserting other words in the stead, and, in short, leaves not one word, even in the *advancements* of books, or of any thing else, that he thinks will be displeasing to the Governor General. Oh, what a fine thing it is to be a hero in that country! But, I think it may be as well for us not to expose ourselves to the contempt of the world by talking of the "*glory*" which our armies acquire in India, especially now that we have seen one of these Indian heroes pitted against a general of France. — Nobody has inquired, how Sir Arthur, how the "*Chevalier da Bain*," who beat "*Monsieur le Duc d'Albuquerque*" "*en personne*;" how this gallant gentleman came to come home; how he came to quit the field of glory. Nobody has made this inquiry, and yet it is an inquiry very necessary to be made. We were told, that one great object of the Convention was, to "*gain time*;" to get our army, as soon as possible, into "*the passes of the Pyrenees*."

there to meet the French and to stop them in their way to Spain. Has a man of our army yet moved in that direction, though it is now two whole months since the Convention was signed, and though it was not pretended, even by Sir Hew, that Junot could have held out more than two or three weeks? Has a man of our army moved in that direction? No; and this, at the time, in my very first article upon the subject, I said must and would be the case. I knew that we should not send away our army if we could. I knew, that we should not leave the Portuguese people to do any thing in the way of settling their affairs; and, besides, it was easy to foresee, that a sea-conveyance would be wanted for the troops, which conveyance we had made over to the French. There the army is, then, at the end of two months, just where it was the day after Wellesley's "glorious victory." What time has been gained, then? How has the Convention answered the purpose of hastening our army towards "the passes of the Pyrenees?" But, how came Wellesley to come away, when it was so necessary to push on to meet the French? "He is not recalled." O, no; he is upon "*leave of absence*." What! get leave of absence, at the very moment when the army was to be pushed on towards the passes of the Pyrenees! "The conqueror of Vimiera" get *leave of absence* at such a time! Leave to be absent from fighting! No: he will not like this ground. Well, then, will he say, that there was no prospect of the army's marching towards the passes of the Pyrenees, or moving towards any other point of real war? Will he say this? If he do, then we ask him what was meant by *gaining time*, in making the Convention, and what that same service was, which was in contemplation at the time when the Convention was made? Admitting, then, that he is come home simply upon *leave of absence*; that, the fact is as his partizans say; he stands in this dilemma: either he is come home for the purpose of avoiding another meeting with the Tartar Duke, or any of his like; or, the pretext of *gaining time* by the Convention was a false one.—The real truth, however, I take to be, that the ministers, or some of them, when they found that nothing could reconcile the country to the Convention, they, knowing (what the public did not at first know) that Wellesley had been the chief instrument in making the Convention, sent off, with all possible speed, an order to Sir Hew to give him a leave of absence. To keep him there they would not venture, and to recall him they

did not like. The middle course was determined upon; and, it was, too, of great importance, that he should have an opportunity of telling *his* story first. This accords with all the rest of the proceedings. There has been, from the first, an evident intention to screen Wellesley, let what would come of the other parties concerned; and this intention becomes, every day, more and more certain.—As to our army in Portugal, so far from being disposed of in the way that was expected, and that it was pretended it would be, it is, it appears, taking possession of different towns and districts in Portugal; seating itself quietly down as in a country that it has won; while our generals are issuing proclamations for the *keeping of the people in order*. It is said, that we have forty-seven generals there. What a deal of wine they will drink! What a fine expence they will be to us! General Howe (of the "*ardent-minded*" family) has issued a proclamation that would not have disgraced the late Lord Advocate of Scotland himself. The fact is, that our whole army in Portugal is now employed in *keeping the people of Portugal in order*; that is to say, in preventing them from forming assemblies of representatives and choosing men to conduct their affairs, as the people of Spain have done. Who did not suppose, that, as soon as we should have beaten the French in Portugal, and relieved that country from the presence and the oppression of its invaders, we should have left the Portuguese to take care of their own affairs and marched off to the assistance of the Spaniards? Was not this what we all supposed? And was it not under the pretence that our army would be set loose to march into Spain; was not this the *sole* pretence under which a justification, or an excuse, was found for the Convention? Now, it appears, however, that our army has got into such snug quarters, that it has no desire to move. It has been moulded into a superintendant of the police; a sort of Gendarmerie, or of Holy-brotherhood, established in Portugal. Are we told, that the security of the *monarchy* of Portugal requires this; for that the people, if left to themselves, might fall to work to make a government of their own? Let us be told this *plainly*, then. Let us be told, if this really be the motive, that we are fighting and labouring merely for the support of the old royal families against the new royal families, and not at all for the freedom and happiness of any people in any part of the world. Let us be told this, in so many plain words, and then we shall know how to think and to feel.—The king's reception

of the city of London *Address and Petition* has excited a little discontent in the minds of many persons, even in this humbled country. But, before we proceed to make any remarks upon this, let us insert the documents themselves. "To THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY. The humble and dutiful Address and Petition of the Lord Mayor, Alderman, and Commons of the City of London, in common council assembled.—MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN.—We your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lord Mayor, Alderman, and Commons of the city of London, in common council assembled, most humbly approach your majesty, with renewed assurances of attachment to your majesty's most sacred person and government, and veneration for the free principles of the British constitution; to express to your majesty our grief and astonishment, at the extraordinary and disgraceful Convention lately entered into by the commander of your majesty's forces in Portugal, and the commander of the French army in Lisbon.—The circumstances attending this afflicting event cannot be contemplated by British minds without the most painful emotions; and all ranks of your majesty's subjects seem to have felt the utmost concern and indignation at a treaty so humiliating and degrading to this country and its allies. After a signal victory gained by the valour and discipline of British troops, by which the enemy appears to have been cut off from all means of succour or escape, we have the sad mortification of seeing the laurels so nobly acquired torn from the brows of our brave soldiers, and trophies granted to the enemy disgraceful to the British name, and injurious to the best interests of the British nation.—Besides the restitution of the Russian fleet upon a definitive treaty of peace with that power, and the sending back to their country, without exchange, so large a number of Russian sailors, by this ignominious Convention, British fleets are to convey to France the French army and its plunder, where they will be at liberty immediately to recommence their active operations against us or our allies. The guarantee and safe conveyance of their plunder, cannot but prove highly irritating to the pillaged inhabitants over whom they have tyrannized, and for whose deliverance and protection the British army was sent, and the full recognition of the title and dignity of Emperor of France, while all mention of the go-

vernment of Portugal is omitted, must be considered as highly disrespectful to the legitimate authority of that country.—We therefore humbly pray your majesty, in justice to the outraged feelings of a brave, injured, and indignant people, whose blood and treasure have been thus expended, as well as to retrieve the wounded honour of the country, and to remove from its character so foul a stain in the eyes of Europe, that your majesty will be graciously pleased immediately to institute such an inquiry into this dishonourable and unprecedented transaction, as will lead to the discovery and punishment of those by whose misconduct and incapacity the cause of the country and its allies have been so shamefully sacrificed. —We beg to assure your Majesty of our unalterable fidelity, and earnest desire to co-operate in every measure conducive to the peace, honour, and security of your Majesty's dominions.—Signed by order of court.—HENRY WOODTHORPE."—To which Address and Petition his Majesty was graciously pleased to return the following answer.—"I am fully sensible of your loyalty and attachment to my person and government.—I give credit to the motives which have dictated your Petition and Address, but I must remind you that it is inconsistent with the principles of British justice to pronounce judgment without previous investigation.—I should have hoped that recent occurrences would have convinced you, that I am at all times ready to institute inquiries on occasions in which the character of the country, or the honour of my arms is concerned, and that the interposition of the City of London could not be necessary for inducing me to direct due inquiry to be made into a transaction, which has disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation."—They were, as the newspapers state, all graciously received, and had the honour TO KISS HIS MAJESTY'S HAND. What, all? All a kiss a-piece? Mr. Walthman, who moved the Address, and who, in making the motion, talked about *Dunkirk* and the *Helder*; did he get a kiss too? I would give a trifle for the ascertaining of this fact. They kneel, I think I have heard, when they kiss. This must have been a highly diverting scene to Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at court, and who, as appears from the newspapers, was the first person presented to the king on that day, upon his return from Portugal, on leave of absence." He must have enjoyed this scene. The thing was perfect in all its

parts. Nothing ever was more so. The Londoners "*most humbly approach*" with a "*most humble and dutiful*" expression of "*assurances of attachment to his Majesty's*" "*most sacred person and government*;" but, then, immediately afterwards, they fall to expressing opinions relative to the Convention in Portugal, and to pray, that something or other may be done about it. Whereupon they get a good hearty slap; and then, being of the true breed, they all kneel down and fall to kissing the hand, by which it has been bestowed. Towards such people the king certainly acted with great propriety; for, if not only his person was the "*most*" "*sacred*" person, but his government also the "*most sacred*" government; if this was the case, what presumption was it in these citizens to interfere in the exercise of the functions of either? And, if this was not the case, then the citizens told a barefaced lie, and, as having done that, were well worthy of the rebuke they received. They first say: you are the most sacred of human beings, and your government is as sacred as you; they appear to approach with fear and trembling not to be described by words; and then, all of a sudden, they begin to sport their opinions about the operations of the army and the conduct of the generals, seeming to forget that the army is under the absolute command of this "*most*" "*sacred*" of persons, and that all the generals have been selected by this "*most*" "*sacred*" of governments.—I am glad, however, that they kissed the king's hand after he had given them what they deserved; because it showed, that they were penitent; that they were come to their senses; that they had seen the folly, not to say the impiety, of presuming to dictate to beings the "*most sacred*" here below.—The Morning Chronicle has taken part with the citizens, who, after they got a great way off, seem to have grumbled at the King's answer, notwithstanding they had kneeled down and kissed his hand. This print has quoted some instances of the conduct of the late King, upon similar occasions. The passage is as follows: "A very strong Petition was presented by the Corporation of London to the King, in the year 1756, respecting the affair at Minorca, "*praying for such an inquiry as may lead to the discovery and punishment of the authors of the late losses and disappointments,*" almost the same words of the prayer of the Petition presented on Wednesday; the words of which are, "*to institute such an inquiry as will lead to the discovery and punishment of those*

by whose misconduct and incapacity the cause of the country and its allies has been so shamefully sacrificed:" the answer to the Petition of 56 was as follows:

I thank you for these professions
 " "*of your duty to me; my concern for*
 " "*the loss of my island of Minorca is*
 " "*great and sincere; my utmost care*
 " "*and vigilance have been, and shall be*
 " "*exerted to maintain the honour of the*
 " "*nation, and the commerce of my sub-*
 " "*jects. The events of war are uncer-*
 " "*tain, but nothing shall be wanting on*
 " "*my part towards carrying it on with*
 " "*vigour, in order to a safe and honour-*
 " "*able peace, and for recovering and*
 " "*securing, by the blessing of God, the*
 " "*possessions and rights of my crown.*
 " "*—I shall not fail to do justice upon*
 " "*any persons who shall have been want-*
 " "*ing in their duty to me and their coun-*
 " "*try; to enforce obedience and disci-*
 " "*pline in my fleets and armies, and to*
 " "*support the authority and respect due*
 " "*to my government.*"—In the year
 " 1757, when the immortal Chatham was
 " at the head of affairs, after the failure of
 " the Rochford Expedition, a member of
 " the common council had given notice of
 " a motion for "*an address and petition*
 " "*to his majesty on the miscarriage of*
 " "*the late expedition to the coast of*
 " "*France.*"—The Lord Mayor acquainted
 " the court, that on Monday the 1st
 " day of October, 1757, William Blair,
 " Esq. one of the clerks of his majesty's
 " most honourable privy council, came
 " to the Mansion House and acquainted
 " the Lord Mayor, that he waited on his
 " Lordship to let him know, *his Majesty*
 " "*had given proper directions for an in-*
 " "*quiry to be forthwith made into the be-*
 " "*haviour of the Commanding Officers in*
 " "*the late expedition against France, and*
 " "*the cause of the miscarriage of the said*
 " "*expedition, and that such inquiry would*
 " "*be carried on and prosecuted with the*
 " "*utmost expedition, vigour and effect.*"
 " —Now, why it should be more incon-
 " sistent with the principles of British jus-
 " tice, to petition for an inquiry of this
 " kind in 1808, than in 1756 and 1757, it
 " is impossible to conceive, unless indeed
 " we should suppose, that lord Hawkesbury
 " is a much better judge of the principles
 " of British justice than lord Chatham.
 " The Address presented on Wednesday,
 " and that of 56, are the same in spirit,
 " and almost in terms. How then are we
 " to account for the difference of their re-
 " ception? Why should the one be con-

"sidered as perfectly just and proper,
 "while the other is reproved as having
 "pronounced judgment previous to in-
 "vestigation?" We have not now,
 "however, to learn with what a total disre-
 "gard of delicacy and propriety the minis-
 "ters can occasionally conduct themselves
 "towards their Sovereign. When they
 "have any favourite object to accomplish,
 "they, without the least scruple, advise
 "his majesty to contradict and stultify his
 "own acts and expressions. Is this decent?
 "Is it to be endured *either by the king or*
 "*the nation*? Can it fail to remind us of
 "the infamous administration of the prince
 "of the Peace in Spain? The gracious re-
 "ception met with by sir A. Wellesley, at
 "the very moment the Corporation was ad-
 "mitted, leaves little doubt as to the de-
 "sign of this proceeding. But we trust
 "that a British public will not tamely see
 "their Sovereign abused, and themselves
 "checked in the exercise of their consti-
 "tutional privileges, without the strongest
 "marks of indignation at such mischievous
 "practices."—Now, as to these instances,
 to make them applicable, the Morning
 Chronicle should have shewn us, not that
 the form of the constitution of the country
 was the same that it was in the years 1756
 and 1757, but that it was in substance the
 same, and, above all, that the people were
 still the same sort of people. At the former
 period the taxes raised upon the labour of
 the people amounted to about 5 or 6 mil-
 lions a year, and they now amount to fifty
 millions; that is to say, the ministers of
 that day had five or six millions a year to
 expend, while the ministers, now-a-days,
 have, in loans and all, about seventy mil-
 lions a year to expend. At the former pe-
 riod, the standing army did not amount,
 perhaps, to more than thirty or forty thou-
 sand men, in time of war; now, the *staff*
 and *foreign troops* exceed that number,
 while the whole of the commissioned-of-
 ficers, *cashierable at pleasure*, amount to
 about fifteen thousand persons, and while,
 in one way or another, the relations of
 all these, as well as themselves, are, in
 some measure, dependent upon the minis-
 try. At the former period a thing like the
 Income tax had never entered the mind of
 man, and, if an Englishman of that day
 had been told, that his children would have
 such a tax imposed upon them, he
 would have clenched his fist and knocked
 down the asserter. At that period the East
 India Company were mere merchants and
 not sovereigns; not a body so powerful as to
 be able to draw from the people of England

million after million of the fruit of their
 labour. At that period the doctrine that
 truth was a libel, and that to hurt a man's
 feelings was libellous, had not been promul-
 gated and acted upon, much less was there
 any law for *transporting* persons convicted of
 libelling the ministers. At that time, the
Habeas Corpus, or *Personal Security Act*,
 had never been suspended except in case of
 actual rebellion or commotion, much less
 had it been kept suspended for several years
 together. At that period there was no in-
 stance of a minister's having been detected
 in lending forty thousand pounds of the
 public money to two members of parliament,
 without interest, without any authority for
 so doing, and without the consent or know-
 ledge of even his colleagues; and, upon
 proof of this being laid before the parliament,
 of such minister's being screened by a bill
 of indemnity.—Now, whether the change
 is for the better or for the worse; whether
 the people have acted wisely in lending their
 aid, or giving their silent assent, to this
 change, let the citizens of London decide;
 but, that the change has taken place is
 certain; that they have, tacitly at least,
 approved of the change, is also certain;
 for it is notorious, that they have, more than
 any other part of the people, supported the
 funding and taxing system, which has natu-
 rally produced all the rest of the change;
 and, therefore, they have no reason at all
 to complain that the present king does not
 speak to them in the language in which his
 predecessor spoke to their fathers. What!
 they now whine and snivel because they are
 not treated as their fathers were treated.
 Their fathers were a different sort of men;
 their fathers would have demanded inquiry
 upon *other* occasions than the present;
 their fathers knew, felt, and would have
 urged, their *rights*, at a time when they
 were talking of their *duties*; their fathers
 knew how to *demand* as well as to *implore*;
 their fathers were men widely different from
 them, and, therefore, they merited and re-
 ceived a treatment widely different. What!
 is it till now that they have waited to dis-
 cover that they are not what their fathers
 were? Do they now complain of the Pitts
 and the Hawkesburys; they, who have
 supported them *in every thing* for so many
 long and fatal years of decline of national
 pride and independence! They, who have
 set up the howl of Jacobin and traitor against
 every one, who dared to move his tongue
 or his pen in opposition to the acts and de-
 signs of the minister of the day? They,
 who have voted and speechified and subscrib-
 ed against every person, who talked of *free*.

dom? They, who, whether in his making peace or in making war, approved of all, aye, all and every individual act, of the late Pitt? Do they now complain of the operation of his principles, acted upon by his legitimate heirs and successors? "Inquiry"! What right have such men to ask for inquiry? They, who have, a hundred times voted against the principle of inquiry; they, who have been maintaining, for more than twenty years past, the doctrine of *confidence* and *irresponsibility*; they who have, upon all occasions, represented as disaffected to the *country* every man who has wished for inquiry into the conduct of the government? What right have such men to ask for inquiry *now* in particular; and with what face can they complain, that they are sharply rebuked for so doing? Pity them, indeed! Not I. They have their just reward. If they had not acted a base and degenerate part, for so many years, that which has now happened, that which has now at last urged them to ask for inquiry, never would have happened. It is *in* themselves, and not in their stars, "that they are underlings." Their humiliation is the work of their own hands. To such men the king's answer was perfectly proper, and, as the rest of the nation has invariably followed their example in acts of submission and subserviency to the ministry of the day, the answer to them will very properly become a general one. The years 1756 and 1757, indeed! Remind the king of what was the language of the king at that time! As well might he remind them of what was the language and what the conduct of the people at that time, or in former times. When it has been urged to this same corporation of London, that such and such acts were a glaring violation of the constitution of England, has not the answer constantly been, that *the times were changed*; that the present situation of the country warranted, and demanded, that which, formerly would have been unjustifiable; and, have we not recently seen, from the pen of those who are well known to be the avowed advocates of the Opposition party, a justification of what was formerly called "bribery and corruption," a justification of the purchase and sale of seats in parliament, as being suitable to this new state of things? And, are we, after this; after having lived so long in this state, to be called upon to bestow our compassion upon those, who, having been most instrumental in producing it, now complain, that they are not treated as their fathers were? But, the chief objection to their complaint

is this: why did they not petition for inquiry upon *former occasions*? Is this the *first* military failure that this poor nation has experienced? Is this the first disgraceful Convention that has been made? Is this the first instance, of late years, in which English treasure and English blood have been expended in the purchase of national dishonour? If it be, then these people might have some ground for complaint; but, it it be not, and if this be the first time of their petitioning for inquiry, the answer they have received, so far from being harsh, was much milder than they had a right to expect.— They complain of the omnipotence of "a *certain great family*," dealing, as slaves must and do, in ingendo and insinuation, not daring to name those whom they hate. But, is not the "omnipotence" of this family their own work? Have they ever stirred an inch in the inquiries moved for with respect to the Wellesleys? Have they not set their faces against all those who did? Have not both parties; have not the nation, with here and there a solitary and insignificant exception, given their sanction to what has been the natural cause of what they now complain of? Whimpering, whining creatures, as they are, it is truly a pretty jest to hear *them*, at this day, calling for inquiry! No, no: they must not hope to succeed in this way. It is too late for them to assume a new character. Oh, the base flatterers! It stirs one's gall to hear their complaints. Is there a man or a woman or a child, in power, or belonging to any one in power, whom they have not eulogized to the skies? Have they not praised *all* that has been done, and all that has been intended to be done, by every set of men who, for the time being, had the expending of the taxes! Is not this the case? No man can deny that it is. Away with them and their complaints, then! Let them howl to the winds.— There is a part of the observations of the Morning Chronicle, relating to the King himself, which deserves notice. It blames the answer, but chooses to suppose, that the ministers *forced* the king to give such an answer, and expresses a hope, that "the *British public* will not tamely see their *Sovereign thus abused*." I am at a loss to know, whether this be meant as irony, or not. If it be, it is much too grave; for certainly the far greater part of readers will take it as serious, and, if so, they must suppose, that the Morning Chronicle pays no great compliment to the intellects of the King. "The King can do no wrong;" but, the meaning of this is, not that he can willingly and willingly do nothing which is

wrong in itself, because, being subject to passion like other men, he might knock a person down ; but, that he can do nothing which shall subject him to the operation of the criminal law. In any other sense, the words are an absurdity. They would suppose the King to have neither will nor judgment of his own ; to be a mere state puppet, whose situation might be filled by an idiot or a log of wood. To that sort of courtesy, which imputes to the ministers all that one disapproves of in the language and conduct of the King, there is no objection ; but, to carry this so far as to call upon the people to *avenge* the King on account of what he, from his own lips, has uttered, is really an insult upon the understanding of the public, and would be practised by no one, whose views were not much more of a party than of a public nature. — BERKSHIRE has come to a resolution to follow the example of the City of London, and, as I fear the instances will be rare, after the rebuke which the city received, I shall, as far as I am able, perpetuate the memory of these instances. The following is an account of the proceedings in Berkshire :—“ READ-
“ ING, Oct. 18.—Pursuant to a requisition
“ signed by a number of the freeholders of
“ our county, and an order issued in conse-
“ quence thereof by the high sheriff, a most
“ numerous and respectable meeting of the
“ nobility, clergy and freeholders, was this
“ day held in the town-hall, for the pur-
“ pose of taking into their consideration the
“ terms of the late Convention in Portugal,
“ which has been acceded to by the British
“ general officers commanding in that coun-
“ try, and for expressing to his majesty
“ their sentiments on the occasion. After
“ the usual form of opening the court, it
“ was moved and seconded, “ That an
“ humble and dutiful address be presented
“ to his majesty, praying that he may be
“ graciously pleased to order that an in-
“ quiry should be instituted with respect to
“ the cause of the late disgraceful Conven-
“ tion in Portugal, and also beseeching his
“ majesty that he may be graciously pleased
“ to order that such steps may be taken, as
“ will ensure the punishment of the guilty
“ person or persons in that disgraceful trans-
“ action, however high his rank in society
“ may be.” —The motion was made by
“ G. MITFORD, Esq. and seconded by C.
“ DICKINSON, Esq. It was opposed by Mr.
“ NARES one of the *British Critic* parsons,
“ the other being the famous *Mr. Beloe*,
“ who was, sometime ago, at the *British*
“ *Museum*. Mr. Nares was seconded by a
“ Mr. COBBAM,—The opposition rested

“ not only on the idea that judgment would
“ by this motion be pronounced before trial,
“ but also on the principle of its being im-
“ proper to offend the royal ear by a subject
“ presuming to give his advice in a manner
“ which was known to be contrary to the de-
“ clared sentiments of the royal mind. In
“ reply to both these points, it was argued
“ by LORD FOLKESTONE, HENRY MARSH,
“ Esq. Dr. VALPÉ, and other gentlemen
“ who signed the requisition, that no indi-
“ vidual was implicated, either by the words
“ or tenor of the motion ; it pointedly, no
“ doubt, censured the thing ; but it, at the
“ same time, called for inquiry as to who
“ may be the guilty person, and expressing
“ the anxious hope of the freeholders, that
“ exemplary punishment may follow this
“ trial and conviction. With respect to the
“ second point which had been advanced
“ by some of the opposers of the motion, it
“ had been so repeatedly urged, and refuted
“ in the most able manner, that it was
“ thought hardly worth a comment ; it was
“ a fact which was notorious to every Eng-
“ lishman who ever consulted a page of
“ his own history, that, however correct
“ the motives of the gentlemen who op-
“ posed the present motion might possibly
“ be, and most probably were, yet it was a
“ most unquestionable fact, that the “ dan-
“ ger of offending the royal ear” has been
“ urged by the most abject slaves, and most
“ time-serving sycophants, in the worst pe-
“ riods of our history. On the other hand,
“ the fact was as clearly ascertained, and as
“ generally known, that at the periods of
“ our history which excited the universal
“ admiration of the world, the constitutional
“ language of Britons was held to be this—
“ that every subject, however humble his
“ station in life might be, had by the pe-
“ culiarly inestimable blessings of the Brit-
“ ish constitution, a most unquestionable
“ right, and that, in fact, it was his bound-
“ den duty, to approach the throne, on any
“ great public emergency, by which the
“ national character, interest, or honour,
“ may appear to him to have been compro-
“ mised, and state his sentiments thereon in
“ respectful but in manly terms : it was his
“ duty to do so, in order that the parental
“ attention of the sovereign might be more
“ immediately, but with humility, called to
“ a point in which bad advisers, had pre-
“ viously had access to the royal ear.—
“ The motion was then put and carried by
“ a majority of six to one.” —The Cor-
“ poration of WINCHESTER have addressed
“ the King upon the subject ! “ Tread upon
“ a worm and it will turn again.” This is.

really creditable to Sir Henry Mildmay, who though in a very bad state of health, did, I believe, attend the meeting in person.—The inhabitants at large, of the city and suburbs of Winchester, have also sent an Address, of which a copy is here inserted. I have heard, too, that the names, signed to this address, were, many of them, such as might have been expected to be withheld, upon such an occasion. * Really, if *Winchester* acts thus, there may be something like *soul* yet left in this county. The account is as follows, and it is with unfeigned satisfaction that I put it upon record.—

"On Monday se'night the corporation of
"Winchester held a meeting, at the Guild-
"hall, for the purpose of considering the
"propriety of addressing his majesty on the
"convention lately entered into by the of-
"ficers commanding his Majesty's forces
"in Portugal, H. C. P. Mildmay, esq. the
"mayor, in the chair. An address was
"proposed by Mr. Alderman Earle, and
"seconded by Mr. Alderman Silver, and
"unanimously agreed to, *praying his Ma-
"jesty to institute an inquiry into their con-
"duct* Sir R. Gimon, bart. and H. C. P.
"Mildmay, esq. the representatives of this
"city, were desired to present the same,
"attended by Mr. Alderman Earle. And
"on Thursday following, a meeting of the
"inhabitants at large of the city and sub-
"urbs of Winchester was held at the same
"place (by permission of the mayor) for
"the like purpose; when Dr. Littlehales
"was unanimously called to the chair, and
"the following address was proposed by
"W. F. Bury, esq. and seconded by J.
"Woolis, esq. and unanimously agreed to:
"—*TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT
"MAJESTY.—May it please your Majesty,*
"We, your Majesty's most dutiful and
"loyal subjects, inhabitants of the city and
"suburbs of Winchester, beg leave to ap-
"proach the throne to express our sincere
"attachment to your royal person and fa-
"mily, and being sensible that your Ma-
"jesty's true glory is inseparable from that
"of your people, we humbly presume to
"pray that your Majesty will be pleased to
"order a full, free, and effective inquiry
"to be made into the causes and circum-
"stances of the convention of Portugal—a
"convention which has caused general mort-
"tification and disappointment, and de-
"prived your brave soldiers of the expected
"result of their good and honourable exer-
"tions—the unconditional surrender of the
"whole French army. Your petitioners
"cannot but deeply lament that such an
"opportunity was lost; but as we do not

"presume to anticipate conviction, if, up-
"on mature investigation, it shall be found
"that your commanders were compelled
"by insurmountable obstacles to conclude
"such a treaty, justice demands that they
"should be reinstated in the good opinion
"of their country; but, on the other hand,
"if they were actuated by any thing less
"than imperious necessity, we are fully
"persuaded, from the interest which your
"majesty must ever feel in the fair fame
"and honour of your kingdom, that they
"will experience such marks of your royal
"displeasure as may prove a severe example
"to others, and deter them from tarnishing
"in the cabinet, the glory acquired in the
"field."—This Address is very good in-
"deed. There is none of that spaniel-like
"humility in it that we see in the London
"Address. The people do not seem to speak
"as if they were approaching the throne of a
"life-and-death sovereign. Upon reading the
"London Address, one cannot help figuring
"to one's self a parcel of crouching creatures
"with knees knocking together and teeth clat-
"tering in their head, as if waiting the crash
"of a roof or the fall of a thunderbolt. No
"man living would suppose, that they were
"the descendants of the men, who obtained
"the *Bill of Rights* and the *Act of Settle-
"ment*. I hear that the county is to have a
"meeting; but, whether the answer to the
"city will put a stop to this, is more than I
"shall pretend to determine.—*Essex* is
"about to meet, and I am happy to perceive,
"that Mr. BURGONNE is taking an active part;
"for, if I am to judge from what he has writ-
"ten and *published*, he is as sensible and
"sound a man as any in the kingdom, though,
"as to some particular points, I differ from
"him in opinion. That county has been,
"as to representation in parliament, a *nullity*,
"for many years. The two factions, as they
"did in Westminster, have, to save trouble
"and expence, made an amicable arrange-
"ment, by which they name each a member,
"the chief persons in the county have a good
"dinner, once in six years, toast the British
"Constitution, and the people have just as
"much to say in the matter, as the good
"people of Russia or Turkey or Germany
"have in choosing their representatives.—
"Aye, *here* is the source; *here* is the real
"cause of all our failures abroad and of all
"our misery at home. There should be no
"Address, or Petition, upon this occasion,
"uncoupled with a declaration as to this fertile
"cause of mischief. It is idle to talk about
"reformation any where else, till a reforma-
"tion take place here.—As somewhat con-
"nected with this subject of the Convention,

I cannot refrain from noticing a dispute that is going on about which part of the kingdom has the misfortune to have given birth to Sir Hew Dalrymple. The Irish must own to the Wellesleys; we here in England, and even in Hampshire, I believe, to Sir Burrard and, from a very natural motive, we gave Sir Hew to the Scots, but they have thrown him back, with both hands, upon Yorkshire. A Yorkshire-man, has however, came forward, and, in a letter which I here insert, from the Morning Chronicle, has given us what we were so desirous to obtain, some account of the origin and progress of this Convention-making general.—“Sir

“Having mentioned Sir Hew Dalrymple, though it is certainly a matter altogether indifferent to the public, whether that officer be a native of Scotland or of Yorkshire; yet as a correspondent, a Scotchman, has thought proper to assert, formally, in contradiction to truth and fact, that he is an *Englishman*, born in the county of York, I shall state such particulars as may defy contradiction. His father was of the county of Ayr, and rose to the rank of lieutenant-col. in the British service. The present Sir Hew is about 57 years of age, and first entered the army as an ensign in the Royals, where he remained many years. His mother's name was Ross; and she having, as was before observed, married for her second husband, General Sir Adolphus Oughton, he, in some measure, adopted, befriended, and brought forward in life, his wife's son. Sir Hew had no patrimonial inheritance, except a small fortune; but ~~he~~ married a lady who brought him a considerable accession to it. She was a daughter of the late General Leighton, I believe the youngest. These circumstances may challenge implicit belief.

“—Yours,—A YORKSHIREMAN.”

There have been men, for the honour of whose birth, cities and counties have contended, and others for the honour of their burying-place; but, as far as I know, it was reserved for the list of English generals to possess men, whose countries contended in disowning. The Scots are to be applauded for their motive; but, there is another way, in which for them to shew and to prove, that they feel as they ought to do about the Convention, and that is, in sending up petitions for inquiry; and, unless they do that, they will, in the end, obtain little credit from their disowning of one of the men, by whom that disgraceful instrument was framed and ratified.—Wellesley is, it seems, gone to Ireland to fill his post

of Chief Secretary, and it will be worth while just to inquire, whether his salary of five or six thousand pounds a year has been going on all the time he has been making armistices in Portugal. He is, if this account be true, now a minister again, and a minister, too, having the management of the affairs of a great part of the kingdom. I'll warrant it that the Irish do not petition against the Convention! There is a pretty little act of parliament existing with respect to that country, which will have a wonderful effect in keeping the several counties in a state of perfect tranquillity. What a pity it is that we have not such an act here! “All in good time,” the reader will say; but, how quiet we should be!—While all this is going on, without doors, the ministers are said to have their different opinions about the inquiry. This is likely; and I should suppose, that Mr. Canning, who is their prop, would be for the inquiry. I think so for this reason; that he, feeling strong in his own talents, is not, at his early time of life, likely to risk his future prospects by taking a side, which, though it may obtain a momentary triumph, or rather, impunity, will assuredly, first or last, meet with due execration and punishment. Mr. Canning has sense enough to perceive, that things cannot always go on thus; he must be pretty sure, that a change, and a very material change, must, in the course of a few years, take place; and, therefore, to say nothing of justice, which I still look upon as having some weight with him, policy would point out the path I have described. There are others, who are the creatures of mere court intrigue, whose power has no other basis, and who, were they not courtiers, would be nothing; but, it certainly is different with him; and, if the resolution should be to screen and support the Convention makers, I should not be at all surprized to see him, at least, quit the ministry. There is one objection to it indeed, and that is, his connection with the Grenvilles; but, he has now tried his own strength, and, if, notwithstanding all that has passed, they should still adhere to the Wellesleys, he cannot fail to foresee, that they, who never were favourites with the nation, will not be a body of which he need stand in dread. These are my opinions. I may deceive myself; but, if justice should be done to the insulted and injured nation, I shall certainly give to him the greater part of the credit.

It was my intention to have made an exposure of DON CEVALLOS's *Exposition*, which I look upon as the most prime piece • •

of imposture that has appeared in print for many years, but I have not time; and, besides, nothing should be mixed with this discussion relative to the Convention. It is what is doing and to be done *here*, here, here at home, that ought to engage our great care and attention. What care I about Ferdinand and Joseph. I am not to have my wits drawn away by this tub to the whale.—Little room, as I have, however, I cannot help pointing out to the attention of the reader, a pamphlet, just published, under the following title: "*An Appeal to the Public and a farewell Address to the Army, by BREVET MAJOR HOGAN, who resigned his commission, in consequence of the treatment he experienced from the Duke of York, and of the system that prevails in the army, RESPECTING PRO-MOTIONS.*" This, I scruple not to say, is the *most interesting* publication that has appeared in England for many years. It should be read by every individual in the nation. Oh, what a story does this gentleman tell! What a picture does he exhibit! What facts does he unfold! If *this* produce no effect upon the public, why, then, we are so base and rascally a crew, that it is no matter what becomes of us. We are unworthy of the name of men, and are beneath the beasts that perish.

Butley, 20th Oct. 1808.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.

SIR;—When I addressed you on the 19th ult. under the then recent impression which the Conventions in Portugal had made upon me, I noticed every circumstance of them that seemed to call for animadversion. I have since attended to the public discussions on this important subject, and in particular to those very judicious and dispassionate observations which have appeared under your name. I have there seen my own opinions confirmed and strengthened by an able developement of topics on which I had only briefly commented; I have derived additional information from the exposition of several incidental points connected with the main question; and I have, in general, observed, with a satisfaction which is to me the source of much hope and sanguine expectation for the public weal, the periodical and political writers of the United Kingdom (with one solitary and despicable exception) zealously employing their pens and presses, in holding up to universal indignation, the transactions of our commanders in Portugal, in calling for justice upon the guilty, and in thus rescuing the British nation from the "deep damnation" of conniv-

ing at what, until some great act of national justice has taken place, must be considered as fixing a most hateful stain upon the national character.—But, Mr. Cobbett, I have looked in vain amongst all the writers on our present subject for any thing amounting to a pretence of justification of the Conventions; still less have I been able to find what could be called a plausible excuse for the persons implicated in the conclusion of them. The exception above alluded to is the Morning Post, the only print that has endeavoured to screen one of the actors in this drama from public indignation by the means (equally discreditable to the principal and his agent) of transferring the blame to an absent and a weaker party. This print has, however, so perpetually shifted its ground of argument; has so often stated facts and revoked them; has had so often recourse to insinuation and misrepresentation where plain and direct language would not suit its purpose; and has now taken such undue advantage of the hacknied device of forging letters from the fleet and army in Portugal;—that it is impossible to say how it would now state the case of its patron if called upon to make a short summary of his apology. We are, moreover, entitled to entertain this doubt from the conduct of the Morning Post since, as well as before, Sir A. Wellesley's return from Portugal. That event has afforded the public no more satisfactory ground than it already possessed for thinking well of the Conventions. In fact, nothing has been said by Sir A. Wellesley or his friends, since his arrival in England, to justify his conduct: they have abandoned their original ground, the famous Protest and Sir Arthur's passive agency; and they have substituted nothing in lieu thereof; so that Sir Arthur stands, at this moment, arraigned for misconduct before the British public, and not a plea, nor any thing that deserves the name of argument, is offered in his defence. It may be said that his great mind disdains to answer what he calls the petty captious bickerings of the vulgar; that he reserves his justification for the grand military inquisition that will hereafter set at the Horse Guards. Be it so; but, if this contempt of public opinion be really the motive of his silence, his friends have strangely mistaken his character in the many awkward attempts that they have made in his favour. It has been said that Sir A. arrived in England quite ignorant of the impression made amongst us by his proceedings, and thinking that he had accomplished an amazing feat in getting the French out of Portugal by means of his Conventions. I very much doubt this. I believe, on the

contrary, that he well knew, before he left Portugal, how those acts had been received, not only by the nation at large but also by his majesty's government; and that his coming over, *without being recalled*, was owing to the advice of his friends here, who, in conformity to the old adage that "the absent are always in the wrong," thought that he would do well to come and make good his own story, leaving his superior officers to the chance of what *their* friends might be able to do for them. It is at the same time but justice to Sir A. to observe, that the circumstance of his plan of defence by recrimination being abandoned, does look as if he were unwilling to sanction so base a proceeding, though he has brought his officious defenders into a scrape very common to injudicious friends,—that of being betrayed into meanness which their very patron is ashamed of and obliged to disavow. At all events, if it should be true that Sir Arthur came away from Portugal in the belief that he had acted meritoriously, and had only to receive on his arrival the plaudits of a grateful country, he could not have been long in England without being undeceived. The very boatmen who landed his baggage, the porter who strapped it on his carriage, must have stared reproof in his face; the looks of every creature he met would apprise him of his fallen estate. When he reached town, he must have learned from his friends the many atrocious calumnies (as they would call them) that had issued against him from the press since the Conventions were known; or even if, through delicacy, his friends should not have told him *all*, the first file of newspapers that he laid his hand upon would shew him how much lee-way he had to make up in the public opinion. Is it then probable, Sir, that under these circumstances any man even of ordinary ambition, and although you do admit him in some sort to despise the vulgar bias of the public mind, should be so far indifferent to his fame, as to neglect any means he might possess of giving a favourable turn to his case? In short, Sir, had Sir A. Wellesley had any thing that could make in his favour, that would be sufficient, I will not say to stop, but even to suspend for a moment, or to slacken the current that now so strongly runs against him, do you think that he would have withheld it? I am convinced that he would not; and I therefore infer, *that he has nothing of this nature to advance*. What, then, you will say, must become of him when, in the hour of public trial, which hour (I differ from you Mr. Cobbett in thinking) must come, he

shall be called upon for his public defence and justification?—Having told you what I believe that he has not done, only because he *could* not do it, I will tell you what I as firmly believe will happen upon the occasion to which I look forward.—When a public inquiry into this business takes place, you may depend upon it that we shall find that the nation has been labouring under a most strange and unaccountable mistake: for that, instead of a calamity, which they seem (poor, silly, ignorant people!) to think has befallen them, they have received a great and signal benefit from the very person on whom they are now calling for judgment. In what that benefit will be made to consist might indeed be difficult to guess, were it not that we have been already told, that the ridding Portugal at any rate of the French army was to be considered as such. This, then, is the great national advantage, that we Englishmen have derived from the immense expence of an armament, such as was never before sent out of British ports, and from the gallantry of our soldiers displayed in two signal defeats of the enemy.—Yes, Sir, this, we shall be told, was the main end and object of the expedition; this has been accomplished, and therefore we ought to be satisfied. To give plausibility to this story, you see that Junot's "*whole army*" is already magnified from 14,000, which were all he could muster at Vimeira, to 25 or even 27,000, which are to be conveyed in our transports from Lisbon to Rochefort; but you very well know too, that if tonnage has really been demanded for this number of men, they will consist of any thing but combatants: probably sick, wounded, civilians, and a very large proportion of renegado Portuguese. Nevertheless shall we be told, that these noted Conventions have driven out of Portugal the whole 25,000 men, just as Lord Castle-reagh gravely informed us last year that Lord Cathcart had achieved the conquest of Zealand, when there were 35,000 Danes in arms to oppose him, though every drummer in our army knew, that, excepting the garrisons of Copenhagen and Cronberg, amounting altogether to 6,000 men, there was not, at the time of the capitulation, nor, for many days previous to it, a single man in arms in the whole island; and that there had at no time been one regular battalion without the walls of the above-mentioned towns?—That *this* deliverance of Portugal was not available for the farther operations of the war; that it did not set a man of ours at liberty to assist the Spaniards, but on the contrary deprived our army of the transports in which it might have been conveyed near the scene •

of action on the Pyrenees; that it does actually give the French a large and well appointed disposable force which they would not otherwise have possessed;—these considerations are to be regarded as trifling when compared to the main object.—“We have got Portugal, though not all belonging to it: we have got rid of the French there; no matter what becomes of them—charity begins at home—and if these same French should march over the Pyrenees and help to beat the Spanish Patriots, why, we are very sorry for it, but our business was to get them out of Portugal: and as to the few little advantages which the French obtained in the course of the negociation and in wording the Conventions, besides that they also are very subordinate considerations, is it our fault that Kellermann was the best negociator of the two? Sir Arthur is a soldier, not a statesman; he has shewn that he could fight and beat the French too; is he to be blamed because he cannot wield the pen as well as the sword, or because Kellermann, who is probably some dull pocking German as his name indicates, and never fought a successful battle in his life, should get and keep the whip hand of him in the course of a long, intricate, and most difficult negociation?”—This, I make no doubt, is the sort of reasoning with which we shall be hereafter edified. But it will not, I dare say, Sir, have escaped your observation, that your correspondent C. has, in your last number, brought forward some “*secret motives, and those very strong ones, to influence the determination of our commanders to agree to a conditional surrender.*” This Mr. C. must surely be one of Sir Arthur’s indiscreet injudicious friends, or he never would even have hinted at secret motives in a case, from which, of all others, secrecy seems most necessary to be banished. What, in the name of heaven, could be the secret motives in such a case, unless they consisted in the very convenient, though not very honourable, preference given to the sort of service that was to follow the Conventions, over that which must have been undertaken to force Junot and his army to unconditional surrender? As to C’s quibbling about your expression of “*next arrival*,” it may, together with his other miserable shifts and subtleties, be safely left to the corrective energy of your own pen, which has very properly characterized him and the cause in which he is embarked. The whole nation will bear you testimony that it did expect (and not without reason), that the next advices of any importance from the army would announce the surren-

der of the French at discretion, and that the vessel that brought those advices would also bring two or three of the principal French generals by way of a sample of what ours had been able to achieve.—This, I can at least vouch, was the general sentiment throughout the metropolis, and it should seem that the counties were to the full as sanguine.—But, since we are on the subject of “*secret motives*,” I will suggest for your consideration one which I think more likely than any other to have influenced the determination of our commanders; one which must not only have embarrassed them greatly at the time of framing the Conventions, but which will, if they are good courtiers as I take them to be, embarrass them still more when they come to unfold their motives to the people of England.—Did you never hear, Mr. Cobbett, of such a thing as an *INSTRUCTION* to a commander drawn up with studied ambiguity, or so encumbered with a multitude of expletives—with paragraph within paragraph—parenthesis within parenthesis—hypothesis built upon hypothesis—and the whole so interlarded with *ifs* and *buts* that it might be construed any and every way save into a direct, clear, and positive meaning? And did you never hear, Sir, that *Lord Castlereagh* was famous for giving such Instructions? There is no act of any description for which a saving clause may not be found in such a dispatch; and there is no clause in it by which any one act can be positively justified. Yet it is such a dispatch under whose influence I am told our commanders acted; and if my information be correct, as I have no doubt it is, their embarrassment, as to what defence they shall set up, will be most naturally accounted for.—But, Sir, let us now look a little farther forward into the consequences of this business; let us see whether it be not possible to extract some eventual good out of the evil that we thus grievously lament. I quite agree with you, that to lose our time in fruitless whining and complaints is to act in a manner very unbecoming men and good citizens. We are, if we do our duty, to see if some practical good may not hereafter result from the confidence of the nation having been thus shamefully abused.—We know from the language of the throne that an inquiry is to take place. Whatever may be the sentence pronounced in a military view, it must be obvious to every body that the source of the evil is not altogether of a military nature, and that it is one which a military court of inquiry is not very likely to notice or to animadvert upon with much

harshness.—What I allude to, Sir, is the practice that has obtained of late years of military and naval commanders negotiating and binding their country to stipulations which are altogether beyond the competency of their functions. It is a question in my mind how far the country is, in honour and good faith, obliged to abide by conditions thus subscribed to. I am very much of opinion that the country is under no such obligation; for if you carry the same principle but a little farther, it would be a necessary consequence that if Lord Cathcart, or Gen. Whitelocke, or Sir H. Dalrymple, or any other of your Convention-making generals had, besides giving up the advantages they respectively possessed, chosen to surrender Portsmouth, or Chatham lines, we must equally have been bound to admit an enemy's garrison into them. The Duke of York's stipulating for the surrender of 8,000 French prisoners who were well and securely lodged in our prison-ships and barracks does come as near as possible to such a supposition. But if this be a question open for the discussions of the learned in the law of nations, I imagine that it is not a matter of doubt whether it would be better to restrict our generals *in future* from committing their country by similar engagement.—Some discretionary power is no doubt necessary to the command of an army: but then that power should be as much as possible of a military nature. The extreme of an evil is in some cases its best cure; and it will now be felt that there is a point beyond which a general may not transgress the limits of his command.—To apply this observation to the Conventions, I would ask, what could be so entirely extra military, so exclusively a political consideration as the acknowledgement contained in the first article of Sir A. Wellesley's armistice, of his imperial and royal majesty Napoleon I.? It is no matter whether the said Napoleon would or would not, at some future day, have been acknowledged by us in that capacity; it could never belong to a general commanding an army on a foreign station to determine the time or mode of so doing.—If I am told that it is an unmeaning complimentary article, and that Buonaparte is not the more an emperor because Sir A. Wellesley chose to call him so, I have only to reply, then why do not you upon the same plea get rid of the Conventions altogether?—Again, what could be more an un-military and political concern than the inquiry into the conduct of the Portuguese during the French occupation of their country? To stipulate moreover that no inquiry of

this sort should be made, was absolutely to say to our ally the Prince Regent, "You shall be no longer master of your country. We have done you the favour of driving out the French for you, but you have no business to inquire how they came there, or by whom they have been aided or abetted. You shall be nominal sovereign of Portugal, but we will carry on the police for you."—In short, it is as completely dethroning the Prince Regent as if we had sent him word that he should not return to Europe now that he has a comfortable home at the Brazils.—You, Sir, have asked a very pertinent question: "What would the French government have done had its generals made such a Convention as ours have made?" In the first place, Buonaparte, who knows how to choose his men, would hardly have employed a general capable of such a transaction; or if, from favouritism or any family consideration,—for these do sometimes prevail at St. Cloud also,—he did send such a person to command an army, he would have placed a proper check upon him in the second in command, or in the chief of the staff. If, however, after all, such an act had been committed, I have very little doubt that he would have instantly disgraced all the parties concerned in it.—The warning he has given Dupont of what is to be his fate sufficiently indicates what would have been his conduct in the case you have contemplated.—I think then, Sir, that some practical good may arise out of the Conventions; because I think that they will serve as a warning to ministers what Instructions they give generals; and as a warning to generals not to exceed the powers intrusted to them. They must, I think, be productive of a new system in these respects; for even if Lord Castlereagh should, for the misfortune of the country, continue to direct the war department, he must still see that he will, in the end, run too great a risk should he always give obscure unintelligible instructions, and should his generals, for want of a better guide, always blunder over their business in the way we have so often witnessed.—The inquiry that will take place about the Portugal Conventions will set these matters in their proper light, and it will also, I trust, expose to public reprobation that other part of our intercourse with foreign powers, which, under the specious name of conciliation, moderation, &c. would sacrifice the dignity and often the best interests of the country to a mistaken notion of personal feeling and propriety.—I expect to hear upon this subject, that it was perfectly genteel and well-bred to treat them and put

army in the manner we have done after having beat them in the field : that it was the bias of a great and generous mind, soaring above little narrow and vulgar national prejudices, to shew that as we were great so we could be merciful; and that it might conciliate the good-will of other countries—of France and of Russia, for instance—to let them see that when victorious we could set bounds to our triumphs, and not carry our resentment to extremes. You may believe me, Sir, it is not with this amiable part of the British character that the nations of the world want to be made acquainted. They give us full credit for disinterestedness, moderation, and generosity; they know that we would never strike or insult a fallen enemy; but they are not so certain of our acting with that vigour that would convince both friends and foes that *we* are not to be insulted with impunity; that we are resolved to obtain satisfaction proportioned to the injuries that we receive; that our exertions will not slacken until the just object of our undertakings be accomplished; and that, at any rate, we are not to be gulled by the artifices of the first intriguer with whom we may happen to have to deal. This is what the people of the continent want to see; they feel that instead of our being Machiavelists, as Buonaparte calls us, all the Machiavelism is on his side, and that we have too often carried on our concerns with other powers with an awkwardness, and a want of system bordering upon silliness.—They think that we make immense efforts to produce very trifling comparative benefits. The nation gives with profusion money and men; the government is at times active in employing them; our soldiers and sailors fight most valiantly; and yet, in the end, what does it all avail us?—We either fail in our object as at the Helder, or obtain it but partially as in the case of Portugal. What can this be owing to but to a defect or to a total want of system? We see things through too small a medium, or we do not look far enough into the consequences of them. Hence it follows, that when we are successful, what with surprise and joy, we are so confused that we know not what to do next.—The actions of the 17th and 21st August, do infinite honour to the bravery of our troops, and we certainly were not behind-hand in bestowing a full measure of applause upon their commanders; but it is clear to me that those actions will be noticed in history, more for the inadequate effects which they produced than for any credit that may be due to the persons engaged in them. It really seems as if a British general, going on the command of an ex-

pedition, had no other thought in his head than how he should land his army; when that is done he must take time to look about him; and if unmolested by the enemy he sits quietly down upon the shore to consume the provisions brought for him in a fleet of victuallers. It is then fortunate if he does not think it necessary to send home for fresh instructions before he proceeds any farther. At length up comes the enemy.—You observed, no doubt, at the time, that on the 21st August our army was the *attacked* not the *attacking* party; and I have been informed, from very credible authority, that our general knew so little of his opponent's movements, that the troops were three times put under arms and as often dismissed in the night of the 20th; and that it was only at six o'clock in the morning, when Junot's main body was seen within a very short distance of ours, that we discovered what his intentions really were.—If it had not been for Junot's adopting the spirited resolution of marching out of Lisbon to give us battle, he might, according to our mode of proceeding, of which the having three different commanders-in-chief in the course of 36 hours is no immaterial trait, have puzzled them all three so as perhaps to be at this moment in possession of that capital. As it was, we were forced to fight, and our soldiers fought as they always have done. But was it enough to beat the enemy in an encounter which in the seven years' war would have been considered as no more than a sharp affair of advanced guard? Where would Buonaparte now be, if, after the battle of Austerlitz, he had sat himself quietly down before the town, concluded an armistice, and enjoyed for ten days the kicking compliments which one of the king of Prussia's generals might have paid him on the bravery of his troops, or the distinguished conduct of any part of them?—Why, it is probable that the Prussians would have recovered from their panic; collected their scattered corps; and taken up some position in which to arrest the conqueror's march: at all events they would not have been devoured piecemeal, or compelled to surrender at discretion, before they could reach any tenable position. But Buonaparte's business was to take all possible advantage of his victory, and to reach Berlin by the shortest road. Ours was to reach Lisbon. He marched his distance in a shorter time than the Prussians. We let the French escape and never stirred from our ground. He then exemplified the principle which we altogether neglect, and the neglect of which is, in my opinion, the cause of much of our distress.—With an exultation, which is only pardonable when it

is successful, he cries : " Nothing is done whilst any thing remains to be done ; " and instantly his troops march on to farther conquest and take rest only when their enemy is utterly annihilated. We, on the contrary, always take time to surfeit ourselves with joy and congratulations ; the enemy is always active, and after a due portion of expectation and conjecture the public is astonished with the information that our first success not having been followed up, it has been either counterbalanced by some success of the enemy, or tarnished by some want of proper exertion on our own part.—You, Sir, were amongst those who approved of our proceedings last year towards Denmark. It was attempted by men of high political consideration in this country, to maintain that those proceedings alienated from us the affections of the continent. Sir, it was no such thing. The politicians on the continent, many even who did not wish well to this country, were unanimous in exclaiming : " At last the English are roused from their lethargy ; at last they assume the tone and attitude that becomes them ; we shall now see, at least in the north of Europe, something like a counterpoise to Buonaparte's overbearing ambition." They admired the wisdom of our plan, and would have admired the energy of the execution, if they had not seen us in the month of September drawing in our horns, and hiding ourselves within our shells as if afraid of the cold of October and November. They then thought that we had put ourselves to a great expence, made an amazing uproar in Europe, and subjected our moral character as a nation, at least to some sort of imputation, without obtaining any object adequate to so much risk.—If the Conventions, and the inquiry that is to be instituted concerning them, should lead to a correction of this most capital defect in our system of foreign policy, I shall think that the disgrace, which they have otherwise brought upon us, is not without its counter-vailing advantage.—I am, yours, &c.—AN ENGLISHMAN.—Oct. 18, 1808.

EXPOSITION OF THE PRACTICES AND MACHINATIONS WHICH LED TO THE USURPATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EXECUTION : BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DISPATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, FERDINAND VII. (Continued from p. 640.)

While these occupied the right bank of the Ebro, and appeared to have for their object the maintaining the communication

with Portugal, I entertained the hope that he would not abandon the sentiments of esteem and friendship which he had always manifested towards me. But when I perceived that his troops advanced towards my capital, I felt the urgency there was for collecting my army round my person, to present myself before my august ally in a manner worthy of the king of Spain. I should have removed all his doubts, and have secured my best interests. I gave orders to my troops to leave Portugal and Madrid, and I united them in various parts of my monarchy, not to abandon my subjects, but honourably to support the glory of my throne. Besides, my extensive experience convinced me that the emperor of the French might very well entertain wishes conformable to his particular interest, and to the policy of the vast system of the Continent, but which might be inconsistent with the interests of my house. What was, in such circumstances, your conduct ? You introduced disorder into my palace, and infused a spirit of mutiny into my body guard, against my person. Your father was your prisoner ; my prime minister, whom I had appointed and adopted into my family, covered with blood, was driven from one danger to another. You dishonoured my grey hairs—you despoiled me of the crown, possessed with glory by my ancestors, which they had preserved without a stain. You seated yourself upon my throne, and placed yourself at the disposal of the people of Madrid, and of foreign troops, who were then entering the capital.—The conspiracy of the Escorial had already accomplished its purposes. The acts of my administration were brought into public contempt. Old, and oppressed by infirmity, I was not able to surmount this new misfortune. I resorted to the emperor of the French, not as a king at the head of my troops, surrounded by the pomp of royalty ; but as an unhappy and abandoned prince. I have found refuge and protection in the midst of his camp. I owe to him my own life, that of the queen, and that of the prime minister. I have arrived at last at Bayonne, and you have so conducted this negotiation, that every thing depends upon the mediation and protection of this great prince.—The idea of resorting to popular agitation would tend to the ruin of Spain, and expose yourself, my kingdom, my subjects, and my family, to the most horrible catastrophes. My heart has been fully unfolded to the emperor ; he knows all the injuries I have received, and the violence that has been done to me ; he has declared to me, that you shall never be acknowledged

as king, and that the enemy of his father can never acquire the confidence of foreign states. He has, in addition to this, shewn me letters written with your own hand, which clearly shew your aversion to France, — Things being thus situated, my rights are clear, and my duties are much more so. It is incumbent on me to prevent the shedding of the blood of my subjects, to do nothing at the conclusion of my career, which shall carry fire and sword into every part of Spain, and reduce it to the most horrible misery. Certainly, if faithful to your primary obligations, and to the feelings of nature, you had rejected those perfidious counsels, and placed yourself constantly at my side, for the defence of your father, you had waited the regular course of nature, which would have elevated you in a few years to the rank of royalty. I should have been able to conciliate the policy and interests of Spain, with that of all. For six months, no doubt, matters have been in a critical situation; but notwithstanding such difficulties, I should have obtained the support of my subjects; I should have availed myself of the weak means which yet remained to me, of the moral aid which I should have acquired, meeting always my ally with suitable dignity, to whom I never gave cause of complaint; and an arrangement would have been made which would have accommodated the interests of my subjects to those of my family. But in tearing from my head the crown, you have not preserved it for yourself; you have taken from it all that is august and sacred in the eyes of mankind. — Your behaviour with respect to me, your intercepted letters, have put a brazen barrier between yourself and the throne of Spain, and it is neither your own interest nor that of the country that you should reign in it. Avoid lighting a fire which will unavoidably cause your complete ruin, and the degradation of Spain. — I am king by the right given me by my forefathers: my abdication was the result of force and violence; I have nothing to receive from you; nor can I consent to the convocation of the cortes, an additional absurdity, suggested by the inexperienced persons who attend you. — I have reigned for the happiness of my subjects, and I do not wish to bequeath them civil war, mutiny, popular juntas, and revolution. Every thing should be done for the people, and nothing by the people: to forget this maxim, were to become the accomplice of all the crimes that must follow

its neglect. I have sacrificed the whole of my life to my people; and in the advanced age to which I have arrived, I shall do nothing in opposition to their religion, their tranquillity, and their happiness. I have reigned for them; I will constantly occupy myself for their sakes; I will forget all my sacrifices; and when at last I shall be convinced that the religion of Spain, the integrity of her provinces, her independence, and her privileges are preserved, I shall descend to the tomb, forgiving those who have embittered the last years of my life. — Dated from the imperial palace of Bayonne, called the Government Palace, May 2, 1808.

No IX.—*Letter written by King Ferdinand VII. to his august Father, in answer to the preceding.*

My honoured Father and Lord; — I received the letter that your majesty condescended to write to me, dated yesterday, and I will endeavour to answer all the particulars with that moderation and respect which is due to your majesty. — Your majesty speaks, in the first place, with respect to the alteration in your political conduct towards France, after the peace of Basle; and, in truth, I believe there is no individual in Spain who has complained of it; rather all were unanimous in praising your majesty for your confidence in, and fidelity to the principles you had adopted. Mine, in particular, were entirely similar to your own; and I have given irrefragable proofs of it from the moment when your majesty abdicated the throne in my favour. — Had the affair of the Escorial, which your majesty states, originated in the hatred with which my wife inspired me against France, your ministers, my beloved mother, and your royal self, been examined with all the legal forms, it would have evidently proved the contrary. Notwithstanding I had not the least influence, and no liberty beyond the shew of it, — guarded, as I was, by domestics whom you put round me, yet the eleven counsellors chosen by your majesty were unanimously of opinion, that there was no ground for the accusation, and that the supposed criminals were innocent. — Your majesty talks of the distrust created by the entrance of so many foreign troops into Spain; and that if your majesty recalled from Portugal your troops, and united those that were in Madrid, at Aranjuez, and its neighbourhood, it was not to abandon your subjects, but to support the glory of the throne.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV. No. 18.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

"That it is the RIGHT of the subject to petition the king. And they" (the people of England) "do claim, demand, and insist upon, ail and singular the premises" (the right of petitioning being only a part), "as their undoubted rights and liberties; and that no declarations, judgements, doings, or proceedings, to the prejudice of the people in any of the said premises, ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter into consequence or example."—BILL OF RIGHTS.

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TO THE FREEHOLDERS AND OTHER INHABITANTS OF HAMPSHIRE.

GENTLEMEN,

It is with great pleasure, and with some degree of pride, that I have seen, in the public papers, a notification, that, on Wednesday, the 2d of November, a meeting of the Nobility, Gentry, Clergy, Freeholders and other Inhabitants of this county, is to be held at the city of Winchester, for the purpose of taking into consideration the propriety of a petition to the king for an Inquiry into the causes of the Convention, lately entered into by our generals in Portugal. That this meeting will be well attended as to numbers, and that there will be present gentlemen able and willing to point out what ought to be done, there can be no doubt; but, as it appears to me, that a few previous remarks, with respect to the objects of the meeting, may tend towards producing unanimity, and thereby adding force to the decision, I beg leave to offer you my sentiments upon the subject.

Gentlemen, the sorrow and indignation at the Convention in Portugal have been, and are, more general than any feeling ever has been known to be in this country, within the memory of the oldest man living, with the sole exception, perhaps, of the sorrow which was felt at the death of LORD NELSON. That this sorrow and indignation were not founded in reason no one has attempted to shew us. There have been attempts made, amongst the parties concerned in the transaction, to shift the blame from one to the other; there have been attempts made to make us believe that the Convention was not altogether so bad as we thought it; but, there has been no man bold enough to stand forward and assert, that we were a nation of fools, who had all joined in condemning that which had in it nothing worthy of condemnation.

It is clear, then, that the thing itself, the deed which we so universally lament, is a proper subject of lamentation. It is clear, that our sorrow and our indignation are well founded. But, if these feelings of ours are to produce no effect upon the conduct of

those who are invested with the care and superintendence of our rights and interests; if our feelings are to be stifled; if we have not the right, or, which is the same thing, if we are deterred from exercising the right, of demanding justice to be done upon those who have been the cause of what we complain of; if this be the case, there is nothing in our situation which distinguishes it from that of slaves. For, Gentlemen, what is the great characteristic of slavery? It is this; that though the slave feel loss and vexation, *he dares not openly complain*. We are in the daily habit of speaking of Buonaparte as a despot, and of the people of France as his slaves; and, in so doing, we are not, I am convinced, guilty of injustice. But, what are the *proofs*, which we possess, or pretend to possess, of the despotism of Buonaparte and of the slavery of the French people? What are these *proofs*? For, if we assert, without proof wherewith to support our assertions, we are guilty of falsehood; and falsehood is not less falsehood, merely because it is uttered against an enemy. What are these proofs, then? Not that he has no parliament, for he has a legislative assembly as well as we; not that, in his legislative assembly, his ministers have always a decided majority, for, you know well, that our king's ministers have the same; not that he can do what he pleases with his army, appointing, promoting, and cashiering the officers at his pleasure, for, you know, that our king has precisely the same power, and that, when, upon a late occasion, an attempt was made to abridge that power, that attempt was stigmatized as an attack upon the just prerogatives of the crown; not because the people of France are not represented in their legislative assembly, for, there are elections in France as well as in England, and, perhaps, it would be very difficult to prove, that between those elections and ours there is any material difference. Well, then, Gentlemen, what is the ground, upon which we charge the people of France with being slaves, and what is the proof which we possess of the fact? The ground is simply

this, that they dare not go to their sovereign with complaints; and, the only proof that we possess of this fact, is, that they do not go to him with complaints. If, therefore, we do not complain to the king, when it is notorious to the world, that we have so bitterly complained to one another, will not that world conclude, that we dare not complain; and, upon the same ground that we call the French people slaves, will not the world justly impute slavery to us? No matter what be the cause, by which we are restrained from complaining; whether it be the bayonet in the hands of a soldier, or the means of corruption in the hands of a minister; whether it be the dread of death from the hands of the executioner or from the cravings of hunger. The cause matters not, so that the effect be the same; so that we are slaves, it matters not whether we are held in slavery by the force of steel or by that of gold.

Those who wish to prevent the people from petitioning the king upon this occasion, tell us, that we are not competent judges of the matter, upon which we have taken it upon us to decide. That we are not all soldiers is certain, and that very few of us, comparatively speaking, would be able to conduct battles and sieges is obvious; but, all of us, who are not absolute idiots, know, that when an army is sent abroad at a vast expence, the people who pay that expence, have a right to expect some services from that army; we know, that when one army is double the force of another, and when the latter has been beaten by a third part of the force of the former, that it is reasonable to expect, that the weaker army ought, very soon, to become captives to the stronger. There does not require any military science to enable us to speak with confidence as to these points. If we must be generals, or admirals, in order to be able to form correct opinions, in every case relating to military and naval affairs, it is plain, that we must, in future, hold our tongues; and that we have nothing to do with such affairs, but to pay the expences attending them. Upon the same principle, we could never, with propriety, complain of any measure of the government, however disgraceful or oppressive it might be. If a treaty were made giving up the Isle of Wight to France, we might be told to hold our peace, seeing that we are not plenipotentiaries and secretaries of state; the chancellor of the exchequer might, upon the same principle, bid us be silent upon the subject of taxation; and so on, till we were reduced to the state of mere hewers of wood

and drawers of water. In the present case; those who do pretend to understand military affairs have not attempted to defend the transaction of which we complain; while some of those persons, who are most active in opposition to our petitioning the king, have asserted, that one of the generals protested against the Convention. But, what are their opinions to us? It is sufficient, that the thing appears to us to be matter for complaint. That is all that is required to justify our complaining; unless we be content to see and hear only through the eyes and ears of those, who appear to think that they have a right to treat us as their slaves, merely because they wallow in luxury upon the fruit of our labour. When, but a very few months ago, it was thought useful to those in power to obtain addresses to the king in praise of his speech about Spain and Portugal, and of the military measures he intended to adopt with regard to those countries; then you were not thought to be quite so unfit judges of matters of this sort; then you were called upon to give your opinions of measures even before they had been put into execution. And now, by the very same persons, who then so called upon you, you are told that military operations and making Conventions are matters above your capacity. So that, though you are very good judges as long as you are disposed to praise, you are not fit to judge at all, when you are disposed to condemn; and, in short, you are to be well-broken dogs in the service of the ministers of the day, at whose command you are to dash on, come in, stand, back, give tongue, run mute, creep, cringe, or lie, dead as a stone, at their feet. This expedition to Portugal, the intention of undertaking which you were, by the agents of the ministers, called upon to praise, has cost England as much as the whole amount of one year's poor-rates; that it has done harm to England instead of good no man has the assurance to deny; and yet you are told, that you ought not to call for inquiry into the conduct of those who have caused all this injury, because you are not competent judges of the matter. This insolence may show you in what contempt you are held by the persons to whom I have so frequently alluded; and, if you now suffer yourselves to be bullied or wheedled into silence, you will convince the world that you are worthy of that contempt.

But, there is another objection to our petitioning the king, at this time, which objection is worthy of your particular notice, and, I trust you will think, of your marked reprobation. It is this: that,

since the promulgation of the king's answer to the city of London, any further petitions for inquiry are unnecessary, seeing that he therein declared his intention to institute an inquiry, after which further petitions, besides being useless, may seem to imply a doubt of his sincerity.—Gentlemen, the petition of the city of London was expressed in terms as humble as it is possible for any description of human creatures to make use of towards any earthly being; and the answer they received contained as sharp a rebuke as any king of England ever gave to his subjects. The king told them, that it was "inconsistent with the principles of British justice to pronounce judgment *without previous investigation*;" and that, "the interposition of the city of London *could not be necessary* for inducing him to direct due inquiry to be made."—

Now, Gentlemen, there was no judgment pronounced on any one by the petition of the poor cringing Londoners. They only prayed that an inquiry might be ordered; they said, what the whole nation had said, that the Convention was disgraceful and injurious to the country; they expressed their sorrow that so many English lives and so much English money should have been lost and expended in vain; and they humbly implored the king to institute an inquiry into the cause of such a calamity, and to bring the offenders to justice; but, they judged no one; they marked out no one for punishment; they pretended not to say, whether the blame lay with the ministers or the generals; they, with the rest of the nation, were convinced that blame lay somewhere, and they prayed, in a most humble style, that an inquiry might take place. Was there, in this, Gentlemen, any thing "inconsistent with the principles of British justice?" Why, is not this the mode of proceeding in all our courts? The man, who thinks himself aggrieved by another man, comes into court, in his own person or by his attorney, and demands that the alledged offender be put upon his trial. The demand cannot be refused; it often happens, that the party accused is found to be innocent; but, no one attempts to say, that the demand is inconsistent with the principles of British justice; no judge, when applied to for a warrant, a writ, an attachment, or citation, ever tells the plaintiff that he is come to "pronounce judgment." When any of us apply for a warrant or summons against a thief, or a poacher, we assert that the person has been guilty of thieving or poaching; yet, the justices never send us away with the rebuke, that we

are "*pronouncing judgment without previous investigation*." It would be an insult to your understandings to pursue the illustration; for there is not a man of you, who will not clearly perceive, that the application of the poor humble citizens of London was strictly consistent, not only with the principles of British justice, but, as nearly as the case would permit, with the forms of legal proceedings.—As to the necessity of this application, the king alluded to the trial of General Whitelocke, and told the poor citizens, that he should have hoped, that his conduct in *that* case would have convinced them, that their interposition was not necessary to induce him to institute inquiry in *this* case. But, Gentlemen, pray mark the distinction. In both cases the transaction was reprobated by the nation at large; in both cases the NATION complained of disgrace and inquiry; but, not so with the MINISTRY, who, in the former case, gave, at once, evident signs of their agreement in feeling and opinion with the nation; whereas, in the latter case, they gave signs as evident, that they disagreed in feeling and opinion with the nation, and that, though they might not openly justify the Convention, their intention was not to put upon their trial any of the persons, who had framed or ratified it. Upon the arrival of the intelligence, or, at least, when the intelligence could no longer be kept from the public, they made a short and equivocal communication of it to the Mayor of London; they caused the guns of the Park and Tower to be fired, which, as you well know, is the token of *joyful tidings*; they caused an illumination to be made at all the offices and buildings under their controul; they put us to the expence of candles, coloured lamps, and flambeaux, for the celebration of the event; and, in short, they did, upon this occasion, exhibit all those marks of joy that were by them exhibited at the intelligence of the battle of Trafalgar.—Well, then, Gentlemen, what similarity is there in the two cases? and, why were the poor citizens of London to be rebuked, because they seemed to suspect, that Wellesley and his associates would not be brought to trial, without a direct application of the people to the king? Were they, because Whitelocke was tried for an act which the ministers *openly lamented*, to conclude that Wellesley would be tried for an act at which these same ministers *openly rejoiced*? Poor creatures, how is it possible, that they could have drawn such a conclusion? There were, moreover, Gentlemen, other circumstances to justify this interposi-

tion on the part of the people. Whitelocke had the misfortune to commit his disgraceful act at a time when the ministry was composed of a new set of men, of men who were the political enemies of those who sent him out on his command; and the citizens of London, slavish as they have been for many many long and disgraceful years, had had opportunities enough of perceiving, that circumstances of this sort are not without their influence. They knew, besides, that the Convention-making generals were not only appointed by the present ministry, who, of course, were their political friends, but that one of them, he who led the way in the transaction that has filled us with indignation, was *one of the ministry*, one of his brothers another of the ministry, and that his family had, at least, twelve *fast* friends in the parliament. These were circumstances calculated to have great weight; and when the citizens of London perceived, that the ministers, in the *Gazette Extraordinary*, in which they gave us an account of the transactions in Portugal, published the *Armistice*, which was negotiated and signed by *Wellesley*, in the *French* language only; when they perceived this, must they not have been convinced, that it was the resolution of the ministers to screen this general, at any rate, and that to screen him would be impossible, if either of the others were put upon their trial? Must not this have been evident to every man of common sense? Well, then, in this state of things, what do the citizens of London do? Why, they meet, and determine to appeal to the king; they say, we see that the ministers are disposed to withhold satisfaction from us for this great injury and disgrace, and therefore, as to the prime source of justice, we will apply to the king himself. They do this in language the most humble; their prayer is termed an unnecessary *interposition*; they are accused of acting *inconsistently with the principles of British justice*; and they are charged with *pronouncing judgment* previous to investigation, at the very moment when they pray for an investigation.

Now, Gentlemen, can you discover any thing in this transaction which ought to prevent us from petitioning the king for inquiry? We have all the original inducements that the citizens of London had; but, we are told, that, at any rate, the king has *now* declared that he will institute an inquiry, and that, therefore, to petition for that purpose *now*, would, besides being useless, seem *highly* a doubt of his sincerity.—Gentlemen, this doctrine is quite new. The answer given to the citizens of London has

not been given to us. If we approve of what they did, it is our duty to do the same; or else, upon all other occasions, the whole nation is to look upon itself as being represented by the city of London; one petition and one answer will do for the whole; London will be the only part of the nation, whom any king or any minister, will have to manage; and the country at large, all the land and all its owners and all its cultivators, are, at once, sunk into complete insignificance. Not so, however, think the government agents, when they call for *praises* of the ministry. Then, as in the late instance, the more addresses the better. The city of London began last summer, and they had their answer; but, the addressing did not stop there. The counties and cities and boroughs, down to the boroughs of ten men, followed the example. Nobody told them that it was *unnecessary* to proceed; but, on the contrary, they were urged on, till there was not a single spot left, from which an address of praise had not been extracted.—Besides, Gentlemen, do you perceive, in the answer of the king to the citizens of London, any assurance that he will cause an inquiry to be instituted? The words are these: “I should have hoped, “that recent occurrences would have convinced you, that I am at *all times* ready to “institute *inquiries* on occasions in which “the character of the country or the honour “of my arms is concerned, and that the interposition of the city of London could “not be necessary for inducing me to direct *due* inquiry to be made into a transaction which has disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation.” Now, Gentlemen, this is, you perceive, by no means a positive assurance that *any* inquiry shall take place; and, supposing it to amount to that, the word *due*, carefully qualifying the word *inquiry*, leaves, I think, little room to doubt, that the inquiry, if any, is not likely to be of that vigorous kind, which it is the wish of the nation to see take place.—The answer implies, that the king has been at *all times* ready to institute inquiries of the sort in contemplation. There was a convention at the *Helder*, by which *eight thousand French sailors* were released out of our prisons to go and fight against us; and, if any inquiry did take place upon that occasion, an occasion in which the character of the country and its arms was certainly concerned, it was of so secret and quiet a kind that the people never even heard of it; and, I take it, that this is not the sort of inquiry, which we now wish for. Besides, does it greatly encourage us to rely upon the advice that

the king will now receive, that we see, at the very same levee, where the Londoners are rebuked, *Sir Arthur Wellesley the first upon the list of persons graciously received by the king*; that we see that same general who signed the armistice, immediately after his return from court, set off for Ireland to resume his place and functions as a minister of the crown, and the chief minister, too, in that part of the kingdom; that we see Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Charles Cotton, Col. Murray, and all those who must necessarily be material witnesses, "left to keep the police at Lisbon"? do we, from these well known facts, derive any great encouragement to rely, to rest satisfied, to hold our tongues and remain quiet, in the assurance, that the king will be advised to institute such an inquiry as is likely to obtain us justice? Nay, Gentlemen, is it probable, is there the smallest probability, that those ministers, who made *public rejoicings* at the intelligence of the Convention, will advise the king to proceed to the prosecution of those, who were the authors, or the cause, of that Convention? You cannot believe, that this is probable; you can hardly believe that it is possible; the answer to the citizens of London alone must convince you of the contrary; and, therefore, if you wish to see justice done upon the authors of the Convention, you are called upon to endeavour, by a resolute exercise of your right of petitioning the king, to induce him to listen to his people, and to reject the advice which is so likely to be offered to him by his ministers.

Gentlemen; it is our lot to live in times, when we are duly called upon "to spend our last shilling, and to shed our last drop of blood, for the preservation of the constitution;" and though this would be going very far, it being difficult to form an idea of any thing much worse than beggary followed by extermination, we should, I trust, if necessary, be ready to encounter the literal performance; but, then, we ought to be quite certain that we have this constitution. When the bigotted and besotted tyrant James was driven from the throne of England, which he had surrounded with speculators and slaves, the nation, when they declared that another king should take his place, first declared what were *their own rights*, and, amongst these rights, was that of petitioning the king. This declaration, which makes part of an act of parliament, contains the letter of what we call the constitution. Every man; every individual person, in whatever rank or situation of life, has, according to the constitution of England, an unquestionable right to lay before the king a repre-

sentation of what he or she deems to be a wrong, whether public or private. It is for the petitioner, or petitioners, *alone* to judge of the necessity, or propriety, of petitioning. There exists no where a right to punish them for petitioning. The right is absolute, and the people are to be the judges as to the time and the occasion of exercising it. Such, as far as relates to our present purpose, is the constitution of England, that constitution to preserve which we are called upon to spend our last shilling and to shed our last drop of blood.—

But, what do we now hear, from those, too, who are the most loud in calling upon us for such terrible sacrifices? What do they now tell us; "That the citizens of London sneaked out of the presence of their sovereign, whose dignity had re-proved their *indecent* and rebuked their *presumption*, and became a laughing-stock." Well, we really deserve this language. We have so long submitted to be the tools, the sport, the slaves, of the minister of the day, that there is no insult which we do not merit at their hands, or the hands of their underlings. Then, again, we are asked: "do the people believe that their *old king* is wanting in justice and integrity so much, as to require a lecture upon both, from every Burgh, City, and county in the kingdom?" You will observe, Gentlemen, that when the object was to obtain addresses of *praise*, these same people had no objection to a lecture from every Burgh, City, and County in the kingdom. But, what is now become of this boasted *right of petition*, if it be proper to reprove and rebuke the petitioner, and to treat his petition as a presumptuous lecture? A *petition*, from the very meaning of the word, must contain a *prayer that something may be done*; a petition to the king must necessarily contain an expression of the petitioner's desire *that the king will do something*; and, therefore, if to express such a desire be indecent and presumptuous; if to express such a desire be to insinuate that the king is wanting in justice and integrity, it is evident, that there can be no petition free from the charge of such insinuation; and, of course, that the right of petitioning the king, as laid down and secured in the bill of rights, is, in fact, a right to remind the king of his want of justice and integrity. The truth is, that a *right*, in one man, implies the power of doing, without risk to person or property or character, certain acts which *may be disagreeable* to some other man; and a bill, or declaration, of *rights* would have been downright stupid stuff; •

sheer nonsense; mere sham; unless? the framers of it had supposed cases, in which the king might *differ* in opinion and views from the people; for, it is manifest, that unless such difference arise, the *rights* can never be brought into exercise. But, the opposers of petitioning upon the present occasion, whose arguments will, indeed, apply to all other occasions, would fain have us believe, that we have the right *only* when we do not want to make use of it; and yet, to preserve the constitution, of which the right of petition is a principal feature, these same persons call upon us to spend our last shilling and to shed the last drop of blood; aye, the last drop of our blood for rights, which according to their doctrine, we are never to exercise!

Gentlemen, *before* the answer was given to the city of London, there was but one object in petitioning the king; namely, to obtain a full and impartial developement of all the causes that led to the Convention in Portugal, and to produce the punishment due to its real authors. *Now*, there is this object, and, in addition, the more important object of asserting one of our principal rights; of convincing the ministry and the world, that we have not entirely given up all pretensions to the enjoyment of those political liberties, for the recovery and preservation of which our fathers wrote and fought with such admirable ability, perseverance, and courage. We are told "not to forget the feelings of *our old and venerable king*." We do not; but, neither do we forget our own feelings, our own sacrifices, losses, and sufferings, and the hardships, which, by the deeds of which we complain, will be entailed upon our children's children. If we have had "forty-eight years of experience" of the king, the king has had forty-eight years experience of us; and never did king meet with subjects more generous, dutiful and patient. In what instance have we been refractory or niggardly? Has not our submissiveness been unbounded? Have we not poured out our all at his feet? And, shall we now be reproved and rebuked because we pray, that he will be pleased to order an inquiry into the conduct of those, who, in our opinion, have with the treasure and the blood of the country, purchased its lasting injury and disgrace? Expedition after expedition is fitted out; expence after expence is incurred; the treasury of the nation is thrown open, and her sons are shipped off in thousands; battles are won, rejoicings are heard; and, at every close, comes a dismal account of failure. All is in vain. We pay and hunger and labour and arm and

fight, but the conclusion always is, that we have gained nothing solid, while he, who has sworn our destruction, keeps on his firm and steady pace of encroachment and of conquest.

In this way have we been proceeding for fifteen long and disgraceful years. The country is not so destitute of men of discernment as for these things, together with their causes and their necessary consequences, not to be clearly perceived; but, so enormous, so overbearing, are become the powers of seduction and corruption, and so completely have even good men been divided by faction, alarmed by craft, and awed by menaces of ruin, that at last, public spirit, though not quite extinguished, exists only in latent sparks in the bosoms of individuals, and is as useless as the fire in the flint buried under ground. Many are the occasions, even within these few years, when a spirit worthy of Englishmen has made its appearance; but, the moment it began to be perceived, forth has issued the demons of faction, with all their train of insinuations, calumnies, lies, and hypocrisy, 'till, in a short time, followed confusion, strife, and, finally, that, in which alone the guilty could hope for impunity, the *division of good men*. I would fain hope, Gentlemen, though I am aware that it is too sanguine a hope to entertain, that, upon the present occasion, no attempt will be made to render your feelings of indignation at this national injury subservient to the views of *faction*; for, much as I desire you to add your voice to that of others who have called for an inquiry, I would infinitely rather see you mute, than behold you the tools of selfish and ambitious men. It is not against the ministry that we have to petition; it is not for the purpose of putting one ministry out and another in, that we are about to meet; it is for the purpose of obtaining justice for a great national wrong and of securing ourselves and our children against that ruin, which, from the prevalent incapacity, or perfidy, of persons entrusted with our affairs, now so awfully threatens us. What is it to me, or to any of my neighbours, who enjoy the honours or the emoluments of office, so that we are ably and faithfully served? What a fool, what a contemptible thing, must that man be, who, having no selfish views, makes himself the tool of a party; gives up his understanding to others; sees with their eyes and hears with their ears; voluntarily abandons truth, impartiality, and integrity, or, at best, exchanges them for the honour of being designated by an appellation proceeding from the name of some detestably

impudent knave, who is, or has been, the leader of a party! The very existence of a knave implies the co-existence of a fool; but, it is the lot of this nation to see men of sense as well as worth become the instruments of knavery. The silly ambition of being thought to *belong to a party* has corrupted the hearts of thousands, and has made millions instrumental in their country's disgrace. From this supremely contemptible passion, I hope, Gentlemen, that you will prove yourselves to be free, and in that hope I remain

Your friend,

WM. COBBETT.

Bolton, 27th Oct. 1808.

. MAJOR HOGHAN's interesting pamphlet is, I see, working its way. It must work, and must lead to good.—There are two other pamphlets, which I beg my readers to peruse: "A LETTER TO THE KING, STATING THE INCOMES AND SERVICES OF THE ROYAL DUKES, &c. &c." And "A LETTER TO THE DUKE OF YORK, RESPECTING SIR HEW DALRYMPLE." Oh! that all England could read this last-mentioned pamphlet! The author, Mr. THOMAS HAGUE, manfully puts his name to it. I did not think that so much boldness was to be found in the kingdom.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary Debates.

The Eleventh Volume of the above Work, comprising the Period from the 11th of April to the close of the Session on the 4th of July, 1808, will be ready for delivery on Saturday next.

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, ON THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.

Sir,—Praying a truce to personal compliment, let us as honest men continue our efforts in the cause of human freedom, persuaded that such efforts will in some way and at some time prove serviceable to mankind, although they should not immediately succeed. It has been well said, that he who causes two blades of grass to grow where only one grew before, is a benefactor to the public; and the same may doubtless be said of him who either produces or disseminates political truth. Although our observations shall at this time refer to the case of Spain, yet, as before observed, they may not be unserviceable to our own country, since the cause of liberty is now common to both; and the very same reforms, which are necessary to the salvation of the one, are no less necessary, although

the necessity may not to the vulgar eye be quite so obvious, to the other.

That the present contest in Spain is not, as some had imagined, a mere war of priests and court nobles, who desire only to expel the French, as their rivals in despotism, that their own power and that of the crown may be restored in their full extent, as exercised prior to the late events, without any thought of recovering the national liberties, we have now, in the oath of the deputies, on opening the supreme national junta, no slight evidence. That oath, if we may take it to mean what it says,—and I cannot have the slightest suspicion of the contrary—indeed, contains in it every thing which patriotism can wish. Knowing how passionately the people are devoted to the religion of their ancestors, as well as the opinion which, in that particular, they entertain of the French, the preservation of their religion is very properly made the first object of the oath. Conscious likewise of the strong attachment of the people to their native princes, of their universal detestation of the attempt to force on them a new dynasty, and the excess of indignation felt by all Spain at the perfidy of Buonaparte, and at his wickedness in making war upon them in a cause the most infamous, they would have been bad politicians had they not, independent of any sense of duty, concurred in the choice which the nation with one voice had made of Ferdinand VII. and in their predilection for a "succession in the reigning family;" that, whatever might befall Ferdinand and the rest who are in the power of the tyrant, there might be no want of an object around which the nation might rally.

Having very wisely laid these foundations of union and enthusiasm in defence of their country, they then shew their adherence to the family of their choice is to be no bar to whatever reformations of their government, and whatever future limitations of the regal power, experience may have shewn them to be necessary; for they bind themselves under the most solemn of all sanctions to the duties of patriotism. They swear that they "will promote the preservation of the rights and privileges, the laws and usages" of their country; "and finally, that they will promote every thing conducive to the general welfare and happiness of the kingdom, and the amelioration of its customs." After thus swearing, they farther pronounce on themselves a solemn imprecation, in case they shall not act up to what they have sworn; for, as a response to the officiating

prelate, who says: "If you do so, God be your helper; and if not, may he punish you, as one who has taken his holy name in vain," they, on their part, say "Amen."

In this most rational oath of allegiance, we are reminded of the ancient oath of the Arragonese, who in return for protection promised allegiance, "but if not, not." The present oath, however, is a happy improvement on that model; for the junta now expressly swear allegiance to the liberties of their country, as well as to their prince. While they promise to "defend their king, his rights and sovereignty," they also unequivocally swear to perform the duties of patriot reformers. Can the friends of human liberty and good government wish for more? And this oath, so different from the fabrications of statesmen under court influence, must, as I conceive, have been privately drawn up and agreed on by the members of the junta themselves; for it is not to be believed that any oath, of which they were previously ignorant, could have been proposed to them; nor was there in existence any power capable of dictating what they were not disposed to adopt. In this view of the matter, the excellence and value of this oath rise in our estimation; "it is not an ordinary official oath, taken as a thing of course; it is not the invention of A, to be sworn to by B; but is an oath first drawn up, and then voluntarily taken by the same men; who, had they not been determined to have acquitted themselves as real reformers, would have put together a very different form of words. I shall conclude these observations on the oath of the Spanish junta, with an ardent wish that the English privy council, and members of both houses of parliament, would, by a like solemnity, bind themselves to the duties of state reformation.

This Spanish oath is in its own nature an invitation to discussions and communications on the science of government, for men who swear "they will promote every thing conducive to the general welfare and happiness of the kingdom, and the amelioration of its customs," do in fact, by the publication of their oath, seek the aid of such as are like-minded. Such statesmen are the last to arrogate to themselves omniscience, and ever the most ready to receive information. They are aware that he must have little knowledge of statesmen, who does not discover that the most accomplished among them frequently needs the aid of men of very inferior capacities and attainments; as the greatest warriors derive services essential to the prosecution

of their designs from the men of detail on their staff, as well as even from commissaries, and such like.

When, indeed, we reflect on the disadvantages under which, ever since the reign of Philip the 2d, the science of government must have been studied in Spain, and the peculiar advantages which since the same era our own more fortunate country has comparatively enjoyed, it may reasonably be imagined, that the most enlightened patriots of Spain have already studied politics in the English school, and will cast a not unwilling eye on what may now issue from the English press, that shall be applicable to the work they have in hand. Should they not find themselves instructed, a sympathy of sentiment, and a desire to serve them must, at least, be causes of complacency, and cements of the alliance now subsisting between the two nations.

Having, Sir, in my late letters, touched on the fundamentals of a free and sound government, namely, the militia and a legislative representation, it is time we advert to the executive. In treating on this branch of a government, we shall have considerable prejudice to encounter. From causes too obvious to need specifying, we know that on this topic more than any other, not even excepting religion, pains have been taken to establish erroneous and even absurd creeds, and to fortify those creeds by mystery, bigotry, corruption, and terror. Hence the almost universal despotism of governments, and the infinity of human calamities of which that curse to our species is the immediate cause! But he who, in the extraordinary convulsions of our day, convulsions by which both hemispheres have been shaken, and by which Europe from one extremity to the other is at this moment violently agitated,—he, I say, who in these convulsions does not perceive political light breaking in upon the human mind, for correcting past error on the subject of executive government, must have little profited from experience or reflection.

That something radically unnatural, and in the highest degree adverse to the wholesome regimen which is necessary to the political health and happiness of nations, is to be found in their *executive governments*, is a broad fact to which all history bears testimony. But it is a fact of a more peculiar nature, that, on taking a survey of the reigning families in Europe within the last half century, it affords a sort of presumption, especially when coupled with the above-mentioned convulsions, that Providence has for some time past been preparing the human mind

for a salutary change of opinion on the subject of executive government. Nor have they been less instructed as to the necessity of such an improvement, from the actual disposal of thrones which those convulsions have already produced, and the means employed. We may therefore hope the time is drawing nigh, when, notwithstanding the efforts of even a Napoleon to keep alive an impious imposture, we shall hear no more of any thing mysterious about the office, or sacred * about the person, of any chief magistrate of whatever denomination; but that their commissions and their duties will everywhere become subjects of sober reasoning, and honest regulation, in like manner as those of all inferior officers, and thereby rendered subservient to the welfare of nations. It may contribute to this end if we establish correct ideas on the nature of *sovereignty*, the different species of which, although perpetually presenting themselves to our minds, we are not in the habit of distinguishing.

The word *sovereignty* has three separate significations; and although, for reasons sufficiently obvious, sovereignty is for the most part ascribed solely to the executive magistrate, yet, by a little attention to the nature of things, it will soon appear, that the sovereignty of the chief magistrate, is the most inferior of the three species we designate by that term. It is observed by Locke that "there can be but *one* supreme power, to which all the rest are, and must be subservient; yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power, to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them"†. Here, then, we see two of the three species of sovereignty; one active, the other, except in elections and on extraordinary occasions, quiescent; the one derivative, the other original; the one limited, the other by nature boundless; a fiduciary or vicarious sovereignty being conferred upon, and entrusted to, that legislative which the will and pleasure of the nation have created for its own service and benefit; while the only underviled, absolute, or *proper* sovereignty is that which is, and must be, inherent in the people.

* This word is objected to only when superstitiously or absurdly or servilely applied. From wrong or violence of every kind, every man's person is as sacred as that of any other. Inviolability of person, is a mere political invention, unconnected with any superstitious fancy.

† On Government, B. 2. C. 13.

I say *proper* sovereignty, because it is in fact the only one which in strict propriety is entitled to that appellation; for in the nature of things there cannot be two supremes; the cause and the effect, the parent and the offspring, the fountain and the stream, cannot be one and the same, nor can we but understand which of these respectively is *first*. It is only through the poverty of human language that in our speech the three species of sovereignty have been confounded; as in practice it has also, to the misfortune of mankind, been generally found, that even the third, last, and inferior of the three, has monopolized all power. In this, I say, there is something radically unnatural: and when the order of political nature is subverted, we must not be surprised at the despotism and calamity with which human society is but too generally deluged. Had the science of government been as open to discussion as physics, astronomy, or chemistry, and had such rewards and honours awaited those who had therein enlarged the sphere of human knowledge by their discoveries, as the suffrages of mankind have conferred on a Harvey, a Newton, and a Davy, the condition of nations would ere now have been infinitely more happy than it is; and the activity and energies of mankind would have had a better direction than in mutual slaughter, for seating on thrones the pests of the human race. In the science of government the generality of nations are in the darkest ignorance, and even the generality of statesmen in mere infancy. Indeed, considering the comparatively small progress made in this science, which, by the way, is to mankind more important than any other (for religion, as a revelation from the Deity, I do not call a science) it would be presumptuous in any man to pretend to be a complete master; but still there are probably some few in different nations who have studied it abstractedly, and who might be able, if opportunities invited, to introduce valuable improvements.

It is not my intention to undervalue, but to make a right estimate of, the political knowledge of statesmen; and when we consider the general motives of action, and how little hope a real political reformer can entertain of ever being admitted into a political party, much less of arriving at state advancement, it will not perhaps be uncharitable to remark of statesmen, as Mr. Tooke, upon his trial in 1794, observed of the lawyers. As these, according to that gentleman, studied only those parts of the law, by which they were to shine in Westminster Hall and get their wealth; so the

others may, too generally, be thought to study only those parts of government and state policy, by which they are to make a figure in courts, camps, or senates, and work their way to high offices in the state. Under a government in a state of such purity and vigour, as to make patriotism of intrinsic value to the individual, by raising him to distinction, the science of government will be properly studied, for preserving the laws and liberties of the people, and advancing the true glory of the state; but when corruption has found its way into the legislature, and faction and favoritism are the high roads to power or to honour, to seats in a cabinet or the command of armies, all knowledge of the true principles and ends of government will go to decay, and statesmen become subtle and expert only in those parts of knowledge by which they can come in for a share of the power and spoil of their country; and a resistance of all reformation will become a conspicuous part of their policy.

But let us return to the affairs of Spain. Considering the condition of her government for nearly three centuries past, it would be miraculous, indeed, were her supreme junta composed of none but men, who by their previous studies, had completely qualified themselves for state reformers: but we may hope, that, in the present exigency, men in general of talents and integrity have been chosen; and we have grounds for believing that some among them are highly enlightened and of the most patriotic sentiments. It is to the influence of these eminent individuals, Spain must chiefly look for salvation. The Junta are to Spain, what the original Congress was to America, and the first National Assembly to France. To both, they may look back with advantage, and in the present temper of the Spanish mind we may safely conclude, they will have no great predilection for improperly following French examples. Perhaps they may see a closer parallel to their own case, in the Convention Parliament of England, which had at once to supply a vacancy in the throne, occasioned by the abdication of James, and to restore the government by a substantial reformation, from despotism to constitutional freedom. But if that way they should cast their eyes, I trust they will not only review that boasted era in our annals, but likewise our subsequent history, and therein see what they have to avoid.

Although the junta has not in it the proper character, either of a legislature, or an executive power, yet, from the necessities of the case, and on the authority of the general

voice in its favour, it must, *pro tempore*, assume the functions of both; and there should, seem to be nothing in the way of its proposing to the Spanish nation a constitution of great perfection. In proportion as, in that particular, it should aim at simplicity, it would probably succeed. Perhaps it would be advisable to confine its interference to that end, to three objects, namely, the militia, the legislature, and the executive power; leaving all else to be the work of subsequent legislation. As the immediate end of a constitution is to preserve the liberties of a nation, should those three powers be clearly defined in writing, adopted, and introduced in practice according to the written model, all that would be actually necessary as the *fundamentals of a constitution* should seem to be provided. It might still be highly expedient, as soon as the legislature should commence its functions, that a *declaration of rights*, after the manner of our Magna Charta and Bill of Rights, should, as the very first of its acts, and with peculiar solemnity, be passed as a *fundamental law*. Every means ought then to be adopted, by periodical readings in all courts of justice, places of worship, and seminaries of education; by the annual oaths of all legislators and magistrates; and other solemnities; that such *fundamental law* should be impressed upon the mind of the whole nation, that they might understand their political rights: nor ought such a *fundamental law* to be capable of the smallest alteration, by a decision of any less number than three-fourths of the legislature.

Possibly, Sir, many of your English readers may not at once perceive the sufficiency of such a constitution, as above-mentioned, for the security of a nation's liberties. Before they can accede to such an opinion, it will perhaps be necessary they should acquire correct ideas of what the militia, and the legislature of their own country, according to its genuine constitution, ought to be; as well as more constitutional notions of the proper office and powers of an English king, than are to be derived from the slavish doctrines introduced with the Bastard of Normandy, who, with no better title to the throne of England than Joseph Napoleon has to that of Spain, unhappily succeeded in establishing his dynasty, as well as in administering poisons to both our constitution and our law, from the effects of which they have not to this day wholly recovered. In addition to what I have already said in my letters which appeared in your Register of the 17th of Sept. and 1st of this month, on the subject of a militia, and have laid down

in the *Aegis*, let it be observed that were it possible in Spain to arm even a greater proportion of men than would be armed in England on restoring the proper English militia, or *posse comitatus*, it ought to be done. Some, and especially those who desire to see the arms of a state monopolized by a government, affect to see danger to the public peace in a nation's being armed in tranquil times. Now these sagacious persons should be called upon to say, what ought to be done for securing the public peace, provided no weapons of any kind had ever been invented. If, in consequence of weapons being known to mankind, a monopoly of them in the hands of a government ought to be established, and it were fit that 49 men of every 50, or 99 of every 100 should be disarmed; then it must follow, that if no kind of weapon had ever been invented, a like proportion, that is, 49 in every 50, or 99 in every 100, ought, in some way or other, to be crippled, or, at least, denied the use of a limb, by amputating a leg or an arm, to render them harmless. If Spain is to be with a high hand defended, and Europe delivered, such absurdities ought to be treated with scorn, and liberty and arms every where preached. Rightly understood, they are the political christianity by which alone nations can be politically saved.

We have only to go back to the times when the Saxons, Goths, and Vandals, established themselves in England and in Spain, to understand the simplicity of their system, and the perfect freedom of their government. "They followed the chieftain who led them forth in quest of new settlements, not by constraint, but from choice; not as soldiers whom he could order to march, but as volunteers who offered to accompany him. They considered their conquests as a common property, in which all had a title to share, as all had contributed to acquire them." * A whole nation, in its emigration, was an *army*; in its settlement, a *militia*. It originally elected all its magistrates, not excepting the king. I cite not these things to prove a right to liberty, for that right is inherent in man; but to shew the simple means of its preservation. In a nation which is at the same time a rightly organized *militia*, there can be no tyranny. It is only as a people depart from the simplicity of nature, as they relax in attention to essentials, as they allow the eloquence of the ambitious to lay asleep their own common sense, and as false brethren, availing themselves of circumstances, first steal into

permanent, then hereditary power, that tyranny by degrees gets established.

The warlike ancestors of the modern Europeans, not scientifically understanding the value of their own customs and institutions, were gradually robbed of them, one by one, by men who, instead of the thrones they ascended, ought, for the most part, to have been elevated on gibbets. The martial genius of the governments spoken of, very early degenerated in all parts of the continent into a feudal system; while for a few ages this curse was warded off from England by the unrivalled institutions of Alfred. His intuitive genius fully comprehending the excellence of the simple constitution of the Saxons, and his exalted virtue disposing him to perpetuate it, he was to the end of his life indefatigable in his endeavours thereto. His organization, for police and defence, of all men from 15 to 60 years of age, as a militia (afterwards called *posse comitatus*), as well as his exertions for perfecting the administration of justice, and preserving in full purity the trial by jury, would alone have immortalized his memory; which, however, is endeared to us by every other excellence that could enter into the composition of a man or a king. As the almost miraculous change, from ruin, anarchy and horrors, of every kind, to prosperity, order and happiness, which he effected, has placed him above all other legislators; and as the liberties he aimed to preserve were common to the Goths and Vandals who settled in Spain, as well as to our Saxon ancestors, the Spanish junta cannot do better than to follow such an example, while endeavouring to restore the prosperity of their country.

With respect to her future legislature, in which Spain, independent of the inherent right to freedom which is common to all men, inherits constitutional principles similar to our own, the same simplicity, if she would preserve her future government from corruption, and perpetuate as well her liberties as her martial renown, as respects a proper militia, ought to be strictly observed, in the constitution of her legislature. Justice requires that representation shall have all practical equality. The independence of representatives depends upon the freedom and purity of elections. To these ends, each elective body ought to be numerous, and the delegated power of short duration. To these securities, in my own judgment, it would be advantageous to add the ballot. I am aware of the common objections, which I allow to be weighty; but I think they are outweighed by the arguments on the other side.

Having proved that, in strictness of speech,

the only proper sovereignty of a state is in the people, although, except in elections and on extraordinary occasions, it is quiescent, we are here more particularly called upon to support this doctrine, as well as to shew a most important principle thence resulting. Feeling, as I have elsewhere remarked, that a people *free* and not *sovereign* is a contradiction in terms, let it be asked, how it has happened that any free nation could ever lose sight of a principle so clear, as that of its own sovereignty?—In the pure democracies, as Athens for instance, where the people in their own persons made the laws, the principle never could for a moment be doubted. Are the English, then, (supposing them in the full enjoyment of their constitution) less free than the Athenians, merely because, by reason of the extent of their country, they make laws, not in person, but by deputation? This, however, has been the principal circumstance which has brought the people's sovereignty into doubt. That doubt was of course strengthened by the powers of the first magistrate for carrying all law into execution being visible to the vulgar eye, and, in our own country, the false notion of a proper sovereignty residing in the person of the chief magistrate, was but too prevalent, in consequence of the successful usurpations and the tyrannical pretensions of our Norman kings, and the servile gabble of lawyers who affected to derive not only all property, but human rights of every kind from the throne as the sole fountain; a conceit as absurd as it is detestable. I am aware, Sir, of the cavils which special pleading adversaries of our liberties may start against the doctrine of a proper sovereignty being inherent in the people, because of the share in making of our laws, which is enjoyed by the peers and the king; and shall not stop to say more than a few words in answer to this supposed objection. The peers, I presume, are a part of the nation, subject to the same general laws, and partaking of the same common liberties; the king himself is likewise subject to the law; and the share he holds in the government is the creature of the law. The exception, therefore, if there be one, is too insignificant to affect the great principle laid down. As to precedents; all precedents against the principles of justice and reason, or the rights of nature, are to be held in abhorrence or contempt, as their wickedness or their folly shall most predominate.

If, then, the proper sovereignty of every free state be necessarily inherent in the people, it will follow that the Spanish junta have been perfectly correct, and have ma-

nifested their wisdom as well as their virtue, in having in effect sworn, as I remarked, allegiance to the liberties of their country. It will also follow that here also ought pre-eminently to attach the pains and penalties against HIGH TREASON. "Treason," says Selden, "at first concerned matters *acted* against the NATION; afterwards "it reached to matters *acted* against the *king*; now it reacheth even to the very "thoughts and imaginations of the heart." Now, the people's sovereignty has two kinds of ordinary exercise, representative and personal; that is to say, in legislation and all other parliamentary proceedings the people *act* by their representatives, as an individual acts through his attorney or his steward; but in the election of those representatives their sovereignty is personally exercised. And as a nation's sovereignty and liberty are inseparable, even in idea, it is evident that, whether we contemplate an attempt to destroy one or the other, we must pronounce it, in the words of Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in 1794, "the greatest of all treasons." This sentiment was strongly felt by the holy junta of Spain, in their struggle against Charles V, near three centuries ago, when they made it an article in their celebrated Remonstrance, quoted in my last letter (Register Oct. 1) "that no member of the Cortes shall receive an office or pension from the king, either for himself or for any of his family, under pain of death, and confiscation of his goods;" for such conduct in a representative of the people they plainly considered as rank treason. And this in principle is closely allied to the law of Athens mentioned by Blackstone (l. 1. § 71) who says: "In a democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by suffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will. In all democracies therefore it is of the utmost importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner, the suffrages are to be given. And the Athenians were so justly jealous of this prerogative, that a stranger, who interfered in the assemblies of the people, was punished by their laws with death; because such a man was esteemed guilty of HIGH TREASON, by usurping those rights of sovereignty, to which he had no title. In England, where the people do not debate in a collective body but by representation, the exercise of this sovereignty consists in the choice of representatives." The learned commentator is not here so correct as usual; for the people, who, he grants, *debate by representation*, and who of course *make laws by representation*, which is indisputably an act of sovereignty, are not in this passage

therein considered as exercising their sovereignty: which he seems to confine to mere election; whereas the exercise of that sovereignty is of two kinds, as already noticed.

One of the main causes of confusion in our ideas of sovereignty has arisen from an English chief magistrate having a share in legislation, whereas it by no means follows, that he who is appointed to execute the laws shall have any share in the making of them. According to my recollection, these functions are kept perfectly separate in the American States, whether viewed separately or in union.

This will probably be a serious question with the Spanish junta. Although they have not, indeed, in their oath used the word *liberty*, yet the least enlightened of that assembly must know, that without liberty the nation cannot enjoy its "rights," the preservation of which they have sworn to promote, neither without liberty, as equally evident, can "the general welfare and happiness of the kingdom" be promoted, and it makes part also of their oath to "promote every thing conducive" to those ends. Whatever modifications or limitations, therefore, of the executive authority they shall have to be for the public good, they are indeed bound by their oath to adopt; and when we consider the person and the family to whom they have pledged themselves to adhere, and that, to say nothing of the despised Charles, Ferdinand and the two next in succession are in a captivity, from which they can never hope to see them released, we must suppose their choice to have been influenced, not by any want they had of their abilities, or their virtues, not by any necessity for hastily filling a vacant throne, but as in fact a matter of no other importance than its merely filling in with the ignorant prejudices of the multitude, who are not enlightened on the subject of civil liberty or in the science of government.

They know that, for the preservation of liberty, it is necessary that even the most limited king shall be incapable of acting by his own will, or otherwise than through ministers who are to be responsible for each of his political acts, except merely the choice of those agents; for, as it has been said before, it is not at all necessary that he should have any share in legislation, and perhaps the better opinion is, that in his person the two powers of making the law and executing the law should never meet. Montesquieu declares that "when the legislative and executive powers are united in

the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty." But he afterwards maintains, not altogether consistently with this aphorism, "that the executive power ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting." But as he wrote under an absolute monarchy which he wished to ameliorate, and probably thought a panegyric on the government of England was going as far as was prudent; and as in this exception to his own general rule the people of English America, when they separated from the parent state did not think proper to follow him, it remains for the Spanish patriots to decide for themselves.

It is also become a maxim, that the person of the executive magistrate shall be inviolable but, unless it be accompanied with all the advantages of a true responsibility in the minister of such magistrate, the people do not receive their equivalent for granting this extraordinary privilege, the contract is broken, and it is then a maxim of absurdity, and full of mischief. When ministerial responsibility is not practically experienced and certain, the inviolability of the magistrate becomes a snare to his innocence, tempting him to all sorts of chicanes and corruption for unduly influencing the legislature, and for making the pretended responsibility of his minister a subject of his and their decision. This once accomplished, then, under forms the most sacred to freedom, a despotism the most absolute may be riveted on the necks of a people. It is to be hoped, therefore, the Spanish reformers will exert their utmost vigilance to prevent so dreadful an evil, and prove to the world that they know how to encounter corrupt influence as well as arbitrary prerogative. An inviolable personage and one who is incapable of a public act beyond the appointment of his ministers who are to be the real responsible parties, is in a mysterious condition which puts one in mind of the Grand Llama of Tibet, and seems indeed bordering upon the state of an imaginary being. If the Spaniards shall act upon these ideas, and if their securities for a prior correspondence to such a theory can be rendered effectual, then indeed, whether a king of Spain shall be on a throne at Madrid or captive in a French castle, will, as to affairs in Spain, make no essential difference. A council or junta of men who are to be responsible for their own advice and their own acts as executive ministers, may serve the turn, especially if a regent be placed at

their head, for having a leading direction in affairs of state, and with authority of appointment and dismissal, for keeping such council to their duty.

If, in the present state of things, the supreme junta should, in the first instance, appoint such a council, to consist of as many members as there are departments of state, and elect a regent, to hold his office until he might be confirmed, or superseded by a national legislature; and should themselves exercise in the interim all the functions of such legislature, the happiest results might be expected. But ought a regent himself, who is to represent an absent king, to be in his person, like the king he represents, inviolable and irresponsible? Here is another delicate and perhaps difficult question. For overcoming this and all such difficulties, it is to be hoped the junta will begin their great work at the right end, and proceed according to the order of nature, doing completely what they do at all. Let them in the first instance organize a perfect militia. Then let them constitute a legislature on a model dictated by the principles of liberty. In ordering the elections of the people, they will then find the previous organization of the militia and the enrolments of the people to that end, if well contrived, of incalculable use towards a free choice of representatives, and attended with such dispatch and perfection, that the elections throughout all Spain may be completed at any time in six hours or less. Let them but carry into execution these fundamentals, and with the necessary foresight for the permanence of their work; then all difficulties touching an executive power will vanish, and they may easily make their kings inoffensive while they make inviolable, conditions which doubtless ought to go hand in hand.

But it may be worth their while to consider, whether a regency may not be now so modelled, as to make with advantage a permanent part of executive government, even when they may see a king of "the reigning family" again seated on the throne; an event apparently at a considerable distance. The great, when placed in dignified and lucrative offices of any kind, are generally content with the trappings and the emoluments, while the real duties are done by their deputies. Even kings are very subject thus to administer a government in the person of a favourite; and with this disadvantage, that the deputy is not always selected for his honesty or fitness to govern. Possibly, therefore, when the *fundamentals* of the state should have been taken care of as suggested, it might prove no inconvenient practice, to

have at all times an able deputy to an hereditary chief magistrate, chosen for a convenient term of years by the legislature, somewhat in the same manner as a president is elected by the federal legislature of America. While there should be no king, or during a king's illness, or minority, or infirmity of any kind, the regent could entirely supply his place; or if a king were present and capable of appearing, to him might be resigned the throne, the canopy, the regalia of every kind, with all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of royalty, while in the performance of all acts of state, he should be attended by his deputy, who should not only be the mouth-piece of his royal principal, but with *responsibility*. What the inconveniences of such a practice might be, I do not foresee; but various advantages are obvious. The defective education of hereditary princes, their vices or imbecilities would no longer, as it should seem, affect the destiny of nations, or entail on them the greatest calamities. In respect of talents and virtues, for beneficial government, the probability would be infinitely greater, that they should be found in a regent so to be elected, than in one born to a throne. The arguments against elective kings I know would be applied against such an elective regent; but until the objectors should shew me in the former constitution of Poland, or any other elective monarchy, *the same securities for a peaceful election, where real freedom was enjoyed, and where real merit was sure of a preference, as I shall be able to shew would be the case in the election now proposed*, I shall continue to think the suggestion deserves the serious consideration of the Spanish junta; who now have to act for a nation that has groaned under three centuries of hereditary despotism. And notwithstanding, Sir, your objections to Mr. Jefferson, I must needs think that the usual declamation against elective kingdoms has lost much of its force, since the sovereign of so great a country as North America has now so peaceably, and, upon the whole, so very beneficially, for above thirty years, been raised to supreme power by the suffrages of the people he was to govern; under a system which seems to exclude the possibility of placing the reins of government in the hands of a man without experience, an honourable character, and the reputation of ability.

I am Sir, your obedient servant,

J. CARTWRIGHT.

Enfield, Oct. 18, 1808.

EXPOSITION OF THE PRACTICES AND MANIPULATIONS WHICH LED TO THE USUR-

ATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED, BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EXECUTION: BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DISPATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, FERDINAND VII (Continued from p. 672.)

Will your majesty permit me to remind you, that no alarm need have been given by troops entering as friends and allies, but on the contrary, that it ought to inspire additional confidence? Your majesty will likewise permit me to observe, that the orders given by your majesty, were for a journey with the royal family to Seville, and the troops were to keep open that road. There was no person who was not persuaded that this was for the transport of your majesty and the royal family to America. Your majesty also published a decree to quiet the minds of your subjects in this particular; but as all preparations were made, and it was manifestly seen, that the coast of Andalusia was to see the royal family assembled, despair took possession of the public mind, and the movement of Aranjuez was the consequence. The part I took in it your majesty knows, which was no other than by your command, to go to protect from the fury of the people the object of their hatred, because he was believed to be the proposer of the journey.—Let your majesty ask the emperor of the French, and his imperial majesty will no doubt tell you what he said to me in a letter that he wrote to me at Vittoria, viz. that the motive of his imperial and royal majesty was, to induce your majesty to make some reforms, and to separate from your person the prince of Peace, whose influence was the cause of every calamity.—The universal satisfaction that his arrest produced throughout the whole nation, is an evident proof of the truth of what the emperor declared. As to the rest, your majesty is the best witness that in the midst of the commotion at Aranjuez, not a word was whispered against your majesty, nor against the person of any one of the royal family; on the contrary, they applauded your majesty with the greatest demonstrations of joy, and professions of fidelity to your august person. On this account, the abdication of the throne which you made in my favour, surprized every body, and myself among the rest; for nobody expected it, or would have solicited it. Your majesty yourself communicated your abdication to all your ministers, enjoining them to acknowledge me as their natural lord and sovereign. You communicated it verbally to the diplomatic body, professing that your determination preceded from your

spontaneous will, and that you had before determined upon it. You yourself told it to your beloved brother, adding, at the same time, that the signature which your majesty had put to the decree of abdication, was the happiest transaction of your life; and finally, your majesty told me personally three days afterwards, that I should pay no attention to any assertion of the abdication being involuntary, inasmuch as it was, in every respect, free and spontaneous.—My supposed hatred to France in no respect appeared by my conduct: the contrary will appear by my actions, of which I will give a rapid narrative.—Your majesty had scarcely abdicated the crown in my favour, before I addressed various letters from Aranjuez to the emperor of the French, which are so many proofs that my principles, with respect to the relations of friendship and strict alliance happily subsisting between the two states, were the same that your majesty had inspired me with, and had yourself inviolably observed. My journey to Madrid was one of the strongest proofs that I could give to his imperial and royal majesty of the unlimited confidence I placed in him, since Prince Murat had entered Madrid the day before with a great part of his army, and the city being garrisoned, it was the same as if I had delivered myself into his hands. During two days of my residence in the capital, I was informed of the particular correspondence of your majesty with the emperor of the French, and I found that your majesty had recently solicited a princess of his family to connect me with it, and to insure more effectually in this way the near union and alliance which was to subsist between the two states. Accommodating myself entirely to these principles, and to the wish of your majesty, I wrote a letter to your majesty, requesting the princess in marriage.—I sent a deputation to Bayonne to compliment, in my name, his imperial and royal majesty. A short time afterwards, I induced my beloved brother, the Infant Don Carlos, to set off, that he might pay his respects to the emperor on the frontiers. Not content with this, I myself left Madrid, on the faith of the assurances given me by the ambassador of his imperial majesty, the grand duke of Berg, and general Savary, who had just arrived from Paris, and who intreated an audience to tell me on the part of the emperor, that his imperial majesty only expected of me to follow the system with regard to France which your majesty adopted; in which case, the emperor would acknowledge me as king of Spain and all the rest would be forgotten.—Full of re-

hang on these promises, and persuaded that I should be met by his imperial majesty, I arrived at this city; and on the same day that I arrived, verbal propositions were made to some of my attendants, quite different from those which had been before suggested, which neither my honour, my conscience, nor my duty would permit me to concur in, since the Cortes had sworn me to be their prince and lord; nor were they consistent with what I had lately sworn, when I accepted the crown that your majesty abdicated in my favour.—I cannot comprehend how any letters of mine could have come into the possession of the emperor, which prove my hatred against France, since I have given so many proofs of my friendship towards him, and have written nothing to indicate such a disposition. A copy of the protest had been lately shewn me, which your majesty made to the emperor, in the nullity of the abdication; and yet, when I arrived in this city, and asked you respecting it, you told me distinctly, that the abdication was voluntary, although not intended to be permanent. I asked you at the same time, why you did not apprise me of this before it was executed, and your majesty answered, that you did not choose it; from which may be inferred, that there was no violence used, at least not by me: it could not be known that your majesty intended to resume the reins of government: on the contrary, you told me, that you neither would reign, nor return into Spain.—In the letter that I had the honour to put into the hands of your majesty on this account, I signified my disposition to renounce the crown in your favour, when the Cortes should be convened; and if not convened, when the council and deputies of the kingdom should be assembled; not because I thought this was necessary to give effect to the renunciation, but because I thought it convenient to avoid injurious novelties, which frequently occasion divisions and contentions, and to have every thing attended to which respected your majesty's dignity, my own honour, and the tranquillity of the realm.—If your majesty should not choose to reign in person, I will govern in your royal name, or in my own; for nobody but myself can represent your person, possessing as I do, in my own favour, the decision of the laws, and the will of the people; nor can any other person have so much interest in their prosperity.—To your majesty, I repeat again, that in such

circumstances, and under such conditions, I am ready to accompany your majesty to Spain, there to make my abdication in the form expressed. In respect to what your majesty has said of not wishing to return to Spain, with tears in my eyes I implore you, by all that is most sacred in heaven and earth, that in case you do not choose to re-ascend the throne, you will not leave a country so long known to you, in which you may choose a situation best suited to your injured health, and where you may enjoy greater comforts and tranquillity of mind than in any other.—Finally, I beg your majesty most affectionately, that you will seriously consider your situation, and that you will reflect on the evil of excluding our dynasty forever from the throne of Spain, and substituting in its room the imperial family of France. This step we cannot take without the express consent of all the individuals who have, or may have, a right to the crown; much less without an equally expressed consent of the Spanish people assembled in Cortes in a place of security; and besides, being now in a foreign country, it would be impossible that we could persuade any one that we acted freely; and this consideration alone would annul whatever we might do, and might produce the most fatal consequences.—Before I conclude this letter, your majesty will permit me to say, that the counsellors, whom your majesty calls perfidious, have never advised me to derogate from the love, respect, and honour that I have always professed to your majesty, whose valuable life I pray God to preserve to a happy and good old age.—I cast myself at your majesty's royal feet, your most dutiful son,—FERDINAND.—Bayonne, May 4, 1809.

No. X.—*Letter from the King to his Father Charles IV.*

Venerable Father and Lord—I deposited in the royal hands of your majesty on the 1st current, the renunciation of the crown in your favour. I have believed it to be obligatory upon me to modify the renunciation by such conditions as were agreeable to the respect due to your majesty, to the tranquillity of my dominions, and to the preservation of my honour and character. It is not without great astonishment, that I have seen indignation produced in the royal mind of your majesty, by modifications dictated by prudence, and called for by the love that I bear to my subjects.

(To be continued.)

It is the duty of every body of men, who heretofore shall address or petition the king for inquiry into the causes of the Convention, to support the City of London.

705.]

TO THE FREEHOLDERS AND INHABITANTS OF HAMPSHIRE.

GENTLEMEN,

Well! we have had our meeting, and I am confident, that, though my wishes did not entirely prevail, our example will have a good effect from one end of the kingdom to the other.

From the circumstance of there being three gentlemen from London, present at the meeting, for the express purpose of taking down and publishing an account of the proceedings, a circumstance of which no one was more surprised than myself, for, I really thought that we were held in too much contempt to be thought worthy of any thing like general attention; from this circumstance, (very pleasing to me, I must confess) I conclude, that nearly the whole of what was said and done at the meeting of yesterday will have been published in the daily newspapers, before that which I am now writing can possibly issue from the press. If this be the case, the report, as so published, will be inserted in this sheet, and, therefore, proceeding upon the opinion that the intended publication will take place, I shall here confine myself to such observations as naturally grow out of the proceedings at the Shire-Hall, and as appear to me likely to be useful.

First, Gentlemen, I hope you will, with me, be delighted at the now established fact, that, at a numerous and respectable meeting of our county, called and marshalled by *Noblemen* and *Baronets*, the leaders of a party lately powerful enough to carry the two members for the county; that, at such a meeting, there have appeared one half, at least, of the persons present, ready to support a proposition, coming from one, who neither has nor wishes to have, pretensions to any rank other than that of *Yeoman*; and who came before that meeting unsupported by any interest other than that which grew out of the principles he had proclaimed: at this fact, Gentlemen, I am convinced you will, with me, feel pleasure and pride. As to the effect with regard to myself, I am completely indifferent. It was of no consequence who was the person. Whether the proposition came from a tall or

a short lump of clay; a lump of flesh or bone, of fair or dark colour; or whether it was called Cobbett or by any other name; this was of no consequence. It was the principle, the vital principle that was of importance. That principle did completely triumph, and in that triumph I see, and I hope you see, a prospect of better days; a prospect of days when this county will not be trampled under foot by men; and particularly one man, who have nothing but what they have derived from the public purse; nothing but what has been squeezed out of the fruits of our labour.

Having spoken of *party*, I think it necessary to say, that I saw no reason whatever to impute party motives, upon this occasion, either to the Earl of Northesk, or to any of the gentlemen who appeared with his lordship; but, on the contrary, it appeared to me, that they were over-anxious to avoid every thing that might have the appearance of proceeding from party motives. The truth is, that, as things stand at present, there would, in a case like this, be nothing done, were not those to move, who belong to a party. If, as is the case, the whole, or nearly the whole, of the opulent men in a county be notoriously of one party or the other, those of the opposition party must call for a meeting, in a case like the present, or, it is evident, that there can be no meeting at all. And, therefore, though I did not approve of the Address moved, and finally carried, by Lord Northesk and his friends; they are fairly entitled to my gratitude; and, I think, to the gratitude of the county at large.

The two Addresses will appear in their proper place in the Report, which will be heretofore subjoined; and, Gentlemen, I beg you carefully to compare them with each other, and; when you have so done, let each man, put it to his own heart, whether the one, which I had the honour to propose to the meeting, is not that of which he most approves; whether the principles there asserted and the sentiments there expressed, are not the principles and the sentiments that he would (all selfish views aside) wish to see universally prevail. There was one object, upon which I was

in a perfectly honest manner, which upon reflection, the whole nation of the day. This I know, when Lord Grenville and his colleagues were in power, the Garnier family supported and that too with great zeal; Messrs. Robert and Thistlethwaite, and that when the dissolution took place upon the falling out of that ministry, the Garnier family so zealously supported Sir Henry Mildmay and Mr. Chute, against whom they had used such strenuous exertions only about eight or nine months before. The fact is, Gentlemen, and you must see it clearly, that persons so situated must obey whomsoever is minister; for, though, as in this case, the place may not be liable to be actually taken away; yet, where the amount is not precisely fixed, the minister has it in his power to render it, by one means or another, worth little or nothing; and, in all cases where a man has to account, he is wholly in the power of the minister, though his accounts should be fair and correct, the latter having so many means of embarrassing and worrying and persecuting him. So that, you see, the loss of the money is not the only, nor is it the least evil. The money is lost to us in the first place, and, next, it makes part of our countrymen join the minister in support of his imposing heavier burdens on us, or, as at the present time, in an endeavour to stifle the voice of the people. Let us trace this a little more minutely. Mr. Garnier receives, as you have seen, twelve thousand pounds a year out of the taxes, raised upon the nation. These twelve thousand pounds a year must, unless they be buried under ground, or locked up in a chest, produce a proportionate influence. The depositing and employing and expending there creates an influence amongst all descriptions of persons; bankers, stewards, farmers, and other merchants, tradesmen of all sorts. This influence is at all times exercised in behalf of the minister of the day; and, therefore, it inevitably follows, that the greatness of the power of the ministry of the day, is in exact proportion to the amount of what we pay in taxes; or, in other words, that, from the moment that the public treasure becomes a source of influence at elections and other public meetings, taxation and absolute power grow up together like the bark and wood.

Gentlemen, I know that this is termed democratic and jacobinical talk. Alas! Gentlemen, these words have done wonders. The late minister, Pitt, of wretched memory, drew millions upon millions out of our pockets by the help of a few words of this sort. I dare say, that there will not be

any more of this kind of talk. I wish the British people to mind, and because I object to Mr. Garnier receiving twelve thousand a year out of the tax for doing nothing. It has, Gentlemen, been the constant practice of these men to live upon the public money, to answer their accounts, not by showing, or attempting to show, that they merited the money they received out of the taxes, but by charges of disloyalty. Tell one of them that he wallows in luxury at the expense of a hard-working and half-starved people; his answer is, that you wish to overturn the government; for, you will always perceive, that, with this tribe, government and impunity for public plundering means the same thing. Just as if you must necessarily be a traitor, because your temper will not permit you to see your money taken away, without inquiring a little what is done with it! But, Gentlemen, when an opportunity serves, let us take care that no answer of this sort shall have its intended effect; let us not waste our breath in refuting the charge of high treason, but continue to urge our accusation, reserving our own defence till a defence has been made by those whom we shall accuse. Talk as long as we will, here is the root of the evil. The public money, the money paid by the people in taxes, do, and will, 'till a constitutional reform' take place, operate in a way to deprive the people of their spirit, and, of course, of their rights. But, Gentlemen, because to effect this reform is difficult; because we do not, at once, clearly perceive the grounds of a hope of accomplishing it, let us not, therefore, say, that the thing is out of our power. Every thing almost, from which any advantage, public or private, is to arise, appears difficult at first; but, when once we heartily set about it, the difficulties, however great and numerous, soon appear less both in number and in magnitude. What we want is public virtue. Possessed of that, every thing, which reason bids us wish to attain, would be soon in our power. But, that is indispensable. Men must come with their hands clean and their minds perfectly independent; that is to say, perfectly free from selfish views, or they will do nothing good. We are seduced into degradation; and a great additional mortification, is, that we are seduced with our own money. We are the slaves of that gold, which we ourselves have earned with the sweat of our brow. Gentlemen, my sincere opinion is, that nothing can preserve this country from becoming a conquest of France, but a con-

political rulers of the nation, which now notoriously exist, and some of which I had the honour to point out to the meeting yesterday. The manner, in which the meeting received my statement; the hearty welcome which was given to sound principles and home truths, expressed in direct and plain terms, encourages me to hope, that the breasts and minds of my countrymen will, as those of their fathers were, yet be found to be the seat of courage and of sense; and, that the day is much less distant than the corruptors and the corrupted imagine, when a proper exertion of these will produce its natural effects.

I remain,

Gentlemen,

Your friend

WM. CORBETT.

Winchester, 3d Nov. 1808.

HAMPSHIRE MEETING.

THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

On Wednesday, the 2d instant, pursuant to a public requisition, the High Sheriff, George Hanbury Mitchell, Esq. convened a Meeting of the nobility, gentry, freeholders, and inhabitants of the county of Southampton, at the Castle of Winchester, for the purpose of taking into their consideration the propriety of addressing his majesty upon the subject of the Convention of Cintra. The meeting was numerous and highly respectable. The High Sheriff having taken the chair,

Lord Northesk presented himself to the attention of the meeting, for the purpose of proposing a Resolution. He hoped that on a subject involving deeply the character and interests of the country, it would not be deemed a presumption in him to offer to their consideration a motion, expressive of the wishes of the county of Hants, to request a full Inquiry into the causes which led to that disgraceful event, the Convention of Cintra. After these prefatory remarks, his lordship proposed the following Resolution:

Resolved, That an humble and dutiful Address and Petition be presented to his majesty, expressing our grief and regret at the Convention lately entered into by the commanders of his majesty's forces in Portugal, and the commander of the French army in Lisbon, praying his majesty to institute such full, public, and effectual Inquiry into this transaction, as will tend to the discovery of all those causes which produced an event so injurious to the honour of this country, and the interests of its allies."

Mr. Corbett then rose and spoke to the

following effect:—*"Mr. High Sheriff, I am far from disapproving of any motion, the Resolution which has just now been read, I have to state, that I heartily approve of every word of it. I have, however, a proposition to submit to the meeting, which I hope, although coming from a person of so little consequence as myself, will meet with the approbation of this meeting. It will embrace the object of this Resolution, while it will go farther, but yet, I hope, not too far. As to the merits or demerits of the Convention, I think that is a question pretty nearly set at rest; for I have never heard from the lips of any of those who are hostile to a Petition or Address to his Majesty for an Inquiry, any argument in justification of that Convention. It has been urged, that any petition for inquiry is unnecessary. Who told us so? From whence is his majesty to receive such a request but from his people? We are told that he has already given an answer to the Petition of the citizens of London, informing them that a due inquiry will be instituted. He has not given any such answer to us, the inhabitants of Hampshire—(Hear! hear! hear!) When they tell us that we ought not to present a Petition, because the city of London has received an Answer (of which I shall hereafter speak more in detail), they do not tell us that that Answer was satisfactory. So far from it, we know that the Common Council have expressly declared that it is not satisfactory, but that it was an ungracious Answer, and, as such, it is entered upon their Journals. Therefore, if we have received an Answer through the city of London, it is an unsatisfactory answer—(Applauses). So that if the Answer to the city of London be adduced as a reason against our proceeding, we have the authority of that city itself, for considering that Answer unsatisfactory—(Applauses). This, Gentlemen, is almost the first time of my addressing a public assembly; and I only intend to present to you a few plain facts, such as my neighbours ought to know—neighbours, whom I am proud to acknowledge, and from whose public spirit I entertain considerable hopes, notwithstanding the treatment they have heretofore experienced—notwithstanding the time and manner in which they have been trodden down—(Applauses).—We know, Gentlemen, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, one of the commanders upon the occasion which has just now been read, is also one of his Majesty's ministers, and we are told, that which it is very natural to suspect, that those ministers are anxious to screen him. In speaking of the conduct of ministers upon this occasion, and particularly of*

The King's Answer to the Address of the House of Commons, in which the Ministers are charged to answer for the conduct of the late Convention. This I presume, in order to guard against mistake or misconception. In my opinion, it is quite evident, that his Majesty's ministers are fully determined to screen Sir Arthur Wellesley. The proofs of this determination are manifest. In the first place, when the news arrived of the disgraceful Convention, ministers withheld the communication as long as possible, and when at last obliged to make the communication to the abused people of this country, in what manner did they do it? That part which it was most material to know; which, in fact, formed the basis of the whole; namely, the *Amnistie* which was signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, was published in the French language. My neighbours do not understand French. God forbid that they ever should! (*Applauses*) They do not understand the meaning of the terms "*Duc d'Abrantes*," nor "*Chevalier du Bain*." Why did ministers give this part of the communication in French, while the remainder was given in English? The reason is obvious. And in this act alone I see proof enough of their determination to screen that man. (*Applauses*.) Now, as to the object of their preference. Sir Arthur Wellesley, it is well known, is allied to a powerful family, which has risen to predominance, not by great or useful talents of any description, not by eminent or laudable achievements, but by beating the poor Indians, just as a dog would hunt a flock of sheep. Why, Gentlemen, Sir Arthur Wellesley has no claim to the merit of generalship for his boasted victories in India, for one thousand English soldiers would beat ten thousand Indians, with as much ease as two of your dogs would drive a flock of sheep out of a pinfold. (*Laughter and applauses*.) I wish, Gentlemen, that this commander was here to hear me; but, although he be not present, there can be no doubt that in a country where the minister has the distribution of seventy millions a year of the public money, there is scarcely a foot of it in which their favourite will not find a friend. Let any such friend now answer me, and correct me if I am wrong, in stating the salaries and the services of Sir Arthur Wellesley. Before he left this country, that officer enjoyed a salary of £6566 as chief secretary of state in Ireland, besides his pay as colonel of a regiment. Ministers take him from that office and send him abroad as a general; still leaving him in possession of the emoluments of his secretarialship in Ire-

land. Why, Gentlemen, is it not a very partiality? Why, because the Wellesley family have no less than twelve votes in the House of Commons. (*Applauses*.)—What is the next step of ministerial partiality towards this commander? No blame is imputed to him. No idea of trying him was insinuated. He was not, in fact, recalled from the army, but allowed to come home upon leave of absence.—And here let me remark, that although one of the pleas or apologies for concluding this infamous Convention was, that it would enable our army to march more expeditiously to the aid of the Spaniards; yet, when they were so enabled, their commander, Wellesley, came home, and left the army to go by itself. He came home before the other commanders, in order to tell the first story—in order to have an undue advantage over his colleagues.—Then, what is done upon his arrival? He is introduced at the king's levee; and on the very day, too, that the corporation of London present their Address. I look at the contrast between the treatment experienced by that corporation, and the reception of Sir Arthur Wellesley! Although there were divers great persons at that levee; although there was a bishop and a judge among the circle, Sir Arthur Wellesley was the first person presented to his majesty; and most graciously was he received! But further still. After being thus cordially treated by his majesty, Sir Arthur is sent to resume his office in Ireland, for which, as I have already observed, he has been all along in the receipt of £6,566 a year. Does this imply any inclination to subject Sir Arthur Wellesley to censure, or to bring him to trial? Quite the contrary. And my firm belief is, that in order to screen that commander, ministers will use their endeavours to screen his colleagues; from a just apprehension, that if these colleagues are brought to trial, they would probably impeach Wellesley. For these reasons, ministers may well be suspected, of a determination to prevent any thing like effectual inquiry. (*Loud applauses*.)—But, Gentlemen, you cannot help being surprised, that ministers should have thought it proper to employ Sir Arthur Wellesley at all, upon this occasion, when they had such a number of generals, from among whom they could select a commander. What was the necessity, then, for sending out that officer? Why, Gentlemen, we have at this moment, a Staff consisting of no less than 291 generals. What a boast! (*A laugh*.) The French have not half so many. Among

these officers we have six field marshals.—There were, I say, 291 generals, of whom Sir Arthur Wellesley was one; and, out of all these officers, a man could not be chosen to go to Portugal, without withdrawing from Ireland its chief secretary, upon whom so much of the government of that part of the United Kingdom rests. Well, Gentlemen, Sir Arthur goes out as a major general, and, after being deeply implicated in a transaction that “has disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country,” he comes back, is cordially greeted by his majesty, and peaceably proceeds to resume the possession of his lucrative office in Ireland. Such, Gentlemen, is the partiality of ministers to the Wellesley family! to a family to which you pay annually, and I wish you to bear it in mind, no less than £23,767, as appears by the following statement:

Marquis Wellesley's Pension	£5,000
Marquis and W. Pole with Provision to Survivor.—Remembrancer of Civil List in Ireland	4,201
Hon. Henry Wellesley, Sec. to the Treasury	4,000
Hon. W. Pole, Sec. to the Admiralty	4,000
Sir Arthur Wellesley's Irish Secretaryship (Report made in June, 1808)	6,566

£23,767

This sum, observe, you are paying to those, whose influence is employed for any other purpose than that of serving you. Of the magnitude of this sum, you will be able to judge when I tell you, that, upon an average of England and Wales, it is equal to the poor's rates of sixty parishes; and to the assessed taxes of seventy-two parishes. According to a Report from a Committee of the House of Commons presented in June last, it appears, that at that time Sir Arthur's salary was given to him in his capacity of chief secretary in Ireland, although he was then under pay as a General upon the Staff going to Portugal.—Perhaps it may not be amiss for some of you to be informed what a Staff Officer is. A Staff Officer is generally a colonel of some regiment selected for his admirable skill, bravery, and experience to command armies. Now, I have told you that these Officers amount to 291 before; and what do you think they cost us? Why, they cost us annually, besides their pay, as colonels of regiments, the sum of £254,776. 5s. 10d. This is the sum, Gentlemen, which we pay annually to generals to command our armies! And what are the effects they produce?—A doubt has often been expressed to me by some of my neighbours, that there can be any descrip-

tion of persons in the country, so deficient of humanity, who can feel any wish for the prolongation of war. They often ask me, why do any men wish a continuation of the war? Above all, say they, the government of the country cannot be desirous for its duration. But, I could now, Gentlemen, begin to read a list, which would occupy two hours, of persons whose great interest consists in the duration of war, at all events, and under all circumstances and hazards. I shall mention one case to you. There is Mr. Garnier, the Apothecary, whom my neighbours call 'Squire Garnier of Wickham, (*Here a mixed cry of Hear! Hear! and To the Question.*) This Mr. Garnier, Gentlemen, is an apothecary, and receives a salary, perquisites, and emoluments, amounting to £12,300. 10s. 3d. a year for being Apothecary General to the Army. His perquisites are in proportion to the magnitude of that army, and the number of wounds they receive. Such a man, of course, must like the duration of war. It is the fault of government that he should have such an income."

Here Sir Francis Baring rose to order;—but the great body of the meeting calling out "Go on, Go on;" the honourable baronet could not obtain a hearing.

The SHERIFF observed, that he thought every thing irrelevant to the question should be omitted upon this occasion, and if there was any difference of opinion upon this subject, he must take the sense of the meeting upon it, being determined to preserve strict impartiality.

Mr. COBBETT—"I have, Gentlemen, to apologize to you for having already detained you so long, by entering into what I conceive to be perfectly regular and relevant to the question at issue; but I will regulate my conduct by your judgment."—(*An almost universal cry of "No, No; Go on, Go on," ensued.*)

Sir FRANCIS BARING observed, that the meeting was called for a special purpose; that that purpose was of a public, not a private nature, and therefore it was, in his opinion, totally irregular to introduce the name of an individual who had nothing to do with the Convention. The honourable gentleman appeared to him not only to be making an attack upon Mr. Garnier, but also directly attacking the government of the country; he therefore hoped, that, taking it upon the principles of perfect justice, the Meeting would strictly adhere to the avowed purpose for which they had assembled.

Mr. COBBETT then resumed.—"I was going on, Gentlemen, to shew the existence

of motives likely to induce men to support any war or any minister, and to pursue a course inconsistent with the interests of the public. I therefore meant to avail myself of this public opportunity to urge my neighbours to think for themselves, rejecting the undue influence which such motives as I have described are calculated to produce. (*Applauses*)—I have, Gentleman, a Petition and Address to propose for the consideration of this meeting. I am aware, that it may be thought presumptuous in me to do so. I had rather it had fallen into other hands; but having come here, I am resolved to do my duty. In this Petition and Address it will be observed, that I allude to the Answer received by the corporation of London; which corporation I am desirous to support, as that Answer seems to have kicked them into courage. I refer in my Address to their observations with regard to former failures. It is fresh in the memory of every one, that there was a failure on the part of the Duke of York at the Helder.—(*Yes, yes, we all remember that!*) These are not times for men to be mealy-mouthed. It is notorious that the duke of York commanded an army, fitted out at an expence exceeding any thing of the kind upon former occasions. It consisted of the very flower of England; who were under the necessity of flying before the French, and were ultimately hemmed up in a corner, where their commander made a capitulation, by which he gave up, not any thing that he himself had gained, but what was obtained through the bravery of others! By the valour of our fleets, 8000 French sailors were safely lodged in our barracks and guard ships, and these the Duke of York gave up, by his disgraceful capitulation. That was a failure, surely, of great magnitude, and yet it has never, to this day, been inquired into. Nearly the same kind of ministers that were then in power, now form the administration; and we have a right to think that these ministers will not be more anxious, if inconsistent with their ministerial interest, to enter into an inquiry upon this occasion, than they were on the other. Unless we press hard in an appeal to his Majesty himself, no effectual inquiry is likely to take place. (*A cry of "Bravo! Bravo!"*)—It may not be inapplicable to the subject in question, and I hope it will not be thought out of order, to state how much the Duke of York, who then escaped inquiry, receives out of the public money for his services. We have, surely, as good a right to know the emoluments, as the services he performs for them. The Duke of York receives from the country

in a pension the sum of £18,000 a year as colonel of the three battalions of guards, £6,000 as commander-in-chief exclusive of his patronage and perquisites the sum of £10,000. I know not whether he receives as colonel of the five battalions of the 60th regiment, but I know that in addition to these sums, by an act passed in 1801 or 1802, the king was authorised to grant to him, out of the lands belonging to the public, called crown-lands (and in lieu, probably, of the bishoprick of Osnaburgh), several manors, &c. in the fee simple, worth, as I have heard them estimated, at £16,000 a year, amounting in all to the enormous sum of £48,000: add to these the interest of £54,000, lent him in 1801, out of the public money, without any consent of parliament, £2,700. The whole amount will then be £50,700, equal to the poor's rates of 125 parishes, or the assessed taxes of 145 parishes! He is also ranger of two parks and warden of the New Forest. From all these the patronage he enjoys is immense; and we know but too well what patronage is worth."—(*Here a great noise ensued, by the approbation of many, and the disapprobation of a few, upon the subject of this curious statement.*)

The Rev. Mr. POULTER, amidst the hisses and hootings of the assembly, rose to speak to order. "I commend the zeal of those gentlemen," said he, "who has before they hear what I am going to say.—I or any man in this meeting have surely a right to speak to order. I did not rise sooner, on account of the former person spoken of being a near and dear relation to myself; but I beg to submit to you, Mr. Sheriff, as chairman, whether the allusion to the illustrious personage just spoken of by the gentleman, be relevant or not."

The voices calling out "*Go on, Go on, Mr. Cobbett,*" were so numerous, that the high sheriff could not get an opportunity of stating his opinion.

Mr. CORBETT then rose again, and continued—"Gentlemen, I do not conceive that I was in the smallest degree out of order; but I will leave this subject by referring every one of you, as I have done the public at large, to the Statement of Facts, lately published by major Hogan. I shall now, Gentlemen, conclude with the expression of my particular wish, that those who do not read upon such subjects, should know that we have an absolute right to petition the king. Nothing can stay this right. There was a time when the king prosecuted persons for addressing him. And, let me tell you, one of the events that followed was

the declaration of that King; another, the appointment of a successor; and a third, the passing of a positive law, enacting and establishing the right of the subject to petition. This right was declared, claimed, asserted, and enacted, by an act passed in the reign of William and Mary. The house of Lords being assembled, first drew up a Declaration of the crimes of king James, stating, that he had "endeavoured to subvert and extirpate the laws and liberties of this kingdom; first, by assuming illegal powers;" and second. "by committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates, for humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed powers." We know, from history, that they afterwards declared what their rights and liberties should be hereafter. They claimed, demanded, and insisted upon them, as the sole condition upon which they would acknowledge William and Mary; and one of them was this: "That it is the Right of the subject to petition the King." This is one amongst the express conditions upon which the present king's family were called to the throne. They bargained, not only for the preserving of those rights from violation, but from all attempts upon them. Such is the language of the constitution and law of England, and upon this strong ground it is, that I submit to you, Gentlemen, the following Address:

TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

The humble Address and Petition of the Nobility, Gentry, Clergy, Freeholders, and Inhabitants of the County of Southampton.

We, your majesty's most dutiful subjects, the nobility, gentry, clergy, freeholders, and inhabitants of the county of Southampton, humbly approach your majesty with an expression of our deep regret at the Convention lately entered into by the commanders of your majesty's forces and the commander of the French forces in Portugal, a Convention which we deem disgraceful to your majesty's arms, greatly injurious to the interest of this nation, and still more injurious to the interests and the glorious cause of your majesty's faithful allies, now engaged in a perilous conflict for the recovery and preservation of their rights and liberties.—Mindful that at the happy period when those laws were made, by which your majesty's family was placed upon the throne of this kingdom, it was claimed, demanded, and insisted upon, solemnly assented to, and legally enacted, that it was the right of the subject to petition the king; and fully convinced that it is of the utmost impor-

tance to the preservation of our liberties, that this right should at all times be freely exercised in all matters of public grievance, without obstruction or reproach, we humbly pray that your majesty will be graciously pleased to institute such an inquiry relative to the said Convention, as will secure a full and open development of the real causes of a transaction, which has brought so foul a stain upon the honour of our country, and has rendered unavailing the valour of your majesty's troops, and the vast pecuniary sacrifice of your faithful, heavily burdened, and patient people. And this application to the justice and paternal care of your majesty we deem the more necessary at this time, because, during the eventual period of the last fifteen years, various enterprises and expeditions have been undertaken, in which the character of the country and the honour of your majesty's arms were concerned, which have grievously failed and disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation, and into which due inquiry has not been made.

The Rev. Mr. BAKER seconded this Amendment; by saying, that he would not do it if he did not conceive that every honest Englishman should heartily concur in it.

The Rev. Mr. POULTER next offered himself to the meeting—"Mr. High Sheriff and Gentlemen, I rise for the purpose of replying to some of the observations which have fallen from the individual who has last addressed you. In doing so I feel it my duty to limit myself to that part of his arguments which are applicable to the subject for which we are convened, and which shall serve to lead to the question before us. Much stress has been laid upon the Answer which the corporation of the City of London has received from his majesty—An endeavour has been made to prove, that it gave no positive promise of an acquiescence in the object sought by the address of that corporation. I contend for the contrary; and feeling as I do, that his majesty's Answer on that point was complete, explicit, and satisfactory—(No! No! No!)—This being my opinion, I am not bound to refer to the other part of that Answer, which was alone applicable to the true spirit of the Address. In that Address was introduced extraneous matter, in my mind in an ill-advised, intemperate, and indiscreet manner. To the address just read, there is, I confess, no such objection, inasmuch as it limits its prayer to investigation, and prays for justice alone. There is no call for punishment before investigation is instituted, as in the Address from the Citizens of

London. But, with the answer to the citizens before the country, let me ask the necessity of petitioning at all? Have we not the highest authority in the kingdom pledged to us that an inquiry will be promptly instituted into the causes which led to an event "that has disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country?" Could I for a moment believe that such an inquiry would not take place, there is no man in this assembly who would exert his utmost efforts to obtain that object more willingly than myself.—But, with the king's Answer before me, I must declare that I am satisfied on that point, and, therefore, think any application to the throne, for that which is already promised, quite unnecessary, and objectionable. In calling upon this meeting to abstain from an unnecessary address, I repose no unjustifiable confidence in either his majesty's Answer to the corporation of London, or in the sincerity of his ministers; but I call upon you to grant to a public instrument coming from such high authority, the same reliance as you are in the habit of observing in the ordinary intercourse of life. I know that it has been asserted, and I have seen it written, that this instrument does not explicitly promise investigation. In order to remove all doubts upon that point, I am in possession of a fact which must be believed, if I am entitled to the common credence of society: I therefore declare, in the most unqualified manner, and am contented to be branded with the character of falsehood and duplicity if it prove otherwise, that an inquiry is not only determined upon and about to commence, but that it will be carried on in the most open and public manner. For this information, I have the highest authority, though not from one of the cabinet, yet from a gentleman closely connected with and holding a confidential office in, the administration.—This authority I am ready to name if called upon. (*Name, name, name!*) In obedience to the wishes of this meeting, I will name my authority, but beg leave to premise, that with ministers I have no connection whatever, although much attached to them. I am indebted for the fact to which I have alluded to my friend and neighbour Mr. Sturges Bourne (*Loud laughter, mixed with disapprobation*). I now proceed to observe on a part of the speech of the gentleman who preceded me, with peculiar satisfaction; because I there fully coincide in his opinion. Indeed, to differ from a man of undoubted talents, a powerful and argumentative writer, is not the most gratifying occurrence.—Those great qualities I am always ready to attribute to him (Mr.

Cobbett), although to his disadvantage, I have started under their application (*Hear! hear!*) I only ask to reserve the same right to form my own opinion, which he claims for himself, and, when necessary, to assert it manfully and without constraint. That the right to petition our sovereign is a great paramount privilege, secured by law to the subjects of this country, is what I trust no man will ever presume to deny. Were that birthright of Britons invaded, most cheerfully would I shed the last drop of my blood to recover and to re-assert it. But, although there may be no question as to the right, there may be a question as to the expediency of exercising it. It is because I deem its exercise at present inexpedient, that I oppose the resolution of the noble lord, and the Address of the last speaker.—And, let it be remembered, that if ever there was a part of the royal prerogative which the constitution of this kingdom treats with most delicacy, it is that very part which the proposed Address calls in question, namely, the conclusion of treaties and conventions and the appointment of officers. If inclined, I could also speculate, as the friends to petitioning have done, on the specific relation and general tendency of this Convention, which has been so much reprobated. But so enamoured am I of fair and public investigation, that I will abstain from hypothetical statements, and commit the development of the facts to that military tribunal, which is the only one now legally competent to come to a fair decision upon such a case. Should there, from such development, appear circumstances which affect the responsibility of his majesty's advisers, there is no doubt but that the zeal of party, and indeed of every member of the legislature, will institute, with respect to them, the fullest parliamentary investigation.—The last speaker has attempted to impeach the character of general Sir Arthur Wellesley. On that point I put myself in direct opposition to him (Mr. Cobbett). Whether that distinguished officer fills his civil situation in Ireland with advantage to the public I shall not stop to inquire. I am not in possession of any means to form an opinion upon that subject. I am confident that it stands as high at home, as in the country where he has been so gallantly serving. If it should stand rather higher in Portugal, it is because, amongst his brave companions in arms, his character is so respected and established, that nothing in the shape of charge or even insinuation has ever presumed to approach it. (*Hear! Hear!*) Ask any one of that brave army where general Sir A. Wellesley was to

be found on the day of the battle, and the answer will be, "in the hottest of the fight." (*Hear! Hear!*) In reviewing the conduct of any individual, common justice enjoins us not to anticipate guilt, nor to subject our judgments to the influence of prejudice. And surely if ever there was a body more entitled, not alone to the benefits of impartiality, not alone to your protection from prejudgment, but even to your indulgence, they are those military and naval men who brave every danger, submit to every privation, and are continually risking their lives for the defence of your interests, and the advancement of your prosperity and glory. —(*Hear! Hear!*)—Should it unfortunately happen, that a disgraceful event should occur, such as has taken place under general Dalrymple, —(*Not fair*, exclaimed Mr. Balfour, *to accuse one officer, in order to screen the other.*) I do not accuse, but call upon you to forbear from being influenced by your prejudices, and to wait until you know the result of the inquiry which has been instituted. With respect to the state of this country, I will say but little. I admit that every possible check ought to be given to the progress of corruption. In fact that destructive stalking horse, and I do believe, that reform is in a course of proceeding—(*A King! No! No! No!*) I do deprecate any factions attempt to alienate the people at this peculiar crisis from the executive government; for our safety must depend upon our union: united we cannot fall, and divided we cannot stand. I therefore feel it my duty to propose as an Amendment to the Resolution proposed by the noble lord, not an adjournment, but a motion to this effect, That notwithstanding the disappointment experienced throughout the country in consequence of the late Convention, yet, that his majesty having already pledged himself to institute an Inquiry, it is expedient on the part of the people to forbear any further interference until the result of such inquiry be known.

Mr. PORTALL.—"Gentlemen, since the Resolution was proposed by the noble lord, an Amendment has been submitted, directly contrary to the tendency and object of the former. The grounds upon which this amendment stands are, that 'our Address is unnecessary—and next, that by our interference we are guilty of prejudging. To such a conclusion I never can subscribe; because I am impressed irresistibly with the propriety of expressing to our sovereign our deep regret that this disgraceful Convention should ever have taken place; and next, that the causes which led to this stain upon

our character should be fully and openly developed. What! if a foul murder be committed, do we not call it murder? We certainly do: and shall we be subjected to the imputation of prejudging, because we reprobate a Convention which all admit to be disgraceful to the British name, and prejudicial to the interest of our allies? Can any man who views the whole, or any part of this transaction, deny that it does fully merit all the reprobation which it has received? We first find, that the French commander, apprehensive of our army in Portugal being reinforced, did practice every expedient, by collecting his whole force, marching out from his entrenchments, to bring the British troops as quickly as possible to an engagement. Yet, notwithstanding all his activity and address, he is completely beaten by one half of the British force. With this victorious army, in momentary expectation of considerable reinforcements, a large Portuguese army co-operating with us, in a country hostile to the enemy, almost to any extreme of vengeance, what was to be expected?—Surely, nothing short of unconditional capitulation. (*Hear! Hear! Hear!*) Did any man dream of any other result? (*Hear! Hear!*) Yet, the very next day after this brilliant victory, we learn that the British commander concluded an Armistice or preliminary treaty, by which the defeated French army was to be conveyed to France in British ships, there to be immediately forwarded to fight against the heroic Spaniards, engaged as they are in the most glorious of all causes, the emancipation of their native country from a vile and base usurpation. There is something still more extraordinary—our commanders gave manumission and pardon to all the traitors in Portugal. That is, we have marshalled in that country a *dépôt* of French spies kept under British protection, and guaranteed by British faith. (*Hear! hear! hear!*) Why, instead of delivering Portugal, which was our object, from plunder and aggression, we have delivered the French army from destruction, in order to afford it fresh opportunities for enterprise and hostility.—(*Hear! hear!*). I have not mentioned the part of this disgraceful event, which went to affect the interests, nay, the safety of our Swedish ally. It is not upon an occurrence the most dark, mysterious and inscrutable that ever was hatched, that the people of England ought to remain inert. For my part, I never will by my silence become a foul participator in this act of disaster and disgrace. No; I contend

that this is the moment when the people of England ought to declare to the world, his regret, indignation, and mortification, which they feel at this ignominious event—that wherever the poison goes, the antidote should follow. (*Hear! Hear! Hear!*) But, my reverend friend tells me, that inquiry is promised positively. I deny it is in fact; to be sure, there is in the Answer to the Corporation of London, something in the shape of a petty composition, from which such an inference may be extracted; but even what kind of inquiry is that?—A due inquiry! What is a due inquiry? The ministers will tell you, one that does not affect us. The generals will answer, such a one as will acquit us.—(*A laugh.*) The people will frame their opinion of it, as it accords with their particular impressions on the subject. But, we have this day been apprised, from the authority of Mr. Sturges Bourne, that it will be not only a due, but a public inquiry. Now, I say, that if we had Mr. Sturges Bourne, or even my Lord Hawkebury, here, and if, after examination and re-examination, we could extract no other information, I would not be satisfied. Courts of Inquiry, or Courts Martial, cannot satisfy, because they cannot embrace the development of all the causes or the conduct of all the persons to whom this disgraceful measure may probably be attributable. The country wants, and ought to have, a full, open, and parliamentary investigation. The opposers of the Address argue, that the inquiry which we seek is promised, and will certainly take place. If that be so, if we only ask what ministers are disposed to give, we do no harm by our interference, nor can our application to the throne be considered offensive.—(*Hear! Hear!*)—But, when I see this anxiety to prevent petitioning, and that there exists in a certain quarter such uneasiness on that account, my suspicions are aroused; I doubt the sincerity of the promise, and think it the duty of the people to exercise their invaluable and undoubted right.—(*Hear! Hear!*)—The people of this country ought not to remain inactive, because the city of London has petitioned and received an Answer. That great body may be far our superiors in a commercial view, but that is no reason for our acting similarly in our plain country way.—(*A laugh.*)—It is upon these grounds that I consider it the most joyful act of my life to support the Resolution proposed, because I conceive, by so doing, I endeavour to rescue my country, in the opinion of the world, from any participation in this foul transaction.

The Amendment, as proposed by the Rev. Mr. Poulter, was then read, amidst strong murmurs of disapproval, and was seconded by the Rev. Mr. Garnet; who considered the country bound by every mark of gratitude to an aged and venerable monarch, to await the fulfilment of his gracious promise for investigation.

The Sheriff then put the question on the Amendment, as proposed by the Rev. Mr. Poulter, which was negatively unanimously, with the exception of about ten persons in that crowded assembly. The Resolution of Lord Northesk was then unanimously carried.

Mr. COBBETT.—“In pursuance of the Resolution now carried, I move, That the Address and Petition read by me, and now in the hands of the Deputy Sheriff, be the Address and Petition of this meeting.”

A desultory conversation then took place, in which it was considered a point of etiquette to receive the Address from the proposer of the Resolution.

Mr. COBBETT.—“I stand here in the exercise of a right, and cannot waive it upon a point of courtesy. I come here with my neighbours, the slaves of no party, and in order to afford to independent men an opportunity of asserting their opinion. In justice, therefore, I must persevere in pressing the motion which has been duly put.”

The Address of Lord Northesk was then read, as well as that of Mr. Cobbett; and the question was put, which of them the meeting would approve. On the first shew of hands, the numbers were so balanced, that the High Sheriff could not decide. It was then proposed, that they should go into the outer hall to be divided, and, accordingly, several departed. Some conversation took place between the two parties. It was proposed to Mr. Cobbett, by Lord Northesk's friends, to appoint a committee for the purpose of combining the two Addresses, or rather forming one out of the two; but Mr. Cobbett thought proper to decline all compromise. The Sheriff proposed that the vote should be taken upon the two Addresses by the holding up of hats. Those who remained in court, accordingly, held up their hats; when it was decided, that the majority were in favour of the following Address, as proposed by Lord Northesk, and seconded by Sir Thomas Miller:

“TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.—May it please your Majesty.
“—We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the nobility, gentlemen, clergy, freeholders, and other inhabitants, of the county of Southampton, beg

"leave to approach your Majesty's throne, with the sincerest assurances of our zealous attachment to your royal person and family; and knowing that your Majesty's true glory is inseparable from that of your people, we humbly beg leave to express our grief and regret at the Convention lately entered into by the commanders of your Majesty's forces in Portugal, and the commander of the French army in Lisbon; and further, humbly to submit to your Majesty our earnest and anxious prayer, that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to institute such full, public, and effectual Inquiry into this transaction, as will lead to the discovery of all those causes which have produced an event so injurious to the honour of this country, and the interest of the allies."

After a motion of thanks to the High Sheriff for his upright and impartial conduct, the Meeting dissolved.—The evening concluded with dinners at the George and White Hart Inns.—Lord Northesk's friends dined at the former; Mr. Cobbett's at the latter.

MAJOR HOGAN'S APPEAL.

The demand for this Pamphlet continues to be such as might naturally be expected from the extraordinary nature of the case. It appears from the advertisement to the fifth edition, that no less than 5000 copies have been already disposed of. What an evidence of the public feeling, and of the interest which this production is calculated to excite! Several attacks have been published against Major Hogan, in consequence of his vigorous Appeal. But those attacks appear totally unworthy of attention; for it would be inconsistent with that gentleman's character and judgment, to notice what cannot make the slightest impression upon any man of common candour or common sense. To those who comment so particularly upon the final Letter, the publisher very properly observes, "that that letter has no connection with the case of Major Hogan. The case, in fact, closes before this letter is presented; and it does not bear in any degree upon the grounds of that meritorious officer's complaint; which complaint rests entirely upon documents, the authenticity of which is quite unquestionable; namely, the letters of the Duke of York's Colonel Gordon."

ERRATA in the last Register, p. 700.

In the last paragraph of Major Cartwright's Letter, read—*executive* sovereign; and, *supreme executive* power.

CITY OF LONDON.

RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO THE KING'S ANSWER. (See the ANSWER at p. 640).

On Thursday, the 27th of October, the Common Council of London assembled to receive the Answer to their Address, on the subject of the Convention which terminated the campaign in Portugal. The Recorder having read the Answer:

Mr. WALTHAM rose and addressed the court. He could, he said, not allow this Answer to pass without some observations, stating it at the same time to be his intention to propose such a Resolution founded upon it, as the nature of the case appeared to him to demand. He confessed that this was a subject of some delicacy, and it was probable he would hear several objections to the course he was pursuing from the gentleman opposite (Mr. S. Dixon), and others, who seemed much more anxious to avoid whatever might be disagreeable to the crown, than to guard the rights and privileges either of the democratical or aristocratical branches of our constitution. But the answer was constitutionally to be considered as that of his majesty's advisers, and as such he felt himself perfectly at liberty to comment upon it. He therefore thought it unnecessary to say any thing further on that point. With regard to the Answer itself, he certainly thought it a most extraordinary one. He conceived that the corporation of London had a right to approach the throne with petitions and remonstrances, even although his majesty might have expressed an intention of adopting such proceedings as they might recommend. It was proper that the king should be acquainted with the state of public opinion on all occasions, whether for or against the measures of the ministers, and it was the duty, as well as the privilege of the subject to give that information to the crown. It was the mode established by the constitution, for conveying the truth to the ear of the sovereign, in spite of the machinations of those around him who might wish to keep him in darkness. This was not a right conceded by the crown as a favour; but one required and demanded at the Revolution as essential to our civil liberties, and to be exercised without obstruction or censure. It appeared from the records of the court, that they had often gone up with petitions and remonstrances to the throne, drawn up in a style and spirit much less humble than their late Address, and yet the answers had not been of so repulsive a description. But the degrading reply which they had just heard read, they had drawn upon themselves;

and if it had been merely a severe lecture upon their past conduct he should be would not have been sorry. During the last 20 years, a period distinguished for the most momentous occurrences that ever called for the interposition of any body of men, the court of common council had scarcely ever exercised its rights of petitioning or remonstrating, except some years ago, on the occasion of the high price of provisions, when they petitioned for convening the parliament. But during all that time they not only did not omit, but eagerly sought for occasions of congratulation. They were ever forward to shew their zeal for prerogative and the rights of the crown; but no anxiety appeared to guard the privileges of the other branches of the constitution. "The glorious independence of the crown" was the constant cry; but when had their voices been raised for the glorious independence of the houses of lords and commons? Occasion was then taken in the answer, to remind the corporation, "that it was inconsistent with the principles of British justice to pronounce judgment without previous investigation." How it was possible to construe the Address, so as to imagine that it had pronounced judgment previous to investigation, he did not know. It called for inquiry certainly; it called for punishment on the guilty, without pretending to point out where the guilt rested. That was the matter to be investigated; and if no guilt was found, then, of course there could be no punishment. He himself had moved a petition for an inquiry into the business at the Helder; and this was opposed on the ground that the ministers of the crown would certainly institute one without any call from the court. A worthy colleague of his said, that the motion was unfortunately full of truths, but then it was unnecessary. Another member however moved a resolution, that the motion was a disgrace to the court, and an insult to the crown, and, incredible as it might appear, the court was so constituted at that time that he carried it. From the nods and gestures of the gentleman opposite (S. Dixon), he supposed he would have done the same thing with respect to the last Address, if he durst have done it. When we were told that the church and our holy religion were in danger, the court went up with an Address, although the danger, supposing there had been any, was known to be over, for his majesty had by that time dismissed his then ministers, and chosen the present "No Popery" administration. That gentleman had then no objection to go

on with what, according to the gentleman might be called an unnecessary motion, and yet he treated this subject with inquiry. How, in the present circumstances of the country, a matter of this importance could be so treated by a person in his senses, he was at a loss to conceive. When our arms by land were attended with such constant disasters, and these sometimes following victories, it was time to exercise our constitutional privileges of petitioning for inquiries with vigour and perseverance. But it was said, "that recent circumstances might have convinced us that his majesty was at all times ready to institute inquiries, on occasions in which, the character of the country, or the honour of his arms were concerned; and that the interposition of the city of London was unnecessary." He supposed the allusion must be to general Whitelocke and sir H. Popham. But yet it was perfectly well known, that though the greatest attention and ingenuity had been shewn in squeezing money out of the pockets of the people, it was found almost impossible to prevent the embezzling of their property, or to get the offenders brought to justice. The strongest attempts had been made to prevent the bringing of lord Melville to trial; and, the business of Alex. Davison had not as yet been publicly investigated. He had been told that ministers would institute an inquiry into the business at the Helder, but no investigation had taken place: and would they be more earnest to institute an inquiry into the causes of the Convention which they had announced as a victory, than into the business of the Helder, which had been allowed to be a great calamity? The situation of the army in Holland had been, according to the account of officers who were there, the most horrid that could well be imagined: men perishing in the snow, amidst plains where they could have no shelter, with other circumstances almost too shocking to describe. Yet no investigation had taken place into the causes of the evacuation of Holland. What need he mention the case of Quiberon, where arms for 25,000 had been delivered by us, and afterwards turned against ourselves? What need he mention the affair at Ferrol, where the inhabitants were seen coming out humbly with the keys by 15,000 men who had landed, as if to take a survey, but where the keys being taken for guns, the whole army was hastily embarked? No inquiry has been instituted into these disastrous events. Expensive expeditions were every now and then proposed, trusting to change

for an object; and were the people who bore the expence to be obstructed and reproved for calling for investigation as to the mismanagement of these expeditions? Many other cases might be mentioned, if it were necessary. As to general Whitelocke, it was not to this day known who had procured his appointment. All that was known was that he had been appointed under one administration, and brought to trial by another. Sir H. Popham had been appointed by one, brought to trial by another, and after being reprimanded by a court-martial, was again taken into favour by a third. Lord Melville, to be sure, had been acquitted—very properly, no doubt—he could not now contest that—but, notwithstanding the very considerable minority against him, and the resolution on the journals of the house of commons, he was taken into favour at court, and had a considerable share in advising the measures of the present administration. If the same system were pursued in our army as in our navy, the same consequences would follow. The men were the same; the difference was only in the way of managing them. Sensible of the importance of promoting inquiries by every possible means, he could not but think the answer to the petition of the city of London very ill-judged, to say the least of it. He would therefore move the following resolution, viz.:

Resolved.—That his majesty's Answer be entered upon the Journals. That at the same time this court cannot forbear declaring it as their opinion, that the Address and Petition presented to his majesty by this court, on Wednesday, the 12th instant, was conceived in the most dutiful and respectful terms; that it is the undoubted right of the subject to petition, and that this right ought at all times to be freely exercised in all matters of public grievance without obstruction or reproof. That they are, therefore, at a loss to know by what construction of their said Petition, however strained or perverted, his majesty's advisers could attribute to them any intention or desire 'to pronounce judgment without previous investigation.'—That they are equally at a loss to know why his majesty's advisers should have deemed it necessary to remind them, 'That it was inconsistent with the principles of British justice,' unless to throw an unmerited odium on this corporation, and raise a barrier between them and the crown, on all occasions where their object is free and constitutional inquiry. That had this court refrained from expressing to his majesty their feelings at the humiliating termination of the campaign in Portugal, they must have ceased to feel—to think

—to act as Britons, and have shown themselves susceptible of that patriotism so essentially necessary for the preservation of their liberties—the maintenance of their national honour—and the independence and security of his majesty's crown and dominions.—They cannot, therefore, sufficiently express their concern, that they should, by any suggestions, have met with obstruction and reprehension in the exercise of this undoubted and invaluable right.—That they particularly regret that his majesty should have been advised to express a hope, 'That recent occurrences would have convinced them, that his majesty is, at all times, ready to institute inquiries on occasions in which the character of the country, or the honour of his arms is concerned; and that the interposition of the city of London could not be necessary for inducing his majesty to direct due inquiry into a transaction, which had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation.'—Because it appears, that during the eventful period of the last 15 years, various enterprises and expeditions have been undertaken, 'in which the character of the country, and the honour of his majesty's arms were concerned,' which have grievously failed, and 'disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation,' and into which 'due inquiry,' has not been made. That in one of the recent occurrences to which his majesty's Answer refers it is not known, even at the present moment, by whose advice the commander in chief was appointed, or on what account such commander was selected.—That during all these calamitous events, and wasteful profusion of blood and treasure, the public burthens have been patiently borne, and his majesty has not been called upon by 'the interposition of the city of London' (if their humble supplication must be so termed) to institute inquiries into these failures; although it appears to them that such 'interposition' might have been highly necessary and beneficial to the country, and by promoting 'due inquiry' precluded the necessity of their late application.—That during these unhappy reverses, and while his majesty's subjects submitted to so many privations, the most shameful and scandalous abuses and peculations have prevailed; into which 'due inquiry' has not been made so as to bring to justice such great public delinquents.—That whoever advised his majesty to put so unfavourable and unwarrantable a construction on their late Petition, has abused the confidence of his sovereign, and is equally an enemy to his majesty and the just rights of his people.—That they do not attribute guilt to any one, much less do they pronounce judgment with-

out previous investigation. They ask for investigation, prompt and equal investigation; and punishment of guilt wherever it may be found.

Mr. S. Dixon insisted, that the Answer ought to be entered separately, and asked the recorder, whether this was not the usual practice? The recorder replied, that it was the practice to propose the motion for entering the Answer separately first; and if any thing was intended to be added, to move it as an amendment.—Mr. Waithman observed, that he would contend against all the lawyers in Westminster Hall, that the court might do as it pleased, as there was no standing order on the point. This was at any rate an extraordinary occasion, and required an extraordinary proceeding.

Mr. QUIN said, that he offered himself to the notice of the court, divested of all prejudice either for or against ministers. Of many of their great foreign measures he approved; he was sorry he could not say so much for their domestic proceedings. He appeared simply as a representative of the citizens of London, to guard their honour and protect their privileges as far as lay in his power. The answer to the Address was undoubtedly to be regarded as that of the ministers, since, constitutionally speaking, the king could do no wrong. The sources of the prerogative were so pure, that it was given only for the good of the people. It was then the answer of the ministers, and he believed it might be considered as the answer of the noble lord, by whom it was delivered. That was a melancholy day for the court in one sense, but it was a glorious one in another. They had left their own place of meeting to tell the truth; they had left the advisers of the answer, not with sorrow, but disdain and contempt. The cause for which they had petitioned was great and noble. They had done their duty in presenting the address: the shame of the answer rested with others. There were three points in that answer, which appeared to him to call particularly for animadversion. In the first place, he should have thought that it was unnecessary to tell the corporation of London, "that it was inconsistent with the principles of the British constitution to pronounce judgment without previous investigation." This was a truism with which every one was acquainted; and if the answer should appear without the address, posterity would be apt to think the common council of this day destitute of common sense. But perhaps it was thought, that the opinion of the corporation on the transactions in Portugal had been too strongly expressed; but could this be the case with re-

spect to an army, which was stated to be concluding part of the summer campaign? We have disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. The second point was the observation, that, "recent discontent might have convinced the city, that the monarchy was at all times ready to instruct inquiries." An investigation had indeed taken place in the case of sir Robert Calder, whose old age had been rendered miserable by a sentence severe in any view of the matter; but most severe when contrasted with the easy escape of many others. Did the noble lord, who delivered the answer, recollect the transactions of the last fifteen years? Did he recollect the retreat at Dunkirk, and his own projected march to Paris? In looking at these events and their consequences, did it not appear necessary to call for inquiry? The royal duke at Dunkirk commanded 40,000 men. It was discovered at length that heavy artillery was wanted; and when this was sent, it was found that the balls did not suit the calibres. Why was there no inquiry into all this? When Holland was evacuated, the army had in December performed a march of ten weeks to Bremen—nothing in them equal to the retreat of the ten thousand; and all this while the royal duke was at headquarters at a considerable distance. On another occasion, when an expedition was sent into Holland, it was found that the army wanted a commander; the royal duke being in London. The command was taken by one who had since gloriously fallen in his country's cause (Abercrombie), and success attended his course. The royal duke at length arrived: he had 50,000 men under his command; the conclusion was a capitulation, with a stipulation to deliver up 8000 French captives, and these their best seamen! Why was there no inquiry into this? Why was there no inquiry into the causes of the failure of Ferrol? Our soldiers were of the same character with our seamen; but the effects of their exertions were constantly liable to be tarnished by the mischievous system of secret courts of inquiry instead of open courts-martial. The third point was, "that the interposition of the city of London was unnecessary." What strange crime did the noble lord suppose the city to have committed by this interposition? Other places, however, in spite of his intended check, had chosen to participate in the guilt. Winchester had interposed—so had Westchester, Berkshire, &c. In 1621 the parliament remonstrated with James I.* who had come from Scotland re-

* See Gobbett's Parliamentary History of England, Vol. I. p. 1338.

plea, with some reason, against the system of policy which he proposed. The reply was, "that the parliament ought not to interpose in any prerogative matter, except the king was pleased to desire it." This prerogative extended to all points of the king's public duty. Such was the notion of the right of interposition under the Stuarts; and the noble lord who delivered the answer appeared to have taken his ideas on the subject from this source. The city of London, therefore, ought not to interpose unless his majesty was pleased to desire it! But it ought to be recollected, that these despotic principles drove the Stuarts from the throne. Had Magna Charta—had the Bill of Rights, and the other great documents securing our liberties, been forgotten? Had the noble lord looked at the first of William, where the right to petition was recognized? In Russia a regulation had once been made, that no petition was to be presented in the first instance, except to a minister. It was then to be presented to a second; and lastly, it might be presented to the sovereign himself, but it was at the peril of the life of the petitioner. Were we to be driven to this pass? In the reigns of Henry and Elizabeth, even while the constitution was floating between life and death, the answers were less insulting than that now read. Even Charles the first had treated the Remonstrance of the City of London with more respect. To keep the truth from the ear of the sovereign was the surest way to bring a government into contempt. This had lately been exemplified in the case of Spain. We ought to learn wisdom from experience. The ministers received flattery with smiles, but turned up their noses to the truth. It became the court, however, to have a due sense of its own dignity, and to act as became the representatives of the city of London, not with a view of pleasing any ministers, but with a single eye to the common weal. This, he hoped, it would do on the present occasion. The whole of the motion of his worthy friend had his hearty concurrence.

Mr. Dixon said, that no person could be more anxious than he was to support the dignity of that court, but, at the same time, he was anxious not to detract from the dignity of the crown, and the respect it was entitled to receive from every denomination of the subjects of these realms. The hon. gentleman who had just

sat down had informed the court, that their Addresses went in general to the king, and that he already well knew, notwithstanding the attachment of that court to his person and dignity. The hon. gentleman, however, with all his declamation, had only told the court what they already knew, and what a boy at school deserved to be whipt if he did not know. The other gentleman had, as usual, been lavish of his abuse of him. He forgave him for it on this day, on every day past, and on every day to come; all he begged of that gentleman was, that he would never praise him! He contended, that it had been the invariable practice of that court, on every occasion when an Answer to an Address was received from his majesty, to move simply that—the answer be entered on the journals of the court; and if any declaration were meant to accompany the answer, then to move such resolution, as an addition or amendment to the original resolution. He read a case in point, to shew that this had been the practice. It was not his intention, at present, to enter into the merits of the resolution; without signifying either assent or disapprobation to the terms of that resolution, he should content himself with now moving, that the whole of the resolution after the word "that" be omitted for the purpose of inserting the words "that his majesty's most gracious Answer be entered on the journals of the court." After this resolution should have been agreed to, it would still be in the power of the hon. gentleman to follow it up with his present resolution, or any other which he might think proper to propose.

The Recorder here again read the original and amended resolutions. In doing so he by a lapsus described his majesty's answer as "grievous" instead of "gracious," and thereby occasioned considerable laughter in the court.

Mr. Alderman BIRCH appealed to the solid sense and good understanding of the court, and hoped they would not allow themselves, in the heat of the moment, to pass a resolution which they might afterwards look at with a considerable degree of regret. The resolution bore that it was the privilege of the court, and of the subjects of these kingdoms in general, to approach the throne without obstruction, and without reproof.

(To be continued.)

“ It is true, that some men have been kicked into courage ; and this is no bad hint to give to those who are too forward and liberal in bestowing insults and outrages on their passive companions.” — *BOAKE: Letter I. Regicide Peace.*

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.—From a question of a mere military nature, embracing the conduct, the merits, or the demerits, of Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Hew Dalrymple, this has, in consequence of the subsequent conduct of the ministers, grown into a question of great political importance. From the first, from the tardy reluctant publication of the Extraordinary Gazette, and especially from the partial manner, in which that publication was made, it became evident, that the ministers, though they had not the courage to defend the Convention, had determined to screen, if in their power ; had determined to endeavour to screen, their colleague, Sir Arthur Wellesley ; and, from the moment that the citizens of London received the rebuking Answer, all men were convinced, that the king had been advised to act in conformity with that determination. It then became a clear question, whether the ministry had the power of defeating the wishes of the whole nation, or not. The nation, with voice unanimous ; with an unanimity as perfect as that of their sorrow for the death of Lord Nelson ; with such an unanimity, the nation declared the Convention to be *infamous*, and with a like unanimity, they called for a speedy, fair, impartial, and open trial of those, who had made that Convention, who had done the deed, which they deemed to be infamous. Such, and no man will attempt to deny it, were the feelings and wishes of the whole nation ; feelings and wishes entirely unconnected with any motives of a party or political nature. Having but too much reason, however, to suspect, that the ministers, from motives of their own, wished and intended to screen one, at least, of the parties concerned in making the Convention, that part of the nation, which generally takes the lead upon such occasions, appealed to the justice of the king himself ; laid before him, in language and manner the most respectful and humble that could possibly be conceived, a statement of the nation's wrongs, to which they added a prayer, that he would take measures to do it justice. To this they received an answer of rebuke

for what was called their unnecessary interposition ; and, they received no positive assurance, that even an *inquiry* of any sort should take place, much less an assurance, that such an inquiry, that an inquiry of a kind calculated to insure them *justice*, should be instituted. Here, then, the ministers and the people were at issue. The question now became, whether the ministers were able to do that which the whole nation disapproved of, or not ; which question still remains to be determined.—A COURT OF INQUIRY is, indeed, said to have been ordered ; that is to say, an inquiry to settle the question, *whether there be any grounds for putting the parties upon their trial*. This is something gained by the people and the press from a ministry, who had caused a firing of cannon and an illuminating of houses at the receipt of the intelligence of the Convention ; this is something gained from those, who, from the outset, appeared resolved to screen one, if not all, the parties, concerned in making the Convention. But, it is not what the nation wished and expected. It is only in cases, where there exist *slight* grounds to presume guilt, that Courts of Inquiry are held ; and the only use of such courts, is, to save unnecessary trouble ; to save the trouble of putting upon their trial persons, against whom there appears to exist no evidence of guilt worthy of attention. In the case of SIR ROBERT CALDER, who with an inferior force, beat the enemy and took two of their ships, the delicate mode of a previous inquiry was not adopted. In the case of COLONEL COCHRANE JOHNSTONE, against whom not a particle of evidence tending to criminate him was produced ; who was not only not proved guilty of any, even the slightest offence, but who *proved himself, to be innocent* of every charge that had been hatched and bred up against him ; in the case of this gentleman, the Duke of York did not advise the king to institute a previous Court of Inquiry. Colonel Cochrane Johnstone, who proved *all* and every one of the allegations against him to be false and malicious, was sent, at once, before a COURT MARTIAL, where the members are *sworn* and

where witnesses are examined upon their *oaths*. The delicate, honour-saving mode of a Court of Inquiry was not, in this gentleman's case, thought necessary; and, I should be glad to know what there is to justify this mode of proceeding in the present instance. It was made evident in the sequel, that there was *no wish to spare* Colonel Cochrane Johnstone; it was equally evident, that there was *no wish to spare* Sir Robert Calder; and, indeed, unless there be a wish to spare, there appears, in cases of importance, no reason whatever for a previous Court of Inquiry. Of such a court the members are not sworn; the witnesses are not sworn; the public are not admitted; all is secret; and, at last, a *report*, decided on by the *majority*, without liability to *public protest*, is drawn up and laid before the king, upon which report a Court-martial is ordered, or the whole proceeding is at an end.

—I do not know how others may view this matter, but to me it appears, that a man, conscious of innocence, would not be contented with a trial of this sort, being convinced, as he must, that, if an open trial does not follow, the world will always have its suspicions of his guilt. It was said, that Sir Hew Dalrymple would not submit to any thing short of a Court-martial; and, if he was misled by the information of the person previously in command; if he be able to prove that, as I am inclined to think he is, there was a very solid reason for his objecting to a mode of proceeding, by which his comparative innocence could not be established, or, at least, by which the knowledge of it would be kept from that public, whose resentment has hitherto been directed chiefly against him, and who, for a considerable time, were, through the abominable arts and audacity of the partizans of Sir Arthur Wellesley, induced to regard Sir Hew as the person who *alone* was guilty. —We have before had to remark upon the circumstance of the *Armistice*, (the only document, relating to the transaction, bearing the name of Sir Arthur Wellesley) being published by the ministers in the French language only; we have remarked upon the circumstance of Sir Arthur's coming home, upon *leave of absence*, while Sir Hew was *recalled*; we have remarked upon the gracious reception which Sir Arthur Wellesley met with at *St. James's*, and we have heard nothing of Sir Hew being received there at all; and, if what has been published, as a copy of the Order, for holding a Court of Inquiry, be correct, the same spirit and motive still actuate those, who have the assembling of that Court. "That an Inquiry shall be made

into the conditions of the Armistice and Convention, and into all the causes and circumstances, whether arising from the previous operations of the British army, or otherwise, which led to them; and into the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of Sir Hew Dalrymple, and of any other commander or commanders, or of any other person or persons, as far as the same were connected with the Armistice and Convention." —Wellesley, you see, though he negotiated the Armistice; and though he had had the previous command of the army, is not *named*. His conduct is, doubtless, included, in the description of the subjects of inquiry; but, why not *name* him? Why name Sir Hew Dalrymple; why hold him up to the world, as a person accused, any more than Sir Arthur Wellesley? Sir Arthur fought us the famous battle on the 21st of September, he negotiated us the famous Armistice on the very next day, and yet he is not named as a person whose conduct is to be inquired into! It appears impossible; to me, at least, it appears impossible, that Sir Hew Dalrymple can be so much to blame as Sir Arthur Wellesley; and yet the name of the former is held up to public notice as that of an accused person, while that of the latter does nowhere appear. The motive for this is too evident to need being pointed out to the reader; and I hope that it will not fail to produce a proper impression, and lead to a strict attention, on the part of the public, to every thing, relating to this transaction, that is now going forward. I do hope, that the public will not suffer its *attention to be diverted* by the numerous stratagems, which will be resorted to for the purpose. All manner of tricks will be played by the partizans of the high Wellesley. The thing will *drawl* along like a snail. Misrepresentations will be made day after day. In the hope that the public will be wearied, its patience will be assailed in all manner of ways, while other topics will be pressed upon its attention, new alarms will be raised, and the passion of fear will be pitted against that of resentment. But, if the people have one grain of sense left, they will, in answer to all these attempts at diversion, say: "stop; for, 'till we have settled the affair of the Convention in Portugal; 'till we have clearly ascertained, whether such an use can, with impunity, be made of the blood and treasure of the nation, it would be folly in us to take an interest in any thing that is liable to happen." This is the answer which every man should give; for, what is it to us that we make

exertions and sacrifices, if they are to be of no avail? No; let us have no diversion. Let us have this matter fully and fairly settled; and then we shall know what to wish for and what to hope for and how to act.

—While this *Inquiry* is going on, endeavours are not wanting to *reconcile us*, little by little, to the terms of the Convention. There will be found, in another part of this number, a *defence* of the Convention, and of Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the same time. The reader will see how pitiful it is; he will see that all its arguments have been long ago refuted; but, I beseech him to bear in mind the fact, that Sir Arthur Wellesley's friends, asserted, at first, that *he* was quite *innocent* of any, even the smallest, share in the transaction; that he, as an inferior officer, was *compelled* to sign the Armistice; that he remonstrated against the order so to do; that he was, at last, induced to do it for fear of exciting a mutiny in the army; but, that he privately *protested* against it in the strongest terms. Now, however, when these abominable falsehoods can no longer hope to obtain belief; now, when it is evident that he must come in for a large, and even a principal, share of the blame; now, the Armistice and Convention are things to be defended, and are defended, by the very same persons, who swore that he had protested against those acts, and by this very writer, who accused me of harshness, because I asserted, that the story of the Protest was a miserable fabrication. I do beseech the public to bear in mind this fact, than which I remember nothing exhibiting a more complete proof of a want of principle.—The opposition, which, at any place, has been made to petitioning the king upon the subject, has been made, not upon the ground of *justification* of the act. No man has, until now, attempted to set up such justification. In the county of Berks, the Address and Petition was opposed upon the sole ground of their not being necessary; and, even that opposition was confined almost exclusively, to Mr. NARES, who is one of the editors (along with Mr. Beloe of *Museum* memory) of the *British Critic*, who has recently received a fat living from the hands of Lord Eldon; and to Mr. COMMAN, late a purser in the *East-India Company's* service, and who is closely allied to persons dependant upon the government. In Essex, where the meeting was so abruptly dissolved, and where a second requisition has been rejected, the High Sheriff is also a person, who was, I am informed, very recently in the *East India Company's* service. Now, though we are not justified in imputing motives to ei-

ther of these men, still the knowledge of these facts should be circulated, especially as the partizans of Sir Arthur Wellesley have endeavoured to make the world believe, that the opposition, in the places above-mentioned, arose from motives of *pure loyalty*. But, at any rate, no *justification* has, until now, been attempted. Many have been the attempts to shift the blame from the back of Sir Arthur* to those of Sir Harry and Sir Hew; but, until now, when the hour of exposure is approaching, no one has attempted to justify the act itself. Such justification, however, we must now expect, in all manner of shapes. The evil consequences of the Convention, which daily become more and more manifest, will, as in the following paragraph from the *Morning Post* (the Nabob's news-paper) of the 8th instant, be imputed, not to those who made the Armistice and Convention, but to those who reprobate them, and who call for the punishment of their authors: "The French writers are naturally delighted at the proceedings of the English Addressers, which we regret to find, have excited the flames of discontent and disorder in Portugal, to a most alarming degree, though in the first instance all was joy and ecstasy at the result of the campaign in that country.—"The Convention of Lisbon," says the *Argus*, "continues to occupy the minds of the people in London. It is not only individuals among the lower classes who loudly deprecate that Convention; even the common council of London presented to the king an Address against the generals who signed it. We are sorry to be unable to give our readers the details of the long debate which took place upon that occasion. It is the finest eulogium of the courage of the French and of the ability of their general."—*The present alarming situation of Portugal affords the best elucidation of the mischievous consequences of the recent proceedings in this country; nor was it difficult to foresee that those ill-judged proceedings, in the very face of his majesty's promise of due investigation, must tend to create dissensions between Great Britain and her ally, to sow the seeds of jealousy and distrust, and give the Portuguese an unfavourable opinion of British honour and integrity.*—Such, in fact, has been the consequence of the outcry, which, without waiting for the promised inquiry, has been factiously raised among us. We sincerely regret to find that many highly respectable, and most worthy individuals have by the

wiles of party, been seduced to give on this occasion a temporary countenance to the designs of a faction, whose prime object it is to discredit his majesty and his government in the estimation of the country and of its allies, *and to bring back to the council of the nation a set of men*, who have proved themselves altogether inadequate to direct the affairs of a great nation, under any circumstances, much less to conduct to a happy issue the glorious struggle in which we are at present engaged."—This is an old, well tried trick of Pitt, who, upon pressing emergencies, always resorted to it.—The French writers, we are told, are delighted at the proceedings of the Addressers in England. They do not, by-the-by, express much delight at our proceedings; nor is their reasoning correct, that, because our generals are accused of not doing their duty, we are of opinion that the French generals were superior in ability, and their soldiers in bravery. The *contrary*, as to the soldiers, is not only the obvious conclusion, but has been, and is, the express assertion of the Addressers. And, I leave the reader to say, whether the fact, that the people of England, of all ranks, are discontented, because our generals did not send Junot and his army prisoners to England; whether our all being discontented *because enough has not been done against the enemy*; I leave the sensible reader to say, whether the knowledge of this fact is likely to give "great delight" to that enemy, and to encourage him in the hope of succeeding in his hostile designs against this country.—But, suppose the affirmative of this question? Suppose a case in which our discontent should be goaded on to the pitch of actual insurrection? That would certainly please the enemy, because he might hope therefrom to profit. Yet, the conclusion insinuated by the Morning Post might be false; because the fault might originate with the ministers; with those whose conduct drove the people to insurrection. Suppose a proclamation were issued to compel us all to wear whiskers upon pain of forfeiting our goods and chattels. Suppose we were, under a similar penalty, to be ordered to burn off our fingers, to tear out our nails, or knock out our teeth. Would you accuse the people of giving pleasure to the enemy, if they rose in opposition to such proclamation; or, would your accusation be levelled against those who advised the proclamation to be issued? According to this doctrine of the Morning Post, which is only the old hacknied doctrine of Pitt revived, we *care to bear any thing, resent nothing, to keep*

silent, though we are expiring under the lash, lest, by uttering our complaints, we give pleasure to the enemy. In the present case, as I have shewn, our complaints must necessarily give pain to the enemy; the enemy does us the justice to say, that *we are all discontented that more has not been done against him*; and yet these vile defenders of Sir Arthur Wellesley, these base hirelings of the press, would fain persuade us, that to express our discontent upon this occasion is to excite doubts of our attachment to our country and its cause!—Now, to "the alarming situation of Portugal." For this, too, it seems, that, not our Convention-making generals, but the people of England, are answerable. I say, *the people of England*, because, whether Addressers or not, *all* have expressed their dissatisfaction at the Convention. *We*, it seems, and not those who made the Convention, are answerable for the "dissensions, the jealousy, and distrust," now existing in Portugal. What, then, such is the *fact*, is it? Such is the state of Portugal. The Portuguese are dissatisfied with what our generals have done and are doing; this fact is now acknowledged; but, the cause of their dissatisfaction is the Addresses of the people in England. They were very satisfied with the Convention, at first; they thought it a very good Convention; but we, by our Addresses to the king, and by persevering in these Addresses, "in the very face of his Majesty's promise," have made them believe, that it is a very bad Convention, and, accordingly, their country is in a most "alarming state of discontent and disorder." This is all true, is it? Well, but how does this bear upon the advisers of the king (for we will keep clear of the king himself), if the Portuguese are really in such a situation, and from such a cause? The people call for inquiry; they are rebuked; they appear to distrust the sincerity of those who advised the answer; but, how could this "influence" the Portuguese, *unless they distrusted too*?—But, "it is wrong to waste one's time in this way. It is rank absurdity to suppose, that, if the people of Portugal had *exulted* at the result of the campaign," they should have been made discontented by our Addresses and Petitions. It is a barefaced and a base falsehood to say, that they ever rejoiced at that result. On the contrary, it is notorious, that their general remonstrated against the Convention, the moment he heard of it; that the Portuguese caused our flag to be pulled down as soon as our generals had had the folly and the arrogance to hoist it; that great delay in the embarkation took place

owing to the opposition which the Portuguese gave to the French being allowed to carry off their plunder; that a board of commissioners was formed in consequence of that opposition; that afterwards, when a part of the French were driven into Oporto, the people seized upon their baggage and plunder, in contravention of the terms which our generals had agreed upon. All these are notorious facts; and yet this wretched East-India hireling has the impudence to assert, that the people of Portugal were very well satisfied, and even delighted at the terms of the Convention, till they heard of our Addresses to the king! So far from tending to create dissension in Portugal, the Addresses of the people of England must naturally tend to produce a suspension of discontent. The Portuguese would naturally say: "though we have been injured and insulted by the English generals, the people of that country have taken up our cause, and we shall have justice done us upon the heads of those generals, therefore, we must not confound the nation with its commanders." I leave it to the judgment of the reader, whether such would not be the probable effect of our Addresses. When, indeed, the Portuguese shall see how these Addresses have been *received*, I will not say, that our addressing may not tend to inflame them; but, then the fault will rest with those, from whose council that reception proceeded. If the answer had been, that such an inquiry would be made, such a mode of proceeding adopted, as would insure ample justice to us and to the Portuguese nation; then, indeed, there would have been good reason for the latter to suspect their resentment. — Who, after we heard of the remonstrance of the Portuguese general, and of the general indignation of the people, expected to see them tranquil?" "Rejoice!" Aye, they did, poor creatures, illuminate their houses in Lisbon; but, it was after our generals had established their military police! It was after our army had been converted into a Holy Brotherhood. I, better than any man living, know how easy it is to *inspire* a city with joy; and our generals, our WELLESLEYS and our HOPES, seem not to be great masters in the art of producing this sort of disposition to illuminate, indeed! Poor souls! What a shame it is thus to insult them. Read general Hope's proclamation; and then say, whether they were likely to refuse to do *any thing* that might be hinted to them as being the wish of our commanders. — Discontent and disorder never appeared in Portugal, till after the Convention was concluded;

and though, in that bare fact, we have not conclusive evidence, that the latter was the cause of the former, it is not bad presumptive evidence, and, when we take into view the facts before mentioned, the unequivocal marks of disapprobation bestowed upon the Convention, there can remain but little doubt of the present dissensions and calamities having arisen entirely from the Convention. Ten or fifteen thousand men, who ought now to be in Spain to meet the French, are, from this cause, kept in Portugal. The friends of the French would naturally recover their boldness upon finding the people discontented with our conduct; comparisons would not fail to be made, and, as the French were gone, it would not be at all surprising if our army supplied their place, in the opinions and wishes of the people as well as in the forts and barracks. The great object should have been so to act as to be able to leave Portugal to itself. We should have so conducted ourselves as to have had Portugal for a *friend* and not for a *dependant*. Give to the thing whatever name we please, the Portuguese nation cannot help perceiving, that, as the matter now stands, they have made merely an exchange of masters. We are disposed to act justly by them, I believe; there is, I think, no doubt, that our object is to secure Portugal for the Prince Regent; but, in the meanwhile, we are *masters of the country*; we seem to be afraid to leave it to itself; and, this fear arises solely from those indications of hostility, which the Convention has brought forth. — And, if this be the case in Portugal, what must be the effect of the Convention upon the feelings of Spain? The Spaniards have all along shown great suspicions of us. They have heard of our conduct in Portugal; they have seen general Hope's Proclamation; they must know all about our Holy Brotherhood; and, can any man imagine, that they will not be shy of us? The Spaniards, if they succeed, must have no sparing of the French; they must have no Conventions of Cintra. They they know well, and, therefore, they must be satisfied, that our commanders will act no such part as that acted in Portugal. They must have no vain blown-up fellows to talk about "Dacs d'Abranes in person." To give them this satisfaction; to give them an assurance that they would be in no danger from such a source; to excite in them a perfect confidence in the future conduct of our generals; to do this, it was necessary to convince them, that the *government* as well as the *people* of England, held in abhorrence the transactions in Portugal. But, what have

they now before them? A Petition of the people to the king, praying that the causes of that transaction may be inquired into, and that the guilty may be punished; and an Answer of the king, advised by his ministers, rebuking and reproving his people for making the application. This is what the Spaniards have before them; this is the security which they have for the good behaviour of our generals, and for their heartily co-operating with them against the Duc d'Abrantes and the other potentates and nobles of Buonaparte's creation. Since one of our generals has acknowledged the emperor Napoleon I. (whom the Spaniards call an *usurper* and a *robber*), how shall they be sure, that another of them, acting under the same ministry, will not, upon the first fair occasion, acknowledge Joseph Napoleon, king of Spain? They have seen Sir Arthur Wellesley, after acknowledging the Duc d'Abrantes and the Emperor Napoleon, graciously received by the king, in a few minutes after the petitioners against him had been rebuked by the king. This they know, if they know any thing that passes here; and will this encourage them to expect from our generals that determined hostility, that implacable hatred, against the French, without which no one can be zealous in *their* cause?—An appeal, in behalf of these generals, has been made to the *compassion* and *gratitude* of the people. It has been said, that we should consider, that the army *venture their lives for us*, while we remain at home in security; and that, therefore, we ought not to act too strictly towards the army.—It is, I hope, far from me to be wanting in any of those feelings, which are due to the soldier or the sailor. But, I consider, that, from them, something is *due to us*; I consider, that, after having been *paid* for years, the soldier actually serves but comparatively a short space of time. If I were to go to the parade at St. James's, or to any of the numerous, the fearfully numerous military stations in this country, and were to say: "What are you all doing here? What use are you of? Here we are taxed to our last shirt to maintain you, a parcel of fellows, who do nothing in this world but prune and black-ball your whiskers, hang monkey's tails to your backs, pipe-clay your belts and your breeches, strut about during the day, and get drunk at night." If I were to say this; if I were to complain of being taxed to support the soldiery in idleness, or in useless parade, the answer would be this: "It is true, that, just at this time, *we are of no use*; it is true, that, in this

situation, we are a mere burthen, and something worse; but, Sir, recollect, that we are here merely in a state of readiness; and, that when we are called upon actually to serve the nation, *ours* is a service wherein *we venture our lives for you*, which consideration ought to prevent you from complaining that we are not *always at work*." Nothing would be more reasonable than this answer; but, then, this venturing of lives is clearly the nation's *due*. Besides, as to the *officers*, and more especially the *generals*, and other considerable commanders, not only do they, in venturing their lives, do no more than render the nation what is its due for having maintained them, for years and years upon the staff without any danger to even a hair of their heads; but, they have, moreover, honours and rewards awaiting them for every distinguished service that they, or the soldiers under them perform. Is all this nothing? And, shall military officers not be as strictly accountable for misconduct as other men? Shall there be honours and rewards for glorious deeds, and no punishment for disgraceful ones?—When the question of *flogging* the soldiers was before parliament, I did not observe that either the ministers, or the military officers present, urged this feeling of compassion, or gratitude. If the soldier acts amiss, he is flogged: and, punished, in that, or some other way, he ought to be, and must be; but, then, is there no punishment to await the misbehaviour of generals? Are we, when their conduct is in question, to hear of appeals to our compassion and gratitude, because they venture their *lives for us*? Does not the private soldier venture his life too? Aye, and that without any hope of obtaining honours or rewards. Yet, if a private soldier, after twenty battles, and covered with scars, were found sleeping on his post, or were to suffer a prisoner to escape, would he not *instantly* be brought to trial, and, if his life were spared, would there be an inch of skin left whole from his nape to his waist? Such punishment would be necessary, though terribly severe. But, then, is not severity equally necessary in the case of the general? Divers lectures have been read, in the parliament and elsewhere, upon the *absolute necessity of strict discipline*. Such opinions are become fashionable, and have been maintained by no set of men with more earnestness, than by the present ministers and their military adherents. But, *now*, it seems, we are to reprobate these notions of severity; or, at least, we are to entertain them as applicable

to the soldiers only. Oh! this is shameful. This is base to the last degree.—There is, in this appeal, and the nation will not fail to perceive it, something strongly indicative of conscious criminality. When a man, accused of theft and threatened with prosecution, reminds you of his distracted wife and starving family, what is your conclusion? And what are we not to think of those, whose partizans make this appeal to our compassion and gratitude? No: we are not to be diverted from our demand of "strict discipline," our demand of justice, by any such puling appeal. We gave most liberally. We grumbled not at these generals being kept upon the staff for so many, many years, without running the smallest risk of hearing a ball whistle by their heads; we grumbled not that the harvests have partly rotted upon the ground for want of the hands, which were kept in inactivity; we said, take our last penny, but, fight, when the day of fighting comes. That day has come; and, from an expedition, which has probably cost us more, than the whole of one year's poor-rates, we have derived nothing but injury and disgrace. And, shall we not now look for *strict justice*? Shall our demands of strict justice be answered by appeals to our compassion and our *gratitude*; gratitude towards those, from whom, in return for our unsparing liberality, we have received nothing of which we are not ashamed?—In another view of this matter, who can fail to foresee, that if justice be now denied, or withheld (which is exactly the same in effect), the people will, or can, continue cheerfully to contribute towards the means of supporting the war? If they see expedition after expedition fail; if they see one year's taxes wasted after another; if they see, battle after battle, and even victory after victory, lead, in the end, to nothing good, but uniformly to something bad; if they see that, having now reached what appears to be the lowest stage of the military bathos, justice is withheld from them: if they see this, is it, I ask, possible, that they should still cheerfully contribute to the continuation of military expenditure; an expenditure amounting to nearly one half of the taxes now raised?—Before I conclude this article, it occurs to me, that some notice is due to the argument, grounded on the assertion, "*that our main object was to get the French out of Portugal.*" This argument is plausible, because it evidently was one of our objects to get the French out of Portugal; but, the conclusion, at which this fact points, is not the less fallacious. It was our

object to get the French out of Portugal; but, the *means* were to be taken into view; for, it was not our object to accomplish that purpose with a total disregard of the means. Suppose, for instance, our wise and valiant commanders had got Junot to quit Portugal, in consequence of a Convention, that should have sent him, at once, by the nearest cut, to Bilboa; would that have been to attain the intended object? Suppose such Convention had put him in possession of our fleet off the Tagus and had put Cadiz harbour into his hands; or suppose, it had stipulated for the surrender to him of Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Wight. There can be no doubt, but Junot, for either of these, would have consented to leave Portugal, particularly as he was to have ships to carry him away. *The French would have been got out of Portugal*; but, will any man say, that it was our intention, that it was our "*main object*," to get the French out of Portugal upon such terms? No: it is a crafty, catching sophism, invented to prop a vile cause. To get the French out of Portugal was regarded as the proof of the success of our efforts; but, our main object was, *to defeat the French*, to humble them in the eyes of the world, and, at the same time, to raise our own character for good faith as well as for military prowess and skill. This was the main object; and does not every man's common sense tell him, that no part of this great object has been accomplished?—As to the *now*-magnified numbers, which the French army in Portugal has assumed, it is such a slavish imitation of Falstaff's lying story of the men in buckram that it were a shame to waste one's time in a refutation of the falsehood; but, I will just put this question to my reader: whether he believes, that, if Junot had had 25,000 fighting men in Portugal, he would not have been instantly shot, upon his arrival in France?—There is yet one topic remaining.—I beg the public to note the arts, which are now making use of, to excite doubts, at least, in the public mind, with regard to the conduct and merits of Sir Arthur Wellesley.—Scarcely a day passes, but we see some paragraph, in the "*Nabobs'*" newspaper, having evidently this object in view. Take the following two, for instance, from the Morning Post of the 8th instant. "*Sir A. Wellesley had a party of his friends at a grand dinner at his residence in the Phoenix Park, on Tuesday last, being the first general invitation given by him since his return from Portugal.*"—The Lord Lieute-

nant of Ireland gave a grand military dinner in honour of Sir A. Wellesley, at the vice-regal lodge yesterday se'nnight, to which all the general officers were invited." Now, whether the facts be true or false, the intention, obviously, is, to make the public believe, that Sir Arthur has done nothing that he is ashamed of, and that the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and "all the general officers" are of the same opinion. But, whatever this Lord Lieutenant (the Duke of Richmond) may be, in other respects, we all know, that he is *one of the ministry*; and therefore, his honouring of Sir Arthur Wellesley ought to have no more weight with us, than if the honour had been bestowed by Lord Hawkesbury or Lord Castlereagh. These lords honoured him by presenting him to the king, on the very day, and in the very room, when and where a petition was presented to the king against an act, in which he had a principal share; but, that honour did not silence the nation, who still continue to censure that act, and to express their indignation that any attempt should be made to screen its authors from justice. But, the most barefaced trick of this sort, is, the Address, which has been published, as presented to Sir Arthur Wellesley, by the officers of the army in Portugal, eulogising his character and his conduct. There are persons, who have had the impudence to appeal to this Address as a proof of the meritorious conduct of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and even as a proof of his innocence of the misconduct, which the nation imputes to him. —In the first place, this is something quite novel in the army. The army has not been looked upon, since the days of Cromwell, as a body proper to deliberate, and especially as to matters relating to the merits of those who are to command it, or who have commanded it. —Next, we may be pretty sure, that where such means of obtaining praise are resorted to, there exists a consciousness of a want of what is really deserving of praise. We see how easy it is for the ministers, at any time, and upon any occasion, to obtain flattering Addresses from their creatures: and, let it be remembered, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was not only known to be *one of the ministers*, but one of the most powerful of them. People in the army are, as well as other people, sagacious enough to discover which is the road to promotion, and if the reader should happen to think, that none of the officers of our numerous army, have any thoughts about any thing but fighting, he is egregiously deceived. We never heard of any Addresses, or pieces of plate being presented, by their

officers to the Duke of Marlborough or Lord Nelson, or to any other of our justly renowned commanders. They left it for the nation, the counties, the cities, the boroughs, and other bodies of the people at home; they left it to the admiration and gratitude of those whom they had served, to present them with Addresses and tokens of regard. The Addressers in Portugal did not think of a sword to present to their hero. A piece of plate they seem to have thought more appropriate; and, to say the truth, their taste was not a little commendable, though a man of the right stamp would assuredly have used it for the purpose of knocking their teeth down their throats. Had they, indeed, presented him with any of the standards, which, doubtless, during such a victorious battle, they took from the enemy, the example of a great captain of the last century, who, with such trophies, made a bed of honour for the king of France, might have been cited; but, to present him with a piece of plate, bought out of their pay, that is to say, out of the taxes; to come to him with a thing, the like of which is given by underwriters to a master of a vessel, who has saved a cargo from the waves; a thing which is given to a meritorious sheep-finder, or a discoverer of the means of killing the fly in turnips, to furnish him with an article symbolical of thrift, a commodity for a pawnbroker's shop; thus to fit him out! Why, it was very well for them and for him; but, let them not imagine, if another thought of the same cast should come athwart their brains, that the people of England are thus to be duped. No, no, gentlemen, we beg you to leave to us the agreeable task of making due acknowledgment of the merits of your commanders. We, who have long and most patiently been paying you, desire to be left to judge of your merits by your deeds, and not by your words. We wish to hear less of your writing and more of your fighting. Send us home standards; club your swords for that purpose, and do not club your shillings to buy pieces of plate for these, who are able to obtain you promotion. We have sense enough left to perceive, that that general, who is least fond of dangerous enterprizes, may frequently be most in favour with his officers. And, as a closing hint (in case this sheet should reach you) you may be assured, that much more acceptable to us, than your endless list of endless letters, abusing the French, would be one single letter of three lines, letting us know that you had beaten them.

Bottley, Nov. 10, 1808.

* * The Letter below ought to have been inserted last week. It is no longer applicable to its immediate purpose; but, it contains so many just and appropriate sentiments, that I cannot prevail upon myself to omit altogether.

I beg leave to point out to the readers of the Register two admirable letters, signed X. Y. which were published in the COURIER newspaper of the 8th and 9th instant, especially the latter.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates.

The Eleventh Volume of the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, comprising the period from the 11th of April to the close of the last Session, is ready for delivery. In the Appendix to this Volume, besides several valuable Reports, will be found all the Annual Accounts relative to the Finance and Commerce of Great Britain and Ireland; documents which are not to be met with in any other work extant. Complete sets of the Parliamentary Debates, from the commencement in 1803, may be had of the Publishers.

—The Fifth Volume of COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, embracing the period from the Revolution in 1688, to the Union in 1707, will be ready for delivery on the 20th of December.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.

Woodrofe House, Hants, Oct. 24.

SIR;—Had I not concluded, that your invitation of the 1st of this month, to the freholders of this county, to join you in a requisition to the high sheriff to call a county meeting, upon the present most exasperating and mortifying occasion, the inexplicable infamy of this Portugal Convention, would, of course, have been accepted by scores of indignant individuals, I had certainly answered your challenge to remonstrate, as soon as I had read your Register of that day. Since, however, I rather collect from your Register since that date, that such has not been the case; though I am not in the habit of putting myself forward on such occasions, I cannot forbear, though thus late, (if none other has or will) to close with your invitation to petition the king, in respectful, but firm language, for the earliest and the strictest scrutiny into this nauseous transaction; to the end that the author or authors of such an indelible disgrace and scandal to our country, and to manhood itself, may be brought to summary justice, and the most condign punishment; let them turn out to be who they may. In-

stead of parliament being prorogued till Christmas, I cannot but think, as a preliminary to an effectual inquiry into this mysterious business, that it most undoubtedly ought to meet as soon as possible; at least on the day originally fixed upon in next month; that ministers may have an opportunity in their places of setting the public right, whether their doughty generals or themselves, are the fittest objects of blame. I, therefore, Sir, with the deepest indignation at the whole proceedings (the more particulars of which we come at, the worse the case seems to be) do thus formally accept your invitation to remonstrate in the strongest language, and to demand in the firmest tone, the earliest and the most rigid inquiry of the nation assembled in parliament, to rescue, if possible, the insulted and prostituted honour of the country; and on whomsoever the base-born act shall eventually attach, that his or their dastardly heads may fall, as a poor compensation and satisfaction for the gross subjection and prostration of Old England, to the insolent pretensions and intrigues of this execrable Corsican. It is impossible to find language to express one hundredth part of one's feelings on the subject; and how these generals could forbear jumping down Kellerman's throat when he had the consummate impudence to presume to dictate to those who had but the day before drubbed him soundly, I cannot for the life and soul of me conceive. I have not yet heard it asked, how Kellerman came to have such free egress and regress to and from his *tête à tête* with Sir Hew, without (as has as yet appeared) any previous leave or introduction asked; but without even a "by your leave" or "with your leave," he seems to have coolly dropped in upon Sir Hew's head quarters with all the easy familiarity of a brother officer, instead of the cautious and ceremonious admittance of a treacherous and beaten foe. And how Sir Arthur Wellesley (if he really felt as he professes, and wishes us to believe he did, *confident of having done his duty*) how he could possibly think of quitting the army immediately after two such creditable victories, and get *leave of absence* to come home, I can as little conceive, as for what purpose; unless (if he felt that he *had* acted *right*) impatient perhaps to receive the plaudits and homage of his noble relation the most noble Marquis Wellesley, and his Eastern admirers; or rather, if he felt (as I suspect he *did* feel, and must have felt), that on the contrary he had blasted his military laurels, in his civil capacity as a conventionist; in which case

he would very naturally wish to get smuggled home, that he might get (*as he did*) the first word with the ministers, and make his *now* story good. Under the *singular predicament* in which he stood on his return, I should have thought it would have been more natural for the "*mens conscia recti*," to have been, at least anxious to clear itself to an indignant public by some address to them, if not to have courted and demanded an inquiry, rather than consent to be *again smuggled off to his post in Ireland*, leaving behind him a most unfavourable impression against him from this very circumstance, in addition to the violent prejudice previously entertained of his conduct in the Portugal cabinet. How his patrons will justify *their* conduct in most *indecently* obtruding him upon the king's notice at the very moment a Petition was actually presenting in the same room, to have his conduct inquired into; and then, as it should seem, in mere contempt and defiance of the avowed sense and feeling of the nation, not only screening, but honouring and rewarding him (*while labouring under this public stigma*) by re-dubbing him a member of the Irish cabinet, I confess I have some curiosity to see. With respect to the Address of the city of London, however the good citizens may have, from their previous conduct, merited a rap on the knuckles, it is no justification whatever of their palming so thoroughly *ungracious*, not to say *harsh* a reproof upon the king, with the additional preposterous aggravation and contradiction, of calling it his majesty's *most gracious* Answer, I trust the witty wags will not by-and-bye pretend to say it was only meant as a neat piece of *irony* on the Corsican's manner of baptizing his replies to his good city of Paris. Though there be among the ministers, some three or four, deeming themselves cleverish lawyers, surely my learned friends have in this instance travelled out of the record; if not gone beyond their instructions likewise.—Hitherto, whenever I have thought upon the annual threat of invasion, I have always been disposed to consider it as impracticable: but, if this kind of tunnel be carried under the bed of the constitution, if this species of subterraneous and infernal passage be made through the bowels of the country, if this sort of fatal shaft, be sunk to the heart and vitals of its existence, as this Portugal Convention is calculated to do; if it be not instantly and effectually dammed up, nothing more practicable than our invasion, nothing easier than Old England's ruin!—I remain, Sir, yours,

—R. L.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.

SIR;—As I have noticed in one of the late Addresses to his majesty, a wish expressed, that those who are guilty, with regard to the late unfortunate Convention, may experience the royal displeasure; and as I think it natural to suppose, that a man would rather subject himself to the displeasure of all the potentates in Europe, than submit to lose the joint of his little finger, I think it my duty to request the insertion of the inclosed plain statement of facts in your justly popular paper, or something of a similar nature in your own energetic language. For my own part, I am so well convinced that in cases of this nature, individual mercy is public cruelty, that I do not hesitate to affirm my belief, that had I pronounced sentence upon General Whitelocke, the Convention of Cintra never would have received the sanction of a British officer; or, at least, he must necessarily have been possessed of more courage than I ever knew man possessed of, who would *dare* even to listen to such an infamous proposal. And as the reason which deters the northern counties from addressing his majesty on this subject, is a belief that a petition with respect to the Convention is a censure on his Majesty's ministers, I have conceived it necessary to remove this prejudice and without the smallest injury to truth: for, if ever there was a time when the honour of the country and the preservation of the constitution required the sacrifice of partial interests, it never was more necessary than at this moment.—I am, respectfully, Sir, &c.—M.—London, Nov. 4, 1808.

TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

To be truly loyal, my countrymen, it is not always necessary to be passive; circumstances sometimes, nay frequently occur, on which, it is the *indispensable duty* of all honest and loyal Englishmen to make known their sentiments to his majesty. First, because his majesty, being a human being like ourselves, is not infallible; and second, because it sometimes happens, that the partial interests of the nobles are put in competition with the true interests and permanent security of his majesty and his people; in the latter case, it surely is the duty of the people to support his majesty against the undue and improper influence of the nobles, and to express unanimously and publicly their determination.—Whether the Convention of Cintra is one of those occurrences which precludes the necessity of publicly addressing his majesty, I leave you to determine; but certain I am, that it is

the true interest of his majesty, and of his majesty's people to endeavour to prevent a repetition of the alarming, dreadful, and disgraceful disasters, which have so frequently occurred with respect to the military expeditions of this country: this can only be accomplished, by a discovery of the causes which have produced such fatal effects.—It is neither my intention to inflame your passions by eloquence, nor to sway your judgment by argument; but I shall take the liberty of stating a few memorable facts for your consideration. Previous to the battle of Minden, British soldiers were invariably successful in the field; the victories obtained by British armies in those days, were victories; expedition was then expedition; and merit at that time was merit. Since that period you cannot be ignorant, that victory has frequently assumed the disguise of defeat; that expedition has become a mere creeping thing; and that merit is now understood to mean, rank, fortune, and influence. Do not imagine, my countrymen, that I consider the result of Lord George Sackville's trial the (sole) cause of these extraordinary "occurrences;" indeed I really do not: at the same time I must state, that had the people of England, during the progress of Lord G. S.'s trial been animated with the same laudable feeling with which they are now animated—or had the members of that court martial been such men as I could have wished,—I am perfectly convinced, that the frequent repetitions of similar misfortunes would not have disgraced the pages of British history. I shall not affirm that Lord G. S. escaped just and salutary punishment, because the truth is, that at this moment, I am not qualified to decide whether disgrace is, or is not, a punishment: however, for the purpose of forming a just conclusion on this subject, I am now studying moral philosophy, and should I find it proved to my satisfaction—that men who deserve extreme punishment, are capable of feeling disgrace as the greatest of "all possible punishments," I shall immediately communicate the important discovery to his majesty's attorney general, who will without doubt recommend it to the consideration of the judges at the Old Bailey. I have long been of opinion, that disgrace to an innocent, to an honourable man, is the greatest evil which can possibly befall him; and I am confirmed in this opinion, by the demonstration of an eminent moral philosopher, who also assures me, that what is an evil to the innocent, is not always a punishment to the guilty. However this may be, I shall not at present hazard any remarks upon such a tender sub-

ject.—In thus addressing you, I am neither actuated by party motives, nor private feelings. I am by no means dissatisfied with his majesty's present ministers; on the contrary, when I consider the nominal opposition of their enemies, and the real opposition of their friends, I am compelled to applaud their conduct, and on the whole, from my own knowledge of the vast abilities of some British generals, their secretaries, commissaries, &c. &c. I heartily acquit ministers of all charges which have been urged against them, with respect to the late dismal and unfortunate Convention. I now implore you, oh! my countrymen! no longer to remain silent, and passive spectators of events which involve the dearest interests of your country; but to make known, in a respectful manner, to a justly beloved sovereign, the disappointed hopes of a loyal people.—&c. JNO. HOMESPUN.

DEFENCE OF THE CONVENTION.

SIR, - The penetrating genius of Hudibras discovered that one spur was sufficient to make both sides of a horse go; wisely reasoning, that while one side of the animal was in action, the other could not be at rest.—You appear to have also made a discovery, though not equal to Hudibras'; his reasoning was incontrovertible; yours will only convince those who conclude without investigation; and who will consequently readily believe, that you would not devote a dozen lines of your Register of the 15th inst. to explain what you intended by the expression "next arrival," unless your meaning had been misrepresented; that you would not contend, unless opposed; appeal, unless resisted; or triumph, unless victorious. But, it is impossible to repel where no attack is made, and ridiculous to attack where no vulnerable point presents itself; and I felt perfectly satisfied that it was impossible to extract from my letter to you of the 30th ult. any one sentence from which, when properly considered with its context, you, possessing no moderate share of ingenuity, could make it appear, that the fair and natural inference coincided with what, in your explanation, you state you never intended. My meaning evidently was, that "the public could not reasonably expect that an unconditional surrender of the French forces in Portugal would be the immediate consequence of their defeat at Roleia and Vimiera," that "the defeats sustained by the French on the 17th and 21st Sept. did not materially increase the probability of eventually expelling them from Portugal more speedily, or on terms more advantageous,

than they would have been expelled by the English army, had no victory been obtained."—I stated my reasons for so thinking, and the fallacy of them has not been established. The question then was, considering the relative situation of the armies, according to the information of which the public was possessed at the time of the publication of the Gazette, announcing the victory at Vimiera, whether terms might not be granted, which would be preferable either to consuming time, and encountering the difficulties that must necessarily be experienced in blockading them, or to sustaining a great loss, in forcibly expelling them from their forts and entrenchments. Indeed, so clear and obvious was my meaning, that I concluded no *Englishman* could be found so perversely stupid, as not to comprehend it; and under the influence of this conviction, added to the expectation I entertained, that, on the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple, some additional particulars would be communicated to the public, I determined neither to reply to your explanation, nor to the other observations which you made upon what I advanced. In both instances I have been disappointed; and shall therefore now shortly reply to those observations, and assure you, that, as you are well acquainted with mankind, I now begin to incline to the opinion, that you thought there might be some for whose benefit it was necessary to elucidate what was not ambiguous, and expound what was not mysterious.

And now this fustian stuff is done,
Let's fairly to th' argument come.

You ask was *it* a reasonable expectation? First: If you mean by *it*, "was the victory at Vimiera such as to render reasonable the expectation generally entertained that an unconditional surrender would be the immediate result?" I answer, no; and from the general tendency of your observations in the Register, I should conclude that you are a convert to this negation, were it not impossible to deduce this inference from your statement, that the whole of Junot's force (14,000) was repulsed by part (9,000) of Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, amounting to 18,000. Now, Sir, this is a phenomenon (if you please) in military affairs, for the existence of which a skilful tactician, even supposing the bravery of the contending armies to be equal, would experience no difficulty to account. But neither does necessity urge, nor inclination prompt me, to detail the demonstrations of theory, or crowd your pages with mili-

tary axioms. It is with peculiar satisfaction I admit, that the superior bravery and firmness of our troops repulsed the attacks of superior numbers of the French. But was their ability to do so first discovered at Vimiera? No. Fortunately many instances have occurred, in which the intrepidity and resolution of English troops have rendered abortive the impetuous and vigorous attacks of the French. They have resisted, where cautious prudence would dictate retreat, or advise surrender; they have assailed, where cold calculation would predict defeat, or foretel destruction. The people of England well knew the character of their soldiers; the retrospective view of their exploits was cheering and delightful; but what reason was there to suppose that they had degenerated? Was the spirit and courage, displayed by our soldiers at Malplaquet, at the commencement of the eighteenth century, less apparent at the attack at Lincelles and other places, at its close? Was the glory acquired at Minden obliterated at Maida? We were covered with glory at Vimiera—but obtained little else. The battle of Alexandria was gained by our troops, in nearly the same proportion to the French, as the battle of Vimiera. The retreat of the French in both cases was not prevented. Was the unconditional surrender of Abdallah Menou's troops the immediate and necessary consequence? Was it the eventual consequence after Sir David Baird had joined with the Indian army, and General Belliard had surrendered at Cairo, to the particulars of which surrender, and the circumstances under which it was negotiated, I beg leave to refer you? To return, however; was it the immediate and necessary consequence? No, and the only possible reply is, that after the battle of Alexandria the English army received no reinforcements; after the battle of Vimiera it did. This reply concedes the point, that, with the troops Sir Arthur Wellesley had at the battle of the 21st, it was not reasonable to expect an unconditional surrender. We have now to examine, with the augmentation of force on the part of the English, the relative situation of the two armies, which naturally includes the consideration of what you may, secondly, mean by the term *it*, viz. was the position of Junot so strong, his supply of provisions so ample, and his force so formidable, as to prevent the English army compelling him, without great delay or considerable loss, unconditionally to surrender? I refer to my former letter to you to shew, that, with the information the public then had, it was not rea-

sonable to expect it, and shall now offer such observations as your remarks on that letter seem to require. It is necessary to premise, that it was generally known that 30,000 men had sailed for Portugal, yet till the news of the victory at Vimiera arrived, no sanguine expectations of unconditional surrender were entertained by the public; and that, at the time I wrote my former letter, no accounts had reached this country of the numbers for which transports had been demanded. I purposely admitted as correct the number which *you* acknowledged Junot had re-conducted into Lisbon; I stated the manner in which I accounted for the number of men Junot could collect; it was what no one could misunderstand or deny; and I still continue to believe that Junot had 20,000 men on whose active services he could rely. You do not prove that there is even a strong probability of the contrary. I cannot avoid expressing my surprise that you should so far have misunderstood as to misrepresent what I stated with respect to the advantage to be derived from a superiority of numbers in a blockade. I started no difficulties, but even granted, that *immediately* after the battle of Vimiera, "the English army was enabled to blockade him, and prevent his incursions into the country; Junot could not again meet them in the field." Further comment is unnecessary. I shall now consider what you advance respecting the advantage to be derived from a superiority of numbers in a storm, reminding you that I then said: "I do not mean to insinuate that our troops could not reduce Junot, but their amounting to 30,000 men would not prevent a great effusion of blood." Estimating, then, the actual military force of Junot at only 20,000 men, and increasing the 30,000 English troops in the proportion of 14 to 9, the ratio established at Vimiera, and which is conceding to you every advantage you can possibly expect from your argument, we shall gain an additional force of 17,000 imaginary men, phantasmagoria soldiers, Philipstal hussars, phantoms who would have been a *long time* in clearing redoubts, ramparts, counterescarp, &c. and have done *little* to enable our 30,000 substantial English soldiers to possess themselves of Junot's intrenchments. ["*Resum teneatis, amici?*"] It is important however to be serious in considering a serious subject. Let us give form and substance to airy nothing. Let us suppose that 30,000 English soldiers contain materials sufficient for the manufacture of 50,000 Frenchmen: here, then, 20,000 Frenchmen in intrenchments have to resist the attack of 50,000 Frenchmen.

I admit that this superiority for insuring success in storming is advantageous; but I repeat, that it would not prevent, on the part of the assailants a great effusion of blood. I suppose success, and shall therefore not allude to instances in which the assailants were defeated. When the Austrians, under Daun and Nadast, attacked the Duke of Bevern, commanding an army of 25,000 men in entrenchments before Breslaw, their loss nearly equalled the whole of Bevern's army, although they attacked him with a force nearly four times as numerous. The Austrians were astonished at their success, and the duke of Bevern was censured for returning with a comparatively trifling loss. Did the superior numbers of the French at Lodi prevent on their part a great effusion of blood? Did Mollendorf—but you must already be exclaiming:

Uturia re non dubi testibus non necessariis.

Further, it is notorious that many instances may be cited to prove, that, after great loss has been sustained in storming the intrenchments and outworks, the assailants have granted to the besieged in the citadel terms of capitulation which seemed to them very considerable advantages to small bodies of men shut up in forts not more formidable than those of Portugal, the greater part of which you say, if *your information is correct*, were things to be taken by storm with *perhaps* the loss of a thousand men for each attack.—Bravo! Mr Cobbett! Excellent well! Let the public read this, and every cool reflecting man will be vexed that he has suffered his feelings to get the better of his judgment, that he anticipated what was either impossible or what policy could not justify. I have a strong suspicion, that, with all your pretended contempt for the learned languages, you are well acquainted with the classics, and that, in writing the preceding sentence, you had in view the following passage of Cicero de Oratore: "*Si quæ premeat res vehementius, ita cedere solere, ut non modo non abjecto, sed ne rejecto quidem sento fugere videar; sed adhibere quandam in dicendo speciem atque pompam et pugnae similem fugam.*" The application is not difficult; and I proceed to reply to what you advance respecting the successful defence of Saragossa and Valencia. You say it has not been owing to the strength of the *place*, but to the strength and courage of the defenders. I thought I had provided against an answer of this sort by instancing the defeat of the defeat of the Spaniards at Rio Sero by a third of their number; and it so happened, that the undisciplined defenders of these places were vanquished in the field, com-

pelled to retreat to their towns, and there became victors. And we now learn that these brave Spaniards hesitate, perhaps prudently, to attack Marshal Ney's corps on the Ebro. Although according to the accounts given in the newspapers, their army is three times as numerous as the French, and possesses besides a large proportion of regulars. As an answer to your representation of what I said with respect to distressing the inhabitants of Lisbon, I shall state what I did say: "there was no great reason to believe that a French army would starve, while there were between 2 and 300,000 Portuguese inhabitants in Lisbon; people whom we went to assist not to distress, to defend and not to assail;" and if Junot was to be reduced by blockade, the inhabitants of Lisbon would first suffer by want of provisions, whatever number of gibbets Dalrymple might erect round Junot's camp. Is it even a very great infraction of the laws of war for a general to subsist his army at the expense of the inhabitants who are his enemies? I beg leave to remind you of the manner in which you have treated this subject in some of your former Registers. In order, however, to remove every pretext for cavil, I will suppose myself to have said, that in the event of assault, every ball the English fired would kill more Portuguese than French; and that Junot would not have been restrained by the feelings of humanity from practising any species of torture and cruelty on the inhabitants, friends or foes, in order more successfully to resist the attack of the English.—You say that for our general to refrain from attacking them on that account is the determination of a coward. "What! did not Junot well know, that at last he must become really responsible for all the cruelties he committed upon the people of Lisbon?" Is Duhesme restrained through fear of the consequences from distressing the inhabitants of Barcelona? And did not the celebrated Earl of Peterborough and sir Cloudesley Shovel hesitate to attack this Barcelona, the inhabitants being in the interest of Charles, and not daring to lift a hostile finger, because, as they affirmed, they were overawed by the duke de Popoli's garrison of 5000 men? Was general Schmettau to be intimidated by threats from burning the fine suburbs of Dresden, and otherwise distressing its inhabitants, when Marshal Daun appeared before it with the whole of his army after his victory at Hochkirchen? And was Daun considered a coward, for not attacking, with very superior numbers, the Prussian army in and before Dresden? No; and it was the threat to destroy the place, and partial

execution of that threat, that induced Daun not to ruin his friends equally with his foes, and save the Prussian army. Did the terror of Russian sabres and halberds induce the French to desist from firing from the citadel of Turin, on its inhabitants in the interest of the allies, who had driven them from their outworks, and got possession of the town? Was *hanging* mentioned in any article of the convention concluded there? It is indeed superfluous to relate any of the atrocities of which the French have been guilty: for no man will believe that they are to be deterred by a gibbet from committing any cruelty, if thereby they can secure to themselves any advantage. And the murdering of a few thousand Frenchmen in cold blood, would not much alleviate the sufferings of the inhabitants. It is however incontrovertible, that whatever portion of distress it is possible for an army to avert from friendly inhabitants, is a circumstance, in that degree at least, exculpatory of the commander, in not resorting to those measures which would have produced that distress. It is not alone, perhaps, sufficient to justify the total abandonment of an object, in itself highly important to be gained, (to shew which I have before stated the conduct of the great Earl of Peterborough at Barcelona), but it is a very considerable item in the catalogue of these obstacles, that collectively would wisely determine a commander to relinquish that object. I wish it to have its due weight and no more. I have now answered all your observations, and will again ask you candidly to declare, whether it was reasonable to expect an unconditional surrender of the French in Portugal, as the consequence of the battle of Vimiera; knowing that Junot was enabled to retreat to his position? If we had gained no victory, we must have occupied the same ground, and possessed nearly the same advantages. We gained glory, and little more; and this glory so dazzled our countrymen, that they considered as inevitable, what before they had deemed scarcely possible. It was this victory at Vimiera that made them exclaim:

—Occidit, occidit,

Spes omnis et fortuna nostri nominis.

The public knew the amount of the force sent against Lisbon; and I ask, whether, (without recapitulating all the particulars) the relative situation of the armies, agreeably to the information the public then had and since confirmed, was such as to render unpardonable the granting of terms to the French? I think I have advanced reasons sufficient to prove the contrary. If they are futile, let their futility be proved; if they

are confining, let it be candidly avowed. If their fallacy shall be established, I shall not be ashamed to acknowledge my error ; and I can assure you, I never hold the candid in contempt. Truth and impartiality are my objects ; they were, I suppose, yours, when you nobly advocated the cause of Lutz, and firmly supported the effects of popular indignation at the peace of Amiens. Do not suffer yourself now to be biassed by popular clamour ; whatever part of it arises from erroneous opinions, resist and correct as far as you can ; whatever part of it is just and reasonable, sanction and support ; but, let your determination be the result of inquiry ; and do not let it be asked,

———Cur non
Ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur ; ac res
Ut quæque est, ita supplicii delicia coercet ?

The case seems to be this : the total expulsion of the French from Portugal is the grand object for which an English army is sent there ; the difficulties in accomplishing this object are great, if the enemy determines to risk his own ruin in opposing them ; but, so important is the object, they must be encountered. If however it can be obtained by granting terms to this enemy, which terms, on balancing the advantage derived, and the injury sustained, both in present effect and probable consequence, will secure *only* the same benefit that would have resulted from adopting the severe alternative of force, it is not culpable to grant them ; and, in whatever degree the disadvantages resulting from such a Convention can be proved to exceed the benefits derived, in that degree the commander who signs it is culpable ; and, I am sorry to say, there are some articles in it so mortifying and degrading, that I cannot conceive it will be possible to produce satisfactory reasons for having acceded to them. There is a portion of infamy attached to this Convention of Lisbon which I fear can never be wholly effaced. Grief and disgrace have invaded us, and I cannot yet discover how they are to be altogether expelled.—I have the honour to remain, with great respect, &c.—C.—25th October, 1808.

THE LATE HARVEST.

SIR ;—As you are always watchful to direct the public attention to important topics, the intrinsic interest of a subject will be a sufficient claim to your notice though it should not obtrude itself by the popular clamour of the moment. The state of our Stocks of Grain, the prospects of our growing crop, and the probability of foreign supplies, were matters of inquiry and examination in

your Register pending the Distillery Bill. It appeared to you, because much had been said both in the house and out of it, that the subject had been completely exhausted ; but, in the different views which were exhibited, the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of our present situation appears to have been overlooked. This, in fact, consists in that very extraordinary extension of the consumption of wheat in this country which of late years has so greatly outstripped the growth of the other countries of production. It is not that our own growth has not increased in a ratio proportioned to this extended consumption that we have cause of alarm, for the reverse is notoriously the case. In a work recently published, entitled “ An Inquiry into the State of National Subsistence as connected with the Progress of Wealth and Population, by W. T. Combe,” an historical view is exhibited of the progress of this increase, and it is there shown that the growth of wheat has doubled itself within the present reign, and, from evidence equally unquestionable, he has shown, that the increased production of other countries has borne no proportion to this amount. However adequate, therefore, our usual and ordinary growth may be to the support of our population, yet, in case of a failure, we can nowhere look for a stock adequate to supply our wants ; for the redundant produce of other countries, which might supply a deficiency in a growth of four million quarters of wheat annually, would be utterly inadequate to cover a proportionate failure where the usual growth exceeded eight millions.—We must therefore admit the justness of the remark of the author above alluded to (p. 18, 8vo. edition), that “ when the consumption of a country greatly exceeds the general produce of the neighbouring countries of exportation, it is from her own produce alone that a stock can be formed at all adequate to her probable wants on a failure of her own growth. The surplus produce of the whole world,” it is added, “ would afford small relief to such a population as that of China.”—Without following this writer, who seems to speak from a practical acquaintance with the subject, through all the causes connected as they are with the existing corn laws, and the peculiar situation of the country which have prevented the formation of such stores, it must be acknowledged, that the removal of these difficulties becomes, under the present circumstances of the country, a matter of very urgent necessity. The practicability of encouraging such stores, without checking the operation of the dealers and farmers, is

demonstrated, and it certainly becomes the imperious duty of the legislature, from the peculiar fickleness of our climate, which, "owing either to our insular situation, or northern latitude, or both, combined with the comparatively limited extent of territory, has been a source of scarcity and famine in every period of our history," to turn their attention to this subject.—Nothing but that natural propensity in man, to forget past evils in the possession of present good, could prevent the effect which these repeated lessons ought to produce on our conduct. But we seem to be governed by a blind fatality or a desperate confidence. The harvest is now over, and the universality of the complaint of mildew puts it beyond a doubt that the injury is extensive. In some places the produce is estimated at a third less than the average crop, in others a fourth, and in some a fifth. If we could suppose the deficiency on the whole to be an eighth, this would amount to at least a million quarters of wheat, more than double our average importation, and which has never been exceeded but once in the annals of our history, and that after two successive failures.—The price of wheat has already risen at least 25 per cent, or a full fourth higher than they were before the harvest, and had it not been for the uncertainty of the American embargo, there can be little doubt that this rise would have been more considerable. "It is not the magnitude of our foreign supplies, so much as the manner of their coming into our markets, which affects our price." A hundred thousand quarters of wheat are not more than an eightieth part of our annual consumption; but such a supply arriving suddenly from America either in London or Liverpool, or both places, would depress the price very considerably, and affect those of the whole kingdom. This circumstance renders the holding of stocks extremely dangerous, without some sort of encouragement from government, and consequently lays us open to every casualty. This rise is already felt by many of the manufacturers both in Yorkshire and Lancashire, where a partial stagnation of trade exists, notwithstanding the new channels that have been opened to us. We must hope, however, that the words of the writer before alluded to may not prove prophetic: "The least consequence that would attend even an inconsiderable deficiency, in the total absence of all measures of precaution and prevention, and the almost inevitable exhaustion of the stocks, which would be a consequence of such neglect, would be a considerable distress to almost every rank and a most serious

alarm, to the whole nation. If the failure was at all general or considerable, the consequence might be an abandonment of national interests, and a sacrifice of national honour, to obtain a participation in stocks, the amount of which, at least, probably, would afford us a very inconsiderable relief."—I remain, Sir, &c.—COLUMELLA.

BREWERIES.

SIR,—Persuading myself that a communication, which may contribute to remove error of any sort, will be favourably received by you, I am induced to offer the following observations on a subject of general concern, inasmuch as it relates to the purity, and other good qualities, of the national beverage, Beer.—What I am desirous to impress on the minds of the community is, that the production of *uniformly* good beer is not an arbitrary matter, as is commonly supposed, and which may be accomplished by any and every person who chooses to take on himself the office of a brewer. For, a man may be willing to sacrifice a large allowance of the choicest materials, without having the power, after all, to make a palatable, early, and spontaneously fine, and consequently a *wholesome* malt liquor, unless he is provided with, and fully understands *all* the uses of, some far more secure guides than the discriminations of his own senses alone will prove. A studious observation of the powerfully different effects of the different degrees of heat in the water used in the several extractions, and of the heat in fermenting the worts so extracted from the malt, is of the very first importance and necessity.—The last is an operation of such influence in the case, that, in conjunction with the precautions required to be observed in the mashings, fermentation determines the early or the later period of *natural* fineness, as well as a distinction of flavour according to the several stages of its progress, and, withal, fixes the principles of preservation in beers. Hops afford the basis of this last mentioned and desirable property; but all the benefits of the hops are destroyed by a few hours only of too long protracted, or otherwise erroneous, fermentation.—The several degrees of heat, critically suitable to these two leading parts of the process, rest on the brewer's experience and judgment; and, when discovered and determined on by him, are applied, most precisely, by the use of properly constructed thermometers. But these heats cannot be judged of, to any tolerably sufficient degree of correctness, by the perceptions of

the touch alone. Neither is the exact quantity of saccharine matter, afforded by the malt, which is the foundation of all the strength in the beer, to be discriminated by the taste. It is, however, necessary that the precise amount of such *sweet* should be constantly ascertained; because, without a knowledge of this product, (which varies surprisingly according to the different quality of the barley, and the method of malting it) the brewer cannot maintain that *uniformity* in the strength and flavour of his beer, which is the only true criterion of a well regulated practice.—This valuable information is afforded by a suitable hydrosstatic instrument; which shews, by the specific gravity of small portions or samples of the different worts, and by their several gauged quantities, the total amount of such saccharine or fermentable matter contained in each brewing of malt, to a thousandth part, or less.—It will be evident to every reflecting mind, that, without a knowledge of the uses of these two instruments, so often as a practitioner succeeds in producing good beer, he is indebted to chance alone—and that he retains no *sure* means to repeat his fortunate operation. Time, indeed, will produce much change and, generally, some improvement in beers brewed at such random; a remedy which may be afforded, and is, also, greatly relied on in family brewings. But this cannot be otherwise than highly disadvantageous to the public brewers in the present state of their trade, by causing a necessity for a burdensome stock of beer, prepared from barley at an excessive price, and loaded with enormous duties on the beer, and on the malt.—The employment of the two instruments is now become pretty general in the trade; yet the advantages derived from them are but partial—always varying with the degree of experience and judgment possessed by the different practitioners, in establishing a set of rules for conducting the operations. It is, therefore, severely injurious that, owing to the generally prevailing opinion, that the business of brewing is merely practical; and therefore performable by persons of the meanest education, those, who have been somewhat more successful than some others, in discovering the beneficial points and use of the instruments, have become the objects of misrepresentation and detraction; and this, directly through the ignorance of the uninstructed part of the trade, or of other persons who are equally unin-

formed in the matter. Much calumny has been disseminated in a charge of their using other articles than “malt, hops, yeast, and water,” or it is chiefly pointed at a supposed use of substitutes for the two first. I shall endeavour to shew that the brewer who expends his money in any such substitutes, or in any extraneous matters whatsoever is most despicably ignorant of every advantageous principle of his business, and of his immediate interest in a pecuniary point of view; for that malt and hops, are not only the most *beneficial*, in every respect, but, also, the *cheapest articles* that can be used in a brewery.—It is well known to the Distillers, as well as to the intelligent among the Brewers, that it would be no more futile to attempt to make saleable bread from sawdust, than to make any sort of vinous liquor (such as beer) from any matters whatsoever, except from some matter which is saccharine. For, no other subjects will yield an extract which is capable of the vinous fermentation; without *such* fermentation no strength or spirituousity can be produced; and the quantity of ardent spirit, (provided the fermentation has been properly conducted) is *ever* in proportion to the quantity of *sweet* contained originally in, and therefore extractable from, the subject or matter employed; and so very exact is this proportion of the spirit to the sweet, that the distillers can ascertain, to mathematical certainty, the precise number of gallons of proof spirit which will be yielded by their fermented liquor, (called by them *wash*) previously to committing the latter to the still. The same rule extends also to, and is practicable in, the brewery. Of all the saccharine matters whether domestic or foreign, procurable in this kingdom, the three cheapest, comparing the produce with the cost, are malt, treacle, and sugar. The proportions which these bear to each other, are, as 8 bushels of malt, so are 196 lbs. of sugar, or 240 lbs. of treacle.—The introduction of the smallest quantity of either of the last two, subjects the common brewer, by the excise laws, to the penalty of £100. If then it were even desirable to substitute such sweets for malt, could, let me ask, any useful quantity of such bulky matters be introduced into any considerable brewery, without the knowledge of every individual employed on the premises, who, as informers, would partake of the penalty? Would, therefore, any prudent man render himself liable to such mean tyranny, or to such exposure

and such penalty? With regard to treacle, must not every person, however unacquainted with the practice of brewing, perceive, that a very small portion of this coarse and black article could not fail to destroy the sale of all beer required to be *pale*; and, as to sugar, the *cost* of 196 lbs. is 107s. while a quarter of the very best pale malt is to be made or purchased at 20 per cent. less; even under the present unusually high price of barley. Which, therefore, of all the saccharine matters, is the most desirable one to a brewer, in producing the most saleable beer, at the least cost to himself?—The use of hops in brewing, exclusively of their desirable flavour, is to preserve the worts from becoming acid; as they would, without this preventive, at some seasons, even in the first stage of the fermentation. For, the introduction or the omission of this ingredient constitutes the chief difference between the operations of making beer and vinegar from malt. More powerful bitters than hops, may perhaps, be procured, but the bitter is of no use without the preservative property. Gentian and quassia are wholesome and useful, *as medicines*; but, if introduced in beer, they cannot fail to cause a rapid decrease in the brewer's trade; owing to their total want of the fine aromatic flavour, as well as of the preservative qualities discovered, hitherto, in hops alone. Hence there can be no inducement to an understanding brewer to use any substitute whatsoever for hops; since it must be plain to every one, that a prosperous trade is no otherwise to be gained, or to be preserved, than by pleasing the palates of the consumers; and no other matters will afford *so salvable* a flavour in beer, as choice hops united with well made malt.—But, the most important of all the considerations connected with the case, relates to the wholesomeness, or otherwise, of the different malt liquors, brewed in the kingdom.—It is owing to the general ignorance among the majority of practitioners that scarcely any beers which are brewed by them will become naturally fine in less time than twelve months; *when*, they are, most commonly, hard, perhaps grabbed, and are, accordingly, deemed by all the medical men unwholesome. On the other hand, that species of malt liquor is allowed, and found to be the most wholesome, which becomes spontaneously bright at an early period, and will so continue; without tendency to acidity during as many months as may be required for consuming it. These desirable properties are to be obtained, constantly, only by a knowledge of the

proper heats which are suited to the critical parts of the process. While uniformity in strength, proportionate to the price obtained for the beer, is gained by the right use of an hydrostatical instrument. It will, probably, be remarked, that the well known importations at the custom-houses of certain articles, supposed to be used in the brewery, establish the proof that such matters are used in beers. It may be so. I am not attempting, nor am I at all desirous, to defend the practices of the grossly ignorant. What I affirm is, that no truly intelligent brewer would so waste his money to no other object than to deteriorate his beer, and thereby impede the sale of it.—In situations where public breweries abound, it is little imagined how very scarce they are in other parts of the kingdom; inasmuch that it was stated to a committee of the house of commons, about eighteen months ago, by Mr. Jackson, one of the commissioners of excise, that the number of common brewers amounted only to 1,400 while the *brewing publicans* were so numerous as 23,700!!—If the community could be prevailed on to believe, that a generally successful practice in brewing is really and truly a matter of science, and not attainable without laborious study, and the constant assistance of accurately made instruments, which last can be of no use whatsoever, unless they are accompanied with some portion of mathematical knowledge, it would be evident that the greater bulk (if not all) of the 23,700, together with very many of the 1400, in the country, must be utterly incapable to apply the instruments, and to conduct such an intricate process, with any approach to certainty, and, that, unable to account for the disappointments which they *must* incur, wholly ignorant, also, of any correct means to judge of the comparative values of *the very best* materials for brewing, and *the very worst*, they are open to the insinuations of the vendors of the drugs alluded to, who, it is well known, hesitate at no falsehoods to persuade these uninformed people that the success of the reputable practitioners is owing to the use of the contemptible trash for which they pressingly solicit orders. These, therefore, if any, are the brewers who, through the grossest ignorance, become the purchasers of ingredients, utterly inapplicable to the purpose; and which can have no other effect than to increase their difficulties, as well as their expences.—On the other hand, the most wholesome, and generally preferable malt liquors, are chiefly to be expected from the efforts of men of better education, engaged in con-

siderable breweries, wherein the principal himself, and not an ignorant deputy, directs the process. To such men the study of the practice affords a pleasing amusement, which leads them to ascertain the qualities of, and rightly to distinguish between, *the four only articles* which are useful and necessary, and *all others* which are *very far worse than useless*. Besides, it is not in the power of *any* brewer, however well experienced and instructed in the business, to obtain so large a proportion of vinous strength, as well as some other of the most desirable qualities in beer, from small as from larger brewings.—This is no chimera; for a powerful cause might be deduced from theory, if that were wanting, to explain the fact. This disadvantage, together with the general want of system among the inferior brewers, cannot fail to occasion the very serious waste of one fourth part of all the malt committed to their injudicious treatment. Any remarks on the effects of this *annual* loss, amounting, as might be shown, to 403,600 quarters of barley, from the national stock of corn, would lead me farther than I intended; and would also intrude more on your valuable paper than I could expect will be allowed.—I am, very respectfully, Sir, yours, &c.
A HAMPSHIRE BREWER.—Nov. 4th, 1808.

CITY OF LONDON.

RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO THE KING'S ANSWER. (Concluded from page 736.)

He should not deny that we were at all times entitled to petition his majesty, and to state our grievances; but would any man contend, that his majesty had not an equal right to make what answer he thought proper to such Address or Petition? He threw out of his consideration the idea which some gentlemen seemed to entertain that in going up to the throne they were going up to the ministers. His view of the subject was very different. He conceived that the court had no right to know any thing farther of the Answer, than that it was the Answer of the sovereign, and in no other light were they entitled to regard it. It was on that understanding he supported the Address to its full extent; but he could never go the length of daring to dispute his majesty's right to answer it as he thought proper, however much he might lament the terms of such Answer.

Mr. Alderman COMBE expressed his astonishment at the doctrine he had just heard so false, and so justly reprobated as it had always been held in the best times of the constitutional history of these kingdoms. The Answer of his majesty to an Address

was well known, and universally admitted to be the Answer of his ministers. His majesty's speech was uniformly received and discussed in parliament as the speech of his ministers; and it was admitted to be competent for every man, public and private, to discuss it as he pleased. He did not question the right of his majesty to return what answer he chose to such addresses as that court, or any other body, or number of individuals, might present to him. All he contended for was, the right of that court to state the sensation which they felt on receiving an answer such as the present to any Address which they might have presented to his majesty. The Address to which the Answer in question had been returned, was not to be treated as if it had been the Address of a faction, or of a short majority. It was the unanimous Address of that court, breathing a sentiment unanimously adopted through the country. The affront thrown on the court therefore, in the Answer which had been made to it, was uncalled for, and unnecessary. The motion now made did not bar or impeach the right of the crown to return any answer it thought proper. He hoped his hon. friend would follow it up with another Address, which should be again carried up to the throne, and which he should most cordially join in presenting.

Mr. Alderman BIRCH, referring to the words of the resolution, declaring that it was the right of the court to approach the throne "without obstruction or reproof," stated, that these were the words to which particularly, he objected.—Mr. CLARKE and another member submitted, that the use of the term "gracious Answer," when coupled with the resolution immediately following, would convey a contradiction in terms.

Mr. Deputy GOODBEHERE argued, that if ever there was a time when the rights and privileges of the City of London ought not to be compromised, this was the period. As the Court asserted their own privileges and independence, so would they be appreciated by the country at large. The Answer of his majesty he regarded as being highly injudicious, improper, and dangerous. When one and all ought to be united with one heart and one hand, as an independent nation, the City of London had been loaded with insult and degradation. This, he submitted, was a crime of the greatest magnitude, as being calculated in an eminent degree to produce anarchy and confusion. As well might gentlemen say, that the Corporation should at once surrender, or allow all their privileges to be snatched from them, as recommend, if

to them to pass over the present Answer in silence. An extraordinary case required an extraordinary measure to meet it. Never had one occurred which could serve as a parallel to the case now before them; and that being so, he trusted the Court would see the necessity of adhering to their rights and privileges. This they would do, if they did not wish to degrade themselves, and to abandon the cause of the country.

Mr. GRIFFITHS contrasted the conduct pursued by ministers on the present occasion, and on the Address before last, which had been passed in that Court. Then it was signified to them that a full attendance would be expected, as it was his majesty's wish to see them all. Here, however, they could not be received in state. Ministers had advised his majesty otherwise. A worthy Alderman, who had always been extremely forward in going up with Addresses (Birch) had, too, been backward on this last occasion, and the Court had to wait half an hour before two Aldermen could be found to go up with the Address. The Answer, he conceived to be most ungracious.

Mr. WATMAN, in reply, declared, that of all the extraordinary doctrines which he had been accustomed to hear in that Court from the gentleman opposite (Dixon), and from a worthy alderman (Birch), nothing had ever surprised him so much as what he had heard this day. He had been informed by the worthy alderman that the Answer was to be held the Answer of the king, not of his ministers—of course, that no responsibility attached to ministers from any Answer which the king might make to an Address. The worthy commoner had denied all argument to his hon. friend. It might, therefore, have been expected that he himself would have used something like argument. But no—he, as usual, had the good sense not to get out of his depth, and had, of course, confined himself to abuse and despicable quibble. It would be necessary for him to bring to mind who was the person by whom, in 1800, a similar motion to that now proposed by him, was made. A petition was then presented to his majesty, requesting him to call parliament together, in consequence of a scarcity which then threatened the country. The Answer was cold; and alderman Hibbert, than whom a more worthy man never sat in that Court, thinking that it might have expressed some regret for the distresses of the people, along with the motion for entering the Answer on the Journals of the Court, moved words expressive of this feeling. This he thought was sufficient in answer to what had fallen from the worthy

gentleman (Mr. Dixon). As to any idea of abusing that worthy gentleman, he never carried his abuse beyond the public conduct of the person to whom he alluded; and if a man could not defend his public conduct, he must not expect to escape if he would obtrude himself on public notice. Praise the worthy gentleman for his political conduct, he could not do with any regard to truth. As to the worthy Alderman, for twelve years that he had observed him in this Court, he had never till this day observed him attempt any thing like a reply. He had now appeared in a new character; he had been unhappy in the exhibition, and he hoped he would never try it again. He seemed to be a pupil of sir R. Filmer, and, like many pupils, he had gone beyond his master, and had laid it down that a king might be and actually was his own minister. The great object of petitioning was, to take care that truth should reach the royal ear. The Common Council of London had, on this principle, gone up to his majesty and stated their wishes, and were they now, after having been reproved for doing so, to stand still and not to tell his majesty that he had been badly counselled? The worthy Alderman might continue to boast of our glorious Constitution, and of our lords and commons; he might talk as he pleased of the dangers of popery, and of the blessings of our holy religion; but if we did not possess that privilege which the worthy alderman seemed inclined to deny us, we would soon cease to have any privilege whatever. Having contended, however, against this principle, the worthy alderman would, perhaps, have the goodness to tell what he thought the people of this country ought to do. Would he recommend to them to stand still, as the Spaniards had done, till things had come to such a crisis that they could only advise the king to run away? Were they the friends to the constitution, to the country, or to his majesty, who would give such an advice? Was it not this advice which had betrayed the Stuart family? Which had continued to deceive the king, till he was obliged to abdicate his throne, and which latterly produced the glorious Revolution, of which the right now contended for by him, but objected to by the worthy Alderman, was the corner stone and pillar? The fate of the country required this court to interfere, and apprise his majesty of the public wish. This was the very time to call on him to resort to better councils. The great sir W. Temple said, that great occasions wanted great men, and great men wanted great occasions.

Never was this country in such a crisis as the present, or in one in which there was a greater want of great men. The question for the court, and for the country to consider, was, if they wished to become the mark for the slow moving finger of scorn to point at. It was impossible to feel on this subject like Englishmen, and not to feel degraded. Ministers were often obliged, by traps and tricks, to attempt to awaken the exertions of the state. In the present situation of things however, there were not two opinions. The public was actuated as by one feeling. They had even thrust ministers forward in the contest. They had given liberally, they had given all that was demanded of them; and was it to be endured, after ministers had taken all that they could get, that we should have the mortification of seeing all ruined, either by their imbecility, or that of those appointed by them, and be denied even the consolation of expressing our grievances, and demanding inquiry into the causes by which our calamities have been occasioned? He hoped not only that the resolution now proposed would be carried, but that it would be carried unanimously. It did not seem possible that any man could oppose it, who was not a place-man or a place-hunter.

Mr. Dixon said, the worthy gentleman took pleasure in representing the country as ruined. He, on the other hand, declared it to be the admiration and wonder of the world. If the hon. gentleman's ideas of our kings were correct too, what would they be but puppets, ready to receive instructions? Though kings could do no wrong, he could not help recollecting, that their acts were sometimes visited on them. One had lost his throne, and another his life, for what the hon. gent. would call the work of their ministers.

The question on Mr. Dixon's Amendment, was now put and negatived, by a great majority. The original Resolution, moved by Mr. Waithman, was then put and carried, Alderman Birch and two or three commoners alone holding up their hands against it.

Mr. WAITHMAN said, the business would be incomplete if it were to rest here. He therefore moved, that an humble Address and Petition be presented to his majesty, in conformity to the said Resolution, expressing the desire of that court, that a strict and rigid inquiry should be made into the causes which led to the Convention in Portugal, as well as into the present system of our military preferments; and that his majesty would be graciously pleased to order his par-

liament to be forthwith assembled, for the purpose of considering of the most effectual means for carrying those desirable objects into execution.

Mr. Jacks, Mr. Clarke, and Mr. Deputy Box were of opinion, that the proposed Address should not be carried through but at a special meeting called for the purpose. It might otherwise seem that the court had been taken ~~by~~ surprise.—Mr. Dixon disapproved of an Address at all. His majesty had already assured the court, that an inquiry should be instituted. It would imply a doubt of the truth of his assurance, to repeat the application; and the request to convene parliament would go the length of inferring, that the court would not be satisfied even with a second declaration of his majesty's sincerity.—Mr. Alderman Combé objected to that part of the motion which extended to our military system. He doubted if the common council could be supposed sufficiently qualified to judge on that subject.—Mr. Waithman had no objection to omit that part of his motion.—Mr. Alderman Birch objected to the Address, particularly if to be conformable to the Resolution. He again alluded to the words "obstruction" and "reproof," and remarked that, though the court had indeed been reproved, they could not complain of obstruction, they having been admitted to present their Address.—Mr. Waithman insisted on the propriety of seeing that his Majesty was not allowed to remain in ignorance of the opinion of that court; that his Majesty had been badly advised. He had no objection, however, as several gentlemen seemed to wish it, to withdraw his motion for the present.—It was then ordered, that the Resolution of the court, passed that day, be inserted in the usual morning and evening papers.

EXPOSITION OF THE PRACTICES AND MANEUVERINGS WHICH LED TO THE USURPATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EXECUTION: BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DISPATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, FERDINAND VI.^o (Continued from p. 704.)

Without any other ground, your majesty thought proper to insult me in the presence of my venerable mother, and of the emperor, by appellations the most humiliating; and not content with this, you require my renunciation without any conditions or restrictions, under pain that I, and those who composed my council, should be treated as conspira-

tors. In such a situation of things, I make the renunciation which your majesty commands, that you may return to the government of Spain, in the state in which you were on the 19th March, when your majesty made the spontaneous abdication of your crown in my favour.—May God preserve the valuable life of your majesty many years! which is the prayer of your loving and dutiful son, prostrate at your royal feet.—**FERDINAND.**—Bayonne, 6th May, 1808.

No. XI.—*Note of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. de Champagny, in reply to one from D. Pedro Cevallos, in which it is complained, that a Cabinet Courier dispatched by Order of Ferdinand the VIIth, with Documents for Madrid, had been detained, and in which he applied for Passports for another.*

The minister for foreign affairs has received the note which Signor de Cevallos did him the honour to address to him, complaining of the obstruction of the courier of his excellency. This measure was occasioned by a notification, that his imperial majesty had required, that no other king should be acknowledged than Charles the IVth. From this results, as a necessary consequence, that the emperor cannot admit in his territory any act in the nature of a passport given in the name of any other king, and for the same reason that the minister could not countersign the new passport which Signor Cevallos had sent him. But he hastens to apprise you, that all the letters which the courier conveyed, and which have been detained, have been put into the hands of the French postmaster, who will provide that they shall be sent to Burgos and Madrid with the greatest punctuality, and the same will be done as to all others, that the Spaniards, whether in France or Spain, choose to have conveyed, either by the ordinary post, or by a French courier. All will be transported to their respective destinations with the most scrupulous exactness, and the correspondence between the two states, far from experiencing any interruption, will acquire new activity.—**M. de Champagny**, in sending this note to Signor de Cevallos, has the honour to assure him of his high consideration.*—**Bayonne**, April 29, 1808.

* While the emperor intreated the king to renounce the throne in his favour, no difficulty was made in countersigning the passports that I gave in his royal name, but as soon as the French government saw its hopes disappointed, it refused passports to every dispatch.

No. XII.—*Resignation by Signor Don Pedro Cevallos of his Office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, into the Hands of Joseph Napoleon, on the 23th of July.*

Sir—At the time your majesty had the goodness to invite me to continue in the employment of minister for foreign affairs, I believed that I ought to submit to your notice some reflections, according to which your majesty could neither have the least confidence in me, or I the least security in your majesty's protection, since I found myself injured, and carefully watched by the emperor, your august brother, whose influence over your majesty's mind could be in no respect favourable to me.—Your majesty persisted in your resolution, telling me that you were anxious to have near you persons possessing the esteem of the nation; but I having no other wish than to return to my native land, which had been denied to me after two months' application to his imperial and royal majesty, it was necessary for me to accept the nomination of your majesty, to put an end to the lamentable separation from my family, and my fellow-countrymen, reserving always the right which no one can renounce, of adhering to the vote of the majority of the nation, in case it should not be disposed to acknowledge your majesty for their sovereign.—To your majesty I have since shown, that Spain is almost unanimously opposed to recognize you as king; and if this claim be wanting to you, there is no other by which your majesty can continue sovereign of these kingdoms. Thus circumstanced, I should be a traitor to my own principles; if I were to continue to exercise a ministerial capacity accepted under such circumstances, and not from a desire to have any influence in the government of your majesty, which I renounce from this moment, to go into retirement, where I will consecrate to my unhappy country my wishes and tears for its calamities and distresses, which I should be glad to remove, for the happiness of a nation noble, generous, loyal, and brave.

APPENDIX respecting the Manner in which the Grand Duke of Berg obtained by Surprise an Order from the Junta of Government to deliver over to him the Person of the Prisoner, Don Manuel Godoy.

Ever since the grand duke of Berg, lieutenant-general of the armies of the emperor, set his foot on the territory of Spain, he endeavoured, by every possible artifice, to impress a general opinion, that he came for our happiness, and to effect certain useful reforms in our government; studiously giving out, that he would protect the cause

of the prince of Asturias, and that he would oppose the prince of Peace, who was the object of universal hatred with the nation. Neither did he neglect to give forth some hints of the great influence of the queen in public affairs. It was very well known, that this only was necessary to captivate the affections of the oppressed Spaniards; and since his mission had for its object what we have since seen, it must be acknowledged, that the calculations of the emperor of the French, his master, were well grounded.—As, however, all things in this world are subject to change, the ever-memorable movements at Aranjuez occurred, and subverted all this plan. Scarcely had the grand duke of Berg become acquainted with them, than he altered his scheme, and appeared to make a great interest in the fate of don Manuel Godoy, with whom he had held correspondence of the nearest intimacy, although he was not personally known to him. It was not concealed from his sagacity that the royal parents took great interest in the protection of their favourite. Then it was that he began to take the most efficacious measures to liberate Godoy from prison; but all this was ineffectual, as long as their beloved king, Ferdinand VII, remained at Madrid. The grand duke of Berg was not dismayed by this circumstance; but scarcely had his majesty arrived at Burgos, when he renewed his application to obtain what he long wished; threatening, in case a negative was given, that he would use the force at his disposal to effect his purpose.—The junta, nevertheless, resisted his first application, and consulted the king as to what they ought to do in such critical circumstances. His majesty was pleased to acquaint them with the answer he had given on the same subject to the emperor of the French, who had himself solicited the release of the prisoner; and which answer is as follows:—‘The grand duke of Berg and the ambassador of your imperial and royal majesty have, on different occasions, made verbal applications that don Manuel Godoy, prisoner for a crime against the state in the royal palace at Villaviciosa, should be put at the disposal of your majesty.—Nothing would be more agreeable personally to myself than to accede to your wishes, but the consequences would be so serious if I were to do so, that I think it right to submit them to the prudent consideration of your majesty.—Consistently with one of the duties of my situation, which is to administer justice to my people, I have ordered the most dignified of the tribunals of my kingdom to judge don Manuel Godoy according to the laws.

I have promised to my people that I would publish the result of a process on which depends the honour of a great number of my subjects, and the preservation of the rights of my crown. Throughout the whole extent of my dominions, there is not a single district, however small, which has not addressed complaints to the throne against that prisoner. All my subjects have signified their joy in a remarkable manner, from the moment that they were informed of the arrest of don Manuel Godoy, and all have their eyes fixed on the proceedings and decision of this cause.—Your majesty, a wise legislator and a great warrior, can easily determine the weight of these considerations; but if your majesty feel yourself interested in the life of D. Manuel Godoy, I give you my royal word, that if, after a full examination of his case, he should be condemned to death, I will remit that punishment, in consequence of the interposition of your imperial majesty.—May God preserve the life of your imperial majesty many years.—FERDINAND.—Vitoria, April 18, 1808.—The royal order of the same date also apprised the junta, that if the grand duke of Berg renewed his applications in favour of Godoy, he should be answered, that this business was in treaty between the two sovereigns, and that the result depended exclusively on the decision of the king. His majesty having been informed that his royal parents (ill informed, no doubt) had complained to the grand duke of the ill treatment of the prince of Peace in his prison, his majesty commanded me, notwithstanding his conviction of the delicate treatment observed by the Marquis of Castelar, that I should direct him, that the greatest care should be taken of the health of the prisoner, which I did under the same date.—Scarcely had the emperor received the letter of the king, when with his accustomed haughtiness he abused it, and wrote to the grand duke of Berg, telling him, that the prince of Asturias had put the prisoner, don Manuel Godoy, at his disposal, and commanding him vigorously to claim the surrender of his person. Nothing more was necessary for Murat, whose character is naturally daring and violent, and he sent the following note to the junta:—‘The emperor and king having informed his imperial and royal highness the grand duke of Berg, that his royal highness the prince of Asturias had just written to him, telling him that he referred the fate of the prince of Peace to his disposal; his highness in consequence directs me to inform the junta of the intentions of the emperor; on account of which I repeat the request for the delivery of

the person of the prince, that he may be sent into France.'—This determination of his royal highness the prince of Asturias, perhaps, has not yet reached the junta. In this case it appears that his royal highness must wait for the answer of his majesty the emperor; but the junta will see, that to answer the prince of Asturias will be to decide a different question, and it is known that his imperial majesty cannot recognise as king any other than Charles IV.—I beg the junta to take this note into their consideration, and to have the goodness to answer me on the subject, in order to give an explanation to his imperial highness the grand duke of their decision.—The government and the Spanish nation will see in this resolution of his imperial majesty, only a new proof of the interest he takes in Spain; because, in removing to a distance the prince of Peace, he wishes to deprive malevolence itself of the possible belief that king Charles will restore to power and to confidence one whom he has resigned for ever; and further, the junta of government certainly will do justice to the exalted sentiments of his majesty the emperor, who would not abandon his faithful ally.—I have the honour to offer to the junta the assurance of my high consideration.—The general in chief of the *etat major general*,—**AUGUSTO BELLARD.**—Madrid, 20th April, 1808.—He added, verbally, to this note such atrocious and unheeded threats, that the junta, no doubt fearful lest they should be realized, and that the tranquillity of Madrid would be shaken, had the weakness to accede to the proposition, and commanded the Marquis de Castelar, by order of the king, the same night, to deliver up the prisoner, which, in fact, was done with great repugnance on his part, and on the part of all the officers who had him in custody.—A proper regard to truth requires that it should be said, that don Francisco Gil, secretary of state and of marine affairs, and in consequence member of the junta of government, opposed the surrender of the prisoner, because it was not authorized by the king.—It is difficult to conceive how, after such direct acts as those that are stated, the junta of government should proceed to inform the council and the public, by the means of two extraordinary gazettes, that the prince of Peace had been delivered up by order of the king. The same difficulty occurs, how this junta could endeavour to excuse its weakness, by distorting expressions of the official correspondence; as for example, a passage in the dispatch addressed to the council, which this tribunal, in its manifest, folio 14 of the

quarto, cites in the following terms:—'As to what respects the prisoner don Manuel Godoy, the king commands me to inform the junta, in order that they may make the proper use of this notice, that his majesty esteems too highly the wish expressed by the emperor of the French, not to gratify it, extending at the same time generosity in favour of a criminal who had offended the royal person.'—With little reflection, it ought to have occurred to them, that this supposed order was not intended to give liberty to the prisoner, but that the king was disposed to extend generosity towards him out of respect to the emperor. In order to know what species of generosity this was, it was only necessary to recur to the decree which his majesty addressed to the council, and which it has inserted, folio 15 of the same edition. Under the same date of the 18th of April, a royal order was addressed to the Marquis de Castelar, notwithstanding his majesty's firm persuasion that his royal parents laboured under a mistake, directing that every care should be taken of the health of the prisoner; and if at the same time the king had commanded that the junta of government should have set him at liberty, such a precaution with regard to his health would have been idle and ridiculous. Besides this, when the junta of government gave an account to the king of the considerations and motives that they had for setting the prisoner at liberty, which are the same that have been stated, his majesty commanded me to reply in the following terms:—'The king is made acquainted with the motives the junta of government had for the delivery of the prisoner without his order.'—The two chief officers of the first secretary of state, and of the cabinet of his majesty, and his secretaries of decrees, don Eusebio de Bardaxi y Azara, and don Luis de Onis (through whose hands they were passed) certify this statement of the junta, and of the reply of the king.—I have considered it to be my duty to publish these transactions, that the whole nation may be informed of the circumstances which occasioned the surrender of don Michael Godoy, which is falsely attributed to his majesty, who never could think of abandoning the solemn promise he gave to his beloved people, to judge him according to the laws, and that we should on this account be more strongly confirmed in the ardent affection we cherish for our beloved king Ferdinand VII. whom God restore, as soon as possible, for the completion of our happiness.—We, don Eusebio Bardaxi y Azara, and don Luis de Onis, secretaries of decrees to our lord the king, and principal of

officers of the first secretary of state, and of the cabinet, certify the fact of the representation of the junta of government, and the answer returned to it by the king; and that they were conceived in the terms stated by the most excellent signor don Pedro Cevallos, in his Expositions; the documents having passed through our hands, and which we authenticate by our signatures.—EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI Y AZARA.—LUIS DE ONIS.—Madrid, Sept. 3, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Manifesto of the Junta of Seville, Aug. 3. 1808. (Continued from p. 576).*

Various supreme juntas and military chiefs have expressed their conviction of this truth.—A conviction of the same springs from the indispensable necessity of a civil government in every nation whose duty is to attend to the happiness of the kingdom, and to which the military may be subordinate. The confidence of the nation, and, consequently, the public funds and the capitals of individuals, must, necessarily, have a civil government for their support. Without it, the military power would, indispensably, be under the necessity of employing violence, with the view of acquiring that confidence which it never could attain, and getting a command of those capitals, which it would be equally impossible for it to bring within its grasp; and thus it would ultimately destroy the public prosperity and happiness, which ought to be the sole object of every government. Let us not vainly flatter ourselves with notions of Roman dictators, and the other military chiefs of the ancient republics: they were placed under very prudent restraints, and the duration of their authority was limited to a very short period. The dangers of complete despotism and usurpation kept them in continual alarm, and compelled them to take very rigorous precautions, which are very incompatible with the habits of modern times. Spain has derived a lesson of wisdom from the history of past ages: she has never thought of appointing a military dictator. Her military chiefs (and it is a fact most honourable to the Spanish name) have been the first to embrace, with the utmost cordiality, a system of things as ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The experience of our times—the confidence of the people in the supreme juntas—the facility and abundance with which pecuniary resource have been placed at their disposal—the heroic loyalty with which the military chiefs and the army have acknowledged and obeyed them, and the hap-

py issue hitherto of their civil administration, and the military enterprises which they have directed, have placed in the most conspicuous light, and established beyond all doubt, this fundamental truth, and most essential political principle.—But who is to create this supreme civil government? Who are to compose it? Where shall be its place of residence? What the extent of its authority? How shall it be established without interrupting the public tranquillity, and producing disunion among the different provinces? How is the public opinion to be so regulated as that, without opposing it, this tranquillity shall be attained, and all risk of disturbance obviated? These are the important and serious questions which we shall now proceed to examine; and upon which, influenced solely by the love of our country, and our anxiety to promote its welfare, we will enter into a frank explanation of our sentiments.—In the various papers that have been published upon this subject, we are told that the cortes should assemble; that they should elect representatives; and farther, that the old council of Castile should convoke them, and the whole of the proceeding should be executed under its authority.—Most assuredly we do not understand the grounds upon which this decision rests. The council of Castile, though a lawful assembly, never convoked the cortes. Why, then, should we give it an authority which it does not possess? Is it because it lent the whole weight of its influence to such important changes, with regard to which it had no powers, nor any authority whatsoever? Is it because it has acted in opposition to those fundamental laws, which it was established to preserve and defend? Is it because it afforded every facility to the enemy to usurp the sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the crown and the dynasty legally in possession, and recognized and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of a shadow of a title to it; for it is incontrovertibly manifest, that the renunciation of Charles IV. in his favour gave him no such claim? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a government created by an authority invalid and illegal, and which had also rendered itself suspected, by the previous commission of acts of so horrible a description, that they may be justly ranked with the most atrocious crimes against the country?—The council of Castile being thus excluded from all consideration—who should convoke the cortes? The authority to convoke them is a part of the peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the king. The provinces would not submit to,

any other authority; they would not unite; there would be no cortes; and should a few delegates assemble, that very circumstance would expose the kingdom to division—the evil which all wish to avoid.—Besides, the cities who have votes in the cortes have not undertaken the defence of the kingdom, nor of themselves, nor in their corporate capacity have they made any effort to defend it. We entertain the most profound respect both for them and their rights; but truth compels us to speak out.—Most undoubtedly, however, the cities who have votes in the cortes, in thus conducting themselves, acted with consummate prudence, and with a due observance of law. The kingdom found itself suddenly without a king and without a government—a situation indeed unknown in our history and to our laws. The people legally resumed the power of appointing a government; and this truth has been openly avowed by various supreme juntas. The people created these juntas without paying any regard to the cities who have votes in the cortes. The legitimate power is therefore deposited with the supreme juntas, and, in virtue of that power, they have governed and do govern with real authority, and have been and still are acknowledged and obeyed by all ranks of subjects, and by all cities in their respective districts, having votes in the cortes. Their situation has not changed; the danger still exists; no new authority has supervened; the lawful authority therefore resides entire in the juntas which the people created, and to which they confided it.—It is, therefore, incontestible that the supreme juntas have the sole and exclusive right of electing those who are to compose the supreme government, as the only means of protecting and preserving the kingdom, whose defence the people have entrusted to them, and which cannot be accomplished but by the establishment of a supreme government. Nothing is more evident than this truth.—And whom shall the supreme junta elect? Most certainly individuals of their own body; for they alone derive their power from the people, and it is in their constituent members that the people have reposed their entire confidence. Should any other persons be chosen, they would possess neither the confidence nor the consent of the people, and all their acts would be null and void; and from this want of confidence, the nation would be exposed to intestine divisions, the last and greatest of all our calamities.—Hence, if there be any province in which the military power has alone been retained, results the absolute necessity of constituting supreme juntas in which the power of the

people shall reside, and by which they may act. Whether they shall be constituted by the petty cortes or any other bodies, their appointment in some form or other is indispensable, in order to the concentration of the legitimate power of the people, and the establishment of a civil government, which shall inspire confidence into the people, and proceed to the choice of persons who shall compose the supreme government, which, under the present circumstances, cannot be legitimate, unless it has its origin in the free consent of the people.—It seems then to be indispensably necessary, that all the supreme juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect from among their own members two deputies to form the supreme government, and the persons so elected should, from that moment, be reputed, and actually be the governors-general of the kingdom; and that as such they should be universally acknowledged and obeyed.—Their authority is well known, and cannot be subject to any doubt. The supreme junta of Valencia has most judiciously marked its extent and limits, in the paper which they published on this question, on the 16th of July. We shall, therefore, be excused from going more at large into the consideration of it.—We will only add, that the supreme juntas ought to be continued with all their appointments and insignia, and be invested with the internal governments of their respective provinces, until the conclusion of the present state of things, but at the same time under due subordination to the supreme government. In those supreme juntas resides the legitimate power of those portions of the people who have respectively created them. It is their duty to take measures for insuring the happiness of their constituents, through the medium of a just government, and vigilantly to protect and defend the rights of every individual among them. For this purpose they ought to give their instructions to their respective deputies, constituting the supreme government; and it will be the duty of the latter to observe them, and to represent and support the claims of their provinces, as far as may be consistent with the general prosperity.—If there existed among us a royal personage, capable of presiding in this supreme government, reason and justice prescribe that he, and no other, should be appointed to that office. But if there be no such royal personage, the supreme government must elect a president from its own body. To obviate every danger, however, the presidency should be temporary, and continue only for a fortnight, a month, or

any other term agreeable to the supreme government; upon the lapse of which period it should be incumbent on them to choose a different person.—We have already remarked, and it is unnecessary to repeat it, that the supreme juntas should elect as deputies to the supreme government such of their members as are most distinguished for their talents, their general knowledge of legislation, and all the branches of public welfare and government, recollecting that they are to be the depositaries of the hopes of the kingdom. The supreme junta, in full reliance upon the generous character of Spaniards, and their ardent attachment to the good of their country, assures itself that intrigue, party, or personal interest or predilections, will have no influence upon this occasion.—The supreme juntas will, in the first instance, appoint the place, which shall be the seat of the supreme government, who shall afterwards adhere to or alter that appointment, as they think fit, according to a plurality of votes. The seat of government, as has been most wisely observed by the supreme junta of Valencia, ought to be at a distance from all the dangers of war, and should, as a claim to preference, possess other advantages of a local nature. Seville conceives herself to possess all these advantages, but has no anxiety to be selected; for she will most cordially sacrifice all her claims to what the other supreme juntas shall decide to be for the general prosperity of the kingdom. The supreme juntas will, therefore, make known their pleasure as to this point, when they notify the election of their deputies. In the meantime we will frankly state that La Mancha appears to us most convenient for the seat of government, and there we would particularly name its large cities of Ciudad Real or Almagro. But on this subject we are nowise anxious; we leave it entirely to the free choice of the supreme juntas.—It remains only that we speak of this supreme junta of Seville, upon which point we shall not say much. Certain persons, either ignorant or malevolent, have endeavoured to spread the persuasion that we affected a superiority over the other provinces. Any such thought has been far from us, although the general good of the nation has been our guide, and as it were the soul of all our determinations. We possessed the only foundery for cannon in the kingdom, and arms and ammunition in a certain degree of abundance. Various captains general acknowledge us from the commencement, and veteran troops were more numerous in our province than in other parts; and thus we formed an army in a

shorter time, and have harassed the enemy, who have surrendered prisoners of war, with their general, Dupont, and have capitulated for the divisions of generals Vedel and Gobert, who are to be conducted to France, amounting, altogether, to 17,000 men, so that there does not remain a single French soldier in arms in the Andalusias; a victory most glorious and singular, which has been effected without the effusion of much Spanish blood, in which it appears we stand alone.—The local situation of the Andalusias presents also a more probable mode of defence against the arms of Napoleon, if he means to attack us; and, with this view, we have united with the Portuguese provinces of Algarve and Alentejo, who have placed themselves under our protection; and the Canary Isles have sent us a deputy for the same purpose.—The greater opulence and other peculiar circumstances of these provinces offer resources which the rest want; and we have thus been enabled to make provision for immense expence, without having received any money from any other part, or imposed any contributions.—The marine arsenal of the isle of Leon, perhaps the most considerable of all, obeyed us from the beginning, and with it the Spanish squadron off Cadiz, whose force is the greatest, and has been since augmented by that of the French moored in that harbour, and surrendered to us at discretion.—Gibraltar, the famous English fortress, is in our territory, and one of the most numerous squadrons of that nation kept our coast in a state of blockade. We immediately, therefore, opened a communication with Gibraltar, and with the English squadron, which has given us all the assistance that was in its power, sent us a resident minister at the very first, and conveyed our deputies to London, to request subsidies, and settle a peace advantageous to the whole nation.—Amidst so many serious cares, we have transmitted all the arms which it was possible to transmit to Granada. Estremadura has received a still greater number, and has experienced our protection, and so has Cordova and Jaen. We have offered arms to La Mancha, to Murcia, to Tarragon, to Gerona, who requested them of us, and we exerted ourselves to the utmost to fulfil the promises which we had made.—We have not forgot the rest of the European provinces and kingdoms, and we hope in time that the effects of our zeal and vigilance will be made clear and public.—The Americas claimed at the first a great share of our attention, in order to preserve that so principal part of the Spanish monarchy. We have

sent envoys and commissaries thither and to Asia, in order that they may unite themselves to us, which we could not do without qualifying ourselves as the supreme junta for the government of Spain and the Indies, and we trust that this title and our cares will not be found useless. So many labours, surrounded by so many dangers, will, we trust, deserve some consideration of our country, for the love and defence of which only we have done and suffered so much.—With all this, we repeat that we neither affect nor desire any superiority. 'Whatever we have done, we owed to our country: it was an indispensable obligation upon us. Our only object is, that Spain may preserve its integrity and independence, for our lord and king, Ferdinand VII; and for that object we joyfully sacrifice our lives. May God, who has so clearly and marvellously shewn his protection of Spain, grant a safe return to its king Ferdinand VII! And then with the supreme government, he will determine what may be his royal will, either commanding an union of the cortes, or by such other means as his prudence may suggest, and will facilitate the reform of abuses and the general happiness of the kingdom, securing it upon such foundations as are firm, and subject to no change.—If these hopes are vain, in which the clemency of God leads us to indulge; then the existing supreme government will itself determine what is most conducive to the interest of the kingdom, conforming itself to the fundamental laws thereof, defending it against the fury and malice of our enemies, and preserving this monarchy, in which itself, the liberty of nations, and the Catholic church, the beloved spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ, is so deeply interested.—Given at the royal palace of Seville, this 3d day of August, 1808.—FRANCIS SAAVEDRA, Archbishop of Laodicea; the Dean of the Chapter of the Holy Church; FRANCIS XAVIER CIENFUEGOS; VINCENT HORE; FRANCIS DIAZ BERMUDO; MANUEL GIL, C. M.; FATHER JOSEPH RAMIREZ; JUAN FERNANDO AGUIRE; Count TILLY; Marquis de la GRANA; Marquis de TORRES, and eleven others.

REVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation by Lieutenant General Hope, commanding the Troops of his Britannic Majesty, for the immediate Security and Tranquillity of Lisbon.*

Inhabitants of Lisbon;—Your country is rescued, and you are restored to freedom: your national flag is flying in every quarter of the kingdom, and his excellency the general-in-chief of the British

army is anxious to establish your civil government upon the same footing in which it was left by your beloved prince, when, assisted by the constant friends of his person and his throne, he escaped from his most insidious enemies. Without losing a moment, we are endeavouring to effect this measure, and to substitute a civil government to the military; to accomplish which, however, some days will be requisite. In order, then, that the evil disposed (if such there be) may not convert true liberty into unbridled licentiousness, and in order to avoid, in the present crisis, the terrible consequences of such disorder, it belongs to the commander-in-chief, and to those to whom he has immediately delegated the superintendence of the public tranquillity of this city, to watch with all vigilance over its peace and quiet, and to give security to the persons and property of its loyal and worthy inhabitants. To obtain this desirable end it will be necessary, for a short time, to maintain strong guards, piquets, and patrols, in various directions, in order to seize and take into custody every person who shall attempt to disturb the public peace.—You may rejoice, inhabitants of Lisbon! You have great cause for gladness; and your English friends, participating in your sentiments, rejoice equally with you. Never let it be permitted, however, that the evil disposed should thereby have an opportunity of promoting insurrection or confusion! But let them beware of such a design! The most vigorous and effective means are prepared for suppressing any attempt of this nature, and all who may be guilty shall be punished according to military law, in the most prompt, rigorous and exemplary manner; and for the purpose of removing every temptation to interrupt the peace of the city, I prohibit, under the present circumstances, the entering the city with arms, and the wearing them in the public streets. All inns and taverns, where wine or spirituous liquors are sold in small quantities, are, for the same reason, required to be shut up at six in the evening, and not to open before sun-rise, under the pain of imprisonment to the dealers, and forfeiture of their liquors.—Finally, I invite all persons, who possess any authority or influence whatever, and whether included or not in the body of the magistracy, and more particularly the holy ministers of religion, to assist the military power in preserving the tranquillity of the capital, until the much wished for object of seeing the constituted civil authorities in the exercise of their functions be obtained.—God save the Prince Regent! Viva! Viva!—J. HOPE, lieutenant-general.

Proclamation, by the British and French Commissioners, for seeing carried into Effect the Convention agreed upon between the respective Commanders-in-Chief. Dated Lisbon, 10th Sept. 1808.

For the fulfilment of the stipulation made in the Convention agreed upon for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army, that property of every kind confiscated, or seized, from the subjects, or other persons residing in Portugal, whether of the royal palace, royal and public libraries, and museums, and from individuals that are still existing in Portugal, should be restored:—We, the commissioners for seeing carried into execution the said treaty, as his excellency the commander of the French army has already notified to his army, think it also right to make public the same for the information of all concerned, and for facilitating the restitution, or the receiving back such property, we have judged expedient to appoint a committee of three persons, viz. lieutenant-colonel Trant, O. Sr. Antonio, Rodrigues de Oliveira, and Mr. Dubliur, commissaire des guerres, to meet at No. 8, Cargo de Loretto, who are appointed to receive, inquire into, and judge of all reclamations on this head, and whose orders for the restitution of property, to whomsoever addressed, are to be obeyed. And it is directed that keepers shall have charge of sequestered or seized property in every house to which it may have been removed, to assure the conservation of objects or moveables transported from royal or public houses, or others, for the use or convenience of such general, administrator, or other subject of the French army. These keepers will make the description of all *meubles* with the name of the owners, and be accountable for whatever is therein, and they will be delivered only on legal proof of ownership, to the possessors of such articles as above described, who will transmit to this committee a return of what each may have in his possession of the property designated. And all persons may with safety apply to this tribunal.—We think it necessary also, to make known to whom it may concern, that any purchase made of articles taken from the public arsenals or stores since the 30th of August, or whatever shall on trial, be proved to have been illegally sold or disposed of at any time, even previous to the 30th August, shall be null and void, the articles seized and the persons purchasing subject to what the law may further direct.—The committee assembled to receive reclamations, and facili-

itate the restitution of property, hold its sittings at the house of Sr. Antonio Rodrigues de Oliveira, No. 8, Cargo de Loretto.—W. C. BERESFORD, Maj. General, PRORY, Lieutenant-Colonel, British commissioners."—Le Général KELLERMAN, Le commissaire Français pour l'exécution de la Convention, du 30 Août.

Address of the Officers of the British Army, to Sir Arthur Wellesley, on presenting him a Piece of Plate.—Camp at St. Antonio de Tugal, Sept. 6, 1808.

SIR:—The commanding officers of corps, and field officers, who have had the honour of serving in the army under your command, anxiously desirous of expressing the high opinion they entertain of the order, activity, and judgment, with which the whole of that force was so ably and successfully directed, from the time of landing, to the termination of your command in the action of Vimeira, request you will accept from them a piece of plate, as a testimony of that sincere esteem and respect which your talents and conduct have so justly inspired.—(Signed) W. W. Blake, major 20th light dragoons, Wm. Robe, lieutenant-colonel commanding royal artillery, James Viney, major royal artillery, H. Elphinstone, captain commanding royal engineers, Edward Gopson, major 5th regiment, and lieutenant-colonel Thomas Eames, major 5th regiment, Henry Bird, captain 5th regiment, and major, Thomas Carnu, major 6th regiment, Arthur Miller, major 6th regiment, J. Cameron, lieutenant-colonel commanding 1st bat. 9th foot, H. Craufurd, major 1st bat. 9th foot, and lieutenant-colonel, D. White, major, 29th regiment, foot, and lieutenant-colonel, G. Way, major 29th regiment, Thomas Egerton, captain 29th regiment, and major, Andrew Creagh, captain 29th regiment, and major, Samuel Hinde, lieutenant-colonel commanding 32d regiment, H. Johnson, major, 32d regiment, John Wood, major, 32d regiment, Robert Coote, captain 32d regiment, and major, Robert Burne, colonel commanding the 36th regiment, Lewis Davis, major 38th regiment, J. Grevell, lieutenant-colonel commanding 38th regiment, J. W. Deane, major 38th regiment, and lieutenant-colonel, E. Miles, major 38th regiment, David Ross, captain 38th regiment, and major, James Kemmis, lieutenant-colonel commanding 40th regiment, and colonel, Henry Thornton, major 40th regiment, Richard Archdull, major 40th regiment, Edward Hull, major 2d battalion 43d, Daniel Heane, major 43d, William Greard, lieutenant-colonel commanding 45th regiment, Andrew Pattan, major 45th regi-

ment, Wm. Gwynn, major 45th regiment, D. Lecky, brevet-major 45th regiment, A. Coghlan, brevet-major 45th regiment, G. J. Walker, col. commanding 50th regiment, J. Ross, lieut. col., commanding 2d battalion of 52d regiment, H. Redwood, major 52d regiment, W. G. Davy, major 5th battalion 60th regiment, W. Woodgate, major 5th battalion 60th regiment, John Gaffe, brevet-major 60th regiment, D. Pack, lieut. col., commanding 71st regiment, D. Campbell, major 71st regiment, Harry Eyre, major, commanding 82d regiment, Chichester M'Donnall, major 82d regiment, J. Robinson, lieut. col., commanding 91st regiment, J. Douglas, major 91st regiment, B. H. Otley, major 91st regiment, and lieut. colonel, D. M'Donnell, captain 91st regiment, and major, Robert Travers, major, commanding 95th regiment.—**STAFF:** Henry Torrens, lieut. col. and military secretary, Geo. Tucker, lieut. col. and deputy adjutant general, Thomas Arbuthnot, major and deputy assistant-general, Andrew Pattan, do. do. do., Wm. Guin, do. do. do., D. Lecky, do. do. do., A. Coghlan, do. do. do., James Bathurst, lieut. col. and deputy quarter-master-general, J. Painy, assistant deputy quarter-master-general.—To which, by their particular request, are added the names of lieutenant-col. Walsh, and the field officers of the 2d battalion of the 9th regiment, which arrived previous to the 21st of August and served in that action.

Camp at St. Anna, near Lisbon, Sept. 18, 1808.—Sir, It has happily fallen to my lot as the eldest field officer in your army, to have the honour of presenting the inclosed address, from the commanding officers of corps, and field-officers serving in it; we have but one sentiment on the occasion, admiration of your talents and confidence in your abilities.—James Kemmis, lieut. col. 40th and colonel.—To the right hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. &c. &c. &c.

September 18, 1808.—Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of this day's date, in which you have transmitted an address, from the officers commanding corps, and the field officers who served under my command in the late operations in Portugal.—I have had more than one occasion of expressing the satisfaction which I had derived, from the state of discipline and order in which we were employed; and my sense of the assistance which I had derived from the officers belonging to the different departments of the army. These advantages rendered our operations easy and certain; and we were enabled to meet the enemy on fair terms in the field of battle.—I beg you

to convey to the field officers of the army, the assurance that I shall not lose the recollection of their services; that I am fully sensible of their kindness towards me; and that I value highly their good opinion.—I have the honour to be, Sir, &c. ARTHUR WELLESLEY.—Colonel Kemmis, 10th Regiment.

AMERICA.—*Mr. Jefferson's Answer to the Inhabitants of Boston, who prayed a Repeal of the Embargo. Dated August 26, 1808.*

Your representation and request were received on the 22d instant, and have been considered with the attention due to every expression of the sentiments and feelings of so respectable a body of my fellow-citizens. No person has seen, with more concern than myself, the inconvenience brought on our country in general, by the circumstances of the times in which we happen to live; times to which the history of nations presents no parallel. For years we have been looking as spectators on our brethren of Europe, affected with all those evils which necessarily follow an abandonment of the moral rules which bind men and nations together. Connected with them in friendship and commerce, we have happily so far kept aloof from their calamitous conflicts, and by a steady observance of justice towards all, by much forbearance and multiplied sacrifices. At length, however, all regard to the rights of others having been thrown aside, the belligerent powers have beset the highway of commercial intercourse with edicts, which, taken together, expose our commerce and mariners under almost every destination, a prey to their fleets and armies. Each party indeed would admit our commerce with themselves, with the view of associating us in their war against the other. But we have wished war with neither.—Under these circumstances were passed the laws of which you complain by those delegated to exercise the power of legislation for you, with every sympathy of a common interest in exercising them faithfully. In reviewing these measures, therefore, we should advert to the difficulties out of which a choice was, of necessity, to be made. To have submitted our rightful commerce to prohibitions, and tributary exactions from others, would have been to surrender our independence—to resist them by arms was war, without consulting the state of things or the choice of the nation. The alternative preferred by the legislature of suspending a commerce placed under such unexampled difficulties, besides saving to our citizens their property, and our mari-

ners to their country, has the peculiar advantage of giving time to the belligerent nations to revise a conduct as contrary to their interests as it is to our rights.—In the event of such peace, or suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers of Europe, or such change in their measures affecting neutral commerce, as may render that of the United States sufficiently safe in the judgment of the president, he is authorised to suspend the embargo. But no peace or suspension of hostilities, no change of measures affecting neutral commerce, is known to have taken place; the orders of England, and the decrees of France and Spain, existing at the date of these laws, and still unrepealed, as far as we know. In Spain, indeed, a contest for the government appears to have arisen; but of its course or prospects, we have no information, on which prudence would undertake a hasty change in our policy, even were the authority of the executive competent to such decision.—You desire that, in this defect of power, Congress may be specially convened. It is unnecessary to examine the evidence, or the character of the facts, which are supposed to dictate such a call; because you will be sensible on an attention to dates, that the legal period of their meeting is as early as, in this extensive country, they could be fully convened by a special call.—I should, with great willingness, have executed the wishes of the inhabitants of Boston, had peace, or a repeal of the obnoxious edicts, or other changes, produced the case in which alone the laws have given me that authority; and so many motives of justice and interest lead to such changes, that we ought continually to expect them.—But while these edicts remain, the legislature alone can prescribe the course to be pursued.—THOS. JEFFERSON.

The President Jefferson's Answer to the Dissent of the Republicans from the Proceedings of the Town of Boston, relative to the Embargo.

I have duly received the address of that portion of the citizens of Boston who have declared their approbation of the present suspension of our commerce, and their dissent from the representation of those of the same place who wished its removal. A division of sentiment was not unexpected; on no question can a perfect unanimity be hoped, or certainly it would have been between war and embargo, the only alternatives presented to our choice; for the general capture of our vessels would have been war upon one side, which reason and interest would repel by war and reprisal on our part.—Of the

several interests comprising those of the United States, that of manufactures would of course prefer to war a state of non-intercourse so favourable to their rapid growth and prosperity.—Agriculture, although sensibly feeling the loss of market for its produce, would find many aggravations in a state of war.—Commerce and navigation, or that portion which is foreign, in the inactivity to which they are reduced by the present state of things, certainly experience their full share in the general inconvenience; but whether war would be to them a preferable alternative, is a question their patriotism would never hastily propose. It is to be regretted, however, that overlooking the real sources of sufferings, the British and French edicts, which constitute the actual blockade of our foreign commerce and navigation, they have, with too little reflection, imputed them to laws which have preserved them from greater, and have saved for our own use, our vessels, property, and seamen, instead of adding them to the strength of those with whom we might eventually have to contend.—The embargo, giving time to the belligerent powers to revise their unjust proceedings, and to listen to the dictates of justice, or interest and reputation, which equally urge the correction of their wrongs, has availed our country of this only honourable expedient of avoiding war; and should a repeal of these edicts supersede the cause for it, our commercial brethren will become sensible, that it has consulted their interest, however against their own will. It will be unfortunate for their country, if in the meantime these their expressions of impatience should have the effect of prolonging the very sufferings which have produced them, by exciting a fallacious hope that we may, under any pressure, relinquish our equal rights of navigating the ocean, go to such ports as others may prescribe, and there pay the tributary exactions they may impose; an abandonment of national independence and essential rights revolving to every manly sentiment. While these edicts are in force, no American can ever consent to a return of peaceable intercourse with those who maintain them. I am in the approach of the period when the feelings and the wisdom of the nation will be collected in their representatives assembled together. To them are committed our rights, to them our wrongs are known, and they will pronounce the remedy they call for; and I hear with pleasure from all, as well those who approve as those who disapprove of the present measures, assurances of an implicit acquiescence in the annunciation of the general will, I

beg leave, through you, to communicate this answer to the address, on which your signature had the first place, and to add assurances of my respect — (Signed) THOMAS JEFFERSON. — To Col. Edward Proctor.

Petition of the Subscribers, Officers of Merchant Ships, belonging to the Port of Philadelphia, to Thomas Jefferson, Esq. President of the United States of America :

Respectfully Sheweth, that in consequence of the present embargo laws, the situation of your petitioners is grievous and afflicting; that they have been engaged in the mercantile service since their infancy, with few exceptions, and accustomed only to conduct ships or vessels across the ocean; that from the operation of the present restrictive laws, they find themselves cut off from their usual employment, and of course the means of subsistence are gone.—Your petitioners are well acquainted with the duties of conducting ships from port to port—well versed in naval tactics, but unable to handle the harrow or plough.—Your petitioners have for a long time borne with patience, the privations incident to these restrictive laws, without murmur or complaint; but when imperious necessity compels them to disclose the cause of their grievances, they humbly suppose they have a right so to do in a decent and respectful manner.—Your petitioners, therefore, pray that your excellency will take their case into consideration, and adopt such measures as will relieve the wants of your petitioners; or, if there are vacancies in the navy to give to your petitioners, or some of them, an opportunity of serving therein, as they think themselves capable of performing services of that nature. They, however, submit their whole cause to your consideration, hoping your excellency will adopt such measures as wisdom and justice may point out, and as in duty bound will pray, &c — Philadelphia, August 10th 1808.

The President's Answer.

SIR.—In answer to the petition which you delivered me from the officers of merchant vessels belonging to Philadelphia, I must premise my sincere regret at the sacrifices which our fellow citizens in general, and the petitioners in particular, have been obliged to meet, by the circumstances of the times. We live in an age of affliction, to which the history of nations presents no parallel; we have for years been looking on Europe covered with blood and violence, and seen ra-

pine spreading itself over the ocean. On this element it has reached us, and at length in so serious a degree, that the legislature of the nation has thought it necessary to withdraw our citizens and property from it, either to avoid or to prepare for engaging in the general contest. But for this timely precaution, the petitioners and their property might now have been in the hands of spoilers, who have laid aside all regard to moral right. Withdrawing from the greater evil, a lesser has been necessarily encountered; and certainly; could the legislature have made provision against this also, I should have had great pleasure as the instrument of its execution; but it was impracticable by any general and just rules to prescribe, in every case, the best resource against the inconveniences of this new situation. The difficulties of the crisis will certainly fall with greater pressure, on some description of citizens than others, and on none perhaps with greater than on our seafaring brethren. Should any means of alleviation occur within the range of my duties, I shall with certainty advert to the situation of the petitioners, and in availing the nation of their services, aid them with a substitute for their former occupation. I salute them and yourself with sentiments of sincere regard.

“ TH. JEFFERSON.”

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HOLLAND.—*Dutch Commercial Decree, dated 18th October, 1808.*

Louis Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitution of the kingdom, king of Holland, and constable of France, has decreed and decrees as follows:—Art. I. The exportation, by sea, of the produce of the kingdom, hitherto permitted to be exported to neutral ports, is provisionally suspended until further orders.—Art. II. The superintendence of the coast shall be divided into three grand precincts; the first, extending from the Helder to the Isle of Walcheren, inclusive; the second from the Helder, inclusive, to Harlingen; and the third from Harlingen to the Jahde, inclusive.—Art. III. The commanders-in-chief shall be personally responsible for the execution of the dispositions that relate to the complete shutting of all the ports of the kingdom, and the prevention of all communication with the enemy, and likewise of all that we may hereafter decree. They shall daily transmit a report to our ministers of what relates to their respective departments.

(To be continued.)

TO THE
REV. EDMUND FOULTER.
(See his Letter below.)

SIR,

Without any waste of time or room for the sake of ceremony, I shall, at once, and following the order you have pursued, endeavour to answer every part of the letter, which you did me the honour to send me on Thursday evening last, which should, if I had had it three hours sooner, have appeared in the Register of the last week, and which I now am about to send forth to the public.

First, then, Sir, you complain of the *partiality* of the gentlemen, by whom the Report of the Proceedings was taken and published. I really did not, when I read the Report, perceive in it any marks of partiality. It appeared to me to be as nearly correct as such a report could be expected to be. You cite, however, a particular instance; and, in this you are unfortunate; for, I myself am ready to take my oath, that you, in speaking of Mr. Garnier, described him as your "near and dear relation." I have, since I have received your letter, put this question to six gentlemen, who were present, two of them clergymen: "What was it that Mr. Poulter called Mr. Garnier, when he gave his reasons for not having called me to order when I was going into that subject?" The answer of every one has been: "he called him his near and dear relation." Besides this, I well remember, that, while you were speaking, a gentleman upon my right hand, asked me *how* you were the *relation* of Mr. Garnier; and, while at dinner, the same day, there being none present but persons of the county, there arose a conversation upon this very question of relationship. To be at issue, thus, upon a point of fact, is not pleasant; but, it is generally true, that no one remembers so imperfectly what a speaker says, in the heat of disputation, as the speaker himself. Ask any of your friends, Sir, who were near you, in the Hall; and I am satisfied, that you will find reason to doubt your own accuracy, in this respect, at least. That you should *forget* what you said, in the haste of the moment, is not

only probable, but it is what one would naturally expect; but, that you should now give us, as *the very words*; that you should now lay before the public, marked by inverted commas, words which you did not utter, does, I must confess, greatly surprise me; and my surprise is not diminished by the reflection, that it is a matter of no importance, as far as I can conceive, what the words were; for, what difference could it possibly make, as to the merits of the case before the meeting, whether Mr. Garnier was your relation, or not? What possible inducement could the reporters have to misrepresent you in a thing of this sort? Supposing their partialities to have been against you, what end could they propose to themselves in making the world believe that you were the relation, instead of the friend and admirer, of the person of whom mention had been made?

As to my being *out of order*, in introducing the subject of Mr. Garnier and his immense emoluments, that I now deny, as I denied at the time. To talk over again the demerits of the Convention appeared to me to be quite useless; but, nothing seemed more proper, in addressing one's self to a meeting of *tax-payers*, than to show the causes of the friendship and support with the Convention-makers found; and, the particular instance in question was a very striking one of the interest which some persons had, and must naturally have, in a continuation of the war, at all events, and to which continuation the Portugal Convention was so manifestly a friend. The people want to be made acquainted with *facts*. They have so long been bandied about from faction to faction, that they cannot know what to think. They cannot know their friends from their enemies. The way is to give them some facts; names and dates and sums. Fix their attention to things, and not amuse them with sounds. The corrupters and the corrupted want nothing more than to keep facts from the people. Neither faction exposes, or attempts to expose, the other, in those points where the public are really interested. They quarrel; they hate one another most sincerely; but, their hatred is that of rivals, that of rivals for

plunder; and, they take care not to attack the object of their common pursuit.

—We were met for the purpose of considering, whether it was proper to petition the king for inquiry into the cause of a great military failure. You called me to order, because I was making a statement of the expense of supporting the Duke of York, of whose failures and of whose memorable Convention at the Helder, I had just been speaking, as of the example, which had led to all our subsequent disgraceful capitulations and conventions. And, if this was not being in order, what could be so? Was I not, when I was speaking of the services of a person, to speak also of the compensation, which he received for those services? Why was this, above all other matter, to be avoided? Was it because you did not wish the people to know how their money was expended? Were you afraid, Sir, that they would begin to perceive, that the sacrifices they were making were not for the defence of their country? I can see no other reason; but, if another such opportunity should occur, the cry of *order* shall not prevent me from proceeding to discharge what I deem my bounden duty.

With respect to Mr. Garnier and his patent and emoluments, I should be fully justified in refusing to admit into my Register, any answer to what I thought proper to say at a public meeting of the county. The time and place for answering me was when and where the speech was made. I am ready, however, to admit any thing respecting *this* matter, until the discussion be fairly closed, because it is a matter of deep and general interest; but, I must, before I proceed further, beg you to observe, that it is upon this account that I admit your letter, and not from any persuasion, that I am bound to give an opponent at Winchester an opportunity of reviving the debate in my Register, which is intended for general circulation; for, otherwise, every one who had a dispute with me, no matter of what kind, might claim the insertion of his letters, and the public, as far as they read my publication, would be entertained with, at best, the mere politics of Hampshire.

Mr. Garnier's is a case of great and general importance. I am happy, that he has, through you, challenged this sort of discussion; not, because I am convinced, that he will have cause to repent of having yielded to the suggestions of zealous, though injudicious, friendship; but, because I regard his party, and the concern growing out of it, as being amongst those flagrant abuses, the exposure of which must, in time, work

a change in the minds of the people, and a rapid nation.

You tell me, Sir, that Mr. Garnier "loaths and abhors the very name and nature of war;" and this, "from his general feelings of humanity, and from his having lost four sons in the service of his country by the war; and that most happily would he restore the money he has gained by the patent, if the blood he has lost could be restored to him." Now, Sir, this is very full of fine sentiment, and might do very well in a modern romance. But, how far will it stand the test of reason? Why did he place four sons in the army, or navy, if he loathed and abhorred the very name and nature of war? He, surely, intended they should, sometime or other, go forth to fight? Or, if he made them soldiers, or sailors, upon the speculation of continual peace, I see, in his conduct, nothing better than the proof of a desire to obtain for them a livelihood out of the public burthens without any corresponding services. This is a dilemma, Sir, from which, I am of opinion, you will find it very difficult to extricate Mr. Garnier. It is in vain, that you apply a general argument in support of a statement from personal knowledge; it is in vain, that you tell me, that "his liberal education, generous habits, and paternal feelings, would prevent him from baser affections for interests;" for I shall be satisfied with nothing but conclusions, drawn from facts. Look, Sir, into the list of places and pensions; and there you will find proofs of greediness and meanness too hateful to be described, in persons, who have had, what you are pleased, in the common phrase of the day, to call a "liberal education." Indeed, it would seem, that, in many instances, such education, instead of having produced dignified notions; instead of having given rise to independence of mind and of conduct, is looked upon as a sufficient plea for saddling the possessor as a sort of state pauper upon the public. This education, call it what you will, has a degrading effect. I have never yet seen it productive of any thing great or praiseworthy. I see it sending forth a train of shameless drones and peculators; and, therefore, I despise it. Of Mr. Garnier's generosity we shall, presently, see some instances not to be controverted; but, give me leave to make a general observation; and that is, that, according to the old maxim, we should be just before we are generous. The Apostle, you well know, Sir, bids us give to those who need, a precept which he had copied from his Master; but, he says

get it by our labour; then it is to be able to call it our own, in conscience as well as in law, before we attempt to give it away. Whether Mr. Garnier's generosity will stand this test we are now proceeding to inquire.

The date and the duration of Mr. Garnier's patent you have accurately stated. It has been in the hands of his father and himself for *seventy-four years*; during that time they have had, in virtue of their patent, a *monopoly* of the supply of the army with *medicines and surgical instruments*. Mr. Garnier himself has never, in any instance, performed any part of the duty; and yet, besides the immense profits derived from the monopoly, he, who never has done an hour's duty, who has been proved upon oath never to have given a moment's attendance, in any way whatever in the public service, has been in the receipt, and is now in the receipt, of the pay of *ten shillings a day*, as being upon the staff of the army, though he "loaths" and abhors the very name and nature of "war!" Sir, fine sentiments will not silence this fact. Talk to me not of the natural effect of a "*liberal education*;" talk to me not of Mr. Garnier's "*generosity*;" for, if ever there was a proof of consummate *meanness*, it is that which we here have before us. Good God! Look at the estates in and about Wickham; look at the endless church preferment of his sons; look at his splendid mansion and equipage, and his numerous train of menials. Look at all this; consider that it has all come from the public burthens and without one day's service on the part of the possessor; consider that this possessor still receives, in pay from that public, the sum of ten shillings a day, as an officer upon the staff of the army, in which office he has never acted for one hour; and then insult us, who are the payers of this man; then insult us again, I say, with an argument, in favour of his disinterestedness, founded on his "*liberal education*" and his "*generous habits*!"

I should now enter upon a refutation of the statement, which you have made with respect to the *profits* of Mr. Garnier. But, Sir, you are not to learn, that, early in the present year, a Report, relative to his department, was laid before parliament by the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, which Report, as far as it relates to the said profits, I shall, before I proceed further with my own observations, quote, word for word. The Commissioners first observe, that there is no efficient check to Mr. Garnier's Accounts, either as to quantity, quality, or

price. The Report then states, that the prices for the Medicines and Materials were referred before the Commissioners; and, in the extract from their Report, you will find it completely refuted.—"Before we proceed to state the course we have followed in endeavouring to get at a correct judgment of the prices allowed in these bills, it may be proper to notice, that the form of the certificate, at present signed by the physician and surgeon general, differs from that which was in use when Sir Clifton Wintringham was physician general to the army. His certificate states, 'that the medicines and materials, as recited in the invoices, had, agreeable to their respective dates, been carefully viewed and examined by him, and that they were found to be very good; and further, that he believes the prices, as far as his inquiries could ascertain, were reasonable, as being rated at the current price which they bore at the time they were supplied by the apothecary general.' From this form of certificate we infer, that the very articles named in the invoices had been examined by the physician general on the dates of their being placed in the packages; and that the current rate of price on the days of the supply was that which was certified by him.—The present form of the certificate states, that the physician general and surgeon general 'have, from time to time, carefully examined the different articles contained in the account, and that they have uniformly found them of the best quality.' Whatever inference may be drawn from the words used in this certificate, we learn from Mr. Clarke, that there is no security but, the integrity of the parties employed," that the articles which have been inspected are the articles which had been issued from the laboratory.—The present certificate further states, that "having examined the prices charged, and having taken into consideration the directions received from the treasury, that they were to pay attention to the delay in the payment, they are of opinion, that the apothecary general's charges to the public are fair and reasonable." This part of the present certificate does not, like the former certificate, afford a ground for inferring that the prices which are certified are at the current rate of the days of supply; but the physician general says, "that in

"checking the apothecary general's charges, he always takes into consideration the variation in the prices of the medicines." On an inspection, however, of the two accounts which we have procured from the treasury, one of which amounts to about forty-four thousand five hundred pounds, and the other to upwards of seventy-five thousand pounds, we cannot find, except in one or two instances, that there is any variation in the prices charged in each year; notwithstanding the supply is extended through the whole of the year; and we have understood that, in one material article at least, that of bark, there was a very great variation in its price during one of the years.—We have remarked too, on an investigation of those bills, that the prices charged by the apothecary general have been *uniformly* admitted; for we can find no alteration of deduction in any one of the charges. Yet this allowance for the delay in payment is not added by the physician and surgeon general at the end of the account as a percentage for a certain specified period on the sum total of it, but *forms part of the charges* on some or all of the items; and must be considered, therefore, as being left to the discretion of the apothecary general.—It is obvious how difficult it must be to check such charges, by comparing them with the charges made by others in the trade. But, conceiving that the most satisfactory mode of doing it would be to compare the total amount charged by the apothecary general for certain invoices of medicines furnished to the army, with the total amount which others would have charged for the same under similar circumstances, we submitted particular invoices of medicines, furnished by the apothecary general in the years 1804 and 1805, but without his prices affixed, to the consideration of two or three eminent druggists and chemists, and we desired them to affix the prices which the best articles of the kind bore in those years. And, for a future comparison, we procured from the ordnance and transport boards the bills for medicines supplied for their use during the years 1804 and 1805; the first of these boards being supplied by a druggist, and the other by the apothecaries company.—The blank invoice which we submitted to Messrs. Kempson and Co. druggists in London, was, for a regimental chest of medicines furnished by the apothecary general in 1803, the

one for which we submitted to us by Mr. Calvert Clarke. It will be seen on an inspection of the two columns in which the different rates of charge of the apothecary general and of Messrs. Kempson and Co. are given, that the rates of the first are almost in every instance higher than those of Messrs. Kempson, and on the amount of the whole, are 40 per-cent. higher than theirs: yet Mr. Kempson says, that his prices would have afforded him *something handsome in the way of profit*; and that the price of bark, particularly, is taken at a high valuation.—The blank bills submitted to Messrs. Godfrey and Cooke, and to Messrs. Corbyn and Co., also chemists and druggists in London, were copied from invoices of much larger quantities than that submitted to Mr. Kempson, and were selected from the apothecary general's bills for 1804 and 1805. On an inspection of the comparative statement in the Appendix, of the rates of the charge of the apothecary general, and of the gentlemen before named, it appears that there is often a difference in the prices of these gentlemen as between themselves, and that, in some instances, their prices exceed those of the apothecary general; but that, on the whole, his prices exceed those of Messrs. Godfrey and Cooke by 41 per-cent. and of Messrs. Corbyn and Co. by 18 per-cent in the year 1804; and in 1805 they exceed the first by 37, and the second by 19 per-cent. Some explanation, however, is necessary in this place: it is well known that the prices which merchants and tradesmen charge for the articles they furnish are, in a great measure, regulated by the quantity furnished, by the credit which is given, and by the risk of payment; and, without a consideration of these circumstances, no comparison can be justly made. In the present case, we learn from Mr. Cooke, the partner of Mr. Godfrey, that his prices are fixed on the principle of his customer being a merchant buying largely, and at six months credit: "was the credit," he says, "to be extended to 12 months in addition (or 18 months altogether) he would have added about 10 per-cent. to his prices." If, comparing, therefore, Messrs. Godfrey and Cooke's prices with the apothecary general's, £10 per-cent. ought to be added to the former; for the apothecary general's bills were seldom paid sooner than eighteen months,

and sometimes not until two years after the supply was made. With respect to Messrs. Corbyn and Co.'s prices, it is to be understood that, in fixing them, they have proceeded on the principle of the articles being furnished to apothecaries, to whom they give twelve months credit: but they look on the risk, it seems, in this case, to be considerable, and they have taken it accordingly into their valuation. They have also calculated their prices on the small quantities of medicines usually furnished to apothecaries; but if such large quantities were furnished, as were described to be furnished in a year by the apothecary general, Mr. Messer (of Messrs. Cowbyn's house) thought that Messrs. Corbyn's prices should be reduced 10 per cent. on drugs, and 20 per cent. on chemical preparations; and, were the payment delayed for eighteen months, or two years, Mr. Messer says, taking into consideration the quantity of the supply, with *certainly* of payment, that he still thinks the prices which his house had affixed to the bills *ought to satisfy any person*. On the whole, therefore, we may consider that the prices of Messrs. Godfrey and Cooke, and of Messrs. Corbyn and Co. under the circumstances of a wholesale supply, and 18 months credit, without risk, would not have materially differed from each other. But these are the circumstances under which the apothecary general has furnished medicines, &c. to the army, and these prices are about one fifth higher than those which we have last considered. —We observe, on an inspection of the medicine bills of the ordnance and transport boards, for the years 1804 and 1805, that the prices of some of the more valuable articles, unlike what we had observed in the apothecary general's bills, vary frequently in the course of the same year. This circumstance, at the same time that it proved the inefficiency of the check on his prices, made it difficult for us to compare them with those charges to the two boards. We have extracted the prices, however, of some of the articles most commonly in use, from his bill for the month of July, in the year 1805, and the prices for the same kind of articles charged to the ordnance board by Messrs. Bush and Howard, and to the transport board by the apothecary company in the same year, and month, and we have arranged them in separate columns. This arrangement shows, that the prices of the apothecary general do not much exceed those

of the apothecaries company; but that they exceed those of Messrs. Bush and Howard nearly sixty per cent. It must not be overlooked, however, that the bills of the apothecaries company are delivered in quarterly to the transport board, and, after having been examined, are paid by 90 days bills, but without interest. Such a difference in the time of payment may sufficiently account, perhaps, for the apothecary general's excess of charge beyond the apothecaries company. The ordnance medicine bills are also made out quarterly, and, after being certified by the surgeon general belonging to that department, are sent to the surveyor general's office, and are discharged in course. In this case too, therefore, an addition ought to be made to the prices, in order to make a correct comparison between them and those of the apothecary general; but this addition must be much less than sixty per cent.—The result of this course of inquiry would shew, if the prices of the apothecaries company are to be the criterion by which to examine the apothecary general's bills, that the prices which have been allowed him are not very improper. But *ought these prices alone to have guided those whose duty it has been to examine his accounts?*—Had the prices of the most eminent of the trade been also resorted to, for the purpose of checking the account, it would have appeared that, even taking into consideration the delay of payment, the prices of the apothecary general have exceeded, BY ONE-FIFTH AT LEAST, what should have been allowed him.—We have already noticed that the subject of the supply of surgical instruments for the use of the army, by the apothecary general, had heretofore been under the consideration of the lords of the treasury, and that their lordships were pleased to approve of his continuing to supply these articles.—In Mr. Garnier's representation to their lordships, after stating the grounds on which he claimed the right, under his patent, to supply surgical instruments (which we have before alluded to), he went further, "that he has an equal right to be paid for them in the same manner as his predecessors have been paid, that is, by charging the instruments to government at a fair price, as between tradesman and consumer, and not by a net addition on the first cost of the commodity," which it appears, it had been proposed to allow him, to the extent of 10 per cent.

“ Mr. Garnier added, “ that such a plan,
 “ “ if adopted, would have been attended
 “ “ with considerable loss to government ;
 “ “ for that then the instruments must have
 “ “ been bought on the same credit as go-
 “ “ vernment took of him, and that Savig-
 “ “ ny and Evans were the only two per-
 “ “ sons in the trade competent to give
 “ “ credit ; and he alleges that these per-
 “ “ sons’ charge to him on an annual credit,
 “ “ would have exceeded, by 10 per cent.
 “ “ what Mr. Garnier charged, which, ad-
 “ “ ded to the proposed commission, would
 “ “ have made a real loss to government of
 “ “ 20 per cent.” Mr. Garnier subjoined
 “ “ a statement of what he then (1797)
 “ “ charged for each set of instruments cal-
 “ “ led capitals, and what would have been
 “ “ the charge if the plan had been adopted.
 “ “ In this he states, that his charge was
 “ “ £17 17s per set ; but that, if bought on
 “ “ an annual credit, the charge to him would
 “ “ be £19 9s to which adding 10 per cent.
 “ “ commission, the whole price would be
 “ “ £21 8s, or a loss to government of
 “ “ £3 11s, (i. e.) 20 per cent.—It is mani-
 “ “ fest, on a view of this statement, that it
 “ “ cannot be correct ; for it assumes the
 “ “ point in question, and proceeds on the
 “ “ supposition that the instruments could not
 “ “ have been procured by Mr. Garnier at
 “ “ less than 10 per cent. above the price
 “ “ which, even under the circumstance of
 “ “ the long delay in payment, was charged
 “ “ by him to government. That which we
 “ “ are about to state will shew that he was
 “ “ altogether mistaken in his representation
 “ “ on this point. For we have examined
 “ “ Mr. Evans, one of the tradesmen to whom
 “ “ Mr. Garnier alludes, on the subject. We
 “ “ selected Mr. Evans, because it appeared
 “ “ that his house has furnished surgical in-
 “ “ struments to the navy hospitals, under
 “ “ the orders of the transport board, for a
 “ “ considerable number of years. We have
 “ “ confined our inquiries relative to Mr.
 “ “ Evans’s prices to the period subsequent to
 “ “ 1802, because, by a prior regulation, the
 “ “ instruments which are to constitute what
 “ “ are called full sets of capitals, and port-
 “ “ able sets of capitals, are particularly enu-
 “ “ merated ; and therefore, when Mr. Evans
 “ “ speaks of these different collections, it is
 “ “ evident that he speaks of the same as are
 “ “ charged in the apothecary general’s bills
 “ “ by those names. In these bills for the
 “ “ years 1804 and 1805, we find that the
 “ “ charge for full sets is always *nineteen*
 “ “ *pounds nineteen shillings* each, and *thir-*
 “ “ *teen pounds five shillings* for each set of
 “ “ portables. During this period, Mr.

“ Evans has charged *sixteen pounds sixteen*
 “ *shillings* for the first, and *nine pounds*
 “ *nine shillings* for the second, including in
 “ “ both the price of the cases. These are
 “ “ Mr. Evans’s prices, however, when these
 “ “ articles were sold on the usual credit ;
 “ “ and therefore it may be remarked, that
 “ “ they can be no fit criterion by which to
 “ “ judge of the apothecary general’s prices,
 “ “ for that he was seldom paid under eighteen
 “ “ months, and sometimes not until two
 “ “ years after the supply. To meet this ob-
 “ “ jection, Mr. Evans was asked, what
 “ “ would have been his prices under such a
 “ “ circumstance ? But adding to the question
 “ “ at the same time (what was the fact in
 “ “ respect of the apothecary general), that
 “ “ the supply of surgical instruments in each
 “ “ year had amounted, on an average, to
 “ “ seven thousand pounds, with no ultimate
 “ “ risk of payment. His answer shews,
 “ “ that under all these circumstances, he
 “ “ would not only not have added to the prices
 “ “ before named by him, but that he would
 “ “ have deducted from the total amount
 “ “ “ certainly not less than 5 per-cent.”
 “ “ This, therefore, ought to have been the
 “ “ principle on which the apothecary general
 “ “ should have made his charges ; for it is
 “ “ the rule of charging between the trades-
 “ “ man and the consumer, for which he con-
 “ “ tends. His charge, however, for a full
 “ “ set of capitals, is about 19 per-cent. above
 “ “ Mr. Evans’s, and 40 per-cent. above Mr.
 “ “ Evans’s charge for a set of portables : and
 “ “ these prices have been allowed (as it
 “ “ should seem without inquiry) by those
 “ “ whose duty it was to check the charge.—
 “ “ We have learned another fact from Mr.
 “ “ Evans deserving of attention, also, on a
 “ “ view of the prices which have been char-
 “ “ ged, and allowed, in the apothecary ge-
 “ “ neral’s bills. The screw tourniquets,
 “ “ for which the apothecary general always
 “ “ charges *twelve shillings and sixpence each*,
 “ “ are sold singly by Mr. Evans at *ten shil-*
 “ “ *lings and sixpence*, and under a sort of
 “ “ contract with the transport board, are
 “ “ supplied by him to the navy at *eight shil-*
 “ “ *lings each* ; being an addition to Mr.
 “ “ Evans’s prices of *above 50 per-cent.* by
 “ “ the apothecary general, as a compensation
 “ “ for an extension of credit of 15 or 18
 “ “ months.—The evidence which we have
 “ “ thus produced shews, we think, a very
 “ “ blameable inattention, in checking the apo-
 “ “ thecary general’s charges in respect of
 “ “ surgical instruments, for the slightest in-
 “ “ quiries would have enabled those to
 “ “ whose consideration the prices were re-
 “ “ ferred, to have ascertained that the char-

“*gas were extravagant.*—The total charge for instruments from the beginning of 1796 to the end of 1806, or for 11 years, amounts to £72,919. 4s. 8d. or nearly £7000 per annum on an average. When it is known that the regimental surgeons have always found their own instruments, the propriety of directing so large an additional supply for the use of the army may well be questioned. The statement, which we shall give hereafter, of the quantity now in store, will evince, we think, that there has been a very great disregard to the public interest in making such a provision.—The apothecary general's bills for 1804 and 1805 include large charges for sugar, pearl barley, oatmeal, paper, sheets, bottles, packing-cases, &c. Many of these articles are not usually provided by apothecaries, and therefore it may be imagined, that neither the physician general nor surgeon general can be very competent to judge of the propriety of the prices charged for them. Had they inquired, however, into the matter, they would have found, perhaps as we have found, that even admitting an extra charge on account of the delay of payment, the prices charged are improperly great.—We have come to this conclusion from an examination of Messrs. Trotters' charges for similar articles supplied to general hospitals, also, in those years, and from the returns made by Messrs. Curtis and Clarke, corn-factors, and Messrs. Harrisons, bottle-merchants, of the prices which similar articles in their different trades bore during the same period. It must be observed, that in Messrs. Trotters' course of dealings with government they have been used, at least during 1804, calculating on a year's credit to government, to charge about 20 per cent. on the money price of the articles furnished by them; yet their charge for hospital sheets is *seven shillings and four pence*, at the time that the apothecary general's charge is *ten shillings*; and, when the apothecary general charges *eleven pence per pound* for Muscovado sugar, Messrs. Trotters' charge only *eight pence per pound*: their charge for corks is *two shillings and four pence per gross*; the apothecary general's *six shillings*; he charges for bottles at the rate of *60 shillings per gross for quarts, and 56 shillings per gross for pints*, at the time when, we learn from Messrs. Harrisons, the first were sold by them at *40 shillings per gross*, and the second at *36 shillings per gross* on a credit of six months, and with a discount,

“*for money, of one shilling and sixpence per gross*; and these prices we understand to have been the current prices of the trade for the last four years. The market price for oatmeal in 1804, as it is to be seen in the returns, fluctuated between 17 and 23 shillings, and averaged during the 12 months *nineteen shillings*; and for Scotch barley, between fourteen and *twenty-two shillings*, and averaged during the same period eighteen shillings; yet the first article is charged by the apothecary general, throughout the year, at *twenty-six shillings per cwt.* and the second at *twenty-seven shillings per cwt.* The total of the charges for this description of articles makes comparatively but a small part, certainly, of the certified amount of the apothecary general's bills; yet it confirms our opinion of the inefficiency of the check on his charges, and of the great loss which the public has sustained from a loose observance of the order of the treasury directing the physician general and surgeon general, in considering the justness of his prices, to pay attention to the delay of payment to him.”

Now, Sir, unless this Report of the Commissioners is *false*; unless they, or the persons they examined, have *lied*, what you assert, respecting the amount of Mr. Garnier's gains, is not true, but, on the contrary, is greatly and manifestly wide of the truth.—I stated Mr. Garnier to pocket of the public money 12,000 and some odd pounds a year. This I took from his own amount of *profits* for the last three years. You deny that this is a fair way of calculating; and, you assert, that the *average* of his gains is not nearly so great. If, by an average, you mean the average upon all the 74 years that the patent and monopoly have been in the family, your assertion is, doubtless, true; because when the patent was first granted, the army did not, in all probability, amount, upon a run of years, to thirty thousand men, instead of three hundred thousand men, as it now does. But, you well know, that I could have no such average in contemplation; you must know, that what I meant to state, and what I did state, was the sum he *now* receives and clears annually; and, in making this statement, how could I act fairer, than to take the average of the three last year, all the years of which I, or the parliament, possessed an authentic and acknowledged amount of profits?

You tell me, Sir, that Mr. Garnier is to be looked upon merely as a *merchant*; as a *wholesale dealer*. You make him cast

his skin, as a "gentleman of liberal education and generous habits," and place him before me as a mere trader; a mere wholesale apothecary; a worker of the pestle and mortar; a downright tradesman and shop-keeper.

"Boastful and high, your first's a country 'Squire; Your next's a tradesman, meek and much a liar."

I do not impute the latter quality to Mr. Garnier; but, I think, it will appear to the reader, that the Commissioners do really charge him with having, for his own interest sake, stated, in a most formal manner, *what was not true*. But, Sir, making Mr. Garnier a tradesman will not answer your purpose, unless you could show, that he had no monopoly; unless you could show, that he ran a fair race with other tradesmen; unless you could remove the fact, proved before the Commissioners, that he sold his goods to the public at a much higher price than those goods might have been supplied from other tradesmen's shops.

I stated that Mr. Garnier pocketed £12,000 a year of the public money, without rendering any services whatever in return. This is my statement. You call these £12,000 profits; and tell me, that I may as well charge any merchant with pocketing the public money to the amount of the annual profits of his concerns; the fallacy of which, the miserable sophistry of which, we shall see in a moment.—In the first place, the merchant, properly so called (and when properly so called no character is more respectable;) the merchant has no monopoly; there are no part of the public fools enough to have entered into a bond to deal with nobody but him for merchandize. The merchant has to look for customers; he has a competition to contend with; and, there is, all through, a rigorous inquiry into the quantity and quality of his goods. All these circumstances are wanting to make the case of Mr. Garnier like that of the merchant.

Now, then, as to the sum which Mr. Garnier annually pockets, without any services rendered to the suffering public in return. And here, Sir, we will take the average of the last 13 years; his average charge against the public has been £67,340. Upon which the commissioners state, that he has charged one-fifth of the gross amount more than other tradesmen, in the same line; would, under circumstances exactly similar, have charged the public. Consequently he has received all the profits that he ought, as a tradesman, to have had; and has, besides those profits,

received this one-fifth clear into his pocket. Now, divide 67,340 by 5, and you will see, that, over and above his profits as a tradesman, supplying so sure a customer, he has, of the public money, for the last thirteen years, pocketed 13,468 pounds a year, for which he has never rendered the public any service, in any way whatever. Either, Sir, this statement is true, or the Report, signed by the seven Commissioners, and laid before parliament, is false. Yet, Sir, he, notwithstanding his "liberal education and generous habits," condescends to receive, besides this immense sum, ten shillings a day, as an officer upon the staff of the army; yes, as a staff officer, though you yourself declare him to be purely a gentleman, and quite incapable of any official attendance of any sort.

Sir, you would fain have it believed, that Mr. Garnier cares little about the preservation of his patent. If this were the case, and if his profits were no greater than what they ought to be, would he not have resigned the patent long ago, and, if he had chosen to continue in the trade, have met the competition of other tradesmen? But, Sir, not only is the presumptive evidence against this assertion of Mr. Garnier's disinterestedness, we have positive proof of his rigid adherence to the privileges granted in his patent. In the year 1797, at the end of 63 years enjoyment of this lucrative monopoly, it was proposed, or hinted at, that the supply of surgical instruments had better be taken out of his hands; whereupon he wrote a letter, asserting his privilege to the exclusive supply of those instruments; stating certain facts as to the comparative cheapness of his articles, which statement the Commissioners have proved to be untrue; and, concluding his letter, with saying, that he "humbly hopes that he shall be permitted still to supply the said articles." Does this, Sir, discover a carelessness about the gains arising from the patent? The agent, Clarke, swore, that Mr. Garnier never meddled with any part of the business; but, you see, he could meddle, when the object was to preserve a small part of the monopoly that appeared to be in danger. Is this the mark of a "liberal education and of generous habits?"

It is stated in your letter, Sir, that one half of the gains are given up, by Mr. Garnier, to his agents. But, what is that to the public? The reason for his participation is manifest enough. "Snacks" is the old word; without snacks, in such a case, Mr. Garnier could not possibly carry the thing on; is it not upon this principle of snacks that all the extortions on the public are practised; and, without snacks, would the pub-

lie treasure be, in any case, wasted as it is, and the taxes increased to the present insupportable weight?

In a letter, from you, Sir, I should not have expected the assertion, that any thing granted by patent was as *sacred as a man's freehold estate*, much less should I have expected to see you apply this similitude to the grant in question, the very nature of which has been changed by the lapse of time and the change of circumstances. The grant to Mr. Garnier was made in the year 1747. It is notorious, that, at that time, it could not be in the contemplation of any one, that the army would, even in time of ordinary war, exceed *forty thousand men*. Time and circumstances have quite changed the effect of the grant, and, would not any man, who had imbibed high and generous feelings from a "*liberal education*" have been contented with the grant as it was at first intended? Instead of which, Mr. Garnier has not only grasped at the whole of the profits arising from this change, but has also procured himself to be placed as an officer upon the staff of the army, at the pay of ten shillings a day. Freehold estate, indeed! Oh what a proof of the humbled, the debased state, of this once-high-spirited nation! From no other idea than from that of the people being lost to all sense of injury and of insult could such an assertion have been made. Suppose the king were advised to grant, by way of patent, pensions to the amount of all the taxes now raised, and of that of all the incomes of all the people in the country, those of the patentees excepted. Would you still assert that those patents were as sacred as the deeds of freehold estates? Would you still say, that the nation would be bound by such patents, and that to object to the continuance of such abominable extortion, would be to discover a spirit hostile to the constitution of England? Sir, this nation has so long tamely submitted to insult from those who wallow in luxury upon the fruit of its labour, that I shall not say, that any thing will rouse it to a proper expression of its indignation; but, if any thing can so rouse it; if it be not doomed to the vilest slavery that ever disgraced mankind, language and sentiments such as you, upon this occasion, have made use of, must have that desirable effect.

You, by way of a closing argument, in for, that because "*His Majesty's present ministers*," whom you fail not to compliment, as being very attentive to the public interest; that, because *they* have, notwithstanding the exposure made by the Commissioners, determined to permit (as

you inform me) Mr. Garnier to go on in the old way; hence you infer, and appear to suppose that I shall agree, that the army could not be supplied upon better terms. Why, Sir, the same argument would apply to the *ten shillings* a day to Mr. Garnier, as an officer upon the staff of the army; it would apply to the question of surgical instruments, in which the Commissioners have proved, that the then ministry (the Pitts and the Roves and the Longs) were grossly negligent of their duty; it would apply to all possible cases; it would apply to the question of inquiry into the conduct of the Convention-making generals; it is, in short, saying to the people: "the *ministers* think "the thing right, and, therefore, right it "must be." But, Sir, I can suggest motives, other than that of the public good, which might lead to this decision of the ministry in favour of Mr. Garnier. No small part of the ministry are *themselves patent placemen*; and those who are not so themselves have children, or other relations, who are. To have entrenched upon Mr. Garnier's patent; to have bound him down to fair profits, might have led to an inquiry into the origin of theirs, and into the amount of the fees, or other emoluments, attached to them. Mr. Garnier can plead no previous services, rendered either by himself or his father, as the foundation of his grant; nor can any of the ministry, for any of the patents, which they and their relations hold. This, Sir, appears to me to be a much better reason for the indulgence they have shown towards their brother patentee, than the one which you have given, and which you really appear to have expected to prove satisfactory to my readers.

I think I have now, Sir, made good my statement, and have even shown, that that statement was far within bounds, instead of being, as you describe it, a gross exaggeration. A similar fate attends the indiscreet friends of the DUKE OF YORK, whom I shall prove to be in the receipt of a *greater* income, arising from the taxes, than was stated by me at the Winchester meeting. Those indiscreet friends have affected to impute *ignorance* to me; but, I shall *prove* upon them, that ignorance or falsehood as gross as ever yet made its way into print.

Of much greater importance to us is this subject of a waste of the means of the nation, than are all the politics and wars of the continent of Europe, or of the whole foreign world; for, what is it to *us* who gains or who loses, who is set up or who pulled down in Spain or elsewhere, if we are to be slaves; and, it must be evident to

"by man of common discernment, that men who have nothing to call their own are, in fact (whatever they may be called) slaves. In the East Indies, the cultivators of the land have all the produce taken from them, except just enough to keep them from actually perishing. When the harvest approaches to ripeness, troops are set round the fields to prevent the husbandman from smuggling away any part of the fruit of his labour. All is seized on by the accursed Aumils, or *renters of taxes*; and a miserable pittance handed back to the cultivator for his bare subsistence. This is slavery the most abject; ten thousand times worse than that experienced in Algiers. To this pitch *we*, thank God, are not come; and, it is our duty, a duty we owe to the memory of our fathers, as well as to ourselves and our children, to take care that to this pitch *we* do not come. In all our thoughts and deliberations, this ought to be the first object. When, as in the approaching election for this county, we have an opportunity of choosing a person to defend our rights, we should first of all consider, whether he be, or will be, a watchful and faithful guardian of the fruits of our labour; or, whether he be a man likely to avail himself of his power, not to defend us, but to enrich himself at our expense. No matter what party he belongs to, or has belonged to. This is a question beneath our notice. We must resolve to break through these trammels, or we shall continue to be the sport of designing knaves, who have so long succeeded in persuading the people, that to be *consistent* they must continue their support of whatever man they have once been led to support, though all the circumstances may have changed, and though that same man may have falsified all his professions and promises. The occurrences at the last meeting gave me a proof, that the spirit of the country is *dormant*, but not *dead*; and, though I know well how mighty corrupt influence is, in this county in particular, I am persuaded, that, in spite of the whole power of that influence, any gentleman of known fortune, of known good moral character, would succeed to the vacant seat, if he came unpropped and unpolluted by party, and stood upon the firm ground of the Constitution. For such a man, every man, whose vote was worth having, would vote; and, that freeholder, who would vote for any other sort of candidate, must be either destitute of sense or of principle. — I am, Sir, your most obedient servant.

WM. COBBETT.

* . *Exley*, 16th Nov. 1808.

N.B. It has been suggested to me, that, if MAJOR HOGAN would advertise the *Numbers* of the four Bank notes, they could be easily traced to their late possessors; and, at his not having done this, is, by many intelligent and respectable persons, regarded as just ground of doubt with respect to the truth of the history connected with those notes, I confess, that I should be much pleased to see it done.

MR. POULTEN'S LETTER.

Meonstoke, Nov. 10, 1808.

SIR,—My immediate view in thus addressing you is, through your favour and candour, to correct some of the errors respecting my part in the late Hampshire County Meeting, which have been copied in your journal, as well as in most of the newspapers, from the report taken by others, of whose partiality I shall hereafter speak.—First, with regard to what I said of Mr. Garnier, whom I am erroneously stated to have termed, my *relation*, I desire to repeat my words which were these, "I refrained from speaking to order before, because it concerned the case of a person, with whom if I may not call myself connected, yet to whom I feel myself so strongly attached that I might appear, as I am, partial to a character which however I admire, I leave to speak for itself to all who know him."—I have to add, in answer to your subsequent journal, that I am now desirous of speaking for him, to all who know him not; to which latter description I think you belong. You therein state your object at the meeting to have been, to give his friends an opportunity to answer you—a fair object I admit, and give you credit for its being so intended by you; but contend that it was wholly unattainable in the manner proposed, because no such opportunity was thereby given; for all discussion of the case was so absolutely inadmissible, that had I, or any other person, as well inclined and better enabled to do it justice, attempted it, his discussion of it must have been prevented in the same way, and for the same reason, that your introduction of it was interrupted, as being entirely out of order; and herein I complain of your introducing a case, in the nature of a charge, at a place and time where and when it could not be discussed in defence; thereby leaving a reflection, which, however false, could not be then removed. Since your journal does now afford that opportunity of answer, which your speech, however so intended by you, did not, I trust you are now ready to give it by your insertion as I am to take it by my sig-

position of the following answer.—Through your subsequent information, and admission, in part anticipates my objections to your previous reflections, yet your continued arguments and assertions, and still more the public impression, which being once made by you requires being removed by me, make me persist in this necessary communication to you and them.—If, as you argue, Mr. Garnier's situation has a natural tendency to his general dependence and to his particular attachment to war, he has the more extraordinary merit for being, as you partly admit, and as he wholly is, in effect, free from both those natural failings, for which you allow he has sufficient cause, and therefore excuse; of which, however, he need not avail himself, for it is notorious to those who know him, that of all men you could have singled out, he is the most sore and tender on the subject of war; the very name and nature of which he loaths and abhors, both from his general feelings of humanity, and his particular sufferances of calamity under it. For you and the public are to learn, that in all honourable and sensible estimation of loss and gain, such as would never be denied to any indifferent person, much less to him, he is on a balance of feeling and fortune an infinitely greater loser than gainer by the war, which neither you nor they will be surprised to hear when I inform you, that *he has lost four sons, in the service of his country by the war*, and most happily would he repay the money he has gained, could you restore the blood he has lost; for of all men, he is the last, who from his liberal education, generous habits, and parental feelings, would barter affections for interests. These may be called my speculative inferences from his supposed feelings, though even in that view I cannot think them overstrained; but the facts themselves confirm my suppositions, for in the first place, so far is he from being actually a particular approver of the war, or even a general supporter of government, that nothing has ever induced him, or if I can judge from what he has said or done on that subject, ever will induce him, to support the war by any thought, word, or deed. In the next place, so far is he from having been an uniform supporter of government, as you suppose, that he has frequently been in opposition to it. As a common point, which is better than any other single instance I could give, I adduce, his long and constant support of Mr. Jervoise during his continued opposition to several different administrations;—so much for Mr. G.'s actual independence of conduct.

In proof of his virtual independence of situation, I produce the following statement of his case.—Mr. Garnier's Patent Place, of apothecary general to the army, was granted to him in reversion, during the life of his father, who had a former grant, dated March 1735; Mr. Garnier's patent bears date the 19th of January 1747, the year in which he was at Eton School, from whence he proceeded to Trinity College, Cambridge. It therefore appears that this patent has been in the family 74 years, during which time, the business has been transacted by deputy.—There is no salary annexed to the office, but the patent officer is considered as belonging to the staff of the army, and receives ten shillings a day.—No other profit or perquisite is derived from the public treasury.—Mr. Garnier's emoluments arise wholly from the contingent profits to which any commercial man is entitled who trades with a large capital.—It is necessary to undeceive you and the public, by stating, Mr. Garnier does not receive twelve thousand a year, out of the public money: give me leave therefore to explain his particular situation, from which, I am persuaded, you will agree with me, in thinking, he is not *overpaid*, for the great risk, and responsibility, which has frequently been to the amount of £150,000 a year. Mr. G. is, by his patent, to furnish the whole British army with drugs and medical stores; and must always be prepared to meet the demands of an immense army, at any moment; he is bound to keep a great stock of articles solely for the service of the army.—Mr. Garnier's profits and perquisites, you state to amount to £12,000 a year; this estimate you have taken from the profits of the three last years only, and I conceive, you give a false impression of the place, when you assert the apothecary general receives that sum annually; whereas the general average would not amount to one-fourth of that sum.—Mr. Garnier, who is incapable of managing any part of this great concern, employs agents to carry on the medical trade; and the better to ensure the faithful discharge of the duties of the place, he has always given up one half of his own profits, (whatever they might be,) as a remuneration to them; as also to secure justice being done to the country.—This, then, reduces Mr. Garnier's personal profit to one half of your statement, and with it, the degree of influence and command, which you seem to think *proportioned* in proportion to a man's income.—The fact is, Mr. Garnier's patent place, is as much his freshold, as his estate at Wickham; of

neither the one nor the other can be de-
 possessed; he is at full liberty to take any
 political part he pleases, his judgment, not
 his interest, directing him in his choice.—
 In fairness to the present government, it
 should be mentioned, that they have not
 been indifferent to the interests of the pub-
 lic, and have maturely weighed the pro-
 priety of giving Mr. Garnier a compensation
 for the purchase of his patent, (which he
 was, and is, ready to relinquish on any fair
 terms); but after due investigation, it ap-
 peared, that the army could not be better,
 or more reasonably supplied, than under the
 present arrangement; as the charges made
 by the apothecary general to the army are
 less than those of the Apothecaries Com-
 pany to the Navy.—Mr. Garnier's emolu-
 ments depend wholly upon the success at-
 tending wholesale purchases, and retail
 prices: he has often a great profit on some
 articles; so has every merchant in every
 branch of trade; and the merchants may
 with as much propriety, be said to be drains
 on the public purse, as that Mr. G. is in
 the receipt of a large income from public
 taxes.—You will now see, Mr. G. derives no
 advantage from any support he may give the
 present government; that he has repeatedly
 opposed administration; that he does not re-
 ceive from the taxes £12,000 a year, during
 the war; that by agreement with his depu-
 ties, he divides the profits with them; that
 though not professionally employed, he is
 responsible often, to an immense amount,
 advancing money from his private fortune to
 discharge the debts of the public; and that
 he never was an enemy to peace.—On the
 whole, I am entitled to conclude, that in
 this case no blame attaches to the adminis-
 tration, no corrupt motives to Mr. Garnier,
 and no injury in effect to the public.—The
 above being the first part of my proposed
 communication, which I have first sent,
 from being of a personal nature, I postpone
 the second part, being of general relation
 only, to the proceedings and report in ques-
 tion, and remain, Sir, your very faithful
 servant,—EDMUND POULTER.

ESSEX MEETING.

SIR,—I thank you for the handsome man-
 ner in which you have introduced my name
 in your Register of the 22d. inst. I certainly
 have been active in advising the freeholders
 to attend the county meeting at Chelmsford
 on Friday last: but I do not plead guilty to a
 charge brought against me, at the said meet-
 ing, of having canvassed the county for that
 purpose. My solicitations were confined to
 the attending the meeting and hearing the

speeches made at the Address. But
 it is turned out, that neither arguments nor
 numbers were of any avail. The sheriff
 thought proper to decide against us, and to
 give us reason to complain; 1st. That he put
 the question of adjournment, before several
 gentlemen who signed the requisition had
 spoken, though they were very desirous to
 deliver their opinion; 2d. That he refused to
 order a shew of hands, but directed those
 who were for the adjournment to go to the
 left and those against it to the right; 3d.
 That he did not put himself in a situation
 where he could see the numbers, but decided
 precipitately, before the freeholders could
 place themselves as he directed; 4th. That
 he declared the majority to be in favour of
 the adjournment when it was clearly appa-
 rent to impartial observers who were in a
 situation to see, that the majority was against
 the adjournment; 5th. That being applied to
 by several gentlemen to correct his mistake
 by taking the numbers with more exactness,
 he hastily ordered his carriage, which had
 been waiting for him, to drive on. A con-
 siderable number of freeholders met and
 requested the gentlemen who signed the re-
 quisition to protest against these proceedings
 of the sheriff. They have protested, and de-
 manded another meeting, but have met with
 a refusal: in consequence of which they
 meet on Tuesday next to consider what
 further steps they should take on this extra-
 ordinary occasion.—I agree with you, Sir,
 concerning the county of Essex. It has
 certainly been a nullity in its representation
 for the last thirty years: and if majorities
 are to be construed into minorities, it is likely
 to be also a nullity in exercising its con-
 stitutional right of addressing his majesty
 on the subject of the most ignominious treaty
 that ever disgraced the page of history.—
 I am, Sir, your obedient servant,—MONTA-
 GUE BURGOYNE.—Mark Hall, 31st Oct.
 1808.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.

SIR;—I have read with no inconsiderable
 degree of surprise, your observations upon
 the Spanish revolution, in the Political Re-
 gister, of the 13th of August current.
 From some of your former writings on that
 remarkable event, I had concluded, that
 you were zealously interested in the cause of
 the Spanish patriots; it is therefore with as-
 tonishment that I find you deprecating in
 such strong terms, the favourite object of
 the Spanish people, to place Ferdinand upon
 the throne, and declaring your opinion, that
 should that object succeed, it will do harm
 to every nation in Europe, and particularly

to this nation. It is surprising that ministers, who have not even the merit of consistency, a quality essentially requisite in every journalist, who would preserve his credit with the public, and particularly so, in the author of the Political Register, which has obtained so extensive a circulation, and is known to possess so much influence over the public mind. — When intelligence of the insurrections in Spain first reached this country, you listened to it with an incredulous ear; the news you thought was too good to be true, and that the people of Spain were too deeply sunk in apathy, to rouse at the call of liberty; but when further accounts arrived, which left no room to doubt that the indignation, which the treachery and tyranny of Buonaparte had excited, was general throughout Spain, that in almost every province of the kingdom, the people were flying to arms; vowing to defend their freedom, or perish in the attempt; when we found them talking of their liberties, of reforming abuses, and restoring the Cortes or real representatives of the people, you then formed a more favourable opinion of the success of their cause, and congratulated your countrymen on an event so glorious to the Spanish people, and so auspicious to the liberties of Europe. You concurred in thinking, that the consequences of this event would not be confined to Spain; you hoped that it would be properly improved by the government of this country, and you were of opinion, that it presented the most feasible opportunity of checking the exorbitant power of France, that had occurred during the last fifteen years; but, at the same time, that you earnestly recommended that every assistance should be given by this country to the Spanish patriots, you gave his majesty's ministers a piece of wholesome advice, the propriety of which was felt and acknowledged by every prudent man in the country. *Do not interfere with the internal affairs of Spain. Send them arms and ammunition, men and money, every succour to enable them to preserve the freedom and independence of their country, but leave the people to choose what form of government may be most agreeable to them.* This seemed to be the line of conduct which ministers had resolved to adopt; and every consideration of prudence, pointed it out as the most proper to be followed. We at that time knew little of the wishes of the Spanish nation, on the subject of their government, or of the opinion which was generally entertained in Spain, of the conduct of their royal family. We seemed to be conscious of the errors which we had formerly fallen

into, in wishing well only for king, and we remained, on the present occasion, not to split on the same rock. Though Britain thus disclaimed all interested views in the assistance which she resolved to give to Spain; yet she was, in fact, wisely following that line of conduct, which was most conducive to her own interest, and the general welfare of Europe. Whatever form of government might be established by the Spanish people, was a matter of no importance to this country, in comparison of preventing Spain from being subjugated by France; and if in that she succeeded, she knew she would procure inestimable advantages, both to herself and to Europe. She knew that she would, thereby, give an effectual check to the inordinate ambition of Buonaparte, the effect of which must be the emancipating of the powers of the Continent from that debasing state of servility and dependence, under which they have so long groaned. These circumstances I mention to shew the wisdom of the advice which you gave, not to intermeddle with the internal affairs of Spain, or to attempt to frustrate, directly or indirectly, any plan of government, that Spain might choose to adopt. Since that time, however, the mass of official intelligence, which we have received from all parts of Spain, leaves us no room to doubt, as to the wishes of the people of that kingdom with regard to their form of government. From Galicia to Andalusia, from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the voice of the people is unanimous for Ferdinand VII. That the people, or their leaders, have, in thus choosing Ferdinand, discovered any intention of re-establishing the old government, with all its defects, there is not the least reason to believe; though from the hatred you bear to that unfortunate prince, and to all the family of Bourbon, you cannot help identifying Ferdinand VII. with the ancient government of Spain; excluding the possibility of any modification of the power of the crown, as well as of all reform of abuses, or amelioration in the condition of the people. It is, however, sufficiently apparent, that the wishes of the Spanish nation are in favour of a monarchical government, and that all ranks of people are enthusiastically bent on having Ferdinand for their king. All their edicts and proclamations run in his name; they call him their beloved sovereign, and, in their addresses, the Juntas of the different provinces, who must be well acquainted with the sentiments of the people, all upon them, in the name of their amiable Ferdinand, to die in defence of their country

their religion, and their king. And even addresses their leaders, certainly, never would have published, had they not known that the people were enthusiastically attached to their prince.—Since it thus so evidently appears, that the governments of the different provinces, as well as the people of Spain, have given their voice so unanimously in favour of the prince of Asturias to be their king; upon what principle is it, that you condemn the gentlemen at the City of London Tavern, at the dinner given to the Spanish deputies, for having drank the health of Ferdinand VII? On the promoters of this dinner, you have poured forth a torrent of the most unmerited abuse: for what reason it is not very easy to conjecture; for I cannot conceive, why a dinner, given by the bankers and merchants of the city of London to the Spanish deputies, as a mark of respect for them, and of attachment to their cause, should be more a subject of censure than a dinner given by any corporation, in any part of this country. Of your remarks on this dinner, it is foreign from my object to take any notice, though there is one observation I cannot pass over in silence; talking of the quantity of turtle on the table, you exclaim: "how many hundreds of wretches have worked like galley slaves, upon bread and water, to supply this gluttonous repast!" If you mean by this to insinuate, that the expence of this dinner was defrayed from taxes, wrung from the earnings of the poor, you have made a most unjustifiable attempt to mislead the ignorant part of the public. If this is not the meaning of the passage, it can have no meaning at all; for I presume that the tavern-keepers, waiters, cooks, under-cooks, turnspits, &c. employed in cooking and serving up this dinner, were acting in the way of their business, and that they were as much obliged to the gentlemen by whom the expence of this dinner was paid, as the paper-makers, stationers, printers, printers-devils, newsmen, &c. &c. engaged in getting up the Political Register, are indebted to you, for the employment you give them, in printing and publishing that meritorious Journal, by which you and they earn so comfortable a subsistence, and the people of this country derive so much entertainment and instruction. But to return—if the gentlemen at the London Tavern knew what were the sentiments of the deputies, and of the Spanish nation, and if at this dinner, given in honour of them, and as a mark of attachment to their cause, they had omitted to toast king Ferdinand VII, they would have been guilty of a piece of rade-

ness to that point, totally unbecoming the character of Englishmen, as pieces of rudeness which could have been equally avoided from sound policy, as contrary to every rule of civility and politeness. They would have been, thereby, taking upon themselves, to express their disapprobation of the conduct of the Spanish nation, and to interfere with the internal affairs of that people, which you must admit, would have been high presumption in a set of gentlemen assembled in their private capacities. They would also have been setting at defiance, the wholesome advice which you gave to the government and people of this country, not to interfere with the Spanish people, in the choice of their government. This advice, which you were so anxious to impress upon others, you yourself have lost sight of, as if you had been the only person in the nation, on whom there was no obligation to follow it. If the Spanish patriots, instead of declaring for Ferdinand, had resolved to establish a republican form of government; if the British ministry, taking alarm at this step, had remonstrated against it, and threatened to withdraw their succours, and to leave Spain to contend alone with Buonaparte; in what terms of severity and reproach, would you have deprecated their conduct? You would have told them, that, by such an unjustifiable interference, they were sacrificing the best interests of the country, and throwing away the most favourable opportunity that had ever been presented to them, of resisting with effect, the exorbitant power of France. But, impolitic as such conduct would have been, it is the very thing which you, by the means of your Journal, are now endeavouring to effect. By the opinion you have expressed of the choice of Ferdinand VII, and by the arguments with which that opinion is attempted to be supported, you have done what lies in your power to thwart the cause of Spain, and to assist the tyrannical attempts of Napoleon. I do not, however, dread, that the publishing of your sentiments will be attended with so alarming consequences; it will only prove your own inconsistency, and how little regard you can pay to your own advices and opinions. Your Journal will not in all probability reach Spain; and there is no great risk that any thinking people in this country will be misled by your arguments. But, in so far as your power goes, you have attempted to raise a jealousy of this country, in the breasts of the Spanish leaders; you have attempted to render the people of England lukewarm to their cause; you have attempted to mislead the people of

England, by making them believe that they are to be used for carrying on a war in Spain, for a purpose which, if it succeed, must be productive of harm to this nation, and to every nation in Europe. It is for you, Mr. Cobbett, to reconcile such conduct with sound policy, and with your former opinions on the subject of the Spanish revolution.—But, if the question were whether the Spaniards had acted prudently in choosing Ferdinand for their king, it would be no difficult matter, not only to prove the affirmative, but to demonstrate, that it was the only possible measure, which could enable them effectually to resist the power of France. When the juntas of the provinces were called to arms, a people so circumstanced as the people of Spain then were,—suddenly deprived of their king and government,—it was necessary, in order to insure unanimity, to shew to them not only what they were to fight against, but what they were to fight for. To defend the liberties of their country, against the base attempts of a treacherous and perfidious tyrant, was no doubt a cause sufficient of itself, to rouse to arms, a people so brave and so gallant as the Spaniards. But to render the rising of the people general; to secure unanimity, and prevent the growth of faction, it was necessary that an ultimate object should be pointed out to them,—that the people should know the hand destined to sway the sceptre, when their exertions had freed the country from its foreign enemies;—and to whom could they so naturally cast their eyes, as to Ferdinand, to whom the people were so unanimously, and so enthusiastically attached? Let it be supposed that the Spanish leaders, illuminated by the same enlightened policy which distinguishes you, Sir, had declared that the royal family had forfeited all right to the crown, and had merely called upon the people to take up arms to repel the invaders of the country; promising when that should be accomplished, to call a national assembly of the people, to choose a constitution, and frame a government for themselves; what, in all probability, would have been the result of so imprudent a step, what, but disunion, ruin, and defeat? The people no doubt would have armed; but one party would have declared for Ferdinand; another for king Charles, and a third for the proposers of the Convention; and from parties influenced by so different views, and actuated by principles so hostile to each other, could any union in council, or cooperation in action, been expected? Would they have joined, with one consent,

against the foreign invaders, when they have known, that whenever that end was effected, they would have to wage a civil war among themselves, for the settlement of the government? Such a measure would have given rise to a fourth faction in the nation, and that too in favour of Joseph Buonaparte. Prudent people, and such as had estates and property in the country, dreading the anarchy and confusion, which must necessarily ensue on a total dissolution of the government;—calling to mind the awful scenes that have been acted in France, under the government of a Convention; and unwilling to run the risk of bringing similar distress and misery on their country, would have quietly submitted to the usurpation of Buonaparte; and to the happiness of the people, sacrificed their liberties and independence. These evils have all been prevented by adhering to Ferdinand; and in so doing, the Spaniards have followed the prudent example of England in the year 1688. When James the VIIth abdicated the throne, and carried his son along with him, England did not make choice of a new family, but conferred the crown upon the daughters of their late king, and on their demise without issue, the parliament settled it on the nearest protestant heirs.—You say that to restore the house of Bourbon to the throne of Spain, without any limitations whatever, will do harm to every nation in Europe, and particularly to this nation. But surely you do not mean to say, that it will be productive of equal harm to this country, as the establishment of Joseph Buonaparte on the throne of Spain? We had, therefore, but to choose between these two evils, prudence would surely dictate to us to choose the least. The consequences of the latter to this country, you have so well described in the 4th No. of the present volume of the Political Register, that I cannot do better than give the passage in your words “ Napoleon once in “ secure possession of Spain, would easily “ keep us in a state of continual alarm; “ all hopes of resistance would be extinguished upon the continent of Europe, “ which, united under one head, would, “ and must, harass us in a way that we “ could not support, for any number of “ years.” If this, Sir, be your real opinion of the fatal consequences that must ensue to this country from the subjugation of Spain, let us hear no more of the harm to every nation in Europe, and to this nation in particular, which the restoration of the ancient government of Spain must occasion,—refrain from declaiming on the

folly and absurdity of England, spending her blood and treasure, to carry on a war in Spain for the restoration of the Bourbons;—and try not to damp the ardour of the people of England, in behalf of the Spanish patriots, when our assistance is of so great importance to them, in the glorious cause for which they have taken up arms, and when the consequences of their want of success must be so fatal to England. —I do not believe, nor do you believe, if we can judge from what you have formerly written on the subject, that the ancient government with all its defects will be restored by the enthronement of Ferdinand the VIIth. But even if it should, if Spain succeeds in driving out the French, the advantages to this country, political as well as commercial, will be very great. The influence which France has so long retained over the government of Spain will be destroyed, and Spain will be thrown into the arms of England. The family compact, which had existed so long to the disadvantage of England as well as of Spain, was annihilated by the expulsion of the Bourbons from France. It is true, that the influence of France still continued to operate, even down to the day that Ferdinand arrived at Bayonne, but that was occasioned by the terror, with which the power of France inspired a weak and cowardly government. But if Spain succeed in defeating the attempts of Napoleon, and securing her independence, the dread of the power of France will no longer operate on the Spanish government; Spain will have become conscious of her own strength, and will no longer submit to be the tool of France, or sacrifice her dearest interests to the views and caprices of Buonaparte. Gratitude to England, and hatred of France, which the present perfidious attempts of the latter must inspire, will naturally occasion a close connexion betwixt Spain and England. It is well known that there is a great similarity of character between the two nations; and that the people of Spain have always been remarked for a strong predilection in favour of England. The peculiar wants of each other, and their mutual ability to supply those wants, would promote a commercial intercourse equally beneficial to both nations. Such an intercourse has been long earnestly wished for in Spain, as appears by their well known adage: “Con todo el mundo guerra, y paz con Ynglaterra.”—“Peace with England, and war with all the world?” and to establish such an

intercourse will be the object of the government, as well as the wish of the people of Spain.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your obliged humble servant,—SEMPRONIUS —*Forth-Bank, 24th of August, 1808.*

N. B.—This letter has been mislaid, or it should have appeared long ago.—W. C.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

HOLLAND — *Dutch Commercial Decree, dated 18th October, 1808. (Concluded from page 800.)*

They are further authorised to correspond direct with ourselves, in such cases where they have any information of great importance to communicate to us, and particularly to acquaint us with any instances of neglect or backwardness on the part of the civil or military agents. The naval and military force shall also be at their disposal, in all that relates to the watching of the coasts and ports. The telegraphs are likewise placed immediately under their orders.—Art. IV. Fishing-boats shall be compelled to return to the havens from which they sailed. They shall, upon no consideration, be admitted elsewhere, not even under the pretext of having suffered damage; and wherever any trace shall be discovered of a communication having taken place with the enemy, such as persons being found on board, not belonging to the crew, or the smallest package of merchandize, letters, or newspapers, the boat shall become the property of the civil or military authorities who shall have contributed to her seizure, as soon as a decree of seizure is pronounced by the judges, which shall be within 14 days at the farthest.—Art. V. All nations or foreign merchantmen entering any of our havens or roads of any description shall be warned by a boat to keep off, and that if they do not they will be fired at. No excuses can be admitted, letters received or any intercourse entered into with them. Ships of war and those of friendly nations; are alone excepted.—Art. VI. All decrees, regulations, and other dispositions, heretofore adopted, relative to the shutting of the havens, and the prevention of communication with the enemy, shall remain in full force.—Art. VII. Our members of finance, marine, colonies, justice, and police, are each in his respective department, charged with the execution of the present decree.—Given at our Palace at Utrecht, 18th October, 1808, in the third year of our reign. —(Signed) LODERWYK.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY .POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL XIV No 22] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1808 [PRICE 10D.

"I will live, for ever a noble
"I will live, for ever, in honour to him"

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HAMPSHIRE MEETING.

For the nomination of members to serve in Parliament, in the town of St. Henry Midway, Baronet, deceased, which meeting was held at Winchester, on the 23d of November, 1808 in consequence of the following Requisition and Notification

"To the High Sheriff of the County of Southampton

"Hampshire, Nov 15/1808

"SIR —The much lamented death of Sir HENRY PAULI ST JOHN MIDWAY BART having occasioned vacancy in the representation of this county, we respectfully intreat you to call a meeting of the gentlemen clergy, and freeholders, to consider of a proper person to be put in nomination to succeed to him so early is convenient

H. P. Mordaunt, William Gurnett,
L. B. Withers, Wm Deacon,
Wm Heathcote, George Gurnett,
P. Williams, James Deacon,
J. G. Gurnett, David Ince,
J. H. Blackburn, Wm Fitzhugh,
J. W. S. Gurnett, S. Hunt

"In compliance with the above request, I do hereby appoint a meeting of the gentlemen clergy and freeholders of the county of Southampton, to be held at the castle of Winchester, in the said county, on Wednesday next, at twelve o'clock, for the purpose above mentioned — C. H. MITCHELL Sheriff — *John's Loc*
Nov 17, 1808

At twelve o'clock the sheriff entered the house, having taken from the town house (which was attended by a number of freeholders assembled on that occasion) to the Guild Hall Chamber, to which persons, who wished to take part in the proceedings, were admitted, while the assembly of freeholders remained in the Castle yard, and were addressed from the window.

The Sheriff having read the requisition, and stated his intention finally to take the sense of the meeting by the show of hands, Sir THOMAS MILLER Baronet, came forward, and recommended, as a proper person to represent the county, the Hon. WILLIAM HEBBERT, which was seconded by Sir CHARLES MILL, Bart. Then Sir

JOHN POLLEN Bart recommended THOMAS IRVING HATHCOTE, Esq a son of Sir WILLIAM HATHCOTE which recommendation was seconded by Sir NATHANIEL HOLLAND

The formalities having, in the course of a few minutes been gone through, Mr PORTER a friend of Mr. Peribert, came forward, and being in address to the freeholders, with observing upon the unfairness of the conduct, which, upon this particular occasion, the Sheriff had been induced, from the party purposes of those who signed the requisition and others connected with them, to pursue. He said that the notice to the freeholders was so short, that it was impossible, supposing every one of them to see the newspapers in due course of their publication, all the freeholders could have been apprized of this day's meeting, because, the provincial papers do not bear date till the Monday, and not, in fact, delivered till the Monday except in places locally favoured in this respect, and not delivered in many parts of the county till the Wednesday morning, and therefore, it was very difficult indeed, almost certain that the majority of the freeholders attended the nomination without having seen the very meeting in any way shilling. He appeared to say that he was, whether such an event was not a scandal, which was coming at this time, had, by my Sheriff, been a public scandal, without, at least two weeks more, and he expressed his hope, that the Sheriff would be after from day to day whatever and especially, to know which is those which are finally presented in his notice, be in the state of what has been done — Mr Peribert read the intimation of the meeting to the nomination of Imope in general, and of St. John and Portugal in particular. He then the question was now to be decided, and the question appeared to be the first left for the decision, whether the noble, the persons, and the noble Spinney was to be delivered from the grasp of the unprincipled grasping and treacherous tyranny of the despot of France, or whether they were to perish

under that grasp, and with them the last remaining hope of the deliverance of Europe. He said, that we had sent out a numerous and gallant army, that the nation, with unanimous voice, prayed for their success, but that timeous and brave as our armies and our officers were known to be, still there was need of a directing mind at home, need of the men, and men of habits of business, in the House of Commons. He said that since the proceedings with regard to the Convention of Cantz, it became more than ever necessary to provide a check upon the conduct of the ministry, who had shown, in a manner almost unequivocal, that they meant to screen those, whom the people, of all ranks and degrees, had, with an unanimous voice, accused of having injured and disgraced the country. Mr Herbert, he said, had during the short time that he had the honour to represent the county, fully proved by his constant attention to his duty, by his independent conduct, and by the great talents he displayed, that he was a proper person again to be chosen for the county under the present awful circumstances, and that, therefore, not only because he thought Mr Herbert to be, for several reasons, the fittest person of the two, but, also, because the other candidate was already (though they might never have heard of it) a member of parliament, he strongly recommended to the Freeholders of the county to show, by a decided majority in the show of hands, that the sense of the county was in his favour.

Mr COBBETT, who took a mother window, then spoke as follows:—“Gentlemen, we have just been reminded of the necessity there is of our making exertion for the deliverance of Europe. The little, with which I shall take the liberty to trouble you, will be of an humble cast, having for its principal object, to effect in time, and in some small degree, at least, the deliverance of Hampshire.—In certain nations, where the great body of the people were slaves, it was a custom with the slaveholders, to give them at certain fixed periods, a holiday, and to ply them plentifully with drink, one of the principal purposes of which appears to have been, that the children of the slave holders, from witnessing the beastly behaviour, the senseless noise, uproar, and confusion, that seldom failed to prevail amongst the degraded wretches, upon these occasions, might, at an early age, contract a deep rooted abhorrence of the odious vice of drunkenness. Too nearly resembling the means, but with an end in view somewhat different, are the

means generally employed by those, who, as yet, condescend to designate us, for one week in seven years, by the flattering name of ‘*gentlemen*,’ but who, unless we now make a stand for our rights and liberties, will all the year round, and during all the seven years, be towing us the better mounted application of slaves. But, Gentlemen, I am not without hope, that the result of this day’s proceedings, notwithstanding the utmost and unprecedented and unjustifiable shortness of the notice of assembling—a notice grown out of a requisition, signed by those who called the honourable bucket lit is deceased, by the endearing name of friend, and who have now hastened to seek for someone to fill his place before his corpse was scarcely cold—a requisition from persons who call themselves gentlemen of liberal education and generous habits, though they are altogether unworthy of any process of that kind, I am nevertheless, discovering in one company, want of all just and gentleman-like feeling. In spite, I say, of the shortness of the notice to the freeholders in general, while secret means have been long using to procure and insure a partial attendance, I do hope, Gentlemen, that the result of this day’s proceedings will convince those who have been the immediate cause of our assembling, and indeed, which is of much more importance, the nation at large, that, though the freeholders of Hampshire, have, in common with the rest of the countrymen, lost much of their rights and liberties, yet, at any rate, that they have sense enough remaining to know what those rights and liberties are.—Before I have done, Gentlemen, it is my intention to submit to you a proposition, respecting a PLEDGE, which I deem it my duty to obtain from one or the other of the candidates, before I give my vote for either, and if I should succeed in convincing you, that to require this pledge is reasonable, fair, and conformable to the principles of the constitution, I shall, of course, hope, that you will, in this respect, follow my example. There is a doubt, Gentlemen, upon the question, whether, *after* a member is returned to parliament, he is bound to abide by the subsequent instructions of his constituents, but, I take it, there can be no doubt at all, that *before* we elect a member, we have not only a right to ascertain, but that it is our bounden duty to ascertain, that his intentions are to act agreeably to those leading principles, the adhering to which may, in our opinion, be essential to the well-being of our country.—The purpose, for which we are met, Gentlemen, as

stated in the requisition, and as sanctioned by the Sheriff, is this: "to consider of a proper person to be put in nomination" to serve the county as a member of parliament. Now, Gentlemen, this is a serious and solemn occasion, and so, I hope, you will consider it. We are not met for the vile purpose of hallooing and hooting at the holding up of the finger of a party leader; we are not met to degrade ourselves beneath the beasts that perish, but to exercise our judgment; to decide upon an important question, agreeably to the dictates of reason and of conscience. Apparently, all those, whom I have the honour of addressing, are the friends, some of one of the candidates, and some of the other; and, I can assure you, that I am the enemy of neither. They are both gentlemen of fortune and of respectable family; and, of such members of parliament ought to consist. I am for choosing neither vagabonds nor upstarts, who, in general, when possessed of power, prove the worst tyrants. I object to neither of these gentlemen; but, before I give my vote, I must have an assurance, that the person for whom I vote will do, upon certain great points, that which I think is essential to the public good; and, in order that you may see the reasonableness of the assurance that I require, I will, with your indulgence, now state to you what the constitution says respecting the points which I have more immediately in view.—First, then, Gentlemen, the constitution declares, that "the election of members to serve in parliament shall be free"; thereby meaning, that no undue influence of any sort shall be made use of to bias the minds, or obtain the votes of the electors; and next, which is what I more particularly wish you to attend to, it declares, "that no person, holding an office, or place of profit, under the king, or having a pension from the crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons." And, Gentlemen, if you consider the duties, which members of parliament have to perform, you will see the justice and reasonableness of this excellent rule of the Constitution, of all which duties, the first and greatest is, to see that the people's money is not improperly granted, and, when granted, not improperly expended. The House of Commons are called the guardians of the public treasure; and, sometimes, still more emphatically, the holders of the national purse-strings. Now only, think, Gentlemen, of the great importance of this office. How long would each of you deliberate; what scrutinizing inquiries would

you make; what solemn promises would you exact, before you would intrust any one with the absolute care and management of your purse. Would you not be quite certain, that he was possessed of integrity enough to secure it from the light fingers of the pick-pocket, and of resolution more than sufficient to defend the open assaults of the highway robber? Yes; and how many years of probation, would you require, before you ventured to confide to him the taking out of the purse just what he pleased?—Besides, Gentlemen, we are to consider what is the company, amongst whom we are about to send either Mr. Herbert or Mr. Heathcote; for, unfurnished with that knowledge, it is next to impossible that we should be able to judge which of them is best calculated for the duty we are about to impose upon one or the other. It is a rule in common life to fit the person, or the animal, to the service: we use a dog and not a sheep for the driving of cattle. Let us see, then, what sort of company that is, into which we are going to send one of the two gentlemen, who have been this day presented to us, as proper to be entrusted with the holding of the strings of our purse.—And, here, Gentlemen, I must, with your leave, refer to a written memorandum of names and sums. The House of Commons, which now consists of 658 members, contains persons, who enjoy the emoluments of 112 places and pensions. But, before I proceed further, suffer me to state to you upon what authority I am about to lay before you these interesting facts.—They are drawn from a Report presented to the House of Commons, in consequence of a motion, made by that intelligent, upright, disinterested, and valiant nobleman, Lord COCHRANE, who, having so often defeated the enemies of England at sea, appears to have wished to contribute towards defeating its more dangerous enemies on shore. His lordship's motion, which would have brought into view all the placed and pensioned relations of the members, was, in a great measure defeated; but, we have, at any rate, got some information from it. The list, even of the members themselves, is very incomplete. It is acknowledged to be incomplete by those who make the Report. Many of the offices, out of mere modesty, I suppose, have not the amount of the emoluments placed against them; and, there are several placemen and pensioners, owing to the want of the returns from the department whence their emoluments arise, who are not mentioned at all, in any part of the Report. But, even from this Report, imperfect as it is, it

appears, that there actually are, in the House of Commons, 78 members, who are placemen or pensioners; that they enjoy amongst them 112 places and pensions; that these places and pensions amount to £178,994 a year, which sum, if it were equally divided, would give to each member of the whole House, £2272 a year; and, I am convinced, that, if all the encloments had been annexed, and all the names brought into view, the sum would have been double what it now appears. What, then, would you say, if you, could behold the long list of places and pensions enjoyed by the *relations* of the different members?—Suffer me now to state some particulars from this list; because they very nearly concern ourselves. First, Gentlemen of Romsey, there is your noble neighbour, my Lord Palmerston, who receives £1,000 a year. Secondly, Gentlemen of Bishop's Waltham, there is your neighbour, Mr. Sturges Bourne (who was standing amongst some tall men in the crowd at the time) receives £1,500 a year. Thirdly, Gentlemen of the Isle of Wight, there is your Governor, my Lord Fitzharris, who, as governor of the Island, receives £1,379, and, observe, he has taken care to have a grant of this place for his *life*, sick or well; though, I must say, that in all probability, he is as able to command a military force, being bed-ridden, as if he were actually on the back of his charger. This lord has, besides, secured a further grant of the public money to the amount of £1,200 a year for *life*, to commence after his father's, Lord Malmesbury's, death, and Lord Malmesbury has received for fifteen years past, and is to receive for his life, a pension of £2,300 a year. This, Gentlemen, is the new Lord Lieutenant of our county. A pensioner, paid out of the fruit of our labour, industry, ingenuity, and economy. Fourthly; and now I must beseech you to enlarge your minds in a degree proportioned to the increasing magnitude of my subject: He that has ears to hear, let him hear; for I am about to speak of the sums enormous, which Mr. George Rose and his sons have received and do receive and are to receive out of the pockets of this taxed nation. First, as Treasurer of the Navy, he receives, £4,324 a year; next, as Clerk of the Parliaments, which place he has for *life*, and in which he has never performed an hour's duty, he receives, and has received ever since the year 1783, the sum of £3,278 a year; next, this place is granted to his son, Mr. George Henry Rose for *life*, who is also a member of parliament; next, Mr. G. Rose has another sinecure place, as

Keeper of the Records in the Exchequer, for which he receives £400 a year; and next, his younger son, Mr. William Stuart Rose, has a sinecure place in the Exchequer, for which he receives £2,137 a year. Which sums put together, make £10,139 a year, which Mr. Rose, and his sons receive out of the taxes annually raised upon us; and, he having, upon an average, received about five thousand a year for *office salary*, besides sinecures, since the year 1783, I am far within the compass when I assert, that he and his sons alone have received out of the taxes of this back-broken country **THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND POUNDS STERLING**.—Such, Gentlemen, is, in part at least, the company, into which we are going to send either Mr. Herbert or Mr. Heathcote. Does it not, then, behove us well to consider, what sort of man that is, whom we thus send? We are about to send, according to the language of the constitution, a person to be the guardian of our money, a check upon the minister in all things, but more especially to be a check upon his conduct as an expender of our money; does it, not, therefore, become us to be as sure as we possibly, in such a case, can be, that this guardian whom we choose, will not himself receive any of this money from the minister; and is it not to be guilty of the grossest self-abuse to pretend to believe that he will be a *check* upon the minister, if he himself be permitted to receive a share of what the minister may choose to expend or give away? But, Gentlemen, there would be, in such conduct, on our part, something a great deal worse than folly. There would be in it the basest treachery towards the rest of our countymen; for, you are to remember, that there is not one man in five hundred who can, as things now stand, vote for members of parliament. With the interests of persons, of this description, in this county, we are charged, as well as with our own; and, therefore, if, in choosing a member, we consider only our individual interest, we are guilty of dishonesty; and, if we, from negligence, choose an improper person, we are guilty of a flagrant and shameful want of duty towards our neighbour.—The way, Gentlemen, in which I think I shall best discharge my duty, is, to tender to the candidates the *pledge*, of which I have already spoken, for the requiring of which I have, with your great patience and indulgence, given my reasons, and the words of which, with the confident hope, that they will meet with the approbation of every truly honest and independent man who hears me, I will now conclude with reading: “That

" he will never, either directly or indirectly, either by himself or by any person related to him or dependent upon him, receive a single shilling of the public money, in any shape whatever, so long as he shall live, and that he will use the utmost of his endeavours to obtain for this burthened people a redress of all their manifold grievances, and especially of that most crying grievance of having their money voted away by those, amongst whom there are many who receive part of that money."

After this, a person, whose name was said to be Brown, who was stated to have been a purser, or something of that sort, under Lord Keith, and who now lives at Walsby, near Farnborough, having begun to speak below, was called up to the window, where, having read from the report of the Debates in the last parliament, a passage wherein Mr Herbert was represented as having proposed the *disfranchisement* of the borough of Limerick, on account of their conduct relating to their member, COLONEL CAWTHORPE, he, Mr Brown, intimated that Mr Herbert had proposed to disfranchise the said borough *merely because the voters had presented a petition disagreeable to the House*.

Mr HERBERT then came forward, and began by defending himself against the charge preferred by the Liberator, but owing to the inarticulate sound of his voice it was impossible to catch more than a very small part of what he said. He defended the conduct of himself and his friends, stating that he had never, in any manner, shown himself dependent upon the ministry, and challenged any one to prove the contrary. He condemned the conduct of the present ministry, with regard to the Inquiry now going on, and complimented the country upon the spirit it had shown, in seconding the liberal and constitutional efforts of the City of London. With respect to the proposed *pledge*, he said he would promise, in the most distinct terms, that he never would, as long as he lived, accept of *sums of money*, and that he would reject, with scorn, the offer of either, but, that he would give no pledge, that, if the king should, at any time, think his services useful to the country, he would not accept of a proper compensation for such services, and this, he trusted, would be satisfactory. Upon perceiving, that Mr Cobbett signified his dissent from this proposition, Mr Herbert asked, what objection he had to it, to which Mr Cobbett answered, "Those services I have no objection to, nor to their being well paid

" for, but I know of no services which can be performed by a member of parliament, which ought to be paid for."

Mr HEATCOTE said nothing that could be heard, except as to the proposed *pledge*, which he refused to give, though he said, that "if he knew his own mind, he never should receive a farthing of the public money as long as he lived."

Mr BARHAM, perceiving that Mr Herbert's explanation as to his conduct, in respect to the petition from Limerick, had not been clearly understood, came to the window, and, in a very clear and satisfactory manner, showed, that Mr Herbert's conduct upon the occasion referred to, was not only blameless, but deserving of the highest praise. Having completely removed the impression produced by the erroneous construction of Mr Brown, Mr Barham said, that he had a test, whereby to try the candidates, to whom he put this question:

"Will you, if the Inquiry, now going on, respecting the Convention of Cintra, should end in a blank report of merely *all's well*, bring forward, or support, in parliament, a motion for another and more satisfactory mode of Inquiry?"

Mr Herbert answered distinctly in the affirmative, Mr Heathcote gave no answer at all.

The Sheriff now put the question to the Freeholders, which of the two candidates they chose to put in nomination, and the majority appeared in favour of Mr Heathcote.

"I must stop till next week, what I intended to have said, respecting the Income-tax Bill of York, the proceedings of the Court of Equity, and the conduct of the Mayor of London."

NEW EDITION OF THE STATE TRIALS

On Monday, the 2d of January, 1849, will be published the complete and uniform Monthly Parts for 1848, the very large volumes in half Octavo, Part the Last, Price 10s. 6d. of

COLLIER'S

COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS,

AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON,
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISFEANORS,
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD DOWN TO
THE PRESENT TIME.

In proceeding with the Parliamentary History, which it is his business, and is, one of the principal objects of his life to lay complete before the public of the present day, and,

in that state, to have the satisfaction of leaving it to posterity, I have for some time past, perceived, that there would still be wanting a Work like that above-described. In putting to myself this question: "How shall I go to work to secure the best chance of rendering a son capable of accomplishing great things; fit to have a share in guiding the minds of others; of weight sufficient to make him an object of respect with good and of dread with bad, public men?" In putting this question to myself, the answer my mind suggested was: "Suffer not his time to be wasted in learning sounds instead of sense; suffer not his body and mind to be debilitated by continual confinement and continual continual and correction. Give him, God being your helper, a sound body and strong limbs; habituate him to bear fatigue; to move with confidence and rapidity in the dark; to fare and to sleep hard; and, above all other things in the world, to rise with the lark, thus making his year equal to eighteen months of his effeminate contemporaries. Next lead him into the paths of *knowledge*, not minding whether pedants call it *learning*, or not; and, when he arrives at the proper age for acquiring that sort of knowledge, make him acquainted with every thing material, as to public affairs, that has really occurred in his country, from the earliest times to the present day. Open to him the book, not of speculation, but of unerring experience. That he may be able to judge of what is, as well as of what ought to be, shew him, in detail, all the political causes and effects, to be found in our history; make him see clearly how this nation has come up, and how this government has grown together."

From these or such like reflections, sprang that arduous undertaking, the Parliamentary History of England; and, from the same source arises the work, which I now submit to the judgment of the public. As I proceeded with the History, I found, that to read discussions, relating to Trials for high Treason and for other high Crimes and Misdemeanors, and not to be able to refer immediately to those Trials, they being so intimately connected with the history of the parliament, and being a detailed relation of some of the most important and most interesting events to be recorded, could not fail to be greatly disadvantageous to the student: yet, to bring into the History such a mass of legal proceedings, which admitted of little abridgment, was, for several reasons, not to be thought of. I, therefore, resolved to form

them into a separate Work, to be published during the same time, and in the same manner, as to paper and print, with the Parliamentary History.

Besides the consideration of uniformity, there were others which had great weight in this determination. The State Trials are now to be found only in an edition of *Eleven Volumes in folio*, a form so unwieldy that it is impossible they should ever be much read, to say nothing of their incomplete state, or of the expense; which latter alone, owing to the scarceness of even this imperfect edition, must be a serious obstacle to general circulation. So that this Work, though absolutely necessary to the lawyer and the professed politician, very curious, interesting, and instructive, in *itself*, and, in a high degree, illustrative of the legal, political, and constitutional history of the country, is to be met with in but very few private libraries, those of counsellors and solicitors not excepted. The mere reduction of size, from the unmanageable folio of former editions to that of the royal octavo, double page, which unites economy with convenience, will, in itself, be no inconsiderable improvement. But, the proposed edition will possess the following additional advantages: 1. The series will commence more than two hundred years before the time of the earliest transaction noticed in the former editions. Many very important Trials and curious matters, omitted in the former editions, though occurring within the period which those editions embrace, will be supplied, and the series will be continued down to the present time: 2. Many useless repetitions, ceremonials, &c. will be omitted, but every Trial will be scrupulously preserved: 3. Many unmeaning and unimportant pleadings will be omitted; yet all those, which are either curious in themselves, or upon which any question arose, will be carefully retained: 4. The different articles, relative to each case, will be placed together, so that the trouble of frequent references backwards and forwards, attending a perusal of the former editions, will be avoided; and, where references from one part of the Work to another necessarily occur, the paging of the present Work will alone be regarded: so that the confusion arising from the various pagings of the former editions will, in no case, arise to tease and retard the reader: 5. The Trials, instead of being placed in the vexatious disorder of the former editions, will stand in one regular chronological succession, unless where a different arrangement shall be dictated by some special reason; as, for instance, where more

Trials than one concern the same party, or the same transaction; for, in such cases, it may sometimes be thought advisable to bring them through the order of time, for the sake of exhibiting together all the particulars relating to the same matter or the same person.

6 Brief historical notices of the principal persons mentioned in the Work, or references to published accounts of them, will be occasionally inserted. 7 Where points of law arise references will be made to those parts of the Law Digests, or Treatises on Criminal Law, in which the principles and cases relating to such points, are laid down, or collected. 8 In like manner, references will be made to any Parliamentary History for any Parliamentary Proceedings connected with any Trial, and to any other work calculated to elucidate any part of this Collection of Trials. 9 Some Trials before Courts Martial, but those only of the greatest importance and most general interest, and illustrative of the manner of the times, will be preserved in this work. 10 To each volume there will be prefixed a full and clear Table of Contents, and in the last Volume there will be a General Index to the whole Work, so complete that I hope it will be found to leave nothing of any importance difficult to be referred to.

It is computed, that the Eleven Volumes of the last edition of the State Trials will be comprized in Nine Volumes of the New Edition, and that the Additional Matter to bring the Work down to the present time, will make three Volumes more. The whole Work, therefore, will consist of twelve very large Volumes. The paper and print will be, in every respect, similar to those of the Parliamentary History. In the mind of publication only there will be this difference, that, while the History is published in Volumes, the Trials will be published in Parts, one Part coming out on the first day of every month, in the same manner as the Magazines and other monthly publications, and will, like those publications, be sold by all the Booksellers, Law Stationers, and Newsmen in the kingdom. Three Parts will make a volume, and it will be optional with the Subscribers, to take the Parts separately, or quarterly to take the Volumes bound in boards, in a way exactly similar to that of the History.

For me to pretend to undertake, unassisted, a Work of this sort, which, to execute well, requires the pen of a person not only possessed of great legal knowledge, but also well versed in the history of the law, would be great presumption. Without such assistance the Work was not to be thought of

for a moment, and, I am convinced, that the very first Part will satisfy the reader, that it has not been undertaken without means of every kind sufficient to carry it on to a conclusion, in a manner worthy of matter so generally interesting and highly important. In the publication of the History, I acted upon the sound sense of the public, rather than upon the prevailing literary taste of the times, and from the success of that work I am convinced that success will attend this also. I am convinced, that there are readers, and readers enough, who wish to know, from authentic sources, what the facts of our history are, how our government really was administered heretofore, what sort of men our forefathers really were, and how they really acted, and who will not be satisfied with the vague notions which alone can be collected from historical magic lanterns, like that of Hume for instance, in which no one single object is plainly or distinctly presented to us, but where a multitude of images are made rapidly and confusedly to pass before our eyes, distorted and discoloured according to the taste of the showman.

Nov 20 1803

W COBBETT.

The first Part will be published on Monday the 21st of January, 1809, and as the number of copies of the succeeding parts must, of course, be regulated by the degree of success that can reasonably be counted upon, Subscribers are respectfully requested to send in their Names as early as possible.

The Work will be published by R. Bignshaw, Bridges Street, Covent Garden; and will be sold by J. Bland, Pall-Mall, J. Fisher, New Bond Street, H. D. Symonds, Pattern Street, Black Pudding, and Kingbury, Tottenham Street, J. Archer, Disher, and by every Bookseller, Law-Stationer and Newsmen in the United Kingdom.

COURTS OF INQUIRY.

SIR—The observations of Major Cartwright at the Middlesex county meeting, as given in the *Times* of yesterday, to shew that courts of inquiry are not only *illegal*, but political weapons which are dangerous to the constitution, having thrown new light on the conduct of our ministers relative to the transactions in Portugal, it is now to be hoped the intended course of proceeding will be changed to that which is alone consistent with the administration of justice. The case is one that admits of no possible doubt, the law is plain, the path to be walked in perfectly straight. There can be no deviation without criminal design. An act so

Now, and great crime has been perpetrated in open day, is the presence of two armies, in the face of Europe. The nation demands a trial, and justice. You are premature, says the minister, 'you *prejudge* the parties concerned, but you shall have "due inquiry." "Due inquiry," Sir, is *legal inquiry*; and, by the converse of the proposition, that which is *not* legal inquiry, is *NOT* "due inquiry." It is in the mouth of every despicable quibbler, that calling the Armistice and Convention a crime, is to *prejudge*. If to *accuse*, be to *prejudge*, and on that account is not to be listened to, how is any criminal to be brought to justice? According to this doctrine, I may see one man kill another, and *apparently* without authority, without accomplices, without provocation, but I am not to accuse him of murder, because that is *prejudging*. He may have been doing his duty, or acting under a legal authority, or on self-defence. Is such reasoning to prevail, and the trial of crimes to be stayed, until guilt is first proved? or what else is the meaning of this quibbling?—That I might not, Sir, be misled by the assertions of the Major, I have consulted the authorities he quoted; namely, Blackstone and the Mutiny Act, and find him perfectly correct. Blackstone, b. 3, c. 3, says, "the LAW hath appointed a prodigious variety of courts,"—"all these in their turns will be taken notice of in their proper places," which he accordingly performs. The Mutiny Act now in existence, herein copying, as I believe, the very words of every preceding mutiny act, §. 31, says,— "for bringing offenders against such articles of war to justice, it shall be lawful for his Majesty to erect and constitute courts martial, with power to try, hear, and determine, any crimes or offences by such articles of war, and to inflict, &c." But the act nowhere says "it shall be lawful for his Majesty to erect and constitute"—*courts of inquiry*; in which neither members nor witnesses are to be upon oath, in which a witness may or may not answer a question, at his pleasure, and before which no person can be brought as a witness, unless he think fit to attend, and the summons to which even the accused may treat with contempt. The law, Sir, has not done any thing so absurd and monstrous as all this. And shall, then, any minister be permitted to do so absurd and monstrous a thing *without law*?—Now, Sir, let us see who are the *prejudgers*. An innocent officer is accused of a very serious crime, which, being at-

tached with some fact, is not a crime in a regular court; with full authority for compelling attendance, and all the powers of an over witnesses, can extract the truth, and give the party his acquittal. If such a party is to be called before such a mock tribunal as I have described, and there, for the want of due means of legal investigation, is judged a proper subject for trial before a court martial, will this circumstance have no effect to his prejudice? Is not this a cruel *prejudging* of his case?—How, again, may it be in the case of a guilty person? May not niceties and difficulties in the case so embarrass the members of a "*court of inquiry*," conscious of the extreme defects of their appointment in all its parts, and not bound by the sanction of an oath to administer justice, when attended with severity, that they may not venture to say the accused person ought to be put upon his trial? And would not this be a *prejudging* favourable to guilt? To *prejudge*, is to *pronounce* upon any act, as to its being criminal or not criminal, *before* it has been decided on by the proper court of law. To *accuse*, and to *pronounce* upon, are very distinct things. But ministers sharply rebuke those who only *accuse*, and call it *prejudging*; while they themselves first assume the arbitrary power of interposing, between accusation and trial, an absurd and monstrous species of tribunal, which is not "lawful for his Majesty to erect and constitute," and a tribunal which cannot possibly do otherwise than *prejudge* the case at issue. Is this, Sir, to be endured? If the nation can tamely suffer itself to be thus insulted, I will not say it is prepared for slavery, but it is already enslaved, for none but slaves could silently submit to such indignity.—To make a shew of impartiality, and to ward off from themselves the suspicion of *packing* a court for screening their colleagues, ministers are said to have put upon their court of inquiry a certain noble lord, and to have ordered that the court shall be an *open* court. But, Sir, when a court is not only *illegal*, but of the ministers' sole appointment, I am at a loss to know how it can be otherwise described; than as a *packed* court; and is not a packed court as odious and revolting as a packed jury, to the feelings of Englishmen?—Now, Sir, those who would liken a court of inquiry to a grand jury, and pretend to recommend it on that account, ought to recollect that a grand jury is *not* an *open* court; and that it can examine no witness but on the side of the *prosecution*. Now,

the court should be the punishment of every
witness on the side of the prosecution who
shall present himself?—Should they take
this course, any indignant Englishman may
demand admittance to their presence, with
the Gazette in his hand, containing the three
documents, signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley,
Sir Hew Dalrymple, and Sir Charles Cot-
ton, containing the Armistice, and the two
parts of the Convention. The accusation of
those officers is, for having signed those docu-
ments and carried the conditions of them into
execution. It is no matter whether the cir-
cumstances which the accused persons have
to bring out upon their trials before a court
martial will, or will not exculpate them;
all that is legally necessary for putting them
upon their trials is, to prove that they are
the persons who signed and acted upon those
documents. If the court should have any
doubts of those facts, they must call for the
originals, and for the proofs of the signa-
tures. If, in the coroner's phrase, there
have been accessories or accomplices among
persons unknown, that may come out in evi-
dence; and then, in my judgment, it will
be time enough to talk of parliamentary in-
quiries into this business. At present, we
have only to do with the three persons,
who, by their *assent*, under their own
hands, have made themselves either princi-
pals or accessories.—Is any special pleader
in this case to attempt talking the nation out
of its senses, by denying that there has been
any criminality at all, and maintaining that
criminality in those acts must *first be proved*,
before those who performed them can be
brought to trial? I, on the contrary, main-
tain, that there is criminality on the face of
those acts, a criminality that has shocked
and stunned the whole nation, and that it is
fit those officers should disprove the accu-
sation, or suffer the punishment due to them.
It is to be remembered, that military law, in
its nature and principles, is of necessity of
greater strictness and severity, and properly
so; than the common law of the land. It is
also to be recollected, that cowardice, which
at common law is no crime at all, is, by mi-
litary law, and very properly, a heinous
crime, and liable to capital punishment. It
is likewise to be recollected, that, although
want of judgment, or even imprudence, in
a man's civil conduct in his private affairs is
punishable, yet for a military commander
open to war in his judgment, or to misma-
naging the force entrusted to him, is, more or
less, according to circumstances, criminal

and punishable by a court-martial judgment.
His situation requires these qualities, and he
is paid for exercising these qualities in the ser-
vice of his country. It was more from a
want of these qualities, than from any proof
of cowardice, that Admiral Byng was sen-
tenced to death. Un-officer-like conduct, in
point of skill, was one of Sir Hugh Pallis-
ser's charges against Admiral Keppel; and
for an imputed misconduct, by Sir Robert
Calder, in his manœuvres, tending rather
to cover and secure the two line-of-battle
ships he had taken, than to hazard their loss
again by attending to nothing but how he
should get again into action with the enemy,
that that gallant, and I must needs think
very judicious officer, was sentenced to a
grievous humiliation. It may, Sir, be di-
gressing from the point immediately in hand,
to say more on the case of Sir Robert Cal-
der, whose person I never saw but once in
my life, and with whom I have not the
smallest connection; but I so warmly feel
the injury which in my mind was done him,
that I cannot but remark, that the very con-
duct for which he was reprimanded, was the
very conduct enjoined by the immortal Nel-
son to the commanders under him, in a
paper written the evening before the battle
of Trafalgar. In that paper, presuming
that in the approaching action some of the
enemy's ships might be captured, while a
part of the hostile fleet might be in a condi-
tion to attempt their recapture, he particu-
larly instructed his commanders, in writing,
by way of precaution in case of his own fall,
to make *the security and protection of their
prizes the first object of their attention*. Sir
Robert Calder not only did this effectually,
but in a masterly and most officer-like man-
ner, parried the enemy's attempts at reach-
ing those ports where he must have been
joined by a strength that would have given
him a resistless superiority. For this con-
duct, Sir Robert experienced a harsh sen-
tence, and has never since been employed;
although, as Major C. observed at Hackney,
the ships he took were not returned to
France with drums beating, colours flying,
and sixty rounds of ammunition; but were
conducted to an English port, and their
crews to an English prison.—To return,
however, from this digression: while con-
sidering our military law, it is very plain,
that there ought not to be one measure for a
sea officer and another for a land officer; and
yet it is well known, that any commission of-
ficer commanding a vessel, from a first rate to

a gun-brig, and lose the same, whether with glory or dishonour, whether by his fault or his misfortune, whether in fight or by shipwreck, must be tried by a court-martial. And is not this invariable rule of the service most proper, and most admirable?—I forgot to remark before, that criminality, in military law, attaches to whatever is dishonourable, and not merely in a moral sense; for whether an officer should commit a felony, or should habitually get drunk with blackguards, in a night-cellar, or should suffer himself to be kicked in the open streets, or should sign, either as a besieger or a besieged, a shameful capitulation, bringing disgrace on the arms of his country, he would be alike punishable for such conduct as dishonourable. Shall then, Sir, the naval commander of the smallest gun brig, who shall lose the same, merely for that act, whether blameable or meritorious, be inevitably, as a regular rule of the service, brought to a court martial; and shall it for a moment be a question, whether generals who have signed such a capitulation as that of Cintra, which has blasted our laurels, disgraced our arms, injured our allies, and favoured the enemy beyond whatever is on record, shall, or shall not, be brought to trial?—From the reference made at Hackney to the cases of Keppel and Calder, and comparing them with the audacious attempt to screen Sir Arthur Wellesley, it is high time that this illegal, unconstitutional, and mischievous engine of a discretionary court of inquiry, to be interposed as a conductor for dissipating the lightnings of national indignation, only when a minister has a friend to protect, only when political purposes and corrupt interests are to be served, should be wrested from the hands that are so dangerously using it, and destroyed for ever.—This ministerial expedient of a court of inquiry for saving a colleague, may perhaps remind you of a circumstance that happened in the case of Byng. In sight of the enemy he called a council of war, and the consequence was, there was no battle. Soon afterwards, as *Flash and Fribble*, on the stage, were at high words, and clapping their hands to their swords, the lady present cried out, 'Lord, lord, what shall I do to prevent their fighting?' upon which an honest tar in the gallery bawled out, 'call a council of war.' Thus our war minister cries out, 'lord, lord, what shall I do to prevent a trial?' to which the valiant landsman who erst proposed a march to Paris, replies,—'call a court of inquiry.'—One word, Sir, if you please, on calling upon the king to assemble parliament, for inquiring into the

business of Cintra. In this call, nothing can I recognize but the voice of justice. It insinuates that the blame does not rest with our military commander, but with ministers. I see no ground, at present, for any such insinuation. Ministers, as well as the nation, were taken by surprise, as to the existence of a hope that Spain and Portugal could possibly be saved from the grips of France, since which I cannot but praise their exertions for meeting France on that theatre. Ready as I am to condemn their illegal, unconstitutional, and corrupt conduct for saving the man on whom depends the *twelve votes*, yet where I see no blame, I will not even insinuate accusation. If a rash individual of inordinate ambition, who well knew all the combinations of their council and plans for reducing Junot, were so eager to snatch from his superiors the wreath of victory, that he would not allow time for those combinations to operate, nor for the whole force destined for Portugal to be brought to bear upon the enemy, it is extremely illiberal to impute consequences to ministers, which, as I conceive, are imputable to him alone. So far as I can judge, they had furnished ample means for effecting, by right management, the reduction of Junot, to a surrender at discretion; and those, in whose hands those means failed of accomplishing the object which, in Portugal, was the end proposed, ought to be first brought to trial before we look farther.—I have another objection to the calling of parliament for inquiring into the conduct of ministers. Parliament is too well read in Scripture to expose itself to the rebuke of, 'Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then thou shalt see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.'—No! no! its "brother" is safe enough from inquiry, until the arrival of that great constitutional renovation, which you, Mr. Cobbett, have from time to time, foretold was approaching. We may have factious attacks, and factious defences, we may have hostile motions and bitter speeches, we may have committees and commissions, and we may have piles of reports as high as Pelion or Ossa, but until this renovation shall take place, we shall not see a minister really called to account by a parliament, nor any department of the state swept of its corruptions.—MARVEL.—Palace-Yard, 13th Nov. 1808.

STAFFORDSHIRE MEETING.

MR COBBETT.—The active and decisive part which you have taken in the question of addressing the king for an investigation into the causes which led to the Portuguese

Commenced, leaves no doubt, but the result of the meeting, held yesterday for the county of Stafford, will become a subject of your animadversion. Of that result the newspaper reports will give you an accurate detail. But I conceive that you must be strangely puzzled to account for the unanimity which prevailed at the meeting, after reading the names attached to the requisition, without some clew to guide your judgment. It is my object to give you that clew; or rather, by a statement of facts upon which you may depend, to discover to you the motives which actuated those staunch friends of constitutional doctrines, the requisitionists, to assert their privileges, and display their independent principles, upon this occasion.—On the 24th day of October last, a copy of a requisition was sent to the high sheriff of this county by Mr. Blount. The sheriff, in acknowledging the receipt of the same, wrote that he could have no possible objection to comply with the wishes of the requisitionists to call a meeting of the county; and begged that the original requisition might be transmitted to him as his voucher; and which indeed was necessary to produce, and he read at the opening of the meeting. Upon this, Mr. Wolseley and Mr. Blount waited on the sheriff, and told him, that they had no requisition signed individually, but read various extracts of letters which authorized them to subscribe the names of several noblemen and gentlemen, and alleged that they had verbal authority for the rest. They declined giving up the letters, but had no hesitation to sign an authority for the sheriff, which they accordingly did.—A day was fixed for the meeting, and the requisition was published in the Staffordshire Advertiser in the form in which they signed it.—To the surprise of every one, in the paper of the week following, immediately under the requisition, appeared a remonstrative letter to the sheriff from Mr. Wolseley; and a protest from the Marquis of Stafford who declined attending the meeting on the ground that the requisition was published in an "irregular and unprecedented manner."—Now, Mr. Cobbett, I look upon it that the zeal of the noble marquis in the cause of his "insulted and degraded country" is not of that description which will urge him to die a martyr in its cause; when, upon the plea of a trifling informality (which, in the way, I do not admit existed), he could withdraw his support from a measure to which he had attached such important results. He might have found a better example, Mr. Cobbett, in the proceedings of

the Hampshire meeting; but the noble marquis, I think, would be pained, hence called "irregular," as it is certainly "unprecedented." It must be admitted, however, that his lordship's sagacity, upon this occasion, is entitled to commendation, as I can affirm that no person in this county would have been able to discover, much less to notice, the irregularity complained of, if his lordship had not kindly condescended to point it out.—But this was not the true reason of the noble marquis's defection. The secret must be told, though I am afraid, Mr. Cobbett, that it will be as unpleasant for you to hear, as it was galling to the noble marquis to discover. The fact is, that the universal opinion of the people of this county, freeholders and others, is, that an address to his majesty for the purposes mentioned in the requisition is not, under the present circumstances, necessary. It was this conviction, which reached his ear very soon after the publication of the requisition, that induced the Marquis of Stafford, to think that he acted precipitately; and he would have given (yes; depend upon it) —he would have given one or two of his best pictures that he had not signed that cursed requisition!—His pride could not bear the idea of the shameful defeat that awaited him in his own county, and even by his own adherents; much less could it bear the idea of submitting to the frank acknowledgement of the truth.—Mark, then, to what meanness pride is reduced. Rather than manfully come forward and avow his sentiments, and support the opinion he had so strongly worded in the requisition,—which, be it known, was drawn up under his immediate inspection at Trentham,—rather than do this, the Marquis of Stafford chose to seize upon an Old-Biley-like quibble, and at all hazards to abandon the object which appeared to him so essential to the future welfare of the country. Like the very generals, who were the ostensible cause of the requisition, he withdrew from the field, and suffered the enemy to dictate his own terms.—After this desertion of a principal leader of the requisition force, others of inferior quality complained that their names had been subscribed upon very slight authority, and without their being acquainted with the nature of the requisition to be made; and one gentleman, as you will perceive by the report, through the medium of a friend, from the hustings, actually denied having given any authority at all, for his name. And here one cannot help remarking the judicious precaution of the sheriff in adhering to the usual manner of publishing

the requisition from an authenticated original.—In spite, however, of the alleged informality, and the noble marquis's protest, the meeting was, not only very numerous, but highly respectable. But not one man of those whose names appeared to the requisition, came forward to avow their signatures, or to propose an address: although Sir Robert Lawley, Mr. Wolseley, and Mr. Blount, were in the town of Stafford during the meeting, and it was believed fully prepared to do so. Lord St. Vincent, who by his own acknowledgement came into the county for that express purpose, remained quietly at Stone, about seven miles from the place of meeting. That, however, the production of their deliberations might not be lost to the world; and probably with a view of assisting other county meetings with their enlightened and *patriotic principles*, they have published the Address which they meant to propose for the adoption of the county. For the rest, they contented themselves with presenting silly protests against an informality which existed no where but in their own blundering and sneaking conduct.—Now permit me, Mr. Cobbett, to ask, if it is to this sort of men that the people of England are to look up, for the maintenance of their civil and political rights, and for the redress of their many and crying grievances; to those water flies, whose public spirit is damped by the spleen of disappointed pride, and whose patriotism is subservient to courtly etiquette, and the companion of party malevolence?—How disgusting is their conduct when compared to your own upon a similar occasion;—you, who by the mere dint of talent and firmness carried an Address (which I certainly believe you did) in the face of rank, wealth, and probably of the powerful stimulus of ministerial influence!—What I have above stated you may rely upon as truth. I could enumerate abundance of other circumstances which would serve to place the *public spirit* of these *independent gentlemen* in a proper point of view. But you are already in possession of enough to enable you to deal to them that portion of praise which their conduct merits, in any remarks you may be induced to make upon the meeting of this county.
—A. B.—*Litchfield, 12th Nov. 1809.*

BREWERIES.

SIR;—In your Register of the 12th inst. I was much pleased with the perusal of a paper signed "A Hampshire Brewer," the production of a person evidently competent to the discussion of the subject he has

brought before the public: and I have only to wish that the paper might have a circulation commensurate with its importance to the community. His general ideas on the production of an uniformly good and wholesome malt liquor are such as can only have been derived either mediately or immediately from an extensive practice aided by a close and philosophical course of observations. From such a writer I am sorry to differ in any thing, but a strict regard to truth, and especially a truth in which men are practically interested, induces me to trouble you with a few observations on some remarks in the gentleman's paper; and for which, I trust, he himself will not deem it necessary to offer any further apology.—It is stated by the writer that the relative value of malt, sugar, and treacle are, "as 8 bushels of malt, so are 196 lbs of sugar or 240 lbs of treacle." I wish the writer had furnished us with the precise grounds of this stated ratio of value, and of the method by which he formed it. As it is, we are left to infer, from other parts of his paper, that his conclusions are built on hydrostatical experiments; and I am the more inclined to suppose so from repeated trials, in which a given quantity of saccharine substance put in solution, when examined by the instrument, has not increased in density scarcely one third of the gross weight of the substance dissolved: a proportion, I believe, that will nearly correspond with the statement which he has furnished us with. But I entertain serious doubts whether any instrument we now have in use is adapted to shew us the *relative value* of two musts, the one prepared from malt and the other from either sugar or molasses. My reasons are these: In the extract from malt a considerable portion of mucilage or viscous matter is blended with the saccharine which is obtained, while the extract from molasses, for instance, is nearly a pure saccharine liquor. Now, as the action of any statical instrument must be in proportion to the specific gravity of any liquid on which the experiment is made, it is evident that the spissitude of the malt extract must far exceed that of the other. But is it philosophical to conclude from thence that the one *must necessarily* be richer and superior to the other? I appeal to the Hampshire Brewer himself. Does he consider that his last wort, which, for the sake of argument, we will suppose to weigh 10 lbs per barrel, equal in point of quality to a *one* portion of his first wort, which we will conclude to weigh 30 lbs per barrel? Why not? Because, though the latter possesses

an abundance of mucilage, yet it possesses a much greater proportion of saccharine also. It is with justice that he considers "sweet" as the basis of vinous fermentation; for it is very certain, that the vinosity of any liquor, (the fermentation &c. being equal) will be in proportion to the quantity of the original base which it possesses. I may therefore be allowed to doubt whether the instrument alluded to, be capable of that extent of application which is attributed to it, and whether the value of the three sweets he has mentioned be correct. I would be very far from being understood as intending to depreciate the merits of the instrument. I know its value too well. But though it will answer every useful purpose to a brewer, where the extract is from malt alone, yet philosophical precision requires it to be stated, that the one which is generally used cannot with any very great propriety of term be called a "Sacharometer." If in a solution of sweets it can only indicate about one third of the value, we may ask what becomes of the remaining two thirds? Are they evaporated? Or do they remain in the liquor, enriching its quality, though in such a rare elastic form as to elude the test of the instrument? I think the fact cannot possibly be doubted. Mr Reynoldson somewhere speaks of a friend of his (I think a Mr Bent) having a method of separating the mucilaginous from the saccharine parts of a wort. Could such a method be generally adopted, we then might have some certain data, from which we might fix a scale for the valuation of any extract. The penalty on the use of either sugar or molasses in the brewery is too serious to risk the actual employment of them, though were the circumstances of the times to make a revision of the act expedient, I think that they might be partially used to advantage. I say partially, because, if used in too great a proportion they would destroy the characteristic taste and quality of the beer itself. The principal obstacle to their use would be in the want of a proper apparatus for estimating their value. Could that be effected, I should have little doubt but a fair comparison would evince an advantage of 40 per cent in a limited use of them, instead of a loss of 20 per cent according to the estimate of the Hampshire Brewer. And so far from deteriorating the beer, they would contribute to its excellence, and be a means of remedying the defects of beer brewed from inferior and ordinary malts. But on the use of every narcotic drug, let just censure fall in due vengeance, and the trade perish, that cannot

but with the use of materials, a natural tendency of which is to bring on debility and disease! The evil has of late been considerably increasing, and calls for some effort to avert its baleful effects. I am glad of the testimony that has been borne by this gentleman on the subject, and with regret that in a paper of so much merit my opinion should be advanced that will not bear the test of rigid examination.—To you Mr. Cobbett, I owe an apology for the length of this letter, but when I say, that the subject has some considerable importance attached to it, in a chemical, as well as political and economical point of view; I trust that such a consideration will be deemed a sufficient one, both to yourself and your readers, from Sir, yours, &c.—
CANDIDUS—Malton, 15th Nov. 1808.

RIGHT OF PETITION.

LETTER I.

SIR—Your late letter to the freeholders of Hampshire, inserted in your Register of the 29th of last month, is sufficient to excite the vigilance, and arouse the ardour of every British subject. You have with just propriety and equal force exposed the flimsy objections, urged by the advocates of the ministry against a full inquiry into the Convention of Cintra. The Answer to the Petition and Address of the city of London, could not, in such a discussion, escape your censure. In fact, that memorable and unprecedented Answer appears to me a most dangerous attack, made by the servants of the crown, on one of the most valuable rights and privileges of the people of England, a privilege, which was demanded and established at the Revolution, and which eminently distinguishes this country from the enslaved nations of the continent of Europe. The Ministers will doubtless deny the justice of the imputation; but let us attend not to their professions, but to their acts. A respectful, but firm address is presented to the crown, by the first city of the empire, praying that a full and efficient inquiry be made into a transaction, which, in the opinion of the petitioners, stains with indelible disgrace the name of Britain; they prejudice no individual; they desire only, that guilt may be investigated and punished in a fair and constitutional manner. In these sentiments and views they are supported by the unanimous voice and ardent wish of the whole empire. To this just and rational application, what is the answer given by the servants of the crown? For to them exclusively belongs the odium of this uncoun-

stitutional transaction. They read to the petitioners a lecture on the first elements of British justice, as if a modest petition for inquiry were an open violation of its principles; they refer to some recent instances, to prove the *general* willingness of his majesty to institute inquiries, though it is notorious, that these instances never satisfied the wishes of the country; they acknowledge the disappointment of the hopes of the nation, on the subject of the petition, but they loudly declare that the interposition of the city of London is wholly unnecessary in this critical conjuncture of affairs. The answer in plain English amounts to this. "However culpable our commanders by sea or land may be; however disastrous the situation of our affairs; what degree of guilt may exist in the management of our concerns; the good citizens of London, and consequently the people of England, have nothing to do but to remain quiet, patiently to pay their taxes, and leave these higher concerns to the wisdom of the king's ministers, without troubling his majesty with their complaints."—This, Sir, is the real substance of their answer; a fair commentary on a most ungracious, harsh, and repulsive text. In the records of ministerial pride, I have never found such an answer to a modest petition. Napoleon would not have ventured to insult his good people of Paris in so pointed a manner. The public will judge, whether such language, dictated by the servants of the crown, be not injudicious in the extreme to the valuable Right of Petition, secured to us by the wisdom and steadiness of our ancestors at the era of the Revolution. A wicked and unprincipled minister, who openly invades our liberties, becomes much less dangerous, than he, who silently and imperceptibly gains ground by *thwarting us in the exercise of our rights*. We are naturally on our guard against the open machinations of the former; but against the secret designs of the latter, what can secure us? What am I benefited by the frequent panegyrics of Lord Hawkesbury on the glorious Revolution, if, amidst all this ostentatious display of patriotism, I am to be robbed by him and his associates of one of the most useful privileges secured by that event? Or at least if I cannot resort to the exercise of it without experiencing the most poignant insult? Where would be the advantage of the grand palladium of personal liberty, if the judge were to tell the prisoner on his application for a writ of habeas-corpus, to remain quiet in prison and leave his case to the

discretion of the court? And, Sir, what does this boasted Right of Petition amount, if the subject cannot carry his complaints to the foot of the throne, without being dismissed with contempt and disdain? If on an occasion, the most important to the honour of the country, that has occurred in the military annals of Britain, an humble petition from the first city of the empire has been thus treated with scorn, what is to be the fate of addresses, on subjects of less consequence, and if suing from quarters less respectable?—Our attention, by the extraordinary conduct of the ministry, is now transferred from the Convention of Cintra to the preservation of the rights and liberties of Britain. The truth is, this country is verging by rapid strides to despotism, and it becomes the duty of every man, who values the birth-rights of an Englishman, to use his utmost efforts to prevent farther encroachments. The only method, that can be pursued for this purpose, is loudly and unanimously to call for full, effectual, and parliamentary inquiry, not only into the Convention of Cintra, but into the conduct of those who were the advisers of this singular Answer to the Petition of the city of London. The cry of "NO ENEMIES TO THE RIGHT OF PETITION!" should resound from one corner of the empire to the other. Our ancestors dethroned a sovereign for invading our rights, their descendants cannot do less than dismiss and degrade an administration, who have evidently attempted to abridge and render nugatory what was then claimed, demanded, and established. In supporting the cause of this great city, we shall contribute to the security of our glorious constitution, and we shall afford a lesson to all future ministers, however fortunate, not to deviate from a constitutional course in the tide of prosperity, but to remember, that there are rocks, on which, whoever splits, must inevitably perish.—POLITIAN—*London, 12th Nov 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLISH COMMERCE WITH SPAIN.—*Letter of Admiral Morla to Mr. Buff.*

The supreme junta of Seville declared to me, under date of the 13th instant, as follows.—"Most excellent Sir,—The supreme junta of Seville is adopting measures for forming a regulation, under which English commodities are for the present to be imported in the country, on which subject your excellency presented a note to the said junta, under date of the 3d inst. in answer to

which the said junta has resolved to relate to your excellency, that with regard to the vessels which have already arrived, they leave it entirely to your own judgment to determine in your wisdom and prudence what duty they ought to pay, the junta being desirous to testify to the English nation the high sense they entertain of their friendship and generous support.—In pursuance of the order received, I have this day communicated the following instructions to the director general of the customs.—Authorized by an order of the supreme junta of the 13th current, touching the importation of English goods, hitherto prohibited to be imported into this country, and the duty payable on goods of the like description, found on board of such ships of the said nation as are at present in the Bay, I have determined after having heard the opinion of their lordships with regard to the duty payable on the same, that they are to pay 15 per cent royal customs, 5 per cent, if destined for inland consumption, and all the other duty payable on foreign goods, the importation of which is permitted, the shipment of the said goods for our possessions in America, being of course free and unprohibited, since, in this respect, they ought to be considered as free goods, on payment of 7 per cent. *ad valorem*, the proper officer adhering strictly to the ordinances issued on this subject. You will attend to the execution of the present order, and make it known to the trade through the competent board, with this proviso, that clothes made up, articles of wood, or any other material perfectly finished, are not to be imported on any consideration whatever.—I inform you of the premises for your own information, and for the direction of the individuals of your nation, that they may form a correct opinion of the high estimation in which the Spanish government holds the worthy subjects of his Britannic majesty, and perceive how anxiously that government desires to give proofs of its gratitude for their faithful alliance. God preserve you many years.—THOMAS DE MORLA.—As in the order which I communicated to you under date of the 16th instant, the supreme junta of Seville says only, that it is adopting measures for making regulation with regard to the importation of English commodities, which hitherto it was not lawful to import, it is not in my power to form any other determination, but with regard to goods of the above description, which are found on board of ships actually arrived in the Bay, and you must therefore apply to the supreme junta, for instruction, how far the same fa-

is to be extended to such ships as may arrive in future, since it is not for me to desire in your last report, to decide the point.—God preserve you many years.—THOMAS DE MORLA.—Cadiz, Sept. 19.

AMERICAN EMBARGO.—*Petition of the Subscribers, Officers of Merchant Ships, belonging to the Port of Philadelphia, to the President of the United States.*

Respectfully sheweth, that, in consequence of the present embargo laws, the situation of your petitioners is grievous and afflictive; that they have been engaged in the mercantile service since their infancy, with few exceptions, and accustomed only to conduct ships or vessels across the ocean; that, from the operation of the present restrictive laws, they find themselves cut off from their usual employments, and, of course, the means of subsistence are gone.—Your petitioners are well acquainted with the duties of conducting ships from port to port, well versed in naval tactics, but unable to handle the harrow or the plough.—Your petitioners have for a long time borne, with patience, the privations incident to these restrictive laws, without murmur or complaint; but, when imperious necessity compels them to disclose the cause of their grievances, they humbly suppose they have a right so to do in a decent and respectful manner.—Your petitioners therefore pray, that your excellency will take their case into consideration, and adopt such measures as may relieve the wants of your petitioners; or, if there are vacancies in the navy, to give your petitioners, or some of them, an opportunity of serving therein; as they think themselves capable of performing services of that nature. They, however, submit their whole cause to your consideration, hoping your excellency will adopt such measures as wisdom and justice may point out, and as in duty bound will pray, &c.—Philadelphia, August 10, 1808.

President's Answer.

Sirs,—In answer to the petition which you delivered me from the officers in merchant vessels belonging to Philadelphia, I most premise my sincere regret at the sacrifice which our fellow-citizens in general, and the petitioners in particular, have been obliged to meet by the circumstances of the times. We live in an age of affliction, to which the history of nations presents no parallel—we have for years been looking on Europe, covered with blood and violence, and seen rapine spreading itself over the ocean. On this element it has reached us,

and at length in so serious a degree, that the legislature of the nation has thought it necessary to withdraw our citizens and property from it, either to avoid or to prepare for engaging in the general contest. But for this timely precaution, the petitioners and their property might now have been in the hands of spoilers, who have laid aside all regard to moral right. Withdrawing from the greater evil, a lesser one has been necessarily encountered, and certainly, could the legislature have made provision against this also, I should have had great pleasure, as the instrument of its execution, but it was impracticable, by any general and just rules, to prescribe in every case the best resource against the inconveniences of this new situation. The difficulties of the crisis will certainly fall with greater pressure on some description of citizens than others, and on none perhaps with greater than on our seafaring brethren. Should any means of alleviation occur within the range of my duties, I shall with certainty advert to the situation of the petitioners, and in availing the nation of their services, aid them with a substitute for their former occupation. I salute them and yourself with sentiments of sincere regard.—THOS. JEFFERSON.

BUENOS AYRES.—*Proclamation by Don Santiago Liniers y Bismond, Viceroy, Governor, and Provincial Captain-General of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, &c. Dated Buenos Ayres, Aug. 15, 1808.*

Brave and faithful inhabitants of Buenos Ayres.—Since the arrival of the last vessel from Cadiz, bringing advices of the events which have occurred in our mother country, relative to the abdication of the crown, executed by our beloved monarch, Charles IV. and his son Ferdinand VII. and the removal of the whole of the royal family to France, I consider you as anxious to fix your opinion upon a matter in which your loyalty is so deeply interested. This anxiety must have been greatly increased by the arrival of the French agent, who brought over various dispatches for this supreme government. The clamours of the unthinking have reduced your accredited enthusiasm to a state of irresolution. The not immediately declaring to you the object of his mission may, perhaps, have appeared to you a want of confidence very contrary to that which I place in you, and which your patriotism has merited. But whilst you were

employed in idle conjectures, the fathers of the country, your magistrates, and the chief, who has repeatedly conducted you to glorious triumphs, were incessantly occupied in devising the best means for maintaining your character, interest, and tranquillity.—From an examination of the contents of all the dispatches, it appears, that the emperor of the French has been compelled to recognise the absolute independence of the Spanish monarchy, and also that of all its transmarine possessions, without retaining or dismembering the minutest portion of its dominions; and to maintain the unity of religion, our properties, laws, and usages, which guarantee the future prosperity of the nation; and though the fate of the monarchy was not entirely decided, the cortes were summoned to meet at Bayonne on the 15th of June last, whither the deputies of cities, and other persons of all ranks in Spain, were repairing, to the number of one hundred and fifty.—His imperial and royal majesty, after applauding your triumphs and constancy, exhorts you to maintain with energy the high opinion which you have acquired by your valour and loyalty, offering you at the same time succours of every description; and I have not hesitated to assure him in reply, that the fidelity of this city to its lawful sovereign is the character which chiefly distinguishes it, and that I shall thankfully admit every description of aid, consisting of arms, ammunition, and Spanish troops. In times so calamitous nothing can so much contribute to your security as union and coincidence of sentiment on a point so interesting to the public happiness. Let us imitate the example of our ancestors in this happy land, who wisely escaped the disasters that afflicted Spain in the war of the Succession, by awaiting the fate of the mother country, to obey the legitimate authority which occupied the sovereignty.—Meanwhile not possessing orders sufficiently authoritative, to countermand the royal cedulas of the supreme council of the Indies for proclaiming and taking the oaths to Don Ferdinand VII. as already announced in my proclamation of the 31st of July, I have resolved that those measures shall be proceeded in with the forms and solemnities already agreed upon, flattering myself that in the midst of the public rejoicings and happiness we shall prepare ourselves for new triumphs.

(To be continued.)

"Sir Arthur Wellesley, in fact, positively protested against the Armistice in the strongest terms; he distinctly declared his objections to the Commander-in-Chief, and that all in his power to prevent him from granting the terms he did to the enemy. Sir Arthur Wellesley neither approved of, nor had any concern whatever in writing the Armistice. It was negotiated with Kellerman, by Sir Hew Dalrymple himself, and was afterwards signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, in obedience to the positive order of Sir Hew Dalrymple."—*Morning Post* (or *Naboth's Gazette*), Sept. 22, 1868.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

COURT OF INQUIRY.—If there can be any such thing as unquestionable pre-eminence in absurdity, it is this thing, now going on at Chelsea. Flinging stones against the wind; eating hasty-pudding with an awl; drinking out of a bottomless pot; singing to the deaf; asking questions of the dumb; exhibiting pictures to the blind: all these, and every other thing that ever was seen, or heard of, yields to this matchless absurdity. A court, destitute of all legal form and authority; the members of which are under no obligation to perform or to abstain from performing any thing; destitute of the power to demand evidence or compel attendance; destitute of the power of putting any question upon oath, of enforcing obedience to any one of its commands, of issuing its censure, and even of pronouncing judgment, in any manner whatever, which, if hostile to the feelings of the party adjudged, would not, according to the present practice, subject it to a criminal prosecution for a libel. Is this the sort of Inquiry, of which the Rev. Edmund Poulter was speaking, when he came forward, at the Hampshire meeting, and upon the express authority of Mr. Sturges Bourne, assured the people present, that an Inquiry, of the most satisfactory description was then actually instituted? Is this the sort of Inquiry, to which the king was advised to allude, and which the partizans of the ministry, asserted to have been promised, in the king's famous never-to-be-forgotten Answer to the City of London? Is this the sort of Inquiry that will, or that *can*, satisfy the indignant nation? Be it remembered, that the king, in the answer which he was so ill-advised as to make to the city of London, referred them to recent occurrences, as a proof of his being, at all times, ready to institute Inquiries, in cases where the interests of the nation and the honour of his arms were concerned. What were these occurrences? Why, the trials of Sir Robert Calder and of General Whellocke, though, I hope, the former will excuse me for naming them in

the same sentence. But, observe, there was, in neither of those cases, a "Court of Inquiry." The former, though he had, with an inferior force, beat the enemy and taken two of their ships, was sent, like the latter, who, with a superior force, had been shamefully beaten; the former, like the latter, was sent, at once, to a court martial; a court invested with all the powers appertaining to criminal jurisdiction, not excepting that of sentencing the accused to suffer death. Well, then, these being the recent occurrences manifestly alluded to in the king's Answer, had we not a right to expect, that the men, now accused, would have been tried in a similar way? And can there be a doubt, in the mind of any man, what was the *real object*, which the ministers, or part of them at least, had in view, when they advised the king to give such an Answer, and to make, in that Answer, such an allusion?—The result of this court will be, the collection and publication of a mass of matter equal in bulk to that of the Old and New Testament; a mass that no man will ever have the patience to read; and a mass, which, I will venture to assert, will, in the minds of the nation, leave the question of guilt, or innocence, just where it now is. Of course, it will leave the complained-of grievance unredressed, and the people, in their different districts, will, if they be not bullied or corrupted into silence, renew their applications to the throne, or to the parliament, or to both, for a legal and rigid Inquiry.—In the meanwhile, the public should, it appears to me, seize upon, and treasure up, certain prominent facts that are transpiring at Chelsea, casting aside all that mass of detail, all that insignificant babble, all that miserable small-talk, dignified with the name of evidence, which can possibly be of no other earthly use, than that of bewildering and confusing their minds.—First then, it appears, supposing Sir Arthur Wellesley now to speak the truth, that all the numerous and positive assertions, made, as will be seen, in part, from my motto, in the *Morning Post*, and by the friends of Sir Arthur

Wellesley, respecting his *PROTEST*, were downright *lies*. All the gories, which came before the public (as relating to this Protest) in the shape of "*letters from officers of his rank and reputation in the army*," all the numerous extracts of this sort; all the assertions about Sir Arthur Wellesley being forty miles distant from the scene of negotiation; all, all and every one of these assertions, are now, from Sir Arthur's, from the reported protestor's, own lips, proved to be *lies*.—Observe, as connected with this point, an assertion of Sir Hew Dalrymple; that a paper, from England, was actually circulated *in the army*, to the same, or nearly the same, purport with these now-acknowledged lies. Sir Arthur Wellesley denies having had any hand in the promulgation of either; but, as my correspondent, R. L. in a late number, very pertinently asks, why did not Sir Arthur, who "*came home on leave of absence*" so long before Sir Hew was "*recalled*;" why did not Sir Arthur, give a contradiction to these atrocious calumnies against his absent Commander-in-Chief, especially as the evident and necessary tendency of them was, to exculpate himself at the expence of that absent commander? No: it may be, that he had, himself, no hand in hatching, or in promulgating, those malignant lies; but, I may venture to leave any man of sound moral principles to judge, how far, under such circumstances, to *think out* such lies makes him an accomplice with those, by whom they were hatched and promulgated. Had I been in the place of Sir Arthur Wellesley, I should, I hope, upon landing at Plymouth, and upon finding how things stood at home, instantly, before I got into my chaise; before I saw the face of the ministers; have taken care to send to the most rapid and most extensive channels of circulation, a declaration of my opinion, "that the Convention was a wise measure; but, that, at any rate, whatever degree of blame it merited, a full share of it was mine, I having assisted at the negotiation, the Commander-in-Chief having done nothing of importance without my advice and concurrence, and I, so far from protesting against the Armistice, having most heartily approved of it." It appears to me, that this is what I should have done. I think, I could not have slept an hour, 'till I had done this. It is certainly what honour, truth, and justice demanded; and it certainly is what was not done.—The next point worth particularly attending to is this: that, it now appears, from a document, produced by Sir Hew Dalrymple, that he, by the instruction of Lord Castlereagh, was to do no-

thing without consulting Sir Arthur Wellesley. More was meant than met the ear, in this case, and that Sir Hew would clearly perceive. What a man must be made of, to accept of a command on such conditions, I will leave the reader to say; but, the fact clearly enough is, that it was meant, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was the *seventh* in command; who had six senior officers over him, should, in reality be the Commander-in-Chief; that his should be all the praise that might become due; his all the renown; and, as far as saving appearances would permit, his all the reward, of every sort. Accordingly, it is said, and I have it from no bad authority, that the head of the high family is offended, that Sir Arthur is not created *Viscount Pimeira*! To this conduct, on the part of the ministers, and of Lord Castlereagh in particular; this creating of an unnatural sway, a confusion, and conflict of authorities, where nominal rank was set in opposition to confidential trust; to this unwarrantable partiality; this poisonous influence at home, no small part of the indelible disgrace, and of all its consequent mischiefs, may, probably, be attributed; and, all other points apart, the having instructed a Commander-in-Chief to be, in fact, ruled by an inferior officer, being the seventh in command, is not only a fair, but necessary subject of parliamentary inquiry; for, one of two things must be: either the nominal Commander-in-Chief was, by the ministers, thought incapable of that post, or he was, without any necessity, insulted and disgraced from motives of favouritism towards another.—The next point, meriting the notice of the public, is, that it now appears, from the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple, that the *whole* of the documents, relating to the disgraceful Convention, were transmitted to Lord Castlereagh in the French language. Men of spirit; men who had felt, as they ought to have felt, upon such an occasion; men, who had had a proper notion of what honour required, and who had had the wisdom to perceive the great effect, which, in certain cases, is produced by apparently trifling causes; such men would not, in the face, and under the very noses, of the Portuguese nation, have put their hands to any document in the French language, though, after acknowledging the legitimacy of the title of the "*Duc d'Abrantes*," and of the "*Emperor Napoleon I.*" this is hardly worth notice. So it was, however, the documents were not only drawn up, and signed, in the French language; but, in that language they were all sent home to Lord Castlereagh. Now,

then, let that Lord explain to an abused and most grossly insulted nation, how, for what reasons, from what motives, he came to cause the *Armistice*, the only document signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, to be published to the people of England in the French language only, while all the other documents were published in the English language only. From the first, this was a great point with me; because, until this distinction appeared, there was no reason, that I could perceive, of suspecting the ministers of a disposition to do any thing that was wrong, or unfair. From this distinction, I did begin to suspect unfair intentions. Yet, until now, there might be a doubt; because, until now, we were not quite certain, that all the documents came home in the same language. Now we are certain as to that fact; and, there can be, I think, but very little difference of opinion as to the motive; whence all the other documents were translated for publication, while that one, that one which alone bore the name of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was published in French.—The next thing, towards which the public should, in my opinion, direct their attention, is the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple, accompanied with documents to prove, that, after a few days' consideration, the Portuguese expressed their pleasure at, and their gratitude for, the Convention; though, at first, they had loudly condemned it; whence it is meant, that we should draw an inference favourable to that measure, which has, in this country, been so decidedly and so generally condemned. But, Sir Hew Dalrymple, before he prevails upon me to adopt this inference, must show me, that this change of language proceeded from some new lights, which the Portuguese had received upon the subject; he must let me see the grounds of their change of opinion; he must convince me that their reasoning was correct; and, above all things, he must convince me, that the persons, who had, at first, expressed opinions hostile to the Convention, were not under the smallest apprehension, that a continuation of that hostility might be attended with disagreeable consequences to themselves. I remember an English House of Commons, who, on one day, by an almost unanimous vote, did, upon a motion of the minister (Mr. Addington) decide in the affirmative relating to a certain tax; and who, when, on the morrow, the same minister, proposed to negative that same proposition, did, without any division, or opposition at all, give their vote in the said negative. We, who were not born yesterday, know too much of the means, by which

approving letters and addresses are sometimes, and particularly in cases of emergency, obtained, to lay much stress upon such documents; and, we know, that, in the present case, there existed, as to the disapprobation, no undue influence at all; and that the Portuguese, whether right or wrong in their opinions, had no temptation, when they first heard of the Convention, to say what they did not think.—We now come to the wonderfully magnified numbers of the French army. It has been stated, it appears, before the Court of Inquiry, that the number embarked amounted to twenty five thousand men. It is not averred, that these were all soldiers; that they were all persons bearing arms, or capable of bearing arms; but, as the public must have observed, and with no small degree of surprize and indignation, all the generals, and others, who have been called upon to state their opinions as to the expediency of the Convention, have reasoned upon this fact, relating to numbers, as if all the persons embarked were actually so many capable of being brought into the field of battle. Now, if this were so, is it probable, that Junot would, in the first instance, have met Sir Arthur Wellesley with no greater a force than fourteen thousand men? Is this probable? And, then, when he actually negotiated, he had, if this new edition of numbers could be believed, more fighting men than our army consisted of, even after the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. Nay, when Sir John Moore arrived, and he did not arrive till after the Armistice was signed, our whole army, even then, amounted to only one-sixth more than that of the "Duc d'Abrantes" is now made to amount to, he having all the fortresses and strong holds and positions, not only at his command, but in his possession. I appeal to the sense and judgment of the reader, whether Junot would have dared to make an offer of evacuation under such circumstances? So much as to the reason of the case; but, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his dispatch, told us, that he defeated "the WHOLE of the French force, commanded by the Duke of Abrantes in person;" and, indeed, that the whole, or very nearly the whole, of the effective force was that day in the field, there can be very little doubt. It is barefaced hypocrisy to affect to believe, that Junot, who had so much time for preparation; who had the choice of time as well as of place; whom it so evidently behoved to have driven our first-advancing battalions into the sea; who had received a check on the

day before; and who had all his means at his back and completely at his command it is barefaced hypocrisy to affect to believe that such a Commander, so situated, would march to the attack of superior numbers leaving nearly half of his efficient force in a state of inactivity. Besides, the reader will not fail to bear in mind, that, when the news of the Convention first reached England, it was asserted, by the friends of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that "if he had not been prevented from following up his victory of the 21st, the WHOLE French army must inevitably have been destroyed." Now, either this was a falsehood; it was, from beginning to end, a lie, invented for the purpose of raising Sir Arthur Wellesley in the public estimation, at the expence of Sir Harry Burrard's reputation; either this was a foul and malignant lie; or, it is not true that Junot ever had, after the landing of any part of our army, twenty-five thousand effective men under his command. It is curious to observe, how this French army is raised, or lowered, as the purposes demand. They were nothing, when the purpose was to persuade the public, that Sir Harry Burrard was guilty of the crime of preventing Sir Arthur Wellesley from putting an end to them; "*destroying the whole of them*," after the manner of Captain Bobadil; but, now, when the purpose is to defend the Convention, it being no longer to be denied, that Sir Arthur Wellesley had a principal share in making that instrument; now, the French army was very numerous, nearly twice as strong as the army with which Sir Arthur beat them. It is; it is, say what they will, the old story of the Buckram Men revived. —The reader will see, that, at Chelsea, there is great stress laid upon the state of the army's provisions. Provisions, we are told, were not to be got on shore, in Portugal, and those, which we had on board, it was difficult to land. I have asked this question before, but I will ask again: how did the "Duc d'Abrantes;" how did Wellesley's Tartar Duke; how did he obtain provisions? He had, they now tell us, twenty-five thousand men; he had long had them there; he had had no communication with the sea; he had even the Russian fleet to feed, besides his own army. How did he, who had all the people for enemies; how did he obtain his supplies of provisions, in this bad barren country, and not only enough for the time being, but enough to horde up stores for the long lingering siege, which our heroes apprehended; I am in tribulation for an answer to this

question; but, I have not yet heard it put by any of the great *warriors* sitting in the Court at Chelsea. *But, our generals appear to have eyes wonderfully adapted to the discovering of dissimulation and obstructions.* We have often been amused with descriptions of the miserable state of the French armies; the *spoo-less, hat-less, shirt-less state* of the "*wretched conscripts*," "*whom Napoleon leads to battle in chains.*" But, somehow or other, *these wretches do fight and get on.* They feed on the air, perhaps; but, certain it is, *that they live; they find something to eat and to drink.* Alas! Buonaparte has generals, *who can shift, for a while at least, without port wine and feather-beds; and he has, of course, soldiers who follow their example.* To hear the miserable excuses of a scarcity of provisions, want of horses and carriages, want of cannon, and the like, is truly deplorable, at a time when we have just been witnessing the campaigns in Austria, Moravia, and Poland; campaigns, at one half of the battles of which, in the midst of winter, Frenchmen, bred up under a southern climate, fought up to their knees in ice and snow, at the end of a march, which had left them scarcely a shoe to their foot, and in which hardships the officers had shared with the men. If this is to be our manner of making war; if to go into the field of battle, we must have our English luxuries, let us, in the name of common sense, give up the thing at once; withdraw from the contest; stay at home in ale-houses and barracks; keep guard over the prisoners taken by the skill and valor of the navy; and no longer expose ourselves to the scorn and derision of the world. —These are the points, which, as far as the proceedings *have hitherto gone and been published, have chiefly attracted my attention.* Out of the circumstances of Sir Arthur Wellesley's command, however, there arises a question or two, which are worthy of great attention. Whether this officer received the usual sum given to commanders of expeditions for their out-fit, together with the staff-pay and enormous allowance of a lieutenant general commanding in chief, including *bat and forage money*, which last alone would, I imagine, amount to, at least, five hundred pounds? There is, too, it has been publicly stated, another general, employed upon the staff of the same army; *I mean the brother of Lord Castlereagh, who, along with the pay and emoluments of a major general bat and forage money, &c. &c. receives* agreeably to the report laid before the House of Commons, as an *under secretary of state,*

to the amount of two thousand pounds a year. Will the House of Commons make inquiry into these matters? Will they ascertain, whether Sir Arthur Wellesley, whether the man who signed the Convention of Cintra; whether this man was, at that time, and had been, for months before, receiving pay, at the rate of six thousand pounds a year, as chief secretary of state in Ireland? Will they inquire into these interesting matters? Are these things right? Will any sycophant, however base he may be, say that these things ought to be tolerated? To be "loyal" must a man hold his tongue upon matters of this sort? Is it to shew one's love of the country and of the constitution, to wink at these crying abuses? And, lastly, does the existence of such abuses tend to strengthen, or to overthrow, our excellent form of kingly government?—There is one general remark to add upon the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry; and that is this: that all the persons, hitherto examined, are, more or less, *parties concerned*. They should, consistently with reason, be called upon for nothing but official returns, or other documents; not, at least, in the present stage of the business. What are their *opinions* to us? They will hardly say, that they think they have done wrong. They will hardly give such evidence as is calculated to throw blame upon themselves. We are proceeding as if upon an implied acknowledgement, that an English army can never, in any possible case, do amiss. But, the fact is, that whole armies have frequently done amiss. Whole battalions, at least, have been disgraced, and, in some cases, have had their colours, and the facings of their coats, taken from them. I do not say, that the army in Portugal, or any corps of it, is under a shade; but, I do say, that we have nothing to do, is the way of evidence, with the *opinions* of any of the generals employed upon that service. It is impossible, that such an inquiry can prove satisfactory to any man, who really wishes for satisfaction. There may be men, who will feign that they are satisfied, that all is well, though they hear of the "Duc d'Abrantes" having again taken possession of his Dukedom; but, the nation at large never will, and never can, and never ought to be satisfied, with any thing short of a fair, open, legal, and rigorous investigation into the causes, which have produced such disastrous effects. Parliament will, indeed, have full power to take the matter up; and, if all other modes of legal investigation are refused us by the ministers, we shall look to that with great anxiety. The mind of the nation never was more decidedly

made up as to any point whatever. It is impossible to shake it. The proceedings already formed. There is no man, who looks with even the smallest degree of interest to the proceedings at Chelsea; and, if no other mode of inquiry be instituted, fresh applications to the throne will certainly be made.

SPAIN.—There appears to be some reason to fear, that Napoleon is in but too fair a way of finally accomplishing his accursed purposes, with regard to the Spaniards. I was, but a few weeks ago, reproached by a correspondent for having, at first, expressed my fears, that the Spaniards would be subdued; I wish, with all my heart, that this ground of reproach, if it be one, may hold good to the end. I would much rather be regarded as a fool for the rest of my life, than that tyranny, in any shape, should, in a nation like Spain, triumph for a single day.—The Morning Chronicle has an article complaining of the conduct of the GENERAL JUNTA in Spain; and, though one does not like to begin to blame, at a moment when the blamed party appears to be experiencing a reverse of fortune, it must be acknowledged, that, as far as we can judge at this distance from the scene, and with means of information so imperfect, there is, as the Chronicle observes, but too much reason to look back with regret to the Junta of Seville.—The General Junta may be composed of wise and good men; but, it does not breathe the *spirit* of the Junta of Seville. It does, perhaps, contain more of *rank* than the Junta just named; but more rank and title will, I should think, do, in such circumstances, little, or nothing.—The General Junta appear to have directed their attention chiefly to the keeping of the people *quiet*; to the maintaining of "*order and tranquillity*;" to the repressing of all violences, proceeding from popular commotion. But, with their leave, this is not the way to oppose Buonaparte and his daring legions. The object of the Junta is, doubtless, to nip, in time, the bud of insurrection; lest, in the end, the people, proceeding from one step to another, overturn the whole system of the government, in church as well as in state, as was the case in France. But, the question is, is Buonaparte to be resisted by any means other than those of a general insurrection; a general letting-loose of the people? I think, that he is not; and that the nobles of Spain have to choose, whether they will see king Joseph upon the throne, or see the people left to act as they please. There wanted, in

Spain, a renovation of character; an entirely new spirit excited; new talents called forth from obscurity. Therefore, if the nobles have assembled in a Junta, and are endeavouring to keep the people quiet; to preserve "order and tranquillity," they, in my view of the matter, are taking precisely the wrong course. It is, in that case, little more than the old government, administered by deputy, under which, it is my decided opinion, that, sooner or later, Spain must fall. It is not *cautiousness* that is now wanted in Spain. It is vigour; it is activity; it is great daring; it is enthusiasm. Anger, resentment, revenge; every feeling that leads to violence. These are wanted in Spain. With these Buonaparte may be resisted; but, without them, it seems to me that he cannot.—There is one decree, or edict, of this General Junta, from which, if it be authentic, it is impossible not to forebode great evil. I mean that, whereby they attempt to put a stop to what they call "the licentiousness of the press." If the press assault only Buonaparte and his friends, it is evident that it cannot be too unshackled. Why attempt to check it, unless it be feared, that it will produce what is thought to be mischief, in Spain? And, if, so soon, the Junta itself be afraid of the press, the reader will easily suppose, that much of a change is not in contemplation, a fact which, the moment it is discovered by the people, will admonish them not to be very lavish of their blood. I must confess, that this little circumstance, this decree, for which the Junta will be, I dare say, greatly applauded by many, has, in my mind, excited very serious fears for the Spanish cause; because, if authentic, it argues a distrust of the people, and an opinion, on the part of the Junta, that the country is to be defended by the *old ordinary means*; than which, I am convinced, the result will prove nothing in the world to be more erroneous.—As to the check, or the defeat, for such I fear it is, that General Blake has received, I think nothing at all of it. How many such defeats did the French experience, at the out-set of their revolutionary war? They rose more powerful after each defeat. It is true, that there is some little difference between the assaults of the Spaniards and those of the revolutionary French. Yet, this I do not value, if the Spaniards have a spirit like that of the French: if they are animated by motives like those by which the French were animated. I cannot help thinking, that it was very unwise in us to send an envoy to the king of Spain. This was, in fact, one way of pointing out to the people

of Spain the object, which we thought they should have in view, and for the effecting of which we would give our aid. I am afraid, that this tended to damp the rising spirit of the people. There are persons, I know, who, rather than see the French resisted by a patriotic insurrection, would see Joseph Buonaparte in safe possession of the throne. This is a fact, which has been all along evident enough, and which was, long ago, dwelt upon by me. But, such persons must be very unwise, very short-sighted; for, in the end, all the evils, which they may apprehend from the success of a patriotic insurrection, must come, and come swifter too, through another channel.—As to our armies, in Spain, they really appear to be in a rather "unsatisfactory state," at present. They are, however, under experienced commanders; and, let what will be their fate, they will have done their best to assist the cause. It is impossible, that either ministers or commanders can foresee every thing; something must be left to luck; and, therefore, if the expedition should fail, under Generals MOORE and BAIRD, I should not, from the bare circumstance of failure, be disposed to blame the ministers.—In the two Morning Chronicles of Tuesday and Wednesday last, there appeared some very spirited and able articles upon the conduct of the ministers, with regard to the war in Spain and Portugal. They are well worth reading; but, I do not agree with the writer, that it was so easy a matter to know precisely what ought to be done, at the time when the expeditions were first sent out. Let the ministers have all the blame that is their due, but no more. It is the fashion, because it accords so well with party motives, never to blame the commanders, but always to blame the ministers. This is not only unjust in itself, but it has a very mischievous tendency, as to the conduct of those commanders, who, be that conduct what it may, are sure to meet with, at least, an indirect defence, from one party or the other. It is not so in the French service, where the commander is looked to, and nobody but the commander. There is nobody found to accuse the war-minister of not sending him to the right point, or of not supplying him with horses or provisions. The fact is, we have nothing but the parade of military service. We have no really military notions; for, if we had, we never should endure complaints against the ministry for having "exposed a general to difficulty and danger," the existence of which are always implied when men talk of war.—That ten thousand English troops

should, at a moment like this, be, as the *Morning Post* states, necessary to "curb" the refractory disposition of certain classes of the Portuguese, is, indeed, matter for serious reflection; for, in the first place, the "refractory" must, if this necessity do really exist, be the most powerful part of the nation; otherwise, they might be "curbed" by the part, who are not refractory. Then, what is the mark of this refractoriness? Is it a disposition favourable to the French? Is it a spirit of hostility to the Prince Regent or the old government? Or is it a dislike to the English authority? One or the other of these, I think, it must be. If the latter, it is quite evident that to withdraw our troops and our authority is the only effectual way of removing the necessity of keeping troops locked up in Portugal; and, if either of the former, it would, I think, puzzle the *Morning Post* to assign any probable good that will arise from keeping them there. To cherish, or defend, a people against their will, is a most difficult as well as a most ungrateful task. It is a task, which, from the nature of things, can never be attended with success.—Is it not a strange thing, that, amongst all the numerous nations, who have been subdued and plundered by the French, there has never yet appeared one, that has demonstrated any great degree of anxiety for the return of their former rulers? Some few have fought a little to keep the French out; but, when once in, there is scarcely any people that have discovered any very strong wish to get them out again. Who would not have supposed, that the people of Portugal, for instance, would have been half mad with joy at their "deliverance?" Who would not have expected to see them vie with each other in eagerness to obtain a return of the ancient order of things? Who would have imagined it likely to be necessary for us to keep ten thousand men in the country, "to curb the refractory disposition" of certain classes of a people, just delivered from the grasp of the French, and restored to the rule of the representatives of their "beloved sovereign?" I should like to hear the sapient editor of the *Morning Post* explain this political phenomenon; for it is a matter of vast importance with all those who study the science of government.

AMERICAN STATES—The election of the new President and Vice President, which has taken place before now, will, it is thought, terminate in favour of the Jefferson party, and in the election of Mr. Madison to the office of president. If so, the embargo will, probably, continue; but, the violations of it, the almost open defiance of

it; will not be less than they now are. We were told, that the Americans could starve the West India Islands. Those Islands were, perhaps, never much better supplied from America than they now are, and have been ever since the embargo was laid. The town of Halifax, in Nova Scotia, is become a grand depository for American produce, whence it is shipped to the West Indies. And, in fact, all that Mr. Jefferson and his bitter set have done, with a view of injuring England, has had no other effect than that of injuring his foolish constituents.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.—The effect of the American Embargo puts one in mind of the alarm of the "Barley-Growers," who are now selling at from 50 to 60 shillings a quarter that corn, which they were afraid would sink below 37 shillings a quarter; and who, upon seeing the ports in the Baltic and in America closed against us, were seized with a dread, that we should be starved in consequence of being able to convert into bread 300,000 quarters a year of that corn of our own growth, which we formerly employed in making spirituous liquors! I defy all the world, the readers of the *Morning Post* not excepted, to produce me an instance of folly equal to this. Mr. Wakefield denied me the privilege of judging upon such a subject, because I was not a practical farmer. Just as if it was necessary for a man to be a good hand at ploughing and sowing, in order to be certain that 300,000 quarters of bread corn would add to the food of the nation. It was a question of such plain common sense, that, to come to a right decision, there required neither experience nor reason. Barley must now be dear till next harvest; so that, at any rate, there is one year for the Barley-Growers, free of that mischief, which they really did, or affected to, anticipate.

*** A letter from LORD ANSON to the Freeholders of Staffordshire is inserted, because it is right that my readers, who have seen the letter of A. B. should see, that that nobleman had it not in his power to be present at the county meeting.

The Income of the DUKE OF YORK I do not state this week, because my intention is to publish, along with it, the whole of the act of parliament, granting him the estate in Surrey, and which is too long to be inserted, except in a double number.

MAJOR HOGAN does not answer my request. I have a letter before me, saying, that, next week, "the publisher of Major Hogan's Appeal will send me a letter upon

"the subject of that Appeal, and particularly with respect to the Bank Notes." I dare say, that there will be no objection to the insertion of the intended letter; but, I cannot refrain from apprising the writer, that I am rather surprized, that the numbers of the Bank Notes have not been published. As the Major expressed his anxious desire to return the notes, one would think that he must still have them in his possession; and, the gentleman who suggested the question to me, assured me, that, if the numbers were advertised, the notes would be traced to the late possessor, with the greatest facility. What I should do, were I in the Major's place, is this. State publicly the numbers of the notes, and offer to give them up to whomsoever would prove a proprietorship in them, than which, I am told, nothing is more easy. The fact is, that, if the Major does this, the public will believe his account, respecting the notes, to be true; if he does it not, they will, with very great reason, believe it to be a most atrocious falsehood.

Botley. December 2, 1808.

NEW EDITION OF THE STATE TRIALS.

On Monday, the 2nd of January, 1809, will be published (to be completed in Thirty-six Monthly Parts, forming Twelve very large Volumes in Royal Octavo), Part the First, Price 10s. 6d. of

COBBETT'S

COMPLETE COLLECTION OF

State Trials,

AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME.

In proceeding with the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, which it has been, and is, one of the principal objects of my life to lay complete before the public of the present day, and, in that state, to have the satisfaction of leaving it to posterity, I have, for some time past, perceived that there would still be wanting a Work like that above described. In putting to myself this question, "How shall I go to work to secure the best chance of rendering a son capable of accomplishing great things; fit to have a share in guiding the minds of others, of weight sufficient to make him an object of respect with good, and of dread with bad public men?" In putting this question to myself, the answer my mind suggested was: "Suffer not his time to be

wasted in learning sounds instead of sense; suffer not his body and mind to be debilitated by continual sedentary and continual controul and correction. Give him, God being your helper, a sound body and strong limbs; habituate him to bear fatigue, to move with confidence and rapidity in the dark; to fore and to sleep hard; and, above all other things in the world, to rise with the lark, thus making his year equal to eighteen months of his effeminate contemporaries. Next lead him into the paths of knowledge, not minding whether pedants call it *learning*, or not; and, when he arrives at the proper age for acquiring that sort of knowledge, make him acquainted with every thing material, as to public affairs, that has really occurred in his country from the earliest times to the present day. Open to him the book, not of speculation, but of unerring experience. That he may be able to judge of what is, as well as of what ought to be, show him, in detail, all the political causes and effects, to be found in our history; make him see clearly how this nation has come up, and how this government has grown together."

From these, or such like reflections, sprang that arduous undertaking, the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND; and, from the same source arises the Work, which I now submit to the judgment of the public. As I proceeded with the HISTORY, I found, that to read discussions, relating to Trials for High Treason and for other high Crimes and Misdemeanors, and not to be able to refer immediately to those Trials, they being so intimately connected with the History of the parliament, and being a detailed relation of some of the most important and most interesting events to be recorded, could not fail to be greatly disadvantageous to the student: yet, to bring into the HISTORY such a mass of legal proceedings, which admitted of little abridgment, was, for several reasons, not to be thought of. I, therefore, resolved to form them into a separate Work, to be published during the same time, and in the same manner, as to paper and print, with the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY.

Besides the consideration of uniformity, there were others which had great weight in this determination. The STATE TRIALS are now to be found only in an edition of *Eleven Volumes in folio*, a form so unwieldy that it is impossible they should ever be much read, to say nothing of their incomplete state, or of the expence; which latter alone, owing to the scarceness of even this imperfect edi-

tion, must be a serious obstacle to general circulation. So that this Work, though absolutely necessary to the lawyer and the professed politician, very curious, interesting and instructive, in itself, and, in a high degree, illustrative of the legal, political, and constitutional history of the country, is to be met with in but very few private libraries, those of counsellors and solicitors not excepted. The mere reduction of size, from the unmanageable folio of former editions to that of the Royal Octavo, double page, which unites economy with convenience, will, in itself, be no inconsiderable improvement. But, the proposed edition will possess the following additional advantages: 1. The Series will commence more than two hundred years before the time of the earliest transaction noticed in the former editions. 2. Many very important Trials and curious matters, omitted in the former editions, though occurring within the period which those Editions embrace, will be supplied; and the Series will be continued down to the present time. 3. Many useless repetitions, ceremonials, &c. will be omitted, but every Trial will be scrupulously preserved: 4. Many unmeaning and uninteresting pleadings will be omitted; yet, all those, which are either curious in themselves, or upon which any question arose, will be carefully retained: 5. The different articles, relative to each case, will be placed together, so that the trouble of frequent references backwards and forwards, attending a perusal of the former editions, will be avoided; and, where references from one part of the work to another necessarily occur, the paging of the present work will alone be regarded, so that the confusion arising from the various pagings of the former editions will, in no case, arise to tease and retard the reader: 6. The Trials, instead of being placed in the vexatious disorder of the former editions, will stand in one regular chronological succession, unless where a different arrangement shall be dictated by some special reason; as for instance, where more Trials than one concern the same party, or the same transaction; for, in such cases, it may sometimes be thought advisable to break through the order of time, for the sake of exhibiting together all the particulars relating to the same matter or the same person: 7. Brief historical notices of the conspicuous persons mentioned in the Work, or references to published accounts of them, will be occasionally inserted: 8. Where points of law arise, references will be made to those parts of the Law Digests, or Treatises on Criminal Law, in which the principles and cases,

relating to such points, are best collected: 9. In like manner, references will be made to my *Parliamentary Proceedings*, connected with any Trial, and to other works calculated to elucidate any part of this Collection of Trials: 10. Some Trials before Courts Martial, but those only of the greatest importance and most general interest, and illustrative of the history of the times, will be preserved in this Work: 11. To each Volume there will be prefixed a full and clear Table of Contents, and in the last Volume there will be a General Index to the whole Work, so complete that I hope it will be found to leave nothing of any importance difficult to be referred to.

It is computed, that the Eleven Volumes of the last Edition of the *State Trials* will be comprized in Nine Volumes of the new Edition, and that the Additional Matter to bring the Work down to the present time, will make three Volumes more. The whole Work, therefore, will consist of Twelve very large Volumes. The paper and print will be, in every respect, similar to those of the *Parliamentary History*. In the mode of publication only there will be the difference, that, while the *History* is published in Volumes, the *Trials* will be published in Parts, one Part coming out on the first day of every month, in the same manner as the *Magazines* and other monthly publications; and will, like those publications, be sold by all the Booksellers, Law-Stationers, and Newsmen in the kingdom. Three Parts will make a volume, and it will be optional with the Subscribers, to take the Parts separately, or quarterly to take the Volumes bound in boards, in a way exactly similar to that of the *History*.

For me to pretend to undertake, unassisted, a Work of this sort, which, to execute well, requires the pen of a person not only possessed of great legal knowledge, but also well versed in the history of the law, would be great presumption. Without such assistance the Work was not to be thought of for a moment; and, I am convinced, that the very first Part will satisfy the reader, that it has not been undertaken without means of every kind sufficient to carry it on to a conclusion, in a manner worthy of matter so generally interesting and highly important. In the publication of the *History*, I relied upon the sound sense of the public, rather than upon the prevailing literary taste of the times; and from the success of that Work, I am convinced, that success will attend this also. I am convinced, that there are readers, and readers enough,

who wish to know, from authentic sources, what the *facts* of our history are; how our government *really* was administered heretofore; what sort of men our forefathers *really* were, and how they *really* acted; and who will not be satisfied with the vague notions which alone can be collected from historical magic lanterns, like that of Hume for instance, in which no one single object is plainly or distinctly presented to us, but where a multitude of images are made rapidly and confusedly to pass before our eyes, distorted and discoloured according to the taste of the showman.

Dec. 1, 1808.

W. COBBETT.

* * The First Part will be published on Monday the 2d of January, 1809; and as the number of copies of the succeeding parts must, of course, be regulated by the degree of success that can reasonably be counted upon, Subscribers are respectfully requested to send in their Names as early as possible.

The Work will be published by R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent Garden; and will be sold by J. Budd, Pall-Mall; J. Faulder, New Bond Street; H. D. Symonds, Paternoster Row; Black, Parry, and Kingsbury, Leadenhall Street; J. Archer, Dublin; and by every Bookseller, Law-Stationer, and Newsmen in the United Kingdom.

LORD ANSON

To the Freeholders of the County of Stafford.

Having taken an active part in the Requisition to the High Sheriff to call a Meeting of the County of Stafford, I am induced to trespass upon your patience, to state, as briefly as possible, my sentiments respecting some part of the proceedings which did actually take place at the Meeting. I entered my Protest against the form adopted by the High Sheriff for introducing the Requisition to public notice. The form was certainly unusual, I believe unprecedented, and a direct deviation on the part of the High Sheriff in his official capacity, from what I humbly conceived to be strictly his duty. I should be almost inclined to say that the calling together a Meeting of any County in a manner so novel, was ill-judged and ill-advised, inasmuch as it might be liable to the imputation of having been so proclaimed, for the express purpose of creating some difference of opinion, as well amongst the Requisitionists, as amongst the other Freeholders of the County, with the hopes, by such a manœuvre of marring the object of the Meeting, and thus checking, if possible, the ebullition of public spirit. Such having been my sentiments respecting

the manner in which the Requisition was announced, I now feel it my duty to enter my public protest against a Vote of Thanks to the High Sheriff, moved at the Meeting which did take place at Stafford; for, in direct opposition to the statement made in that motion, I do conceive that there was at least, much, and most notorious irregularity in the mode of convening that assembly. Under the same impressions it was judged right by many of my friends, not to give sanction to such a Requisition by their attendance on the day appointed by the Sheriff. In this, I felt myself obliged, though unwillingly, to concur, as my health would not allow of my personal appearance in the county—a circumstance which I cannot sufficiently deplore. For, most assuredly, had I been present at Stafford on the 11th inst. I would, at all events, have had the honour of proposing to you the intended Address or Petition to his Majesty, (a copy of which you have no doubt seen in the Staffordshire Advertiser) and notwithstanding it was a Convention of the County, not at all agreeing with my own ideas of regularity, should certainly have given my Brother Freeholders an opportunity of deciding upon the merits of the Address, which it would, under such circumstances, have fallen to my lot to propose, and the uncalled-for Resolutions, which, though they may probably speak the sentiments of some few of the most powerful interests in the county, I will venture to assert and maintain, are by no means declaratory of the real and general sense of the people, with respect to the terms of that most weak and disgraceful, though important Convention, upon which myself and many of my friends felt anxious to express our sentiments to his Majesty, in a manner the most loyal and constitutional. It may, I know, be urged, that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to institute an Inquiry. It is upon this point, that myself and my friends, on the other side are at issue. His Majesty (as we are informed by the public prints) has indeed ordered a Military Court of Inquiry, and the adoption of such a mode of Inquiry may, at first view, appear to some persons to be all-sufficient. But I beg leave to ask, in case that Military Grand Jury should throw out the Bill, how, or from what quarter is the nation to look for an explanation either consolatory or satisfactory? And I very much doubt whether, in any point of view, such a Court will be competent to afford full and comprehensive satisfaction to the Country at large. It is upon these grounds that myself and friends were desirous of petitioning his Majesty to

convene his Parliament, for the purpose of instituting an Inquiry and Investigation before that Constitutional Tribunal. Parliament is said to be the voice of the People; by some persons it may be objected that it is not precisely so at this moment, and though the public expectations and anxious wish for truth, and nothing but the truth, might be disappointed equally, even by such a reference, yet the people at large would certainly have no right to complain, as they could only blame themselves for having elected such Representatives, as could sacrifice their Country's glory and honour, either from fear of avowing constitutional principles, or with a view of promoting their own private interest, or party spirit.—Having thus entered my decided protest against the Resolutions passed at the Meeting which did take place, I shall now say a word or two upon the Address intended to have been proposed, the object of which was to request his Majesty to summon his Parliament, and to bring the discussion of the unfortunate Convention before that, the only Constitutional Court.—I earnestly request you to examine with attention the words of that Address. No attack is made upon the character of any set of men. No attempt is made to prejudge any Commander. No allusion is made to any individual—I defy the most zealous or scrutinizing prerogative stickler, to point out any part of that Address, which is wanting either in loyalty, or attachment to the sovereign. It is, on the contrary, couched in terms of the most proper respect towards his Majesty; at the same time, that, in temperate but dignified language, it asserts the right of the subject and expresses boldly, that just sense of the disgrace, which has fallen upon the national character, by an event as unaccountable, as it was unexpected. The Address implies distinctly an imputation of blame somewhere, and solicits a Parliamentary Inquiry into the causes of an evil of such magnitude.—I shall now take my leave of you, with only requesting that you will compare carefully and without prejudice the intended Address, with those Resolutions, which were carried at the Meeting. Let every man appeal fully to his own heart, whether the Address intended to have been proposed, is not more adapted to his own private sentiments, more consonant to the public opinion, and more congenial to the feelings of every Englishman, who professes an honest, though not parasitical loyalty to his King, and an attachment invincible to the laws and Constitution of his Country.—I entreat you to make this comparison in order to convince

yourselves, that the Address alluded to, breathes NO spirit, which is not most truly and strictly honourable to the feelings of subjects of a great empire, and that I may stand acquitted before my Brother Freeholders, of having been actuated by any other motives, than such as glow in the breast of every true and free-born Briton. I am proud of participating in such sentiments, and have the honour to be, "In this matter, "as in all others in which" not only "the Independence and Honour of the County "of Stafford" but of "the Kingdom at large, are concerned,"—Brother Freeholders,—Your devoted and faithful Servant,
—ANSON. Bath, Nov. 15th, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

BUENOS AYRES—*Proclamation by Don Santiago Liniers y Briond, Viceroy, Governor, and Provincial Captain-General of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, &c. Dated Buenos Ayres, Aug. 15, 1808. (Concluded from p 684)*

I communicate this by special couriers, to all the heads of provinces on this continent, that by adopting one uniform system, they may make the greater efforts to facilitate the succours necessary to preserve the glory acquired by a city, which from its local situation, and its energy, has been, and will continue to be, the impregnable bulwark of South America. But I cannot conclude without impressing upon you, and yourselves cannot but know it, that no force is comparable to union of opinion and feeling, nor any means more effective to preserve you invincible than reciprocal confidence between you and the constituted authorities, who, attentive only to the public interest and benefit, will see with dissatisfaction and abhorrence every thing that opposes or separates itself from the general prosperity—**SANTIAGO LINIERS.**—*Buenos Ayres, Aug. 11, 1808.*

FRENCH EXPOSÉ. *Paris, Nov. 3*—In the sitting of yesterday, his excellency the minister of the interior, accompanied by Messrs. de Segur and Corvetto, counselors of state, pronounced the following speech on the situation of the French empire:—Gentlemen, you terminated your last session, leaving the empire happy, and its chief loaded with glory. The year has passed away, and a multitude of new circumstances have added to the good fortune of the country, and increased our hopes of future benefits. All that I have to state to you, gentlemen, is already known to you; and, for your full information, I have only

to retace to your memory the principal events which have filled up the interval between your last and your present session, and to recal to you the additional advantages for which France is indebted to the wisdom and valour of her sovereign. I will speak to you first of the wants of nations; justice, public instruction, the arts and sciences, the numerous branches of internal administration, public worship, the finances, and our principal relations with the states of the Continent. The recital will bring us of course to this lamentable war, which we maintain against one single people. The glory of our nation wounds that people, our strength alarms them; the independence of our commerce and our industry disquiets them; every thing is again subjected to the fortune of war; but the days of justice are not far distant.—[Here follows a long detail respecting the administration of justice, the principal amelioration of which consists in the establishment of the trial by jury, on the precise principles of the English law. The next head is that of public worship, which is followed by that of sciences and literature, public instruction, &c.—These articles being of great length, and less immediate importance, we reserve them for a future opportunity, and proceed to the heads which are most interesting to the English reader.]—Among the arts of industry, which have made progress in the course of this year, we must enumerate the manufacture of tin. In two of our manufactories they have attained a degree of perfection, no ways yielding to that of the English. A premium of encouragement has been given accordingly; and another is also destined to ulterior efforts in the same branch.—The mechanics, in their endeavours of simplifying their looms, and introducing economy in their labours, have often also improved the quality of their stuffs. Those that are used in the weaving of cotton, have, for several years, been much multiplied; the spirit of invention has brought them to perfection. There is nothing now but what we can make, and very well. The weaving of the cotton has made as marked a progress as the spinning. These two kinds of industry are already adequate to the consumption of the empire, which is for ever liberated of the grievous taxation it has hitherto been under to the Indian manufacturers and to their oppressors. The machines best calculated for the manufacture of cloths, are already in wide circulation; they have lately been much encouraged by advances made to different manufacturers in the departments.—The conservatory of arts and handicraft is daily

enriching by the acquisition of new patterns, and is entitled to commendation for the information which the pupils receive, who frequent its school of drawing and descriptive geometry. Reforms have been made in the school at Chalons-sur-Marne.—The consultation chambers of the manufactures are hastening to present useful views, which will be taken advantage of. The institution of arbitrators, for the purpose of deciding with celerity variances that may arise between the workmen and their employers, render to industry services which have been set forth. Since your last session, gentlemen, several towns have demanded them, and there are already some established at Nîmes, Aix-la-Chapelle, Avignon, Troies, Mulhausen, Sedan, and Thiers.

Commerce.—The political events have been unfavourable to commerce. It still was kept alive in the midst of the contentions that have deluged the Continent in blood, because those nations that were involved in the war preferred their neutrality—that right deemed, even in our times, inviolable. But the English legislation, already misled by the ambition of universal monopoly, has overthrown the ancient barrier of the law of nations, and trampled their independence under foot, substituting in the room of them a new maritime code. The ordinances of his Britannic majesty have realized these innovations: that of the 11th of November, 1807, is particularly remarkable; it pronounces, by an universal blockade, the interdiction of all our ports, in subjecting the ships of neutral powers, friendly and even allied to Great Britain, to the visitation of its cruisers, to be conducted to British ports, and there to be taxed by an arbitrary inquiry.—The emperor, obliged to oppose just reprisals to this strange legislation, gave out the decree of the 23d of November, ordaining the seizure and confiscation of the ships which, after having touched in England, should enter the ports of France.—From these measures, provoked by the British laws, the almost absolute cessation of the maritime relations, and many privations for the French merchants, manufacturers, and consumers, must have necessarily ensued. We all know with what resignation these privations were endured; we know that they are already become habitual, that they have awakened the genius of invention, and produced a thousand resources in substitution of the objects which we are in want of; we know, finally, that a great nation, essentially agricultural, can, by possessing in abundance all articles of utility, easily forego those, which only form certain luxuries

or conveniencies of life, particularly when its independence and glory should be put at stake.—These circumstances have favoured one of the greatest scourges of commerce, smuggling. But it has been strongly repressed. The government is preparing new means against this foe to the public revenue, and national industry; the great emoluments it procures excites the most ardent cupidity. Those, who ought not to be honoured with the approbation of merchants, lest we should degrade commerce, are still devoting themselves to criminal peculations; they think that they are only braving the shame of an ordinary transgression; but the public indignation and vengeance will overtake them, and teach them that under circumstances where the nation employs for its defence, in an unexampled war, the interdiction of all commercial relations with the enemy, the violation of these dispositions is an hostile declaration, a true alliance with this same enemy; that consequently every smuggler renounces the benefit of the municipal laws, to be subjected solely to those of war, and that he ought to dread the terrible and rapid application of those laws, which authorise the invasion of his fortune and personal castigation.—The government, penetrated with the situation of the French commerce, has strove to mitigate the evils, to provide for its wants.—Abroad, a treaty with the kingdom of Italy secures to France all the advantages which are compatible with the reciprocal justice. In the interior, various sums, which have been advanced to manufacturers and proprietors of produce, which public events had accumulated or cramped in their stores.—The *Caisse d'Amortissement* has interfered in the outfitings of adventurers.—A law has limited the bounds of the interest on money; offices established at Lyons and at Rouen are prelude to a grand system of facility in the circulation of the numery and merchandize.—The exchange and the commercial tribunal of Paris see rising for their accommodation a stately palace, on the scite of the nunnery of St. Thomas.—Conformably to the new code, an organisation of the tribunals of commerce of the empire is preparing. The prefects, the courts of appeal have been consulted, on the most eligible scites for these tribunals, as well as on the subject of their number, the judges and their surrogates. A general project has been submitted to the discussion of the council of state, and to the sanction of his majesty.

Agriculture.—The prefects, the courts of appeal, and of the members of the general

councils of department, formed in consultation, are also called upon to give their advice on a project of the greatest utility, that of a rural code, so important to the prosperity of agriculture, and so closely interwoven with national prosperity.—In the meantime, one of the principal improvements of which agriculture is capable, is daily effected by the re-organization of our repositories for the breed of horses. Eight new repositories of stallions have been formed this year. Premiums held out to the owners of the best horses brought to the fairs, rewards decreed at the departmental races, are so many additional means of favouring the production of the most eligible species of this animal.—Two new sheep-farms have been introduced. Six hundred Merinos, of the best breed, have been ordered from Spain, and they are already arrived in France, notwithstanding the variety of obstacles that have occurred on their passage. They will be divided in two new establishments, as yet in embryo. The multiplication of the flocks increases rapidly, and we may consider the happy revolution introduced in this branch as completed.—May, it one day be so also with the culture of cotton. In spite of the contrarieties of a hardy spring, and a tolerable cold autumn, the attempts made still give room to hope for ultimate success. We are justified to augur well also of the attempts made on the subject of the syrups of the grape. The rich culture of tobacco is daily extending; that which is gathered in the vicinity of St. Malo, equals in quality that of America. France will one day, to judge by appearances, not only supply its own wants with that production, but also export it to her neighbours.

The Public Treasure and Finances.—Regularity, and a judicious administration, prevail in every department of the public treasury.—The national accounts are reduced to a system the most scientific and luminous; it differs from the mode adopted by the most intelligent merchants, only in the extent and necessary complication of the transactions of government.—The finances have been gradually brought by the emperor, from a state of dilapidation and confusion, to a state of order and prosperity unknown in the governments the best administered. It is a trophy raised by vigorous exertion, by combinations the most judicious, and by a perseverance which has unravelled the most intricate details, and surmounted incredible difficulties. The nation enjoys the benefits which result from this new sort of conquest. Since France has generously consented to the adoption of indirect taxation, the finan-

oes have really been consolidated, and the utmost facility of carrying on the functions of every department of the public service.—The finances in modern times may be considered as the security of states, and the measure of their stability. If they furnish government only with inadequate, precarious, or oppressive resources, its energies become paralyzed, individuals insolvent, and if war, or any other calamity, should visit a nation under these circumstances, it must subscribe to its own dishonour, or be involved in irretrievable ruin.—The finances of a state are not essentially and efficiently good, until they become independent of circumstances—until they can be maintained independently of the ruinous expedient of resorting to loans and excessive contributions—until, in fine, they are so connected and identified with national prosperity, that they constitute a direct emanation from it; then only can they be deemed solid, efficient, permanent, and essentially national, and, particularly, if they have received an organization sufficiently simple; so that in an extraordinary emergency, all the property, and all the individuals may be called upon, promptly, to furnish their respective quotas in advance.—The endeavours of his majesty have been incessantly directed to the attainment of this desirable object, and they have been crowned by the most complete success, and the finances are calculated in future to meet with equal effect the exigencies of war and of peace.—In a period of peace, 600 millions will be sufficient to defray the public expenses, and will leave a large surplus for national improvements. The receipts, which amount at the present moment to 800 millions, will, according to this arrangement, be reduced one-fourth.—In time of war, it is not in the contemplation of his imperial majesty to resort to the illusory expedients of imposing taxes of a novel description, or to hold out temptation to raise new supplies. The contributions on the recurrence of war will be brought back to the war standard—i. e. 800 millions, and even then raised only by 100 or 150 millions at a time, in case of need; and this will be done by a simple scale, or table of proportions, which will enable every citizen to judge of the share he has in the good or bad fortune of the state.—Observe, gentlemen, that this simplicity has no affinity or connection with that so considerably extolled as the result of a single direct contribution; it is, on the contrary, founded on a conviction that taxes ought to be laid on various objects, that our laws of finance include all the taxes which it was expedient to establish, and that all that is

just and reasonable has been effected.—It remains only to limit to the survey or register, without which the uniform progress of the scale of increase or diminution would be deficient, in proportion, and would continue to affect the proprietors of the funds actually surcharged; the making up of this register, which ought to efface so much inequality, to repair so much involuntary and inevitable injustices, is pursued with so much constancy, that those who disbelieve the practicability of this immense work, no longer doubt of its speedy execution. I must not here omit, gentlemen, the creation of the court of accounts, to the establishment of which you co-operated in your last session. We wanted a new institution, powerful in its unity, present to all the depositaries of the public property by the rapidity of its action, embracing all the responsibility of inferior accountants connected with the public income and expenditure. This court ought, by the distribution of its duties, and the number of its members, to be adequate to all the occasions, and responsible for all the labours, that may be entrusted to it. The principles on which this establishment rests, the choice of its members, the consideration in which they are held, every thing guarantees the success the government has promised itself, that of a salutary controul over the several accountants.

Administration of the War Department.

—The same principles of order, and the same views for the acceleration of the service, have influenced the general direction of the commissariat, whose first essays justify the expectation that had been formed. This administration renders the supplies of the army independent of contractors, who have so frequently done injury, at the same time that it secures the advantage of our economy, very sensible to the public funds.

Marine.—Though during the present campaign the government has limited its maritime operations, still a squadron armed at Toulon, as if by enchantment, and conducted with skill, has been able to defeat, by able manœuvres, the combinations of the enemy, by conveying to Corfu two years supplies of men, artillery, provisions, and ammunition. After having thus rendered useless the expedition with which that barrier of the Adriatic was threatened, the fleet of Admiral Ganteaume returned safe through all the difficulties of a boisterous navigation, and all the dangers of continued tempests. The colonies have in like manner been successfully supplied with provisions, by squadrons of frigates and corvettes, which, while they fulfilled that important object, had,

like the squadron, that went to Corfu, the advantage of making prizes of a great number of the enemy's ships, richly laden. In India, prizes to the value of 15 millions have been the result of the cruises of our frigates, one of which only surrendered, and that after a glorious contest, against a superior force.—Our cruisers, in all parts of the world, and above all in the seas of India and Guadaloupe, have proved themselves formidable to the enemy. But it is not so much with a view to what it has done, but to what it may do with time, that our marine ought to be considered. Ten ships of the line, constructed in the docks of Antwerp, and fitted for sea many months since, are awaiting their destination. The flotilla of Boulogne, kept up and equipped, is still in readiness to undertake the operations for which it was originally created.—Twelve ships of the line, and as many frigates, have been launched within the year, and twenty-five more, and as many frigates on the stocks, attest the activity of our dock-yards. Our ports are preserved in perfect order, and the creation of that of Cherbourg is so far advanced, that its basin may be expected to be in a state to contain squadrons before the lapse of two campaigns.—Spezzia is about to become a second Toulon. The union of almost all the coast of the Mediterranean to France, secures to our arsenals and our ships, abundant supplies of provisions, stores, and men. Venice, Ancona, Naples, and all the means of Holland and Italy, are in motion.

The Present War.—At the epoch of your last sitting, gentlemen, every thing combined to deliver Europe from its long agitations; but England, the enemy of the world, still repeated the cry of perpetual war, and war continues. What then is the object—what will be the issue? The object of this war is the slavery of the world, by the exclusive possession of the seas. There is no doubt, that, by subscribing treaties of bondage, disguised under the holy name of peace, nations may obtain repose; but this shameful repose would be death. In this alternative, the choice between submission and resistance could not be long doubtful.—The war which England has provoked, which she continues with so much pride and obstinacy, is the termination of the ambitious system which she has cherished during two centuries. Mixing in the politics of the continent, she has succeeded in holding Europe in a perpetual agitation, and in exciting against France all the envious and jealous passions. It was her wish to humble or destroy France, by keeping the people of the

continent constantly under arms; but thus detaching the maritime powers, she had the art to profit from the divisions she fomented among neighbours, in order to forward her distant conquests.—In this manner she extended her colonies, and augmented her naval power; and, by the aid of that power, she hopes henceforth to enjoy her usurpation, and to arrogate to herself the exclusive possession of the seas.—But until these latter times, she paid at least some respect to the laws of nations; she seemed to respect the rights of her allies, and even, by some returns towards peace, allowed her enemies to breathe.—This conduct is, however, no longer suitable to the development of a system which she can no longer dissemble. All who do not promote her interests are her enemies. The abandonment of her alliance is a cause of war; neutrality is a revolt; and all the nations that resist her yoke are made subject to her cruel ravages.—It is impossible to foresee what might have been the consequence of so much audacity, had not fortune, on our part, raised up a man of a superior order, destined to repel the evils with which England threatens the world.—He had also to combat the allies of that power on the continent, and to conquer the rising enemies she succeeded in creating. Always attacked, always threatened, he found it necessary to regulate his policy by that state of things, and felt that to lay the contest it was necessary to augment our forces, and weaken those of our enemies.—The emperor always pacific, but always armed by necessity, was not ambitious of aggrandizing the empire. Prudence always directed his views. It became necessary for him to relieve our ancient frontiers from the too near danger of sudden attacks, and to found their security on limits fortified by nature; finally, it became necessary so to separate France, by alliances from her rivals, that even the sight of an enemy's standard never could alarm the territory of the empire.—England, defeated in the disputes she so often renewed, profited however, of them to increase her wealth, by the universal monopoly of commerce.—She had impoverished her allies by wars, in which they fought only for her interests. Abandoned at the moment in which their arms ceased to serve those interests, their fate became the more indifferent to her as she preserved some commercial relations with them, even while she continued at war with France.—Even France herself left to the English the hope of a shameful subjugation to the want of certain objects, the privation of which they believe our generous population could not support. They thought that

if they could not enter the territory of the empire by their arms, they might penetrate its heart by a commerce now become its most dangerous enemy, and the admission of which would have exhausted its most valuable resources.—The genius and the prudence of the emperor have not overlooked this danger. Involved in the difficulties of the continental war, he ceased not, however, to repel from his states the monopoly of English commerce. He has since completed the measures of an effectual resistance.—No one can now be deceived on this subject, since the English have declared this new kind of war, all the ports of the continent are blockaded, the ocean is interdicted to every neutral ship which will not pay to the British treasury a tribute which is meant to be imposed on the whole population of the globe.—To this law of slavery other nations have replied by means of a reprisal and by wishes for the annihilation of such a tyranny.—The English nation has separated itself from every other nation. England is fixed in this situation. All her social relations with the continent are suspended. She is smitten by the excommunication which she has herself provoked.—The war will henceforth consist in repelling from all points the English commerce, and in employing all the means calculated to promote that end. France has energetically concurred in the exclusion of the monopoly of commerce; she has resigned herself to privations which long habits must have rendered more painful. Some branches of her agriculture and her industry have suffered, and still suffer, but the prosperity of the great body of the nation is not affected: she is familiarised with that transitory state, the hardship of which she beholds without fear. The allies of France, and the United States, sacrifice like her, and with a resolution equally generous, their private conveniences. England was on the eve of the moment when her exclusion from the continent was about to be consummated: but she availed herself of the last circumstance to spread the genius of evil over Spain, and to excite in that unhappy country all the rage of furious passions. She has sought for alliances even in support of the inquisition, and even in the most barbarous prejudices. Unhappy people, to whom do you confide your destiny? To the contempters of all moral obligations—to the enemies of your religion—to those who, violating their promises, have elevated on your territory a monument of their impudence, an

affront, the impunity of which, above a century, would bear testimony against your courage, if the weakness of your government had not been alone to blame. You ally yourself with the English, who have so often wounded your pride and your independence, who have so long ravished from you, by open violence, and even in time of peace, the commerce of your colonies; who, in order to intimate to you their prohibition of your neutrality, caused their decrees to be preceded by the plunder of your treasures, and the massacre of your navigators; who, in fine, have covered Europe with proofs of their contempt for their allies, and for the deceitful promises they had made to them. You will without doubt recover from your error. You will then groan for the new perfidies that are reserved for you. But how much blood will flow before this tardy return to your senses? The English, hitherto absent from all great conflicts, try a new fortune on the continent. They ungarrison their island, and leave it almost without defence, in the presence of an enterprising and valiant king, who commands a French army, and who has already snatched from them the strong position of the island of Caprea. What then will be the fruit of their efforts? Can they hope to be able to exclude the French from Spain and Portugal? Can the success be doubtful? The emperor himself commands his invincible legions. What a presage does the heroic army of Portugal offer to us, which, struggling against double its force, has been able to raise trophies of victory on the very land where it fought to such disadvantage, and to dictate the conditions of a glorious retreat? In preparing for a new struggle against our only enemy, the emperor has done all that was necessary for the maintenance of peace on the continent. He must reckon upon it without doubt, inasmuch as Austria, the only power which could disturb it, has given the strongest assurances of her disposition, in recalling her ambassador from London, and desisting from all political communication with England.—Still Austria had recently made armaments, but they took place certainly without any hostile intention. Prudence, nevertheless, dictates energetic measures of precaution. The troops of Germany and Italy are strengthened by levies of the new conscription. The troops of the confederation of the Rhine are complete, well organized, and disciplined.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER

Vol. XIV No. 21] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1808 [PRICE 10d.

Justice gives sentence, in my times,
On one man for another's crimes
Our Brethren of New England us
Chose Multifarious to excuse,
And hang the Guiltless in their stead,
Of whom the Churches have less need,
As lately 't happened in a town
There liv'd a Cobbler in but one,
That out of Doctrines could cut us,
And mend men's lives, as well as shoes.
This pre-*val* her, having said,
In times of peace an Indian,
Not a bit more but mere zeal,
(But is he was an infidel.)
The mighty Totipottery
Sent to our leaders an envoy.

Complaining sorely of the breach
Of league, held forth by Brother Patch,
Against the articles in force
Between both Churches, his and ours,
For which he crav'd the *Saints* to render
Into his hands, or hang, the offender,
But they, maturely having weigh'd
They had no more but him o' th' trade,
(A man that serv'd them in a double
Capacity, to teach and crible)
Resolv'd to spare him, yet to do
The Indian Hoghan M'hem too
In partial Justice, in his stead did
HANG AN OLD WEAV'ER that was bedrid.
HUDIBRAS

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS

DUKE OF YORK'S INCOME.—At the Hampshire meeting for proposing an address and petition to the king upon the subject of the Convention of Cintra, I made a statement of the sums, which the Duke of York annually receives from the public taxes, which statement was as follows:

Pension to himself and Duchess	15,000
As Colonel of the Grenads	6,000
As Colon Commander in Chief	8,000
Worth of public lands &c granted him	16,600
Interest upon 24,000 lent him	2,700
	£50,700

In the printing there was an error of £2,100, in the head of Commander in Chief, which is upon the total of 53,800, and not ten thousand — The statement to this statement, which the Morning Post, I think it is, charging upon me is greatly exaggerated, another statement has appeared. I have not the paper now at hand, but the substance of it is as follows: That the profits of the three battalions of Grenads of which the Duke of York is Colonel, do not exceed £3,000 a year, that his pay and allowances as Commander in Chief do not exceed £8,300 a year, that being Colonel of the 60th Regiment (of five battalions, I believe) he receives only about £227 a year for *paper, pens, and ink*, that, as to the grant of lands, which I valued so highly, Oatlands was bought with *his money*, and that, with respect to the *last* appointments, he received one third, and that all he was entitled to, upon his score was, a portion of the *rent*, &c. &c.

in the New Forest, of which he is the Ranger, or Warden. I forget which — Now, as to the profits of the Colonelship, though this winter talks of a Report upon the subject before the House of Commons, it would puzzle him, I believe, to point out that report. Thirty years ago, the profits of a battalion of 400 men, were considered worth £700 a year, and I am inclined to think that, at the present time, that, taking the depreciation into view, the profits of 500 men should not now exceed £600 a year. The salary of the Commander in Chief is not that, to be looked at. We must include the *house*, the *travelling*, the *candles*, the *cost* of every description, because it is not for in consequence of there being a *Commander in Chief*, who is benefited by the use of them all, and who, while he is so, them, cannot use his own. I reckon nothing for *patronage*, because I succeed upon the supposition, that no money, or pecuniary advantage, in any way whatever, is derived from it, but, it must be evident to every one, that, supposing all appointments and promotions to be made without improper motives, such immense patronage must, in any mind of moderate munificence, supply the place of many of the purposes, for which a great pecuniary income might be wished for. It is not to purchase estates and drinkables that a nobleman, and especially a prince, can want, or wish for, money. Such a person naturally wishes to have power. Power consists in the good will, or of obedience to your wishes, of other men, and one or the other of these things is an unlimited power of advancing others. We cannot fail to imagine you — When I speak of the *last* offices, the *rent* will

see, by the detail below, that they are not quite so insignificant as the writer in question asserts them to be; and, the public, who have now, for the first time, an opportunity of forming an opinion upon the subject, will easily guess, from a perusal of the Act of Parliament, inserted in another part of this sheet, whether I have over-estimated the value of the immense grant of Crown Lands, described, set forth, and alienated, for ever, from the public, by that Act, which was amongst the last of the famous deeds of the Pitts. But, a word or two are necessary here, upon the nature of the proprietorship of the lands and houses and mills and minors in question. They are, improperly, I think, called "*Crown Lands*." The kings of England formerly had no other income, for the maintenance of themselves, their families, and regal establishments, but what arose from the Crown Lands and other sources of a similar, or nearly a similar, nature. But, the present king, in lieu of this source of income, and, in compensation for it, has had a certain sum annually paid to him out of the mass of the taxes, which sum, if we take into view the occasional additional grants by parliament, has, I believe, upon an average, amounted, for some years past, to upwards of *one million of pounds sterling a year*. Now, in consequence of this new mode of maintaining the king and his family, the sources, whence before he derived the means of such maintenance, came, of course, into the hands of the public; and, accordingly, one source of the public revenue now is, the Crown Lands, which, as the reader will, I think, be of opinion with me, ought now to be called, *Public*, or *National*, Lands. Much depends upon names; and, this very explanation has been rendered necessary only because the Lands in question are not called by the name here suggested; because, from the name of *Crown Lands*, the reader might be led to suppose, that the grant to the Duke of York affected merely the *property of the king*—From this account of the proprietorship of the thing granted, it is clear, that the alienation is from the people, and not from the king.—As to the worth of the *manors, lands, and messuages*, let the reader look at the things granted; let him consider *where* they lie; let him take into view the value of things of the same sort in the same neighbourhood; and, then, let him say, whether my estimate be exaggerated. Indeed, I have not put it at more than *one-fourth* of what I have heard the possessions estimated at.—I shall be told, that the Act provides for a "*valuable consider-*

ation" to be paid by the Duke; and, when I see this consideration brought to account; when I see it amongst the items of national income, then I shall be able to judge of the proportion which it bears to the real value of the things granted. The amount of this "*consideration*" is to be fixed by the officers of the Crown-Land revenue; that is to say, by persons appointed by the Crown. If, indeed, these domains had been *publicly offered for sale*, and the Duke of York had been the highest bidder; then the matter would have been different, especially if we had seen "*the valuable consideration*" brought to account.—This is not "*Outlands*," as the writer above-named would have us believe, but certain *manors, &c. &c.* in the neighbourhood of that seat, which, in itself, is, comparatively, a very insignificant thing. This grant is a grant, in the *fee-simple*, in full, complete, and absolute right, of large estates, in the most valuable part of England; in a part where one acre of land is, upon an average, worth as much, probably, as ten, if not twenty acres, of common farming land in Norfolk or Suffolk. The value of such a grant *must* be immense; and, as to the payment of "*the valuable consideration*," it is to be observed, that, unless such payment *has been actually made*, it does not appear what security is to be had, seeing that the Act is of itself a complete title of possession. It appears to me, that the domains, or any parcel of them, may now be disposed of to any individual whatever. I do not say, that *no payment*, in any degree, is *intended* to be made; but, as to the *ability* to make such payment, or, at least, any thing like full payment, in any reasonable space of time, we may surely be permitted to doubt, when we see it stated, in the reports laid before parliament, that, in the year 1801, just three years before the grant was made, advances had been made to the Duke of York, out of the public money, to the amount of "*fifty-four thousand pounds*, which is to be repaid "*by instalments of one thousand pounds quarterly, from the first of January one thousand eight hundred and five.*" Thus, here was not only a loan, which the Duke, only three years previous to the grant, found it necessary to obtain from the minister, but here was to be four years before any repayment of that loan was to take place, and then it was to be so slow a repayment, as to amount to little more than the interest upon the principal sum, reckoning the accumulation from 1801 to 1805, the payment of *no interest* upon the principal having,

according to the report, been provided for by the minister who advanced the money. It was, however, under these circumstances, and before any part of this borrowed money had been, according to the report, repaid, that, under the Pitts, in 1804, the grant, which we have been speaking of, was made to the Duke "for a valuable consideration."

— I will now state the several items of the income, which the Duke of York derives from the Public, taking the *military* income at the *acknowledged* amount of the writer, who has thought proper to contradict the statement, which I made at Winchester.

	£.	
Pension to the Duke and Dutchess of York, granted by parliament....	18 000	0
Pension to the Duke of York, granted by writ of Privy Seal.....	12 000	0 0
To the Duke of York, as keeper and lieutenant of his Majesty's forests, parks, and warrens of Windsor.....	591	16 7
To the Duke of York, as holder of the Swanmote courts in Windsor forest.....	40	0 0
As a colonel of the foot guards....	3,000	0 0
As colonel of the 6th Regiment....	227	0 0
As commander-in-chief.....	3,500	0 0
Interest upon fifty-four thousand pounds, borrowed as above....	2,700	0 0
	39 858	16 7

Of these fees, no man will venture to deny the correctness of any one. Yet, did this impudent writer assert, that the Duke of York derived *not a farthing* of profit from any of his offices about the *forests or parks*, except the worth of a little *venison* from the New Forest—Is such a man to be believed? Either he spoke from *authority*, or he did not; if not, his statement relative to the colonelship and the commandership-in-chief is the result of mere conjecture; if he did speak from authority, which can hardly have been the case, then that authority taught him to lie. My belief is on the side of the former; because, no one acquainted with the real truth of the case, would have thought it prudent to deny, in such broad terms, that the Duke of York derived profit from his forest and park offices, when he must have known, that the fact, to the contrary, was not only upon record, but was within my reach. I, therefore, retain my former opinion, with respect to the value of these two posts, and that opinion I shall retain, until I see something to *satisfy* me to the contrary. When the reader has gone through the act of parliament, making the grant of lands, &c. part of which Act must, I am afraid, be reserved till my next, he will be able to judge, whether I overestimated the annual worth of that immense estate; and,

when he considers, that, within the last five or six years, the Duke has received from twenty to thirty thousand pounds out of the *Droits of Admiralty*, that is to say, out of the amount of captures made at the public expense, he will, I think, be of opinion, that I greatly *understated* the income, which the Duke of York has derived annually from the public purse.

SPAIN.—The *bulletins* have begun, and I am sorry to say, that there is but too much reason to fear, that they will proceed, in the usual strain, until the whole of Spain be subdued to the will of Napoleon. This fear, however, is only a conditional one; for, unless the junta, or those who have the management of the affairs of Spain, intend, if they succeed, to *restore the people to their liberties*, which necessarily includes the redress of thousands of grievances, I cannot say, that I *fear*, because, I hardly know what to fear, or what to hope. I wish the French to be beaten, and especially when engaged with our own troops. Let the consequence be what it may, I cannot help wishing that; but, really, it is, with me, matter of doubt, whether it would be *finally* better for my own country, all things considered, that King Ferdinand should be restored, without any change of things in Spain, than that Joseph Buonaparte should be placed upon the contested throne. There are great evils to be apprehended in either case; and, so nicely do they appear to me to be balanced, that I hardly know which to choose. Therefore, while I hear the Central Junta talk about their "*beloved Ferdinand*," who give up the sword of Francis I. and say not a word of a reform of the manifold abuses of what the Junta of Seville denominated the "*infamous government*"; and, especially while I hear them issuing decrees against what they, in the language of most other persons in power, call "*the licentiousness of the press*;" it will be impossible for me to feel much anxiety about the result of the contest, except as far as our own army or navy may be concerned. What had they to do with the "*licentiousness of the press*?" Their time should have been employed in preparing to meet the French. There was no talk about the licentiousness of the press till the French were driven out of Madrid; till Joseph seemed to have given the thing up; till the danger appeared to be over. Then, and not till then, the provisional rulers of Spain began to think that the *people* talked too freely, and might go too far with their revolutionary doctrines. Alas! it was precisely this that was wanted, as I think will, when too late, be discovered by the Central Junta.

HAMPSHIRE NOMINATION.—I am assured, by a gentleman, upon whose word I can rely, that Mr. HEATHCOTE, on the day of nomination, did, in answer to Mr. Barham's question, whether he would move for, or support, a motion for another mode of *Inquiry*, if the present was not satisfactory, say, "the only answer I shall give to such question, is, that, upon this and all other occasions, I shall be happy to receive the instructions of my constituents." I did not, myself hear any answer from that gentleman; but, it seems, that, owing to being pressed out from the window, whence he had before spoken, he went to a window further off, and thence spoke the foregoing effect.—There was, in the statement that I made to the meeting, respecting places and pensions, held by members of parliament, one error, which the reader will find explained, in a letter to the Editor of the SALISBURY JOURNAL, a copy of which letter he will find below.—Upon a report, which, from what motive I am at a loss to guess, has been widely propagated, that I did, at the time above-mentioned, *promise*, that, in the event of a contest, *I would give my vote for Mr. Heathcote*, I will only observe, that I never made any promise, of any sort, to either of the candidates, and never made any *offer*, except that which I made in the hearing of all the freeholders assembled.—I then stated the only condition, upon which I thought it not disgraceful to pretend to vote at all. That condition was complied with by neither of the candidates; and I can truly say, that whether my cherries be eaten by a magpie or by a jay, is a question of full as much importance with me, as is the question, whether Mr. Heathcote or Mr. Herbert, be elected in the place of Sir Henry Mildmay; nor is it with a small degree of satisfaction that I perceive the thing to be viewed in the same light by hundreds, nay thousands, of respectable men in the county.

MAJOR HOGAN does not yet answer, nor any one for him. He certainly stands, therefore, convicted of a *falsehood*; a most base and *malignant falsehood*; and, he stands convicted, too, by that press, to which he himself had resorted. Thus, and it is so in every instance, where a free scope is given to discussion, *the truth finally prevails*; and the promulgator of falsehood is punished, in the best of all possible ways, without any recourse to the law.—A correspondent laughs at me for being "the *dupe* of Major Hogan." He may as well laugh at a jury and judge for being the *dupes* of a perjured witness, whom, from his tes-

timonials of character, they are induced to believe. Who was to suspect, that a man, who produced such a recommendation from a person like GENERAL OGILVY, would commit to writing and to print, a statement such as that about the bank notes, without having a shadow of foundation for it? I suspected, and could suspect, no such thing.—Another correspondent *laments*, that the pamphlet will *now* have an effect the *contrary* of what it was intended to have. The fact will certainly be so; but, it is not a proper subject of *lamentation*. It ought to be so. Infinite is the advantage, which, in hundreds of instances, I have derived from the lies which have been published against me; and I am not so unjust as to lament that another should derive advantage from a similar cause.

Alresford, Dec. 8, 1808.

N. B. I did not recollect, the state of the Volume, when, last week, I promised a *double number*. The last number of the Volume must be a double one, on account of the TABLES, TITLE-PAGE, &c. and, as the whole of each Volume is to contain no more than 33 sheets, there can be but one more double sheet in the present Volume.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SALISBURY JOURNAL.

Bolton, Dec. 6, 1808.

SIR,—In your paper of the fifth, under the head of Winchester, I find the following paragraph, relating to the statement, made by me, at the late county meeting, held in that city.—"We are desired, from the most unquestionable authority, to inform our readers, that Lord Fitzharris has not, as was lately asserted at a public meeting, a reversionary grant of £1,200 per annum, or any other sum, after the death of Lord Malmsbury. The pension of £1,200 per annum, which was, some years ago, granted to Lord Fitzharris, to commence after his Father's death was relinquished by him on his being appointed, by his Majesty, Governor of the Isle of Wight; so that the public purse has been relieved, instead of being burthened, by that appointment."—Now, Sir, with regard to the fact of relinquishment, I find, upon examination, that this correction is right; and, of course, that my statement, at the meeting, was erroneous. But, the fault was not mine. In the list of *parliamentary* placemen and pensioners, there is no mention made of the relinquishment of the former grant. I had seen the grant of £1,200 in a former list, and though I now find, that the relinquish-

ment is stated in a subsequent list, I had not seen that when I made the statement at Winchester; and this you will readily suppose must have been the case, when you consider, that the statement was made, if not in the presence of Lord Fitzharris himself, in the presence of many of his friends, and particularly of Mr. Sturges Bourne, from whom I had naturally to look for a contradiction as to any misstatement of fact. — With this explanation I should content myself, had not your correspondent thought proper to make an assertion, that the *public purse has been relieved* by the appointment of Lord Fitzharris, as Governor of the Isle of Wight, *for life*, with a salary of £1,379 a year. To make this assertion good, he must first prove, that there was an *absolute necessity* of keeping alive this sinecure place of £1,379 a year; and, next, he must prove, that it was *absolutely impossible* to give it to some military or naval officer, as a compensation for *real* services; for, until he can do this, it will appear to me, and so, I trust, it will appear to your readers, that a pension of £8,000 to commence after the death of Lord Malmsbury, would cost less than a sinecure salary, which has begun before Lord Malmsbury's death, and which is to last as long as the pension would have lasted. The exchange was one of very plain calculation. It was a simple question of whether Lord Fitzharris should receive, from the public purse, £1,200 a year, for life, after the death of his father; or whether he should receive, from the same source, £1,379 a year, for life, to begin in 1807; to decide which question in favour of the latter there required only a very ordinary degree of the influence of self-interest, totally unassisted by that public-spirit, that desire to spare the poor public purse, which your correspondent would fain have you attribute to his Lordship. — "Oh, but the ministers! They took this opportunity of relieving the public from the reversionary pension." Yes, Sir, but then, they must show us the absolute necessity of giving this sinecure of £1,379 a year to somebody or other; and, for my part, I can perceive the existence of no such necessity. The place is, in fact, a mere nominal thing, serving as an excuse for the payment of so much money, under another name than that of *pension*. If there really be any little duties of form attached to it; if it have a little patronage, and if it give a little of honourable distinction in the Island; if this be the case, should not this post be bestowed upon some meritorious military or naval commander? Would not such a compensation be peculiarly appro-

priate to such a purpose? Ought such posts to be given to persons, who have never, in any way, rendered even the most trifling service to the state, while those who have spent the best part of their lives in honourable toil, danger, and service, are by being *pensioned off* (if provided for at all), put upon a level with the swarm of court dependents, who are maintained as it were out of charity? — To you, Sir, and to your readers, I may safely leave the task of answering these questions, while I remain, with great respect, your most humble and most obedient servant, — WM COBBERT.

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

In the COURIER, the head ministerial newspaper, of the 2d instant, an article appeared, entitled "APOLOGY OF THE 'EDINBURGH REVIEW.'" The writer, who is evidently a downright *scolding*, and who no more dares put his name to what he writes, than he dares, within the doors of Whitehall, to say that his soul is his own, accuses the Editors of the above-named celebrated work of having, since their attack upon me, *changed their sentiments* as to the state of things in this country. He charges them with having now, and especially in certain passages, which he quotes, and which (because I think the public will be much obliged to me for it) I shall copy from him; he charges them with having, in these passages, in particular, "sounded the charge of *revolution*, in the true spirit of *Marat* and *Robespierre*, mistaking that the word '*revolution*' shall now no longer be obnoxious to the people." This, as the reader will see, is a most vile calumny. The wretch, from whose pen it has proceeded, wishes to revive the cry of "*Jacobin*;" but, this last resource of guilty and trembling speculation will avail him nothing. I do think, that the Edinburgh Reviewers, from some motive of no very fair hostility, did act by me in a manner that neither public-spirit nor bare justice could warrant; but, while they did me no harm, they have, in many instances, done the public a great deal of good, for my share of which good I feel a proper degree of gratitude; and I cannot, of course, help feeling anger against every base wretch, who attempts to throw discredit upon their labours in the way above mentioned. "*Marat* and *Robespierre*," indeed! Just as if the Edinburgh Reviewers wished to see the king and his family butchered, because they express their hope, that the time is at hand when such a change will take place, as will put down corruptors and plunderers! Yes; every one, who is in-

interested in the uninterrupted, unchecked course of corruption and speculation; every such man will regard as an assassin every one who wishes for reform. Indeed the public plunderer has no idea of any thing being good, which does not protect him in his plunder. When he talks of the *Constitution*, he means not the laws, which were made to preserve to the people *the enjoyment of their rights and liberties*, but that state of things, which favours his villainous views of self and power.—I shall now insert the extracts above-spoken of, and then leave the reader to judge, whether the writers of them deserve to be compared to "*Marat*" and "*Rolespierre*." WM COBBETT.

Botley, Dec 6, 1808.

EXTRACTS FROM THE REVIEW OF CERVILLOS, IN THE EDINBURGH REVIEW FOR OCTOBER LAST

We are rather disposed to contemplate the efforts of the Spanish struggle in the cause of civil liberty. The resistance to France has been entirely begun and carried on by the people of Spain. Their kings betrayed them, fled, and rushed with the whole of their wise courtiers, into the hands of the enemy. Those who had so little of what is commonly termed interest in the country,—those who had no stake in the community (to speak the technical language of the mystery),—the persons of *no consideration* in the state,—they who could not judge *their fortunes*, having only lives and liberties to lose,—the bulk, the mass of the people,—not the very odious, many-headed beast, the multitude, the mob itself—alone, unaided, unaided by the higher classes,—in despite of these higher classes, and in direct opposition to them, is well as to the enemy whom they so valiantly joined,—raised up the standard of insurrection,—bore it through mist and through victory, until it raised the usurper away, and waved over his deserted courts. Happen what will in the sequel, here is a grand and permanent success,—a lesson to all governments,—a warning to all oligarchies,—a cheering example to every people.—Suppose for an instant that the Spaniards succeed, will that gallant people quietly open the doors of the Escorial to the same herd of crowned or titled intrigues who brought them to ruin? Will they be such fools as to restore those poltroons and traitors to their former posts, and give a confidence so universally abused? The people who have reconquered the state have a right to a fair salvage—a large share in its future management. And if all considerations of justice and of prudence were out of the

question, the Spanish court may be assured of this, that the feelings of our common nature—the universal sentiments of right and of pride which must prevail among a people capable of such gallant deeds, will prevent the repetition of the former abuses, and *early reform—change—revolution* (we dread not the use of this word, so popular in England before the late reign of terror), salutary, just, and necessary revolution, over all the departments of the state.—Such will be the consequences of the Spaniards' ultimately triumphing. Whether Ferdinand or Charles be the monarch, we care not; or whether *a new stock be brought from Germany for a breed*. That they should have a king every one must admit *who believes* that an hereditary monarch, well fettered by the constitution, is the best guardian of civil liberty. Whatever may be the form of the checks imposed upon him, we shall be satisfied, provided the basis of a free constitution is laid *deep and steady*, in a *popular representation*. Let us further recollect, that this system of liberty will grow up with the full assent, and, *under*, the active assistance of the English government;—and, what is of infinitely greater importance, with the warm and unanimous approbation of the English people. And who then shall ever more presume to cry down popular rights, or tell us that the people have nothing to do with the laws but to obey them, with the taxes, but to pay them,—and with the blunders of their rulers, but to suffer from them? What man will now dare to brand his political adversary with the name of revolutionist—or try to hunt those down, as enemies of order, who expose the follies and corruptions of an unprincipled and intriguing administration?—We anticipate, then, a most salutary change in public opinion, from the example of Spain, should her efforts prove successful, and from the part which this country so wisely and generously takes in her affairs. The measures of our government will be more *freely* canvassed, the voice of the country will no longer be stifled, and, when it raises itself, it must be heard. *Reforms* in the administration of our affairs must be adopted, to prevent more violent changes; and some *radical improvements* in our constitution will no longer be viewed with horror, because they will be found essential to the permanence of any reformation in the management of the national concerns.—The alarm which the atrocities of the French revolution had raised in this country having now spent itself, the Spanish revolution places the cause of freedom and reform on a

much better footing than it had even at the beginning of the French revolution. Therefore we must admit that there is now a much better prospect of reform in England than that which the French revolution seemed for a moment to hold out to us.—The plain and broad fact is this—that every Englishman who has, for the last six months, heartily wished that the Spaniards should succeed, has knowingly and wilfully wished for a *radical reform* of abuses in the regular monarchy of Spain, and for such a change of the government, as might permanently secure a better administration of its affairs. He has, moreover, wished to see that change adopted by the Spanish people themselves, and has admitted most amply the right of the people to call their rulers to account, and choose their own constitution. If these happy effects have already flowed from the Spanish revolution, and are sure to spread far and wide over this great country the blessings of free discussion, watchful jealousy of the government, and *unsparing reform* of existing abuses, it is equally manifest, that the force of the example of Spain will not be spent here, but must reach over the other states of the Continent.

The following passages are extracted from the Review of Mr LICKIE'S Book in the Edinburgh Review.—"There is nothing, indeed, in political science which stands more in want of a philosophical investigation, than the influence of aristocracy in human society. So great a tendency has it to predominate, that, with the exception of those cases in which a military leader or chief swallows up the power both of aristocracy and people, there is perhaps no instance of a government, in the history of mankind, in which the power of the aristocracy did not exceed the proper limits, in which it was not more than a match for the power of the people, and enabled the rich and leading men to shift the burthens of the state from themselves upon the inferior orders. Notwithstanding the helps provided for the people to protect their interests are, in our happy constitution, the strongest ever actually admitted in any government, all the changes which have taken place in the texture of our common affairs, have been in favour of the aristocratical interest. Our system of taxation, which is now so enormous a machine, decidedly, and, to a degree infinitely greater than is generally supposed, favours the higher orders, and throws the mighty burthen upon the middling and the lower. *The composition of the commons house of parliament has become, confessedly, less dependent upon the*

voice of the people. The enormous revenue of the government, which is chiefly taken from the pockets of the people, is chiefly returned into the pockets of the higher ranks, by whom so great a proportion of the lucrative places are engrossed."

BREWERS.

SIR.—In writing the letter on the Breweries, inserted in your Register of the 12th November, my view was to rescue the intelligent part of the trade from the aspersions thrown on all of them, through the ignorant practices of many (therein I was right) who are engaged in that business, and this chiefly by showing that there could be no temptation to a man of understanding to substitute any articles for malt and hops, because the latter are not only the most suitable, but *and nearly the cheapest*, that can be procured. I am so desirous to avoid obtruding on your valuable paper, that it is with no small degree of reluctance I once more, and, as I hope and intend, for the first time on this subject, solicit your indulgence to notice, as concisely as in my power, the remarks of a gentleman who names himself "Cindis" in your Register of the 26th ult.—He wishes I had stated the grounds and the methods, whereby I formed the ratio of the value of malt compared with sugar and with treacle. My answer is by hydrostatics, as he supposes. He doubts the competency of any instrument to shew the exact difference between the saccharine matter extracted from malt, and that which is afforded by a solution of sugar, or of treacle, in pure water, on account of the mucilage in the first, which, he concludes, affects the accuracy of the rule. This is the (now fully exploded) objection which was urged against the hydrometer so long ago as in the year 1770, by the *then* principal brewer in London in a conference which I obtained with him, on the subject, but who changed his opinion a few years afterwards, and adopted the instrument of the hydrometer, in which he was actually followed by the other considerable brewers. But the proof of this, and also the following question between us rests in distillation of which I shall speak hereafter. I stated that malt was 20 per cent superior to sugar, on a comparison of the produce of each with their respective costs. This gentleman *thinks there must be an advantage of 10 per cent in favour of sugar*, without, however, offering any other grounds for this opinion than his doubts before mentioned, as the effect of the mucilage combined with the sweet of the malt on the different gravities of the two musts.

There is the very serious difference of 60 per cent in our opinions. One of us must be under a very great error. I could, if it were not rendered unnecessary by their being the same, as he will hereafter find described by a scientific and practical gentleman, Mr. Martineau, to a committee of the House of Commons, give a series of experiments on sugar and treacle, made many years ago, accompanied, also, with a set of twelve distillations (in a still of a suitable size which I procured to be made for the purpose) of small portions of beer formed from as many different original specific gravities in the worts, which experiment I then entered on with the view to ascertain the fact of the accordance, or not, of the final proportion of proof spirit with the original gravity, as shewn by the hydrometer, due reference being had to all the circumstances. The results of each, and of all of these examinations, did so remarkably correspond with the several circumstances as to afford the most convincing testimony to my mind that every hydrometer, now in use, is truly and correctly a measure of *weights*, although that appellation is given to one only, among the several sorts now constructed. But I must not expect that my own experiments and consequent decision will be deemed of sufficient authority to be conclusive with others. I am happy, therefore, in the opportunity to adduce for superior proof, premises, that the average value of each 9 bushels of malt is known to be usually to every brewer who has employed in hydrometry for a sufficient time to understand its uses. I say, usually, because the produce of saccharine matter varies with the five millibleness of the harvest and season to the barley, as well as very irregularly according to the method of malting it. But a quarter of malt, weighing from 60 lbs to 55 lbs, usually yields from 75 to 80 lbs of saccharine matter. A like quantity and no more is yielded by 155 lbs to 160 lbs of sugar, or by 224 to 240 lbs. of treacle. The produce of the last two is found rarely by a solution of them in water, and finally the separate value of all the three is found by the production of spirit, uniformly corresponding to the gravity of their worts, or solutions. There, indeed, I have the help to be taken from a partial entry. * Report of the "Sugar & Sullivay Committee," ordered by the House to be printed 17th February, 1807. The object being, to inquire how far relief might be afforded to the West India proprietors by the use of sugar in the breweries and distilleries, a committee after having examined (from the 2d to the 15th Jan

1807) the persons most competent to give them information, say in page 4 — "It appears to the committee that taking the price of the quarter of malt, capable of producing 80 lbs of saccharine matter at 82s the quantity of sugar necessary to produce an equal proportion of saccharine matter must be 1 cwt 3 qrs 1 lb (197 lbs) which at 58s * the cwt would amount to 101s 6d in price, making a difference in favour of the malt of 19s 6d in that given quantity. It is stated, besides, in evidence, that the beer produced from sugar, even if the prices would admit of it, is not equal in any degree to that produced from its equivalent quantity of malt, and consequently that *the brewer would not use sugar in their manufactory, unless they were prohibited by law from using grain*." — In page 10, Mr. Jackson, commissioner of excise, examined by the committee, says, "I recollect that about the year 1800 (or 1801), when sugar was by law permitted to be used in the breweries, on account of the scarcity of grain at that time very little sugar was used. One or two brewers in London, and at Manchester, and one at Liverpool, were the only brewers I recollect to have used it, and they very sparingly." — "The price of malt at that time was, as far as I recollect, five guineas a quarter, and sugar, including the duty, about 52s, the cwt." — In page 20, Mr. Martineau, an eminent porter brewer in London, examined, and to questions put to him says, "I have never brewed from sugar, but have made such experiments as to compare my own rice, complete." And being desired to state the opinion he had formed in consequence, said "I have a very short statement showing the comparative value of rice with sugar, and of molasses with malt." Mr. Martineau then delivered in the following paper to the committee, which was read — December 14, 1800 experiments on a sample of brown "Muscovado sugar at 50d per cwt, and the same on a sample of molasses at 10s per cwt. One pound of the above sugar was dissolved in a gallon of water and then boiled half an hour, it lost by evaporation not more than 1 quart, which quantity being restored with cold water, and reduced to the heat of 60 degrees, it

* My estimate of the price of sugar was 60s and my quantity 100 lbs the cost of which would be 100s 0d I believe it is now dearer than 61s.

"then weighed by Quin's hydrometer 1 lbs 8-10ths" (consequently) "7½ lbs of the same extract, which is about the fair average produce of a quarter of malt would consume 145 lbs of sugar, which, at 53s 3d per cwt is 87s 3d. One pound of molasses treated exactly as the sugar had been weighed by the same instrument 12 lbs 4-10ths, therefore 75 lbs of the same extract would consume 216 lbs of treacle, which at 10s the cwt is 77s 1d. To other questions put to him by the committee, Mr. Martineau answered, "that he took not the best malt, that such malt as would yield 80 lbs of saccharine matter per quarter would require an equivalent of 107 lbs of grain, and 230 lbs in treacle, that he never used either sugar or molasses in brewing, being so perfectly satisfied, by the result of the experiments, that they made so completely against the use of sugar, that he never was induced to try it in the brewhouse. —Candidus may still think "that it is not philosophical to conclude, even from this useful examination by Mr. Martineau, that the extract of malt must necessarily be inferior and superior to the others." Such however, was the conclusion of the committee, in their report to the house, and who will deny the further proof that is afforded by distillation? In pages 22-24 of this Report will be found the examination of Mr. Smith of Brentford, and of Mr. B. Newell of Bittersea, both very eminent, and extensive distillers. They state "the then prices, (in January 1807) of the different materials suitable to their use, to be barley at 14s and malt 51s the quarter, and sugar 61s to 6½s the cwt, but that the price of sugar should be from 3s to 3½s to induce the distillers to use that article in their trade, and that even then the spirit distilled would not be equal to so good a quality as that distilled from malted barley, or so disposable in the market. Also, that to tempt the distillers to use molasses it should bear a proportion to barley at 44s and malt at 51s the quarter bear the price of 21s the cwt and even then the molasses is considered a worse article in the distillery than sugar. Now the judgment of these gentlemen, and by which they govern their practice in business is founded on the actual produce of rectified spirit obtained from the different quantities of the several materials, and which, as was observed in my letter at page 770 of your Register, is well known to them to be even in a ratio to the original gravity of their

works, and of their wash, as ascertained by hydrostatics, from whatever saccharine and fermentable matters such washes and wash, are drawn.—Other parliamentary inquiries and reports on the same subject might be adduced, in confirmation, particularly the first, second, and third Reports of the Committees on the Distillation of Sugar, ordered to be printed 15th June 1808, any part of which it must be unnecessary to quote. I cannot however refrain from stating the following proof that the mucilage is of no consideration, to destroy the brewer's confidence in the competency of hydrometers to exhibit a just comparison between sweets. In the years 1805 and 1806, three gentlemen, distinguished for their abilities, and well known requirements in chemistry, (viz. Drs. Thompson, Hope, and Cavendish) were selected by government to inquire into the differences in value between the English and Scotch barley and malts, for which purpose they took with them some practical assistants to conduct the operations of both brewing and distilling. I have unfortunately parted with their very valuable Report, printed by order of parliament, containing the particulars of numerous trials made by them. I recollect enough, however, to be able to say that their unanimous conclusion, the differences between the two grains, was by the gravity of their extracts as shown by the hydrometers of various constructions from which they varied, and the constant agreement of the produce of spirit with them they formed a numerical rule for ascertaining at once, the proportion of alcohol, and consequently of spirit, to every degree of strength, producible from every gravity of must. The operation of their this discovered (denominal) multiplier on the gravity of must taken with the attending circumstances, as the multiplier of all such very close agreement with the exactness in the above publication reports as to remove every partial error, as to the reasons to be drawn in the present question. One other remark calls on me to be noticed, that a third wort of 10 lbs per bushel cannot be so valuable as a third part of the first wort of 30 lbs per bushel, because the latter contains a less proportion of mucilage to the sweets than the last wort. "Yes," but what then would be the produce of a fourth liquor of the grains, which, according to the inference, would contain a still larger proportion of mucilage to the sweets? I say that this produce from the previous exhaustion of the grains would not exceed, in mucilage and saccharine mat-

ter combined, 2 or at the most 3lbs. per quarter which is a quality that is inapplicable to form any sort of beer. And even in these 2 or 3lbs not the mucilage, but the remnant of saccharum, constitutes the whole of the nutritive quality, without which he refuse (usually left in the grains) would not deserve the low price at which it is sold. With every sentiment of respect towards this evidently able, though mistaken gentleman, I appeal to himself whether the testimony of the several scientific, practical, and truly respectable men I have quoted, from such unquestionable authority, is or is not conclusive? And if so, it is surely fair to ask what becomes of the alleged advantage of 40 per cent in favour of sugar, and, also, which of us is it who "has advanced an opinion that will not stand the test of rigid examination?"—I am Sir yours, very respectfully, —A HAMPSHIRE BREWER —
Dec 5, 1808,

P S—On your account, Mr Cobbett, as well as my own I decline all future public discussion of this subject. But if this respectable gentleman wishes to know me, he may satisfy his curiosity by addressing a letter to M B (with his own name and address) at No 11, Princes Street, Cavendish Square, which shall be noticed in return to him, with all respectful attention.

DUKE OF YORK—An Act to enable His Majesty to grant the Inheritance, in Fee Simple, of certain Manors, Messuages, Lands, and Hereditaments, in the Parishes of Byfleet Weybridge, Walton, Walton Leigh, and Crowthorne, in the County of Surrey, to His Royal Highness Frederick Duke of York and Albany, for a valuable Consideration, Passed the 11th March, 1804

Whereas his late majesty king George III by letters patent bearing date the 11th June, 1760, for the consideration therein mentioned, did demise, grant, and to farm let, unto Henry then earl of Lincoln and afterwards duke of Newcastle, all that the manor or lordship, manors or lordships, and lands, of Byfleet and Weybridge, and the park of Byfleet called Byfleet or Weybridge Park, or lying and being in Byfleet and Weybridge, with all and singular the appurtenances, in the county of Surrey, together with the capital messuage or tenement, stables, and other outhouses thereto belonging, then in the occupation of James Incebird, and all that messuage or tenement with the appurtenances then in the occupation of Joseph Spence, and all that messuage or tenement with the appur-

tenances then lately erected and built near the Mills on the Banks of the River Wey, within the said manor, then in the occupation of John Bardow, Esq, and all those two Iron Mills erected on the banks of the said river and near the said last mentioned messuage or tenement, and then in the occupation of the said John Bardow, and used by him in the Iron and Steel Manufacture, and all those warehouses, storehouses, smiths shop, and all other buildings thereto belonging or therewith used, which said messuages, mills, warehouses, and storehouses, were buildings which required to be repaired and rebuilt, and were of greater yearly value than the manor, lands, park, and other premises above mentioned, together with all meadows, pastures, lands, tenements, profits, rights, liberties, privileges, immunities, hereditaments, and appurtenances to the said manor or lordship, manors or lordships, lands, park, messuages, mills, and other buildings and edifices, or any parcel of them or any of them appertaining or in any manner belonging, (excepting nevertheless and always reserving all great trees, timber trees, saplings, woods, underwoods, mines, and quarries, growing or being on or upon the said premises or any of them) to hold the same unto the said Henry earl of Lincoln his executors, administrators, and assigns, from the 5th Jan 1781, (at which time a former term then in being would expire), for the term of 26 years, at the yearly rent of £15 3s 8d. And when his present majesty, by letters patent bearing date the 30th Oct 1773, for the consideration therein mentioned, did demise, grant, and to farm let, unto the said Henry then duke of Newcastle, all and singular the said manor, or lordship, manors or lordships, park, messuages, &c &c comprized in and demised by the said herein-before mentioned letters patent of the 11th June, 1760, with their and every of their rights, royalties, members, and appurtenances (except as in the said herein before mentioned letters patent is excepted), to hold the same unto the said Henry duke of Newcastle, his executors, &c for a reversionary term of 13½ years, to be computed from the 5th Jan 1810 (at which time the before-mentioned term of 26 years would expire), at the yearly rent of £15. 3s 8d theretofore payable, and an increased rent of £2 16s 4d. (making together £18) until the 5th Jan. 1810, and at the yearly rent of £50 for the first 13 years of the said reversionary term of 13½ years, to commence from the said 5th Jan. 1810, and at the rent of £25

for the last half-year of the said reversionary term . and whereas his said present majesty, by other letters patent bearing date the 7th Aug 1780, did demise, grant, and to farm let, unto the Rev R Palmer, DD and Thomas Hurst, gent , all that minor of Walton Leigh in Surrey, with all and singular its rights, members, and appurtenances, and all those rents of the free tenants there by a particular thereof amounting yearly to £3 0s. 7½d , and all those rents of the tenants by copy of court roll, and at the will of the lord thereof, by a particular thereof amounting yearly to £10 0s. 9d , and all those messuages, lands, and tenements in the hands of the said tenants by copy of court roll, and at will under the yearly rents aforesaid and all that annual or for term years of 99 years issuing out of the lands and tenements theretofore granted to E. Porter, and all that site of the minor of Walton Leigh in all demise lands there with them and every of their appurtenances, by a particular thereof mentioned to be of the yearly rent or value of £10 18s , and all that increase thereof, by a particular thereof amounting yearly to 9s 3d , and all that common fine there, by a particular thereof amounting yearly to 2s , and all those perquisites of courts there, one year with another, by a particular thereof valued and estimated at £5 11s 11d a year, which said minor of Walton Leigh and other the premises last above mentioned, by a particular thereof were mentioned to be parcel of the possessions theretofore purchased of Giles Leigh, esq , and annexed to the honour of Hinton Court , and all and singular messuages, mills, houses, edifices, structures, barns, stables, dovecotes, orchards, gardens, lands, tenements, meadows, feedings, pastures, commons, common of pasture, demise land, glebe lands, wastes, turves, heaths, moors, marshes, advantages, profits, waters, water-courses, fisheries, fishings, suits, sokes, mulcts, warrands, rents reversions, and services, rent charges, rents, and rents and services, as well of the free as customary tenants, tenants works, farms, fee farms, annuities, tithes, heriots, fines, amercements, courts leet, views of frankpledge of court and leet, and leets perquisites and profits, and all things which to courts leet and view of frankpledge belong or appertain, chattels, waifs, estrays, goods and chattels of felons and fugitives, felons of themselves and put in exigent, bondmen, natives and villains, with their sequels, exors, and common of estovers furs, markets, tolls, exemption from paying toll,

customs, rights, jurisdictions, liberties, franchises, privileges, profits, commodities, advantages, emoluments, and hereditaments whatsoever, of whatsoever nature, kind, or specie the same were or by whatsoever names soever they were known, understood, called, or were theretofore known, situate, lying, and being, coming or arising or growing within the manor therein-before mentioned, or within the village, town fields, or place or parish of Walton Leigh and Wilton-upon-Thames in the said county of Cheshire, whatsoever to the said manor, messuages, lands, tenements, &c in anywise belonging or appertaining, happening or appertaining, or as part, parcel, or member of the same manor, messuages, lands, tenements, and other the said premises or any of them, had, taken, accepted, occupied, used or reputed, and also the reversion or reversions, remainder or remainders whatsoever of the said minor and the said lands, &c depending, happening, or in expectancy, from, in, or upon any demise or grant demises or grants, for term or terms of life, lives, or years, or otherwise of the same premises or any parcel thereof, of record or not of record, and also all and singular rents and yearly profits whatsoever reserved upon every demise or grant of the same premises or any parcel thereof (excepting nevertheless and always reserving to his majesty, his heirs and successors, all lands, tenements, and hereditaments, then or theretofore being or reputed to be parcel of the said minor of Walton Leigh which were inclosed in Oatlands Park or in any other of his majesty's parks, or reserved for the depasturing of the fallow deer and wild beasts, and also all other lands, &c in Walton Leigh aforesaid or within the precinct of the said minor of Walton Leigh, which were theretofore purchased by any of his said present majesty's progenitors or ancestors, kings or queens of England, or any other person or persons whatsoever, besides the said Giles Leigh only , and also excepting and always reserving all great trees, woods, underwoods, knights fees, waifs, marriages, mines, and quarries of the said premises, and all timber trees, and fir saplings apt and fit for timber, and sufficient saddles growing in and upon the said premises; and also all and singular advowsons, free donations, dispositions, and right of patronage of all and singular rectories, vicarages, chapels, and other ecclesiastical benefices whatsoever to the same premises or any parcel of the same belonging, appertaining, happening, or appertaining), and

also all those lands and tenements in Walton aforesaid, therein-after particularly mentioned and expressed, that is to say, one close called Dodd Croft, containing by estimation 6 acres inclosed together, &c. and one close lying near Hill Croft in Walton aforesaid called Poland, containing by estimation 3 acres, and one close called Russels, containing by estimation 4 acres; and one close called Barn Close theretofore adjoining to a certain tenement then demolished and purchased of the said Tho. Driver; and all those lands in the field called Hill Croft in Walton aforesaid, containing by estimation $8\frac{1}{2}$ acres of arable land; and all that close of wood called Little Ice, lying in the common field in Walton aforesaid; and all those arable lands in the field called Winkmeershill, containing by estimation $6\frac{1}{2}$ acres, &c.; and also one parcel of land in Walton aforesaid, called an Eyte, containing by estimation half an acre of meadow, &c. And whereas his said precept in jesty, by other letters patent bearing date the 7th March, 1770, for the considerations therein mentioned, did demise, grant, and to farm let, unto Sarah Hodges and Susannah Hodges, sisters, all that messuage, tenement, or farm house, called or known by the name of Brooklands, in the county of Surry, and all barns, stables, outhouses, &c. to the said messuage, &c. belonging, containing by admeasurement 3 acres, 1 rood and 12 perches or thereabouts, and also those 11 several closes or parcels of arable, meadow, and pasture land situate together and lying round the said messuage, containing in the whole by admeasurement 16, acres, 1 rood, and 31 perches, and also all those two several closes or parcels of meadow situate together between the river Wye on the west and certain lands therein-after mentioned on the east, containing together 25 acres, 2 roods, and 9 perches, and also all those two several closes or parcels of arable land situate together between Walton common on the east, and the lands therein-after mentioned on the north and west, containing together 20 acres and 17 perches or thereabouts, all which said several closes or parcels of land and premises, containing in the whole 219 acres, 1 rood, and 31 perches, belonged to and were to be held with the said messuage, &c. and also all that new built messuage or tenement called the Light Acres, adjoining to the lands first therein above described, &c. and all those 11 several closes or parcels of land situate together and lying round the said last mentioned messuage, and containing 10 acres, and 27 perches, all which said premises are and shall coe together within the parish

of Weybridge, and were then in the tenure or occupation of George Payne, esq. together with all ways, passages, waters, rivers, streams, fisheries, &c. to hold the said messuage, &c. first therein above mentioned to be demise and granted with the several parcels of land thereto belonging, &c. unto the said Sarah Hodges and Susannah Hodges, their executors, &c. for a reversionary term of $12\frac{1}{2}$ years, to commence from the 5th January, 1738, and to hold the said new built messuage with the appurtenances and the several parcels of land thereto belonging containing 59 acres and 27 perches with the appurtenances unto the said Sarah Hodges and Susannah Hodges, their executors, &c. for a reversionary term of 31 years and the half of another year, to commence and be computed from the 5th January, 1788, at the yearly rent of five pounds eight shillings and sixpence for the first thirty one years of the said last mentioned reversionary term, and at the rent of two pounds fourteen shillings and three pence, &c. And whereas his said present majesty, by other letters patent bearing date the 3d May, 1785, for the considerations therein mentioned, did demise, grant, and to farm let, unto the right hon. George earl of Tyrconnel and John Johnston, esq. all and singular the said messuages, lands, &c. comprised in and demise by the said letters patent of the 7th March, 1770, with their appurtenances (except as in the said letters patent excepted), to hold the said messuage, &c. with the said several closes or parcels of land thereto belonging, and above-mentioned 219 acres, 1 rood, and 31 perches with their appurtenances (except as before excepted), unto the said George earl of Tyrconnel and John Johnston, their executors, &c. from the 5th July, 1800 (at which time the term then in being would expire), for a reversionary term of 15 years, at the yearly rent of £16. 10s. 2d. and to hold the said new built messuage firstly therein described with the said several closes or parcels of land and premises thereto belonging and above mentioned to contain 59 acres and 27 perches with the appurtenances (except as before excepted), unto the said George earl of Tyrconnel and John Johnston, their executors, &c. from 5th July, 1819 (at which time the term then in being would expire,) for a reversionary term of 15 years, at the yearly rent of £9. 14s. 8d. And whereas his said present majesty, by other letters patent bearing date the 6th April, 1785, for the considerations therein mentioned did demise, grant, and to farm let, unto Nicholas Elcock, all

that parcel of land with the appurtenances upon which then lately stood a house abutting towards the east upon the highway leading to the common of Weybridge by the town there, upon the orchard then or late of

Amborne towards the north and west, and upon Father's Grove towards the west, and upon the lands called Cobbetts towards the south and east, containing by estimation 3 roods, and also all that close of arable, called Nener Hutchers, abutting upon the aforesaid way towards the north and east and upon the river of Weybridge aforesaid towards the west, and upon a close called Further Hutchers towards the south, containing by estimation 6 acres, and also all that close of pasture commonly called Further Hutchers, abutting upon the aforesaid close called Neaper Hutchers towards the north and west, and upon the aforesaid river towards the west, upon certain lands then or late of Amborne towards the south and east, and upon Hatcher's Grove towards the south, containing by estimation 8 acres, and also all that close called Hatcher's Grove, abutting upon certain lands called Cobbetts towards the south, upon the aforesaid close called Further Hutchers, towards the north and west, and upon a close called the Three Acres towards the west, containing by estimation 3 acres, more or less, and also all that close of pasture called the Three Acres, abutting upon the aforesaid close called Further Hutchers towards the north, upon the river aforesaid towards the west, upon a close called the Sand Lands towards the south, and upon Hatcher's Grove towards the east, containing by estimation 3 acres, more or less, and also all that parcel of meadow called Sand Lands, abutting upon the river aforesaid towards the west, and upon one part of a certain meadow called Great Millets towards the north, upon a close called the Three Acres aforesaid, and upon another piece of land called the Sand Lands towards the east, containing by estimation 5 acres, more or less, and also all that close of pasture called Sand Lands, abutting upon the aforesaid meadow towards the west, upon a close called Mallbrooke towards the south and west, upon certain lands called Crickets towards the south and east, and upon the lands called Cobbetts towards the east, containing by estimation 14 acres, more or less, and also all that close of pasture called Waller's Brook, abutting upon a certain piece of meadow belonging to a firm called Brooklands towards the east, upon Cricket's Hill towards the south, upon a certain meadow called Sett's Meadow towards the north, and upon the aforesaid close called Sand Lands, to-

wards the east, containing by estimation 12 acres, and also all that close of parcel of meadow called Sett's Meadow, abutting upon a meadow called the Great Meadow of Weybridge aforesaid towards the north and east and towards the south and east, upon the aforesaid close called Waller's Brook towards the south, and upon the aforesaid river of Weybridge towards the north and east, containing by estimation 10 acres, and also all that parcel of arable land then divided into two closes called Cobbetts, abutting upon the common of Weybridge towards the south, upon the close called Sand Lands aforesaid towards the west, upon Hatcher's Grove towards the north, and upon the aforesaid way leading from the common of Weybridge unto the river of Weybridge aforesaid towards the east, containing by estimation 10 acres, and also all that parcel of meadow called Millett's Grove, upon a meadow called Great Millett towards the west, upon the aforesaid river towards the south, and upon a parcel of land lying near the bridge of the aforesaid river towards the east, containing by estimation 3 acres and 2 roods, and also all that parcel of meadow lying and being in Weybridge Great Mead (amongst other lands thereto) known by the name of Child's Put, then or late in the Tenure of W. Porter or his assigns, containing by estimation 2 acres, which said parcels of land contain in the whole by estimation 77 acres and 2 roods, more or less, together with all ways, passages, easements, commodities, and profits whatsoever to the said closes or parcels of land in any manner belonging or appertaining, all which said premises are situate at Weybridge in the county of Surrey, (excepting and reserving their cut and great trees, woods, underwoods, mines, and quarries growing, and being in and upon the premises other than and besides the woods and underwoods the afore-mentioned), to hold the same (except as therein before is excepted) unto the said Nich. Lock, his executors, & from the 10th Oct 1791 for the term of 23 years at the yearly rent of £7 17s 11d. And whereas H R H Frederick Duke of York and Albany has purchased and is now possessed of or entitled to the whole of the household manor or manors, park, messuages, mills, lands, tenements, and premises comprized in the said several recited letters patent, of the 11th June 1760, the 30th Oct 1773, the 7th March 1770, and the 3d May 1785, and his said royal highness has also purchased and is now possessed of or entitled to one undivided third part of the household manor,

messuages, lands, tenements, rents, and premises comprized in the said recited letters patent of the 7th August 1780, for all the residue now to come and unexpired of the said several existing terms of years granted or demised by the said letters patent respectively: And whereas his said royal highness is desirous to purchase and is now in treaty for the purchase of the said leasehold messuage, lands, tenements, and premises comprized in the said recited letters patent of the 8th April 1785, for all the residue now to come and unexpired of the term of 21 years granted or demised by the same letters patent; And whereas his said royal highness is in the possession of, and holds as tenant under the crown from year to year, two coney warrens in or near Byfleet and Weybridge aforesaid with the appurtenances; and also a close or parcel of land now or heretofore called Millett Meadow in Weybridge aforesaid, containing ten acres or thereabouts, be the same more or less; and also divers closes or parcels of land now or heretofore called Hones in the parish of Chertsey, in the said county of Surry, containing together 25 acres or thereabouts, be the same more or less, which said last mentioned premises were heretofore held under lease from the crown, but the lease or leases whereof hath or have lately expired: And whereas his said royal highness has lately purchased and is seised or entitled in fee simple, of or to the freehold capital messuage or mansion house and park of Oatlands, and divers other freehold and copyhold messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, situate and being within the several manors or parishes of Byfleet and Weybridge, Walton-upon-Thames, Walton Leigh, and Chertsey, or some of them: And whereas under and by virtue of two several inclosure acts passed in the 40th year of his present majesty, divers separate and distinct parcels of land or ground within the parishes and places aforesaid have been allotted and awarded to his said royal highness and other persons respectively, as well in respect of the several leasehold premises herein-before mentioned, including the said premises whereof his said royal highness is tenant under the crown from year to year, as in respect of his said royal highness's said freehold and copyhold hereditaments and estates in the manors or parishes aforesaid; and his said royal highness has also purchased and contracted to purchase from different proprietors thereof several other lands or hereditaments in the same manors or parishes, which have been allotted and awarded to them in fee simple under the said inclosure

acts; and whereas his said royal highness has been put to a very great expence, and has laid out several considerable sums of money respecting the said inclosure acts, and in making the necessary inclosures and improvements in consequence thereof; and the commissioners acting under the said acts have, with a view to the convenience of occupation and improvement intermixed, and laid together, or as contiguous as may be, the several allotments which have been made to his said royal highness, as well in respect of his aforesaid leasehold premises, as of his said freehold and copyhold hereditaments and estates; and inasmuch as on account of the situation and intermixture of the several allotments which have been made in respect of the said several leasehold premises, including the said premises whereof his said royal highness is tenant from year to year, and in respect of his said royal highness's said freehold and copyhold hereditaments and estates, and from the situation and intermixture of the said allotments which he has so purchased and contracted for in fee simple as aforesaid, the same several allotments cannot be occupied and improved to the advantage they are capable of, unless they are held and kept together and enjoyed as one estate; and in regard that at the expiration of the present leases or demises of the said leasehold premises, it would not only be difficult to ascertain and distinguish the said leasehold allotments from the said freehold and copyhold allotments, but would also be very prejudicial and injurious to his said royal highness's mansion-house, park, and estate at Oatlands aforesaid, if the said leasehold allotments were separated and taken away from the said freehold and copyhold allotments: and inasmuch also as the said several leasehold manors and premises herein-before mentioned lie contiguous to, and are very desirable and convenient to be held and enjoyed with or by the proprietors of the said mansion house, park, and estate of Oatlands, H. R. H. the said Fred. Duke of York and Albany, is desirous of purchasing the inheritance of the whole of the said leasehold manors and premises respectively, including the said premises whereof H. R. H. is tenant from year to year, with all the timber and other trees, woods, underwoods, mines, and quarries, growing or being on or in or about the same manors and premises; and his said royal highness has made his suit to his majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to give leave that a bill may be brought into parliament to enable his majesty to grant to his said

royal highness such inheritance and whereas his majesty hath been graciously pleased to assent thereto, may it therefore please your majesty that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that it shall and may be lawful for his majesty, his heirs or successors, at any time or times hereafter, by letters patent or indenture or indentures under the great seal, to grant the fee simple and inheritance of land in and among the manors, park, messuages, mills, war-houses, storehouses, lands, tenements, rents, hereditaments, and premises, comprized in and devised by the said herein before recited letters patent, 11th June 1700, or any of them respectively, with their and every of their rights, royalties, advowsons, and appurtenances, and also of and in the two county warrons, lands, and premises thereof H R H is tenant from year to year aforesaid, with their and every of the appurtenances, and likewise of and in all and singular the lands, grounds, and hereditaments whatsoever, which by virtue of or under any inclosure act or acts of parliament, have been or shall or may be allotted or awarded to any person or persons whomsoever, for or in respect of the said leasehold manor, park, messuages, mills, &c. or any of them, including the said premises held from year to year, and also all and every the timber and other trees, woods, underwoods, royal and other mines and quarries, growing or being on or in or about the same leasehold manors, hereditaments, and premises respectively, and all rents, issues, and profits, of the premises so to be granted, and particularly the rents reserved by the said recited letters patent unto and to the use of H R H his heirs and assigns, or into such person or persons in trust for his said royal highness, his heirs and assigns, as he or they shall nominate or appoint for a full and adequate consideration in money, to be valued and ascertained by the proper officers of the crown for the time being, who are hereby authorized to value and ascertain the same accordingly.—II And be it further enacted, that the price or consideration in money to be valued and ascertained as aforesaid shall be paid into the bank of England in the name of the lord high treasurer of England, and shall be forthwith laid out by the order of the surveyor-general of the land revenue for the time being in the purchase of £3 per cent consolidated bank annuities, in the same manner and to and

for the same uses and purposes as the monies arising or to arise by the sale of fee farm rents are directed to be laid out by an act, passed in the 31st of his majesty, intitled, 'An Act for the better management of the land revenue of the crown,' and for the sale of fee farm and other unimprovable rents; and that all and singular the annuities to be purchased by virtue of this Act shall be and remain invested, and the interest or yearly dividends thereof shall be from time to time received, answered, accounted for, applied, and appropriated in such and the same manner as by the said last before mentioned Act is directed and enacted in respect of the annuities to be purchased in pursuance of that Act.—III And be it further enacted, that such grant of the said premises, or any part thereof, as shall be made by his said majesty, his heirs or successors, or any such letters patent, indenture or indentures as aforesaid in pursuance of this act, shall be and is and are hereby declared and enacted to be good, valid, and effectual in the law, according to the tenor and purport thereof in the said letters patent, indenture or indentures to be expressed, notwithstanding any restriction, matter, or thing contained in an act of parliament made in the 1st of her late majesty queen Anne, intitled, 'An Act for the better support of her majesty's household, and of the honour and dignity of the crown,' or in an Act made in the 1st of his present majesty, intitled, 'An Act for the support of his majesty's household, and of the honour and dignity of the crown of Great Britain,' or in an Act made in the 34th of his present majesty, intitled 'An Act for the better management of the land revenue of the crown, and for the sale of fee farm and other unimprovable rents,' or any other law or statute to the contrary, or any misrecital or non recital omission, or other defect in the said letters patent, indenture or indentures hereafter to be made in anywise notwithstanding.—IV Saving always to all bodies politic and corporate, and all other persons whomsoever, and their, his, and her successors, heirs, executors, and administrators (other than and except his most excellent majesty and his heirs and successors), all such estate, right, title, interest, claim, and demand, of, in, and to the premises to be granted in and by the said letters patent, indenture or indentures to be made in pursuance of this Act, as they, every, or any of them had before the passing of this Act, or might or could or would have had, held, or enjoyed, in case this Act had not been made.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH EXPORTS.—(Concluded from p. 896.)—One hundred thousand of the grand army leave the Prussian states to occupy the camp at Boulogne, while Denmark, henceforth safe from any English invasion, is evacuated by our troops, which are concentrated and centralizing themselves. Before the end of January, the battalion is withdrawn to Spain will be replaced on the banks of the Elbe and the Rhine.—Those which quelled Italy, last year, return to their former destination.—Such, Messieurs, is the external situation of France.—In the interior, the greatest order in all parts of the administration, important ameliorations, a great number of new institutions, have excited the gratitude of the people.—The creation of titles of nobility have environed the throne with a new splendour. This system creates in all hearts a laudable emulation. It perpetuates the recollection of the most illustrious services paid by the most honourable reward.—The clergy have distinguished themselves by their patriotism, and by their attachment to their sovereign and their duties. Respect to the ministers of the altar, who honour religion by a devotion so pure, and virtues so disinterested.—The magistrates of all classes every where aid, with their utmost efforts, the views of the sovereign and the people, by their zeal facilitate the operation of their authority, and by the manifestation of the most affecting sentiments, exalt the courage and honour of the troops.—Soldiers, magistrates, citizens, all have but one object, the service of the state, but one sentiment, that of admiration for the sovereign, but one desire, that of seeing heaven watch over his days, too just a recompense for a monarch who has no other thought, no other ambition, than those of the happiness and the glory of the French nation.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*First Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Vittoria, Nov. 9, 1808.*

Position of the French army on the 25th Oct.—Head quarters at Vittoria.—The marshal duke of Cornegliano, with his left wing, along the banks of the Arragon and the Ebro. His head-quarters at Rialla.—The marshal duke of Eichingen is with his head quarters at Guardia.—The marshal duke of Istria has his head-quarters at Miranda, with a garrison in Fort Pancorba.—The general of division Merlin occupies with one division the heights of Durango, and presses upon the enemy, who seem disposed to attack the heights of

Montragon.—The marshal duke of Dantzic having arrived with the divisions of Sebastiani and Laval, the king was pleased to order the division of Merlin to return.—The enemy being in the mean time in force at Lerin, and having occupied Viana, and several posts on the left bank of the Ebro, the king ordered the duke of Cornegliano to advance against the enemy. General Walther, commander of the cavalry, and the brigades of generals Habert, Brune, and Bazout, proceeded against the enemy's posts.—On the 27th of October the enemy were defeated at all points. Twelve thousand men, who were surrounded in Lerin, at first showed a disposition to defend themselves, but general Grandjean having made his arrangements, defeated them completely, making prisoners one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, 40 officers, and 1200 soldiers. These troops formed part of the camp of St. Remy, before Gibraltar. At the same time, marshal the duke of Eichingen marched for Logrono, passed the Ebro, took 300 of the enemy prisoners, pursued them several miles, and re-established the bridge of Logrono. In consequence of this event, the Spanish general Pignatelli, who commanded the insurgents, was stoned by them.—The troops of the traitor Romana and the Spanish prisoners in England, landed by the English in Spain, with the division of Gallizia, making together a force of 30,000 men, then attended from Bilbao marshal the duke of Dantzic, who, led on by a noble ardour, advanced upon them on the 31st of October, and drove them, at the point of the bayonet, from all their positions. The troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, and particularly the corps of Bieden, distinguished themselves.—The marshal duke of Dantzic close, followed up his pursuit of the enemy, the whole 1st of November, as far as Guenes, and entered Bilbao. In that city, very considerable magazines were found. Several Englishmen were made prisoners. The enemy's loss, in killed and wounded was considerable, but we took very few of them prisoners. Our loss consists of only 50 killed and 100 wounded. However praiseworthy this action was, it was to be wished that it had not taken place, the Spanish corps was in a situation to have been completely cut off.—The corps of marshal Victor having just arrived, was detached from Vittoria to Orduna. On the 7th of November, the enemy, reinforced by fresh troops from St. Audero, occupied the height of Guenes.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV No. 25] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1808. [PRICE 10d.

"... of rascals, who gloss over their treasons to their country by high-sounding declarations ; raising one hand with energetic enthusiasm, vowing their eternal vengeance on the French tyrant ; while the other is actively employed in rummaging the Public Pocket."—POOR WATCHMAKER'S LETTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN—I have, for some time past, left off the title, "*Spanish Revolution*," because I perceived, that nothing worthy of the name of revolution was intended. I do not say, that the reverses, which the Spaniards have experienced, have proceeded wholly from their new Junta having discovered no disposition to suffer any change to take place in the form, or system of the government, or to cause a radical reform of abuses ; but, it cannot be denied, that it was, by many persons besides myself, feared, that, unless the people of Spain were completely gone ; unless they were convinced, that the war was *for themselves*, and not for any single person or single family, they would not make much exertion against the French. The example of other nations was added to the reason of the case, in order to convince the public, that such would be the effect of obstinately adhering to a war in the name of Ferdinand VII, but, the hurlings of the press vociferated, the London merchants and the king's ministers dined and toasted ; and the fatal measure was resolved on, to make war for the king of Spain—I shall be told, perhaps, that it was the choice of the people of Spain to fight for Ferdinand. In answer to this I say ; that, when the Spaniards first took up arms, their declarations against France were little less vehement than their declarations against their "*late infamous government*," and against the numerous "*abuses*," that it engendered and maintained. While the people were in this mind, Spanish deputies came to England, and, soon after, at a public feast given to them, the king's minister for foreign affairs gave, in the way of toast, "*His most Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII,*" which, as I remarked at the time, amounted, considering from whom it came, to a declaration, that, if we gave any aid to the Spanish cause, it would be upon the condition of that cause being the cause of *king* in general, and of the king of Spain in particular. That this or something very much like this was the language of the Deputies, or whatever else they might be called, who were sent to Spain, with a view of offering the people assistance, there can be little

doubt ; and, when our king came formally to appoint a representative of himself to go to Spain, that representative was appointed, not to the Spanish *nation*, or to the *Junta* ; Oh, no ! to nothing short of "*His Most Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand the VIIth*." It does, and it did at the time, appear clearly to me, as, I think, it must have appeared to the public in general, that all this amounted to a declaration, on our part, that, unless the war was a war for the king, we would have nothing to do with it, and, that we would, by no means, have any hand in aiding and abetting a democratical revolution. The reader will judge, whether our conduct and language did amount to this ; that may be a question, but, if it did, there can be no question, that we were principally instrumental in making the cause a kingly instead of a popular one.—The proclamations of the Junta are now styled "*Royal Proclamations*." They breathe no longer that popular enthusiasm, which characterized the Addresses of the several separate Juntas. They talk of little but the ill-treatment and the rights of that "*beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII.*" whom to restore to the throne appears to be the principal object of the persons in power. They declare, in one of these "*Royal Proclamations*," that they *never will make peace with Napoleon*, until their "*beloved sovereign Ferdinand* be restored to the "*throne*," than which, I think the reader will allow, nothing could, at such a crisis, be more impolitic, that is to say, supposing long continued despotism not to have totally deprived the people of their senses, for, with what heart could they possibly go to the war, if they were never to have peace but upon conditions, which, however beaten by them, Buonaparte, unless they conquered France itself, might refuse them ? The people of Spain, when they took up arms against the French, while they were engaged in expelling the French, declared against their "*late infamous government*," and, was it to be supposed, that they would be urged to shed their blood by a declaration, on the part of those who now manage the affairs of the nation, that the object, the ultimate object, of their toils and dangers is to restore that government ?—In the midst of all the melancholy re-

lations that are daily reaching us from Spain; while we see Buonaparte, like the destroying angel, sweeping away armies and spreading desolation over the land, and while we are trembling for fear that the next mail may bring us the sad assurance, that the bodies of some of our own countrymen, friends, and relations, have been trampled beneath the hoofs of his horses: in the midst of these tidings, is it not enough to sting one to madness to be gravely informed, that, on the 14th of November, "his excellency DON JUAN HOOKHAM FRERE," upon being introduced to the Central Junta, delivered a speech, in which "he stated "the extraordinary complacency and flattering satisfaction, which he felt in the "honour granted him by the king, his "master, in appointing him his representative near the august person of his most Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII?" It really makes one's feet and fingers itch; it sets one all in a twitter, to read this, at a time like the present. "Near the august person," indeed! Why, what more could we do, were we to study for years how we should furnish food for ridicule in the French newspapers?—Of a piece with these proceedings was the proclamation to check "the licentiousness of the press," of which proclamation it is by no means difficult to guess the origin. It was so exactly according to the taste of certain people; it was so like them; it was the very thing one would have expected from them. Keep the people down. Keep their tongues and pens in order. Don't let them talk too much. Well, according to all appearances, the Junta may now issue as many proclamations as they please against "the licentiousness of the press;" for, it is to be feared, that they will soon have little else to do.—My decided opinion is, that the present disasters in Spain have chiefly, if not wholly, proceeded from the change of feeling in the people, produced by the change of language in their leaders. It was always obvious, to those who reflected upon the matter, that Spain, to avoid the embraces of the Buonapartes, must be thrown into a state of revolution; *revolution* or *King Joseph* appeared to be the only choice for the nation; and, unfortunately, those who obtained the lead, resolved not, at any rate, to have a *revolution*. They resolved not to suffer "the licentiousness of the press." I, for my part, shall always think of that. I know what sort of folks those are, who talk about "the licentiousness of the press" in this country and in America; and upon this knowledge I do, and must, form my judg-

ment.—As to the conduct of our ministers, in their *military* arrangements, I am not disposed to find fault with it. The Morning Chronicle does, indeed, use some very powerful arguments to show, that they might have acted more for the benefit of the Spanish cause; but, the worst of it is, these arguments come after the event. It was all along quite clear, that we could do nothing, unless the Spaniards themselves were in great force, as to numbers at least; but, it would now seem, that the French have the superiority even in that respect. Therefore, their accounts, which we before received, about their numbers, were false, or those numbers have, of late, diminished, which diminution, if that be the case, must, I think, be attributed to the change, which, by the altered language of the Junta, has been produced in the minds of the people. The blame, then, to the ministers, appears to me to be that of having *royalized*, if I may use the word, the Spanish cause. This is a subject well worth the serious attention of Parliament; but, as to the military part of their measures, it will be very difficult, I imagine, to make any blame stick to them.—I could not help observing, in the Courier newspaper of Saturday last, a letter, said to come from one of our officers in Sir David Baird's army, who, after complaining of the *lukewarmness* of the Spanish people, and their backwardness to make exertions against the enemy, says, "this is a miserable people, the French must *do them good*." I really did wonder to meet with a sentiment like this last, in a ministerial newspaper. You see, how things strike even our officers. This gentleman seems to have a high opinion of the *benefits* of French fraternization. Is it any wonder, then, if great numbers of the Spaniards are of the same opinion? No, no: say what we will, it does not necessarily follow, that the French must be hated by the Spaniards, because we wish it to be so.—I do not yet give up the Spanish cause as lost, because the great dangers of the country may rouse the *people*; a truly revolutionary spirit may arise, and, in that case, the French may be defeated; but, if a king at all, there is, I think, but little doubt, that Joseph Napoleon will be that king.

DAVISON has, at last, been tried. He has been found *guilty*. Well, this is something; and now, I hope, that *refunding* will follow, that the poor abused and cheated people may obtain, from this proceeding, a little, at least, towards defraying the expenses of the *Boards of Commissioners*,

which have been created for the purpose of detecting and bringing to light such frauds upon the public purse. Without refunding, I think little of the prosecution, or the verdict. Squeeze the purse, that's the way to make them feel. "I squeeze you, sponge, and you are dry again."—I shall be very anxious to hear the result of these proceedings. If I were a member of parliament, I would never rest, 'till I had the pounds-shillings-and-pence picture of the whole affair clearly before the public. —DAVISON is, however, a person, after all, it seems, of a most excellent character. His sponsors, upon this occasion, were numerous. I marvel that he did not bring his corps of "*Loyal North British Volunteers*," who inhabit about St. James's Square. He is famed for his *loyalty*; and, really, little afraid, upon the public, if committed by so *loyal* a man, might meet with a lenient construction. Who knows but that he might have been tempted to add now and then a pound to the price of his articles, for the sake of acquiring the means of raising Volunteers, in order to keep out the French, and to keep down the wicked and seditious at home? We are told, indeed, by the disaffected, that the detected speculators are all famous for their loyalty; for their attachment to "regular government, social order, and our holy religion." But, while the truth of this is, and must be, confessed, it may be answered, that loyalty, like every other lofty virtue, subjects the possessor, or, more properly speaking, the professor, to the charge of some petty vices. Besides, who is to be loyal *for nothing*? Godliness, we are told, is *great gain*; and, is there to be no gain attached to loyalty? Is a man to be loyal, while others are disloyal, or while others are said to be so, which answers his purpose full as well, if not better, and is he to get nothing at all by it? The loyalty of my little friend, THOMAS FITZGERALD, the small-beer poet, is almost proverbial. He has written more verses against Buonaparte than any man living. If the Corsican's carcass had been assailable by doggerel, he would have been killed long ago by my little friend, whose attacks upon him have been truly bloody-minded. Accordingly, little Thomas has a pension of one hundred and fifty pounds a year, duly paid him out of the fruits of the people's labour. The disaffected may say, that the pay ought to have followed the service, and that Thomas's pension should not have begun, 'till after he had killed Buonaparte; but, with their leave, this is not fair. Soldiers are not paid thus. What

is to support the loyal man, while his *country* is going on? Mr. Dallas is an able lawyer. I have heard, but, he did not; I think sufficiently dwell upon the uncommon loyalty of his client.—The newspapers state that Sir Andrew S. HAMMOND, Sir Evan NEPEAN, Mr. HUSKISSON, the *Right Honourable* Charles LONG, the *Honourable* WELLESLEY POLE, and LORD MOIRA, gave evidence to Davison's character, and, I dare say, not without quite sufficient reason. Why, under the late ministry, Lord Moira made him *Treasurer of the Ordinance*; and, now I think of it, I was threatened with a prosecution for a libel, because one of my correspondents inveighed most bitterly against the project, then much talked of, of making him a *baronet*. "Sir Alexander Davison" and the heirs male of his body lawfully "and loyally begotten!" I am in tribulation for his corps of Volunteers. They will now be just like sheep that have lost their shepherd. Aye, the disaffected may sneer; but, St. James's Square may yet rue the day when loyalty thus suffered in the person of one of its most famous champions.—About the time, just mentioned; that is to say, the time of the *baronet* project, I remember some pompous accounts, that were published of "*grand Dinners*," given by Mr. Davison, to very distinguished personages. It would be curious to ascertain the probable cost of one of those "*Grand Dinners*," the motive of giving them being too obvious to become a subject of inquiry with any one at all acquainted with the movement of the wheels of the political machine. I never hear of one of those festivals, without reflecting on the distress and misery, which they occasion. Oh! how many wretched families have spent their winter evenings supper-less and fire-less to furnish the means of carousing at "*Mr. Alexander Davison's hospitable board*," as the paid-for paragraphs in the newspapers termed it! "*Hospitable board*," indeed! Are entertainments like these; entertainments furnished from such means; given from such motives; and received upon such implied conditions: are these worthy of the heart-cheering name of hospitality? Where is the sycophant; where is the loyalty-deflecting hypocrite; where is even the hired editor or reviewer, who is bold enough to stand forward, and justify this abominable perversion of the use of words? —For the last three years, the daily press has teemed with paragraphs, praising this now-convicted man. The topics of praise have been of great variety; but, all the paragraphs have had for their

evident object the causing it to be generally believed, that Mr. Davison was a most liberal and loyal and benevolent man. To exhibit all the marks of liberality, loyalty, and benevolence, having such means in his hands, was very easy; and, if the people, in every part of the country, could see to the bottom of things, they would find, that no small part of what they term liberality and charity, is little more than a trifling per-centage of what is derived from their labour and privations. Even the praises, the nauseous printed flatteries of this man Davison, have, in fact, been paid for by the people; by the very people, whom they were written and published to deceive.—Take this man's wealth; see the amount of it; and then consider how many of those, who now live in misery, it would, if added to their present means, make comfortable. How many hungry bellies the interest of it would fill for ever; in how many families it would change water into beer; in how many fire-less hearths it would make a cheerful blaze; in how many cottages it would eke out the scanty day-light of winter. This is the true way, in which to view the effect of these accumulations of the public means, in the hands of individuals; for, disguise the thing how we may, it is luxury, which is the great cause of misery. When the few destroy, by themselves and their idle retinue, a great portion of the products of the earth, there must be less than sufficient for the many. That there must, and ought to be, gradations in society we all know. They are necessary to the very existence of society; but, is it, therefore, necessary or right, that one man should, by the means of *taxes* raised upon the labour of the community, be enabled to consume the fruit of the labour of thousands, and that, too, without any corresponding services rendered to that community? Let us suppose, for instance, that Davison has a fortune of twenty thousand pounds a year, which may be about the mark, and that this fortune has come out of the taxes. This twenty thousand pounds a year is so much taken from the means of enjoyment in the community at large. View it as taken from a hundred gentlemen; each of these have so much the less to use himself, and, of course, so much the less wherewith to give unto them who need. I shall be told, perhaps, that the power of giving and the act of giving, in such cases, only change hands; but, besides that such a change is injurious to the former possessors, the objects of benevolence are also changed. The superfluities of fortune, instead of being used for the relief of

unfortunate merit, go to support the idle and the vicious; and, of course, to foster and perpetuate vice.—The splendour of the metropolis, the increase of houses, of carriages, of scenes of amusement, of expences and luxuries of all sorts, in that all-devouring place, have their rise, principally, in causes such as we have now been contemplating. The wealth of the whole kingdom; that part of the fruit of all its labour and industry and ingenuity; that part of these, which ought to go to the providing of assistance to the unfortunate, and to the procuring of a small portion of general convenience and pleasure; all that part, is drawn up to the metropolis, through the channel of taxation. One such man as Davison takes away the conveniences and the pleasures and the voluntary alms of several parishes. This is the scourge, under which we smart, and under which we shall smart, till a constitutional reformation in the Parliament take place, till those, whose office it is to take care of the people's money, be no longer suffered to receive from the king's servants a part of that same money.—I know very well, that the general herd, in imitation of that of the forest, will now stand aloof from Davison; will now disclaim him and swear they never tasted of his dinners. But, the people ought to be upon their guard against this; they ought to look upon him as one only amongst the numerous herd; they ought not to join in any cry against this particular man; they ought to be fully aware, that, however great and numerous the frauds that he may have committed, those frauds, all put together, do not amount to a fraud so great and so wicked as the single fraud, now attempted by those, who would make the uninformed part of the people believe, that he is the only, or the greatest, speculator; they ought to look upon Davison as a *sample*, rather than a singularity, and to bear in mind the old saying: "as is the sample so is the sack."

MAJOR HOGAN'S APPEAL.—In another part of this sheet will be found a letter from Major Hogan's *publisher*, from which it appears, that the Major himself is in America, whither he went some time after his pamphlet was published, and whence he is expected to return, in the space of two or three months. This circumstance of the Major's being in America does, indeed, alter the case. It totally does away the ground of that reasoning, whence I drew the conclusion, that his relation, as far as belonged to the Bank Notes, was false. Before we come to such a conclusion, upon such ground,

we must see the Major in England again; or give full time for his agent's receiving his instructions upon the subject. — There certainly is a good deal of reason, in what the Publisher says, as to an objection to make the numbers of the notes known; but still, I think, it would be safe enough, if there was a proviso for *proving* the property to be that of the claimant. — As to the *probability* of a woman's doing what is ascribed to the "female in a dashing barouche," it is hard to say what is, or what is not, probable amongst such persons. But while the improbability has been urged, on *this side*, it has always appeared very odd to me, that nothing has been said of the improbability, on the *other side*. As to the *fact* of the strumpet's going to the newspaper office and to Frank's Hotel, there can be no doubt, and, indeed, no such doubt has been started. This fact being admitted, we have to require, *whether it be probable, that such a woman was employed so to act by Major Hogan?* In the first place, what *motive* could he have for taking so much trouble and running so great a risk? Not to recover his rank in the army, which he had quitted, and from re-entering which he might be well assured, that such a device would, for ever prevent him. There appears to have been no possible motive of gain, which could have actuated him. Revenge, then; *sheer* revenge must have been the motive, if he really did commit the act. Revenge is a very powerful feeling; it will carry a man very far; some men much farther than gain will carry them; indignation, rage at what the party conceives to have been gross ill-treatment from irresistible power; will, I allow, be very apt to set a man's wits to work to find out the means of vengeance, and will greatly tend to make him set risks of all sorts at defiance. But, after all, I cannot see, for my life, how the Major could hope to gratify his vengeance from this scheme. I cannot see, why he should have hoped to do, with this scheme, what might be left undone by the other part of his narrative. Granting, however, that revenge did set him to work, it must be allowed, that he took time to reflect about it; it must be allowed, that there was much of craft and invention in his conduct. Well, then, would such a man readily commit himself to the hands of a strumpet, who, the very day after she had received a reward from him, might, and, in all probability would, betray him for a much greater reward? Was the strumpet his own mistress? Such persons are not famed for their fidelity, es-

pecially to ~~gallant men~~ who are hired across the Atlantic ocean. Besides, ~~there~~ was the "dashing barouche" to hire; there were a coachman and a footman to engage to secrecy, a sort of gentry who are not very apt to hold their tongues for a trifle, when they become possessed of saleable knowledge. Major Hogan *must* have been nearly a stranger in London. Was it not a difficult thing for him to set to work and produce this equipage of barouche, lady, and servants? It is, I am told, very easy to trace hundred pound bank-notes; but, would it not have been much easier; nay, is it not much easier now, to trace the barouche, lady, and servants? The *waiter* at the hotel took in the letter. *He* says he took it from such a person, with such an equipage; and, if he was bribed to tell a lie, can it be believed, that, especially now when the Major is gone abroad, he could not be induced to tell the truth? Let it be observed, too, that, if a *sham* lady and servants, it was to such people, that the Major had confided his *four hundred pounds*. Is it probable, that he would have done this? Is it probable, that a man, capable of such a deep-laid scheme, would have entrusted four hundred pounds to such keeping? But, the great thing of all is; the striking fact is, that the lady, barouche, and servants have not been found out, in a town where there is such a police as now exists in London. It is notorious, that the most artful and experienced swindlers cannot, for any length of time, escape this police, the officers of which, when once laid upon the trail, however cold the scent, however stale the haunt, do, ninety-nine times out of every hundred, discover and hunt down their prey. To me, therefore, it is a matter of great astonishment, and so, I think, it must be to the reader, that the lady and her equipage have not been yet discovered; that is to say, upon the supposition, that they were hired by Major Hogan. There appears to have been, upon this occasion, as strong motives for the vigilance of the police, as ever existed upon any occasion. No one will doubt of the power of the parties interested to set the police at work. The detection and exposure of the imposture, if it was one, would have been worth fifty millions of the paragraphs of hiring writers, in newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and reviews. Yet, has the police not stirred, that we have heard of; yet, has there been no endeavour, that I have perceived, by a public offer of reward to "the lady or servants" to come forward and make the discovery. This cannot fail to have great weight

with the public, in favour of the truth of Major Hogan's statement. There cannot have been less, supposing the thing to have been an imposture, than six or eight persons in some measure acquainted with it. Major Hogan must have hired the barouche and horses; for what person would have let them to a woman, who could have been engaged in such a service? The two servants must recollect the expedition. The heroine herself together with her companions, or servants, at home. This affair has made so much noise; it has been so long a matter of public conversation; that, one would think it almost impossible, that all these parties should have kept the secret, until this day, especially as there were such strong temptations to a disclosure, and no temptation at all, in any one, except the Major himself, to prevent such disclosure. This was my reasoning before I started the question about the publication of the numbers of the bank-notes; but, as that was pointed out to me as quite effectual to ascertain from whom the notes came into the Major's hands; as I could see no reasonable objection, which the Major could have, to such publication; and, as he neither published the numbers, nor took any notice of my hint, I concluded that he dared not try the experiment. But, if it be true, as I must suppose it is, and as I am now, for the first time, informed, that he was gone abroad before my hint was given, this conclusion of mine was, of course, premature.—It is very desirable that the truth of this matter should be ascertained and publicly exposed. If the Major has really trumped up the story about the lady and the notes; if his revenge has carried him so very far, it is proper that it should be known, and, it appears to me, that nothing is more easy than for the police to find out the heroine and the attendants. I cannot refrain from again expressing my surprise, that, upon the supposition of the thing being an imposture, no one of the parties should have yet made a voluntary discovery. They must all have heard of the noise made by their calling at the hotel; the calling there must be fresh in their memory; they must all be aware of the advantage to be derived from turning evidence; the sea is between them and the Major; amongst the vilest of man and woman kind they must necessarily be; and yet, they do not, there is no one of them that does, come forward with a discovery. Supposing, therefore, the thing to be an imposture, there must be, in the composition of these persons' minds, a most uncommon mixture of baseness and of honourable feeling.—

On the other side, upon the supposition, that the Major's statement be correct, there is little or no chance of a discovery; for, as my correspondent observes, as to the tracing of the notes, you are liable to be stopped by any one of the possessors refusing to tell how he disposed of them, or any of them; besides which, the possessors may not be in the kingdom, or, if in it, not to be found; to say nothing about the circumstance of people's forgetting, or never looking at, the numbers of the bank-notes that fall into their hands. Then, the woman, if the story be true, having her own carriage and servants, there would be no coach-master to trace her to; and, though the servants of such a person are not likely to be remarkable for their fidelity, they would be under no temptation to betray their mistress, or employer, there being no chance of gaining by their treachery, while there would be a pretty good chance of their losing by it.—Such is the light, in which I view this matter. I must confess, that I felt great pleasure at hearing a sufficient cause assigned for the not publishing of the numbers of the notes; because, I should have been greatly mortified to find, that a gentleman of such excellent character as Major Hogan appears to be; that so worthy a man and so very meritorious an officer, should, though from a sense of ill-treatment, have been induced to go so far as to state and to promulgate, under his own signature, a deliberate and long-intended falsehood.

*** The "POOR WATCHMAKER OF A ROTTEN BOROUGH," in his enumeration of national calamities and disgraces, has overlooked one, which is greater than any of the rest, but which I need not name, when I add, that it is its existence which prevents me from giving to the world his excellent and admirable letter. This is our curse; this is our political pestilence. Every word he has said ought to be read by every man in the kingdom. Let us hope, that a time may come, when the public may read this very letter; and, in the meanwhile, let us not fret ourselves much as to what engages the hopes and fears of the coffee-house politicians. Oh! how gladly would I drag forth the "rascals, who gloss over their treasons to their country by high-sounding declarations; raising one hand high with energetic enthusiasm, vowing their eternal vengeance on the French tyrant, while the other is actively rummaging the public pocket!" But, I will keep his letter treasured up for the use of family and friends; and I beg him to accept of my best thanks for taking the trouble to commu-

nicate it to me.—This “WATCHMAKER” is a man after my own heart.

Some speculator, who calls himself “A Hampshire Man,” has written me a letter upon the subject of the last Winchester meeting. For the reasons, stated in the beginning of my letter to Mr. Poulter, shall not insert this letter; though I should, I must confess, be glad to see it published, particularly in this county, as a specimen of the folly as well as the baseness of those, who stand forward as the champions of corruption and speculation.

Botley, Dec. 15, 1808.

MAJOR HOGAN'S APPEAL.

SIR,—Respecting as I do the great talents by which you are distinguished, and still more their bold and independent exercise, any suggestion from you naturally commands my attention.—I therefore feel myself urged to submit a few remarks upon two paragraphs which have lately appeared in your Register, upon the subject of Major Hogan's Appeal. In the first of these paragraphs, you require, upon the suggestion of a friend, that Major Hogan should publish the numbers of the notes, which your friend alleges may in that case be traced with facility; and in your second paragraph, you state, that, “if the Major does this, the public will believe the account concerning the notes to be true; if he does not, they will, with very great reason, believe it to be a most atrocious falsehood.” If this story be really false, Sir, I agree with you, as to its atrocity, nay, I should consider even the term *atrocity* as too feeble to describe its character.—But if it be true, Mr. Cobbett, in what terms of reprobation would you describe all the hireling scribblers, and scurrilous slanderers, all the newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and reviews, which have, for the last two months, teemed with such vulgar venom against the reputation of Major Hogan?—This gallant officer's Appeal had not been long before the world, when several persons applied to know the numbers of the notes. But how simple must those who made the application have been, or how simple must they have conceived the person to whom they addressed it, in supposing that it would or could be safely complied with, while the agent of Major Hogan stood pledged to give up the notes to any person who could state their numbers. For, if the application had been acceded to, what security existed that some callous swindler would not avail himself of the information and immediately stand forward to claim the

notes?—The motives that would prompt such a claim are obvious;—first, the claimant would obtain the notes, and secondly, he might secure favour, by producing such an evidence of spontaneous zeal. Such a suspicion you would certainly think excusable, were I to name to you four, in particular, of the gentry, by whom the application has been actually made.—But the application of these men, Sir, materially differed from that which you have made: they required a private communication; you call for the publication of the notes, and with your proposition I am entirely disposed to concur.—Indeed so fully impressed have I been for some time, with the propriety of such a proceeding, in order to remove all doubt, and to facilitate the detection of guilt, that long before your paragraph appeared, I had written to Major Hogan, strongly advising him, first to give the notes to some charitable institution, and then to publish the numbers.—But Major Hogan having gone to America, some time after the publication of the pamphlet, in order to make arrangements of property with his brother, who is one of the first merchants in the United States; the Major's agent must wait for his acquiescence, before your proposition can be complied with.—The Major assured me, that he would return to England by February or March; before that period, however, I have reason to hope for his answer to my request.—His compliance will, I assure you, afford me much satisfaction, although I do not feel myself in the slightest degree implicated, in any part of the transaction, having received the whole of the statement from Major Hogan, and taking it entirely upon his faith and credit, which I have no reason whatever to doubt, as I do not find the authenticity of any of the documents referred to in that publication, has ever been questioned.—Upon this affair of the bank notes, I must, Mr. Cobbett, take leave to say, that I am by no means disposed to adopt the doubts, which seem to exist, as to the probability of such an event; for I can easily suppose, that a woman of fashion and intrigue might have quite sufficient motives for doing what is, by Major Hogan, stated to have been done by the person in question.—One of the pamphleteers asks with some air of triumph, “what could have taken any person to a newspaper office, to inquire after Major Hogan's address, which could be so easily known, by application at the Horse Guards?”—But the Major, having, some weeks before resign-

his commission, nothing about his address was known at the Horse Guards.—Another pamphleteer asks, why apply at a newspaper office, when the name of a bookseller appeared? But the fact is, that no bookseller's name appeared to the first advertisement, which was published in *August*.

Now, Sir, as to the facility of tracing the notes, I rather think your friend has been too sanguine. To satisfy you of that, I need only refer to the case of Lord Melville, where a committee of the House of Commons, invested with powers, to send for persons, papers, and records, found it extremely difficult to trace any of the notes, and were entirely unable to trace some.—Then, Sir, if, with the means which that committee possessed, obstacles arose, how can it be so confidently stated, that it is in the power of any individual, or even of the directors of the Bank of England, to trace the notes, alluded to in Major Hogan's Appeal.—It must be obvious, that any individual may refuse to answer the application of the person or persons endeavouring to trace such notes, and the probability of a refusal to answer, where the answer might betray a party, making an improper application of such notes, is so strong, that I always heard with surprise, have the confident language of those who talked so much about the facility of tracing these notes.—After all, Mr. Cobbett, let us argue this matter as we may, it must resolve itself into a question of *faith*, and then you are to consider, whether you will attach credit to the words of Major Hogan, recommended as he is, to your respect, by some of the first military characters in the country, or whether you will attend to the mere doubts, surmises, and conjectures, of sycophants in office, and anonymous libellers.—Here let me conclude, Sir, with the repetition of your own words, that “the affair of the Bank notes has no connection with “Major Hogan's case, which closes before “this affair occurs.”—But the motives which urge that meritorious officer's assailants, to dwell so much upon this affair, are quite obvious. The case of Major Hogan is found inpregnable, because the grounds of his complaint are undeniable, and therefore, it is thought expedient, by his foes, to fix the public attention as much as possible, upon the business of the Bank notes, because it affords some opportunity for cavilling.

THE PUBLISHER OF MAJOR
HOGAN'S APPEAL.

December, 6, 1808.

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, ON THE AFFAIRS
OF SPAIN.

Sir,—The Proclamation from Aranjuez, bearing date the 20th of October, and published in the “Times” of the 3d of this instant, fully justifies the conclusions drawn in my letter, inserted in your Register of the 29th of October, touching the patriotic views of the supreme junta; but if virtue herself be too slow in her movements, consequences the most fatal may ensue. As the salvation of Spain depended on the people being made politically *free*, and being *armed*, these were points on which there ought not to have been a moment's hesitation. The very first resolution of the supreme junta, and while the oath of fidelity was warm upon their lips, ought to have been, that a national cortes, equally representing the people, and annually elected by all who contribute to the taxes, should as soon as possible be assembled; and that all the able-bodied of the whole community should be instantly trained for war, and furnished with arms as expeditiously as they could be procured; and to these objects the whole energies of the junta ought, in the first instance, to have been directed.

These being the principles I have uniformly inculcated, they cannot, now that disasters have been experienced, be called afterthoughts; and I could appeal to a Spanish nobleman, for having, in a letter dated so far back as the 21st of June, expressed an anxiety for seeing “the English force with “the best of the Spanish in the service of “their country, *in the Pyrennees*.”—What have been in both countries the *causes* of delay, and what may be the fatal consequences, are objects worthy investigation; because a knowledge of them might be highly instructive. No time, however, ought to be lost in attempting to retrieve past errors; and, from the heroism and constancy of the Spanish character, much may be hoped for. If the *mind* of Spain be not subdued, the farther the enemy leads his columns into the country, the sooner perhaps he may be destroyed. I say *perhaps*; for, knowing very little of actual circumstances, I cannot judge what is likely to be the event. We have, however, seen the confidence with which Buonaparte has undertaken the conquest of the Peninsula, at a time when the whole people were apparently hostile, and when every hand that had a weapon would be raised against him. If, under such circumstances, we should see that Peninsula actually subdued, the event must give birth to two reflections, on which we cannot ponder with

too much or too serious attention. *First*, that all the combinations of political and military powers, *applicable to invasion and offensive war*, have, in the French government, attained a degree of perfection far exceeding even those of Rome, and consequently whatever was before experienced among mankind; and that, for resisting the attacks of such an invader, nothing is to be depended on, short of the best combinations of political and military power which are *applicable to defence*. *Secondly*, that that national disease, of which inveterate despotism and habitual slavery are the indications, so breaks down and destroys the constitution, the energies, and the very means and capacities, of a state, that the mere dissolution of its detestable government is by no means a restoration of health and vigour. According to circumstances, its recovery must be a work of time of greater or less duration; as genius and virtue have more or less the ascendant; and as the true spirit of liberty shall be more or less aroused and cherished.

It was at an early period of the struggle, and in my first public letter on Spanish affairs, written on the 15th, and inserted in your Register of July, the 23d, that I used this language:—"If she fail in the attempt, it can only be, *because she reformed and armed too late; AND IF SHE FALL, WE KNOW WHOSE HARNESS, FOR THE FINAL CONFLICT, MUST BE NEXT BUCKLED ON.*" After just remarking, in confirmation of my second reflection, that *eight months* have now elapsed since the worn-out government of Spain was annihilated; and *four months* since the French power in the country was in effect broken by the capture of Dupon's army; *which ought to have led to an early contest in the very passes of the Pyrenees*, we in England ought not to lose a moment in effecting those reforms in our own government which, by equally restoring to health and vigour both the civil and military branches of our constitution, shall once more give us these best combinations of political and military power which are *applicable to defence*.

An attorney-general may think it a right season for proposing a statute, abridging the rights of liberty and adding to the severities of law; a court of King's Bench may think it a right season for acting upon most questionable precedents, in committing, for offences in Middlesex, the convicted persons to distant gaols, thereby grievously and calamitously adding to the evils of legal imprisonment, and causing to the parties a heavy expence, although *fine* made no part of the sentence; ministers may think it a season

for mocking the nation with a tribunal which has all the qualities of a parliament, but none of its powers; and no one attribute of a court of justice or equity; and the great rival parties of the state may still think it a season, for fruitlessly contending with each other for power, but ought not all parties, and all descriptions of men, rather to consider how long it may be, before we ourselves may have to contend with that invader, under whose prowess many are of opinion Spain and Portugal must sink?

Should such an event take place, it would need not the spirit of prophecy to foretel, that nought but reforms, civil and military, completely restoring to us those best combinations which are *applicable to defence*, could save the throne, or government of our country. But when those combinations are at the same time the very essence of our constitution, which, in the strictest sense, is a constitution of *liberty and arms*, were it not the first duty of king, ministers, parliament, and people, to restore whatever is in decay, and with one heart and one soul build up again the dilapidated parts of our constitution, and rear again the fallen parts of our liberties, yet, as mere matter of the most vulgar prudence, it should seem advisable, *not to neglect these things until the Iberian peninsula may become French, until the marine of France may double our own, and until the armies of France may be in Ireland or in England.*

But Mr. Miles, in his letter to the Prince of Wales, p. 73, tells us of "a project of suspending the constitution," which project he attributes to one of whom he says, "the natural despotism of his temper is well known, and it has lost nothing of its stern and inflexible ferocity by a residence in Asia, where it has been most woefully felt." The reason which the person alluded to is said to have given for his advice, is this, "that the power of Buonaparte can only be effectually resisted by a power as despotic as his own." But there are some objections to this conclusion. *First*, in the most effective combinations of political and military power, for *offence* and for *defence*, they are radical differences of principle. *Secondly*, neither of the humbled emperors, nor the king of Prussia, were at all deficient in *despotic power*. And, *thirdly*, if despotism is to be our defence against despotism, we may as well submit at once to that of Buonaparte himself, as that of the adviser, or any other. Nay, it would be more creditable as well as more beneficial: more creditable, because there is less discredit in submitting to a mighty con-

entire, than to any traitorous usurper of contemptible pretensions; and more beneficial, as we should not only be spared the havoc and bloodshed of a contest, but, when once slaves, should at least be governed with transcendent ability.

As I am not, however, likely ever to become a convert to the preachers of despotism, so I must myself continue a preacher of Reform.

I have remarked, that in the combinations for *invasion* and for *defence*, there is a radical difference. But this requires explanation and qualification. In the present state of society, standing, regular, and highly disciplined armies, are best for *invasion* and *conquest*; but it is only in despotic states that such armies can arrive at the magnitude necessary for subduing extensive and potent states; for so long as any nation retains its liberty, its standing army must necessarily be limited in its numbers for the security of that liberty. A *free* nation, therefore, in these days of civilization, is, happily, unqualified for the conquest of other powerful nations. In the rude and ferocious ages prior to civilization it was otherwise; for then the nations most free were most warlike; and countries were not conquered by standing armies, discipline, and military science, but by whole nations of free men pouring into a territory more fruitful than their own, and exterminating or subduing nations less free, fierce, and hardy than themselves. My positions therefore remain unshaken, that in our own age *despotism*, with its unlimited *standing armies*, are the machinery for *invasion*; while *liberty* and the *universal arms-bearing of the people*, are the means of *defence*; always recollecting, that the more universal that arms-bearing of the people, the greater may be with safety the regular army of the country in question.

Nor, Sir, is reform, radical reform, only necessary to our political liberty, and to the preservation of our property from taxation at the will and pleasure of a minister, for corrupting parliamentary supporters, and for enlisting an immense army of *civil* mercenaries for the support of his power, to be paid out of the pockets of the betrayed and injured people; but it is necessary for restoring discipline and vigour to every department of the state; that our affairs abroad as well as at home may not be conducted with imbecility, and our national efforts end in disappointment, and cover us with disgrace. In "A Short English Tale," written in answer to Major Hogan, it is made an *apology* for the commanders-in-

chief, in not always selecting proper men for command, that *parliamentary influence must be yielded to*. Here, is the bane of our affairs! Here is the canker-worm preying on the vitals of the state! This, Sir, is "the accursed thing" we must "take away," or in the day of trial "we cannot stand before our enemies."—I remain, Sir, &c.—J. CARTWRIGHT.—*Enfield, Dec. 12th, 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.—*King of England's Declaration against France. Dated Westminster, Dec. 15, 1808.*

The overtures made to his majesty by the governments of Russia and of France have not led to negotiation: and the intercourse to which those overtures gave rise being terminated, his majesty thinks it right thus promptly and publicly to make known its termination.—The continued appearance of a negotiation when peace has been found to be utterly unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy.—It might enable France to sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who are combined to resist her oppressions: and if, among the nations which groan under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintain against France a doubtful and precarious independence, there should be any which even now are balancing between the certain ruin of a prolonged inactivity, and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that ruin; to nations so situated the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed by the vain hope of returning tranquillity; or their purpose shaken by the apprehension of being left to contend alone.—That such was, in fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted to his majesty from Erfurth, his majesty entertained a strong persuasion.—But at a moment when results so awful from their importance, and so tremendous from their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision of peace or war, the king felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the possibility of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies.—It was difficult for his majesty to believe, that the emperor of Russia had devoted himself so blindly and fatally to the violence and ambition of the power with which his imperial majesty had unfortunately become allied, as to be prepared openly to abet the usurpation of the Spanish monarchy; and to acknowledge and maintain the right

assumed by France, to depose and imprison friendly sovereigns, and forcibly to transfer to herself the allegiance of independent nations. When therefore it was proposed to his majesty to enter into negotiation for a general peace, in concert with his majesty's allies, and to treat either on the basis of the *Uti Possidetis* (heretofore the subject of so much controversy), or on any other basis, consistent with justice, honour, and equality, his majesty determined to meet this seeming fairness and moderation, with fairness and moderation, on his majesty's part, real and sincere.—The king professed his readiness to enter into such negotiation in concurrence with his allies; and undertook forthwith to communicate to them the proposals which his majesty had received. But as his majesty was not connected with Spain by a formal treaty of alliance, his majesty thought it necessary to declare, that the engagements which he had contracted, in the face of the world, with that nation, were considered by his majesty as no less sacred, and no less binding upon his majesty, than the most solemn treaties; and to express his majesty's just confidence that the government of Spain, acting in the name of his catholic majesty Ferdinand VII, was understood to be a party of the negotiation.—The reply returned by France to this proposition of his majesty casts off at once the thin disguise, which had been assumed for a momentary purpose; and displays, with less than ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish nation is described by the degrading appellation of "the Spanish Insurgents;" and the demand for the admission of the government of Spain as a party to any negotiation, is rejected as inadmissible and insulting.—With astonishment as well as with grief his majesty has received from the emperor of Russia a reply, similar in effect, although less indecorous in tone and manner. The emperor of Russia also stigmatizes as "insurrection," the glorious efforts of the Spanish people in behalf of their legitimate sovereign, and in defence of the independence of their country; thus giving the sanction of his imperial majesty's authority to an usurpation which has no parallel in the history of the world.—The king would readily have embraced an opportunity of negotiation, which might have afforded any hope or prospect of a peace, compatible with justice and with honour. His majesty deeply laments an issue, by which the sufferings of Europe are aggravated and prolonged. But neither the honour of his

country, nor the generosity of the Spanish nation, would admit his majesty's consenting to commence a negotiation, by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who are contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man; and whose exertions in a cause so unquestionably just, his majesty has solemnly pledged himself to sustain.

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SPANISH REVOLUTION. *First Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Vittoria, Nov. 9, 1808. (Continued from p. 928.)

The marshal duke of Dantzic advanced against them, and broke through their centre. The 58th and 32d regiments distinguished themselves upon this occasion.—Had these events occurred in the plains, not a man of the enemy would have escaped; but the mountains of St. Andero and Bilboa are almost impassable. The duke of Dantzic pursued the foe during the whole of the day in the passes of Valmaseda.—In these various affairs, the enemy have lost, in killed and wounded, from 3500 to 4000 men.—The duke of Dantzic particularly praises the generals of division Laval and Sebastiani, the Dutch general Chassey, colonel Lacoste, of the 27th regiment of light infantry, colonel Baco, of the 63d regiment of the line, and the colonels of the regiments of Baden and Nassau, upon whom his majesty has conferred rewards.—The army is abundantly supplied with provisions, and the weather is very fine.—Our columns are marching forward, and combining their movements. It is supposed that the headquarters will move forward to-night from Vittoria.

Second Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 12.

The duke of Dantzic entered Valmaseda, in pursuit of the foe.—On the 8th, general Sebastiani discovered the rear-guard of the insurgents posted upon a high hill to the right of Valmaseda: he immediately advanced against them, defeated them, and took about 100 of them prisoners.—In the meantime, the city of Burgos was occupied by the army of Estremadura, consisting of three divisions.—The advanced guard was composed of Walloons and Spanish guards; and the students of the universities of Salamanca and Leon, divided into several battalions, and some regiments of the line, with other corps raised since the insurrection of Badajoz, made the whole of the army amount to little short of 20,000 men. The command of the cavalry of the army was given to marshal the duke of Istria; and the emperor confided the command of the second corps to marshal the duke of Dalmatia.—On the

10th, at day-break, the 1st division of Mouton, to reconnoitre the enemy. On reaching Gamonal, he was received with the discharge of thirty pieces of artillery. This was the signal for advancing at the pas de charge; the infantry of the division of Mouton attacked them, supported by the artillery. The Walloons and Spanish guards were defeated at the first outset. The duke of Istria, at the head of his cavalry, attacked them in flank. The enemy were completely routed; 3000 of them being left dead on the field. We took twelve pair of colours, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and 3000 prisoners. The remainder were completely dispersed. Our troops entered the city of Burgos intermixed with the enemy, and the cavalry pursued them in all directions.—This army of Estremadura, which had come from Madrid by forced marches, whose first enterprise was the assassination of their unfortunate general count Torres, and which was completely equipped with English arms, besides being in the pay of England, is no longer in existence. The colonel of the Walloon guards, and a considerable number of the superior officers, are prisoners. Our loss was very inconsiderable, consisting only of 12 or 15 killed, and at most 50 wounded; only one captain was killed by a cannon ball.—This affair, which we owe to the excellent dispositions of the duke of Dalmatia, and the intrepidity with which the duke of Istria led on the cavalry, does the greatest honour to the division of Mouton; though it is well known that this division consists of corps whose name alone has for a long time been a title of honour.—The castle of Burgos has been occupied, and was found in good condition; it contained considerable quantities of flour, wine, and grain.—On the 11th the emperor reviewed the division of gen. Bonnet, and immediately detached it towards the entrance of the passes of St. Andero.—The position of the army, this day, is as follows.—The marshal duke of Belluna is in close pursuit of the remains of the army of Galicia, who are flying in the direction of Villarcayo and Reynosa; towards which points the duke of Dalmatia is also marching. They can have no other resource than that of dispersing in the mountains, with the loss of artillery, baggage, and every thing that constitutes an army.

Third Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 13.

The army of Galicia, which fled from Bilbao, is pursued by the marshal duke of Belluna, in the direction of Espinosa; by the marshal duke of Dantzic, in the direction

of Villarcayo; and at Reynosa is surrounded by the marshal duke of Dalmatia. Important events must take place in that quarter. —General Milhaut, with his division of cavalry, has entered Palencia, and has sent off detachments towards the outlets of Reynosa, in pursuit of the park of artillery of the army of Galicia.—The young students of Salamanca, who thought to accomplish the conquest of France, the fanatical peasants, who already dreamed of plundering Bayonne and Bourdeaux, and imagined themselves led on by all the saints, being misled by the treacherous monks, are dispossessed of their foolish fancies. Their despair and dismay are at their height. They deplore the misfortunes of which they are become the prey, the lies which they have been made to believe, and the struggle, without an object, in which they are involved.—The whole plain of Castille is already overspread by our cavalry. The zeal and ardour of our troops enable them to perform journeys of fourteen or fifteen miles a day. Our piquets are on the Duero. The whole coast of St. Andero and Bilbao completely swept of the enemy. —The unfortunate city of Burgos, a prey to all the miseries of a town taken by storm, trembles with dismay. Priests, monks, inhabitants, fled upon the first news of the battle; terrified lest the soldiers of the army of Estremadura should attempt to defend themselves in the houses, which resolution they probably made known beforehand; first plundered by these, and afterwards by our soldiers, who entered the houses, in order to drive out their enemies, and found there no inhabitants.—Such men as M. Von Steine, who from want of troops of the line, which our eagles could not oppose, form to themselves the exalted idea of raising the people in a mass, have become witnesses of the misfortunes which they have brought upon themselves, and of the small obstacles which such auxiliaries can oppose to regular troops.—At Burgos and in its neighbourhood, wool to the value of thirty millions has been found, which his majesty has caused to be sequestered. All of it that belongs to the monks, and to those persons that have formed a part of the insurrection, shall be declared forfeited, and shall be first set apart for the indemnification of the French, for the losses which they have sustained; for in the city of Madrid, Frenchmen, who had been settled there even for forty years, have been robbed of every thing, and the Spaniards who were true to their king have been declared emigrants. The property of Azanza, a most virtuous and intelligent minister; of Masseredo, a most experienced seaman; of

O'Farril, the best soldier in Spain, has been exposed to public sale. The property of Campo Alanje, respectable for his virtues, his rank, and his fortune, the proprietor of 60,000 Merinos, and of three millions of income, has been the prey of these infuriated men.—Another measure determined upon by the emperor, is the confiscation of all the goods of English manufacture, and of all the colonial produce which has been disloaded in Spain since the period of the insurrection. The merchants of London have thus done very well in sending their goods to Lisbon, to Oporto, and to the Spanish ports. The more they shall send, the greater will be the contributions which they will pay us.—The city of Palencia, governed by a worthy bishop, has received our troops with affection. That city suffers none of the miseries of war. An honest bishop, who, animated by Christian charity, fulfils the precepts of the gospel, and from whose lips nothing but honest discourses, is the greatest blessing which Heaven confers upon man. An intemperate, odious, and infuriated bishop who preaches up nothing but rebellion, uproar, disorder, and war, is a curse whom God in his anger gives to mankind, to mislead them in the very source of morality itself.—There is a great number of monks confined in the prisons of Burgos. The peasants throw stones at them.—“Wretches!” said they to them. “It is you who have plunged us into this abyss of miseries. Perhaps we shall never again behold our unfortunate wives, our dear children. Wretches! a just God will punish you in Hell for all the miseries which you have caused to our families, and our native country.”

Fourth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 15

Yesterday his majesty reviewed the division of Marchand, filled up the vacancies with the most deserving officers, and distributed rewards to the soldiers who had distinguished themselves. His majesty is extremely well satisfied with those troops who have cheerfully marched, without halting, from the Banks of the Vistula.—The duke of Ichungen has marched from Burgos. This morning his majesty reviewed his guards on the plains of Burgos. His majesty afterwards inspected the division of Dessolles, and made appointments to all the vacancies in that division. Important events are at hand; all the troops are in motion. Nothing can be done in war without following a well concerted plan. Among the prisoners there were some who had engraved on their buttons a fallen eagle, pierced by two arrows, with the inscription—“To

the conqueror of France.” In this rich and gasconade the countrymen of Don Quixote may be recognized.—Worse troops cannot be found, whether employed on the mountains or in the plains. Clownishly ignorant, foolishly obstinate, cruel towards the weak, mean and cowardly towards the strong. Such is the spectacle they exhibit to us. The monks and the inquisition have bewildered this nation.—Ten thousand light cavalry and dragoons, with 24 pieces of cannon, marched on the 11th, to fall upon the rear of the English division, which was said to be at Valladolid. These brave troops advanced 34 miles in two days, but our expectations were frustrated. We have entered Palencia and Valladolid, and have pushed on six miles further—still none of the English, but prospects and assurances of finding them.—In the meantime, it appears certain, that a division of their troops have been disembarked at Coruna, and that another division entered Badajoz in the beginning of this month. The day on which we shall meet them, will be a festival for the French army. May their blood dye that Continent which they have desolated by their intrigues, their monopoly, and their horrible selfishness. Would they were, instead of 20,000, 80 or 100,000 strong, then would the English mothers learn what are the miseries of war, and the English government would no longer continue to sport with the blood and the lives of the people of the Continent! The greatest falsehoods, the basest means, are practised by English machiavelism, to mislead the nation, but the great body of the people is good, Biscay, Navarre, Old Castile, and even the greatest part of Arragon, animated by an excellent spirit. The nation in general views with profound sorrow the abyss into which it has been endeavoured to plunge it, and will therefore cease the cause of so much evil.—Donda Blanca who was at the head of the insurgents, is the same who was minister under Charles the Third: he has always been the sworn enemy of France, and is thus partner of England. It is to be hoped that in his last days he will acknowledge the error of his political life. He is an old man, who, to the blindest attachment to England, joins the most unbounded religious superstition. His confidants and friends are fanatics and stupid monks.—Tranquility is restored in Burgos and its environs. The first moment of truce has been succeeded by confidence. The peasants have returned to their villages and resumed their labour.—His majesty the emperor is with his guard at Burgos—

General Milhaud is marching with his division upon Palencia. General Lasalle has taken possession of Lerma.—Thus, in an instant, have the armies of Galicia been defeated, dispersed, and partly annihilated, notwithstanding that all the corps of our army have not yet come up. Three-fourths of the cavalry, and almost one half of the infantry, remain behind.—The army of the insurgents exhibited the most singular contrast. In the pockets of the officers who were killed were found lists of companies, having some of them the name of Company of Brutus, and some of them Company of the People. There were companies of students, and others that had the names of saints. Such were the military bands that composed the insurgent army of the peasants. Anarchy and confusion—these were what England sowed in Spain. What will she reap from them? The hatred of this brave people, when they are once enlightened, and under a good government; for the rest, the extravagance of the leaders of the insurgents is every where notorious.—Among the standards that have fallen into our hands are some bearing a representation of the lion of Spain tearing in pieces the imperial eagle. And who are they that have indulged in such emblems? The worst troops that are in Europe.—The cavalry of the army of Estremadura could not even so much as face us. The instant the 10th regiment of chasseurs came in sight of them, they were put to the rout, and were no longer to be seen.—The emperor reviewed the corps of the duke of Dalmatia previous to its marching from Burgos in pursuit of the rear of the army of Galicia. His majesty has made various promotions, distributed rewards, and is extremely well satisfied with the conduct of these troops. He has expressed his satisfaction to the conquerors of Medina, Rio Seco, and Burgos, the marshal duke of Istria, and generals Merle and Mouton.

Fifth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 16.

The fate of the army of Estremadura has been decided on the plains of Burgos. The Gallician army, beaten in the battles of Durango, Guenes, and Valmaseda, has been dispersed in the battle of Espinosa. This army was composed of the ancient Spanish troops which were in Portugal and Galicia, and which retreated to Porto towards the end of June, the militia of Galicia, Asturias, and Old Castile, of 5000 Spanish prisoners, which the English had clothed and armed at their expence, and disembarked at St. Andero, of the volunteers of Galicia, &c. of

the regiments of artillery, and of the troops which the traitor Romana had carried away from the north. This army had the presumption to attempt cutting off our communication with Biscay. For ten days it was driven from post to post; at last, on the 10th of November, it arrived at Espinosa, where, in order to save its artillery, magazines, &c. it formed in order of battle, as it believed, in a situation not to be forced. At three o'clock in the afternoon, marshal Belluno arrived in front of the enemy; general Paethod was ordered to carry a small battery occupied by the troops of the traitor Romana. This position was excellent, and defended by their best troops, but general Paethod, with his corps, fell upon these troops, who had abused our confidence, and broken their oaths. In an instant they were broken, and precipitated down the precipices. The princess's regiment was destroyed. The enemy made several attacks, in all of which they were defeated. During the night both armies remained in their positions.—Whilst this was taking place, the duke of Dalmatia marched towards Reynosa, the only retreat of the enemy. At break of day the enemy were attacked, both on the right and left, by the dukes of Dantzic and Belluno, while general Maison advanced against his centre; the enemy fled, throwing away his arms and colours, and abandoning his artillery. The duke of Dantzic took at Reynosa their artillery, magazines, and baggage, and made some prisoners. Thus the enemy have been turned not only in Reynosa, but at Palencia; 60 pieces of cannon have been taken, 20,000 men killed or prisoners; two Spanish generals killed. All the succours in arms, &c. sent by the English, have fallen into our hands. Blake saved himself by taking to the Asturian mountains. Romana, with a few thousand men, is marching towards St. Andero. Our loss is trifling in these combats, not exceeding 80 killed, and 300 wounded.—We have not lost any officer of distinction.

Sixth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 18.

Of the 40,000 men who composed the army of Galicia, part has been killed and taken, and the rest is dispersed. The remains arrive daily at our posts. The general of division Debelle has taken 500 prisoners in the environs of Vasconcelles.—Col. Taschen, who commands the 1st regiment of chasseurs, attacked the escort of the Spanish Gen. Acevedo; the troops who composed the escort having made some resistance, they were all put to the sword.—General

Bonnett, with his division, fell in with the head of a column of fugitives, consisting of 2,000 men; they were partly taken and partly destroyed.—The marshal duke of Istria, who commands the cavalry of the army, entered Aranda on the 10th at noon: our advanced parties of horse go on the left as far as Soria and Madrid, and on the right to Leon and Zamora.—The enemy evacuated Aranda with the utmost precipitation, leaving behind them four pieces of cannon. A considerable magazine of biscuit, 40,000 quintals of grain, and a large quantity of clothing, were found in that town.—At Reynosa numerous English effects were found, and a considerable quantity of provisions of every description.—The inhabitants of Montana, and of the whole plain of Castile, which extends to Portugal, and of the province of Leon, detest and curse the authors of this war, and earnestly demand peace and repose: 20,000 bales of wool, worth from 15 to 20 millions, which were seized in Burgos, have been sent to Bayonne. • •

Seventh Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 20.

By the 10th the van of the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia entered St. Andero, and found there a large quantity of flour, ammunition, and British goods.—The bishop of St. Andero, animated rather with the spirit of the devil than that of the gospel, is always marching with a cutlass by his side; he has taken shelter on board the English frigates. The cavalry of Gen Lasalle has pushed its advanced posts as far as Sorne Sierra. The regiments of Zamora, and of the Princessa, which formed part of Romana's division, are almost entirely annihilated. Some Spanish officers, of the regiments of Zamora and Princessa, who were in the north, and who escaped from Zamora, were made prisoners. "You took an oath of allegiance to the king," said some one to them. They acknowledged they did. "You have violated your oath." "We only acted in obedience to our general." "You formed a part of the French army, and you recompensed the kindest treatment by the most infamous treachery." They again replied: "That they were under the orders of their General, and that they had only obeyed him." "You might have been disarmed," it was observed, "and perhaps that measure ought to have been adopted. But reliance was placed on your oaths. It is more to the glory of the emperor to have to fight you, than to have been induced to a step which might have been censured for too much mistrust. You

are no longer protected by the laws of nations, which you have violated. You ought to be put to the sword. The emperor can descend to pardon you a second time." For the rest, the regiments of Zamora and Princessa have suffered most severely. Very few of them were left with their colours.

Eighth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 22.

The Duke of Dalmatia is following his successes with the utmost activity. A convoy of artillery, ammunition, and English muskets was taken in the port of Cunillar, the very moment the ships were on the point of getting under weigh.—Gen. Surrat, at the head of his brigade, continues vigorously to pursue the enemy. He has passed Montuna, and entered Asturia. The light companies of the 36th regiment have seized, in the port of Santillana, an English convoy, laden with sugar, coffee, cotton, and other colonial commodities. The number of English vessels, richly laden, which have been taken on this coast, amounts, already, to twenty-five. The 7th corps of the army of Spain, commanded by Gen. Gouvion St. Cyr, has also begun preparations. On the 6th of November, the place of Rosas was invested by Generals Reille and Peno, and the heights of St. Pedro were carried by the Italians. A large number of Miquelets and English occupied the port of Silva; they were attacked by General Fontana, at the head of three battalions of light infantry, and dashed into the sea, with the loss of ten 24 pounders, four of which were English, which they had not time to embark. On the 8th, the garrison of Rosas made a sortie in three columns, protected by the guns of the English ships. General Marechelli killed 600 of them, and repulsed the rest. It is supposed, that the headquarters will be removed from Burgos in the course of the night.

Ninth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Aranda, Nov. 25.

The military system seems to have been as follows:—On the left was the army of Galicia, one moiety of which was composed of troops of the line, and of all the resources of Galicia, Asturia, and Leon. In the centre was the army of Estremadura, which the English corps had promised to support, and which was composed of all the resources of Estremadura, and the neighbouring provinces.—The army of Andalusia, Valencia, New Castile, and Arragon, stated to amount to 80,000 men, occupied, on the 20th November, Calahoria, Tudela, and the borders of Arragon. This army supported the right of the enemy, and was composed

of the troops who formed the camp of St. Reth, and of the whole force of Andalusia, Valencia, Carthagers, and Madrid. It is against this army the French troops are now manœuvring: the rest having been dispersed and destroyed in the battles of Espinosa and Burgos.—The head-quarters were removed on the 22d from Burgos to Lerma, and on the 23d from Lerma to Aranda.—The Duke of Elchingen marched on the 22d to Soria; the town was disarmed, and a committee of well-disposed persons appointed for the administration of the province. The duke is now in Medina Celi, and his light troops scour the road from Saragossa to Madrid.—On the 22d the Dukes of Montebello and Cornegiano formed a junction near the bridge of Lodosa.—On the 24th the Duke of Belluno removed his head-quarters to Vente Gornez. Almost all the roads of communication between Madrid and the northern provinces are intercepted by our troops, whose light parties have picked up a great number of couriers and mails.—The utmost confusion seems to prevail in Madrid, and the whole nation anxiously desires the restoration of that tranquillity and peace, of which Spain has been deprived by the puerile arrogance and criminal cunning of a few intriguers.—It appears difficult for any army which forms the right of the enemy, and is now on the banks of the Ebro, to fall back on Madrid, and the south of Spain.—The events which are now preparing will probably decide the fate of this other moiety of the Spanish army.—For these three days we have had damp and hazy weather. This season is more hurtful to the natives of the country than to men accustomed to the climate of the north.—Gen. Gousson St. Cyr continues vigorously to push on the siege of Rosas.

Tenth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Aranda de Duero, Nov. 26.

It appears that the Spanish forces amount to 180,000 effective men.—80,000 effective men, making 60,000 men under arms, who composed the armies of Galicia and Estremadura, and were commanded by Blake, La Romana, and Galuzzo, have been dispersed and put hors de combat.—The army of Andalusia, Valencia, New Castile, and Arragon, commanded by Castaños, Penas, and Palafox, and which likewise appeared to amount to 80,000 men, that is, to 60,000 under arms, will, in a few days, meet its fate. The marshal duke of Montebello has received orders to attack it, in front, with

30,000 men, while the dukes of Elchingen and Belluno are already posted on its rear.—The remaining 60,000 effective men may amount to 40,000 under arms, 30,000 of whom are in Catalonia, and 10,000 at Madrid, at Valencia, and in other garrison towns, or in motion.—Before he proceeded a step beyond the Duero, the emperor resolved to annihilate the armies of the centre and left, and to inflict a similar fate on that of general Castanos on the right.—This plan once executed, the march to Madrid will be but a promenade. This grand design must, before the present moment, have been accomplished. With respect to the corps of Catalonia, which is composed, in a great measure, of the troops of Valencia, Murcia, and Granada, these provinces being threatened, will withdraw their troops, that is, if the state of the communications will permit. At any rate, the 7th corps, after the conclusion of the siege of Rosas, will give a good account of them.—At Barcelona, general Duhesne, with 15,000 men, and supplies for six months, answers for that important place.—We have said nothing of the English forces. It seems that one division is in Galicia, and that another made its appearance at Badajoz, about the end of last month. If the English have any cavalry, we must have perceived it; for our light troops have almost reached the frontiers of Portugal. If they have infantry, they probably have no intention to employ it in behalf of their allies; for it is now thirty days since the campaign was opened; three large armies have been destroyed; an immense quantity of artillery is taken; the provinces of Castile, La Montano, Arragon, Soria, &c. are conquered; in a word, the fate of Spain and Portugal is decided, and nothing is heard of any movement of the English troops.—At the same time, one-half of the French army is not yet arrived. Part of the 4th corps of the army, the whole of the 5th and 8th corps, six regiments of light cavalry, many companies of artillery and sappers, and a great number of men belonging to the regiments which are in Spain, have not yet passed the Bidassoa.—In truth, and without doing injustice to the bravery of our soldiers, it may be asserted that there cannot be worse troops than the Spanish. Like the Arabs, they can lurk behind houses, but they have no discipline, no knowledge of manœuvres, and it is impossible for them to make any resistance in a field of battle.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV. No. 26.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

The Honourable C. Stewart is serving as a Brigadier, or a Major, General, in Spain or Portugal, with, of course, the pay and allowances of that rank. He is a member of the House of Commons. He is also, according to a Report, printed by order of that House, an Under Secretary of State in the office of the war department, which office is kept in Downing Street, and, in which latter capacity, he receives two thousand pounds a year. He is a brother of Lord Castlereagh.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

COURT OF INQUIRY.—Since the arrival, and appearance, of Sir Harry Burrard, the objects of Inquiry have taken a new shape. This general is accused of having presented Sir Arthur Wellesley from pursuing his victory on the 21st of August; that is to say, at the close of those proceedings, which constituted what has been called the *Victory of Vimiera*. It clearly appears, that Sir Harry Burrard was opposed to the advance of our troops, which advance led to the battle of that day; and, after the battle was put an end to by the retreat of the French, he, having then landed, and being upon the spot, was likewise opposed to a pursuit of the enemy.—It is impossible for the public to be able to determine, whether this decision was right or wrong, unless they could come at an authentic statement of the force of the French. Sir Arthur Wellesley now says again, that the whole of the effective force of the French was that day engaged. If so, and, if the roads and distances were as they are described in the published evidence; then it certainly does appear, that the enemy might, by a pursuit of them, have been completely defeated; and, of course, that Sir Harry Burrard was the sole cause of preventing that defeat. We must take it for granted, that the roads and distances have been accurately described; but, as to the force of the enemy, if that force did really consist of 27 or even of 25 thousand men, as the Convention-makers would fain have us believe; then the decision of Sir Harry Burrard was certainly wise; for, in that case, is it at all probable, that our army would not have been finally defeated, if not captured in great part or in whole, especially as it is acknowledged, on all hands, that the French were greatly superior to us in cavalry, and that we could not get on our artillery? Besides, it now clearly appears, that, though there was some confusion in the French army, that confusion was by no means general. The retreating corps formed in good order, not only in sight of our army, but within the reach of our artillery. Now, if the French

army, which we fought with 17 thousand men, consisted of 14 thousand, and if the French had, as they had according to the Convention-makers' account, 13 thousand more, besides the Russians, in their rear, would it not have been madness to have attempted a pursuit of the 14 thousand, who were retreating upon their reserves and their forts? The enemy was not routed; he was in very little confusion; we took some prisoners, but no standards that I have yet heard of; and, from the account given before the Court of Inquiry, it does not seem that much of a victory was, upon the whole, obtained, though there evidently was a good deal of bravery displayed, on the part of our troops.—Thus, as to the conduct of Sir Harry Burrard, it appears to me, that the whole of the case turns upon the question, of what was the real strength of the French army, or the strength of which our people had information? Upon this question will also depend, whether Sir Arthur Wellesley was right, or wrong, in advancing upon the 21st of August; for, if he was aware, that the French had an army of 27 or 25 thousand men, it was evidently faulty, and even criminal in him, not to wait for the arrival of Sir John Moore's division, which division was, at that time, actually landed in Portugal, and which could have been brought to the scene of action in the course of a few days. Nay, upon the supposition, that the 14 thousand in "Kendal Green" were the whole of the French army, and that the 13,000 regues "in Buckram" have only been brought in for the purpose of justifying the Convention; even, upon this supposition, it does not appear to me, that Sir Harry Burrard was to blame for wishing to bring up the division of Sir John Moore previous to an advance against "the Duke of Abrantes in person;" because, as the French could, at any time, retreat towards their forts; as there was no compelling them to keep the field against 17 any more than against 25 thousand of our troops, it does not seem to me, that any thing could have been lost by the delay of a few days, while it is quite clear, that much might have

been gained, because no one can fail to perceive, that a retreat before 25 thousand men must have been more difficult, than a retreat before 17 thousand. But, though such a determination, on the part of Sir Harry Burrard, might have been wise *previous* to the battle of the 21st, of August, it does not follow, that, *supposing the French force to have been thus inferior to ours*, his decision was wise *after* that battle; because then all the advantages to be hoped for from greatly superior numbers were given up.—So much for the reasoning upon supposition. But, I think, there can be no doubt in the public mind, that, at the utmost, the French force did not exceed 14 or 15 thousand men; and that of this fact our officers were well assured. How does this tell, then, for the Convention? What becomes of all the paltry excuses for suffering the French to go off with their plunder, and with all the honours of war, and to be carried home, and set down (ready to march against the Spaniards) at our expense?—The cause of this disgraceful event appears to me to be the design of Wellesley to have to himself all the honour that was to be achieved, and the desire of Sir Harry Burrard to thwart him in that design. Wellesley hastened to the combat before Sir Harry landed, and against Sir Harry's expressed opinion, who wanted the former to wait for the arrival of Sir John Moore. On the 22d, Wellesley was no longer commander-in-chief. Any honour gained by capturing the French must have been claimed and enjoyed by another; Wellesley's name would have appeared neither at the head nor the tail of the official papers relating to the event; and, which was of still more importance, in this view of the matter, his "Victory of Vímiera" would have sunk into comparative insignificance. If not to a cause of this sort; to a jealousy somewhere or other; to what can we ascribe a Convention, such as that of Cintra, made with an enemy, whose whole force, commanded by "the Duke of Abrantes in person," had been obliged to retreat, at least, before one half of the army which we had ready to act on the day when that Convention was signed? "Oh," say they, "but, after the 21st the opportunity was lost." What opportunity? What opportunity, my good Nabobites? Why, the opportunity of "annihilating the whole of the French army." This is what you said at first; but, you had not then thought of the 13 thousand men in Buckram. At the utmost, it was only the army in Kendal Green that

could have been annihilated by continuing the pursuit of the 21st of August. Besides, does it not appear from the evidence, that, at most, supposing the pursuit to have been attended with all the success, which its most strenuous advocates contend for, there was only a *part* of the French army, amounting to about 4 or 5 thousand men, that there was the smallest chance of intercepting on their retreat towards their "strong holds?" What becomes, then, of the pretence, that, *after* the 21st of August, "the opportunity was lost?" The object of this pretence is evident enough. Sir Hew, it is clear, is no more than a participator with Sir Arthur, whom he was to consult, whom he did consult, and with whose concurrence he acted. It is, therefore, necessary to make it out, that the fault lay elsewhere; and the only way that can be found out of doing this, and of combining all the purposes together, is to throw the blame upon him who prevented a pursuit on the 21st; but, unfortunately for this scheme, it must be shown, by those who have invented it, that the army in the forts was the same, or very nearly the same army, that retreated before our troops the day before; and this does not suit *any* of the persons concerned in making the Convention; of course, it does not suit Sir Arthur Wellesley, who is in this dilemma: either the French had 27 or 25 thousand men, or they had 14 or 15 thousand. If the former, Sir Harry Burrard was right in wishing to wait for Sir John Moore, and also in preventing a continuation of the pursuit on the 21st of August: if the latter, then the Convention, in making which Sir Arthur Wellesley had his full share, is deprived of one of the principal facts, which have been stated in its justification. —This clutter about the "fatal effects" of preventing the gallant Sir Arthur "from pushing forward on the 21st" is a *ruse de guerre*, against which the people should be upon their guard. Granted that he would have pushed on; granted that he would have succeeded; granted that he would have cut off and captured the 4 or 5 thousand men, whom he and his friends say he could have captured. What then? What would that have done towards driving out of the forts, the 27 or 25 thousand men, which they are now said to have contained? Evidently nothing. Junot would have been able to march out, the very next day, with a force greatly superior to ours, and consisting chiefly of fresh troops. And, if we take away this force of Buckram men, away goes Sir Arthur's chief argu-

ment in favour of the Convention. It is, therefore, the *Convention* to which our attention is still to be directed. We ought not to suffer our minds to be led astray by any of these pretences of "a *lost opportunity*." Let it, for argument sake, be granted, that Sir Harry Burrard acted unwisely; let it be granted, that, if he had acted upon the suggestion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 5 thousand Frenchmen would have been captured on the 21st; still, according to the latter's own first account, there would have been but a force, one half, at most, as great as ours to subdue. The whole question is, after all, a mere question of numbers. If the French had, as we were first told, only the 14 thousand men, who were engaged in the battle of the 21st, then nothing in the world can justify the Convention of Cintra; and, if they had 27, or even 25 thousand men, previous to that battle, the getting them out of Portugal, except upon the condition of retaining their plunder and securing indemnity to their partisans, was a very meritorious and honourable service, and there is no blame attaches to any of the generals; though one cannot very well excuse Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose greediness for fame would have led him to continue his pursuit of the 21st, while "the Duke d'Abrantes" could have come out upon him with 13 thousand fresh troops.—As to the settling of this important question, no *proof* has been produced, or attempted to be produced, that the French had 27 or 25 thousand soldiers that could possibly have been brought into the field; and, as I have before asked, is it probable; nay, is it *possible*, that Junot, who knew that our army was daily receiving large reinforcements, would have met our 17 thousand men, with only 14 thousand, if he had had 27 or 25 thousand men capable of being brought into the field? There is not, I think, one man in the whole world, who is impudent enough to say, that he believes the affirmative of this proposition. It cannot be believed. Of course, the public must still see, as the world will always see, that about 12 or 13 thousand Frenchmen, allowing for the losses of the battle of the 21st of August, obtained from, or rather dictated to, 30 thousand Englishmen the terms of the Convention of Cintra. Whitewash, plaister, disguise the matter howsoever we may; confuse, confound, bewilder, as long as we please; to this plain nut-shell statement, the world, who has no interest in becoming out dupes, will still return; and this the enemy does, and will continue to, throw in our teeth. "Thirteen thousand Frenchmen

" dictated to thirty thousand Englishmen, " the terms of the Convention of Cintra, " which terms caused a firing of cannon, " and an illumination in London; under the " direction of those who administered the " government."

SPAIN.—If the French bulletins and accounts be true, Buonaparte was at Madrid on the 4th instant, and, of course, his brother has, before now, been crowned in that city. Madrid is not *Spain*; and, upon the supposition, that a *complete change of the government* be intended by those who are at the head of affairs in Spain, the *country*, I hope, will let the invading despot see, that his conquest is hardly yet begun. He will issue proclamations, as the Duke of Brunswick did; but, with men resolved to live free, or die, hostile proclamations are nothing. A correspondent, whose letter I insert below, complains of my "*lukewarmness*" as to the reverses in Spain, and says he expected from me something more "*patriotic*." Now, I have no recollection of what I have said, or thought, upon this subject; if I have, upon any occasion, shown myself wanting in warmth towards the cause of the Spanish people, whom I regarded as engaged in a most perilous conflict against a despot, to whom their former despot had transferred them. For their *own* sakes I heartily wished them success, and also, for the sake of *other nations*, who, in more than one way, might be induced to *follow their example*, as far as that example might be found to apply to their several situations. The resistance of the Spaniards to the declared will of their late masters, and to the threats and violence of their new ones, excited in my mind more pleasure, as far as I know, than I had ever felt at any political event. But, what had this to do with a war for that very Ferdinand, by whom they had been abandoned, and by whom they had been, in terms the most earnest, exhorted to submit to the sovereign sway of Joseph Napoleon?—My correspondent, in complaining, that I am "continually looking " at the abuses of the old government," asks me, if I am "not *assured* that those abuses " would be corrected?" I answer, that, so far from being *assured* of this, I see no reason to *believe* the fact, in the case of a successful war in behalf of the old government; and, if I had had no doubts upon the subject before, the proclamation of the Central Junta, for restraining what is there called "the licentiousness of the press," would have excited such doubts; because, for reasons which I have, of late, amply stated, I can see no *good* motive for restrain-

ing the press, nor, indeed, any motive at all, other than that of preventing the promulgation of *truth*; and, of that person, or that government, that desires to prevent such promulgation, I want very little else to enable me to judge of the character.—“But,” says my correspondent, “if the ‘abuses were not to be corrected, is this a ‘time to chill the blood of *patriotism*?’” What is *patriotism*, Sir? Is it *love of country*? If so, let me ask you, whether by restoring the old government of Spain, with all its abuses, good would be done to either Spain or England? I think not; and, really, you must excuse me, if, in my turn, I express my “surprise and indignation” to hear an Englishman say that, from which I may fairly infer, that he would gladly see the blood of his countrymen flow, for the preservation, or restoration, of the *Inquisition*.—I am as well aware as my correspondent can be, of the “tremendous power” of Buonaparte; but I have never seen, and I do not now see, the means of checking the progress of that power, in the *old system* of Spain, or of any other nation. I wished to see a new system brought to bear against him in Spain. That wish has not yet been gratified; and I am not to blame if I cannot see any good likely to arise from a perseverance in the old system. When the people of Spain first took up arms, they talked of “the ‘abuses and corruptions of the late infamous government;’” and they uttered unreserved imprecations on the “*traitors at Bayonne*.” They then drove the French before them. They have now changed their language; and they do not now, that we hear, frequently drive the French before them. I do not say, however, that the one has proceeded solely from the other; for, I always expected the Spaniards to be beaten *at first*; but, if I had thus far seen the Spaniards successful, I should still have been fully persuaded, that, unless they made a complete revolution, they would have been finally subdued.—The Spanish cause was good till it was taken up by those, who never did, and never will, approve of any thing which is not bad at bottom. Who, but such people as those, to whom I allude, would, when the Spaniards discovered such an excellent disposition, have set to systematically at work, to harness them in the cause of royalty? Who, when they saw the Spanish kings go off without any resistance on their own part, or on the part of the people, would, by toasts or otherwise, have given the people to understand, that they would do well to fight for a king, and

for a king, too, who was in the hands, completely in the power, of the despot, whose armies were about to be sent against them? Who, but such people, would not have considered, that there were, and that there *must* be, a numerous party in Spain opposed to Ferdinand, and that the war, if carried on for him, must be carried on by a party or faction? It is the common trick of partisans, to regard and describe their own party as the whole community; but who, except the people I am now speaking of, would not have known, that it was next to impossible, if not quite impossible, that the whole of the Spanish people should approve of the act by which Ferdinand had supplanted his father, though the latter was a half-ideot, and though his favourites were notoriously the most corrupt and rascally men in the nation? What was there in the conduct or character of this Ferdinand, that could be expected to produce such a singular feeling in his favour? We have often spoken, of his conduct *since* the affair of Aranjuez; and, we have, since the war has been carried on for him, made, through Mr. Pedro Cevallos, the discovery, that this famous king had actually given his consent to marry “a *Princess of France*,” that is to say, one of the female relations of Buonaparte, or of his wife. And, this is the king, for whom we are making war. This is the “beloved Ferdinand VII.” This is the object, for which the whole people of Spain, eleven or twelve millions of people, are to risk their property and their lives. Time was when whole nations suffered themselves to be half butchered in such a cause; but, that time is passed, and who can regret it? Who but the basest of mankind can possibly regret it?—A correspondent has lately reminded me, that, at the outset of the insurrection in Spain, I expressed my hope, that the people would be left to choose a government for themselves; and, that, *as they have chosen Ferdinand VII.*, I should be content. Prove to me that they have. The *Central Junta* have, I know, and lament; but, without inquiring into *their* motives, I know that we have no proof, that the *people* have made any such choice. I always bear in mind the *toast* at the Turtle Feast. That toast had a great deal of meaning. It was said at the time, and now we see the verification of the saying.

PORTUGAL is, too, in an “unsatisfactory state,” if we are to believe that which is given as intelligence coming from that unfortunate kingdom. Divided into parties and factions, there can be no such thing as

union of operation in any enterprize, whether of offence, or of defence. If we had carried freedom to the shores of Portugal, why should there not have been, by this time, fifty thousand Portuguese, well armed and equipped, and tolerably disciplined, ready to march against the French in Spain? Instead of which an English army is necessary to keep "the refractory Portuguese in order." The Nabobs' Gazette tells us, that it is only the "*lower classes* who are discontented." Very true. Only those who have *no share of the good things*. Very true, I dare say. I'll engage that the Alcades and the Bishops, who eat the beef, and the Capuchins who sup the broth, are, as they always have been, for "social order and regular government;" and, if the fighting part was performed by them, things might go pretty smoothly on; but, alas! this part falls upon those who have none of the good things; and, in times like the present, they are very apt to aspire to a share of them; they are very apt to think it reasonable, that a share of the eatables and drinkables should, at last, come to their mouths. Yes, after all, it is not witchcraft, but downright hunger and thirst and nakedness, that work for Buonaparte. They are saying, it appears, plenty of *masses* in Portugal, and the Courier is very angry with them for seeming disposed there to test their exertions. But, the Courier forgets, sure, that it is much easier to say *mass* than to fight or to pay taxes; and, I think, the editor of that paper would not venture to bet very great odds, that the same persons, who now say *masses* for the expulsion of the French, will not, a few months hence, say *masses* upon their return. And, are these the materials wherewith to work in resisting Buonaparte? Is it to be hoped; is it within the scope of possibility, that he should not, whenever he chooses, become the master of such a people? We may fret at their conduct; the Courier may abuse them; but, that will not dispose them to risk their lives in battle. For exposing themselves to such danger they must have *some motive*, and some powerful motive too; and, unless that motive be given them, the Courier may keep its breath for a more useful purpose than that of abusing them and their *masses*.—It is very true, that the possession of Spain and Portugal will make Napoleon more formidable to us; much more formidable: but, as was, sometime ago said with regard to Austria, the Spaniards and Portuguese may be foolish enough not to perceive any great harm in that. In short, we may rest assured, that the mass of the Portuguese will like those

best, who afford them the best chance of enjoying the good things of this world, without any regard to the circumstances of names or of nation.

THE DECLARATION, dated the 4th instant, and just published, respecting the overtures of France and Russia, from *EX-FURTHER*, is, in my opinion, the most insignificant state-paper, that I have seen, for some time.—It was certainly right to make known to the world, that no negotiations were going on. The reasons given for this are quite sufficient, and very well and concisely stated; but, it is impossible, I think, for any man of a just mind, to approve of the partiality, which is shown towards the Emperor of Russia, who in abetting Buonaparte, with respect to Spain, is, of the two, most worthy of censure. Nor do I, for my part, approve of the charge against Napoleon of having "*deposed and imprisoned friendly sovereigns*." The kings of Spain went to Bayonne *without any force*; without *compulsion* of any sort; and, there they *abdicated* their rights to the Spanish throne. They might be induced to do so from personal fear, and their journey to Bayonne might be attributable to the same cause; but, I can see no use in calling it a *deposing* of them, when the fact certainly is involved in some doubt, or, at least, admits of dispute.—The reply "*of France*" to the king's proposition to consult his allies and also "the government of Spain, acting in the name of His Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII;" this reply is deeply resented. It is said to have "*displayed, with less than an ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of the government of France*;" and, in substance, though not altogether in manner, the reply of the Emperor of Russia is described as being equally offensive. Two of the ministerial newspapers have informed us, that, in his reply, Napoleon observed, "*that it would not be more unreasonable on his part to propose admitting THE CATHOLICS OF IRELAND, as a party to any negotiation, than that we should propose admitting the Spanish Insurgents*." If this be true, as the Morning Post and the Courier give us, there is, indeed, no longer any ground to wonder at the asperity of the Declaration; for, of any thing fuller of gravel than this observation it would be difficult to form an idea. One almost fancies one hears it grate under the teeth of "*No Popery*." It cuts, not like razors and knives, but like bits of glass and flint stones; it pricks, not like pins and

needles, but like splinters and fish-hooks; it draws no blood, but leaves an aching festering wound; and a wound, too, which is, somehow or other, shy of showing itself to the doctor. Mr. Canning seems to have been put into so much agony by this observation as not to know very well what he was about; for, the latter part of the Declaration is, whether as to manner or matter, any thing, I think, but what it ought to be. There is a pitiful hankering still after the Emperor of Russia; there are blunt attempts at severity; there is a soundness of assertion that nothing short of *proved* facts could have justified; and, as to the phraseology, it may, perhaps, be thought a compliment to it, to say, that it is equally "unparalleled" with the usurpation of the throne of Spain by the Buonapartes.—— When parliament meets, we shall, I suppose, have all these negotiation papers before us; and, my opinion is, that it was to soften the effect of Buonaparte's sarcastic observation, about the Catholics of Ireland, that the newspapers were enabled to let it leak out beforehand. There is, to be sure, a gross fallacy in the reasoning of that observation; but, gross as it is, it is a fallacy, which many will not perceive, and which will be affected not to be perceived by many more. And, whose fault is it, that we are exposed to the probable, or, at least, possible, effect of such a dangerous fallacy? That question may be useless; but, certainly it is not useless to ask, whether all possible speed ought not now to be used, in order to remove the ground, whereon it rests? Frequently have Napoleon's newspapers sympathised with the Irish Catholics; but, this is the first time that he has openly and officially given us to understand, that they are an object of his imperial attention and solicitude. There is no doubt, however, that they long have been such, and that, if he succeed in his present enterprise; if he get safe possession of Spain and Portugal, the Irish Catholics will be the next, or nearly the next people, to whom he will directly, and with very little reserve, address himself. This must be evident to every man of common sense; and, it being evident, the question is, whether our government will, *while there is yet time*, adopt the means, and the only possible means, of preventing him from obtaining a fair chance of final success; or whether, we are doomed to keep blundering on to the end of the chapter, under the influence of despicable bigotry and more despicable intrigue. That Buonaparte will, as long as he has life, never rest until he has tried all the means in his power of subjugat-

ing this kingdom no one can doubt. The motives which existed at the rupture of the peace of Amiens, still exist in all their former force; they have received strength from time, and especially from recent events. Our fleet is, indeed, a mighty bulwark; but, as has been a thousand times observed, there are modes of attack against which a fleet cannot be brought to bear. Experience has proved, that our fleet cannot, at all times, prevent the landing of French troops in Ireland. Now is, therefore, the time to erect, in that country, an impenetrable barrier against the enemy. The means are completely in our hands. They will cost us nothing. Only a single act of parliament does the business. How many millions. What freights of treasure, what streams of blood, might be spared, by an act of parliament passed in time!

DUKE OF YORK'S INCOME.——In my last statement, upon this subject, there was, I am informed, an important omission. At page 901 of this volume, I stated the several sources of the Duke's income, taking his military income at the *acknowledged* amount, as published in the *Nabobs' Gazette*, which statement shewed that, exclusive of the immense grant of *crown*, or rather *national*, lands in Surrey, the total of that income, paid out of the public purse, was £39,858. But, I now find, if my information be correct, as I believe it is, that, to this enormous sum must be added £7,000 a year pension, upon the IRISH establishment! The place and pension Report of the Finance Committee, which, as I observed before, is, in bulk, equal to the Old and New Testament, and contains about 300 folio pages, does not, however, contain the places and pensions upon the Irish establishment, except in part, but contents itself with referring to another Report, *which was laid before parliament some years ago*, and which, of course, very few of the present members ever saw, or ever will see as long as they live. I will endeavour to find out this Report, and when I have so done, I will state the fact, relating to this additional pension. In the meanwhile, I beg the reader to look again at the whole of the article beginning at page 897 of this volume.

Botley, Dec. 22, 1808.

SPAIN.

SIR,—Accustomed to approve and admire your writings on most subjects, I cannot but read with a mixture of surprize and indignation your very lukewarm remarks on the late reverses in Spain. It seems with you a matter of doubt whether we ought to

regard the success of the French as a circumstance of regret or not. From you, Sir, a more patriotic spirit was expected. You are continually looking to the abuses in the old government of Spain. Are you not assured these would be reformed? And if that were not to be the case, is this a time to chill the blood of patriotism and raise a doubt to which side we should lend our hearts and aid? Look at the tremendous power of Buonaparte. Is there an object that can come in comparison of importance with the diminishing of that power? Can any one estimate the extent of his ability to injure us as a commercial nation? Independent of our sympathy with the brave resisters of his tyranny, our own situation is become most alarming. Instead of reflections upon an old government, it was expected that you would have shewn that zeal and energy (which you have displayed on more trivial occasions) to excite and animate the spirit of this country to every practicable means of assistance to the patriots. Convinced that you cannot exert it at a fitter period, I trust I shall yet not be disappointed.—Your constant reader, A. Z.—*Coven-*
try, December 13th, 1808.

BREWRIES.

SIR,—On the perusal of controversial writings, we may observe that a general pertinacity attaches to most of them. We defend a position merely because we have advanced it; and are ingenious in framing arguments, by which our favourite hypothesis may be supported. It was under a full persuasion that there is in the human mind a tendency to this sort of obstinacy, that I ventured my remarks on the first paper of the Hampshire Brewer. And as we are all desirous of taking credit to ourselves, for our full share of candour and ingenuousness, I trust I may be intitled to a presumptive credit for my own openness to the full force of my respondents' arguments, and a readiness to acknowledge my conviction, should they be able to effect it. There can be no reason, sufficient to induce an honest man, to persist in error after he is convinced of it; neither can there be any, for renouncing an opinion without its being fully confuted. Had the reply of the Hampshire Brewer been such as to satisfy my mind, it should have been followed by an ample acknowledgement; but I should deem it worse than folly, to admit the force of arguments, of the illegitimacy of which I am firmly persuaded. That gentleman has shrouded himself under the protection of names, the greatness of which no one will

dispute. To some of them, particularly to Dr. Thompson, I own myself under considerable obligations, for the satisfaction and pleasure I have received from his writings. And when, from a comparison of dates, I learn that the writer himself was able to confute a "now long-exploded" doctrine, several years before I was born, I almost feel how unlucky a wight I am to venture into the field against so much age, so many great names, such long experience, and such unquestionable abilities. The Hampshire Brewer appears to me to mistake the question at issue between us, as all the experiments he produces either prove what I readily admit, or what with me prove nothing to the purpose. When he speaks of me as reviving the long exploded opinion, as to the inadequacy of a stical test of a malt extract, I can assure him that he is entirely mistaken; and I cannot conceive from what part of my paper he has drawn such a conclusion. Competent experience will prove the accuracy of the instrument for the general purposes of the brewery, but it is no reflection on any human invention, that it is not capable of an application to every purpose. A malt and a molasses extract are very different; and as the original qualities of which they are composed, and which they possess in common, are combined in different proportions, they must require a different mode of valuation as any one quality prevails in the combination. Where mucilage prevails, there will be an increase of spissitude without an increase of value; and there may be a liquor of greater tenacity which possesses more saccharine virtue, and is capable of becoming an article of superiour flavour and vinosity. I am not so fortunate as this gentleman in having a number of learned authorities to quote; but, however, I have one, and that in itself a host;—it is the Hampshire Brewer himself. When he admits that a third part of a wort of 30lbs. per barrel, is superior to another of 10lbs. per barrel, merely because of the greater prevalence of mucilage in the latter, does he not by this concession establish that opinion which he is labouring to overthrow, and prove that the instrument, indicating in both instances an equal gravity, is insufficient to shew their relative value?—Mr. Martin's experiments nearly coincide with my own, as to the final gravity which will appear by the instrument in a separate solution of either malt or sugar; but, I think, neither of them sufficient to form the basis of a decision. From many experiments which a private friend of mine has made on the subject, and which have been

frequently repeated under my own eye, with the most critical exactness, I draw a conclusion very different from that gentleman's. In two gyles, the one brewed from malt only, and the other having in it a solution of sugar, in the proportion of one-tenth part of the total aggregate of fermentable matter under operation;—the malt in both instances being from the same flooring, the fermentation similar, and the final gravity equal, per the instrument; and yet the latter product has been found uniformly superior to the other as an agreeable and vinous beverage: it possessed a greater fulness on the palate, and was a liquor to which the best judges would give the preference. That the superiority of the one, was owing to the sugar that was used, there can be no doubt; nor can there be any, that the instrument was incapable of shewing that superiority. It was with this fact in view, that I wrote my former letter; but I do not know that it will have the same weight with the Hampshire brewer, that it has with me. As to the result of distillation, however conclusive he may deem it, I must beg leave to differ from him. The question is not as to the production of the greatest quantity of ardent spirit, but as to the value of either sugar or molasses used in a limited proportion in the brewing of *malt liquor*. The production of a wash suitable to the distiller's purpose, will certainly require a mode of management different from that which will be pursued by an intelligent brewer. Will not two worts of equal gravity, yield a different quantity of proof spirit, as they are fermented either in the best way for beer, or as they are usually fermented for wash? Next to *potency*, two of the most desirable qualities in malt liquor are, *early transparency and fulness*; but were the distiller's method of fermentation to be followed in the brewery, I think we should be hardly able to obtain either. While it must be acknowledged, that the particular method which is most proper for obtaining them, would be inimical to the production of spirit by the still. As the two purposes then, require two different methods of treatment, what may be an infallible test of value in one case, may not be so in the other. And as the quantity of ardent spirit will depend upon the fermentation of the wash, as well as upon its previous gravity, its product cannot be a certain criterion of the value of its original materials, any further than a similar treatment obtains, but will be unavailing when treated in a different manner and for a different purpose. As to the testimony of Drs. Thompson, Hope and Coventry, which

the gentleman has introduced, I consider it as quite irrelevant, as it has no bearing on the question immediately at issue. Their manner of estimating the differences between English and Scotch barleys and malts was certainly judicious. And what does that prove? Why nothing, but what I am as well convinced of as the Hampshire brewer himself. But though I am compelled thus to differ from a gentleman of such abilities, experience and information, yet it will be impossible for such difference to lessen that respectful sentiment I felt towards him on the perusal of his first valuable paper. I now close the correspondence on the subject by thanking him for the frankness with which he has communicated his sentiments, and by claiming for myself a right to dissent from the greatest authorities when I have reason to doubt whether their arguments are founded on legitimate reasons. To you, Mr. Cobbett, I am indebted for your impartiality, and for the space you have allowed for the discussion, and am obliged by the readiness you have shewn in giving insertion to the correspondence—I remain, Sir, &c.—*Candidus. Malton, 19th December, 1808.*

BREWERIES.

SIR;—It is rather unfair to make your valuable Register a medium of discussion on any particular art or manufacture, but as you have already admitted the subject, I am induced to trouble you for a small space in a paper of such general instruction, for a few observations on the statement of the gentlemen who sign themselves "a Hampshire Brewer" and "Candidus" in your Registers of the 12th and 26th of Nov.; and 10th of Dec.—The difference in the opinions of these gentlemen, on a subject which the former has so laudably brought before the public, seems to arise solely from Candidus' supposing that nothing but a saccharum is capable of the vinous fermentation, and that therefore the instrument used in the brewery cannot be an accurate "measure of sweets;" so far he is right, for although it cannot possibly express the quantity of sweets contained in any extracts, it ascertains exactly their *relative* value, or amount of *fermentable matter*, under which term is comprehended saccharum, mucilage, and perhaps a little oil; in short, whatever is extractable from corn or grain, or soluble from other substances, where a small portion of saccharum is present—from all which, experiment proves, that equal specific gravities will give equal quantities of ardent spirit, thereby exploding the commonly

received opinion that sweets *alone* are capable of producing alcohol.—Candidus however had great reasons for his inquiries on the subject, which I presume will be farther elucidated when it is explained (if explanation be necessary to gentlemen who handle the subject so ably) why the saccharometer in general use will not indicate above one-third of the "gross weight of the substance dissolved," for as it is impossible that either of those in question can undergo solution without increasing the bulk of the solvent, therefore a saccharometer (I wish I could find a better term for the instrument), indicating the difference of weight between a barrel of water and a barrel of wort, on which scale those in general use are, I believe, formed, can by no means express the quantity of fermentable matter in pounds avoirdupois, contained in such barrel of wort; which may however be discovered, very nearly, by multiplying the amount per saccharometer by 2, 7; as is proved by ascertaining the weight of malt before brewing, and the grains (being completely dried) afterwards. Instead, therefore, of a quarter of malt weighing from 300 to 236 pounds, yielding from 75 to 80 pounds of saccharine (fermentable, I presume) matter, it really produces from 202 to 216 pounds avoirdupois.—As to the brewery in general, sugar cannot be introduced to advantage, for it is by no means a superabundant saccharum which is there required, but an extract where mucilage bears the greater proportion.—With every apology for continuing a subject which can interest so few of your readers, I am respectfully, Sir, &c.—I. H.—*Gurnsey, Dec. 19, 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Tenth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain.*—(Continued from p. 960.)

The very mountains have afforded them but a feeble protection. But thanks to the power of the inquisition, the influence of the monks, their dexterity to seize all pens, and to make them speak all languages, it is still believed, throughout great part of Spain, that Blake has been victorious, that the French army has been destroyed, and the imperial guard taken. Whatever may be the momentary success of these wretched shifts, and of these ridiculous efforts, the reign of the inquisition is over; its revolutionary tribunals will no longer harrass any country in Europe; in Spain, as at Rome, the inquisition shall be abolished, and the horrid spectacle of auto-da-fés shall

never again be repeated. This reform shall be effected in spite of the religious zeal of the English, in spite of the alliance which they have formed with the monkish impostors, who have given our Lady del Pilar and the saints of Valladolid the power of speech. England has for her allies, exclusive monopoly, the inquisition, and the Franciscans: all are alike to her, if she can but sow discord among nations, and deluge the continent with blood.—An English brig, the *Ferret*, which left Portsmouth the 11th of this month, came to an anchor on the 22d, in the port of St. Andero, not knowing that the place was in the occupation of the French. She had on board important dispatches, and a great quantity of English papers, which were secured.—At St. Andero were found great quantities of Jesuit's bark and colonial produce, which were sent to Bayonne.—The duke of Duimatia has entered the Asturias. Several towns and many villages have begged to submit, in order to avoid falling into the abyss dug for them by the counsels of foreigners, and by the passions of the multitude.

Eleventh Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Aranda de Duero, Nov. 27.

His majesty on the 19th sent off the marshal duke of Montebello with instructions for the movements of the left, of which he gave him the command.—The duke of Montebello and the duke of Cornegliano concerted measures together at Lodosa on the 20th, for the execution of the orders of his majesty.—On the 21st, the division of general Lagrange, with the brigade of light cavalry of general Colbert, and the brigade of dragoons of general Dijon, set out from Lagrogno, by the right of the Ebro. At the same time the four divisions, composing the corps of the duke of Cornegliano, passed the river at Lodosa, abandoning the whole country between the Ebro and Pampeluna.—On the 22d, at the break of day, the French army began its march. It took its direction to Calahorra, where, on the evening before, were the head quarters of Castanos; it found that town evacuated, and afterwards marched upon Alfaro; the enemy had in like manner retreated.—On the 23d, at break of day, the general of division, Lefebvre, at the head of the cavalry, and supported by the division of general Morlat, forming the advanced guard, met with the enemy. He immediately gave information to the duke of Montebello, who found the army of the enemy in seven divisions, consisting of 45 000 men, under arms, with its right before Tudela, and its left occupying a line

of a league and a half; a disposition absolutely bad. The Arragonese were on the right, the troops of Valencia and New Castile in the centre, and the three divisions of Andalusia, which general Castanos commanded more especially, formed the left. Forty pieces of cannon covered the enemy's line.—At nine in the morning the columns of the French army, began to deploy, with that order, that regularity and coolness, which characterise veteran troops: situations were chosen for establishing batteries with sixty pieces of cannon, but the impetuosity of the troops, and the inquietude of the enemy, did not allow time for this. The Spaniards were already vanquished by the order and movements of the French army.—The duke of Montebello caused the centre to be pierced by the division of general Maurice Mathieu; the general of division Lefebvre, with his cavalry, immediately passed on the trot through this opening, and enveloped, by a quarter wheel to the left, the whole right of the enemy. The moment when half of the enemy's line found itself thus turned and defeated, was that in which general Lagrange attacked the village of Cascante, where the line of Castanos was placed, which did not exhibit a better countenance than the right, but abandoned the field of battle, leaving behind it its artillery, and a great number of prisoners. The cavalry pursued the remains of the enemy's army to Mallab, in the direction of Saragossa, and to Tarracona, in the direction of Agreda. Seven standards, thirty pieces of cannon, with all their furniture, 12 colonels, 300 officers, and 3,000 men, have been taken; 4,000 Spaniards have been left dead on the field of battle, or have been driven into the Ebro. Our loss has been trifling, we have had 60 men killed and 400 wounded; among the latter is the general of division Lagrange, who has received a bullet in the arm.—Our troops found at Tudela a number of magazines.—The marshal duke of Cornegliano has begun his march upon Saragossa.—While a part of the fugitives retired to this place, the left, which had been cut off, fled in disorder to Tarracona and Agreda.—The duke of Elchingen, who was on the 22d at Soria, ought to have been on the 23d at Agreda, not a man would have escaped but this corps being too much fatigued, remained at Soria the 23d and 24th. He arrived at Agreda on the 25th, still sufficiently in time to seize a great number of magazines.—One named Palafox, formerly a garde du corps, a man without talents, and without courage, a kind of insignificant monk, the

true head of a party, which acquired him the name of general, was the first to take flight. This is not the first time he has acted in that manner; he has done the same on all occasions.—This army of 45,000 has been thus beaten and defeated, without our having had more than 6000 men engaged.—The battle of Burgos had struck the centre of the enemy, and the battle of Espinosa the right; the battle of Tudela has struck the left; victory has thus struck, as with a thunderbolt, and dispersed the whole league of the enemy.

Twelfth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Aranda, Nov. 28.

At the battle of Tudela, the general of division, Lagrange, charged with the attack of Cascante, ordered his division to march by echellon, and put himself at the head of the first division, composed of the 25th regiment of light infantry, which fell upon the enemy with such impetuosity, that 200 Spaniards were killed in the first charge of the bayonet. The other echellons could not come up. This singular intrepidity spread consternation and disorder among the troops of Castanos. It was at this moment that general Lagrange, who was at the head of the first echellon, received a ball, which wounded him dangerously.—On the 20th, the duke of Elchingen advanced by Tarracona to Borja. The enemy destroyed sixty tumbrils which they had at Tarracona.—General Maurice Mathieu arrived, on the 25th, at Borja, pursuing the enemy, and every moment taking fresh prisoners, the number of which already amounts to 5,000, they are all troops of the line. No quarter was given to any of the peasants who were found in arms. We took 37 pieces of cannon. Disorder and delirium have seized upon their leaders. Their first proceeding was a violent manifesto, in which they declared war against France. They imputed to her all the disorders of their court, the degeneracy of the race which reigned, and the baseness of the great, who, for many years, have prostrated themselves in the most abject manner at the feet of the idol which they load with all their rage, now he is fallen. They have very false ideas in Germany, Italy, and France, of Spanish monks, if they compare them to those which exist in these countries. We find among the Benedictines, the Bernardines, &c. in France and Italy, a crowd of men remarkable in sciences and literature; they distinguish themselves by their education, and by the honourable and useful class to which they belong. The Spanish monks, on the contrary, are drawn from the dregs of the people; they are ignorant and drunken.

ken, and can only be compared to people employed in slaughter-houses. They are illiterate, and have the very manner and appearance of it—it is only over the lowest classes that they have any influence. A citizen would think himself dishonoured in admitting a monk to his table. As to the unfortunate Spanish peasants, we can only compare them to the Fellahs of Egypt; they have no property—every thing belongs to the monks, or to some powerful house. The liberty to keep an inn is a feudal right; yet in a country so favoured by nature, we find neither posts nor inns. The taxes even are alienated, and belong to the lords. The great have degenerated to such a degree, that they are without energy, without merit, and even without influence. We every day find at Valladolid, and beyond it, considerable magazines of arms. The English faithfully executed that part of their engagement; they provided muskets, poniards, and libels; these they have sent in profusion: their inventive spirit has been signalled, and they have carried to a great length the art of spreading libels, as of late they have distinguished themselves by their fire-rockets. All the evils, all the scourges which can afflict mankind, come from London.

Thirteenth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated St. Martin's, near Madrid, Dec. 2.

On the 29th ult. the head-quarters of the emperor were removed, to the village of Bouzealas; on the 30th, at break of day, the duke of Belluno presented himself at the foot of the Somo Sierra; a division of 13,000 men of the Spanish army of reserve defended the passage of the mountains.—The enemy thought themselves unattackable in that position. They had entrenched the narrow passage, called Puerto, with sixteen pieces of cannon. The 9th light infantry marched upon the right; the 56th upon the causeway; and the 24th followed by the side of the heights on the left. General Senarmont, with six pieces of artillery, advanced by the causeway. The action commenced by the firing of musquetry and cannon.—A charge made by the general Montbrun, at the head of the Polish light horse, decided the affair, it was a most brilliant one, and the regiment covered itself with glory, and proved it was worthy to form a part of the imperial guards; cannons, flags, musquets, soldiers, all were taken or cut to pieces. Eight Polish light horse were killed upon the cannon, and sixteen have been wounded.—Among the last is captain Dzievaneski who was dangerously wounded, and lies almost without hopes of recovery.

Major Segur, marshal of the emperor's household, charged among the Polish troops, and received many wounds, one of which is very severe.—Sixteen pieces of cannon, 10 flags, 20 covered chests, 200 waggons, laden with all kinds of baggage, and the military chests of the regiments, are the fruits of this brilliant affair. Among the prisoners, which are very numerous, are all the colonels and lieutenant-colonels of the corps of the Spanish division. All the soldiers would have been taken, if they had not thrown away their arms, and dispersed in the mountains.—On the 1st of Dec. the head-quarters of the emperor were at Saint Augustin, and on the 2d, the duke of Istria, with the cavalry, commanded the heights of Madrid.—The infantry could not arrive before the 3d—The intelligence which we hitherto have received leads us to think that this town is suffering under all kinds of disorders, and that the doors are barricaded. The weather is very fine.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from p. 791). *Address of the Supreme Junta of Seville to the Spanish People. Dated from the Royal Palace of Seville, September 17, 1808.*

This Supreme Junta, from the first appointment guided only by its loyalty and patriotism, has seen with no less admiration than pleasure the exertions of the other parts of the kingdom, and that surmounting difficulties almost insuperable, all have vied with each other in manifesting, that their conduct and operations were actuated by the same sentiments, and directed to the same objects. Far from conceiving, even for an instant, that it has exceeded any of them in those points, which, notwithstanding its scanty means and supplies, it has been able to realize by its zeal and sacrifices, it ardently felicitates itself upon witnessing that union of dispositions and exertions, which might disconcert the bold and wicked plans of the common oppressor, as soon as the respective circumstances of the several provinces shall permit the whole of their united force to be directed to the single object of expelling our ferocious enemy from our territory. Never did so silly and chimerical an idea enter into the calculations of this Supreme Junta, as that, notwithstanding the loss of the other provinces of the kingdom, one particular province might be able to rescue itself from the yoke of a powerful, vindictive, and obstinate enemy: but though to superficial minds this project might not appear an absolute impossibility, its attachment to its king and country, and

its anxiety to preserve the integrity of the monarchy, would have compelled it to identify itself, with the hard fate under which our fellow-countrymen in the other provinces are suffering, and to afford them those succours which they so justly solicit, and which is demanded by their distresses, and the necessity of our united exertions for the salvation of the country, the only wish of all good and loyal Spaniards.—Notwithstanding these were, and are, the principal objects attended to by the Junta, whilst it did not at the same time lose sight of the points by which the enemy might menace us, or attack us with the intention of making a combined diversion, or to try the effect of a bold movement, there have not been wanting ignorant or disaffected persons, who have imputed to it the intention of retaining in Andalusia that army which had so gloriously effected the destruction of Dupont, whereas all its efforts were directed towards the object of expelling our enemies from the Castiles, in combination with the disposable forces of the other provinces, after concerting such a system of combined movements as should ensure a happy issue to our operations. With this view, the Supreme Junta, on the 8th of September, among other particulars, wrote to the general in chief as follows.—‘ This Supreme Junta has long since manifested the high confidence which it reposes in your excellency. You will therefore act as prudence directs, making such movements and marches with the army as you shall judge expedient for delivering Spain from the French; and making it known to all, that our firm resolution is to employ all our forces in defence of the country.—Repeated orders have been issued to the newly-raised troops to march for Castile, and place themselves at the disposal of your excellency. They will be furnished with clothing; and we will also make every exertion to forward some for the divisions under your command, whose naked condition we deeply regret, though hitherto unable to remedy it, notwithstanding the clothes now making already amount to eleven million of reals. We shall also cause the 10,000 flasks, or canteens, presented to us by the English, to be forwarded with all expedition to Madrid.—Having just learnt the arrival at Cadiz of several English transports, with about 30,000 muskets, and other military implements, we instantly resolved to send your excellency 10,000 of them, to be disposed of as may be thought necessary, leaving the distribution of them to the determination of your

excellency.—Although such have been, and are the genuine views and wishes of this supreme junta, joined to that of the speedy convocation of the Central Junta; and although it has not omitted, nor will omit, any means of accomplishing them, as the general defence of the kingdom imperiously dictates, malevolence has nevertheless attempted to confound the impossibility of more promptly realizing their desires, with the nature of those desires themselves. But with what acute pain has this supreme junta learnt, both from verbal and written communications, the prevalence of a malicious report, that its members had assigned to themselves, and are now enjoying large salaries! Calumny could not have been carried to a greater pitch. Far from any of the members having any appointment, or receiving a single maravedi, it will be seen, when the list of donations is published, that they have contributed, as well as the rest, according to their respective means, in supplying funds for the glorious defence of our beloved king Ferdinand VII. our liberty, and our most sacred rights. Indefatigable in the important duties of this great undertaking, the junta have devoted every day, since their first meeting, to public business exclusively, to the neglect and contempt of their private affairs, abandoning their homes and interests, and having incessantly two of their body on duty during the night, to attend to any emergency which might occur in the critical circumstances wherein we were placed.—Such is a brief sketch of the conduct of this supreme junta. It will more fully explain it, in a manifesto which shall contain a true and more particular account of all its proceedings. In the meantime, it hastens to submit to the public this short and frank statement, in order to give a check to malignity, and to remove those sinister impressions which malice, falsehood, and ignorance, are making every effort to propagate. This supreme junta has not known, nor will it know, any other principles than those of constantly approving and supporting the truly patriotic views and efforts of all the provinces in defence of the most just cause of any recorded in the history of the world—the united exertion of all our energies to expel the satellites of despotism from every part of the kingdom—the integrity of the monarchy, and a complete concert in all our plans and operations, in order to plant upon the Pyrenees the triumphant standards of our king, as harbingers of the deliverance of Europe, forerunners of the destruction of the tyrant who endeavours to subjugate

it, and monuments of the immortal glory of the Spanish nation.—JUAN BAUTISTA ESTELLER, Chief Secretary.

Manifesto to the Inhabitants of Saragossa.

Dated Head Quarters, Saragossa, Sept. 20, 1808.

The heroic defence of Saragossa, which has been made by the magnanimous inhabitants of that city, and its vicinity, is the object of admiration to all parties, and will be so to future ages. The constancy, inflexibility, and calmness, with which they resisted the incessant assault of an enemy, who every day attacked, and who every day was conquered, shew that their hearts are animated by the most noble sentiments, and evince, that those virtues which best secure the independence of a people, are not lost to Spain, and at the same time teach us what may be done by a people resolved to be free; of their resolution and valour, I have been a constant witness, and have ever seen them as great in their resolves, as noble in their deeds; the happiest of my days will be that in which I shall inform our beloved king, Ferdinand the VII., what they deserve for their fidelity, their valour, their loyalty, and the ardent affection with which they adore him: but till that day arrives, what they have done shall not remain without a distinguished mark to perpetuate its memory: therefore, reserving to myself to distribute particular rewards to such individuals as may have merited them by eminent services, as soon as I shall have received accounts sufficiently accurate to enable me to make a just distribution, I have resolved to grant as I do grant, in the name of our august sovereign, Ferdinand VII. to all the inhabitants of the vicinity of this city and its districts, that they now and hereafter shall always enjoy the privilege never to be adjudged by any tribunal in any case, except for treason or blasphemy, to any disgraceful punishment; which privilege shall be perpetual, invariable, and peculiar, to all the citizens of whatever class, sex, age, and condition, they may be without any person offering to contradict or act contrary to its tenor; but, on the contrary, all shall be careful punctually to fulfil and execute it; for which end an edict shall be passed, authorised by the royal audience, and transmitted to the hall of justice, and magistracy of the city. And that it may be known unto all, it shall be published on the vigil of the city's most sacred protector, our Lady of Pilar, by proclamation, with trumpets, &c. in the accustomed form, and shall be fixed up in the public places, and circulated besides in all the cities, towns,

and villages in the kingdom, that to all may be known the just reward of the valour, fidelity, and constancy of this capital, which has given me the most heartfelt pleasure.—JOSEPH PALAFOX Y MELZI.

Proclamation by Brigadier-General Count de San Roman, Colonel of the Regiment of Infantry of the Princess, and Provisional Commander-in-Chief of the Division of the North, lately arrived in Spain; addressed to the Troops who compose it, drawn up in Line, in Celebration of the Birth-Day of our august and beloved Sovereign, Ferdinand VII. the 14th of October, 1808.

Soldiers,—The general-in-chief, marquis de la Romana, on his departure from Gottenburgh, committed to me the honourable charge of commanding you; and as he has not yet been able to rejoin us, I think it right not to delay any longer stating to you, what, I am convinced, he would have done under the present circumstances.—Absent from your country upwards of 700 leagues, and kept in complete ignorance of its fate, your loyalty was tried by seduction, and exposed to act the most arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust; but faithful to your banners and your lawful sovereign, you knew how to resist them with unshaken firmness, and to live and die, united with your country, was the sole wish you unanimously entertained and expressed.—Under these circumstances, through the interposition of Divine Providence, direct intelligence reached us of the situation of our country, and of her anxious desire to obtain our assistance. You immediately united all to afford her your aid; but obstacles, almost insurmountable, obstructed the attainment of that end. Nothing, however, was capable to make you shrink from your firm resolve. Great were the privations, fatigues, and incessant dangers, with which you had to struggle, in order to attain your purpose, but you bore up under them all with that heroic perseverance and kind of satisfaction, which the most exalted patriotism alone can inspire.—Divine Providence could not but favour a cause so just; and aided by that Providence, we succeeded, under the powerful and energetic protection of a great and generous nation, now our intimate ally, to surmount all obstacles, and tread again our anxiously desired native soil. When you set foot on it, you all expressed the most lively emotion of heartfelt joy; and corresponding demonstrations of your countrymen, convinced you of their joyful feelings on the happy occasion. A truly memorable day, warranted by the public expression of sentiments worthy of true

Spanish patriotism, the memory of which will, no doubt, be handed down to the latest posterity with the glorious history of its name.—We have already joined in his temples to offer up thanksgivings to the Most High, who vouchsafed to dispose this, and to implore with fervent prayers the continuance of his support.—Now we are under arms, enjoying the blissful destiny of celebrating in our native land the birth-day of our sovereign Ferdinand VII. to restore him to his throne, and to reign full of splendour, prosperity, and glory. Your anxious desire to march for that purpose, and to share in the laurels of our gallant companions in arms, who have covered themselves with glory, shall soon be fulfilled.—But, soldiers, in order to secure the attainment of your wish, you should constantly bear in mind, that order and discipline must be scrupulously observed, and unremitting vigilance displayed in the service. The least fault or omission on this head would no longer prove injurious to those unfortunate people with whom you formerly acted, and who still groan under the heavy oppression of the perfidious enemy who endeavoured to impose his iron yoke also on our country, but hurts and distresses your worthy countrymen, your brethren, in fine, those who so generously step forward to share our fatigues and alleviate them. Every offender shall therefore be promptly punished with the utmost severity, and deserves, besides, to be turned out of your ranks, as unworthy of the Spanish name, because he could render himself guilty of misconduct in circumstances so interesting and important.—But I feel perfectly satisfied that a case so disgraceful will never happen; my conviction on this head, arises from your good conduct and fervent patriotism. I have merely to add, that when the day so much desired shall come, to front our enemy, you shall always find me by your side; I will share all your dangers, and, jointly with the gallant and distinguished officers by whom you are commanded, we will shew the world, that it is a glorious death, in the field of honour, to be at all times the darling object of the wishes of Spanish soldiers, how much more so must it be for those who are fighting for a cause the most just and most sacred; a cause in which the defence of our holy religion, and of our beloved lawful sovereign, Ferdinand VII. and the dignity and independence of our native land, are equally concerned!

—COUNT DE SAN ROMAN.

Address of the Central Junta to the Spanish Nation. Dated Nov. 21, 1808.

Spaniards!—The Central Junta of Government of the kingdom, after having taken all measures in its power to defeat the enemy, who, continuing his attacks, has advanced into the neighbourhood of Samozierra, addresses you, for the purpose of putting you upon your guard against the intrigues with which the perfidious agents of Napoleon endeavour to alarm and deceive you, by increasing the number of the enemy's troops, who hardly amount to eight thousand men, according to the reports made by the Generals whom the Junta has charged with the defence of the important post of Guadarrama.—Inhabitants of Madrid!—The country stands in need of your exertions; your circumspection, and patriotism, are the bulwarks on which it chiefly rests its defence. The Junta trusts that you will know how to support the dispositions of your Captain-General, and of the tribunal of vigilance, in order to discover and deliver to the inexorable arm of the law, all traitors, who will now exert themselves more than ever to introduce disorder, and paralyse the activity with which you must be present at all parts, which will be pointed out to you; bearing in mind the 2d day of May, when, deprived of all assistance, and even of the liberty to defend yourselves, you struck the whole nation with astonishment by your loyalty and valour.—The Central Junta feels at a loss to express to you the confidence which the enthusiasm, with which the soldiers of the nation prepare themselves to beat the enemies of our beloved Sovereign Ferdinand VII. of our country, and our religion, inspires them; our allies, the English, convinced of the justice of the cause we defend, and, animated by the same enthusiasm, are invited, and ready to march to Escorial, where they are at present to reinforce the position chosen by our wise General, and support the operation of our van, which must already have commenced to engage the slaves of the tyrant who oppresses all nations. Spaniards! cowardice, inspired by treason, will, no doubt, try means to augment the dangers, exaggerated by the ill-disposed, in order to frustrate the measures pursued by the Junta, which places implicit confidence in your unexampled fidelity and obedience.—Royal Palace of Aranjuez, Nov. 21, 1808. By order of the Supreme Junta.—MARTIN DE GARAY.

AMERICA.—*Message of the President of the United States to the Senate and House of Representatives. November 8, 1808*

It would have been a source, fellow-citizens of much gratification, if our last com-

communication from Europe had enabled me to inform you, that the belligerent nations, whose disregard of neutral right has been so destructive to our commerce, had become awakened to the duty and the policy of revoking their unrighteous edicts. That no means might be omitted to produce this salutary effect, I lost no time in availing myself of the act authorising a suspension in whole, or in part of the several embargo laws. Our ministers at London and Paris were instructed to explain to the respective governments there, our disposition to exercise the authority in such manner as would withdraw the pretext on which the aggressions were originally founded, and open the way for a renewal of that commercial intercourse, which it was alledged, on all sides, had been reluctantly obstructed. As each of these governments had pledged its readiness to concur in renouncing a measure, which reached its adversary through the incontestible rights of neutrals only, and as the measure had been assumed by each as a retaliation for an asserted acquiescence in the aggressions of the other, it was reasonably expected that the occasion would have been seized by both, for evincing the sincerity of their professions, and for restoring to the United States its legitimate freedom. The instructions to our ministers, with respect to the different belligerents, were necessarily modified with a reference to their different circumstances, and to the condition annexed by law to the executive power of suspension, requiring a degree of security to our commerce, which would not result from a repeal of the decrees of France. Instead of a pledge, therefore, for a suspension of the embargo as to her, in case of such a repeal, it was presumed that a sufficient inducement might be found in other considerations, and particularly in the change produced by a compliance with our just demands, by one belligerent, and a refusal by the other, in the relations between this other and the United States. To Great Britain, whose power on the ocean is so ascendant, it was deemed not inconsistent with that condition, to state, explicitly, that on her rescinding her orders in relation to the commerce of the United States, their trade would be opened with her, and remain shut to her enemy, in case of his failure to rescind his decrees also. From France no answer has been received, nor any indication that the requisite change in her decrees is contemplated. The favourable reception of the proposition to Great Britain was the less to be doubted, as her orders of council had not only been referred for their vindication to an acquiescence on

the part of the United States, no longer to be pretended; but as the arrangement proposed, whilst it resisted the illegal decrees of France, involved, moreover, substantially the precise advantages professedly aimed at by the British orders. The arrangement has, nevertheless, been rejected. This candid and liberal experiment having thus failed, and no other event having occurred on which a suspension of the embargo by the executive was authorised, it necessarily remains in the extent originally given to it. We have the satisfaction, however, to reflect, that in return for the privations imposed by the measure, and which our fellow-citizens, in general, have borne with patriotism, it has had the important effects of saving our mariners, and our vast mercantile property, as well as of affording time for prosecuting the defensive and provisional measures called for by the occasion. It has demonstrated to foreign nations the moderation and firmness which govern our councils, and to our citizens the necessity of uniting in support of the laws and the rights of their country; and has thus long frustrated those usurpations and spoliations which, if resisted, involved war; if submitted to, sacrificed a vital principle of our national independence.—Under a continuance of the belligerent measures, which, in defiance of laws which consecrate the rights of neutrals, overspread the ocean with danger, it will rest with the wisdom of Congress to decide on the course best adapted to such a state of things; and bringing with them, as they do, from every part of the Union, the sentiments of our constituents, my confidence is strengthened that in forming this decision, they will, with an unerring regard to the essential rights and interests of the nation, weigh and compare the painful alternatives out of which a choice is to be made. Nor should I do justice to the virtues which on other occasions have marked the character of our fellow-citizens, if I did not cherish an equal confidence that the alternative chosen, whatever it may be, will be maintained with all the fortitude and patriotism which the crisis ought to inspire.—The documents containing the correspondences on the subject of the foreign edicts against our commerce, with the instructions given to our ministers at London and Paris, are now laid before you.—The communication made to Congress at their last session explained the posture in which the close of the discussions relating to the attack by a British ship of war on the frigate Chesapeake, left a subject on which the nation had manifested so honourable a sensibility. Every view of what

had passed authorised a belief that immediate steps would be taken by the British government for redressing a wrong, which, the more it was investigated, appeared the more clearly to require what had not been provided for in the special mission. It is found that no steps have been taken for the purpose. On the contrary, it will be seen in the documents laid before you, that the inadmissible preliminary which obstructs the adjustment is still adhered to; and, moreover, that it is now brought into connexion with the distinct and irrelative case of the orders in council. The instructions which had been given to our ministers at London, with a view to facilitate, if necessary, the reparation claimed by the United States, are included in the documents communicated.—Our relations with the other powers of Europe have undergone no material changes since your last session. The important negotiations with Spain, which had been alternately suspended and resumed, necessarily experience a pause, under the extraordinary and interesting crisis which distinguishes her internal situation.—With the Barbary powers we continue in harmony, with the exception of an unjustifiable proceeding of the Dey of Algiers towards our consul to that regency. Its character and circumstances are now laid before you, and will enable you to decide how far it may, either now or hereafter, call for any measures not within the limits of the executive authority.—With our Indian neighbours the public peace has been steadily maintained. Some instances of individual wrong have, as at other times, taken place, but in no wise implicating the will of the nation. Beyond the Mississippi, the Ioways, the Sacs, and the Alibamas, have delivered up, for trial and punishment, individuals from among themselves accused of murdering citizens of the United States, on this side the Mississippi: the Creeks are exerting themselves to arrest offenders of the same kind, and the Choctaws have manifested their readiness and desire for amicable and just arrangements, respecting depredations committed by disorderly persons of their tribe. And generally from a conviction that we consider them as a part of ourselves, and cherish with sincerity their rights and interests, the attachment of the Indian tribes is gaining strength daily, is extending from the nearer to the more remote, and will amply requite us for the justice and friendship practised towards them; husbandry and household manufacture are advancing among

them more rapidly with the southern than the northern tribes, from circumstances of soil and climate: and one of the two great divisions of the Cherokee nation have now under consideration, to solicit the citizenship of the United States, and to be identified with us in laws and government, in such progressive manner as we shall think best.—In consequence of the appropriations of the last session of Congress for the security of our sea-port towns and harbours, such works of defence have been erected as seemed to be called for by the situation of the several places, their relative importance, and the scale of expence indicated by the amount of the appropriation. These works will chiefly be finished in the course of the present season, except at New York and New Orleans, where most was to be done; and although a great proportion of the last appropriation has been expended on the former place, yet some further views will be submitted to Congress for rendering its security entirely adequate against naval enterprise. A view of what has been done at several places, and of what is proposed to be done, shall be communicated as soon as the several reports are received.—Of the gun boats authorized by the act of December last, it has been thought necessary to build only 103 in the present year; these, with those before possessed, are sufficient for the harbours and waters most exposed, and the residue will require little time for their construction, when it shall be deemed necessary.—Under the act of the last session, for raising an additional military force, so many officers were immediately appointed as were necessary for carrying on the business of recruiting; and in proportion as it advanced, others have been added. We have reason to believe their success has been satisfactory, although such returns have not been received, as enable me to present you a statement of the numbers engaged.—I have not thought it necessary, in the course of the last session, to call for any general detachments of militia, or of volunteers, under the laws passed for that purpose; for the ensuing season, however, they will be required to be in readiness, should their service be wanted. Some small and special detachments have been necessary to maintain the laws of embargo, on that portion of our northern frontier which offered peculiar facilities for evasion; but these were replaced as soon as it could be done, by bodies of new recruits. *(To be continued.)*

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"This, it seems to me, is the point, upon which the fate of Spain will turn. *Uncommon, unheard of exertions* are required; *new courage, new talents, new genius*, are demanded. To call these forth, powerful motives must make their way, at once, to the hearts of even the lowest orders of the people. A choice of persons, to whom the people are to be slaves, appears to me to be no motive at all. Hence, I conclude, that, if the leaders in Spain persevere in making war for the restoration of their king, they will be defeated, and that Joseph Napoleon, though the son of a green-grocer, will stand at the head of the new family of sovereigns. God forbid that such should be the result; but, if the struggle be made for no better purpose, the failure of the Spaniards will be a subject of regret with those only, whose fears of the conqueror have deprived them of the power of reflection."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Oct. 8, 1808.

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In the present Number, which concludes the volume, I have not, as in the former volumes, inserted any *Index*. I did not myself find the index useful, but the *Table of Contents* very useful. I have, therefore, made this Table much fuller than usual, and have so arranged the articles, that any one will be easily found. The OFFICIAL PAPERS stand first, the date of each being added to the title; next come the LETTERS FROM CORRESPONDENTS, the subject and signature of each being specified; next the ARTICLES WRITTEN BY THE EDITOR, the several topics of each article being mentioned, in the order in which they follow each other; and, lastly, come some MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES, which were found not to come naturally under any of the former heads. This Table of itself will, I am of opinion, be found to be no very imperfect chronicle of the events of the half year; and, I am sure it will, as far as dates go, save a great deal of trouble in the way of reference.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—Yes, for a revolution it will be, in spite of all the efforts of the Central Junta and of John Hookham Frere.—Upon this subject there has been published in the *Courier newspaper*, of a few days ago, a long letter signed X. Y. containing accusations against Mr. Waithman, the *Edinburgh Reviewers*, and myself. The two former need no defence, seeing that the writer has inserted a passage from Mr. Waithman's speech, and also from the Review, which passages will do great good, and will be remembered to advantage when the accusation against the authors are forgotten.—As to myself, I notice this writer because his letter opens the way for an exposure of those, by whom, in all probability he is paid, and affords me an opportunity of placing in a new light many things, which cannot be too strongly imprinted upon the public mind.—The accusation

against me is this: That though I might like well enough to see the Spaniards in a state of revolution, I could not wish them success, when I considered that they were opposing Buonaparte, who had so often humbled the English government, and all the friends of the English constitution; that it went against me to applaud those who were hostile to one, who had so often gratified the feelings of the opponents of the English ministers, and especially, as the Spaniards were fighting for their lawful sovereign, and not for a rights-of-man government; that, accordingly, I set to work, on the 24th of June last past, to alarm weak persons in this country, lest England should associate herself with a new race of Robespierres; that, thus, at a moment, when all ranks and all parties were enthusiastic in the Spanish cause, when the few, who, from party feeling, were less warm than the multitude, dared not even murmur dissent, "that good patriot Mr. Cobbett, truly instigated by the devil, stepped forth, with a hellish spirit, to throw the apple of discord amongst us;" and, that, if this writer could suppose it true, as he is firmly persuaded it is utterly false, that any person in this country, from the king to the cobbler, dreaded the success of the Spanish patriots as tending to excite a spirit of revolution in this country, he should set down the shame of that delusion to the Patriot William Cobbett, who was the first to engender a factious feeling on a cause, respecting which this whole nation was unanimous; a cause, on the success of which depended the dearest interests, not only of England, but of the world.—Now, supposing, for argument's sake, all this to be true. Supposing, that, with the devil at my back, I did use, on the 25th of June last, and have continued ever since to use my utmost endeavours to persuade the people of England, that, to carry on war for Ferdinand was the way to fail, and that, by different way of proceeding something

would be brought about that I wished to see brought about. Supposing this, and all the rest of it. What *harm* have I done? My advice was not followed. The ministry, and all those whom, upon such occasions, they call forth to address the king, and praise them, have set their faces against my wicked council. They have made war for Ferdinand; they are still at it; and, as they will have all the benefits of such a line of policy; as the cause will not have been injured by me and the devil, why set up a whining complaint against us? Had we indeed, succeeded in persuading the ministry, or any part of this besotted nation, to follow our hellish advice, and had the cause then failed, there would have been some ground of complaint against us; but, the wise and godly were upon their guard against us; they have made, and are making, war for Ferdinand. "Great luck" to them, again I say; but, if they fail, let them not throw the blame upon the devil and me. —I feel little disposition to "justify myself against the false charges of this assailant; for, any one, who can believe me to have a friendly feeling towards Buonaparte, and that I mourned at the thought of seeing him defeated; any such person is beneath my notice, and must be too foolish and insignificant a creature to have any weight in society, more than a mouse.—But, there is one passage of this charge that I cannot refrain from noticing in a manner somewhat more particular; and that is, the passage, wherein this writer speaks of the "*English constitution*," which he, according to the invariable custom of the hirelings, identifies with the *English ministry*, and which constitution it is my wish, and my constant endeavour, to assist in restoring and preserving. But, I must be excused, if I differ from this writer as to *who* are the great enemies of that constitution; he will, I hope, have the goodness to excuse me, if I do not clearly perceive any harm that Buonaparte has done to it, while I can see, that much harm has been done to it, and is now doing to it, by the corruptors, the corrupted, the speculators and plunderers, in England, Ireland, and Scotland. These appear to me to be the best friends that Buonaparte has in this kingdom; and, of these I am a bitter, and would fain be, a mortal enemy. It is to persons of this description that Buonaparte owes all his conquests; and it is from them, that we everywhere hear charges of disloyalty preferred against those, who complain of their infamous robberies and oppression. Year after year the work of conquest goes on.

Every Christmas sees a kingdom for two fall beneath the conqueror. Still the hireling crew change not their tone. Still they can discover no fault in the old system of opposition to him. Still they cling to the rotten stump that is crumbling away before him. Still they continue to excuse all those, who recommend that, out of which none could spring the means of effectual resistance of his terrible power, and still more terrible policy. And, still the cowed-down, the confounded, the besotted nation, lends but too favourable an ear to their crafty misrepresentations.—Nothing can better discover the character of this writer, than a complaint, which he makes against the Edinburgh Reviewers, on account of what he calls "their infamous attack upon Cevallos." I am obliged to the *Courier* for the extracts from this Review, my copy of the number which contains it, not having yet reached me. I do not, therefore, know what these celebrated Reviewers have said of Cevallos; but, I am not a little pleased to find, that men, of such talents as they are, should have taken up an exposition of him, and his barefacedly lying publication. No matter with the speculators, however. Cevallos is now for the scheme of things that suits them; and, therefore, though he served the three kings successively; though he deserted each of them, the moment they were deserted by power; though he was, by Buonaparte, thought worthy of the highest confidence; and though he actually took a post under, and went to Madrid with king Joseph: notwithstanding all this, he is, amongst the speculators, a most respectable person; every word he says is to be believed; we are to look upon him, and speak of him, as a pattern of loyalty and fidelity; and, if we dare to think or act otherwise, we are to be set down as men "truly instigated by the devil," and, which is worse, as men "who do not sincerely hate Buonaparte."—Verily, this *loyalty* of Cevallos is a pretty good specimen. Under similar circumstances, in other kingdoms, there would be a great plenty of Cevalloses. It has always been so; and, I dare say, that the writer of the letter, upon which I am now commenting, would, as far as his station and capacity would allow, be a faithful imitator of that loyal gentleman, though he would now assist to imprison or to hang any man, who should call for a reform of abuses, and whom, for that reason alone, he would accuse of disloyal intentions.

PORTUGAL. From a proclamation, which will be found in another part of this

Number, it appears, that our troops, in Portugal, have become an object of dislike, at least, if not of hostility, with the people of that country. The proclamation fairly warrants this inference; for, otherwise, why call upon the people to restrain their *fury*, and assure them, that the English are *not become French*?—The INTENDANT, whose name is to the proclamation, assures the people, that the English are *not* come in the character of conquerors; but to free the Portuguese from slavery; and, then, he enters into some general reasoning, in order to show, that what he states must be true. —Now, though I am not at all disposed to controvert the statements, and still less the reasonings, of the Intendant, I must be allowed to ask, how it came to pass, that any such assurances were thought necessary: How the Portuguese, or any considerable part of them, came to *suppose*, or to appear to suppose, or act as if they supposed, that the English were come as conquerors? Or, how they came to need any assurances, that the English came to free them from slavery? I should, I must confess, like to have an answer to these questions; because, to me, it appears to be of vast moment to ascertain the causes, which led the people to be in a state of uncertainty as to these very material points. There were persons in England, who, the moment they saw them, apprehended serious mischiefs from our “ardent-minded” proclamations in Portugal, and amongst these persons were the editors of the two principal English daily prints, the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Times*; but, there must, I think, be some cause more remote than this; for, those proclamations, would hardly, one would suppose, have been issued, unless something like discontent had already made its appearance. At any rate, we appear to be in a difficulty; for, if the proclamations, just referred to, were not necessary, then, there is room to suppose, that they have led to the present state of discontent; and, if necessary, that necessity, considering the tenor of them, is a proof, that we were not at any time, or, at least, after the Convention, very welcome guests in Portugal.—It is, I fear, in Portugal, as we have seen it everywhere else, the fact, that the great mass of the people feel little concern about the ejecting of the French, to whose wild and heroic sway they submit with more patience than to the sway of their old governments, which sway I need not describe.—Need we ask what is the cause of this? Need we ask, why Napoleon meets with little or no resistance; and that, when once he has got possession,

of a country, the people, notwithstanding all the pillaging that we hear of, make no efforts to get rid of him, and, if delivered by a third power, appear to feel very little pleasure at the event? Courtiers affect to be surprised and indignant at this. “Curse on the base rabble, not draw a single trigger against the Corsican!” Not so passionate, gentlemen. Base rabble will do nothing that is high-minded, so long as they are base rabble. Buonaparte, believe me, has no secret allurements. He does not, like Pons, carry love-powder about him; or, if he does, why do not you order your famous Apothecary-General to send out a large packet with each of your generals? You scorn, I suppose, the use of such means? You prefer making love after the manner of the Muscovites? No: there is no witchcraft in the matter. Napoleon has no trouble but to enter the several countries he means to conquer. The rest is done ready to his hands.—Here I shall insert a short paragraph from the *Morning Chronicle*, and another from the *Courier*, the latter being an answer to the former, and this latter requiring some observations from me, containing, as it does, some of those wicked opinions, which have already produced so much mischief, and which, I fear, will finally lead to something bordering upon total ruin.—“This state of things suggests the most serious reflection. If we have not only to deliver the subjugated nations from the yoke of France, but afterwards to employ our army in forcing them to submit to a government of our establishment, which they detest equally with French domination, no wonder that the work of deliverance advances but slowly. So the secret comes out at last, why, to the astonishment of every one, our army loitered so long in Portugal, after having apparently achieved the purpose for which it was sent; and the *Morning Post* seems for once to have let out the truth. It was because an army of 35,000 men were necessary, to borrow the words of the Ministerial Journal, to constrain the refractory classes of the Portuguese, that that lamentable delay took place, which has brought every thing to jeopardy, perhaps to ruin. And it is not, it seems, in the cause of the people of Portugal—it is not in the cause of liberty and independence, nor for our own security, nor even for the diminution of Buonaparte’s power, that the people of England have expended their blood and treasure. We have been spending our money and shed-

"ding our blood for a *Regency*—for
 "Regency which the Portuguese detest,
 "and which they detest us for supporting!"

—Thus far the *Morning Chronicle*, who adds, that this is, for us, "a miserable policy; a vile occupation." In such a light the thing must, one would think, appear to every unprejudiced mind.—Now let us hear what the *Courier* has to say, ~~preparing ourselves for the disgusting cant~~ about party and opposition, to motives of which every thing unpleasant is attempted to be imputed.—"It will perhaps puzzle

most of our readers to discover in the above events cause for censure against this country.—But what is too difficult for Opposition ingenuity? They consider these disturbances as having been produced by the establishment of a Regency, which we are said to have forced upon them. The Regency was appointed by the Prince Regent himself.—As soon as Portugal was released from the French yoke, we, who came to assist the Portuguese against the French, who had put down the ancient and legitimate Government, did that which, as the friend and ally of the Prince Regent, it was our duty to do; *we recognised the authority which the Prince had appointed to govern the country in his absence.* What would the

"Opposition have had us do? Would they have had us tell the people to throw off their allegiance, put themselves in a state of revolution, and new cast and model the whole form of government? They might then have exclaimed indeed with some justice, "Oh miserable policy!" "most vile occupation!"—But we are

told, that were the whole British army to be sent, it would be insufficient to defend Portugal till we had first gained over the people to our side—and therefore it is meant to be recommended, we suppose, that we should abandon Portugal altogether—for as to gaining over the people, if delivering them from the French does not produce that effect, nothing that we can do besides is calculated to produce it—though the Opposition seem to think that if we were to take part against the Regency, that is against the authority of the legitimate Sovereign, we should attach the people amazingly to us.—These revolutionary counsels our Government, we do not think, will be much inclined to follow.—But the people of Portugal are said either to dislike or to be indifferent about their government.—It may be so, and we shall not inquire at present whether they have or have not

"reason—but *we should have thought,*
 "that any dislike or indifference they may
 "feel would have disappeared, nay, would
 "have been converted into love and attachment, when the question was, whether
 "they should submit to such a Government,
 "or to the Government of the French?
 "Why have Prussia, Naples, and Italy
 "been conquered? we are asked; and we
 "are answered that it was because the
 "people either felt dislike or indifference
 "about their governments! And what has
 "been their reward? *That they have been placed under a government compared to which their own was perfect happiness and freedom.* So far then from Prussia, Italy, and Naples furnishing examples which the Portuguese might be desirous of following, *we should have thought they would have afforded incitements to them to cling to ANY government, rather than, by being indifferent to it, suffer their country to fall under the yoke of France.*—Since writing the above, we are informed that the affairs to which the proclamation of the intendant general of police refers, was by no means a very serious affair, and was soon put an end to.—It was occasioned by some regulation adopted respecting the market.—What a falsehood is here, as winder-up! A trifling regulation about the market! Could that have called for such a proclamation as the one, which has given rise to this discussion? Common sense forbids us to believe it; and the man who makes the assertion must look upon his readers as downright fools. Discontents on account of a regulation about the market call for a proclamation, assuring the people, that the English are not come as conquerors, and that they are come to free the people from slavery! Detestable falsehood! But, such are the means, by which this nation has long been deluded from one stage of danger to another. What connection was there, or could there be, between the political views of the king of England and a regulation about the market at Oporto? Shameful falsehood! The Intendant issues a proclamation to stay the "fury" of the people, to whom he speaks about the political views of the king of England, whom he describes as too wise to think of enslaving them. And, it is a proclamation like this, that the shameless hireling holds up to us as the consequence of disturbances arising out of a regulation about the market at Oporto! It is seldom that I have met with any thing so impudent as this.—This writer tells us, that we recognized the government of the Prince Re-

gent; that we re-established that government; and asks, what the Morning Chronicle would have had us do. Why, I know what I would have done. I would have ascertained what sort of thing, or state of things, *the people were willing to fight for*; and, if I found it inconsistent with my engagements, or promises, to give them that, I would instantly have withdrawn my troops, being, as, I think, every man, in his senses, must be, convinced, that, seeing the geographical situation of Portugal, it is impossible to defend the country against the French, unless these are beaten by the Spaniards, without the hearty co-operation of the people of Portugal.—This writer, in answer to an opinion, similar to the one just expressed, asks, if it be meant to recommend the *abandonment* of Portugal altogether? for, says he, “as to gaining over the people, if “delivering them from the French does not “produce that effect, nothing that we can “do besides is calculated to produce that “effect.” Well; but, we *have* so delivered them, and that effect *has not* been produced. Will you, then, persevere in defending Portugal without the aid, and even against the will, of the people? Will you attempt to keep out Buonaparte with one hand, and to keep down the people of Portugal with the other? The minister who, should so apply the lives of an English army, would deserve to be hanged.—This writer next tells us, “that *he* should have thought, “that any dislike or indifference the Portuguese might have felt respecting their former government, would have disappeared, nay, been converted into *love* “and *attachment*, when the question was, “whether they should submit to such a government, or the government of the “French.” Aye, *he* might think so; and many others might think so, and so they may think with respect to the people of other countries, where the French have not yet been. But, what says *experience*? Alas! that which has, heretofore, made fools wise, has now, as far as relates to governments, lost its power of inculcation! Experience has proved, has proved in numerous instances, that the sway of France has no such terrific power; and that, where the people dislike, or are indifferent about their old government, they are not to be made to love it by a dread of its being succeeded by the government of France. The Morning Chronicle did not hold up the conduct of the people of Prussia, Hanover, and Italy as *an example to those of Portugal*; but, as examples, whereby we might judge of how the people of Portugal were, under similar cir-

cumstances, likely to act; but, indeed, we wanted no other example than that, with which we were furnished by Portugal herself. —We need not inquire into the truth of the assertion, that “compared with the “French government, established in Hanover, Italy, and Naples, their own was “perfect happiness and freedom;” because, whatever may be the fact, we know that the people have made no exertions in behalf of their own government against the French. “*We should have thought*,” says this writer, “that the fate of Hanover, Italy, and Naples, would have afforded incitements to the people of Portugal to cling to ANY “government, rather than suffer their “country to fall under the yoke of France.” —Aye, *this*; this; this is the pernicious; this is the execrable opinion, that has so long and so widely and so fatally prevailed. Oh! then you think, do you, that, as long as there can be kept up, in any country, a dread of the French “yoke,” the people may be harassed and insulted, that their very entrails may be squeezed out, without danger to their rulers? This is your opinion, is it? Others have proceeded upon it, and they are now smarting under the richly-deserved consequences. Others have said: no; there is no occasion for a reform of abuses; a dread of the French will do; we can go on in the old way; a dread of the French is your only true specific for silencing all complaints, for keeping all quiet.” Others have thus thought, and they have been most justly punished. This has been the doctrine, which has bent the continent beneath the feet of Buonaparte; and this doctrine, persevered in, will yet lead him to conquests, of which the editor of the Courier does not appear to have dreamt.

Dotley, 28th Dec. 1808.

COBBETT'S

COMPLETE COLLECTION OF

State Trials,

AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON,
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS,
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD DOWN TO
THE PRESENT TIME.

The FIRST PART of this Work will be published, at the places and in the manner before notified, on Monday next; and, I think, I may venture to say, that it will be found to exceed any expectations that may have been raised by the Prospectus. Of the *forty-one* Trials, or Proceedings, contained in this First Part, *twenty-five* are new, or,

at least, new in this shape, and never before came into any Collection. That the new matter will bear this proportion all the way through, is not to be expected; but, I am confident that the difference between this work and those, which, under a similar title, have gone before it, will surprize even those who have most frequent had occasion to perceive and to lament the imperfectness of those works.—Some persons have conceived, from the passage in my Prospectus, relating to the *Pleadings*, that it was intended to leave out the *pleadings*, or speeches, of counsel. What were meant to be left out, were merely such of the *formal pleadings* as could not possibly be of any use; such as old common Latin Indittments, and other technical forms. After, however, again looking through the various papers, it has been found, that these *Pleadings* will take up but little room; and, therefore, it has been resolved to retain the whole of them. That there is no intention of *abridging*, the contents of the FIRST PART must, I think, pretty clearly demonstrate.—To such gentlemen as may happen to be in possession of curious Trials, or of documents relating to trials of the description of those to be contained in this work, I shall be much obliged for a communication of them. If the document, or paper, whether in print or manuscript, be requested to be preserved, great care shall be taken of it.

MR. ROOPE'S ADDRESS TO THE NORFOLK FARMERS.

Gentlemen,—A large majority of the Corn Merchants, Brewers, and Millers, attending the weekly market at Norwich on the 14th of last October, having, by public advertisement declared, "That in future they will not purchase corn upon any other terms than one month's credit, to be calculated from the day of its delivery, and that if payment is requested previously to the expiration of the month, they will deduct one penny in the pound discount," I took the liberty on the next market day of submitting to your consideration the following RESOLUTIONS.—1st. "That the determinations of the Buyers of Corn are inconsistent with that freedom which never will permit a few individuals to dictate in a manner so authoritative to the numerous Growers of corn, who for so many years, have constantly attended the Norwich market, and who hitherto have been considered men as respectable and independent as this or any other county can boast.—2d. That by submitting to such Resolutions, that confidence and good-will

which, as yet, have subsisted, between the Buyers and Growers of corn, would no longer exist.—3d. That there is no reason why the Buyers should take from the pockets of the Growers the discount proposed; and, therefore it is a duty incumbent on the Growers to make every exertion to prevent such an imposition being practised.—4th. That the plan proposed by the Buyers of corn, will create either inconvenience or loss to the Growers, and may also subject them to have unpleasant remarks made, on the application for their legal demands, previous to the expiration of a month, and therefore it must be regarded; not only as adverse to the long-established practice of fair and honourable dealing; but also subversive of delicate and confidential transactions.—5th. That the seller of any commodity, not being compelled to dispose of it, except to whom, and on what terms he pleases, the intended combination, to carry into effect the Resolutions of the Buyers, is not only unprecedented in this market, but believed to be illegal, and is repugnant to those inherent and hitherto indisputed rights of the venders, which no combination ought to be permitted to annihilate.—6th. That the recollection of the length of time the Growers of corn have to wait before they can get a fair return for their property expended ought to have due weight with every friend to agriculture.—7th. That the returns of men engaged in other commercial pursuits than those of agriculture, being so much more frequent, and so much larger, the agricultural remains below the commercial interest in the scale of profit.—8th. That the transactions of this Meeting be printed and laid in St. Andrew's Hall, Norwich, on Saturday next the 29th of October, to receive the additional signatures of those Growers of corn who are inclined to maintain their own independence, and to unite with this meeting in their laudable exertions to prevent the combination of the Buyers being effected.—9th. That the Committee already appointed at this Meeting, shall assemble at the Rampant Horse Inn, Norwich, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, to adopt such further measures as then may be deemed necessary, and the attendance of those, who are desirous to support the customs of the market is earnestly solicited.—10th. That no example tending to defeat the intentions of this Meeting, shall deter it, from abiding by these Resolutions, which already have obtained very numerous and most respectable signatures.—11th. That these Resolutions be advertised in the Farmer's Journal, the Bury, and

the Norwich papers.—12. That the thanks of this Meeting be presented to the Chairman Mr. Thos. Utting of Ashwellthorpe, for his active and manly conduct on this occasion."

At your second Meeting on October 29, Sir Thomas Bevor, bart. consented to take the chair, and the committee now consisting of 32 gentlemen (the largest growers of corn); it coincided with the Resolutions which were unanimously adopted at the first Meeting. The signatures of the chairman and the committee being placed beneath them, they were laid in St. Andrew's Hall, Norwich, and there having received the sanction and names of more than 500 occupiers of land in Norfolk, I afterwards endeavoured to prove how necessary it was for you to declare the sentiments which you had expressed. But my reasons having been but partially made known, and believing, as I do, that every county throughout the British empire, as well as the county of Norfolk, is as deeply interested in the result of this prejudicial and daring combination, I am induced to give the *greatest publicity* to my remarks, and therefore I have solicited from Mr. Cobbett the favour of their insertion in his Register.—Gentlemen, the Growers of corn very justly expressed their indignation, that a few individual Buyers who for so many years have been amassing property, by the constant dealings which were carried on between them on fair and equitable terms, should most suddenly and without any good reason being assigned, decline to transact business with them on the same basis. How much more astonished were they to find the Buyers had entered into a combination to drive the Growers from their accustomed and most convenient market, or to compel them to dispose of their corn on terms which are very disadvantageous, that must render them great inconvenience, and which by length of credit, from the failure or misconduct of their London factors, from an unexpected drop in the markets, or other causes (of which you have had such numerous and fatal instances), might probably occasion to them very serious loss.—Gentlemen; if your legal demands for your property disposed of, be requested before the expiration of the month, the Buyer will either believe that you want your money and have no other resource to which you can apply, or he must know that you have no confidence in him by your consenting to pay the discount of one penny in the pound: although he pay your debt he will be mortified that his object is not obtained; namely, having your property (or your money, which is the

same thing) to speculate with; and you cannot be much pleased, that to obtain your right, you must pay 5 per cent. to put into the pocket of him, who is getting a livelihood by his connection with you, and who, in ungrateful return, compels you to act as he dictates; and that to his great profit, and to your great loss. If such transactions will not destroy that confidence which should exist between you both, I know of no circumstance, however more degrading to you, (were it possible to be so) to which you would not submit.—Gentlemen; I always declared that, I believed this combination of the Buyers of your property to be a shameless imposition, to be *illegal*, and Mr. Wilson has since confirmed that opinion, and obtained a rule to prosecute, in the Court of King's Bench, and £500 are already subscribed, to defray the expences. But, even if the combination were not illegal, I think you ought well to consider, before you sacrifice your own honour and interest, and to recollect the danger of the ill effects which must result to you, if the endeavours of these merchants be accomplished.—Gentlemen, the Buyers say "these are our terms, and on no other will we purchase your commodity; and surely we have a right to please ourselves."—I will, then, ask, if the poor journeymen shoe-makers, tailors, and weavers, have not the same right to say, "we cannot be compelled to work, except we like, and at such prices as we choose to demand." Yes, I consider, they have an equal right so to say, and to act; but the laws have, very wisely, declared, that they shall not so act, because, many will be injured by a few; and, amongst these poor people, this is called an illegal combination. Is not, then, the same conduct amongst the rich to be termed an illegal combination? Does not the proposed plan of the Buyers of corn tend to annihilate your market, by compelling you to withhold your corn? and does it not deprive the community of their regular and necessary supplies, and injure all of you more especially?—Does it not tell the public, that the Buyers know the Growers of corn must dispose of it, and, therefore, they, the Buyers, have all agreed to demand it on their own terms? Is this the language of the conduct to which Norfolk farmers will submit?—No: Gentlemen, I trust not. But, let me ask you, with whom is the power? I say it is with you. If you were to declare, that you would have no further dealings with such men, if they were entirely deprived of your support, could they continue their present mode of obtaining a livelihood? Whenever, and wherever you

choose to assemble, the Buyers, be they whom they may, must come to you. The sustenance of human life, the provender for cattle, &c. must be had; and from whom can it be obtained, but from the Grower? Besides, if a month's credit be given to the merchant, any man may become one; because no property will be required for him to begin his speculation; as he will trade with your property, with the possibility of great profit, and the certainty of no loss; while you, and you alone, venture the risk: and if, in reply, it be said, he must have property to pay his debts when requested, I contend, that your permitting the discount to be allowed will have a similar disadvantageous effect on you, and benefit him; and that discount will create not only a real property for him, but will also enable him to borrow money on his effects; and you thus put it in his power to make you present him with 5 per cent to pay your legal demands. Will the various losses to which you are subject, the uncertainty of the seasons, the increased price of labour, of implements, &c. and no reduction in your rent, be your crops ever so bad, justify you in thus sporting with your hard-earned property? Is it natural, is it consistent with the dictates of common sense, thus to act? Gentlemen, there is as yet no law passed to make you bend to this compulsory measure; but by your compliance to it, your precedent will not only be as binding as any law, by establishing a custom, but it will be the means of extending the same despotic authority over all other Farmers. It will give to the Buyers of corn, the power of creating the same rule in all other markets throughout Great Britain: their example most indisputably will be followed by their brother merchants, and their baneful system will be effected, except, by your exertions, this illegal combination be crushed on its first appearance.—There is now an opportunity of soliciting other merchants to trade with you on the old and long established customs; but if you once give way—if you once surrender your rights—vain will be the attempt to regain them; for no merchants then will be found to deal with, as they will all have joined the combination. So completely will you be in the power of the Buyers (especially all of you residing in the interior counties) that you must abide by whatever terms are dictated, and what security have you that two, three or even six months credit may not hereafter be insisted on? Will not the month's credit be very likely to deprive the merchants of smaller property, and also many Millers of

the power of as fairly exercising their trades, because the credit will be given to the men who are supposed to possess the most money? Will it not also enable a very few merchants with large capital to engross the trade and to monopolize the fruits of the earth? If they were selfish men, might they not add to the distresses of the poor already hard enough to be borne? The great prop which in your estimation supports the merchants by your submission will be entirely removed, and which, Gentlemen, is this.—A merchant cannot now come to market without property, for he must either have effects or stand in that credit with which his Banker is so satisfied as to honor his drafts, and as is sufficient to keep up his respectability. But when there is no property, or not an adequate share, both to answer his immediate demands on the market day and to have *as much security remains* will induce his Banker to continue his usual assistance, why, then, in such a case, (which is not either impossible or improbable to happen) I know of no better plan for him to adopt, than to persuade you to give him a month's credit, which will enable him to get his bills accepted by his London Factor, and, as I before said, he will then have no risk. If he be possessed of such large property as to render this unnecessary, either he does not want the credit and only gets your money to speculate with, or you are making him independent of his country banker, and thus placing yourselves at his mercy; your great and chief reliance is of no avail, and you subject yourselves to every possible loss, or to avoid that you are deprived of part of your property by paying an illegally demanded discount. When I declare to you, what I can prove from the statement of one amongst the merchants, that, according to the number of lasts of corn bought by him on a Saturday, (and I include all grain and take an *average price of the whole*) by paying the discount you would to only *ten individuals*, purchasing the same quantity, give from your labours more than *six thousand pounds per annum*—and as this buyer is *not the largest purchaser*, I trust you will perceive the impropriety of consenting to such a tame, unnecessary, and prejudicial compliance, to the daring attempt to annihilate a custom which for centuries has remained sacred and unmoled, and which is wanted to be set aside only to enrich those few persons. Gentlemen, if you consider as I do, that these evils which I have endeavoured to shew will be brought on the agricultural interest, I am convinced they will be sufficient reasons to deter you from deserving the reproach of

having been the means of depressing instead of supporting it. Say to the merchants, you will take only specie, or bank of England paper, and you will convince them of your power.—Say to those who form the combination, you never more will have the smallest transactions with them, and they will soon repent *their* conduct, and be assured no *others* will hereafter presume to make a similar attempt in any part of the kingdom. Gentlemen, there are other and still more important facts that must stimulate you to persevere in your judicious and manly resistance, and although perhaps those facts are but little known, yet as they ought to be developed, probably I may hereafter relate them, and in the meanwhile I thus publicly call on any one to refuse if he can what I have already told you.—With every mark of respect, I remain your well wisher.—THOMAS ROOPE.—*Lakenham Cottage, Norwich, Dec. 28, 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICA.—*Message of the President of the United States to the Senate and House of Representatives. November 8, 1808.*—(Continued from p. 988.)

By the aid of these, and of the armed vessels called into service in other quarters, the spirit of disobedience and abuse, which manifested itself early, and with sensible effect, while we were unprepared to meet it, has been considerably repressed.—Considering the extraordinary character of the times, in which we live, our attention should unremittingly be fixed on the safety of our country. For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed militia is their best security. It is therefore incumbent on us, at every meeting, to revise the condition of the militia, and to ask ourselves if it is prepared to repel a powerful enemy at every point of our territories exposed to invasion. Some of the states have paid a laudable attention to this object, but every degree of neglect is to be found among others. Congress alone having the power to produce an uniform state of preparation in this great organ of defence, the interests which they so deeply feel in their own and their country's security, will present this as among the most important objects of their deliberation.—Under the acts of March 11, and April 23, respecting arms, the difficulty of procuring them from abroad, during the present situation and dispositions of Europe, induced us to direct our whole efforts to the means of internal supply; the public factories have, therefore, been enlarged,

additional machineries erected, and in proportion as artificers can be found or formed, their effect, already more than doubled, may be increased so as to keep pace with the yearly increase of the militia. The annual sums appropriated by the latter act, have been directed to the encouragement of private factories of arms; and contracts have been entered into with individual undertakers, to nearly the amount of the first year's appropriation.—The suspension of our foreign commerce, produced by the injustice of the belligerent powers, and the consequent losses and sacrifices of our citizens, are subjects of just concern. The situation into which we have thus been forced, has impelled us to apply a portion of our industry and capital to internal manufactures and improvements. The extent of this conversion is daily increasing, and little doubt remains that the establishments formed and forming, will, under the auspices of cheaper materials and subsistence, the freedom of labour from taxation with us, and of protecting duties and prohibitions, become permanent. The commerce with the Indians too, within our own boundaries, is likely to receive abundant aliment from the same internal source, and will secure to them peace and the progress of civilization undisturbed by practices hostile to both. The accounts of the receipts and expenditures during the year ending on the 30th day of September last, being not yet made up, a correct statement will hereafter be transmitted from the treasury. In the meantime, it is ascertained, that the receipts have amounted to near eighteen millions of dollars, which, with the eight millions and a half in the treasury at the beginning of the year, have enabled us, after meeting the current demands and interest incurred, to pay two millions three hundred thousand dollars, of the principal of our funded debt, and left us in the treasury on that day, near fourteen millions of dollars; of these, five millions three hundred and fifty thousand dollars will be necessary to pay what will be due on the first day of January next, which will complete the reimbursement of the eight per cent. stock. These payments, with those made in the six years and a half preceding, will have extinguished thirty-three millions five hundred and eighty thousand dollars of the principal of the funded debt, being the whole which could be paid or purchased within the limits of the law and of our contracts; and the amount of principal thus discharged, will have liberated the revenue from about two millions of dollars of interest, and added that sum annually to the disposable surplus. The probable

accumulation of the surpluses of revenue, beyond what can be applied to the payment of the public debt, whenever the freedom and safety of our commerce shall be restored, merits the consideration of Congress. Shall it be unproductive in the public vaults? Shall the revenue be reduced? Or shall it not rather be appropriated to the improvement of roads, canals, rivers, education, and other great foundations of prosperity and union, under the powers, which Congress may already possess, or such amendment of the constitution as may be approved by the states: while uncertain of the course of things, the time may be advantageously employed in obtaining the powers necessary for a system of improvement, should that be thought best. Availing myself of this, the last occasion which will occur, of addressing the two houses of legislature at their meeting, I cannot omit the expression of my sincere gratitude, for the repeated proofs of confidence manifested to me by themselves and their predecessors, since my call to the administration, and the many indulgences experienced at their hands; the same grateful acknowledgments are due to my fellow-citizens generally, whose support has been my great encouragement under all embarrassments. In the transaction of their business, I cannot have escaped error—it is incident to our imperfect nature; but I may say, with truth, my errors have been of the understanding, not of intention; and that the advancement of their rights and interests has been the constant motive for every measure. On these considerations, I solicit their indulgence. Looking forward with anxiety to their future destinies, I trust, that in their steady character, unshaken by difficulties, in their love of liberty, obedience to law, and support of the public authorities, I see a sure guarantee of the permanence of our republic; and, retiring from the charge of their affairs, I carry with me the consolation of a firm persuasion, that heaven has in store for our beloved country, long ages to come of prosperity and happiness.—THOS. JEFFERSON.—Nov. 8, 1808.

AMERICAN EMBARGO.—Letter from Mr. Pinckney, to Mr. Secretary Canning. Dated Great Cumberland Place, Aug. 23, 1808.

SIR;—I have had the honour, in consequence of the orders of the president, to recall your attention, in the course of several recent interviews, to the British orders in council, of the 7th January and 14th of November, 1807, and to the various orders

founded upon, or in execution of them; and I now take the liberty to renew, in the mode which I have understood to be indispensable, my instances on that subject. I need scarcely remind you, Sir, that the government of the United States has never ceased to consider these orders as violating its rights, and affecting most destructively its interests, upon grounds wholly inadmissible, both in principle and fact. The letters of Mr. Madison to Mr. Erskine, of the 20th and 29th of March, 1807, produced by the official communication of that minister of the order of the 7th of January, and the answer of Mr. Madison of the 25th of March, 1808, to a like communication of the orders of the 11th of November, containing the most direct remonstrances against the system which these orders introduce and execute, and expressed the confident expectation of the president, that it would not be persisted in. That expectation has not yet been fulfilled, but it has, notwithstanding, not been relinquished. The president is still persuaded that its accomplishment will result from a careful review, by his majesty's government, made in the spirit of moderation and equity, of the facts and considerations which belong to the occasion. It is not my purpose to recapitulate, in this note, the sentiments and reasonings contained in the above-mentioned letters of Mr. Madison, in support of the claim of the government of the United States, that the British orders be revoked. I content myself with referring to those letters for proofs, which it is not necessary to repeat, and for arguments which I could not hope to improve. But there are explanations which those letters do not contain, and which it is proper for me now to make. Even these, however, may be very briefly given, since you have already been made acquainted in our late conversations, with all their bearings and details. These explanations go to shew, that, while every motive of justice conspires to produce a disposition to recall the orders, of which my government complains, it is become apparent, that even their professed object will be best attained by their revocation. I had the honour to state to you, Sir, that it was the intention of the president, in case Great Britain repealed her orders as regarded the United States, to exercise the power vested in him, by the act of the last session of Congress, entitled "an act to authorise the president of the United States, under certain conditions, to suspend the operation of the act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels

in the ports and harbours of the United States, and the several acts supplementary thereto," by suspending the embargo law, and its supplements, as regards Great Britain. I am authorized to give you this assurance in the most formal manner; and, I trust, that upon impartial inquiry, it will be found to leave no inducement to persevere in the British orders, while it dictates the most powerful inducements of equity and policy to abandon them. On the score of justice it does not seem possible to mistake the footing upon which this overture places the subject; and I venture to believe, that in any other view there is as little room for doubt. If, as I propose, your orders should be rescinded as to the United States, and our embargo rescinded as to Great Britain, the effect of these concurrent acts will be, that the commercial intercourse of the two countries will be immediately resumed; while, if France should adhere to maxims and conduct derogatory to the neutral rights of the United States, the embargo, continuing as to her, will take the place of your orders, and lead with an efficacy, not merely equal to theirs, but probably much greater, to all the consequences that ought to result from them. On the other hand, if France should concur in respecting those rights, and commerce should thus regain its fair immunities, and the law of nations its just dominions, all the alledged purposes of the British orders will have been at once fulfilled. If I forbear to pursue these ideas through all the illustrations of which they are susceptible, it is because the personal conferences to which I have before alluded, as well as the obvious nature of the ideas themselves, render it unnecessary. I cannot conclude this note without expressing my sincere wish, that what I have now suggested, in conformity with the liberal sentiments and enlightened views of the president, may contribute not only to remove the more immediate obstacles to the ordinary intercourse of trade between your country and mine, in a manner consistent with the honour of both, but to prepare the way for a satisfactory adjustment of every question important to their future friendship.—I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, (Signed) Wm. PINCKNEY.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Pinckney to the Secretary of State. Dated London, 24th Sept. 1803.

I am now able to transmit to you a Copy of Mr. Canning's Answer, received only

last night, to my note of the 23d of August.—I regret extremely, that the views which I have been instructed today before this government, have not been met by it, as I had at first been led to expect. The overture cannot fail, however, to place in a strong light the just and liberal sentiments by which our government is animated; and, in other respects, to be useful and honourable to our own country.

Mr. Secretary Canning's Letter to Mr. Pinckney. Dated Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1803.

The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, had the honour to receive the official letter addressed to Mr. Pinckney, minister plenipotentiary of the United States, respecting the orders in council issued by his majesty, on the 7th Jan. and 11th Nov. 1807.—He has laid that letter before the king, and he is commanded to assure Mr. Pinckney, that the answer to the proposal which Mr. Pinckney was instructed to bring forward, has been deferred only in the hope that the renewed application, which was understood to have been recently made by the government of the United States to that of France, might, in the new state of things which has arisen in Europe, have met with such a reception in France, as would have rendered the compliance of his majesty with that proposal, consistent as much with his majesty's own dignity, and with the interests of his people, as it would have been with his majesty's disposition towards the United States.—Unhappily there is now no longer any reason to believe that such a hope is likely to be realised; and the undersigned is therefore commanded to communicate to Mr. Pinckney the decision, which, under the circumstances as they stand, his majesty feels himself compelled, however unwillingly, to adopt.—The mitigated measure of retaliation, announced by his majesty in the orders in council of the 7th January, of the further extension of that measure (an extension in operation, but not in principle) by the orders in council of November, was founded (as has been already repeatedly avowed by his majesty) on the "unquestionable right of his majesty to resort upon the enemy the evils of his own injustice;" and upon the consideration, that, "if third parties incidentally suffered by those retaliatory measures, they were to seek their redress from the power by whose original aggression that retaliation was occasioned."—His majesty sees nothing in the embargo laid on by the president of the United States of America, which varies this original and simple

state of the question.—If considered as a measure of impartial hostility against both belligerents, the embargo appears to his majesty to have been manifestly unjust, as, according to every principle of justice, that redress ought to have been first sought from the party originating the wrong; and his majesty cannot consent to buy off that hostility, which America ought not to have extended to him, at the expence of a concession, made not to America, but to France.—If, as it has more generally been represented by the government of the United States, the embargo is only to be considered as an innocent municipal regulation, which affects none but the United States themselves, and with which no foreign state has any concern; viewed in this light, his majesty does not conceive that he has the right or the pretension to make any complaint of it, and he has made none. But in this light, there appears not only no reciprocity, but no assignable relation between the repeal by the United States of a measure of voluntary self-restriction, and the surrender by his majesty of his right of retaliation against his enemies.—The government of the United States is not now to be informed, that the Berlin decree of November 21, 1806, was the practical commencement of an attempt, not merely to check or impair the prosperity of Great Britain, but utterly to annihilate her political existence through the ruin of her commercial prosperity; that in this attempt almost all the powers of the European continent have been compelled, more or less, to co-operate, and that the American embargo, though most assuredly not intended to that end, (for America can have no real interest in the subversion of the British power; and her rulers are too enlightened to act from any impulse against the real interests of this country): but by some unfortunate concurrence of circumstances, without any hostile intention, the American embargo did come in aid of the blockade of the European continent, precisely at the very moment when, if that blockade could have succeeded at all, this interposition of the American government would most effectually have contributed to its success.—To this universal combination, his majesty has opposed a temperate, but a determined retaliation upon the enemy, trusting that a firm resistance would defeat this project, but knowing that the smallest concession would infallibly encourage a perseverance in it.—The struggle has been viewed by other powers, not without an apprehension that it might be fatal to this country. The British government has not disguised

from itself that the trial of such an experiment might be arduous and long, though it has never doubted of the final issue. But if that issue, such as the British government confidently anticipated, has providentially arrived much sooner than could have been hoped; if “the blockade of the continent,” as it has been triumphantly styled by the enemy, is raised even before it had been well established; and if that system, of which extent and continuity, were the vital principles, is broken up into fragments, utterly harmless and contemptible, it is nevertheless important, in the highest degree, to the reputation of this country (a reputation which constitutes great part of her power) that this disappointment of the hopes of her enemies should not have been purchased by any concession, nor that a doubt should remain to distant times of her determination, and of her ability, to have continued her resistance, and that no step, which could even mistakenly be construed into concession, should be taken on her part, while the smallest link of the confederacy remains undissolved, or while it can be a question, whether the plan devised for her destruction has or has not either completely failed, or been unequivocally abandoned.—These considerations compel his majesty to adhere to the principles on which the orders in council of the 7th January and the 11th November are founded, so long as France adheres to that system by which his majesty’s retaliatory measures were occasioned and justified.—It is not improbable, indeed, that some alterations may be made in the orders in council, as they are at present framed; alterations calculated, not to abate their spirit, or impair their principle, but to adapt them more exactly to the different state of things which has fortunately grown up in Europe, and to combine all practicable relief to neutrals, with a more severe pressure on the enemy.—But of alterations to be made with this view only, it would be uncandid to take any advantage in the present discussion; however, it might be hoped, that, in their practical effect, they might prove beneficial to America, provided the operation of the embargo were not to prevent her from reaping that benefit.—It remains for the undersigned to take notice of the last paragraph of Mr. Pinckney’s letter.—There cannot exist, on the part of Mr. Pinckney, a stronger wish than there does on that of the undersigned and of the British government, for the adjustment of all the differences subsisting between the two countries. His majesty has no other disposition than to cultivate the most friendly inter-

course with the United States.—The undersigned is persuaded that Mr. Pinckney would be one of the last to imagine, what is often idly asserted, that the depression of any other country is necessary or serviceable to the prosperity of this. The prosperity of America is essentially the prosperity of Great Britain, and the strength and power of Great Britain are not for herself only, but for the world.—When those adjustments shall take place, to which, though unfortunately not practicable at this moment, nor under the conditions prescribed by Mr. Pinckney, the undersigned, nevertheless, confidently looks forward, it will perhaps be no insecure pledge for the continuance of the good understanding between the two countries, that they will have learnt duly to appreciate each other's friendship, and that it will not hereafter be imputed to Great Britain, either, on the one hand, that she envies American industry, as prejudicial to British commerce, or, on the other hand, that she is compelled to court an intercourse with America, as absolutely necessary to her own existence.—His majesty would not hesitate to contribute, in any manner in his power, to restore to the commerce of the United States its wonted activity, and if it were possible to make any sacrifice for the repeal of the embargo, without appearing to depreciate it as a measure of hostility, he would gladly have facilitated its removal, as a measure of inconvenient restriction upon the American people.—The undersigned is commanded, in conclusion, to observe, that nothing is said in Mr. Pinckney's letter of any intention to repeal the proclamation by which the ships of war of Great Britain are interdicted from all those rights of hospitality in the ports of the United States, which are freely allowed to the ships of his majesty's enemies.—The continuance of an interdiction, which, under such circumstances, amounts so nearly to direct hostility, after the willingness professed, and the attempt made by his majesty to remove the cause on which that measure had been originally founded, would afford but an inauspicious omen for the commencement of a system of mutual conciliation: and the omission of any notice of that measure in the proposal which Mr. Pinckney has been instructed to bring forward, would have been of itself a material defect in the overtures of the president.—But the undersigned is commanded no further to dwell upon this subject, than for the purpose of assuring Mr. Pinckney, that on this, and every other point in discussion between the two governments, his majesty earnestly desires the

restoration of a perfect good understanding, and that his majesty would decline no measure for the attainment of that object, which should be compatible with his own honour and just rights, and with the interests of his people.—The undersigned requests, &c.—(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation by the Intendant-General of Police of the Court of Justice District at Oporto.*

Portuguese!—Where does your fury transport you? Do you suppose that the English are become French? No, my dear countrymen, the English are not come here in the character of conquerors as the Frenchmen did; they come to free us from the slavery that oppressed us. If we deny this truth, we must be reproached as an ungrateful people. The English did not enter Portugal from any motives of ambition; the motives are more generous, wise, and politic; they know very well, that views of aggrandisement always tend to destroy the equilibrium that forms the fundamental law of nations. What Great Britain aims at, is only the restitution of all countries to their lawful sovereigns. Ah, incomparable George! How great will be thy glory in future time! Where is the sovereign in Europe that does not, at present, owe his crown to thee? Thy name shall for ever shine in the Portuguese annals. Excuse, then, O mighty king! the indiscreet zeal of a people who love their sovereign, and whose feelings are partly analogous to thy views. Remain quiet, then, O ye inhabitants of the most faithful and loyal city in Portugal! It is to you, ye inhabitants of Porto, that I speak, for those honourable epithets are indisputably your right. Consider that the glorious cause which you have undertaken, can only be obstructed and retarded by vain and tumultuous mobs. This is what the common enemy wishes for; and a civil war would only retard their total destruction. Let us then unite ourselves to our faithful allies, the English and the Spaniards, in order to overthrow that belated monster. The union of these three nations will scorn all Frenchmen's threats, their intrigues and perfidy. We shall then have the glory of being instrumental in the speedy overthrow of the tyrant, in bringing about a general peace, and in restoring our august prince to his lawful throne. This is the just cause that calls aloud for your vengeance, and in which you ought to display all your courage, your love, and your fidelity. Long live Portugal! Long live Great Britain! Long live Spain!—J.F.R.G.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Fourteenth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Madrid, Dec. 5.*

The 2d at noon his majesty arrived in person on the heights which impend over Madrid, on which were already placed the divisions of dragoons of generals Latour Maubourg, and Lahoussaye, and the imperial horse-guards. The anniversary of the coronation, that epoch which has signalized so many days for ever fortunate for France, awakened in all hearts the most agreeable recollections, and inspired all the troops with an enthusiasm which manifested itself in a thousand exclamations. The weather was beautiful, and like that enjoyed in France in the finest days of May. The marshal duke of Istria sent to summon the town, where a military junta was formed, under the presidency of the marquis of Castelar, who had under his orders general Morla, captain general of Andalusia, and inspector-general of artillery. The town contained a number of armed peasants, assembled from all quarters, 6000 troops of the line, and 100 pieces of cannon. Sixty thousand men were in arms. Their cries were heard on every side; the bells of two hundred churches rung altogether; and every thing presented the appearance of disorder and madness. The general of the troops of the line appeared at the advanced post to answer the summons of the duke of Istria. He was accompanied by 30 men of the people, whose dress, looks, and ferocious language, recalled the recollection of the assassins of September. When the Spanish general was asked whether he meant to expose women, children, and old men to the horrors of an assault, he manifested secretly the grief with which he was penetrated; he made known by signs, that he, as well as all the honest men of Madrid, groaned under oppression; and when he raised his voice, his words were dictated by the wretches who watched over him. No doubt could be entertained of the excess to which the tyranny of the multitude was carried when they saw him minute down all his words, and caused the record to be verified by the assassins who surrounded him. The aid-de-camp of the duke of Istria, who had been sent into the town, was seized by men of the lowest class of people, and was about to be massacred, when the troops of the line, indignant at the outrage, took him under their protection, and caused him to be restored to his general. A little time after, some deserters from the Walloon guards came to the camp. Their depositions convinced us that the people of property, and honest men, were without

influence; and it was to be concluded that conciliation was altogether impossible.—The marquis of Perales, a reputable man, who had hitherto appeared to enjoy the confidence of the people, had been, on the day before this, accused of putting sand in the cartridges. He was immediately strangled. It was determined that all the cartridges should be re-made; 3 or 4000 monks were employed upon this work at the Retiro. All the palaces and houses were ordered to be open to furnish provisions at discretion. The French infantry was still three leagues from Madrid. The emperor employed the evening in reconnoitring the town, and deciding a plan of attack, consistent with the consideration due to the great number of honest people always to be found in a great capital. At seven o'clock the division Laplace of the corps of the duke of Belluno arrived. The moon shone with a brightness that seemed to prolong the day. The emperor ordered the general of brigade, Maison, to take possession of the suburbs, and charged the general of brigade Lauriston to support him in the enterprize, with four pieces of artillery belonging to the guards.—The sharp-shooters of the 16th regiment took possession of some buildings, and, in particular, of the grand cemetery. At the first fire, the enemy shewed as much cowardice as he did of arrogance all the day. The duke of Belluno employed all the night in placing his artillery, in the posts marked out for the attack. At midnight, the prince of Neufchatel sent to Madrid a Spanish lieutenant-colonel of artillery, who had been taken at Somosierra, and who saw with affright the obstinacy of his fellow-citizens. He took charge of the annexed letter, No. 1. On the 3d, at nine in the morning, the same flag of truce returned to the headquarters with the letter, No. 2. But the general of brigade Senarmont, an officer of great merit, had already placed 30 pieces of artillery, and had commenced a very smart fire, which made a breach in the walls of the Retiro. The sharp-shooters of the division of Villatte having passed the breach, their battalion followed them, and in less than a quarter of an hour 1000 men, who defended the Retiro, were knocked on the head (*culbuté*).—The palace of the Retiro, the important posts of the Observatory, of the porcelain manufactory, of the grand barrack, the hotel of Medina Celi, and all the outlets which had been fortified, were taken by our troops.—On another side, twenty pieces of cannon of the guards, accompanied by light troops, threw shells, and attracted the attention of the enemy by a false attack.

After a description of the disorder that reigned in Madrid, the bulletin proceeds: "The enemy had more than 100 pieces of cannon mounted; a more considerable number had been dug up, taken out of cellars, and fixed upon carts, a grotesque train, and in itself sufficient to prove the madness of a people abandoned to itself. But all means of defence were become useless. The possessors of Retiro are always masters of Madrid. The emperor took all possible care to prevent the troops from going from house to house. The city was ruined if many troops had been employed. Only some companies of sharp-shooters advanced, and the emperor constantly refused to send any to sustain them. At eleven o'clock the Prince of Neufchatel wrote the annexed letter, No. 3.—His majesty at the same time ordered the fire to cease on all points.—At five o'clock on the 4th, Gen. Morla, one of the members of the military junta, and Don Bernardo Yriarte, sent from the town, repaired to the tent of the major-general. They informed him that the most intelligent persons were of opinion that the town was destitute of resources, and that the continuation of the defence would be the height of madness, but that the lower orders of the inhabitants, and the foreigners at Madrid, were determined to persevere in the defence. Convinced that they could not do it with effect, they requested a pause of a few hours to inform the people of the real state of affairs. The major-general presented the deputies to the emperor and king, who addressed them thus:—"You make use of the name of the people to no purpose; if you cannot restore tranquillity and appease their minds, it is because you have excited them to revolt; you have seduced them by propagating falsehoods. Assemble the clergy, the heads of the convents, the alcades, the men of property and influence, and let the town capitulate by six o'clock in the morning, or it shall be destroyed. I will not, nor ought I, to withdraw my troops. You have massacred the unfortunate French prisoners who had fallen into your hands; only a few days ago, you suffered two persons in the suit of the Russian ambassador to be dragged along and murdered in the public streets, because they were Frenchmen born. The incapacity and cowardice of a general, had put into your power troops who surrendered on the field of battle, and the capitulation has been violated. You, Mr. Morla, what sort of an epistle did you write to that general?—It well became you, Sir, to talk of pillage, you who, on entering Roussillon, carried

off all the women, and distributed them as booty among your soldiers!—Besides, what right had you to hold such language?—The capitulation ought to have induced you to pursue a different line of conduct. See what has been the conduct of the English, who are far from piquing themselves on being rigid observers of the law of nations. They have complained of the Convention of Portugal, but they have carried it into effect. To violate military treaties, is to renounce all civilization: it is placing generals on a footing with the *Bedouins* of the desert. How dare you, then, presume to solicit a capitulation, you who violated that of Baylen? See how injustice and bad faith always recoil upon the guilty, and operate to their prejudice. I had a fleet at Cadiz; it was under the protection of Spain, yet you directed against it the mortars of the town where you commanded.—I had a Spanish army in my ranks; I would rather have viewed it embark on board the English ships, or be obliged to precipitate it from the rocks of Epinosa, than to disarm it; I would rather have 7000 more enemies to fight, than be deficient in honour and good faith. Return to Madrid.—I give you till six o'clock tomorrow morning—return at that hour—you have only to inform me of the submission of the people.—If not, you and your troops shall all be put to the sword."—This speech of the emperor, repeated in the midst of the respectable people, the certainty that he commanded in person, the losses sustained during the foregoing day, had carried terror and repentance into all minds. During the night the most mutinous withdrew themselves from the danger by flight, and a part of the troops was disbanded. At ten o'clock Gen. Belliard took the command of Madrid, all the posts were put into the hands of the French, and a general pardon was proclaimed." [The Bulletin closes with a panegyric on the order observed by the French, in taking possession of the town, the security enjoyed by the inhabitants, and with a tirade against the English, said to have been pronounced by an aged Spaniard. The principal reproach is, that an army of 40,000 British troops had not appeared on the scene of the war at a proper period of the contest].

No. 1.—*To the Commandant of the Town of Madrid.*

Before Madrid, Dec. 3, 1808.—The circumstances of the war having conducted the French army to the gates of Madrid, and all the dispositions being made to take possession of the town by storm, I hold it

right, and conformable to the usage of all nations, to summon you, Monsieur General, not to expose a town so important to all the horrors of an assault, not to render so many peaceful inhabitants victims of the evils of war. Wishing to omit nothing to inform you of your real situation, I send you the present summons by one of your officers who has been made prisoner, and who has had an opportunity of seeing all the means that the army has to reduce the town. Receive, Monsieur general, the assurances of my high consideration.—The Major-General ALEXANDER (Berthier).

No. 2.—(In Spanish).—To his Most Serene Highness the Prince of Neufchatel. Madrid, 3d Dec. 1808.

It is indispensably incumbent upon me, most serene signior, to consult, previous to my giving a categorical answer to your highness, the constituted authority of this court (*esta corte*), and, moreover, to ascertain the dispositions of the people as impressed by the circumstances of the day. For these purposes, I intreat your highness to grant, for this day, a suspension of arms, in order that I may comply with those duties, assuring you, that early in the morning, or this night, I will send a general officer with my answer to your highness; assuring you, that I profess to you all the consideration due to your high rank and merit.—MARQUIS CASTELAR.

No. 3.—To the Gen. Commanding in Madrid. Imperial Camp, before Madrid, Dec. 4, Eleven A. M.

Monsieur General Castelar.—To defend Madrid is contrary to the principles of war, and inhuman towards the inhabitants. His majesty authorises me to send you a second summons.—Immense batteries are mounted; miners are prepared to blow up your principal buildings; columns of troops are at the entrances of the town, of which some companies of sharp-shooters have made themselves masters; but the emperor, always generous in the course of his victories, suspends the attack till two o'clock. The town of Madrid ought to look for protection and security for its peaceable inhabitants; for its ministers; in fine, the oblivion of the past. Hoist a white flag before two o'clock, and send commissioners to treat for the surrender of the town.—Accept, Mons. Gen. &c.—The Major-Gen. ALEXANDER.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—Decree for the Formation of a Militia of Honour, Dated Royal Palace of Aranjuez, Nov. 23, 1808.

It would be useless to proclaim to the Spanish people the great obligation they are under, to deliver themselves from the slavery which threatens them, and which is already suffered by their most amiable monarch, and the whole royal family, from the most powerful, cunning, and perfidious of tyrants. Although the continental powers of Europe, all subdued and held in great subjection, more by the subtle, sordid, and immoral policy of the tyrant, than by the force of his arms, cannot aid us directly by rebelling, or declaring war against the common oppressor, yet they assist us indirectly and passively, by engaging a great part of his armies in the keeping in obedience some of them, and watching the others. All of them, even France herself, have their attention fixed upon Spain, hoping from its intrepid inhabitants, liberty and independence. As soon as the Spaniards shall have shaken the superiority of their opposers, not one of them will fail to take up arms for his annihilation; because not one of them will fail to behold his black intrigues laid bare and frustrated, or to convince himself that the terrifying opinion hitherto entertained of his power, has been more the effect of the artifices, of which he has been able to seduce them, than by the number, skill, and valour of his troops. But upon us is imposed the duty, and to us is reserved the glory of striking the first blow. To us, Spaniards, Providence has left the alternative of being the first people of Europe, and the deliverers of all of them, or of being the most wretched of slaves. The general will of all has been long pronounced, in the most solemn and expressive manner. Almost altogether disarmed, our best resources dispersed and disorganized; our marine destroyed; our enemies masters of the capital, and of the most important fortresses; the nation impoverished; social virtue despised, our manners corrupted, and vice enthroned, we have in an instant recovered our ancient dignity and character, vanquished obstacles which could yield only to patriotic heroism. While we believed that our public disorders might be ephemeral, being accidental, and produced by the blind confidence of our sovereign, in a perverse favourite, our innate loyalty obliged us to endure them with resignation and constancy; but no sooner did we clearly perceive, that the tyrant of France sought to avail himself of those disorders, in order to enslave us, as he had enslaved our sovereign—in order to entangle us in the same toils in which he had already caught Italy, Holland, Switzerland, and

the greater part of Germany, and in order to convert our ignominy and honourable arms into the instruments of his ambition and impetuosity—then it was that all our provinces, cities, towns, and villages, as if on a sudden they had awakened from a profound lethargy, recollected their imprescriptible rights, and recovered all the energy necessary to defend and preserve them. In the short space of eight days, every Spaniard, animated by an enthusiasm as ardent as patriotic, resolved to perish or take vengeance on the tyrant; and Providence instantly favoured their just and valorous determination. The satellites of oppression, who had till then arrogated to themselves the epithet of invincible, were finally conquered, for the first time pursued, hunted like wild beasts, and obliged to take refuge either in the recesses of the Pyrenees, or in the strong places which had been surprized by the arts of fraud, perfidy, and treason. But, Spaniards, it is still to be seen whether these first and brave efforts of your valour are to resemble the sudden flashes of an expiring torch, or the first flame of a pile, whose fire, growing every instant more luminous and active, does not cease till it has no substance to devour. The first would take place were you to prefer your apparent and individual interests to the public welfare, which is truly substantial—if you suffer yourselves to be misled by selfishness, or distracted by private passions—if you divide yourselves into factions or parties—and, in a word, if you are not convinced, that it is above all things, indispensably necessary that you should make great sacrifices, in order to complete your great enterprise, and one day enjoy the glory you are to reap with it. In this enterprise your devices should be, to ~~the~~ or conquer. But you will overcome all obstacles, if you assert and boldly maintain this your irrevocable resolution; for neither does fortune generally forsake those who meet danger with unshaken firmness, nor can God deny his aid to those who purpose to defend his cause with sound and deliberate resolution. Spaniards, do not doubt it. War ought to be henceforth your chief ele-

ment. Your enterprises should be directed to the maintaining of it with perpetual constancy; and whatever is capable of hindering those efforts, you should consider as a detriment in the shape of your future misery, and as impediments to the delivery of your adored Ferdinand. —In his name, and after the maturest examination, the supreme junta have resolved, that besides the increased numbers of troops already constituted, and even organized, and which are now marching towards the Pyrenees, to make attack, and drive away the foe, 250,000 warriors shall be enlisted, organized, and instructed in arms, agreeably to the rules prescribed in the regulations and provisions, which are to be published for that purpose. —But at the same time that his majesty flatters himself that those forces, added to those which will be furnished by the English and Portuguese, allies, will be able to destroy his mortal enemy, he foresees at the same time, the great convenience, and even necessity there will be that in the metropolis, and in all the provinces which remain without garrison or armed force, there should be raised loyal bodies, interested in preventing disorders, and capable of arresting banditti, deserters, and evil-disposed persons, who may purpose to effiate their ambition or rapacity by disturbing the public tranquillity. Honour, union, fraternity, forgetfulness of injury, a disregard of what is or what we may fancy due to us, internal and mutual peace and concord among the citizens, and, in a word, all the virtues which constitute true patriotism, these are the planks which alone can save us from the threatening shipwreck. The suggestions and discourses which might stifle and make cool these virtues, would be so many hemlock cups fraught with death, so many hidden snares placed by malice or imprudence in our path, on the brink of the precipice. —To preserve then those virtues, and maintain tranquillity in all the towns, and especially in the larger; to impose laws upon robbers, and apprehend deserters, and to prevent, by prompt and inevitable punishment, the multiplication of crimes, his

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DIRECTIONS TO THE BOOK-BINDER.

It is to be observed, that this sheet, which is the last of Volume XIV, should not be cut off by the Reader, but should be left to the Book-binder, who will perceive that the first quarter, viz. 1023 to 1032, of which this page makes a part, comes at the end and may the rest of the sheet, containing the Title Page and Table of Contents, is to be bound, and placed at the beginning of the Volume.

majesty has resolved, that in all the towns of the kingdom which are out of the theatre of war, there shall be raised bodies of militia of honour (*milicias honradas*), according to the rules and regulations contained in the following article:—(Here follow 28 articles, most of them matters of detail and formal provisions susceptible of abridgement).

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from p. 992.)—*Letter from the Conde de Florida Blanca, President of the Central Junta, to General Xavier Castanos: date, Aranjuez, Oct. 1, 1808.*

Most honoured Sir,—In the supreme government of the kingdom, a memorial has been received from your excellency, pointing out the difficulties which oppose, in your opinion, the establishment of military council, the necessity of which, in the judgment of your excellency, there is, that the inspectors should have a seat in it; and lastly, that your feelings and honour do not permit you to remain any longer at Madrid; in consequence, the Junta has resolved, that your excellency should be informed, that it has already signified its orders to the members absent, and it doubts not that they will expedite their journey, which is destined to a service so important, that the inspectors shall be called to the council when they shall think proper; in which case, they shall have a vote in it; and finally, that the Junta cannot but recognize in your excellency's exposition, relative to your march to the army, all the delicacy of which the most delicate soldier can be susceptible.—The stay of your excellency in Madrid was useful and essential, since from it have resulted the formation of plans and measures most proper for carrying on the war against our enemies; intelligence of their situation, that of the forces your excellency commanded, and their superior discipline, are in a great measure due to the penetration and military talents of your excellency, and ultimately the union of operations of all the armies, which happily has been arranged during the continuance of your excellency in Madrid, and at the side of the Supreme Junta. Envy and detraction cannot asperse motives so pure, nor shade the merit which in the present state of affairs, your excellency has recently gained in the service of the country, and the Supreme Junta, which knows it to be so, will give to your excellency proofs of it on every occasion that offers, and on those which it shortly expects, in consequence of the determination of your excellency to place yourself at the head of your army, which it highly ap-

proves; since in that, and in the acknowledged military talents and patriotism of your excellency, the Junta has founded the hope of the quick expulsion of the enemy from our country, the nation waits for it with unspeakable anxiety, and has placed its eyes on your excellency, already accustomed to similar undertakings.—May God preserve your excellency many years.—THE CONDE DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

By order of the supreme council, we insert the following document, which, on the 27th of last September, was addressed by the most illustrious senior deacon Don J. R. J. Nacarro, auditor of the council of Navarre.

Most illustrious Senior,—In folio 33d of the proceedings of the council, it is said, that as the auditor of the council of Navarre, presented himself disguised, who had gained admittance into the residence of Senor Don Fernando the VIIth, and brought verbal instructions from his majesty, limited to strict injunctions and wishes that it should follow a system of friendship and harmony with the French. The obligations I owe to that supreme tribunal, for having suppressed my name and the most important part of my commission, solely with a view to the safety of my person, subject, at the time of its publication, to French controul, demanded my gratitude and acknowledgment, and therefore I intreat your highness to signify the same; but now, although at the expense of difficulties and uncertainties, I find myself in this town, free from all fear. I think it necessary that the public should know my mission in its fullest extent.—I was at Bayonne with other ministers of the tribunals of Navarre, when the king arrived in that city. The emperor of the French did not defer many hours in throwing aside the veil which hid his mischievous conduct. He signified openly to his majesty the scandalous and unexpected project of tearing forcibly from his temples the crown of Spain, and doubtless persuaded that in order to its ready accomplishment, it was necessary to straiten the king by every means; one of the first that he put in execution was the interruption of the couriers. Daily were they dispatched, but the right of nations, was not a guarantee sufficiently sacred to insure them against the insults of a government accustomed not to hesitate in the choice of means for the accomplishment of its depraved ends.—Thus circumstanced, his majesty thought himself obliged to adopt new secret channels of communication with the supreme junta, presided by the infant Don Antonio;

and honoured me with the trust, that it should be me, who passing to this capital, should inform it verbally of the events which occurred on those first three miserable days. I accordingly left Bayonne, about six in the evening of the twenty-third, and arrived in this city, by circuitous roads and partly not without serious dangers and difficulties, at night-fall of the 29th April. I immediately proceeded to the junta, and acquainting it with the royal order, I said that the emperor of the French wished to exact imperiously from the king our Lord Don Ferdinand VII. that he should for himself, and in the name of all the family of the Bourbons, renounce the throne of Spain, and all his dominions, in favour of the said emperor and his dynasty, promising him in recompence the kingdom of Etruria, and that the suite which accompanied his majesty, should make a similar renunciation in a representation of the Spanish people; that his imperial and royal majesty, feigning not to perceive the evidence manifested, that neither the king could, or ought, in justice, to accede to such a renunciation, and disregarding the bitter complaints which he made to him, for having conducted his majesty to Bayonne by a deceit and perfidy unexampled, inasmuch the more unaccountable as they were disguised under the most sacred title of friendship and reciprocal benefit, pledge words the most decisive, he persisted in it without any further reason than two pretexts, unworthy of being pronounced by a sovereign who had not lost all respect for the morality of cabinets, and that good faith which constitutes the bond of nations: the first, that his policy did not allow of any thing else since his person was not safe while any of the Bourbon enemies of his house should reign over a powerful nation; and the second, that he was not so stupid as to neglect an opportunity so favourable as that which presented itself, and having a formidable army in the heart of Spain, its fortresses and principal parts occupied, nothing to fear from the north, and the persons of the king and infant Don Carlos in his power, advantages too great to expect they should offer themselves at a future time.—That with a view of gaining delays, and drawing from them the greatest possible advantage, a note has been sent, requesting that some person might be authorised to explain his pretensions in writing, but that if the emperor should persist in not receding, his majesty was resolved to lose his life rather than yield to so iniquitous a renunciation. Thus, with this security and

positive information, the Junta should continue its proceedings, and I concluded, adding, that being voluntarily asked by Don Pedro Cevallos, when I took leave of his excellency, if I should communicate any thing to the Junta on the conduct which it was to observe towards the French, he answered that although the commission did not include this point, I might say, that it was agreed on in a general manner, that at that time no alteration should take place; because that it was to be feared, from the contrary, serious consequences would result towards the infant, and as many Spaniards as accompanied his majesty; and the kingdom would be endangered, by manifesting hostile dispositions before it was ready to throw off the yoke of oppression. Your excellency knowing that, with those expressions, I expiated not only the whole night of the 29th of April, but also the morning of the 30th, in which his highness the Infant, Don Antonio, desired that I should assist in the sitting held on it, consisting of most of the members of the Supreme Junta, of all the Presidents of the Tribunals, and of two ministers from each, with informing all of my commission, and me of the news of the day and other business that might be discussed, in order that I might inform his majesty of the whole at Bayonne.—When I returned on the evening of the 6th of May, after continued dangers and apprehension, which augmented my speed, and since it is very proper, in my opinion, that the heroic trait in the firm character of my sovereign should not be concealed, and, the more so, it is confirmed in a manner, the most authentic, by the exact fulfilment of the discharge of my mission in all its parts, I entreat your excellency, and the council, if not improper, to order this paper to be inscribed in the Gazette and diary of this city. May God preserve your excellency many years.—L. M. I. NAVARRO.—*Madrid, Sept. 27, 1808.—To his Excellency Senor Don Ancies M. y Alvarde.*

BARCELONA.—The General of Division, Lechi, superior Commander, decrees as follows: dated Barcelona, Oct. 15, 1808.

Art. 1. No person, of whatever rank, shall keep in his house, or any other place, a greater quantity of rice and oil than shall be sufficient for the consumption of his family alone, for two months, without giving information of it, within three days, to the commissary-general of the police.—2. Such quantities of rice and oil as may be found, not having been notified to the commissary-general of the police, within the said time,

shall be seized, and taken from the concealers.—3. Whoever shall discover, and give information to the commissary-general of the police, after the said term, of any quantities of rice and oil, shall receive one-fifth of the quantities so discovered, as a reward, and his name shall not be made known.—4. The commissary-general of police shall fix the price at which the said commodities shall be sold during the said two months.—5. Every person who shall be discovered to have sold rice and oil at a higher price than that at which they shall be fixed, during the said two months, shall suffer a fine of 25,000 svedors. (Signed) LECHE.—Approved by the General Commander-in-Chief, DUKESMA.

Another, dated Nov. 9, 1808. cc.

His excellency the general of division Lechi, military commandant of this city, commands that all the inhabitants keep the doors of their houses shut; that those persons who are obliged to go out, go alone; and it is announced that whenever three persons are seen together, they will be fired upon by the troops.—The general of division, &c. commands that whenever an alarm shall be given by any movement of the enemy, three cannon shall be fired in the arsenal, and that all persons who shall not instantly shut themselves up in their houses on this firing shall be arrested by the troops, excepting those who are in office, and who have to go out upon public affairs.—The general of division, &c. commands that all the trees which are at the distance of 300 toises from the covered way of this place, and its fortresses, shall be cut down. The fruit-trees alone shall be allowed to stand, lopping the tops and branches. If the proprietors of these trees neglect to comply with these orders, the soldiers will be commanded, and the poor of the city permitted to do it, keeping the wood for themselves.—(Signed) LECHE.

ORDER IN COUNCIL.—From the London Gazette, Dec. 24, 1808.

At the court at the queen's palace, the 21st of Dec. 1808, present, the king's most excellent majesty in council; his majesty, in virtue of the powers reserved to him by two certain acts, passed in the forty-eighth year of his majesty's reign, the one intituled "an Act for granting to his majesty, until the end of the next session of parliament, duties of customs on the goods, wares, and merchandises therein enumerated; in furtherance of the provisions of certain orders in council;" the other intituled "an Act for granting to his majesty, until the end of the next session of parliament, certain duties on the exportation from Ireland of goods, wares, and merchandises therein enumerated;" is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that, until further order shall be made herein, the operation of the aforesaid acts be suspended, as to any duties on exportation granted by the said acts, so far as relates, to articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of any country or the time being in amity with his majesty, and from the ports of which the British flag is not excluded, which articles have been, or shall be, imported direct from such country into any port or place of the United Kingdom, either in British ships, or in ships of the country of which such articles are the growth, produce, or manufacture. And his majesty is further pleased, with the advice aforesaid, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that the operation of the aforesaid acts be in like manner suspended, as to any duties on the exportations of goods, wares, or merchandises, which have been or may be condemned as prize.—And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his majesty's treasury, are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.—W. FARQUHARSON.

END OF VOL. XIV.

